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SHOULD CANADA PARTICIPATE IN THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM?

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ABSTRACT

This paper is based upon the assumption that the United States intends to develop and deploy a National Missile Defence (NMD) system and that Canada may be asked to participate. Within this context, this paper analyses whether or not Canada should participate in NMD by assessing the degree to which participation might enhance Canada's physical security, effect Canada's relations with the U.S. and the rest of the world and influence Canadian participation in NORAD. The evidence presented in this paper indicates that Canadian participation in NMD cannot be founded solely on any realistic near-term ICBM threat. Further, that Canadian participation may cause Canada to lose some credibility internationally concerning its position on weapons proliferation. However, the evidence also shows that, when taken as a whole, these potential penalties may be outweighed by the potential benefits that Canada might gain through her participation in terms of future security, trade and stability with it's closest ally. On balance then, from the evidence offered, this paper concludes that Canada should participate in NMD.

"Today, I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30-year-old treaty."[1] With this statement on 13 December 2001, concerning his decision to withdraw from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, President Bush put to rest the months, if not years, of speculation concerning the U.S. intention to deploy a National Missile Defence (NMD) system. This decision to deploy a NMD system should not come as a surprise to anyone who witnessed the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York. The American fear of a second Pearl Harbor style attack upon the U.S. had been realized and the nation was bound to respond in a fashion that would put into place defence systems to deter any future would-be attackers from prosecuting a third attack, regardless of the type of weapons one might use. Clearly, with this statement, the Bush administration sees a future threat from terrorist organizations and rogue states that could develop missile systems capable of striking the U.S. from locations around the world.

To counter this anticipated threat, the United States is developing and planning to deploy a national missile defence system designed to intercept and destroy a small number of long-range ballistic missiles launched at the United States or key US allies. Although the final system architecture has not yet been finalized and testing of the intercept vehicle continues, the primary mission of the proposed missile defence system would be to defend the territory of the United States against a limited number of long-range ballistic missiles that might be launched by terrorists or a "rogue" state. The system is also intended to provide some capability against a small accidental or unauthorized launch of ballistic missiles by other states with nuclear arsenals.

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[1] George W. Bush. President George W. Bush delivers remarks on National Missile defense and the ABM Treaty. FDCH Political Transcripts 12/13/2001. On-line, internet, 12 January 2002, available from wysiwyg://bodyframe.13/http://ehos…%20missile%20defense%22&fuzzyTerm=.

Although originally limited to the protection of US territory, the missile defence system now envisaged by the Bush administration would extend coverage to some or all US allies and US forces deployed overseas. By bringing allies under the missile shield, the U.S. would be able to keep potential enemies from denying them coalition partners through threatened use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[2]

Although the U.S. has acted unilaterally in this decision, the Bush administration has attempted, prior to 13 December 2001, to attain acceptance from Russia, many of the European, NATO and Asian allies and of course Canada, concerning their intention to deploy an NMD system. In Canada's case, although no formal request has been made, officials in Washington have made many statements concerning their desire to have Canada participate in NMD. Canada's reaction to these entreaties has been reserved and the government has neither officially endorsed nor opposed NMD. The reason for this official coyness is that the U.S. missile defence proposal raises special implications for Canada in regard to its foreign and defence policies. In particular, Canada must come to grips with the following concerns:

1. The requirement for Canada to defend itself against a limited ballistic missile attack;
2. The effects a Canadian decision might have on CAN-U.S. relations; and,
3. The impact any Canadian decision, pro or con, might have on Canada's position and influence on the international stage.

[2] Bowen, Wyn Q. "Missile Defence and the Transatlantic Security relationship." International Affairs Volume 77 Number 3 July 2001: 485-507

Although Canada has yet to be officially invited to participate, "some U.S. officials believe that Canada will be asked to participate in NMD approximately 12 months following any U.S. decision to implement the program."[3] Now that the U.S. has withdrawn from the ABM treaty and their decision to deploy a NMD system is in the offing, Canada should be preparing its position on how to respond to any U.S. request to participate. As the decision to participate, or not, may have economic, political and military ramifications for Canada, the purpose of this paper will be to determine if Canada should participate in the U.S. National Missile Defense system.

Within the context of this paper, the final decision as to whether or not Canada should participate shall be decided using the following criteria:

1. The degree to which participation might enhance Canada's physical security;
2. The effect on Canada's relations with the U.S.;
3. The effect on Canada's relations with the rest of the world; and,
4. The effect on NORAD.

In the first section of the paper I will briefly review the missile ine the /AMCID 2 /BDC BT/T10164a003lie8e7i th

international community's fear that the U.S. may be moving to a unilateralist approach to international affairs. I will then discuss, in section four, NORAD within the CAN-U.S. relationship. In the final section, I sum up my findings and make a recommendation.

Threat to U.S.

The probability of a missile attack against the U.S. is clearly a debatable subject, but for as long as the various missile threats to the U.S. have existed, so too has the American desire to create a defensive shield against that threat. In the 1960s, the U.S. attempted to put its first missiles shield in place based upon the Sentinel and Safeguard anti-missile systems. These systems failed due to technical deficiencies but the ultimate dream of a missile defence shield did not. President Reagan revived the dream in the 1980s with his Strategic Defense Initiative. Again, the implementation of a missile shield was stymied by technological difficulties. However, this time another factor played a key role in its demise and that was the collapse of the Soviet Union; the supposed threat against which the system was originally designed to defend.[4]

The third effort to build a missile defence system arose following the Gulf War in 1991. The war was a resounding success for the technically advanced conventional military forces of the west and in particular, those of the U.S. However, as with most wars, its conclusion led to follow-up analyses of lessons learned by various militaries and governments around the world. From these analyses it became quite evident to most nations or terrorist groups that their only chance of confronting the U.S., with any hope of success in deterring an unwanted U.S.

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[4] Philip H. Gordon. "Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance." Survival Vol. 43, no. 1, Spring 2001. p. 19.

intervention, was to coerce or attack the U.S. asymmetrically.[5] With this in mind, the Gulf War demonstrated that the American and allied forces lacked an effective defence against ballistic missiles: a lesson that was not lost on the U.S. or its potential enemies. American leadership soon after the war began to ruminate about how the war might have been conducted differently, if at all, had the Iraqis possessed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system associated with weapons of mass destruction capable of attacking U.S. allies or the U.S. itself. The thought that a small, third world nation might be able to dictate or influence U.S. policy decisions through the threat, or potential use of ICBMs set the U.S. back on the road to deploying a NMD system.[6] By the summer of 1999, the perceived ICBM threat combined with advances in technology, a large budget surplus and a looming Congressional election in which neither party wanted to be seen as weak on defense, the Congress passed the National Missile Defense Act that wedded U.S. policy to the deployment of a NMD system as soon as was technologically feasible.[7]

Although many conflicting voices are making themselves heard as to the exact nature or extent of any potential missile threat to the U.S., President Bush's decision to deploy a national missile defence system is based on the perception of the American leadership that a growing missile threat to the U.S. exists. Further, it recognizes that ballistic missile proliferation has been increasing and the potential of a rogue nation or nation of concern possessing the capability of striking the U.S. or its allies could become a reality in the not too distant future. To keep tabs on

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[5] Ferguson, James. "National Missile Defence, Homeland Defence, and Outer Space: Policy Dilemmas in the Canada-US Relationship." Canada Among Nations 2001 Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 236.
[6] Daniel Smith. "The Ballistic Missile Threat." Center For Defense Information On-line, internet, 25 January 2002, available from www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch6/index.html. P. 4 of 11.
[7] Philip H. Gordon. "Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance." Survival Vol. 43, no. 1, Spring 2001. pp. 20-21.

the growing ballistic missile threat, the American Congress requested that the U.S. intelligence community provide them with an annual report on ballistic missile developments. Their 1999 report found that no country in the developing world had yet developed an intercontinental ballistic missile that could threaten North America, but that North Korea could very likely develop the capability to strike the U.S. within the next 15 years and that probably Iran and possibly Iraq could also be expected to be capable of developing this capability within that timeframe. The report also predicted that these smaller nations would be constrained to fewer than 10 ICBMs and that their payloads would be small, less reliable and less accurate than those possessed by either the Russians or Chinese. They further indicated that in their judgment, North Korea, Iran and Iraq would be more prone to use their ICBMs as tools of deterrence and coercive diplomacy than as weapons of war.[8]

The overall number of countries possessing missiles, however, continues to expand. The Arms Control Association has identified 28 states in addition to the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France that now possess ballistic missiles. While the majority of the 28 possess only short-range missiles, five have missiles with a range greater than 1,000 kilometers. The most worrisome aspect of the growing proliferation in ballistic missiles is that the North Koreans are selling their medium-range missiles to countries like Libya.[9] It is likely this type of missile proliferation will continue because ballistic missiles are viewed by many developing nations as a viable source of power. Countries deal with each other based on the amount of power they wield and though the source of national power can come in several forms, most tangible power is derived from either

[8] National Intelligence Council: Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015. September 1999. p. 2.
[9] Wagner, Alex. "Global Ballistic Missile Proliferation." Arms Control Association June 2001, On-line, internet, 29 August 2001, available from www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/gbmp.asp. p. 1.

military or economic strength. The easiest of these sources is that of military strength because it is easy to see and can be used in either a direct or coercive manner.[10] As smaller countries are unable to influence many of the economic factors of power on the international stage, they turn to their military strength as a tool of influence. From this perspective, it can be understood why many countries see ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction as a combined capability that can be used to deter an aggressor, conduct coercive diplomacy, and provide a long-range threat to potential adversaries around the world.

