

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE
CSC 28

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES (MDS) THESIS

THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE

IS IT COLLAPSED?

By Maj FERNANDO MAURICIO ROS

This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. This paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied except with express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

Este trabajo fue escrito por un estudiante que asiste al Colegio de las Fuerzas Armadas Canadienses en cumplimiento de uno de los requerimientos del Curso de Estudio. Este es un documento escolar y por lo tanto contiene hechos y opiniones que el autor solamente ha considerado como apropiados y correctos para el tema. Este no refleja necesariamente la política o la opinión de ninguna agencia, incluyendo el Gobierno de Canadá y el Departamento de la Defensa Nacional. Este trabajo no puede ser distribuido, reproducido o copiado, excepto con el expreso permiso de el Departamento Canadiense de la Defensa Nacional.

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

FIRST SECTION 3 - 21

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and its Application in the Past

General Considerations..... 3
The Democratic System, Institutional Breakdowns and Military Interventions by
the United States..... 5
The Attack of an Extra-Continental Power against one of TIAR’s High
Contracting Parties..... 15
Summary 19

SECOND SECTION..... 22 - 66

The Threats

General Considerations 22
Organised Crime, International Delinquency..... 24
Terrorism..... 43
Poverty..... 59
Summary..... 65

THIRD SECTION..... 67 - 88

Security and its various models

General Considerations..... 67
Collective Security..... 69
Cooperative Security..... 71
Security as a Product of the Integration of the States..... 75
Human Security..... 78
TIAR and Security Models..... 81
Summary..... 87

CONCLUSIONS..... 89 - 91

ANNEX 1 – Statistics About Population and Poverty in America 92 - 93

BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 94 - 100

THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE

IS IT COLLAPSED?

INTRODUCTION

Having been in existence for more than half a century, the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR, by its initials in Spanish) has been witness to a large number of facts, circumstances and aggressive actions which affected the safety of the American countries during that period, whether this was detected through a strictly local analysis or one that focused at the regional level, and it is feasible to evaluate this information in order to determine its efficacy during said period.

But TIAR should also be revised, or at least questioned, to determine its feasibility and efficiency in view of the threats (this concept shall be defined in the second section) which surfaced after the end of the cold war which marked the collapse of the USSR, accelerating after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and therefore determining the non-existence of the hard or military power emanating from the Warsaw Pact.

The American continent needs mechanisms which contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in this new international order which, although as yet undefined, requires a series of “actions directed toward the preservation or restoration of law and order, to dissuade, detain and penalise war, aggression and oppression; to relieve civil suffering and to promote civil and human rights”¹.

Faced with these circumstances, a question becomes evident: **is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance still an efficient instrument for confronting or averting the threats that the American continent must face, or would this instrument already have collapsed?**

This paper intends to answer that question, firstly by analysing some incidents in the past, which required the TIAR application, and secondly, by defining the main threats to the security system adopted by the American continent.

Once the principal threats to America have been established, concepts underlying the issues of international security shall be discussed, under the premise that security conceptions have been expanded as a function of the global society, whereby the military element is just a contributing factor in the consecution of the objective of all security instruments to be designed, that being none other than the achievement of peace.

¹ Schroeder, Paul. The New World Order: A Historic Perspective. The Washington Quarterly. Cambridge, Spring 1994, (26). _

Lastly, conclusions shall be drawn which permit the formulation of a well-founded and demonstrable solution to the proposed problem, avoiding all intellectual entelechy, which only serves to add more volume to the rivers of ink that this subject has inspired in renowned researchers.

FIRST SECTION

THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE PAST

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

On March 12, 1948, the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance came into effect, thus materialising the aspirations of many of the American nations with regard to the adoption of a security mechanism for the continent, as established in the agreement reached at the Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace and Security of the Continent, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in February 1947.

It is apparent that the interests pursued by the signatory countries of the aforesaid treaty were diverse, as was the nature of each of their interests, although it is also true that TIAR pursued common objectives for the American nations in the international context of the time. One of them was the implementation of an efficient mechanism which would produce a rapid solution of conflicting situations resulting in acts of war and, even more ambitiously, would prevent the escalation of conflicts between the contracting members.

But there was also a second objective that had arisen as a consequence of the recently ended World War II, one which had taught the lesson that the continent's countries might face extra-continental armed aggression, for which reason it was necessary to adopt a judicial mechanism guaranteeing assistance to the country(ies) under attack from the rest of the American states.

In those times, Communism was seen as the main threat and therefore, aggression on the part of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) directly, or through third parties, against America was not a senseless hypothesis, having been interpreted as such by most of the countries represented in the Rio de Janeiro conference.

The United States, as the dominant power of the continent, had a particular interest in the execution of the treaty, vis-à-vis the Soviet threat. In this way, Washington would have an instrument justifying, if necessary, its intervention with the support of the other signatory members of TIAR, in such a way as to stop the expansion of

Communism, which was interpreted as the common enemy, after Hitler's Germany had been defeated².

In an attempt to establish the degree of applicability that the treaty has had since its implementation to the present date, this first section is guided by the following questions:

Have the mechanisms indicated in TIAR for the maintenance or reestablishment of PEACE been established in view of the existence of factors that threaten it? What are the reasons that motivated said situation? What level of efficacy has this treaty demonstrated throughout its history?

In the establishment of verifiable answers, the statements indicating commitments and mechanisms contained in TIAR will be taken into account and they will be compared to the historical facts occurring from the moment of the adoption of the treaty.

2. THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWNS AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES

Among its legal reasons, TIAR cites the fact that “The obligation for mutual assistance and common defence of the American republics is **essentially linked to their democratic ideals** and their desire to enter into permanent co-operation to carry out the principles and purposes of a policy of peace.” (highlighted by the author)

Further along, TIAR states that “The regional American community considers self-evident the fact that a judicial framework is a necessary condition for security and peace and that peace is founded in justice and moral order and, therefore, in the international acknowledgement and protection of the rights and freedoms of human beings, in the indispensable well-being of the peoples and in the **effectiveness of democracy**, for the international realisation of justice and security”³.

² Fitch, Samuel J. The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1998. Fitch states that, after the end of World War II, the United States considered Soviet communism as a threat that was necessary to confront, even by means of military alliances.

Cisneros, Andrés y Escudé, Carlos. Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina [General History of Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic]. <http://www.argentina-rree.com/index2.htm>. These authors in Part III: The Foreign Relations of Subordinated Argentine (1942-1989), Volume XIII: The Political Relations (1943-1966), Chapter 61: The third position of the Peronista era (1946-1955), The limits of an independent foreign policy (1946-1952), state: “At this moment (referring to year 1947), moreover, an Inter-American Defense Treaty would strengthen the United States position against the Soviet Union.”

³ Organización de los Estados Americanos. Considerando del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca [Organization of American States. Considering the American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance]. <http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29.html>. Rio de Janeiro, February 09, 1947. (1)

It is evident that TIAR underscores the need to maintain the ideals and the democratic system as a method of government for the consecution of justice, security and, ultimately, the realisation of the principles and objectives arising from a policy of peace.

The negation or non-existence of democracy goes against the objectives pursued by TIAR; however, since the date of inception of the treaty, the Latin American states, with the exception of Mexico and Costa Rica, have experienced the interruption of governments duly elected by the people through democratic mechanisms as a consequence of coups d'état carried out by their Armed Forces.

Starting with South America, Argentina was ruled by military governments in the following periods: 1955-1958, 1966-1973 and 1976-1983; Bolivia: 1964-1966 and 1969-1982; Brazil: 1964-1985; Chile: 1973-1990; Colombia: 1953-1958; Ecuador: 1972-1978; Paraguay: 1954-1994; Peru: 1968-1980; Uruguay: 1976-1984 and Venezuela: 1945-1959.

With regard to the Central American and Caribbean countries, there were also interruptions of the democratic system, thus El Salvador was ruled by 'de facto' governments in 1945-1961 and 1977-1981; Guatemala: 1954-1958, 1963-1966 and 1971-1985; Honduras 1963-1981; 1963-1981; Nicaragua: 1979-1984 (Take-over of the government by FSLN⁴; in November 1984, the FSLN candidate for president, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, won the election with a wide margin of votes); Panama: 1952-1955 and 1968-1978; Cuba: 1952-1954 and 1959-2002; Haiti: 1950, 1986-1988 and 1991-1994; Dominican Republic: 1963-1965.

The periods of interrupted democracy indicated in the preceding two paragraphs should basically be interpreted as having experienced the interruption of governments arising from elections, which, in some cases, may have been fraudulent, but at least held a vestige of a democratic mechanism, that of popular election or having been elected by congresses or legislative assemblies, although some were of a doubtful origin.

In particular, the above-described situations (anomalous democracies) took place mostly in Central America and the Caribbean, and no one in his/her right mind can be impervious to the obvious effects of ideological passions or personal biases, be they understood as democratic governments or regimes those which will be indicated below, as a factual demonstration of these statements.

⁴ *In the case of Nicaragua, the interruption of the Somocista regime, which ruled the country since 1936, was not brought about by the Armed Forces, but rather by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN, by its initials in Spanish). In this regard, one may read in the Encarta Encyclopedia 2001 that "The Sandinist advance on Managua was very rapid. Trying to prevent another Communist regime (besides that of Cuba) in Latin America, the United States pressured Somoza to resign his presidency in favour of a moderate coalition".*

Commencing with Cuba, the government of Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar, who took power again in 1952 with the support of the Armed Forces, dissolved Congress, imprisoned or murdered political opponents, suppressed freedom of expression and finally called for elections in 1954, and after the resignation of his main opponent, Grau San Martín, who was intimidated by political persecution, won the popular vote and continued in power until he was deposed by Fidel Castro on January 1st, 1959.

Continuing in the Caribbean, but in this case in Haiti, in 1957, Francois Duvalier, known as Papa Doc, was nominated president and he governed until his death in 1971; he established an authoritarian regime, eliminated constitutional rights, dissolved Congress and restored it with his cronies, persecuted and eliminated his political opponents by means of a paramilitary body known as the Tonton Macoute, which, in fewer than ten years, assassinated more than 2,000 political dissidents.

In 1971, he was succeeded by his son Jean Claude Duvalier, who was only 19 years old and who, supported by his father's collaborators, assumed power as president for life, creating a veritable dynasty of terror (now Les Leopard would be doing the work of the former Tonton Macoute), and ruled the country until 1986, when he fled the country and a military junta took over the reigns of the government.

Moving on to Central America, we pause in Nicaragua, which, from 1937 to 1979, was under the mandate of the regime established by the Somoza family; first Anastasio Somoza Debayle, National Guard Commander, who, in 1937, was elected president and continued as such until his assassination in 1956, subsequently being substituted by his son, of the same name as the father but nicknamed "Tachito", who, supported by the National Guard, persecuted his opponents and suspended individual rights, modified the Constitution without respecting the mechanisms established for such purpose, and dissolved the legislative assembly, staying in power until the Sandinista Front guerrilla took over control of Nicaragua in 1979.

Therefore, to the so-called 'de facto' governments which interrupted democratic processes, it will be necessary to add regimes which are similar to those described, since they did not comply with democratic patterns.

It is easy to deduce that all of these non-democratic regimes took place while TIAR was in full effect, with several of its contracting parties even being under the control of this type of system when the treaty was signed in 1947.

Thus, what can be said of the democratic principles stated by TIAR as a necessary condition for the maintenance of security and peace in the region? On the other hand, was the term "Democracy" only utilised to define regimes that were opposed to Communism?. Given the international circumstances present at that time, and the fact that the most dangerous threat

perceived by the most powerful contracting member, the United States, had been the expansion of Soviet communism, the answers to the above questions seem quite evident.

The identification of democracy as a synonym of anti-communism materialised in the attitude adopted by the United States regarding the acceptance of 'de facto' and non-democratic regimes during the period of the cold war, "Most of the coups d'état and military interventions in Latin America have been supported or endorsed directly or indirectly by the governments of the United States. U.S. intervention became more evident when the National Security Doctrine (DSN, by its initials in Spanish) appeared, examples of this being the coups d'état in Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973)"⁵.

Under the pretext that democracy was being threatened, and therefore the security of the continent was at risk (which, on some occasions was not actually true), the government of the United States intervened covertly through its Intelligence Agency (CIA) or openly by means of military action against those regimes that had shattered the system and type of government consecrated by the continent, implementing the mechanisms established in TIAR, or even without taking them into account on most occasions. The primary objective was the defence of the interests of the United States and not those of the continent as a whole.

Cited below are some examples which attest to this assertion, beginning with Guatemala, which, since 1951, had been governed by Jacobo Arbenz, who had carried out a strong agrarian reform and suffered a coup headed by "Colonel Castillo Armas, with the support of CIA and United Fruit Company, (who) would defeat Arbenz and end the reform experience"⁶. What was the danger for the safety of the Continent?.

In reality, everything seems to indicate that what was actually in danger were the direct interests of the United Fruit Company (established in the country in 1901), a company that had received important concessions during the governments of the Liberal president Estrada

⁵ Leal Buitrago, Francisco. Surgimiento, Auge y Crisis de la Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional en América Latina y Colombia. [Rise, Peak and Crisis of the National Security Doctrine in Latin America and Colombia]. Análisis Político magazine, Santa Fe de Bogotá, No. 15 (Jan- Apr 1992), (6-34).

This Colombian sociologist from the Institute of International Studies and Relationships of the National University of Colombia states that in the process of implementing the Doctrine of National Security (DSN) in Latin America, seven basic factors may be identified which influenced its origin: de-colonization, the Russian and Chinese revolutions ideologies, the cold war, geopolitics, the Cuban revolution, absence of military policies, and the influence of the United States.

In relation to the latter factor, Buitrago asserts that this may be verified by means of four main elements: Pan-Americanism, Political Ideology, Military Strategies and lastly, Political Interventionism, an element that is corroborated because "Most of the State coups and interventionism of this century (referring to the 20th century) in Latin America have been supported or endorsed directly or indirectly by the governments of the United States. With the appearance of DSN, the USA intervention became more evident, some examples of this being the coups d'état in Brazil (1964) and Chile (1973)".

⁶ Larousse, Diccionario Ilustrado. Guatemala: La experiencia Populista [The 'Populista' Experience]. Barcelona, Spain, 1999. (1367)

Cabrera (1898-1920) and particularly from Jorge Ubico Castañeda (1931-1944), who headed a dictatorial government supported by the banana-growing company.

On April 24, 1965, a group of military officers rebelled against the military junta that had governed the Dominican Republic since 1963, defeating the government of Juan Bosch, who had been constitutionally elected in 1962, and who shortly after taking the office of president was accused of sympathising with Fidel Castro. This revolt sought to reinstate Bosch as president.

Santo Domingo was turned into a battlefield and four days later, April 2, 1965; infantry forces of the United States went ashore near the capital city for the purpose of restoring peace and “protecting their interests (interests of the United States)”⁷.

During the first week in May of that year, the Organisation of American States (OEA, by its initials in Spanish) agreed to a cease-fire and established its own military forces for the maintenance of peace.

In this case, United States acted without waiting for the decision of the Advisory Organism established by TIAR, adopting unilateral measures which fall neither within Article 6 nor Article 8 of the treaty, due to the characteristics of the conflict.

With regard to the improper intervention of United States, as a contracting member of TIAR, and in relationship to the mechanisms established in it, Jerome Slater, expressed: “Beyond the immediate requirements of the political situation in the Dominican Republic, it is very probable that the recent effort to channel U.S. policy through the OAS was also a reflection of Washington’s intentions of repairing damages caused to the Inter-American system by the USA flagrant illegal and unilateral intervention. The two fundamental principles of the Inter-American system, namely collective security and non-intervention, have been ignored”⁸.

Later, on October 25, 1983, troops from the United States, together with a small group of forces from the Organisation of the Oriental States of the Caribbean, invaded Grenada, after a coup d’état finished off the government and the life of Maurice Bishop, and in this way ended the government regime who had lined up with the Cuban government.