The threat to the U.S. posed by the ICBM arsenal of Russia, while lethal, is considered to be negligible because of the new relationship between the U.S. and Russia while the threat of an accidental or unauthorized launch of Russian ICBMs is considered to be highly unlikely. China on the other hand has a limited number of ICBMs (approximately 20) that could impact the U.S. China is developing new road-mobile ICBMs as well as additional land- and sea-based systems that will have the ability to strike the U.S.[11]

Sun Tzu stated, "To rely on rustics and not prepare is the greatest of crimes; to be prepared beforehand for any contingency is the greatest of virtues."[12] The U.S. learned this lesson the hard way at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. They learned again on 11 September 2001, that to be unprepared leads to disaster. With regard to a possible ICBM attack, they are again unprepared. With this in mind, if the U.S. does not now begin to prepare a defence against a

[10] Daniel Madar. Canadian International Relations. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc. 2000. p. 259.

[11] National Intelligence Council: Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015. September 1999. p. 8.

future ICBM threat, it may be unprepared to deal with the threat should one arise. It is interesting to note that if an ICBM attack were made against the U.S. today, the only two options that exist would be to accept the attack and suffer the consequences or to accept the attack and retaliate either in kind or with conventional weapons. This situation entails an enormous price if the analysts who now estimate the current and future ICBM threat to the U.S. to be small are wrong. However, following the 11 September attack, it is highly unlikely that any President of the United States or American Congress would be willing to accept even the remotest chance of an ICBM attack against an undefended population. President Bush stated as much in his 13 December 2001 address when he indicated that defending the American people was his highest priority and that the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would allow the country to develop effective defences.[13] With the deployment of a national missile defence system, a small number of missiles or a single missile inbound toward North America or the United States could be defeated.

From the review of the missile threat to the U.S., it can be seen that the U.S. feels threatened by the growing number of nations possessing ballistic missile technology, the growing reach of these missiles and their potential to carry weapons of mass destruction to American soil. Further, that its leadership is determined to avoid a further Pearl Harbor style attack by any nation or group that might try to use these weapon systems to attack America. To this end, the primary role of NMD is to protect the U.S. from a direct missile attack while the secondary role

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[12] Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford University Press, 1971), p, 83.

[13] George W. Bush. President George W. Bush delivers remarks on National Missile defense and the ABM Treaty. FDCH Political Transcripts 12/13/2001. On-line, internet, 12 January 2002, available from wysiwyg://bodyframe.13/http://ehos…%20missile%20defense%22&fuzzyTerm=.

is to provide a deterrent to those countries that would use their ICBM capabilities as a method of coercing U.S. policy decisions to their favour. With the deployment of a NMD system, the U.S. would have a strong deterrent to any potential attack and should an attack occur, a defence.

Threat to Canada

Canada is known by most Canadians to be one of the best places in the world to live and this is the image we project to the world at every opportunity. We live in a tolerant, multiracial society where nearly everyone feels secure and is relatively free from want. We donate to international charities freely, help other countries to weather natural disasters, and send our peacekeepers around the world to reduce the prospect of armed conflict. In such a society, it is difficult for many citizens to imagine any foreign nation or terrorist group would deliberately target Canada with an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. However, potential ICBM threats to Canada do exist. They exist primarily because of our geographic proximity to, and because of our close relationship with, the United States. The most probable threat to Canadian cities arises from the potential inaccuracy of rudimentary third world missile technologies.[14] For example, should a rogue nation decide to target an American city like Detroit, Windsor is just across the river and could be struck because of an inaccurate ICBM. The second threat might arise from the allocation of the NMD system's defence weapons capability. Should Canada refuse to take part in NMD, the potential exists that the U.S. would not factor in the defence of Canadian cities or relegate Canadian cities to a second class status should an opponent launch several ICBMs simultaneously at the North American continent. In fact, ambassador James Swihart, a U.S.

political advisor to NORAD, advised a national security forum in Fredericton in April 2001 of just such a possibility. He noted that the NMD system was primarily software driven and should Canada refuse to participate in NMD, the software designers would be tasked to design the software such that it would protect only the 50 states.[15] Even if the U.S. decided to factor Canadian territory into its NMD software, without Canadian participation in NMD, there is no assurance that Canada would be protected should a missile be aimed at one of her cities. The deputy commander of U.S. Space Command espoused this train of thought in May 2001 when he announced that the U.S. would be under no obligation to defend Canadian cities from an ICBM attack unless Canada was a partner in NMD.[16] However, the potential that Canadian cities might be relegated to secondary status, should the American's deploy a NMD system, may be considered minimal as the same missile inaccuracies that threaten Canadian cities when American cities are targeted may also endanger American cities should a Canadian city be targeted.[17] Further, U.S. State Department officials later denied that the commander's comments reflected any official U.S. position. The third potential threat comes from the deliberate targeting of a Canadian city by a rogue nation. The threat may be coercive in nature, to harm a close U.S. ally should more peaceful negotiations fail, or the threat might be more direct in nature by actually attacking a Canadian city to prove to the U.S. their resolve and ability to strike U.S. cities. Mu'ammar Qadafi gave the world a lesson on this approach to international relations when, following the U.S. raids on Tripoli in 1986, he launched a retaliatory SCUD missile attack

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[14] James Ferguson. Déjà vu: Canada, NORAD, and Ballistic Missile Defence. (Winnipeg: The University of Manitoba, 2000), p. 16.
[15] Linda Rothstein, "Ignore That Missile—It's Headed for Toronto." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists July/August 2000. p.12.

[16] Linda Rothstein, "Ignore That Missile—It's Headed for Toronto." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists July/August 2000. p.12.
[17] Dr. David Mutimer, E-mail to the author, 21 April 2002.

against the Italian island of Lampedusa.[18] Although he lacked the ability to strike the North American continent in 1986, countries such as Libya may have that ability in the future. From this perspective, his willingness to attack an ally of the U.S. that was within his reach, in response to U.S. actions, represents a threat that, while remote, cannot be ignored totally. In a similar vein, the CAN/U.S. economy is deeply integrated not only in terms of trade but also in terms of economic infrastructure. As the al'queida attacks on the world trade towers in New York demonstrated, an attack on American infrastructure has a direct and negative impact on Canada. Further, that the direct CAN/U.S. infrastructure linkages could encourage an enemy of the U.S. to adversely affect the U.S. economy by attacking Canada's hydroelectric power or natural gas distribution grids that the Americans rely upon to power their economy.[19] As we learned during the Cold War, there also exists an indirect threat to Canada that stems from a successful ICBM attack against the U.S.: the potential for radioactive fallout or chemical/biological agents to be swept into Canada by the prevailing air currents that travel from west to east. Such an occurrence could prove just as deadly to Canadians as the initial attack against intended Americans.[20]

In summarizing the missile threat to Canada, it is clear that the direct threat of a missile attack against Canada can be only considered as non-existent at this point in time. However, the indirect threat posed by a nation or terrorist group using an ICBM capability that may not be accurate enough to ensure that Canadian targets are not directly affected or that the fallout or agents are not swept into Canada cannot be ruled out entirely. However, even the indirect threat

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[18] Wyn Q. Bowen, "Missile Defence and the Transatlantic Security relationship." International Affairs Volume 77 Number 3 July 2001. p. 495.
[19] James Ferguson. "National Missile Defence, Homeland Defence, and Outer Space: Policy Dilemmas in the Canada-US Relationship." Canada Among Nations 2001 Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 238.

has to be deemed as remote based upon the National Intelligence Council report of September 1999, which found most countries were expected to use their ICBMs in a coercive manner rather than in any direct manner. As such, there is no compelling reason from a purely defence related argument for Canada to participate immediately in NMD. However, the potential future threat posed by ICBMs in general indicates that it may be in Canada's best long-term defence interest to consider becoming a partner on the NMD program so that it too will be sheltered by any missile defence system deployed.

NMD system

The NMD system is designed to detect, track and destroy ICBMs that are expected to impact on the U.S. The system will use the Defense Services Program satellites as the first vehicle to detect an enemy missile. This satellite constellation sits in a geosynchronous orbit and is designed to detect the infrared signature of a missile during the initial launch and boost phase. This satellite system is getting older and is soon due to be replaced by the Space-Based Infrared Satellite High constellation that will also be parked at a geosynchronous orbit to maintain fulltime surveillance of the planet. The second detection stage of the NMD system will incorporate upgraded ballistic missile early warning radars located in the U.S., Greenland, and England. SBIRS Low, a constellation of lower earth orbit infrared satellites, will supplement the detection capability of these radars and help to cue the X-Band radars that will home in on the actual warheads and guide the ballistic missile interceptor. The final stage is the anti-missile missile, which is designed to strike the incoming warhead. Estimates of the total assets that will

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[20] Daniel Madar. Canadian International Relations. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc. 2000. p. 254.

be applied to the NMD system vary but the largest estimate I've encountered cites a cost of at least $60 Billion and, "at least two launching sites, 3 command centers, 5 communications relay stations, 15 radar, 29 satellites, 250 underground silos, and 250 missile interceptors".[21] This overall cost may be somewhat inflated as the SBIRS High and Low constellations have been on the USAF project books for several years while many of the radar sites, command centers and communication relay stations already exist.

The system is expected to be up and running by 2007 with an initial capability in place by 2005.[22]

The most common aspect of the system that comes under critique is the issue of interceptor missile technology and more specifically, the ability of the interceptor to hit the intended target and to discriminate between real warheads and decoys. Although technical arguments can be made on both sides of this issue, I feel any detailed technical debate is best left to the engineers and technocrats. However, I will offer that weapons technology is constantly evolving to meet future threats. Advancements in many technologies are increasing the potential lethality of the interceptor missile. For example, the miniaturization of missile subsystems and parts has led to the production of interceptors whose bodies are able to withstand a greater g factor or stress loading which offers the potential for greater maneuverability. The greater g capacity in turn allows developers to integrate thrusters into the interceptor's body that produce enhanced maneuverability and improved accuracy. Detector technologies, ranging from millimeter wave radars to infrared, are also improving and adding to the kill vehicles potential. The current

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[21] Harvey, Frank P. "The International Politics of National Missile Defence." International Journal Volume lv no. 4/Autumn 2000. p. 554.

[22] The Military Balance, 2000-2001. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 17.

generation of interceptor has decreased in size from tons in the 1980s to about 130 pounds and 54 inches in length today.[23] The decreased size not only allows for greater maneuverability but also allows designers to construct smaller and potentially cheaper boosters that may be able to carry, not just one but, several kill vehicles to further enhance the probability of terminating the intended target and potentially decrease overall program cost. Research and development in weapons technology is a never-ending cycle. Within the research and development world, it is anticipated that once a development is achieved a potential enemy will learn how to counter the improvement within three to five years. Therefore the struggle to stay ahead technologically is continuous. From this perspective, experience with technological advancement leaves me with little doubt that technical problems that are encountered can be overcome.

From a Canadian perspective on the NMD system's architecture, it is unclear as to what the price of admission might be should Canada be officially asked to participate. However, Canadian participation in previous joint programs has proved to be a relatively good deal for Canadian defence. For example, Canadian participation in AWAC operations around the world entail only manpower costs while the cost of the North Warning System was split on a 60/40, U.S.-CAN cost-sharing arrangement. To date, the cost of maintaining a Canadian interest in NMD has been that of two research scientists and one military officer currently working related research and development issues in the U.S. As the cost of participation in CAN-U.S. military endeavours has traditionally been favourable to Canada from a cost versus enhanced security perspective, it is anticipated that the cost of Canadian participation in NMD would also be minimal while

[23] Harvey, Frank P. "The International Politics of National Missile Defence." International Journal Volume lv no. 4/Autumn 2000. p. 557.

improved security would be attained. From this historical cost versus security perspective, it is concluded that Canada should move towards participating in NMD.

CAN/U.S. relations

One of the key factors to be discussed when thinking about Canada's decision to participate in NMD is Canada's foreign policy and how it is formed and implemented and how any decision on NMD might affect Canada's position in the world. In this section of the paper, I will review the determinants of Canadian foreign policy, CAN/U.S. relations, and the changing relationship between Canada and the U.S.

The determinants of a nation's foreign policy in general are often difficult to identify and because of their subjective nature even more often disputable. However, it is important to identify the basic determinants of Canadian foreign policy and how they affect policy makers in order to apply these to the discussion of whether or not Canada should participate in NMD. Like all countries, Canadian foreign policy is shaped by external and internal factors. Two very important external factors for Canada are geography and economics. Geographically, Canada is surrounded on three sides by oceans and on the fourth by the United States, the most powerful nation in the world. Canada's nearest neighbours are Russia to the north and the European industrialized countries to the east. Although Canadians have traditionally felt a connection to Europe based upon our historical immigration patterns, this has diminished over the past 60 years along with the increased flow of immigrants from third world locations. Canadians thus consider the U.S. to be our closest neighbour, friend and military ally.

Within a geographical context, Canadians see themselves as physically isolated from many of the threats to national sovereignty experienced by most other nations in the world. As a result, they have traditionally held the perception that they live in a 'fireproof house'.[24] However, a national poll of Canadians following the terrorist attacks of 11 September found that far more respondents were concerned about terrorism, war and religious extremism than in previous years.[25] From an economic perspective, Canada and the U.S. are each other's largest trading partners and our two economies are highly integrated. In Canadian dollar terms, more than $1.5 billion worth of goods and services crosses the CAN/U.S. border each day.[26] The U.S. imported 82.9 percent of Canada's exported goods and services in 2000 and in particular, they absorbed 85.8 percent of Canada's merchandise exports. These extraordinary percentages not only reflect the overall importance of trade between Canada and the U.S. but also the geographical proximity and the complementarity of our two economies.[27]

At the national level, Canada has attempted to counterbalance American influence by seeking to diversify its trading patterns with other countries and by aligning itself with international organizations. However, these attempts have failed to develop any substantial counterbalance to American influence on Canada. Consequently, the power and influence of the U.S. dominates Canada's external environment and plays a key part in almost every aspect of Canada's external

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[24] Garth Stevenson, "The Determinates of Canadian Foreign Policy." De Mackenzie King a Pierre Trudeau Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1989. p. 37.
[25] Scott Costen. "Poll Finds CF Supported by More Canadians." The Maple Leaf 23 January 2002, Vol 5, No. 3. p. 5.
[26] Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Canada Among Nations 2000, Vanishing Borders. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 6.
[27] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Trade Update 2000: Second Annual Report on Canada's State of Trade p. 4. On-line, internet, 26 January 2002, available from www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eet/state-of-trade-e.asp

relations. In fact, it is generally accepted that before any serious foreign policy initiative is taken, its impact on Canadian/U.S. relations must be considered. In truth, a very large part of Canada's day-to-day foreign policy deals solely with bilateral disputes and problems within the Canada/U.S. relationship.[28]

However, Canada does see itself as a 'middle-power' in the international context. It may not be able to compete financially or militarily with more powerful countries but many Canadian politicians, and indeed Canadians, feel that their country's capacity to contribute to international alliances, such as during WWI and WWII, has earned it the right to a voice in international affairs and a seat at international councils.[29]

From this discussion of external determinants it is clear that the predominant factor affecting our foreign policy is derived from living next door to our powerful American neighbour. However, although we must always take this into consideration when formulating foreign policy, Canadians feel their country has many superior values to those of the U.S. and through its past efforts on the world stage has earned the right to take part in the larger international politic.

Several internal factors also affect Canada's foreign policy and they arise from the economic, social and political makeup of the country. Economically, Canada has a capitalist economy that is highly industrialized and incorporates modern technology. The economy provides the majority of Canadians with incomes sufficient to support themselves comfortably with a high material standard of living. In comparison to much of the world's population, Canadians see

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[28] Garth Stevenson, "The Determinates of Canadian Foreign Policy." De Mackenzie King a Pierre Trudeau Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1989. pp. 38-39.

[29] Adam Chapnick. "The Canadian Middle Power Myth." International Journal Volume LV NO.2/Spring 2000. pp. 188-189.

themselves as fairing quite well. From this perspective, most feel benevolent and wish to see their country assist people in other countries less fortunate.

The social fabric of the nation also plays a significant part in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. The predominant social feature of Canada that affects foreign policy is the division between the English and French linguistic communities. Historically, these two groups have had serious differences over issues such as conscription during WWI and WWII and the attempted separation of Quebec during the 80s and 90s. The linguistic nature of Canada has led to a number of foreign policy decisions based on language. The deployment of military and police forces to restore order in Haiti is but one example while perhaps another more recent one might be the Prime Minister's call for economic assistance for African countries. The linguistic divide can also lead to the manipulation of Canadian foreign policy by foreign governments. For example, to attain a second viewpoint on world affairs, English and French citizens often turn to American, British or French sources.[30] The most recent social factor affecting Canadian foreign policy is the large number and varied background of immigrants settling in Canada. As they change the cultural mosaic of the country, they bring with them their own global interests that must now be factored into who we are as a nation and how we see the world.

The political determinant of foreign policy in Canada also explains a great deal about how we interact with the world. Canadian federalism inherently forces federal politicians to negotiate with their provincial counterparts in order to achieve their domestic goals. In order to be successful, they are forced to always seek positions of compromise through persuasion,

[30] Garth Stevenson, "The Determinates of Canadian Foreign Policy." De Mackenzie King a Pierre Trudeau Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1989. p. 48.

flexibility and inter-provincial/federal alliances. In Canada, the requirement for negotiation between the federal and provincial governments is further enforced as the ability of the Federal Government to enact foreign policy is also restrained by the functional division of legislative powers between the Federal and Provincial levels of government. For federal politicians, their domestic experience often projects itself onto the world stage where they feel that everything contentious can be solved through alliances and negotiation.[31]

As my discussion of internal factors shows, Canada's federal politicians must take into account the economic, social and political determinants of their national constituency and personal experience when creating foreign policy. The divisive nature of our style of federalist government and our linguistic and cultural identity often forces them to 'sit on the fence' on contentious issues while they build consensus on which way to lean. This approach to Canadian politics also allows the players to avoid alienating any particular group or weakening their personal chances at re-election. Finally, this style of domestic political leadership often lends itself to similar action at the international level.

When we take into account the external and internal determinants of Canadian foreign policy, it is easier to understand how the Canadian government developed the three stated objectives of Canadian foreign policy. They are:

[31] Garth Stevenson, "The Determinates of Canadian Foreign Policy." De Mackenzie King a Pierre Trudeau Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1989. p. 53.