According to William Blum⁹, President Ronald Reagan considered that Grenada represented a military threat to the United States. Reagan showed great concern when American

⁷ Enciclopedia Encarta. Historia de la República Dominicana. [History of Dominican Republic] MICROSOFT, 2001

⁸ Slater, Jerome. Intervention and Negotiation (The United States and The Dominican Revolution). United States, 1970. (75-76).

⁹ Blum, William. Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA interventions since World War II (Lying-one of the few growth industries in Washington): Grenada 1979-1984. United States, July 1995. (269-277).

intelligence services determined that the airport that was being built under the supervision of Cuban engineers and military and could be used against the security of the United States. Was the Grenada situation a threat to the continent? The answer could be affirmative or negative, but one thing is clear: TIAR was not taken into account when carrying out that action.

On December 20, 1989, the United States again invaded an American state: in this case, Panama, and the motivation was the capture of general Manuel Antonio Noriega, the man ruling the country and whom Washington accused of being involved in drug trafficking activities.

According to Noam Chomsky¹⁰, the United States government had been aware of Noriega's activities since 1972, but he was kept on the CIA payroll as an agent as long as he was useful. On this occasion, while Noriega was connected to the drug cartels, he was therefore a threat to American security, and TIAR mechanisms were ignored by Washington. Moreover "on December 29, 1989, OAS voted on the severe condemnation of the United States' invasion, voting 20 in favour of the condemnation and 1 against. The country voting against was, of course, the United States"¹¹.

All of the examples presented up to this point took place during the cold war, making it evident that the United States acted without regard for TIAR, whenever they believed "democracy was being threatened", whether it was because the government of an American country was showing signs of supporting Socialist or Communist ideals, or because those regimes showed some complacency with the USSR, especially after the Castro government in Cuba declared itself openly aligned with the Kremlin. This is without mentioning the fact that Washington also decided in favour of the intervention under the pretext of balancing threats against its security, as was the case of Guatemala in 1951, when, in reality, it was protecting its own economic interests.

On the contrary, there was no reaction in the cases of coups d'état by the armed forces engaged in fighting communism, and several of them not only met with complacency on the part of the United States, but were also encouraged and received financial and ideological support in their endeavour: "the Rockefeller report of 1969 considered necessary any temporary dictatorship as a measure of continental security"¹².

¹⁰ Chomsky, Noam. What Uncle Sam Really Wants?: The Invasion of Panama. United States, October 1992.

¹¹ Willson, Brian S. The Case of Panama: U.S. Continues its Bully Ways as International Outlaw (Analysis of the Dec. 20, 1989 U.S. Invasion in Historical Context). United States, 1991. <http://www.brianwillson.com/awolpanama.html>

¹² Leal Buitrago, Francisco. Surgimiento, Auge y Crisis de la Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional en América Latina y Colombia. [Rising, Peak and Crisis of the National Security Doctrine in Latin America] *Revista Análisis Político*, Santa Fe de Bogotá, No. 15 (Jan- Apr 1992), (21).

In either case, TIAR mechanisms were not applied, despite the requirement of the existence of effective democracies, which are necessary for security, as set forth in the treaty.

Finally, there is an example after the end of the cold war, when Communism, going hand-in-hand with the dissolving USSR, was no longer a threat.

This is what occurred in Haiti, after the priest Jean Bertrand Aristides was deposed by a military coup headed by General Roul Cédras in September, 1991.

It took more than three years to reinstate the deposed government, and only after pressure was exerted by the United Nations (ONU, by its initials in Spanish), which included an embargo and military intervention of the United States under its command.

TIAR, was not applied “despite the fact that the hemispheric States (in reference to TIAR Contracting Parties) had previously coincided in considering the rupture of any democratic regime as a threat to peace and security in the hemisphere”¹³.

3. THE ATTACK OF AN EXTRA-CONTINENTAL POWER AGAINST ONE OF TIAR’S HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES

Article 3 of TIAR establishes in the first paragraph that “The High contracting parties hereby agree that an **armed attack on the part of any State against an American State shall be considered an attack against all the American States**, and consequently, each one of such **Contracting Members hereby pledge to help to fight such an attack, exercising the inherent right of legitimate individual or collective defence**, as recognised by Article 51 of the United Nations”¹⁴. (highlighted by the author).

On April 2nd 1982, the Argentine Republic recovered the Falkland (Malvinas), Georgias and South Sandwich Islands without any bloodshed (during the military operation on April 2nd 1982, there were no casualties, either in the English military forces or in the civil population).

These territories were under the administration of the United Kingdom since its violent occupation and displacement of the Argentinean inhabitants in January 1833, despite the

¹³ Bartolomé, Mariano C. El Pentágono de la Seguridad Hemisférica. [The Pentagon of Hemispheric Security] Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra No. 540, Buenos Aires, (January- March, 2001), (35).

¹⁴ Organización de los Estados Americanos. Artículo 3° del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca <http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29.html>. [Organization of the American States. Article 3 of the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance] Río de Janeiro, February 09, 1947. (2)

Argentinean diplomatic claims to Great Britain¹⁵ since this usurpation, and particularly before the United Nations and the Organisation of American States beginning in 1945¹⁶.

As a consequence of the British solution of going back to the situation existing before April 2nd and retaking the islands by means of military force, the Argentinean Republic, through its ambassador before OAS, Raúl Quijano, requested that the Permanent Council convoke a meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Inter American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance, pursuant to Articles 3 and 4 of the treaty.

Argentina had executed TIAR on February 9, 1947, after long negotiations in which the foreign minister at that time, Atilio Bramuglia, according to historian Félix Luna¹⁷, was able to establish that the boundaries that the treaty considered to be ‘security boundaries’ include the Falkland (Malvinas) and South Georgias islands, as was finally established in Article 4. The United States had, at first, opposed this aspiration of the aforesaid diplomat.

When the meeting for the application of TIAR finally took place, the Argentinean Foreign Secretary had the following objectives: that Argentinean sovereignty over the territory in dispute be recognised, that the British attitude be condemned, since hostilities had begun just before the meeting and, lastly, that the use of negotiation be recommended so that a peaceful solution to the conflict might be found through such a method. To this end, Argentina required the strong commitment of all the contracting members regarding the application of the necessary measures according to the provisions of Article 8 of TIAR in this respect.

¹⁵ Ferrari, Cristina. Historia de las Islas Malvinas. [History of the Falkland Islands] <http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Center/3665/malvinas/>. This author states: “Taking advantage of its lack of preparation, on January 2nd, 1833 the British Corvette Clio, under the command of John Onslow, entered the bay of Puerto Soledad. Accidentally, Argentinian Commander José María Pinedo was in charge of the island government, who rejected the evacuation ultimatum given to him by the British forces. However, the absolute superiority of the English forces determined that on January 6 he abandoned the archipelago, in route to Buenos Aires, while the English troops appropriated the territory and proceeded with the systematic harassment of the Argentinian population. The inhabitants were dispersed and expelled, and the invaders took over the islands and their assets. On its part, the Argentinian government was not in a military situation to repel with arms the greatest military power of the time. Informed by José María Pinedo, the Buenos Aires government, headed by Ramón Balcarce, immediately protested to the British chart of affairs, Philip Gore. Almost simultaneously, on June 17 1833, the Argentinian representative in London, Manuel Moreno, submitted to the Foreign Office an extensive protest. The Argentinian claims continued in December 1884, April 1835, February 1842 and so on, since Argentina not only never dropped their sovereign rights, but on the contrary, from year to year and government to government felt deeply the armed dispossession of part of its territory”.

¹⁶ Cisneros, Andrés y Escudé, Carlos. *Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina*. [History of the Argentine Republic Foreign Relations] <http://www.argentina-tree.com/index2.htm>. See Part III: Foreign Relaciones Exteriores of Subordinated Argentine (1942-1989), Volume XII: The Malvinas (Falkland Islands) Diplomacy (1945-1989), Chapter 56: Malvinas (Falkland Islands) and multilateral diplomacy (1945-1981) and Chapter 57: Malvinas (Falkland Islands) and the bilateral Anglo-Argentina diplomacy (1945-1981).

¹⁷ Luna, Félix. *Perón y su Tiempo. Tomo I: La Argentina era una fiesta (1946-1949)*. [Peron and his Time. Volume I. Argentina was a party]. Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1984 (227-228).

The Working Committee of the Foreign Ministers Conference, representing TIAR signatory members, approved a resolution by 17 votes in favour and 4 abstentions supporting Argentinean sovereignty in the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. It exhorted Great Britain to immediately cease hostilities and asked the parties for the re-initiation of negotiations to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict.

But, in practice, these recommendations were not carried out, since the United States abstained from fulfilling the obligations of the treaty, citing that Argentina had already begun hostilities, thus in the real world, TIAR did not have any effect.

Finally, the position adopted by Washington was in total support of the actions of Margaret Thatcher's government.

With respect to the standpoint of the United States regarding the applicability of TIAR in the case of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, Gregorio Selser, says that Gaspar E. Weimberger, Secretary of Defence of Reagan, stated, "In terms of our policy, it is much more important to strengthen our influence in Western Europe than to conform totally to the 1947 Rio Treaty. Any North American politician gives priority to the unity of the NATO alliance in the second degree conflict initiated by the Argentinean government"¹⁸.

4. SUMMARY

- a. From the TIAR analysis, it may be concluded that the existence of States ruled by democratic regimes is one of the requirements upon which the judicial organisation that makes security and peace possible is based, and will be preserved as a consequence of the obligations of mutual assistance and defence, which are founded, essentially, on the democratic ideals of the American republics.
- b. From the execution of TIAR to the end of the cold war, with the exception of Costa Rica and Mexico, all Latin American countries have had coups d'état. Whenever these coups took place under the flag of fighting Communism, despite the institutional rupture, TIAR was not applied on grounds of the principle of non-intervention in matters of another state.

¹⁸ Haig, Alexander. Malvinas fue mi Waterloo Diario "La Nación", Buenos Aires, October 08, 1997. [The Falklands (Malvinas) was my Waterloo] "La Nación" daily. In this article, the former Secretary of State of the Ronald Reagan administration stated "In any case, I made it clear to the Argentineans from the beginning that we would be on the British side if the negotiations failed". I have mentioned the mediator on the part of the United States government during the Falkland (Malvinas) war to avoid a lengthy enumeration of facts demonstrating the support provided by the Reagan government to the British, in the total conviction that their own confession relieves me of submitting any further evidence.

¹⁸ Selser, Gregorio. Reagan: de El Salvador a las Malvinas. [Reagan: from El Salvador to the Falklands (Malvinas)]. Mex Sur Editorial, Mexico City, 1982. (286). Author's comments: the expressions of the author of this book could not be corroborated by other sources, this clarification has been provided due to the acknowledged communist militancy of this Argentinean writer (many of his books are openly hostile to the United States) who, while exiled in Mexico since 1976, committed suicide in 1990.

- c. Whenever the government of an American country was considered by the United States as a threat to the democratic system due to its policies or connections with the USSR, Washington intervened, either covertly or openly, to depose said regime, without taking into account TIAR's mechanisms. When this situation occurred, the other contracting members remained on the sidelines of the situation.
- d. The propagation of Communism in America by the USSR was considered a threat to democracy and it was on this basis that the largest TIAR contracting state, the United States, designed its strategies and policies. That was reflected in its interventionist actions, which put aside the very system of security that it had, itself, pressured the other countries into establishing.
- e. In the TIAR application that was required by Argentina during the Malvinas conflict, the sole case since the treaty had come into effect where the situation established in Article 3 was applicable, the treaty had no practical usefulness due to the lack of support of the United States, whose interests lay with the United Kingdom.
- f. At the end of the cold war, the coup d'état against Aristides in Haiti demonstrated that TIAR was no more efficient when fighting Communism as a threat to the security of the continent, due to the fact that the contracting members did not share the same perception of threat.
- g. TIAR's application over the past fifty years has been subject, in reality, to the designs and interests of the United States, and not to the probable and unique common interest of the remaining countries of the continent; that is, the maintenance of peace.
- h. Most of TIAR's inefficiency has resulted from the differences in perceiving threats among the contracting states, while also taking into account the role played by the interests of each country.
- i. Based on the above manifestations and cases presented, TIAR has proven to be a rather useless tool for maintaining or re-establishing peace on the American continent.

SECOND SECTION

THE THREATS

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the belief that the perception shared by the American states of the threats that the continent must face is one of the key factors for the definition and design of an efficient security system, this section will describe the probable threats that must be taken into account for this purpose.

As a first step toward achieving the objective of this section, the meaning and the scope assigned to the term “threat” shall be established. In this regard, Dr. Mariano Bartolomé states, “Threat is an array of circumstances which, when combined, constitute a potential factor of true damage that may, under certain circumstances, come about”¹⁹.

Of course, this meaning is comprised of more simplistic definitions that consider some facts as threats when they directly affect a country or a group of countries, reducing the capacity of action and reaction of the states to provide the protection or defence necessary to the society which conforms them.

The definition of threat also covers the definition of risk, which should not be understood “as a function of the possibility of damage, but in the conjunction between an intent of generating it and the capabilities available for that purpose”²⁰.

Using the above definition of the term “threat”, the following paragraphs will develop the concept of those “new threats” that it is believed will be present in any scenario defined for the mid- and long-term, which displaces to ‘second level’ that of an attack on the part of an extra-continental State against the region, as set forth in TIAR’s Article 4, as it likewise does with the possibility of armed conflict between the American countries.

With respect to the latter, the president of Colombia stated “We neighbours understand each other and work in a manner very different from the past. We see each other as partners, not as

¹⁹ Bartolomé Mariano. Las Amenazas Transnacionales. [Transnational Threats] Revista Escuela Superior de Gendarmería Nacional [Journal of the Higher School of National Police], Buenos Aires, 1999.

²⁰ Bartolomé Mariano. Las Amenazas Transnacionales. [same as above] Revista Escuela Superior de Gendarmería Nacional, Buenos Aires, 1999.

competitors. For all of us, co-operation, globalisation and interdependency are issues of permanent analysis. The promotion and adoption of measures of mutual trust is an excellent example, to the point that it has allowed us to move in our relations (referring to the relations among the American countries) from a position of constant tension to the condition of allies in various aspects”²¹.

The key question for this section is: **which threats should the security model for the American continent take into consideration?**

2. ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERNATIONAL DELINQUENCY

a. Introduction

One of the negative facets of our “globalised world” is that all countries feel that they are, themselves, vulnerable to a greater or lesser extent.

On our American continent, underdeveloped or developing states (euphemisms to denominate poor countries located south of Rio Bravo) are weak due to shortages of all types; the developed countries (United States of America and Canada) show weaknesses due to their complex political, social and economical structures, which may be affected by a multitude of events.

These weaknesses are exploited by international delinquents, converting them into vulnerabilities that may compromise even the very existence of the states with larger shortages in their social-economical and political framework.

On the subject of delinquency, it is possible to mention a wide variety of options; however, the more significant ones will be those related to terrorism and organised mafias.

Given the transcendence reached by terrorist organisations and activities in the world, particularly for the American nations, it is within the Organisation of the American States (OAS) that the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE, by its initials in Spanish) has been created²². This specific form of delinquency will be treated specifically.

Organised crime has traditionally been a legal-political problem for the individual states. But the growth of an interdependent economy among the countries, the quick development

²¹ Pastrana, Andrés. Discurso pronunciado en la sesión de apertura de la IIIra Conferencia de Ministros de Defensa de Las Américas. [Speech delivered at the opening session of the 3rd. Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas] Cartagena de Indias, November, 1998._

²² Organización de Estados Americanos. Historia del CICTE. [Organization of America States. History of CICTE] <http://www.cicte.oas.org/historia.htm>

of transportation and communication systems, the wide growth of international trade, and the appearance of a global financial market, are factors which have drastically changed the context in which organised crime operates, as well as the nature of crime itself.