- **"**The promotion of prosperity and employment by advancing Canada's international trade and economic interests abroad, by maintaining market access for Canadian goods and services, by attracting foreign investment, and by promoting tourism to Canada;
- The protection of our security within a stable global framework by using diplomacy to protect against military threats, international instability, environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, international crime, uncontrolled migration, and the spread of pandemic diseases;

- The projection of Canadian values and culture in the world by promoting universal respect for human rights, the development of participatory government and stable institutions, the rule of law, sustainable development, the celebration of
- Canadian culture, and the promotion of Canadian cultural and educational industries abroad."[32]

A quick analysis of these goals shows that Canada sees itself as a secure, highly successful, egalitarian nation that wishes to be seen as one of the international good guys. It wants to maintain that status through open international markets and secure trade while defeating the world's ills through international diplomacy and compromise. Further, that Canada sees it's success stemming from its values of democracy, human rights and justice for all in a diverse society and wants to improve the lot of the less fortunate of this world through the projection of those traits of success.

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[32] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Mandate of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. On-line, internet, 26 January 2002, available from www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/dfait/mandate-e.asp

This sense of self has led Canada to adopt a very cautious approach to NMD. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade states Canada's position on NMD in the following terms:

> "Canada sees a robust multilateral non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime as an essential element in the pursuit of Canada's foreign policy objectives, including the elimination of nuclear weapons. Missile defence need not be incompatible with arms control and disarmament. Missile defences have been used to defend troops in theatre, but not as yet to defend against intercontinental ballistic missiles. Indeed, Canada supports and participates in Theatre Missile Defence research with our NATO partners. However, the potential impact on global strategic stability, on the existing non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime, and on the weaponization of outer space will depend entirely on what kind of missile defence system is proposed and on how it is pursued. Consequently, in the absence of a clear US plan, Canada has still not taken a stance for or against missile defence. We are using every opportunity to express our concerns and to try to influence US thinking. The position Canada ultimately adopts will reflect a careful consideration of all the facts and will be predicated on what is best for Canada and for global security. Canada would be concerned if an approach emerged which alienated Russia and/or China, which did not sustain the gains of the international non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime or which failed to enhance overall security. That said, Canada would welcome further reductions of nuclear weapons and is encouraging the US to consider how such reductions might be codified internationally. Canada is continuing to urge the US to take all the time needed to fully explore the implications of its strategic vision and plans for missile defence for global security."[33]

The Canadian population's perception of itself as an international good guy thus has a significant impact on its approach to NMD. In general, Canadians have heard little on the subject of NMD from their politicians, but what they have heard is that the Canadian government's official policy is to neither completely condemn nor completely support the system. An Ipsos-Reid poll taken between the 17th and 19th of July 2001 regarding Canadian government support for NMD found

that 58% of the respondents felt that the government should oppose the construction of the NMD system. However, the question may have been misleading. The respondents were told that, "the U.S. has tested and is planning to build an anti-ballistic missile system, which would allow the U.S. to shoot down missiles that are fired at it by a hostile country". Further, they were told that, "those who are opposed to the system have suggested that it could lead to another arms race".[34] Since, at no point were the respondents told that proponents of the system disagree with the assertion that deployment of NMD would lead to an arms race, the question must be considered a very poor one because it puts the respondent in a quandary: he or she can either support the U.S. decision to defend itself or they can support a new arms race. As we have already discussed, Canadians want to be seen as international good guys and supporting a new arms race could surely not be seen as being that, thus the slanted negative response to the question of NMD. As demonstrated by the results achieved with the above question on NMD, interpreting the results of polls can be, in general, an extremely delicate exercise because a bias in wording or approach to a question may lead the respondent towards a certain answer. However, if taken at face value in this particular case, the results of the poll do support the government's position in attempting to avoid any policy that might induce an arms race.

On the other hand, there has been very little negative comment on NMD from the Canadian public. Even though there have been several newspaper and broadcast news articles on the issue, these have not initiated any great debate on whether or not Canada should participate in NMD. Indeed, even the opposition parties within parliament have chosen not to raise the topic of NMD

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[33] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. US Strategic and Missile Defence Initiatives On-line, internet, 27 January 2002 (last updated by DFAIT on January 25, 2002), available from www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/usstrat-e.asp

as an issue.[35] Perhaps this lack of debate has been driven by the longstanding relationship that Canada has with the U.S. and the fact that the Canadian people acknowledge the right of the U.S. to defend itself through the deployment of NMD. As the issue does not appear to be contentious to the Canadian people, it allows the Canadian government considerable leeway in its response from a national perspective.

Now that I have reviewed the determinants of Canadian foreign policy, it is equally, if not more important, to gain an understanding of how Canadian foreign policy is implemented. The Canadian government is based upon a system of parliamentary democracy in which the government of the day decides on the implementation of the nation's foreign policy. As the Liberal Party has been in power for the past 9 years, I will focus my discussion on this government's impact on the CAN/U.S. relationship during that period and how that relationship may impact the Canadian government's decision on NMD.

Prime Minister Chretien came to power believing that his predecessor, Brian Mulroney, had forged far too close a relationship with the U.S. and was determined to chart a more independent course for Canada while avoiding any overt strengthening of the Canada-U.S. relationship. To this end, the Prime Minister and a small group of close associates took control of the development and implementation of Canadian foreign policy in relation to the U.S.[36] In keeping with his goals, the Prime Minister has maintained cordial relations with the U.S. while at the same time taking an independent stance by disagreeing with the U.S. on certain foreign policy

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[34] Ipsos-Reid. Majority (58%) Oppose U.S. Missile Defence Shield On-line, internet, 28 August 2001, available from www.ipsos-reid.com/media/content/displayer.cfm?id_to_view=120.htm

[35] Macleod, Alex, et al. "Hobson's Choice?" International Journal Volume LV no. 3/Summer 2000. p. 354.

issues. This Canadian approach to the Canadian/U.S. bi-lateral relationship was exemplified by the 'open mike' incident that occurred during a NATO summit in 1997, when Prime Minister Chretien told his Belgian counterpart that, 'I like to stand up to the Americans. It's popular. But you have to be careful because they are our friends'.[37] Certainly this pragmatic approach to our relationship with the U.S. has been crafted to reflect the determinants of Canadian foreign policy and seems to have proven successful in its implementation up to this point in time. Applying this concept of operations to the issue of Canadian participation in NMD, the current government will have to balance Canada's view of itself in the world as one of the international good-guys with the goal of not losing its independence by appearing to be too cozy with the U.S., while at the same time, not alienating the U.S. However, some of the conditions from the American perspective that have allowed this approach to be pursued successfully in the past may be changing, especially since the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center Towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.

The first and likely the most important factor that may be changing the Canada/U.S. relationship is the generational change of American politicians and the shift in political power within the U.S. from the north eastern states to those in the south west. For American politicians who grew up in the Northern part of the U.S. during the early to late 1900s, Canada was well known as a staunch ally who had fought beside them in two world wars and Korea and who during the Cold War had possessed, 'a very important piece of real estate', or buffer zone, between the U.S. and the Soviet

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[36] Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Canada Among Nations 2000, Vanishing Borders. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 19.
[37] Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Canada Among Nations 2000, Vanishing Borders. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 32.

Union.[38] These American politicians also had more of an opportunity to visit Canada during their vacations owing to the proximity of Canada and in some instances, may even have had extended family ties to Canada.[39] As a result, Canada had occupied an important place in the American psyche and these politicians were knowledgeable of, and sensitive to, Canadian concerns regarding Canada/U.S. relations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and as the generational gap became more evident; Canada began to take a backseat in American politics. The new southern breed of American politician is more knowledgeable of Mexico than Canada and thus they are more comfortable with and interested in that country. For the most part, Canada only receives national attention when border or security issues arise or when Canada takes a position on an international issue contrary to that of the Americans.[40]

For the current government approach to the bi-lateral relationship, this reduction in visibility may have been seen, prior to 11 September, as an opportunity to duck contentious issues that might have forced the Canadian government to confront any overt strengthening of the Canada-U.S. relationship and thus any concerns regarding an attendant loss of independence. Certainly the NMD issue was just such an issue that the government hoped to avoid. However, the approach may have backfired to some degree because of a Canadian misunderstanding of the shifting power-base in the U.S. and the changing foreign policy philosophy that has been building within the U.S. government since the end of the Cold War that, 'you are either with us or against us'. This change in attitude towards the relationship with Canada within the U.S. government began

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[38] Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky. The End of the Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship. Kingston: Queen's University, Center for International Relations, 1996. p. 1.
[39] Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Canada Among Nations 2000, Vanishing Borders. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 19.
[40] Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Canada Among Nations 2000, Vanishing Borders. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 19.

to make itself clear in 1998 when the ambassador to Canada advised Canada that: 'Our mutual relationship is no longer contained on an a la carte menu. Rather, at this North American restaurant, it is necessary to take the whole dinner'.[41]

This new American philosophy has grown steadily stronger as American politicians become more confident in their role as leaders of the world's only superpower. In conjunction with this philosophy has come a growing loss of patience with those who are unprepared to take a full part in American international endeavours and with those who would openly confront American policy.[42] Clearly, this American view of 'it's our way or the highway' puts the Canadian government's current approach to Canada/U.S. relations in a bad spot. In fact, on the whole, American patience with Canada's foreign policy is waning for a number of reasons. First, Canada is seen to have adopted a somewhat isolationist approach to foreign policy in the sense that it has significantly reduced its expenditures on the mechanisms of traditional hard power projection: the foreign service, the military, international development assistance and intelligence services.[43] An example of this isolationist drift can be found in the country's reduction in foreign aid expenditures that has dropped from 0.49 percent of the gross national product in 1991

[41] Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Canada Among Nations 2000, Vanishing Borders. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 29.