The problem has widened due to the presence of government crises in some American states (the majority of the Latin American states are not foreign to that situation) and in the system of states as a whole. Political corruption, economic crises and globalisation have provided the means by which criminal organisations have become capable, not only of operating with relative impunity, but also of exploiting new economic initiatives²³.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, and under the shadow of the conflicts erupting in different regions of the world, for instance, “a type of illegal economy of weapons smuggling has been developed with the support of Russian mafias and funded by the growth of opium or hachis and its refining in the valley of Bekaa (Lebanon) or in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border”²⁴.

Further, there are numerous examples all over the world of the network of terrorism and mafias (be they of Russian origin, southern Italy, Chinese, Japanese, etc.) in relation to the sale of weapons and drug trafficking. But the significant part of this is the connotation implied regarding war security, particularly for the American continent due to the influence of said “societies” in the expansion of conflicts. The current situation in Colombia is a good example of that.

The level of danger represented by international delinquency to world security was demonstrated at the World Conference of Ministers on International Organised Crime,

²³ Madeleine Albright stated, in a speech before the Council of the Americas in Washington on May 4 2000, that “the culture of corruption is one of the main obstacles to the expansion of democracy in Latin America. The results of growth in the last decade cannot be seen in all the countries of the region, with the programs and policies of the governments too often increasing rather than reducing inequality. Corruption blocks the capacity of the government to provide basic services to their citizens, undermines the confidence of people in democracy and is too often linked to across-the-boarder crime, including drug trafficking, organized crime and money laundering”.

Catells, Manuel. Hacia el Estado Red [Towards the Network State] . <http://www.tce.sc.gov.br/biblioteca/artigos/globalizacao.html>. This Sociology and Planning professor at the University of California at Berkeley, in his paper on “Society and State Reform”, Sao Paulo, March 26, 1998, stated: “The constitution of criminal networks with extraordinary economic and technological means, capable of corrupting and murdering administrators and politicians, of breaking into and instilling fear in the institutions of the State, has become a central aspect of politics and economics in Latin America and in many other countries (as is the case of Yakuza penetration in the Japanese financial system or the various mafias in the banking system). Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Panama are, among others, countries whose institutional dynamics is strongly conditioned, and on occasions annulled, by the influence of crime. But those are not national phenomena, although they may have roots in each country. They are linked networks which move among countries when they see themselves threatened on the basis of the strategic superiority of their global activity in police networks and judicial systems which, essentially, remain being local”. “In an economy that is increasingly penetrated by mafias and in politics that is more and more vulnerable to corruption, administrative ‘cleanliness’ is probably the most important government principle”.

²⁴ Pucheta, Luis. El Nuevo Orden. Ensayo de Maestría de Estrategia y Geopolítica de la Escuela Superior de Guerra. [The New Order. Master’s Essay on Strategy and Geopolitics of the Higher School of War] Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 2000.

which took place from November 21st to 24th 1994 in Naples, which reached the conclusion that there is a need to establish a common front against organised crime by means of:

- Awareness on the part of all members of the real threat of organised, international crime.
- Establishment of legislation at the international level to impose penalties for participation in criminal and conspiratory associations.
- Development of a spirit of involvement and common predisposition against the organised crime problem.

The threat of international crime and criminal organisations is insidious, omnipresent and wears multiple masks. International crime violates with impunity the frontiers defying the sovereignty of the countries. Although developing states are particularly vulnerable, no state can escape from the threat. Organised crime threatens the normal functioning of governments and law, attempting simultaneously against the global political system.

The American continent is affected by different criminal actions and organisations, from those dedicated to the traffic of people - as is the case of the introduction of illegal immigrants from poor countries into United States and, to a lesser degree, into Canada - to white slavery (which promotes the diffusion of AIDS)²⁵, establishing and operating networks of white slavery in countries with higher social-economical levels, for which women are introduced from other American countries (with Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic and Central American countries being the most affected ones), and, at the same time, having increased the sexual exploitation of minors²⁶.

The actions developed by 'mafiosi' and criminal organisations, which represent the greatest danger to continent security, are those of drug trafficking and money laundering, as illustrated below.

²⁵ Ministerio de Salud Pública de México. Informe sobre Prostitución y SIDA. [Mexico's Public Health Ministry. Report on Prostitution and AIDS]. Mexico City, volume 37, November-December 1995. (592-601).

²⁶ Buscarons, Edis. El papel de la familia frente a la explotación sexual infantil. <http://www.hurlinet.com.ar/a.html>. This author in relation to prostitution with minors states: "In the Dominican Republic, it was estimated that there were some 25,400 minors involved in prostitution. In 1994, a study in Colombia estimated that, in Bogotá alone, three thousand minors were working as prostitutes. In many parts of South America and Central America, the problem of street kids who prostitute themselves is widely documented". In this sense, the report of the NGO Casa Alianza on prostitution, dated March 1998, expands this data to include all of Central and South America, see <http://www.derechos.org/ddhh/casalanza/mcra.html>. Organización Panamericana de la Salud. Tráfico de Mujeres y Niños para la Explotación Sexual en las Américas. [Pan-American Health Organization. Traffic of Women and Children for Sexual Exploitation in the Americas]. Washington, July 2001. According to this report, 500,000 girls prostitute themselves in Brazil, 50,000 women and children in the Dominican Republic are taken each year to the United States, 35,000 women are taken each year from Colombia and 2,000 children are exploited in whorehouses in the city of Guatemala.

b. Drug trafficking

If the smuggling of people provides substantial profit, it does not compare to the benefits obtained from drug trafficking.

From the capital generated by the criminal economy and circulated in financial circuits “which has been estimated at about 750,000,000,000 dollars”²⁸, it is estimated that the international drug market generates annual earnings of close to 400,000,000,000 dollars, with this figure representing “approximately 8% of the product of all commercial activity in a year”²⁹.

At any rate, the drug market is still evolving, both geographically as well as with regard to its production. One of the most important increments has been the traffic of heroin. Myanmar and Afghanistan are the world’s largest producers of opium and Pakistan seems to be the largest processor of Afghan heroin, in an area known as the “Golden Crescent”.

We shouldn’t forget the “Golden Triangle” in Burma, Thailand and Laos, which is a large-scale production and distribution hub both to Europe and the United States.

West Africa is becoming a drug transit zone between America and Europe, “all supported by authoritarian regimes immersed in internal disputes, almost civil wars, greedy for easy money to fund those conflicts”³⁰.

The Nigerian ‘mafiosi’ are contributing to the expansion of the trafficking of both heroin and cocaine throughout the entire southern region of Africa and expediting its transit to other continents, while “South Africa is supplied with cocaine by Argentina and Chile, the source of the second most important seizure after Nigeria”³¹.

Regarding the American continent, we find, at the same time, from a macro- analysis of the sources of production in South America, that countries such as Colombia, Peru and Bolivia are the largest producers of cocaine or basic paste for such purpose and the United States is the most representative of the consumers, as a result of being the country with largest

²⁸²⁸ Catells, Manuel. Hacia el Estado Red.[Towards the Network State] <http://www.tce.sc.gov.br/biblioteca/artigos/globalizacao.html>

²⁹ Organización de las Naciones Unidas. Primer Informe Mundial Sobre Drogas. [United Nations Organization. First World Report on Drugs. <http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protec/Archivo/d000d59e.htm>

³⁰ Castellano, Guillermo. Las Amenazas Transnacionales en los Escenarios de la Argentina. Monografía de la Maestría de Estrategia y Geopolítica de la Escuela Superior de Guerra.[Transnational Threats in Argentinean Scenarios. Monograph for a Master’s degree at the Higher War School] Buenos Aires, October, 2001, (6) .

³¹ Druetta, Gustavo. Producción y Tráfico ilícito de drogas. Situación de América Latina y el Caribe.[Drug Production and Illicit Trafficking. Situation in Latin America and the Caribbean] Ser en el 2000 magazine No. 10, Buenos Aires, July 1997.

population on the continent and its high buying power, although other countries such as Brazil, Argentina or Mexico, are also consumers on a lesser scale.

But also, the territories of several countries on the continent have become “transit routes” of cocaine destined for the United States and Europe, such as Venezuela, Panama, Mexico, Brazil or Argentina, or the case of Jamaica as a country of transit for Ecstasy pills bound for Canada.

Of course, all countries have drug consumers to a greater or lesser degree.

Among the criminal organisations involved in this trade, the Colombian cartels in the so-called “infernal drug circle” dominate cocaine smuggling exported to the United States, utilising all type of means, from MI-8 Soviet helicopters to small conventional submarines. Furthermore, some organisations, such as the formerly powerful Cali cartel, have diversified their markets, expanding them to Europe with the collaboration of the Sicilian mafias whose earnings, made in the immediate future, exceed even those stemming from the North American market.

These Colombian criminal organisations have a symbiotic relationship, as Colonel Oscar Rey³² has disclosed, with the guerrilla groups of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC, by its initials in Spanish), the National Liberation Army (ELN, by its initials in Spanish) and also with the group Colombian United Selfdefence (AUC, by its initials in Spanish), obtaining protection for their activities in exchange for payment of money to said guerrilla groups.

We should not forget that the actions of the drug trafficking organisations extend to the Andean region; Peru and Bolivia are affected by this problem since “they are the main producers of coca paste from which Colombia obtains supplies to produce cocaine clorhydrate”³³ and more than a million persons live directly or indirectly from the production of coca leaves, this figure being possibly even higher. In this regard, Pablo Basz, states “Bolivia is a textbook case: 80% of its rural population is dedicated to coca plantation”³⁴.

A strong relationship as also been demonstrated in South America between the drug trafficking organisations and governmental organisations, and these links have even been found at the highest levels of governmental power.

³² Rey, Oscar. Colombia, Guerrilla y Narcotráfico. [Colombia, Guerrilla and Drug Trafficking] Editorial Militar. Vol 756. Buenos Aires, November 1994.

³³ Druette, Gustavo Adolfo. Previously mentioned work.

³⁴ Basz, Pablo. Los Narcos Golpean en América Latina. [Drug Dealers Hit Latin America]. Diario “El Cronista Comercial”, Buenos Aires, July 02, 1996 _

An example is the case of Peru, where the former Intelligence advisor of the former president Fujimori, Montesinos, was involved with drug cartels. In this regard, the Brazilian Federal Police, through Mauro Spósito, who was in charge of the investigation, stated: “To operate on Peruvian territory, the Porras group (referring to a drug dealing kingpin) had the collaboration of Vladimiro Montesinos”³⁵.

In 1998, “DEA had begun the investigation of the involvement of Montesinos with the group known as the camels, after the impoundment of 681 kilograms of cocaine in Bulgaria and 2,300 kilos of the same substance hidden in a hake cargo and marked with the shape of a camel. This cartel had sent numerous shipments to Europe”³⁶.

Reaffirming the connection between Montesinos and drug trafficking, a group of five Peruvian representatives, headed by David Waisman, submitted a 1,500 page report in which it was asserted that “Peru had been converted into a narco-state by the Fujimori government due to the illegal activities of Vladimiro Montesinos”³⁷.

In North America, the Juárez cartels and, to a lesser degree, Tijuana in Mexico, have entered into a larger-scale participation in drug trafficking to the United States over the last decade.

Other Latin American countries have also been introduced to the world of the international drug trafficking organisations. Brazil, just to mention one, is playing an increasingly important role as a transit state, and is suffering from a plague of drugs, especially in the “favelas” (marginal neighbourhoods of the large Brazilian cities) of Rio de Janeiro³⁸.

This alarming situation was the reason for Brazilian authorities to send the Army to restore order and law (operatives Rio I and II) in the Carioca favelas in 1994, given the level of corruption reached by the police as a result of the activity of the drug mafias³⁹.

³⁵ This information was published by the daily “La Nación”, Buenos Aires, July 04, 1997.

³⁶ Castellano Guillermo. Previously mentioned work

³⁷ Noriega, Carlos. La Fujicracia Vivió del Tráfico de Drogas, según la Comisión. [“Fujicracy” lived out of drug trafficking, according to the Commission]. “Página 12” daily, Buenos Aires, June 18, 2001. _

³⁸ Druetta, Gustavo Adolfo. Previously mentioned work. See: Trafficking evolution from 1994 to 1995 and current trends. Besides, see article “Drugs get out through Brazil”, “Página 12” daily, July 20, 1996.

³⁹ Basz, Pablo. Previously mentioned work.

Also, installations of laboratories and airfields have been detected in the Brazilian Amazonas by the Cali Cartel⁴⁰, from which it can be deduced that this country is entering into the category of a producer state.

The drug trafficking phenomenon represents, among other things, a threat to the state of a military type, on which account several countries of the continent employ their Armed Forces to fight it, due to both the wearing down and corruption factors generated within the political institutions, liquefying their power, and to the consequent “risks of feudalización”, meaning the loss of territorial control on the part of the state, to the hands of drug trafficking cartels”⁴¹.

The fact that, for several countries in the continent, as may be the case of Argentina or Chile, this threat has not resulted in the direct use of the Armed Forces, would be due to the interaction of three factors: first, the reluctance of the political leading classes to grant a higher power of decision and means to the military⁴²; second, the fear of most of the military component of deforming the role of the armed institutions⁴³; and, third, corruption.

With respect to this last factor, the former Argentinian ambassador to the OAS, Hernán Patiño Mayer, states: “Another risk is corruption, which is the consequence of a strategy of fighting against drugs, one which stresses prohibition and penalties, and neglects the prevention of consumption. There is no doubt that drug trafficking produces resources: figures for “laundering” are higher than the annual Argentinean GDP, an almost bottomless pit used to corrupt those who should persecute them. To expose the Armed Forces to that contamination, something that has been widely verified when the military have been involved, would inflict a mortal wound on institutions which, in our case, work to recover social esteem and

⁴⁰ Jobim, Nelson. Cartel de Cali Invade a Floresta Amazónica. [Cali Cartel Invades the Amazon Jungle] *Diario Jornal do Brasil*, Brazil July 21, 1996. The former Brazil’s Minister of Justice, Nelson Jobim, stated: “In the Brazilian Amazon region, laboratories and airstrips have been detected that were installed by the Cali cartel for producing and trafficking cocaine”.

⁴¹ Mendel, William y Munger, Murl. Las amenazas que representan los estupefacientes, Porqué poner nuestras prioridades en orden. [Threats represented by narcotic drugs. Why do we need to have our priorities in order?]. *Revista Parameters*. United States, July 1997.

⁴² Author’s Note: The reluctance of the political leaders to accept the involvement of all means and elements of the Armed Forces, beyond the current logistic support and some Intelligence assistance, would be founded in the aftermath of the fight against the subversion which took place during the decade of the ’70 in Argentina and the ’70 and ’80 in Chile, this perception being the product of numerous talks with military officers of those countries and as a consequence of my own work in the design of the future Argentinean Military Ground Instrument.

⁴³ See editorial Aporte Militar Contra el Narcotráfico. [Military Contribution against Drug Trafficking] “La Nación” daily, Buenos Aires, February 26, 1997. Author’s Note: On this subject, my activity in the Argentinean Army General Staff (EMGE, by its initials in Spanish), resulted in my reaching said conclusion.

recognition, things we have been obtaining through efficient compliance with our own missions”⁴⁴.

In relation to the above paragraph, and given the seriousness of the situation, the United States is exerting constant pressure on other countries in the continent to get their Armed Forces involved in a direct fight against drug trafficking, citing the reason that, under normal circumstances, the repression of this plague is a task that corresponds to police forces, but that in the current situation, there is clear evidence of the magnitude of the problem.

Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and, to a lesser degree Mexico, constitute clear examples of the devastating nature of this threat, and the pressure from Washington has resulted in the full participation of the Armed Forces in their fight against the production, trafficking and marketing of illegal drugs.

As expressed by the Commander of the Southern Command of the United States, “this command holds in high priority the fight against drug trafficking. In 1998, more than 12,000 people died in the United States due to causes related to drug consumption and trafficking”⁴⁵.