[42] Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Canada Among Nations 2000, Vanishing Borders. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 68.

[43] Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick. "The Axeworthy Revolution." Canada Among Nations 2001 Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001. pp. 78-79.

to 0.25 percent in 1999; a reduction of nearly 50 percent.[44] This approach to foreign affairs, introduced by Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axeworthy, has stressed a reduced need for traditional hard power in favour of a more humane approach to foreign affairs that has been coined "soft power". Canadian soft power emphasizes those age-old political values of compromise and coalition building while it uses Canada's reputation as a liberal country that values democracy, human rights and justice for all, as a platform of advantage from which to forge international agreements and understandings.[45] While soft power has allowed the Canadian government to achieve some success in achieving its goals on the world stage, it has also been seen by other nations as merely a method of prosecuting foreign policy on the cheap. Americans have condemned this Canadian approach to foreign affairs as one that attempts to 'minimize commitments while maximizing prestige'.[46] From this perspective, Canada has been less able, or less willing, to take an active physical role in international affairs. For example, when the U.S. called for allies to stand up and send peacekeeping/peacemaking combat forces to Kosovo in the mid-nineties, Canada was less than enthusiastic. In fact, Canada was the last NATO country to contribute and only sent 1,000, mainly non-combat, troops. Perhaps this minimalist effort, and others preceding it on the world stage, was a leading cause of Canada's exclusion from the allied forces council that was attempting to broker a regional peace in the Balkans in 1994.[47] Clearly, as the instruments of foreign policy are winnowed down, the country's ability to exert influence internationally also diminishes. The second reason the U.S. may be losing patience with Canada's foreign policy is that, on several occasions, Canada has

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[44] Douglas Alan Ross. Canada and the World at Risk: Depression, War, and Isolationism for the 21st Century? International Journal Volume LII no.1/Winter 1996-7. p. 21.
[45] Daniel Madar. Canadian International Relations. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc. 2000. p.263.
[46] Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick. "The Axeworthy Revolution." Canada Among Nations 2001 Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001. p. 79.
[47] Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky. The End of the Canada-U.S. Defence Relationship. Kingston: Queen's University, Center for International Relations, 1996. pp. 7-9.

taken and maintained a political position in contrast to that of the U.S. Canada's differing political approach to Cuba is one such position that has always been a sore point between Canada and the U.S.[48] The third

reason lies in the fact that Canada has, on occasion, embarrassed the U.S. on the world stage. The land mine treaty is one such case. Canada played a significant role in pushing for the approval of the land mine treaty in Oslo in 1997 and then quickly signed the treaty in December that same year. The Canadian government saw this success as a victory for Canada and the policy of soft power as 'we were setting the agenda and providing international leadership'.[49] However, Canada had invited the U.S. to attend the Oslo conference knowing full well that the U.S. would not be able to sign the treaty given the time constraints Canada was pushing.[50] When the U.S. had to publicly refuse signing the treaty, it lost a great deal of credibility as a team player on the world stage.

Canada needs to be sensitive to the new American fact in international politics. A Canadian decision not to participate in NMD could potentially damage the special relationship between Canada and the U.S. and lead to a decline in Canadian influence, not only in the U.S., but also in world affairs. The current relationship between the two countries is known worldwide as unique and other countries that may not be able to approach the U.S. directly on specific issues may choose, as they have in the past, to approach Washington through the Ottawa connection.[51]

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[48] Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Canada Among Nations 2000, Vanishing Borders. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 68.
[49] Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick. "The Axeworthy Revolution." Canada Among Nations 2001 Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001. pp. 76-77.
[50] Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Canada Among Nations 2000, Vanishing Borders. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 68.
[51] James Ferguson. Déjà vu: Canada, NORAD, and Ballistic Missile Defence. Winnipeg: The University of Manitoba, 2000. p. 24.

Certainly the Russians and Chinese have sought to influence U.S. policy on NMD through Canada. This inferred influence could be lost if Canada chooses not to participate in NMD.

As American patience with Canadian foreign policy dissipates, the maneuvering room available to Canadian politicians regarding CAN/U.S. relations is likely to become more restrictive. The current government's indecision on participation in NMD, primarily because of the desire to be seen by the world as taking an independent stance while maintaining the moral high ground, has likely led to a further erosion of American patience with Canada for not acting like a team player at a time when the U.S. feels particularly threatened. After all, the U.S. has undoubtedly carried the lion's share when it comes to defending Canada in the context of North American defence. Certainly, the fact that some influential Americans are beginning to express displeasure with the foreign policy approach Canada has been trying to follow during the past several years, especially regarding the country's vacillation on NMD, is bound to cause at least some Canadian politicians to take a second look. And with good reason, continued American political displeasure could result in trade disputes and other, less overt, reprisals being taken to encourage Canada to come on side.

In truth, the CAN/U.S. relationship is far more important for Canada in terms of trade and defence than for the U.S. and hence the relationship is skewed in favour of the U.S. Therefore, any long-term American dissatisfaction within that relationship is likely to have a greater negative impact on Canada. With this in mind, it will likely be far easier domestically, to engage the U.S. and participate on NMD.

International discussion

On the international stage, Canada has expressed concerns about official participation in NMD on two fronts. The first deals with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty while the second deals with multilateral concerns about European and Asian support or opposition to NMD. For Canada, the ABM Treaty has been sacrosanct as a pillar upon which the peace of the world has been based. In essence, the 1972 ABM Treat restricts either the U.S. or Russia from deploying an Anti-Ballistic Missile system that would have the ability to defend each nation's entire land mass and limits both nations from increasing their stocks of offensive nuclear weapons. Without a viable defence against ballistic missiles, the ABM Treaty led to the policy that became known as Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD. The basic tenet of the MAD philosophy was that neither the U.S. nor Russia could attack the other with nuclear weapons without the other being able to retaliate in kind, thus ensuring the physical demise of both nations. With each member, figuratively, holding a loaded gun to the head of the other, it was no longer necessary for these two nations to continue their nuclear arms race and this brought a form of peaceful stability to the world order. Many Canadians fear that the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty may lead to another nuclear arms race that they are opposed to. An Ipsos-Reid poll taken between the 17th and 19th of July 2001 supports this assertion. When respondents were told that the American deployment of NMD
might lead to a new arms race, 58% of the respondents felt that the government should oppose the construction of the NMD system.[52]

[52]Ipsos-Reid. Majority (58%) Oppose U.S. Missile Defence Shield On-line, internet, 28 August 2001, available from www.ipsos-reid.com/media/content/displayer.cfm?id_to_view=120.htm

So, what is the likelihood of a renewed arms race between Russia and the U.S. occurring now that the demise of the ABM Treaty is a scheduled reality? The relationship between the U.S. and Russia has changed markedly during the past 10 years and this change has been positive. As President Bush noted in his 13 December 2001 speech, "One of the signatories, the Soviet Union, no longer exists, and neither does the hostility that once led both our countries to keep thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, pointed at each other". Russia seems to have taken a pragmatic approach to the issue as well. Although they were originally vehemently opposed to the U.S. deployment of a NMD system, tensions have eased considerably between the two countries over this issue during the past 6 months. A poll of Russian elites on the issue of NMD following the 11 September attacks against the U.S., found that over half of the respondents felt the U.S. desire to deploy a NMD was credible and 47 percent felt a U.S. missile defence system would not pose a security threat to Russia.[53] President Putin echoed these same sentiments in his reaction to the American intention to withdraw from the treaty. He stated that, though he felt the U.S. decision to withdraw unilaterally was a mistake; he did not see the action as a threat to Russia's security.[54] In an effort to strengthen the view that NMD would pose no threat to Russia's security, the U.S. has offered to discuss President Putin's proposal that each nation cut their current stock of strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,500 and 2,200.[55] At this point in time, the U.S. move to extricate itself from the ABM Treaty does not appear to be instigating an arms race between the U.S. and Russia. However, the unilateral U.S. move away

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[53] CDI Russia Weekly #189. "State Department Report Finds New Attitude in Former Soviet Union on Missile Defense." Center For Defense Information On-line, internet, 25 January 2002, available from http://www.cdi.org/russia/189-6.cfm

[54] Valasek, Thomas. "Europe's role in National Missile Defense." Center for Defense Information On-line, internet, 25 January 2002, available from http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch8/index.html

[55] Ibid.

from the treaty may have some more far-reaching effects on international affairs that will be discussed later in the paper.

Beyond its concerns over the demise of the ABM Treaty, Canada is very concerned with approaching the world in a multilateral fashion on the issue of NMD. Canada has historically tried to gauge European and Asian views on international issues in an effort to use those views as a counterweight to U.S. influence. However, the nations of Europe and Asia have been, with some exceptions, relatively sanguine about the issue of NMD. As any Canadian decision on NMD is likely to be influenced by European and Asian opinion on the issue, a brief review of those opinions is warranted. China will be evaluated first as this country figures prominently in this issue and then the opinions of Japan, Taiwan, and the European countries will be discussed.