The relevancy of this threat was manifested in the words of the retired General Barry R. McCaffrey, former Director of the Office of National Policies for Drug Control of the United States, in an interview granted to the magazine “Diálogo”⁴⁶ “The support we offer to the Andean nations in matters relating to drugs is totally inadequate. Colombia has enormous problems, and Pastrana will be strongly pressured to solve them, and while Peru and Bolivia are encountering some difficulty getting out of the tiger’s jaws, Colombia is getting into it”.

Further, McCaffrey indicated, “The situation in Colombia is perhaps worse than what many people imagine. We have 25,000 armed guerrillas and the body and soul of that criminal empire is the money from drug trafficking. The production of cocaine in Colombia has

⁴⁴ Patiño Mayer, Hernán, Fuerzas Armadas y Narcotráfico. [The Armed Forces and Drug Trafficking] SER en el 2000 database. <http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protec/Archivo/>

Wilhelm, Charles E. Apuntes personales sobre la exposición del Comandante del Comando Sur de los Estados Unidos durante una visita de la Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejército Argentino a la sede del citado comando. [Personal notes in the presentation by the United States Southern Command during a visit by the Argentinean Army’s High War School to said command headquarters]. United States, December 1999.

Shevis, James. McCaffrey, one to one with Diálogo. “Diálogo” magazine, United States Southern Command, United States, June 2000.

increased so much in the last three years that it has doubled. It's the number one producer in the world, far exceeding Peru, which used to be the top producer”

Finally, when we analyse this threat, one must take into consideration the environmental damage which comes as the result of deforestation associated with the illegal cartel planting of drugs and the environmental impact of the drug trafficking consumables. For each hectare of coca grown, three hectares of rain forest are deforested and 2.5 hectares in the cloudy forest for each hectare of poppy planting. “Over the last thirty years, somewhere between 850 thousand and one million hectares have been cut down in Colombia. At the same time, chemicals, weed killers and pesticides leave the ground sterile for eight to ten years, which does not allow the substitution of legal crops, according to the Colombian Ministry of the Environment”⁴⁷.

The remaining chemical substances employed, such as gasoline, sulphuric acid, ether, acetone, etc. to liberate the cocaine alkaloids from the leaves and then purify the drug, results in a variety of chemical sub-products, which are discharged into the rivers.

These residues have a negative impact, requiring a minimum of between 10 and 15 years for the environment to recuperate its natural state. It is estimated that more than 30 million litres of waste chemical sub-products from production of cocaine are dumped each year in the watercourses of the Colombian jungle and in the region of Chapare and Yungas in Bolivia.

“More than 150 rivers and creeks, which are flooded annually with large quantities of toxic waste and contamination have suffered irreparable damage, including the loss of species and even being reduced to having minimal animal life in their courses. Some reports have revealed the finding of fish with crooked spines and other with genetic deformations”⁴⁸.

Colombia, Peru and Bolivia are the countries most affected by the effect of contamination by chemical waste employed in refining coca, as a direct consequence of being the producers of more than 70% of all cocaine consumed in the world.

Therefore, drug trafficking, in addition to its other well-known effects, is aggressively contaminating the South American environment.

c. Money laundering and trafficking

⁴⁷ Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. El Narcotráfico: Una Amenaza para la Seguridad Nacional (Drug trafficking: a threat to the National Security). Colombia, October 2000. (33-34)

⁴⁸ Varela, Juan Carlos. Informe sobre narcotráfico y medio ambiente. [Report on drug trafficking and environment]. Departamento Planeamiento de la Jefatura III-Operaciones – E M GE. Buenos Aires, May, 2000

The laundering or whitening of money is the action of converting money earned through illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, weapons traffic, etc., into money which bears a legal appearance and whose origin can not be traced to the illegal activity which generated these assets.

“According to a recent estimate, the world activity in money laundering reaches approximately one trillion dollars annually. This illicit money allows the criminals to finance a variety of other criminal activities.

Furthermore, money laundering promotes corruption, distorts the making of economic decisions, worsens social problems and threatens the integrity of financial institutions”⁴⁹.

The American countries, particularly the Latin American ones, are deeply affected by money laundering resulting from criminal and ‘Mafiosa’ activity, which finds judicial and financial structures that facilitate such activities, as well as government officials who permit them.

Money laundering has produced a symbiotic relationship between the criminal organisations and the political elite of some countries, with a good example of this being Colombia, Peru and particularly Argentina. With regard to the latter country, the report on money laundering issued by the Chamber of Representatives of the Argentinean Republic⁵⁰ has given clear evidence of this criminal association, a relationship that allows the operation of legal businesses with money resulting mainly from drug trafficking, weapons traffic, and payment of bribes.

Moreover, money laundering is facilitated by taking advantage of the laws of banking secrecy existing in some places in the world, such as the Caiman Islands and Switzerland, as well as the possibilities offered by the electronic transfer of funds in the global financial system.

According to studies published⁵¹, in fiscal havens throughout the world, there are deposits for six trillion dollars, equivalent to almost one third of all the assets deposited in the world by private wealthy groups. In the Caiman Islands alone, which is considered the fifth world

⁴⁹ Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos. La lucha contra el lavado de dinero. [The fight against money laundering] United States State Department, Vol. 6, No. 2, Washington, May, 2001.

⁵⁰ Cámara de Diputados de la República Argentina. Informe final de la Comisión Especial Investigadora sobre Hechos Ilícitos vinculados con el Lavado de Dinero. [Argentinean Chamber of Representatives. Final Report of Special Investigative Commission on Illicit Acts connected with Money Laundering] <http://www.infomelavado.com/> Buenos Aires, November 15, 2001.

⁵¹ Braslavsky, Guido. Jaque a los paraísos fiscales. [Checkmate to fiscal havens]. “Clarín” daily, Buenos Aires, October, 2000.

financial market, there are more than five hundred banks with deposits of over 500,000 million dollars.

Financial havens prospered in the decades of the '70's and '80's. Extremely advantageous fiscal conditions, political and institutional stability, banking secrecy and discretion have transformed small countries and territories into prosperous sites receiving money from all corners of the world.

The Financial Action Group (GAFI, by its initials in Spanish), which was created as an initiative of the G7 in 2000, made public a list of countries which they called "non-co-operative" in the task of adopting standardised measures for the international campaign against money laundering. In America, Panama, Bahamas, Dominica and Caiman Islands are listed.

In Paris, in June 2000, the Organisation for Economic and Economic Development (OCDE, by its initials in Spanish) published a list of 35 tax havens or fiscal paradises in Europe, the Caribbean and Southern Pacific⁵².

OCDE classifies the fiscal havens as those with nominal or non-existent taxes which openly or implicitly are offered as places where foreign nationals may avoid embarrassing questions or the risk that information about their investments be divulged, therefore those "paradises" favour tax evasion and even expedite money laundering resulting from drug trafficking, weapon trafficking, corruption and other criminal activities.

Some of the characteristics that define an ideal financial haven are the lack of agreements governing the sharing of fiscal information with other countries, the possibility of establishing companies instantaneously, a legislation which protects social or entrepreneurial secrecy, good electronic communications, banking confidentiality, adequate geographic location and generally an abundant tourist market which serves as a cover-

CNN. OCDE amenaza con sancionar a "Paraísos Fiscales" que no cumplan con normas internacionales. [OCDE threatens to sanction "Fiscal Havens" not complying with international standards] <http://cnnespanol.com/2000/mundo/europa/06/26/oecd/>

up⁵³.

These so-called fiscal havens are an excellent platform from which to do business, and companies with headquarters located in such places do not pay the taxes corresponding to their subsidiaries in the countries where they are located.

The mechanism used to avoid fiscal taxation from the State where their subsidiaries are located is a statement of symbolic capital which then permits them to operate with loans granted by the head office.

But if this were not sufficiently prejudicial for the states, which are thus cut off from a genuine source of resources that would allow them to pay for their operation and fulfill their obligations as such, the so-called fiscal havens allow “money laundering”, transforming illegal money from their criminal activities such as drug trafficking, weapon trafficking, earnings tax evasion and payment of bribes.

In these “paradises”, nobody questions where the money, which will be later displaced to other latitudes from a legally organised company, comes from. In this

sense, over the past ten years, South America has been transformed into an excellent laundering market due to a strong financial opening, since “financial liberalisation and de-regulation have allowed a remarkable growth in the circuits of penetration during the first stage of laundering”⁵⁴, and the need for investment indicated by the governments of the region.

The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States⁵⁵ has classified as the countries where money laundering takes place: Panama, considered the largest centre of money laundering, the Caiman Islands, Argentina, Ecuador, Chile, Venezuela, including the United States itself. Countries that are highly vulnerable with regard to the execution of that illicit activity

Kandel, Pablo. Cuáles son las tácticas más usuales del lavado de dinero. [What are the most common tactics for money laundering?] “Clarín” dialy, Buenos Aires, June 13, 2000. In this article, the author explains that a typical money laundering manoeuvre involves three stages: 1°) Depositing money, that is, placing the money in the market, be it through bank deposits, investments in insurance companies, financial intermediaries, shares and public papers, money exchange markets, and money exchange agents. 2°) Decanting the money utilising multiple accounts, mixing illicit accounts with proper ones and, when necessary, transferring to other countries, mainly to fiscal havens around the world. 3°) Transit from illegality to legality, called integration, that is, to develop activities allowing them to continue laundering money indefinitely. “A series of services can be ideally adapted, as in the case of hotels, videoclubs, private mail and many transport companies, for instance, where it is difficult to control passenger activity and the drugs that are being transported”.

⁵⁴ Chesnais, Francois. El blanqueo del dinero sucio y la mundialización financiera. [Dirty money laundering and financial globalization]. <http://www.attac.org/fra/cons/doc/>.

⁵⁵ Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA). World Factbook. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> United States, 2001.

are: Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Bahamas, Belize and Dominica. Most of the assets are the product of the trade and traffic of illegal drugs.

3. TERRORISM

a. Introduction

In a general sense, terrorism could be defined as “a means of violent assault, carried out by an organisation or political group against the power of the State in order to achieve their objectives”⁵⁶.

From a legal point of view, citing the definition of Manuel Osorio in the Judicial Political and Social Science Dictionary, terrorism is understood as: “acts of violence against people, freedom, property, common security, public tranquillity, the public powers, the constitutional order against the public administration”.

From a military point of view, terrorism is defined as: “serial acts of violence aimed at causing panic through the assassination of people, kidnappings, torture and moral, physical damage or destruction of material assets. It may constitute one of the methods employed by subversives in the process of recruiting and dominating the population where the objective is to seize power”⁵⁷.

Whichever definition is taken, it is extremely difficult to determine when a group or political denomination, religious belief or ethnic group has executed an act of terrorism in pursuit of its objectives, and more difficult still to be able to determine whether that action maybe justified or not, taking into account the causes invoked as a basis for said actions.

In the first instance, terrorism may have an objective that apparently lacks sense in and of itself, such as the diffusion of fear, but its true goal would probably be to subdue the people or modify the conduct of the State through the application of an active method that focuses essentially on the physical and moral suffering of those that have been selected as targets, to be the objects of violent actions.

There are many controversies surrounding this subject and it is not the objective of this paper to discuss each aspect in depth, but rather, to demonstrate that terrorism is a threat for the security

⁵⁶ Larousse, Diccionario Ilustrado. Definición sobre Terrorismo. [Definition on Terrorism] Barcelona, 1999. (972)

⁵⁷ Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas. Diccionario para la Acción Militar Conjunta. Definición sobre Terrorismo. [Argentinean Joint Armed Forces Staff. Dictionary for Joint Military Action. Definition on Terrorism] Buenos Aires, 1998. (T-2-5).

of any system or model that is currently had or shall be adopted by America in order to obtain or maintain a situation of peace⁵⁸.

From the time of TIAR's inception, the American continent has suffered aggressive acts of terrorism carried out by various groups which had not been contemplated as being among the threats that this treaty would encounter.

This serious failing, or perhaps the total lack of presence of TIAR, was manifested in the statement made by the Peruvian Foreign Affairs Minister after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001.

In this respect, García Sayán⁵⁹ explained that TIAR contemplated a joint military reaction when dealing with external aggression toward any of its members, and, in this case, the aggressor was a very particular phenomenon”, said in reference to the attacks of September 11.

He continued to state that, “there is no context of classical aggression which may result in an Inter-American multilateral force. What we are going to see is involvement, not only in the way of political support and the fight against terrorism, but also the commitment of the hemisphere not to become a zone in which terrorism may expand or find direct support”.

For the purpose of this paper, we will classify organisations as being: those whose origins can be found on the same continent, that is, autochthonous ones; and those having extra-continental roots and have executed, or are capable of and rate a high probability, of carrying out terrorist actions in America.

In relation to the former (autochthonous), it must be noted that this classification does not exclude the fact that, in many cases, they were supported, and their actions promoted and instigated, from entities outside the continent, as we will see below.

b. Autochthonous organisations

America, particularly Latin America⁶⁰, has suffered from the activities of organisations or groups that may be classified as insurgents, subversives, revolutionary or guerrilla,

Martínez, Carlos María. Bases para el Pensamiento Estratégico: “El Conflicto”. [Basis for Strategic Thinking: “The Conflict”]. Vol I, High War School, Buenos Aires 1994. (51-72). In this work, it is concluded that the type of peace that must be achieved is that known as Political Peace, which is different from Seraphic Peace and Evangelical Peace.

García Sayan, Diego. Declaraciones del Canciller de Perú en relación del TIAR y los Ataques Terroristas del 11 de septiembre. [Statements of Peru's Foreign Minister in relation to TIAR and the September 11 terrorist attacks] Revista Poder.Com, September 20, 2001. <http://www.punto-com/NR/exeres/>

⁶⁰ In North America, the following may be mentioned: the separatist organisation Liberation Front of Quebec in Canada and Zapatista Front of National Liberation, in Mexico.

according to different authors, who, on occasion pressured by ideological and political passions, classify these groups into typologies, thus justifying or, to the contrary, rejecting their activity before the readers.

While the existence of armed groups, be they classified as revolutionaries, subversives or insurgents⁶¹ employing guerrilla warfare techniques, have not been an exclusive phenomenon of the 20th century in Latin America, and we still must remember the “montoneros” (followers of General Martín de Güemes) who fought against the Spanish Army in northern Argentina since 1814⁶², it is during the decade of the fifties in the last century when many of the organisations employing violence as a way of seizing power began to arise.

It was during those years that these groups or organisations that may have found their origins in old traditions of political conflicts located in different countries in Latin America, the majority of which supported socialist or communist type-ideals and were supported by the USSR through the KGB, as part of the strategy to continue with the cold war which was formulated by the Kremlin⁶³.

In the decade of the ‘60’s, after the triumph of the Cuban revolution, the large number of groups employing terrorist means to achieve power increased dramatically, with extra-continental support and incentives from the countries behind the Iron Curtain, and from Cuba itself, beginning in the second half of that decade.

The strategy was designed to get to power by means of subversive zones which would be created in the countries that possessed the necessary conditions, those being strong economic and social inequalities, as was the case of many Latin American countries.

The main set of instructions derived from such strategies were propagated at meetings of the Organisation of Solidarity of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAAL, by its initials in Spanish) and particularly during the meeting of the Latin American Organisation of Solidarity (OLAS, by its initials in Spanish), celebrated in Cuba in 1966⁶⁴.

⁶¹ O’ Neill Bard E. Insurgency & Terrorism: Chapter II “The Nature of Insurgency” Brassey’s, Inc. United States of America, 2000. (13-30).

General Martín Miguel de Güemes, since 1814 organised the defence of the northern Argentinean frontier against the Royalist armies which was trying to invade from “Alto Perú” [Bolivia] the region to move onto Buenos Aires and squash the revolutionary movement arisen in 1810. For that purpose said general organised armed groups of “gauchos”, to which he called “montoneros”, and through techniques of guerrilla warfare prevented the progress of the Spanish army for over six years. He was killed by the Spanish troops in 1821.