China is opposed to the deployment of an American NMD system and disbelieves the U.S. assertion that the system is designed to protect it from rogue states such as North Korea. First of all, they believe that the number of interceptors envisioned for the NMD system would be sufficient to negate the small number of nuclear ICBMs that the Chinese possess. They also believe that the system has been intentionally designed to assist in American domination of East Asia by containing an increasingly powerful China.[56] In response to NMD, some Chinese officials have expressed concern that China must now enter into an arms race if they are to maintain a capable nuclear deterrent ICBM force. Considering that the Chinese have approximately 20 ICBMs capable of striking the U.S. and that the American NMD system

[56] Berry, Nicholas. "U.S. National Missile Defense: Views From Asia." Center For Defense Information On-line, internet, 25 January 2002, available from http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch7/index.html

currently envisaged would be capable of defeating a few tens of warheads,[57] those Chinese officials who fear a reduction in the effectiveness of their nuclear deterrent ICBM forces by the American deployment of an NMD system are almost certainly correct. Further, it may be concluded that, if the Chinese are to maintain some form of credible nuclear deterrence they will have to increase the number of ICBMs in their inventory.

Certainly from the Canadian perspective, if the Chinese choose to follow this course, it would seem as if their worst nightmare had come to fruition. However, there are some good indications that the Chinese will not charge ahead pell-mell into an arms race. First of all, many Chinese see the deployment of NMD as an American ploy to cause them to spend national resources on building a deterrent force rather than build their economy. They point out that the U.S. enticed the Russians into such a spending game and caused the Russian economy to bankrupt itself.[58] And secondly, the Chinese are already well underway in modernizing its nuclear weapons including, new land mobile missile systems, ballistic missile carrying submarines and nuclear aviation forces.[59]

Any conclusion that might be drawn from this discussion on how China might react to the deployment of an American NMD system can only be speculative in nature. Although there is no concrete evidence that the Chinese are currently intending to expand their nuclear ICBM

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[57] Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, 2000. p. 74.
[58] Bin, Li., et al. "China Will Have to Respond." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists November/December 2001. p. 26.
[59] Ruslan Pukhov and Ivan Safranchuk. "The Withdrawal of the United States From the ABM Treaty: A Failure of Russian Diplomacy or New Opportunities?" Center for Defense Information On-line, internet, 25 January 2002, available from www.cdi.org/nmd/safranchuk121801.cfm. p. 12.

forces beyond the growth and diversification that was already planned, they do see the real threat that an American NMD system poses to their nuclear deterrence force. On the other hand, it is also understandable that the Chinese are loath to enter into an arms race that could prove difficult to win economically. Therefore, the foundation for Canadian fears regarding an arms race being initiated by the Chinese in reaction to the deployment of a U.S. NMD system does hold some merit and therefore must be taken into consideration regarding any Canadian decision to participate in NMD.

Japan's approach to NMD has been non-committal. Although they understand the immediate U.S. rationale for missile defence, they do have some concerns about how the U.S. might use the shield in the future. Their main fear is that the U.S. might use the shield to exert a greater influence in the Asian region.[60] However, Japan is reluctant to argue with the U.S. over the NMD issue because they have a missile defence problem of their own. North Korea's launch of a Taepo Dong-1 missile over Japan in August 1998 alerted the Japanese to the fact that they too were vulnerable to a possible missile attack. Consequently, the Japanese began searching for a Theater Missile Defence (TMD) system to provide them with a defence.[61] To this end, the Japanese and the U.S. have agreed to develop a joint sea-based missile defence system. It was reported on 17 December 2001, that the Pentagon plans to spend approximately $423 million between 2003 and 2007 on joint research with Japan on this type of missile defence system.[62]

Taiwan faces a similar, but more immediate, missile threat from China, that has approximately 200 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. In response, Taiwan is seeking American help to develop its own TMD system to counter this threat within the next 8 to 10 years. Consequently, Taiwan has not raised any criticism of NMD.[63]

One of the lessons that Canada may take from the Japanese and Taiwanese experiences is that the missile threat is real and growing. Although the threat to Canada is considered minimal today, the spread of missile technology and the increasing ranges of these systems may represent a greater threat to Canadians in the near future. Moreover, that as nations are threatened with these forces they seek to find shelter under some form of missile defence, either strategic or regional in nature. Japan and Taiwan both face immediate regional missile threats to their nations and have chosen discretion as the better part of valour in regard to NMD. To ensure that they receive the requisite U.S. technological and financial assistance in procuring their own TMD systems, they are willing to admit that the U.S. is entitled to self-protection as well. To counter-balance a possible ballistic missile threat in the future, it might be prudent for Canada to entertain participating in NMD.

The European view of NMD varies from country to country based upon their individual national interests. However, although a European consensus on the issue has not been achieved, few, if any, have openly criticized the U.S. over NMD because they do not wish to alienate themselves from the economic and military strength of that country.[64] The Europeans were initially concerned that the American deployment of NMD would initiate an arms race between the U.S.

[63] Ibid. p. 13.

and Russia: and for good reason. In an effort to sway European sentiment, the Russians specifically threatened to restart their intermediate range missile program should NMD go ahead. These missiles (SS-20) have the range to hit any European city. The Russians also threatened to target NMD facilities in England, Norway and Denmark with nuclear weapons.[65] Europeans collectively sighed with relief as they discovered following the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. from the ABM Treaty, that President Putin no longer felt that NMD posed a serious threat to Russian security. Although the threat from Russia may have diminished, some Europeans feel that an even more serious threat to Europe may exist as potential enemies of the U.S. seek to influence American foreign policy by targeting and threatening unprotected European cities. However, his threat has been losing credence as the U.S. continues to insist that it intends to protect its friends and allies from the emerging missile threat.[66]

The British government has tended to support the U.S. on NMD. In an effort to maintain their excellent relationship with the U.S., the British have consistently emphasized that there is evidence of a growing missile threat and that if the U.S. has a defence against this threat they will be far more willing to take an active role in international affairs.[67] The Germans and the French, on the other hand, have been much less enthusiastic about NMD. The Germans view NMD as unnecessary, extremely expensive and posing a threat to international agreements[68]

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[64] J.R. MacIsaac. Canadian Consideration of European Perspectives on NMD. Canadian Forces College – NSSC 3, 2001. p. 13.
[65] Valasek, Thomas. "Europe's role in National Missile Defense." Center for Defense Information On-line, internet, 25 January 2002, available from www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch8/index.html. p. 5.
[66] Wyn Q.Bowen. "Missile Defence and the Transatlantic Security relationship." International Affairs Volume 77 Number 3 July 2001. p. 498.

[67] Rebecca Johnson. "Downing Street Says Yes; Britons No." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists November/December 2001. p. 30.
[68] Harald Mueller. "Germany Hopes it Will Go Away." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists November/December 2001. p. 31.

while the French feel that should NMD initiate an arms race then it's deterrent nuclear force would be weakened.[69] Following America's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, European countries issued statements welcoming the proposed reductions in nuclear weapons but offering concern over the withdrawal. Britain, Germany and France all indicated that although the treaty was being terminated, they hoped that strategic stability would be maintained through multilateral mechanisms.[70]

From the discussion above, it is interesting to note from the simple perspective of defending oneself from a ballistic missile threat, that while the Europeans, in general, are apprehensive about NMD, they don't seem to suffer any angst in pursuing their own TMD systems. For example, Germany and the Netherlands are in the process of procuring Patriot defence systems while the French, Italians and the English are developing the naval-based Principal Anti-Air-Defence Missile System. In addition, NATO is looking at developing a TMD system that incorporates ground stations, ships, aircraft and satellites.[71]

As discussed, the European community is divided in its support of NMD. The level of support shown by each nation is dependent on its relationship with the U.S. but, as was the case with the Asian states, European governments are reluctant to openly criticize the U.S. because of its superpower status. Consequently, Canada cannot hope to find a holy grail in this region upon which to base its final decision on NMD. However, the fact that many European nations are in

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[69] Wyn Q.Bowen. "Missile Defence and the Transatlantic Security relationship." International Affairs Volume 77 Number 3 July 2001. p. 501.

[70] Thomas Valasek. "Europe's role in National Missile Defense." Center for Defense Information On-line, internet, 25 January 2002, available from www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch8/index.html. p. 10.

[71] Ibid. p. 496.

the process of developing TMD systems to counter the current regional ballistic missile threat should provide Canada with a barometer of the potential for a future threat to Canada.

In Europe, as in Canada, multilateralism has become the byword of international relations. The European countries have come to rely on multilateralism as a way of ensuring that their interests are heard in what was a bi-polar and now a uni-polar world. For this reason, their main concern regarding NMD is the readiness of the U.S., as the world's only superpower, to pursue its national interests unilaterally.[72] The apprehension of growing American unilateralism in international affairs is a concern shared by many nations. One of the recurrent themes in the discussion on world opinion regarding NMD is the near universal fear that the U.S. has chosen to follow a unilateralist approach to international affairs. This fear is not unfounded.

From a historical perspective, great powers tend to be, or become, unilateralist in nature while small or medium sized powers tend to be multilateralist. This stands to reason, as great powers tend to rely on their superior military or economic power to settle disputes while smaller powers tend to settle their differences based on an internationally accepted code of law and international organizations such as we find in NATO and the UN today. The propensity for the great power to use its power unilaterally to achieve its national goals tends to be increased where no counter-balancing great power exists.[73] So, has this tendency been occurring in the U.S.?

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[72] Philip H. Gordon. "Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance." Survival Vol. 43, no. 1, Spring 2001. p. 24.

[73] Steven Holloway. "U.S. Unilateralism in the UN: Why Great Powers Do Not Make Great Multilateralists." Global Governance Vol. 6 Issue 3, July/September 2000. p. 363.