⁶³ Escobar, Raúl Tomás. Estrategia Contrarrevolucionaria. [Counter-revolutionary Strategy] Editorial F.I., Buenos Aires 1983. In this work the author, in Chapter I, explains the location, internal connections and with the URSS, actions and ideology of the groups or organisations, which Escobar clasifies as subversives.

⁶⁴ Escobar, Raúl Tomás. Work previously mentioned. See chapters on O.S.P.A.A.A.L. and that dedicated to O.L.A.S.

In this way, different organisations became integrated, and Bard E. O'Neill classified these mostly as subversive groups of the Equalitarian and Pluralist types⁶⁵, types which would support armed combat, fundamentally through guerrilla warfare techniques in both rural and urban areas, executing, on occasion, actions that could be qualified as terrorist.

As an example, we shall mention only a few of the organisations that utilise this methodology and which supposedly received support from the USSR and Cuba, and would have been inspired by the Fidel Castro and Che Guevara revolutionary movement.

“Montoneros” and the ERP (People's Revolutionary Army) in Argentina; the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (MLNT) in Uruguay; the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Bolivia; the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FMR) in Chile; Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VRP) in Brazil. Shining Path (this group acknowledges its origins in 1960) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru, some researchers may deny or question the Cuban support to MRTA, although there are sufficient articles published which would prove the contrary⁶⁶; ML 19, FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (National Liberation Army) in Colombia.

As far as Central America is concerned, the National Sandinist Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua; the Farabundo Martí Front for the National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador; and the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Guatemala⁶⁷.

Although, again in Latin America, other organisations also appeared which did not get support from the USSR or Cuba, such as the United Self-Defence of Colombia (AUC) which, under the banner of “Colombia without Guerrilla”, “attempted to break the link between subversion and the population by means of terror and assassination”⁶⁸.

With the exception of the organisations operating in Colombia, the terrorist group Shining Path, to which the State Department of the United States assigns capability of carrying out terrorist actions by means of bombs and selective assassinations⁶⁹, and the subversive group National Liberation Sandinista Front which took power in Nicaragua in 1979, all the other

O' Neill Bard E. Work previously mentioned (17-19).

Zimmerman, Matilde. La Conexión Centroamericana: Ideologías revolucionarias entre 1959 y 1979. [The Central American Connection: Revolutionary ideologies from 1959 to 1979]. Paper presented in the Third Central American Congress on History. San José de Costa Rica, July 15-18, 1996.

Romero, Mauricio. Guerra, Paz y Democracia. [War, Peace & Democracy] Institute of Political & International Affairs Studies of Colombia's National University, Research sponsored by Colombia's Ministry of National Defence, February 2001. http://www.midefensa.gov.co/conflicto_armado/cainv01201_guerraypazun.html

groups were annihilated or reduced to a minimum by the Army and Police forces of the States that suffered their activities

Finally, the collapse of USSR and the block of the eastern communist countries deprived those organisations of the substantial source of income, of sanctuaries and training bases, from which they have counted from the decade of the sixties to the end of the eighties.

Regarding to the armed organisations acting in Colombia, FARC, ELN and AUC, these entities obtain money from kidnapping, robberies, money laundering and particularly from the funds resulting from the drug trafficking “business”.

Funds coming from the production and illegal trafficking of drugs represents the main source of financing of said organisations, and it is estimated that 70% of the FARC’s funds are obtained from that activity. ELN, on its part, has 7 of the 41 fronts which are directly connected to the production and traffic of drugs, and lastly, the illegal groups of AUC get 70% of their financial resources from trafficking, according to its own head Carlos Castaño⁷⁰.

c. Extra-continental organisations

The American continent has suffered attacks, during the last decade, which were carried out by terrorist groups belonging to international terrorism⁷¹, and falling within this classification was the attack against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992, with more than 29 casualties and 200 injured persons⁷²

, the attack against the World Trade Centre in 1993, resulting in 6 casualties and 5 injured persons⁷³.

Office of Counterterrorism. Background Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Department of State, United States of America. http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/fto_info

⁷⁰ Ministry of National Defence. El Narcotráfico: Una Amenaza para la Seguridad Nacional. [Drug Trafficking: A Threat to National Security] Republic of Colombia, October, 2000. (6,19-29).

, the attack against the World Trade Centre in 1993, resulting in 6 casualties and 5 injured persons, and the attack against the Argentinean Mutual Israel Association (A.M.I.A.)

There is no widely-accepted definition of the meaning of international terrorism; for the purpose of this paper, the definition contained on Title 22 of the United States Code, section 2656f(d) has been adopted.

⁷³ Donángelo , Karina y Rodríguez Leirado, Pablo. La Memoria de la Impunidad [Memory of Impunity]. <http://www.almargen.ar/seba/seccion/politica/amia1>

Moving along time, we arrive at September 11, 2001, when the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were attacked, leaving more than 5,000 casualties and missing persons in its wake, and a loss of materials assets in the amount of many millions dollars⁷⁴.

All of these attacks have in common the fact that they were executed, according to the United States, Israel, Argentina and European Union intelligence services, by Islamic fundamentalist organisations of extra-continental origins which are classified by Bard E. O'Neill as "reactionary traditionalism"⁷⁵.

A fundamentalist is a person who is a member of the fundamentalist movement, "Muslim religious movement of the XX century" promoting the strict observance of the laws of the Koran"⁷⁶.

If fundamentalism is analysed as a doctrine, the historic reality shows that the conception of the fundamentalist proposal is religious/political in nature, meaning that fundamentalism has a transcendental and dogmatic foundation. That means that it is essential, undeniable and absolute, endorsing the justice of coercion and force for those who do not accept its belief and this is the potential danger of fundamentalist groups⁷⁷.

On the subject of the composition of these groups, Emmanuel Sivan⁷⁸ asserts that "the fundamentalist thinkers are capable of attracting some people who generally do not understand those ideas. This is natural, as is the fact that many people became communist after reading the manifesto, and perhaps surrender their lives blindly in the face of something that they only partially comprehended, but which was enough to explain the world and drive them to action".

There are, according to the sources, discrepancies on the number of casualties, injured and economic losses caused by the September 11 terrorist attacks. The figures mentioned in this paper were taken from the ABC daily. Ataque Terrorista en EE UU. [Terrorist Attack in USA]. <http://www.abc.es/especiales/index.asp>

⁷⁵ O' Neill, Bard E. Previously mentioned work. (18-19).

⁷⁶ Larousse, Illustrated Dictionary. Definición sobre fundamentalismo y fundamentalista. [Definition on fundamentalism and fundamentalist]. Barcelona, 1999, (470).

Similar descriptions of Islamic fundamentalism and the threat it represents are given by: Bartolomé, Mariano. Cultura y Violencia a Fin de Siglo: "El caso del Islam". [Culture and Violence at the end of the century: "The case of Islam"] Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra No. 534, Buenos Aires 1999; and Bozo Cerdá, José. El Fundamentalismo Islámico. [Islamic Fundamentalism]. Revista Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Santiago de Chile, 1999.

Sivan, Emmanuel. El Antisemitismo y El Fundamentalismo Islámico. [Antisemitism & Islamic Fundamentalism] Kivunim magazine (Spanish) No.5 Jerusalem, Abril 1995.

Further, this author continues: “A similar process has taken place in the core of the Muslim community, who share similar feelings, based on the rejection of modernity and all of the effects that this concept has caused to the Muslim world.

These fundamentalist leaders single out Israel, and particularly the United States, which they call Satan, as responsible for the damages afflicted on the Islamic community.

According to their preaching, humanity is divided into two factions, the faithful, and therefore the chosen, and the unfaithful which have already been condemned as infidels. In this regard, Alvin Toffler states: “By selectively quoting the Koran, they justify mass killing, and the murderers believe the world to be an enemy attacking Islam under the command of the greatest infidel enemy, the United States”⁷⁹.

The terrorist acts carried out by Muslim fundamentalist organisations increased after the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, both in Middle Eastern as well as in Western countries⁸⁰.

In the case of the American continent, the terrorist acts committed in Buenos Aires, and, particularly, the attacks of September 11, 2001, are not only clear evidence of the increase of these actions but also of the destructive capability of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, which, by the decision of the executors of those attacks to immolate themselves for the “cause”, has proven to have important financial resources at its disposal⁸¹.

According to different research lines⁸², these groups are not only getting financial and technical support, as well as sanctuary from states governed by fundamentalist regimes, as is the case of the Talibán in Afghanistan, but are also being incited to commit the terrorist actions by the regimes governing Iran, Sudan, Libya, Syria and Iraq.

It is probable that, in the future, an Islamic renaissance would bring other Muslim states governments to embrace fundamentalist theories, or would at least cause this renaissance to persist as a social, cultural and political force, since the economic and popular

⁷⁹ Toffler Alvin. Librando una Batalla Mental. [Fighting a Mental War]. Newspaper article published in “Los Ángeles Times” and translated by “Paniega” magazine of Octubre 08, 2001. <http://revista.pangea.org>.

⁸⁰ Goobar, Walter. Condena contra el Gobierno Iraní. [Condemn against the Iranian Government]. “Página 12” daily, Buenos Aires, November 4, 1997. This newspaper article recalls that the German judicial system, in sentencing those responsible for the bomb attack which took place in Berlin on September 1992, had confirmed the involvement of Iranian authorities. Also see Di Lazzaro, Alejandro. El nexa entre Irán y la Jihad Islámica. [The link between Iran and Islamic Jihad]. “La Nación” daily, March 13, 1998. Bartolomé, Mariano. Cultura y Violencia a Fin de Siglo: “El caso del Islam” [Culture and Violence at the end of the century]. Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra No. 534, Buenos Aires 1999.

⁸¹ Gunaratna, Rohan. “Blowback”. Jane’s Intelligence Review. August 2001 (44).

⁸² Department of State. Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism. Washington, 1999. <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/>. Bartolomé, Mariano. Cultura y Violencia a Fin de Siglo: “El caso del Islam”. [Culture & Violence at the end of the century]. Higher War School’s magazine, No. 534, Buenos Aires 1999.

pressures keeping them in power continue to exist, if the situation currently being experienced in Muslim countries does not vary radically⁸³.

Continuing with this part of the analysis, a synopsis of the main groups driven by Islamic fundamentalist ideals and carrying out terrorist activities shall be presented.

Based in Palestine, there are two terrorist groups, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (JIP, by its initials in Spanish) and Hamas. They focus on regional actions directed particularly against the State of Israel, especially after the beginning of the second Intifada, although one should rule out that, in the future, they may formulate terrorist acts against countries that they view as Israel's allies.

If cyberspace is seen as a favourable field in which to carry out terrorist cybernetic activities, then members of those groups would have transposed the regional framework with their actions.

“Hackers (those who fraudulently enter into computer networks but not necessarily to damage systems, often limiting themselves to stealing information) and crackers (who, similar to hackers, enter fraudulently into computer networks but with the clear intention of damaging the system or its contents)”⁸⁴ belonging to the aforesaid group have been carrying out actions of this type “since the second Intifada was launched in Jerusalem and occupied territories on September 28, 2000”⁸⁵.

Another terrorist organisation is Hizballah in Lebanon and in other Arabic nations, with branches in European countries, and includes Ciudad del Este, the triple frontier between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay⁸⁶.

Gellner, Ernest. Posmodernismo, razón y religión. [Postmodernism, reason and religion]. Ediciones Paidós Ibérica S.A., Barcelona, 1994. This author states that “Islamic fundamentalism is a socially empowering movement, tremendously simple, powerful, terrenal, sometimes cruel, absorbent, which offers a sense of direction and guidance to millions of men and women, many of whom live lives of extreme poverty and are subject to cruel oppression”.

⁸⁵ Busuttill, James. The Reality of International Law. “A taste of Armageddon: The law of Armed conflict as applied to cyberwar”. Clarendon Press, United States of America, 1999 (48-56).

Corach Carlos. Contra Los Santuarios. [Against the Sanctuaries]. “Página 12” daily, Buenos Aires, August 01, 1995. This South American region was indicated as a “physical sanctuary” for terrorist fundamentalist organizations by the first time by the then Argentinean Minister of the Interior, Carlos Corach, during the “International Consultation Meeting on Co-operation to prevent and Eliminate Terrorism” celebrated in Buenos Aires in August 1995.

Hizballah has operated in this region of our continent, according to reports from the intelligence services of Argentina and Brazil, since the end of the decade of the nineties. This was corroborated by the co-ordinator of the Counter-terrorism Office of the United States, State Department, Francis Taylor, who stated “my government is very concerned about the situation of the triple frontier, since there are extremists already operating in that area”⁸⁷.

Sometime after the statements made by Taylor, other information identified the fact that the groups operating in Ciudad del Este were related to Al Qaeda: “that region is being used as a refuge and source of financing for terrorists related to Iran’s Party of God and organisations working closely with Osama Bin Laden”⁸⁸.

Another fundamentalist Islamic terrorist organisation is the widely-known Al Qaeda, which, after the attack committed against United States on September 11, 2001, demonstrated the capability it had acquired and the degree of danger it poses to the western world, especially the United States, which has been selected as the main target of its activity.

“Al Qaeda is a conglomerate of groups dispersed around the world operating as a network and whose presence has reached global levels”⁸⁹.

This organisation, created by Osama Bin Laden in 1988, with cells and branches in fifty countries, “has been supported by Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan”⁹⁰. It has been indicated as the entity responsible, in addition to the attacks committed against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in September 11, 2001, for the terrorist actions carried out against the United States embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, the attack against the United States warship USS Cole which was moored in Yemen, and also the first attack against the World Trade Centre in 1993.

But, in addition to the attacks committed by this organisation against “United States targets”, the Argentinean intelligence agencies after September 11 were not discarding the possibility that, behind the attacks against the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and against the

Taylor, Francis. El control de la Triple Frontera. [The Triple Frontier control] Editorial of Clarín daily. Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 2001.

CNN. La Triple frontera es refugio de terroristas, dicen fuentes de inteligencia. [The triple frontier is a refuge for terrorists, according to Intelligence sources]. <http://www.cnnenespanol.com>. November 8, 2001.

Gunaratna, Rohan. “Blowback”. Jane’s Intelligence Review. August 2001 (42). According to this author the Al Qaeda organisation would have cells in Argelia, Egypt, Marroco, Turkey, Jordania, Tayikistan, Uzbekistan, Siria, China, Paquistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Philipines, Libano, Iraq, Arabia Saudita, Kuwait, Bahrayn, Yemen, Libia, Tunes, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechenia, Dagestan, Kashmir, Sudán, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Etiopia, the West Bank and Gaza, and of course, Afganistan.

⁹⁰ Gunaratna, Rohan. “Blowback”. Jane’s Intelligence Review. August 2001 (43).

Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and against the Jewish mutual AMIA in 1994, was the organisation headed, to date, by Bin Laden.

Other fundamentalist organisations are: the Islamic Armed Group (GIA, by its initials in Spanish) in Algeria, Gama at al Islamiya y the Islamic Jihad in Egypt, although the latter two would not have, in the opinion of the Counter-terrorism Office of the United States State Department, the operational capacity demonstrated by the former ones.

We reiterate that all of these groups promulgate a selective interpretation of the Muslim faith which justifies terrorist violence and recruit “martyrs” for suicide attacks.

The degree of relevance or danger of this threat is augmented when the decision to sacrifice themselves in acts of suicide is made, which, as been pointed out by the authors of the attacks, adds to the capacity they have, according to the United States, Israel and United Kingdom Intelligence agencies, to access weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical or biological, which could be obtained, according to the above-mentioned sources, from scientists of the former USSR or provided by countries capable of producing them, such as Iran, Iraq, Syria and even Libya, or finally could be purchased in North Korea.

Lastly, terrorism is not a “weapon” for the private use of Islamic fundamentalist organisations, as have demonstrated other groups, such as ETA, in Spain, IRA in Ireland, or the Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) group, which made evident to the world the ease with which massive destructive agents may be available to terrorist groups when they carried out the attack involving the Tokyo subway in 1995.

But the Islamic fundamentalists pose the greatest threat, due to their numbers, acquired capacity and, particularly, their “faith in the cause”.

4. POVERTY

Poverty, in itself, does not pose a threat, but when analysed from a wider perspective, it may become the cause of actions that affect not only the internal security of the American States, but also create veritable focus points of regional instability, particularly in some Latin American regions.

The following is a transcript of the analysis made by the United Nations Development Program (PNDU)⁹¹ regarding poverty and its effect on society. This entity, which is affiliated with the United Nations Organisation, states: “The problem of poverty has ethical, economic and political implications. For PNDU, poverty is a brutal negation of human rights and it eliminates the mistaken notion that social well-being, education, health and employment are

⁹¹ PNUD. Publicación sobre la pobreza. [Paper on poverty]. <http://www.pnud.org/> Caracas, Venezuela, March 2002

favours or acts of charity by governments and international organisations in the benefit of poor people”.

Further along, the PNDU document adds: “Poverty denies people the freedom, capability, right and opportunity to have longer, creative and healthy lives, to obtain knowledge, and to enjoy freedom, dignity and self-respect”.

Lastly, PNDU asserts that: “A society immersed in anxiety, lack of hope and insecurity is a factor that **compromises democratic stability** (highlighted by the author). Democracy cannot be firmly established while large sectors are excluded from the economy and from society. Poverty leads predominantly to exclusion, in addition to cultural, ethnic, gender and political discrimination, which is usually accompanied by social-economic deprivation”.

It is obvious that poverty and inequality particularly affect Latin American countries on the continent, and those which are not of Latin origin, located in the Caribbean region, in addition to increasing inequality and denial of opportunities of growth to the people, may find that the levels of social peace are disturbed, and, as a result, the ability to govern the states may be hindered.

All of the above means risks to democracies that the protocol of reforms to TIAR, among its provisions, lists as some of the requirements for the “international realisation of justice and **security**”⁹² (highlighted by the author).

Poverty may generate violent actions affecting not only the internal security of the States but also regional security. With regard to the latter, the so-called Movement of Landless Rural Workers, “the most powerful social movement in Latin America”⁹³, has effected numerous illegal invasions of private properties in the south of Brazil, resulting in the intervention of that country’s Army⁹⁴, but that organisation is also a threat for the Argentinean and Paraguayan owners next to the Brazilian border, which, if it materialises, will extend the conflict to that region in South America.

⁹² OEA. Protocolo de Reformas al Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca (TIAR). Considerando. [Protocol of Reforms to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR). Legal reasons. San José de Costa Rica, July 26, 1975 (2) .

⁹³ Harnecker, Marta. El Movimiento de los Trabajadores sin Tierra de Brasil Construyendo la Fuerza Social Antineoliberal.[The Brazil Landless Workers Movement Building the Anti-neoliberal Social Force]. Sao Pablo, Brazil, August 2000. <http://www.sodepaz.org/Comunicaciones/marta>.

Guzmán, Eleonora. Brasil: cientos de campesinos armados en pie de guerra [Brazil: hundreds of armed peasants ready to fight]. “Clarín” daily, Buenos Aires, November 3rd, 1996. In this article, one of the facts produced by the Landless Workers Movement de los Trabajadores sin Tierra is reported, pointing out threats to security.

Also, poverty can trigger an increase in crime rates, such as smuggling, which is prevalent on the Paraguay-Argentina border⁹⁵ or, for the thousands of Bolivian, Peruvian and Colombian peasants who grow coca, forced by the exclusion imposed by poverty, making it possible for the drug traffickers to obtain raw materials for cocaine production⁹⁶.

Others, as is the case of Colombia, have joined the guerrilla groups under the flag of social equalities and a fair distribution of wealth⁹⁷, or they are forced to cross over illegally into countries offering better economic and social conditions than their places of birth, making it possible to form criminal organisations dedicated to the smuggling of human beings, as is happening at the border between Mexico and the United States.

Further, poverty promotes the traffic of women and children for sexual exploitation, which, beyond the illegal significance of that trade, is an important factor in the propagation of sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS⁹⁸.

Lastly, poverty leads to the poor exploitation of non-renewable resources, resulting here in aggression towards the environment, indiscriminate deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonian region and on the border between Argentina and Brazil, to cite an example.

“Poverty is the socio-economic medium that limits the economic options of the people, damaging their health, restricting the formation of rural capital, reducing opportunities to generate income and limiting institutional and infra-structural development. It is an underlying state which facilitates deforestation”⁹⁹.

⁹⁵ An increase in smuggling actions of the so-called “ant” smuggling type has been reported at the border between Argentina and Paraguay, utilising people, particularly of the poorest classes, who are called “passers”, because they “pass” everything over the border, from cattle to cigarettes. See Articles Smuggling reaches 3000 million pesos, “La Nación” daily, Economic Supplement, Buenos Aires, July 21st, 2000. Desolación y falta de control en la frontera con el Paraguay. [Desolation and lack of control in the Paraguayan border] “La Nación” daily, August 10, 2000. Gendarmería y Aduana se facturan por las aftas. [Police and Customs are invoiced by “aftas”] “Página 12” daily, Buenos Aires, August 15, 2000

⁹⁶ Ministry of National Defence. El Narcotráfico: Una Amenaza para la Seguridad Nacional. [Drug Trafficking a Threat to National Security]. Republic of Colombia, October 2000. (18,49 & 50). Conflicto Político y Social en Bolivia. [Political and Social Conflict in Bolivia]. “Clarín” daily, Buenos Aires, October 2nd, 2000.

Rey, Oscar. Colombia. Un problema americano. [Colombia. An American Problem]. Military magazine No. 750, Buenos Aires, March 2000.

⁹⁸ Pan-American Health Organisation. Tráfico de Mujeres y Niños para la Explotación Sexual en las Américas. [Trafficking with Women and Children for Sexual Exploitation in the Americas]. Newsletter, Washington, July 2001.

Canadian Agency for International Development. Asuntos Forestales, Deforestación: Bosques tropicales en disminución. [Canadian Agency for International Development. Forestry Issues, Deforestation: Diminishing Tropical Forests]. <http://www.rcfa-cfan.org/spanish/s.issues.12-5html>

Another example is uncontrolled fishing on the Paraná River, which, if the current uncontrolled exploitation of its resources is not reversed, will lead to this, the second largest river in South America, losing the most important species among its fish to extinction in the next 7 to 10 years¹⁰⁰.

When human beings, pushed by poverty, do not have their basic needs fulfilled, they make use of Nature without taking into consideration the irreparable damage caused to their habitat.

It being of interest to translate the above concepts into figures reflecting the magnitude of the problem, we have analysed the data included in Attachment I, which is based on an estimated population for the year 2001 of 829,880,000 million (SIC) inhabitants in America, of whom almost 194,000,000 are below the poverty line.

According to the World Bank, “a person shall be considered ‘poor’ if his/her level of income or consumption is under a minimum level which makes it possible to satisfy his/her basic needs, this level usually being referred to as the poverty line. This is the level necessary to satisfy basic needs according to time and societies”¹⁰¹.

It clearly isn’t the same to be considered poor in the Latin American and Caribbean countries, as it is in the United States and Canada, because in the latter countries, the social barriers of contention and support provided by governmental organisations and even non-governmental ones, tend to ameliorate the seriousness of the facts.

Therefore, the problem manifests itself more seriously in the Latin American countries and the Caribbean region, where, as indicated in Attachment 1, there are currently 153,922,000 people that are classified as poor, although, in this regard, the General Director of FAO states, “Data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL by its initials in Spanish) indicate that, in that area, there are 224 million under the poverty line, most of which are concentrated in South American countries that are currently undergoing difficult macro-economic circumstances”¹⁰²

OAS has also defined the number of people who will be under the poverty line: “in absolute terms, it is estimated that that, in the region, there are 210 million poor persons in the Caribbean and Latin American homes”¹⁰³.

Cordiviola de Yuan, Elly. Crecimiento de Peces del Paraná Medio. [Fish growth in Middle Parana River] Instituto de Limnología Nacional [National Institute of Limnology], Santa Fe City, 2001. The conclusions of this work were widely publicised in February 2002, being the basis of a TV report in the “Ecology” program broadcast by CNN in Spanish.

World Bank. Informe sobre la pobreza. [Report on Poverty]. <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty>

¹⁰² Diouf, Jacques. La pobreza en América. [Poverty in America]FAO, <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty>

¹⁰³ OEA. La OEA y la Superación de la Pobreza. [OEA and Overcoming Poverty]. <http://www.oas.org/vdsa>

While the above sources show some discrepancy with regard to the figures, the number of people immersed in poverty is of such magnitude that the threat is well defined, especially when the future reveals such a complicated panorama¹⁰⁴, according to some sources that are related to this issue.

In this regard, the World Bank indicates that “The average growth rate for the developing countries (PVD for its initials in Spanish) should increase 3.2% in 2002 and 5% in 2003, but this re-activation will continue to be insufficient if a significant reduction of poverty is to be achieved. Latin American economies, however, will continue to stall this year, with a growth of only 0.5% before climbing to 3.8% in 2003”¹⁰⁵.

In the same sense, an editorial of the news agency France-Press, in relation to the World Summit for an end to poverty, says that “for the last 30 years, the industrialised countries had promised to dedicate 0.7% of their GDP to official assistance in the development of poor nations, but, decades later, those figures did not reach even half of what was anticipated, and in some richer economies, such as the United States, they don’t even want to hear about a specific deadline in which to reach said ideal goal”¹⁰⁶.

The increase of poverty in the PVD in Latin America is reflected in the growth of marginal urban settlements, which has resulted in a decrease in the levels of poor people in the rural areas of some countries in the region, but this urban growth “is a manifestation of the wounds of poverty in a perhaps more visible way”¹⁰⁷.

Lastly, in America, poverty must take priority in the agenda of those who define security systems, because if this aspect is not seen to with the expediency and the degree of importance that the issue requires, there will be an increase in criminal activity, as indicated above, and also there will be some concern over regional stability, in which case, we may not witness a clash of civilisations, as announced by Huntington¹⁰⁸, but rather, a collision of masses of poor people with those who have their basic needs satisfied.

According to the data in annex 1, and if similar poverty levels are maintained, in the year 2020, Latin America will reach a figure of almost 227,000,000 poor from a total of 274,000,000 people of the same condition for the whole continent. Statistics such as those published by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC by its initials in Spanish) of Argentina in April 2002, in which it is set forth that in the last 6 months alone, 1,500,000 Argentinean have entered the poor class category, will demonstrate that if the current policy is not drastically reversed, poverty will continue to increase over the next decade.

World Bank. Estudio sobre el crecimiento económico.[Study on economic growth] <http://www.yupimnsn.com/negocios/>

France-Press. Cumbre Mundial sobre la Pobreza. [World Summit on Poverty] <http://www.yupimnsn.com/negocios/leerarticulo.cfm>

Menjivar Larín, Rafael; Kruijt, Dirk and Van Vucht Tjissen, Lieteke. Pobreza, Exclusión y Política Social. [Poverty, Exclusion and Social Policy]. FLACSO, San José, Costa Rica. January 1997.

5. SUMMARY

- a. The model of security for the American continent will have to consider the following as being among the threats posed: **organised crime**, particularly drug trafficking or general narcotics activity, and money laundering, which expedites the whitening of capital that is the product of criminal activities and contributes to corruption; **international terrorism**, carried out by Muslim fundamentalist terrorist organisations, and, lastly, **poverty**.
- b. Poverty will become a source of instability in most of the Latin American countries, which will endanger their capability to govern, therefore endangering democracy.
- d. Poverty will be a trigger which forces millions of Latin American inhabitants to enter other countries illegally in search of better socio-economic conditions, and promote the trafficking of human beings and sex trade, while also forcing thousands of peasants to become involved in the growth of raw materials for the production of drugs such as cocaine, marihuana and heroin, making it easier for local subversive movements (such as FARC and ELN in Colombia) to obtain the right conditions in which to recruit fighters and sympathisers and contribute to the damage done to the environment.
- e. The probability of warfare between the American states will have been placed at a second level, in comparison with the possibility of occurrence of the above- mentioned threats.
- f. Threats such as those mentioned above were not contemplated when TIAR was executed, simply because, at that time, they were not perceived as such, as is the case of Muslim fundamentalist terrorism, or they did not exceed the threshold of a police problem, as is the case of drug trafficking.

THIRD SECTION

SECURITY AND ITS VARIOUS MODELS

1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The objective of this section is to outline the principal concepts surrounding the security models that have been developed to date, defining the type of model to which TIAR belongs.

In this sense, Nye defines security as “the absence of threats to a State-Nation”¹⁰⁹; but it is evident that this concept can only be achieved in a theoretical plane.

Nye, Joseph. El Nuevo Poder Mundial. Actualización de la Política. [The New World Power. Updating of Politics] Buenos Aires, Argentina. November 1991. (43).

On the other hand, the UN interprets security from an inter-state point of view: “a condition in which the States consider that there is no risk of a military attack, political pressure or economic coercion which would prevent their own free development and progress”¹¹⁰.

In the beginning, the concept of state and inter-state security, in the widest sense and in my opinion, must be understood as the situation resulting from the control of all threats, thereby ensuring that the interests of the States or groups of associated States not be negatively affected and that the objectives that they have determined be accomplished.

From the creation of the States-Nations after the Peace of Westphalia, nations adopted security systems based mainly on the development of a military apparatus capable of responding to the threats facing them. Therefore, in many of the security programs, the pre-eminence of the military factor over the remaining power factors of the States is evident, and this model may essentially be considered as being reactive in nature, where, in some way, the concept of defence has been confused with the wider concept of security, the former being just a means for the consecution of the latter.

But the end of the cold war, and the appearance of new threats, or old threats that grew to a higher level for the security of the states, has promoted the design of other security models, which is one of the phenomena that has been produced by this yet-to –be-defined new world order.

The questions guiding the development of the research in this section are: **What are the basic security models? What features define and typify them?**; and finally, **To which security model does TIAR belong, and why?**.

1. COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The models of collective security, comprising the collective defence systems, are based on the premise that peace may be maintained, or war may be prevented, if a coalition of states agrees to confront the aggression by the use of collective force - as a last resort, naturally.

But the model of collective security should not be interpreted exclusively as collective defence, because, in reality, the latter is a component or mechanism which helps to achieve the desired results for this model.

United Nations Organisation. Los conceptos de seguridad. [The Security Concepts] Document A/40/553. 1986, (introd. Paragraph 3, Pages 205 to 209).

Basically, this model rests on three principles:

- a. Members adhering to this model must identify that a threat exists, as such, for all the states comprising this system.
- b. That all the States must share common interests, or at least one interest, for example that of maintaining peace, or a certain level of peace.
- c. Those states, members of the collective security system, which have detected and characterised the threat, should react without hesitation through the implementation of mechanisms and measures to face those threats.

This model which, seems to be a good solution to the security problem, may be efficient if:

- a. The States subordinate their interests on foreign policy to the higher interest offered by the model. It is well known that the interests of States rarely coincide on a permanent basis, especially when the parties involved have totally diverse conditions of development, and therefore their objectives will be different.
- b. Threats are perceived in the same way, defining the degree of dangerousness and identifying the parties responsible for it.
- c. Consensus is reached regarding the response required by the threat to be faced, and adopted as such.

This model is the basis on which diverse military alliances were designed and built during the cold war. “The hypotheses of conflict which dominated the cold war, and which were based in the clear identification of an enemy as a function of the position occupied by this enemy in the ideological framework characterised by the antagonism of that time, propelled the proliferation of military alliances which adopted a conception of collective security which would increase the possibility of emerging as the victor in a contest with the opponent side. This logic is followed by essentially military organisations such as NATO and the already non-existent Warsaw Pact”¹¹¹.