Steven Holloway's investigation into this very question seems to indicate that the U.S. has indeed been following an increasingly unilateralist approach to world affairs.[74] He found that from 1968 to 1993, the number of dissenting American votes, or the number of times the U.S. voted against their NATO allies in the UN, rose steadily and actually jumped significantly during the Reagan and Bush administrations. For example in 1968, only 4 percentage points separated American and NATO member voting patterns. However, by 1993, the difference had grown to 30, clearly demonstrating a growing propensity for unilateral action on the part of the Americans.[75]

In fact, many nations have noted America's shift to more unilateral action on the international stage in more recent years. They point to America's failure to ratify international agreements such as the International Criminal Court, the ban on anti-personnel mines, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Kyoto environmental agreement as proof positive that the U.S. is willing to sacrifice international multilateralism in order to achieve its own national goals.[76]

The American decision to retire unilaterally from the 1972 ABM Treaty is seen as only the most recent act of this trend to unilateralism. Ivan Safranchuk, an expert in strategy and defense affairs, has interpreted this move, as a watershed in the direction the Bush administration will

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[74] Steven Holloway based his findings on the way the U.S. voted in the National Assembly of the UN between 1968 and 1993. In essence, he sought to discover the number of times the U.S. voted against no when the motion was adopted and voted yes when a motion was defeated. From this number, he was able to determine how often the U.S. voted against the majority and was able to rank this number against all other members. From this, he was able to determine which nation was the least accommodating or least multilateral. See "U.S. Unilateralism in the UN: Why Great Powers Do Not Make Great Multilateralists." p. 365.

[75] Ibid. pp. 365-366.

[76] Philip H. Gordon. "Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance." Survival Vol. 43,

follow with respect to international affairs. He believes that since the Bush camp came to power, there has been a struggle between the unilateralists and the multilateralists; and that with Bush's decision on the ABM Treaty, the unilateralists have won.[77]

Some fear that the U.S. decision to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty will set a bad precedent that will have an extremely negative impact on international relations in general. In effect, destabilize the legitimate multilateralist order that the world has come to rely upon to secure world peace and order. They argue that being a world leader the U.S. has set a bad example which will encourage other nations that might wish to increase or solidify their power within a regional context to do so based solely upon their own self interest.[78] In fact this already appears to be happening. As the Americans have initiated the war on terrorism, many other nations have also sought to solidify their own regional positions by attacking enemy elements deemed to be terrorists. Israel is one nation that has used the American example to support its own increased efforts to weaken Palestinian opposition.

So how might Canada play a role in modifying the American trend to unilateralism? Douglas Ross has made the assertion that: "Only capability can inspire serious consultation and co-operation on vital issues."[79] In other words, Canada needs to engage the U.S. through a more powerful and aggressive foreign policy: one with some substance in terms of physical, political

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no. 1, Spring 2001. p. 24.

[77] Ruslan Pukhov and Ivan Safranchuk. "The Withdrawal of the United States From the ABM Treaty: A Failure of Russian Diplomacy or New Opportunities?" Center for Defense Information On-line, internet, 25 January 2002, available from www.cdi.org/nmd/safranchuk121801.cfm p. 3.

[78] Ruslan Pukhov and Ivan Safranchuk. "The Withdrawal of the United States From the ABM Treaty: A Failure of Russian Diplomacy or New Opportunities?" Center for Defense Information On-line, internet, 25 January 2002, available from www.cdi.org/nmd/safranchuk121801.cfm p. 4.

[79] Douglas Alan Ross,. "Canada and the World at Risk: Depression, War, and Isolationism for the 21st Century?" International Journal Volume LII no.1/Winter 1996-7. p. 11.

and financial presence. Otherwise, Canada's opinion or concerns may carry even less weight in future and make us even less able to counter US unilateralism. If Canada participates in NMD, it may offer an opportunity to ensure that the U.S. remains engaged on world opinion even if only through the Canadian conduit. As Steven Holloway points out in his article, the U.S. can learn a great deal from Canada in regards to multilateralism.[80]

NORAD

I will now turn to Canada's defence relationship with the U.S. and more specifically examine that relationship in terms of the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Agreement. I will also discuss how Canada's decision to participation or not in NMD might affect Canada's influence within NORAD, its ability to access space technologies and its defence industry.

Since its inception, the geographic size of Canada combined with the country's limited population has forced Canadians to seek national security within the confines of bilateral and multi-lateral defence relationships. The most important of these has been the CAN/U.S. defence relationship. Indeed, this relationship blossomed following WWII with the advent of the Soviet nuclear bomber threat to North America. In fact, this defence relationship between Canada and the U.S. is so important to the security of Canada that it encompasses one of the three military objectives stated in the 1994-defence white paper. In effect, it states that it is Canada's objective, "to defend North America in cooperation with the United States—protecting the Canadian approaches to the continent in partnership with the United States, particularly through

[80] Steven Holloway. "U.S. Unilateralism in the UN: Why Great Powers Do Not Make Great Multilateralists." Global Governance Vol. 6 Issue 3, July/September 2000. p. 368.

NORAD; promoting Arctic security; and pursuing opportunities for defence with the United States in other areas".[81] The main reason this defence relationship between Canada and the U.S. has been so important and beneficial to Canada is it has allowed Canada to defend itself at a fraction of the cost the same security would have demanded of Canada alone.[82] Hence Canada is seen to have enjoyed a long and productive defence relationship with the U.S.

NORAD is singled out in the CAN/U.S. defence relationship as it is considered by the Canadian government to be a cornerstone of that relationship since NORAD was conceived in 1958. In fact, both countries see the NORAD alliance as a symbol of their long-standing commitment to their mutual defence, cooperation and indeed, friendship.[83] NORAD's initial mission was to monitor and protect North American airspace against the threat of Soviet manned nuclear bombers. However, since that time, the NORAD mission has evolved to include the threat warning and attack assessment mission associated with ballistic missile defence. As part of its commitment to NORAD, Canadian military personnel are currently employed in several facets of space operations including command and control, the tracking and identification of space objects, orbital analysis, satellite constellation management, missile defence research and development and missile warning.

With regard to NMD, this evolution of NORAD to encompass ballistic missile defence has today, come to represent something of a political difficulty for Canada. This difficulty stems

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[81] Canadian Defence White Paper 1994.
[82] Alex Macleod, et al. "Hobson's Choice?" International Journal Volume LV no. 3/Summer 2000. p. 341.
[83] D.F. Holman. NORAD in the New Millennium. Toronto: Irwin Publishing Ltd., 2000. p. 35.

from the potential of the U.S. to employ the command and control structure of NORAD with the deployment of NMD. This decision would seem to be a logical one as the current command and control functions of NORAD to conduct surveillance, detection, warning and attack assessment would be incorporated with the additional function of ballistic missile defence.[84] As Canadians are an integral part of NORAD's command and control structure, should Canada opt not to take part in NMD, the command and control system for NMD would either migrate to another command authority, such as U.S. Space Command, or assign the Canadians solely to the air defence role.[85] In either case, Canada's role in NORAD could be diminished in stature. This may be significant in a number of ways. First of all, NORAD is a unique institution in that it allows Canada a lens into U.S. military planning and policy development in addition to evolving doctrine, technology and changes in command and control architectures. It also provides Canada an excellent avenue by which to sensitize the American military leadership to Canadian security issues. This is accomplished via the Deputy Commander-in-Chief (DCINC) NORAD, a Canadian three star General, who interacts directly with the CINC NORAD, an American four star General, on a daily basis. The DCINC thus has the ability to assert Canadian influence in some of the most important four-star councils of the U.S. military.[86] Should Canada's position within NORAD be weakened, and the command hierarchy modified such that Canadians are displaced from the DCINC position, it may result in a diminished capacity to influence American decision-making.

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[84] George R.C. Macdonald. "NORAD and National Missile Defence: A Perspective of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief." Canadian Military Journal Summer 2000. p. 11.
[85] Sharon Hobson. "Canadian Missile Defence." Jane's International Defense Review March 01, 2002.
[86] D.F. Holman. NORAD in the New Millennium. Toronto: Irwin Publishing Ltd., 2000. p. 35.

Secondly, NORAD provides Canada a vital link to U.S. space operations. Canada's unique position within NORAD's space operations command and control structure allows Canadians an exceptional window into U.S. space projects and access to space based assets.[87] Maintaining this privileged position is extremely important as the surveillance, communications and navigation systems located in space become increasingly vital to military and civilian commercial operations.[88] Canadians continue to expand their knowledge of space operations through NORAD and this experience and knowledge, in many cases, is transferred to the Canadian Space Agency and Canadian industry where it is used to enhance Canada's global economic competitiveness. Should Canada decide not to become involved with NMD, Canada's position within the American's space command and control architecture may be lost along with our ability to access the advanced technologies being applied to, and the information to be attained from, current and future U.S. space operations.