It is necessary to remark that an important part of the success of any alliance, pact or treaty based in the model of Collective Security, will require a similar perception of the threats on the part of the allies, and the commitment to assume similar risks in the face of those threats.

Finally, this model carries with it the implicit need for interstate organisations to exert some powers that State members in it have been delegated: the Collective requires “a transfer of

Muñoz, Sebastián. El Nuevo Modelo del Sistema de Seguridad Europea y la Expansión de la OTAN. [The New Model of the European Security System] “Ser en el 2000” magazine. No 10. Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 1997.

state powers to international authorities, thus constituting a partial renunciation of their sovereignty”¹¹².

3. COOPERATIVE SECURITY

This security model is essentially based on the so-called mutual trust measures (MCM, by its initials in Spanish) which must be designed and developed among the countries of the region and which, through the “transparency” of the actions adopted, as a logical consequence of MCM, will make possible the prevention, not only of military conflict, but, even more importantly, of the immediate causes of it.

But, in addition, this model has to ensure, in the event that there is no possible way of avoiding aggression and violence, that the aggressor and violator of international law suffer the corresponding act of punishment.

This model should not be interpreted as one of Non-Offensive Defence, due to the fact that the model of Co-operative Security includes military, political, economic and even human factors, according to the European Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE)¹¹³.

This model should include, in its design and implementation, four sets of measures:

- a. Firstly, it imposes on the co-operating States the obligation to adopt the procedures and mechanisms leading to the construction and strengthening of mutual trust.

Within those measures, the interchange of information on defence expenditures, Armed Force doctrinal tenets, equipment and related combat information exchange, shall be carried out in order to create an atmosphere of trust and transparency in an attempt to eliminate fear and suspicion which, at the time of defining threats, plays a transcendental role in the set of perceptions for those who define defence policies, and, furthermore, the minds of military planners.

Therefore, constant contact between the persons responsible for defence, the politicians and the military, is also imperative.

As an example, the member countries of MERCOSUR, with their adherent partners, Chile and Bolivia, have designed procedures and developed concrete actions leading to the construction of a co-operative security model.

The realisation of joint military exercises among the countries of the region, particularly between the Armed Forces of the so-called Axis Santiago de Chile-Buenos Aires-Brasilia,

OSCE. Cumbre de la Organización Para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa: La plataforma para la Seguridad Cooperativa. [Summit of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe: The platform for Co-operative Security] Istanbul, Turkey, November 19, 1999. (Section III)..

the interchange of military personnel for upgrading and training, the sharing of some information levels, including intelligence, the publication of white books on defence and the participation of troops from one country with military troops assigned by other country, in the compliance with peace mission policies, are a necessary part of MCM's model.

These MCMs have achieved a lessening of tensions in the region, which, up to the beginning of the decade of the nineties, was showing some situations of conflict arising between Argentina and Chile and between Argentina and Brazil¹¹⁴.

As Patiño Mayer so eloquently expressed, "the measures of trust on strictly military grounds are an indispensable condition for advances in other areas of inter-state reliability, and cannot be suddenly threatened"¹¹⁵.

- a. The second of the mechanisms is based on the procedures designed and measures adopted for the solution of discrepancies and dispute through friendly agreement alone. Among the procedures contemplated are: the negotiation between the interested parties, with or without the involvement of third parties designated by common agreement, mediation, conciliation, and of course, arbitration.

In this context, and as signatories of international entities, the co-operating States should accept the designation of third parties, if necessary, for the solution of their disputes, namely, of organisations such as OAS, or, in lieu of that, the UN.

- b. A third group of measures aims at establishing mechanisms that go beyond the Inter-state relations of a military nature, and strives for improvement to the relationships at the level of economic, scientific-technological and even political co-operation.

Donadio, Marcela Rosana y Tibiletti, Luis. Balance Estratégico y Medidas de Confianza Mutua: "El Concepto de balance estratégico y la seguridad regional en el cono sur". [Strategic Balance and Mutual Trust Measures: "The concept of strategic balance and regional security in the Southern Cone"]. FLACSO, Santiago de Chile, October 1995, (157-190). In this paper, the authors demonstrate the impact that MCMs have had in the reduction of tension and in the prevention of possible armed conflict between the countries above indicated.

Argentinean Navy. Medidas de Confianza Mutua en la Región. [Mutual Trust Measures in the Region] "Ser en el 2000" magazine, No 8, Buenos Aires, October 1995, (86-88).

On the same subject, an official document such as the Military Strategic Guidelines (DEMIL 98 by its initials in Spanish) issued by the Ministry of Defence of Argentina, mentions that, starting from the imperative situation in the region partially produced by MCMs, in addition to ordering their increase, discards the traditional hypotheses of conflict.

Patiño Mayer, Hernán María. La Seguridad Interamericana. [Inter-American Security]. "La Nación" daily. Buenos Aires, Argentina, February 19th, 1995.

- c. Lastly, it is necessary to establish organisations that undertake permanent follow-up of co-operation and security, ones in which all co-operating members are represented and from which the veracity of the MCMs adopted may be monitored.

The co-operative security model, based on transparency and MCMs, could be a solution to the security dilemma in an atmosphere which, for the countries of the continent, shows a reduction in the presence of traditional threats but a rise in terrorism, organised crime and poverty.

4. SECURITY AS A PRODUCT OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE STATES

This model supports the idea that inter-state conflicts may be reduced if the States commit themselves to the design and development of a co-operation process while, at the same time, taking an active part in supra-national organisations.

The objective pursued in the integration of States, whether these be political, regional or continental in nature, is the achievement and maintenance of Peace, as Karl Deutsh has stated¹¹⁶.

Once this objective, that is, Peace, has been achieved, the States may define other goals, such as to increase economic capacity, to improve social-cultural levels, to develop projects and tasks in the scientific-technological field under the direction of entities to be created for that purpose and the allocation of specific resources for the fulfilment of that task, etc.

In the more advanced stages of integration, could there be other objectives, such as the design and use of common symbols, the “rupture” or flexibility of the concept of frontiers, the elimination of customs duties, the utilisation of common currency,

a displacement of sovereign attributes towards supra-national institutions or entities, the generation of a new identity, etc.

The evolution that was undergone by Western Europe, involving a first stage that lead to the construction of permanent peace after the Second World War among the main States of the region, and later, the adoption of measures of economic integration which resulted in the

Deutsch, Karl W. *The Analysis of International Relations*. First Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc, United States, 1968 (110-132).

The integration between States will suffer a similar process to that developed in all social systems. Parsons, Talcott. *Societies: Evolutionary and comparative perspective*. Englewood Cliffs, United States, 1966. This author indicates that each social system, without taking into consideration its size, in order to survive must have three things: to adhere to a model, to adapt to the environment, and to achieve a goal or objective, but as the resources are limited, there is a fourth function which is integration.

inception of the European Common Market, which finally evolved to become the current European Union (UE, by its initials in Spanish).

In the UE, the integration of the States has been evident through the founding of a European Parliament, the use of common emblems, the adoption of the Euro as a common currency, the total flexibility of customs controls, including the creation of multilateral armed forces (beginning in 1989 with the establishment of the Franco-German brigade to evolve into the creation of the Euro-Corps in 1992) which demonstrates the intent of western Europe to establish an exclusively European military force to protect its interests. The above facts show evidence of the various stages in the process of integration of the Nation-States.

This integration has been possible, excusing the reiteration, when this political community achieved its primary objective, which was to maintain Peace.

If we take this model and examine it in relation to our continent, one may find similarities between MERCOSUR and the above-cited process of evolution, whereby the first objective has been obtained, that of maintaining Peace, such that in 1998, the member countries of this common market and its associates agreed to declare the region as a zone of Peace.

Although in the case of the Southern Cone this integration has met some resistance, as seen in the problem of establishing custom rates, phyto-sanitary controls, import and export quotas, exchange rates, etc. between the two larger states, Argentina and Brazil, and even some reticence on the part of some members and associates to establish multilateral armed forces for the region, which is probably a consequence of a still-lingering lack of trust. “One heritage that has most zealously been guarded by the American States has been that of mutual distrust”¹¹⁷.

Since the debate over whether the economic integration proposed by MERCOSUR will evolve to a level of total integration with regard to security matters is not yet concluded, even though “the most feasible possibilities, on the road to integration, currently involve a deepening of mutual trust as a way to eliminate suspicion and promote agreement among countries. As long as they become actual instruments, they will have taken a fundamental step toward allowing us to think in terms of the future integration of defence policies and, consequently, of the construction of a system of strategic regional security”¹¹⁸.

Deutsch indicates that those States that do not pursue objectives are classified as “non-amalgamated”, and when States are integrated for the sole purpose of maintaining Peace, this political community is termed “Pluralist”. Lastly, if the States have objectives that go beyond the

Patiño Mayer, Hernán María. La Seguridad Interamericana. [The Inter-American Security] La Nación daily, Buenos Aires, Argentina, February 19, 1995.

Donadío, Marcela. Integración y Defensa Nacional en el Cono Sur. [Integration and National Defence in the Southern Cone]. <http://www.ser2000.org.ar/articulos-revista-ser/revista-8>

search for and preservation of Peace, such as the establishment of common governmental organisations, the adoption of a common symbology, etc., they are classified as “Amalgamated”.

In the context of this study, a fourth category has been discarded, namely, the so-called “non-security” Community of States, because this would not extend beyond a theoretical level, given that, in this model, the States would totally abstain from the use of violence in their interactions, when this is the last rationale of a State.

5. HUMAN SECURITY

This, the fourth model of security, is built upon the concept of creating an environment in which individuals may fully realise their potential and satisfy their needs, thus allowing them to achieve a real state of well being¹¹⁹.

This model, in contrast with the previous ones, conceives the individual, not as an object and subject, but as an individual within a social context, taking into consideration the relationships between home, work, community and the environment.

Therefore, security based on the individual or human security is global and indivisible, and sustained on ethics and equality. The former, understood as a function of the expansion of values and the latter, is defined as equal opportunity for present and future generations.

While the primary idea in the security concept leads us to consider the State as the object and subject of any model to be designed, there are also numerous theories and tenets, beginning with the Social Doctrine of the Church, which subscribe to the theory that, commencing with the achievement of human well-being, Peace is reached by avoiding the causes that may alter it, fundamentally poverty and the privation generated by the same with regard to health, housing, education, work, with affects also being generated regarding the individual’s dignity.

As detailed in section 2, poverty is a threat. Its elimination, or at least constant reduction, will lessen the possibility of the occurrence of violent events affecting the stability and security of the States, and even of regions covering more than one country, for which reason, this model focuses on individual features of a preventive nature.

ONU, through PNUD, is responsible for carrying out the program for human development in most American countries. This program asserts that “the people are the true wealth of nations and, therefore, development involves expanding the options that they have to choose from in order to live in accordance with their values”¹²⁰.

Bartolomé, Mariano C. *El Pentágono de la Seguridad Hemisférica*. [The Pentagon of Hemispheric Security]. Higher War School magazine. No. 540, Buenos Aires, Argentina, January-March, 2001. The human security model is developed by this author, as a feasible model to be adopted by the American countries.

PNUD. *Informe sobre el Desarrollo Humano*. [Report on Human Development]. United Nations Organisation, 2001 (11).

It is necessary to clarify that economic growth by itself is not an indicator of human development, thus PNUD, in order to determine the same, employs the Human Development Index (IDH, by its initials in Spanish), based in longevity, level of knowledge and level of income.

On the other hand, used in conjunction with IDH to define human development, one may employ the Human Privation Index (IPH, by its initials in Spanish), based in privation of longevity, knowledge, income level and social inclusion.

PNUD¹²¹ has established objectives aimed at the development and the eradication of poverty which must be reached by the year 2015,

- a. Reduce by half the number of world inhabitants living with less than a dollar per day.
- b. Reduce by half the number of inhabitants suffering from hunger.
- c. Reduce by half the number of inhabitants lacking access to drinking water.
- d. Achieve universal attendance of the full cycle of elementary education.
- e. Achieve gender equality regarding access to education.
- f. Reduce maternal mortality rates by three quarters.
- g. Reduce the mortality rate of children less than five years old by two thirds.
- h. Reduce AIDS propagation, malaria and other significant diseases.
- i. Allow everyone that so desires to have access to reproductive health services.
- j. Stop the loss of environmental resources.

Should these objectives be reached, poverty and social exclusion indices will be greatly reduced, which will strengthen security, but the critical issue for their achievement is the availability of economic-financial resources, to which end certain actions need to be implemented¹²².

6. TIAR AND SECURITY MODELS

If we use the conceptual framework pertaining to the above developed security models, TIAR may be defined as a treaty based on the collective security model.

This statement is based on the following reasons:

- a. It shares at least one common interest, that being, in the case of TIAR, the maintenance of Peace, a point that appears in several parts of the document executed in Rio de Janeiro¹²³.

PNDU. Informe sobre el Desarrollo Humano: Pasado, Presente y Futuro. Report on Human Development: Past, Present & Future]. United Nations Organisation, 2001 (27)

Organización de los Estados Americanos. Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca. [American States Organisation. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance] <http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29.html>. Río de Janeiro, February 09.

In its provisions, the treaty is referred to as an “Inter-American Peace System”, and in the last paragraph it is stated that “the following Treaty [is entered into] in order to **ensure Peace by all possible means**” (highlighted by the author).

Article 1 indicates, “The High contracting parties formally condemn war and pledge that, during the course of their international relations, they shall not use threats nor force in any way that is incompatible with the United Nations charter or this Treaty”.

Article 2 indicates, “the High contracting parties pledge to submit any discrepancy among them to the methods of peaceful solution...”

Article 7, “the High contracting parties, upon meeting for consultation, will recommend the conflicting States to suspend hostilities and re-establish matters to their previous status quo and, further, shall take any further measures necessary to re-establish or maintain peace and the Inter-American security”.

The common interest in the maintenance of Peace is again stated in the Protocol of Reforms to the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance¹²⁴, which lends

support to what was stated above, although this protocol has not yet come into effect because it has not yet been ratified by two thirds of the Signatory States¹²⁵.

- b. The member States identify common threats. At the time that TIAR was executed, there were two threats perceived by most of the American countries.

One of them was the high probability of armed conflicts, originating with old unresolved boundary discrepancies, territorial disputes, rehabilitation of sovereignty, the handling and exploitation of natural resources (the handling of water, for instance, was a visible dispute in the La Plata River watershed), conflicting interests in the search for establishing some hegemony on the continent regions, or simply national pride that had been injured by defeats in past wars.

A quick analysis shows sufficient examples confirming the above statement. One could mention, for example, the dispute over boundaries between Argentina and Chile, the theoretical conflict between Brazil and Argentina resulting from converging economic interests, the use of the Paraná river, or the search to be the leader country in South America, resulting mainly from two conflicting geo-political trends.

Organización de los Estados Americanos. *Protocolo de Reformas al Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca*. [American States Organisation. Protocol of Reforms to the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance. [http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29\(1\).html](http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29(1).html). San José de Costa Rica, July 26, 1975.

To date, the treaty has been ratified by Brazil, United States, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Peru and Dominican Republic.

The sequels of the Pacific war kept alive the possibility of an armed collision by Peru and Bolivia, on the one side, for the purpose of recovering territory lost in the past century and the aspiration of restoring the honour tainted in the so-called saltpetre war, and Chile on the other side.

The Chaco war, which took place from 1932 to 1935, kept alive the theoretical conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia, especially after the government take-over of Bolivia, which had lost this war, by a generation of ultra-nationalist military officers in 1936.

Continuing in South America, Perú and Ecuador were facing border problems that had resulted in a war in 1941, and after that, Peru invaded the El Oro Ecuadorian province.

In Central America, there were numerous conflicts of a territorial nature which may have led to armed warfare between countries of the region.

Honduras and Nicaragua were in conflict as a consequence of the marking of the frontier in the Mosquitia region, which was inhabited by the Misquito Indians, who did not recognise any sovereignty, and as a result, made the border more permeable.