The third, and final point I will discuss with regard to NORAD is that of trade. Since WWII, Canada and the U.S. have shared an unrestricted trade in defence related industries. This trade agreement has proven beneficial to Canada in the sense that it has fostered military research and development to occur in this country that has allowed Canada to apply leading edge technologies to military and civilian industry. The application of these technologies to industry has in turn contributed to increased employment, the country's Gross National Product and national industrial competitiveness. Furthermore, as the government is a potential consumer of the products made available by these new technologies, it has some influence on where these new

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[87] Maureen Appel Molot and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Canada Among Nations 2000, Vanishing Borders. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2000. p. 15.
[88] D.F. Holman. NORAD in the New Millennium. Toronto: Irwin Publishing Ltd., 2000. p. 78.

contracts might be awarded. This allows the government the flexibility to direct those contracts to economically challenged regions of the country and consequently reduce regional disparities.[89] To underlie the importance of this trade arrangement, it is worth noting American defence contracts currently account for some $5 billion in annual trade and create approximately 50,000 jobs in Canada.[90]

The CAN/U.S. defence trade relationship has survived for over 50 years and although it has had its ups and downs, it has been extremely successful overall. The main reason for this success has been the overarching belief of CAN and the U.S. in their shared approach to continental defence.[91] This vision of a shared approach was tested in 1985 when the Canadian government decided not to join the U.S. on the development and implementation of their Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Although defence industrial cooperation was weakening for a number of reasons during the early 80s, the decision not to engage in SDI was to prove a disaster for the Canadian defence industry in 1985. Of the 30 to 40 percent of the U.S. Department of Defense's procurement budget that was available to Canadian industry, only .64 percent was accessed.[92] This low point in defence related trade between Canada and the U.S. began to be reversed with the 1987 White Paper on Defence that stated Canada's intention to become engaged on space defence programs as they evolved within the NORAD command. Indeed, by 1995 the Canadian aerospace industry was experiencing exceptional growth. In fact, it was the lure of access by

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[89] Ann Denholm Crosby. Dilemmas in Defence Decision-Making, Constructing Canada's Role in NORAD, 1958-96. Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1998. p. 107.
[90] Alex Macleod, et al. "Hobson's Choice?" International Journal Volume LV no. 3/Summer 2000. p. 347.
[91] Joseph Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, eds. Fifty Years of Canada-United States Defence Cooperation: The Road From Ogdensburg. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992. p. 200.
[92] Ann Denholm Crosby. Dilemmas in Defence Decision-Making, Constructing Canada's Role in NORAD, 1958-96. Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1998. p. 140.

Canadian aerospace companies to billions of dollars in American missile defence programs that played a key incentive for Canada to sign the new NORAD agreement in 1996.[93]

From this discussion of defence trade between Canada and the U.S., it can be deduced that defence trade tends to dwindle between the two countries when their individual approaches to continental defence are out of synch. Further, that this divergence of approach tends to affect adversely Canadian industrial interests in particular. While Canada is currently engaged on space defence programs through NORAD, its aerospace industries have been experiencing a period of exceptional growth. Should the 1985 downturn in business experienced by Canadian defence industry following Canada's refusal to partake in the American's SDI program be seen to be connected, then Canada might also anticipate another downturn in this industry if they refuse to participate in NMD.

To conclude my discussion on NORAD and the CAN/U.S. defence relationship, I will offer the following observations. It is clear that Canada sees its defence relationship with the U.S. as essential for the effective defence of Canadian territory. Furthermore, that NORAD represents a cornerstone of the long-standing partnership between the two countries in the defence of North America. As NORAD's role has evolved from the deterrence of Soviet bombers to that of warning and attack assessment against the ballistic missile threat, NORAD has moved from conducting operations solely within the air environment to operations within the air and space or aerospace environment. As NORAD has evolved, so too has Canada's involvement in space operations and today, Canadians are involved in nearly every aspect of those operations. This participation has led to an increased awareness of America's space activities and allowed for a

[93] Ibid. pp. 142,143.

transfer of leading edge technology to Canadian industry. Canada's involvement in NORAD has also permitted Canada's voice on security issues to be heard through the DCINC NORAD at the highest levels of American military councils. And finally, from an economics perspective, that our participation in NORAD and its associated space activities has a direct influence on our significant defence trade relationship with the U.S. This trade relationship has been, for the most part, a success story from the Canadian perspective but has had some less than stellar moments. Furthermore, during periods of disharmony between our two nations concerning the direction of joint defence, Canada seems to bear the brunt of any economic dislocation.

NMD thus poses a particularly sticky problem for Canada. The country receives a great deal of benefit from NORAD and their defence relationship with the U.S. Should Canada refuse to participate in NMD, Canada runs the risk of damaging the vision of shared continental defence with the Americans and thus the fundamental role of NORAD in space operations. Should the U.S. decide that Canada no longer wishes to shoulder the shared burden of continental defence, they may decide to go it alone with regard to space. This situation would likely lead to the marginalization of Canadians within NORAD and see Canadian personnel removed from space command and control positions. This, in turn, would preclude Canadian participation in current and future space operations and hinder the transfer of leading edge technologies to Canadian industry.

Conclusion

In summary, the United States is going to develop and deploy a national missile defence system to protect themselves and their allies from what they perceive as the growing ICBM threat posed by the proliferation of missile and WMD technologies that might be used by rogue countries or terrorist groups to directly attack the U.S. or attempt to coerce American policy in the not too distant future. As a close ally of the U.S., Canada has received informal overtures to participate in NMD, but to this point, Canada has refrained from making any formal decision on the matter. However Canada decides to respond to a formal request from the U.S. to participate on NMD, the decision will be a strategic one that will likely have far reaching ramifications for the CAN/U.S. relationship. In an effort to determine whether Canada should participate or not, this paper has discussed the issue of Canada's participation based upon the following four criteria:

1. The degree to which participation might enhance Canada's physical security;
2. The effect on Canada's relations with the U.S.;
3. The effect on Canada's relations with the rest of the world; and,
4. The effect on NORAD.

With respect to enhancing the physical security of Canada, it is clear that the direct threat of a missile attack against Canada, at this point in time, can only be judged as non-existent. Further, even the indirect threat is deemed as remote based upon the National Intelligence Council report of September 1999, which found that countries with a new ICBM capability were expected to use their ICBMs in a coercive manner only. However, although it may be argued that there is no immediate credible missile threat to Canada's security, the potential threat posed by the

proliferation of ICBM technology to unstable nations and terrorist organizations indicates that it may be in Canada's best long term defence interest to participate in America's NMD program.

From the perspective of CAN/U.S. relations, the U.S. is our closest neighbour, one of our best friends and our closest ally. The U.S. also happens to be the world's only superpower and it dominates the world both militarily and economically. The U.S. is Canada's largest trading partner absorbing approximately 83 percent of our exported goods and services and 86 percent of our exported merchandise goods. Furthermore, our two economies are highly integrated not only in terms of trade but also in terms of economic infrastructure. Consequently, the U.S. represents, by far, the greatest determinant of Canadian domestic and foreign policy.

During the past century, Canadian and American politicians have traditionally experienced a friendly and, at times, very close relationship. However, as the U.S. has evolved into the world's only superpower, there are signs that they are becoming less tolerant of friends who do not share their view of the world. From this perspective, Canada's reduction in spending on it's instruments of foreign policy, such as the military, foreign affairs, international development assistance and intelligence services has proven to be a growing irritant between our two nations. In this context, because the NMD program is so important to America, Canadian participation in NMD would likely play a role in strengthening CAN/U.S. relations at a time when those relations appear to be at an ebb.

Internationally, opinion on NMD is divided between those who disagree with NMD on the grounds that it might induce an arms race and those who offer luke-warm support because they

do not wish to alienate the U.S. or seek to attain their own missile defence system technologies from America. Canada is one of those countries that have been reluctant to endorse NMD because they fear a deployed system could spark the Chinese into building up it's nuclear ICBM forces. This fear is not unfounded as the Chinese nuclear deterrence force capable of striking the U.S. consists of approximately 20 missiles while the NMD system is being designed to counter tens of missiles. From this perspective, the Chinese will either have to increase the number of nuclear missiles in its inventory or accept a significantly reduced nuclear deterrence capability. From this perspective, Canadian participation in NMD would run counter to long-term Canadian interests in China and against Canada's stance on missile proliferation.

It has also been determined from an international perspective, that several countries facing an immediate missile threat are actively seeking technologies to provide a shield against it. Again, although Canada does not face an immediate missile threat, the potential of meeting one, as these other nations are now facing, in the future is likely. Participating in NMD today may represent a form of security insurance that would be in Canada's long-term interest.

From the perspective of CAN/U.S. defence relations, it has been determined that Canada has enjoyed great benefits from this relationship. Not only has Canada experienced a level of security it could not have afforded on its own, this relationship has also allowed Canada a voice at the highest levels of America's military command structure, access to U.S. space operations and assets, and the right to leading edge aerospace technologies that have created a defence trade relationship that has contributed to Canada's economic growth. In addition, it was determined that NORAD is the flagship agreement that symbolizes the long-standing defence relationship

between the two countries. As NMD is expected to utilize the command and control architecture within NORAD, Canada runs the risk of damaging the vision of shared continental defence with the Americans, the fundamental role of NORAD in space operations and hinder the transfer of leading edge technologies to Canadian industry should it decide not to participate in NMD. From this point of view, Canada stands to lose a great deal. Therefore, from the standpoint of CAN/U.S. defence relations it is felt that participation in NMD offers continued defence and economic benefits for Canada that cannot be ignored.

Finally, the evidence presented in this paper has determined that Canadian participation in NMD cannot be founded on any realistic near-term ICBM threat. Further, that Canadian participation may cause Canada to lose some credibility internationally concerning its position on weapons proliferation. However, the evidence has also shown that, when taken as a whole, these potential penalties may be outweighed by the potential benefits that Canada might gain through her participation in terms of future security, trade and stability with it's closest ally. On balance then, from the evidence offered, this author feels that Canada should participate in NMD.

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