Guatemala and Honduras had a latent conflict over the mountainous region close to the city of Nueva Ocotepeque after the 1938 treaty.

Honduras and El Salvador had not defined their borders, and this led to a probable increase in the conflict between said States, particularly driven by the situation created by Salvadorian citizens living in Honduran territory close to the frontier with their country of origin. Ultimately, this would be the main cause of the so-called “soccer war” which erupted in 1969.

The second threat was communism. The perception of its advancement, promoted by the USSR, was of high concern to the United States, who had played an important role in convincing many American nations of the perils that America would face if this ideology was propagated through the continent.

In this regard, Samuel Fitch states: “The Rio treaty (in reference to TIAR) and the expansion, after the war, of the United States military missions and the agreements of assistance throughout the region were aimed at establishing a military alliance against the common enemy, the Soviet communism”¹²⁶.

Fitch, Samuel J. *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, United States, 1998 (13).

Slater, Jerome. Intervention and Negotiation. United States of America, 1970. For this author, the argument of the communist threat was used by Washington when it decided to intervene in the Central American and Caribbean countries, making its own interpretation of the principles of collective security consecrated in the Rio de Janeiro treaty, making decisions in the name of self-defence and celerity in the action required by the situation that had arisen.

This model establishes that, once the aggression had been defined and characterised, the contracting parties are to react by means of the implementation of the mechanisms established in the treaty, without further delay.

In this sense, in Article 2 of TIAR, it establishes that “... the High contracting parties pledge to submit all discrepancies which may arise among them to **peaceful methods of solution and to try to solve the dispute among themselves by utilising the current procedures of the Inter-American System, before referring it to the General Assembly or to the Security Council of the United Nations.**” (highlighted by the author).

Further along, in Article 3, TIAR states:

- 1) In paragraph 1 “...an armed attack on the part of any State against an American State shall be considered an attack against all the American States, and consequently, **each one of said Contracting Parties pledges to help to repel the attack, exercising the inherent right of legitimate individual or collective defence recognised by Article 61 of the Charter of the United Nations**”. (highlighted by the author).
- 2) In paragraph 2 “...up to the decision of the Consulting Organism of the Inter-American System, each one of the **Contracting Parties may decide on the immediate measures to be adopted individually**, in compliance with the obligation that was cited in the above paragraph and **in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Consultation Organisation will meet immediately for the purpose of examining these measures and, for those of a collective nature, to agree upon which should be adopted**”.
- 3) In paragraph 4 “**The measures of legitimate defence indicated in this article may be applied** as long as the Security Council of the United Nations had not taken the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security”.

Lastly, TIAR strictly establishes the measures that must be adopted against the aggressor state(s), giving the conclusive examples of the timing of execution, the mechanisms to be implemented and, moreover, the type of measure or action to follow.

In accordance to the provisions of the above, TIAR indicates “For the purpose of this Treaty, the measures that the Consulting Organisation agrees upon **will include one or more of the following**: the withdrawal of mission heads; the breaking off of diplomatic relations; the rupture of consular relations; the partial or total interruption of economic relations, or communications by rail, sea, air, mail, telegraph, telephone, radiotelephone or radiotelegraph, and the use of the armed forces”.

In spite of what has been indicated in point C., in practice, many of the actions adopted in the face of various different threats over the fifty-five years that TIAR has been in existence, they did not adjust, in form and time, to the provisions of the document signed in Rio de Janeiro, as we have demonstrated in Section 1 of this paper.

7. SUMMARY

- a. The security models analysed in this section were: the collective security model, the co-operative security model, the security model by means of integration, and the model based on human development.
- b. The collective security model is based on three principles: the identification of common threats on the part of the States adopting the model, the sharing of at least one common interest, and the establishment of mechanisms and procedures that, in a consensual fashion, must be implemented without further delay.
- c. The co-operative security model is based on the principle of transparency in the relations among the countries of the region through the establishment of measures of mutual trust for the purpose of preventing the immediate causes of the conflict, as well as the conflict itself, while, at the same time, defining the mechanisms that allow for the punishment of the aggressor.
- d. The integration model proposes that peace may be reached as a consequence of the development of measures of mutual trust and the conformation of supra-national entities through which part of the sovereignty of the contracting States will be delegated. In this model, once the primary objective of maintaining peace has been obtained, the effects of integration in other fields, such as economics, scientific-technology, judicial and political realms, will be experienced, making it possible to maintain and strengthen the peace achieved, while also incrementing the development of the involved countries, which will ultimately act as a dissuasive element against threats.
- e. The security model based on human development, whereby the object and subject of the model is the individual, in contrast to the previous ones, where the focus of attention is the State.
- f. This model is solely preventative in nature, and attempts to avoid the development of threats, which are the consequence of the non-satisfaction of human needs (food, health, education, housing, and freedom of religion, expression and ideas), reducing or eliminating the immediate causes that produce them.
- g. The Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance contains the three basic elements which characterise and typify the collective security model, as can be ascertained in the document supporting it.

CONCLUSIONS

1. TIAR conforms to the model of collective security, which requires the identification of common threats on the part of the States adopting the model, sharing at least one common interest, and establishing mechanisms and procedures which, in a consensual form, shall be implemented without further delay.
2. When TIAR was executed, the main perceived threats were: the possibility of a war between the contracting countries, and aggression towards the continent on the part of the USSR, either by direct attack or through the diffusion of the communist ideals in the American countries. The United States had the principle role in the definition of this threat.
3. During the period of the cold war, the mechanisms determined by TIAR would not have been of use to solve the multiple situations in which the security of the continent may have been threatened, according to the provisions of the treaty, because they would not apply in the case of frequent interruptions of democratic governments, or because the United States acted unilaterally when it considered that its interests were threatened, leaving the provisions of TIAR aside or only invoking its application at the last minute, as a way of mitigating the lack of trust of the remaining contracting parties.

Finally, when the application of TIAR was required by the Argentinean Republic due to an attack by a power foreign on the continent, as was the case in the Falkland (Malvinas) war, TIAR did not have any particular effect, a consequence, mainly, of the will of the United States, more than any other contracting party such as Chile, Colombia or the Antilles, which opposed the application of the mechanisms established by the treaty.

4. Once the cold war ended, TIAR continued to demonstrate its inefficiency, as in the case of the situation in Haiti during the first half of the decade of the nineties, or in the current Colombian situation.
5. Due either to the non-existence of the perception of similar threats on the part of the Contracting States, sine qua non condition in a collective security model, or to the diversity of interests pursued by the signatory countries, TIAR had, in fact, collapsed.
6. After the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the USSR, and the retraction of communist ideas due to the failure of many countries which had adopted this system, new threats arose, such as drug trafficking, money laundering and trafficking, international terrorism, mainly of a Muslim fundamentalist origin, and poverty.

In addition to the disappearance of the “communist threat”, the conflictive situations among Latin American countries, which, in the past, led to pre-war situations between neighbouring States, and on some occasions, even escalated into armed fighting, have diminished.

7. When TIAR was executed, the “new” threats that have been defined in this paper were not appreciated as such, therefore this treaty lacks the mechanisms required to face them, a fact that was made evident by treaties based on the collective security model when they are compared with the post-cold war scenario.
8. Based on all of the above, as a result of having evaluated the efficiency of TIAR in the past, and comparing the model of collective security on which this treaty is based with the threats that are perceived to affect security and the maintenance of peace on the continent, it is hereby concluded that:

**THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE IS AN
INEFFICIENT INSTRUMENT FOR THE PREVENTION AND REDUCTION OF THE
THREATS AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE AMERICAN STATES.**

ANNEX 1 – STATISTICS ABOUT POPULATION AND POVERTY IN AMERICA

COUNTRY	POPULATION			LITE-RACY RATE	POPULATION BELOW POVERTY LINE		
	YEAR 2001	GROWTH RATE	ESTIMATED YEAR 2020		RATE	ESTIMATED YEAR 2001	ESTIMATED YEAR 2020
SOUTH AMERICA							
ARGENTINA	37,384,816	1.15	46,456,563	96.2	37 (1999 est)	13,832,381	17,188,928
BRAZIL	174,468,575	0.91	207,236,920	83.3	17.5 (1990 est)	30,532,000	36,266,461
BOLIVIA	8,300,463	1.76	11,562,911	83.1	70 (1999 est)	5,810,324	8,094,037
CHILE	15,328,467	1.13	18,976,619	95.2	22 (1998 est)	3,372,263	4,174,856
COLOMBIA	40,349,388	1.64	54,962,366	91.3	55 (1999 est)	22,192,163	30,229,301
ECUADOR	13,183,978	2	19,590,697	90.1	50 (1999 est)	6,591,989	9,795,348
PARAGUAY	5,734,139	2.6	9,338,305	92.1	36 (2000 est)	2,064,290	3,361,789
PERU	27,438,864	1.7	37,797,600	88.7	49 (1994 est)	13,445,043	18,520,824
URUGUAY	3,360,105	0.78	3,894,623	97.3	25.2 (1)	846,746	981,444
VENEZUELA	23,916,810	1.56	32,094,780	91.1	67 (1997 est)	16,024,262	21,503,502
FRENCH GUIANA	177,562	2.74	296,757	83	NIL (2)	17,756	29,675
GUIANA	697,181	0.07	696,378	98.1	NIL (2)	69,718	69,637
SURINAME	433,998	0.6	486,238	93	NIL (2)	43,718	48,623
TOTAL	350,774,346		443,390,757			98,650,066	150,264,425
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN							
COSTA RICA	3,773,057	1.65	5,149,125	94.8	20.6 (1999 est)	754,611	1,060,719
CUBA	11,184,023	0.37	11,996,998	95.7	5.1 (3)	570,385	611,846
EL SALVADOR	6,237,662	1.85	8,836,524	71.5	48 (1999 est)	2,994,077	4,241,531
GUATEMALA	12,974,361	2.6	21,129,335	63.6	60 (2000)	7,748,616	12,677,601
JAMAICA	2,665,636	0.51	2,936,140	85	34.2 (1992 est)	911,647	1,004,159
HAITI	6,964,549	1.4	9,070,143	45	80 (2000 est)	5,571,639	7,256,114
HONDURAS	6,406,052	2.43	10,108,966	72.6	53 (1993 est)	3,395,207	5,357,751
NICARAGUA	4,918,393	2.15	7,368,044	65.7	50 (2000 est)	2,459,196	3,684,022
PANAMA	2,845,647	1.3	3,637,143	90.8	37 (1999 est)	1,052,889	1,345,742
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	8,581,477	1.63	11,667,522	82.1	25 (1999 est)	2,145,369	2,916,880
BAHAMAS	297,852	0.93	355,127	98.2	NIL (2)	29,785	35,512
BARBADOS	275,330	0.46	300,416	97.4	NIL (2)	27,533	30,041
BELICE	256,062	2.7	423,971	70.3	33	84,500	139,910
CAYMAN ISLANDS	35,527	2.12	52,925	98	NIL (2)	3,553	5,292
DOMINICA	70,786	-0.98	58,706	94	NIL (2)	7,079	5,870
GRENADA	89,227	-0.06	88,215	98	NIL (2)	8,923	36,500,933

TOTAL	67,575,641		93,179,300			27,765,009	40,381,811
NORTH AMERICA							
CANADA	31,592,805	0.99	38,095,813	97	15 (4)	4,738,920	5,714,371
UNITED STATES	278,058,881	0.9	329,662,030	97	12.7 (1999 est)	35,313,477	41,867,077
MÉXICO	101,879,171	1.5	135,188,641	89.6	27 (1998 est)	27,507,376	36,500,933
TOTAL	411,530,857		502,946,484			67,559,773	
TOTAL AMERICAN CONTINENT	829,880,844		1,039,516,541			193,974,848	274,728,617

Reference:

Data provided by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was used in this chart. World Factbook. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> United States, 2001.

(1) Information from Control Ciudadano-Uruguay http://www.socilawatch.org/2002/esp/informes%20nacionales/uruguay2002_esp.htm

(2) For lack of accurate data, a rate of 10 % (this rate is lower than USA's) has been used in the chart, but the amount of inhabitants involved (eight small countries) does not have a significant impact on the total figure.

(3) Information from PNDU 1997, not confirmed by other sources.

(4) Information from Statistics Canada.13-569-XIB. Low Income Persons, 1980 to 1997. Ottawa, Canada 1998.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Agencia Canadiense para el Desarrollo Internacional. Asuntos Forestales, Deforestación: Bosques tropicales en disminución. <http://www.rcfa-cfan.org/spanish/s.issues.12-5html>
2. Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA). World Factbook. Estados Unidos, 2001. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.
3. Armada Argentina. Medidas de Confianza Mutua en la Región. Revista Ser en el 2000, Nro 8, Buenos Aires, octubre de 1995.
4. Banco Mundial. <http://www.yupimnsn.com/negocios/>
5. Banco Mundial. Informe sobre la pobreza. <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty>
6. Bartolomé Mariano. Las amenazas Transnacionales. Revista Escuela Superior de Gendarmería Nacional, Buenos Aires, 1999.
7. Bartolomé, Mariano. Cultura y Violencia a Fin de Siglo: “El caso del Islam”. Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra Nro 534, Buenos Aires 1999.
8. Bartolomé, Mariano C. El Pentágono de la Seguridad Hemisférica. Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra Nro 540, Buenos Aires, Enero- Marzo de 2001.
9. Basz, Pablo. Los Narcos Golpean en América Latina. Diario “El Cronista Comercial”, Buenos Aires, 2 de julio de 1996.
10. Boschi, Silvana. La Corte decidió revisar toda su investigación: Atentado contra la Embajada de Israel. Diario “Clarín”, Buenos Aires 14 de abril de 1996.
11. Blum, William. Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA interventions since World War II (Lying-one of the few growth industries in Washington): Grenada 1979-1984. United States, July 1995.
12. Braslavsky, Guido. Jaque a los paraísos fiscales. Diario “Clarín”, Buenos Aires, 15 de octubre de 2000.
13. Bozzo Cerda, José. El Fundamentalismo Islámico. Revista Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Santiago de Chile, 1999.
14. Buscarons, Edis. El papel de la familia frente a la explotación sexual infantil. <http://www.hurlinet.com.ar/a.html>.
15. Busuttil, James. The Reality of International Law. “A taste of Armageddon: The law of Armed conflict as applied to cyberwar”. Clarendon Press, United States of America, 1999.
16. Cámara de Diputados de la República Argentina. Informe final de la Comisión Especial Investigadora sobre Hechos Ilícitos vinculados con el Lavado de Dinero. Buenos Aires, 15 de noviembre de 2001. <http://www.infomelavado.com/>
17. Castellanos, Guillermo. Las Amenazas Transnacionales en los Escenarios de la Argentina. Monografía de la Maestría de Estrategia y Geopolítica de la Escuela Superior de Guerra. Buenos Aires, Octubre de 2001.

18. Catells, Manuel. Hacia el Estado Red. <http://www.tce.sc.gov.br/biblioteca/artigos/globalizacao.html>
19. Chesnais, Francois. El blanqueo del dinero sucio y la mundialización financiera. <http://www.atac.org/fra/cons/doc/>.
20. Chonsky, Noam. What Uncle Sam Really Wants?: The Invasion of Panama. United States, October 1992.
21. Cisneros, Andrés y Escudé, Carlos. Historia General de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina. <http://www.argentina-rree.com/index2.htm>
22. CNN. La Triple frontera es refugio de terroristas, dicen fuentes de inteligencia. 8 de noviembre de 2001. <http://www.cnnenespanol.com>.
23. Control ciudadano-Uruguay. http://www.socilawatch.org/2002/esp/informes%20nacionales/uruguay_2002_esp.htm
24. Corach Carlos. Contra Los Santuarios. Diario "Página 12", Buenos Aires, 1 de agosto de 1995.
25. Cordiviola de Yuan, Elly. Crecimiento de Peces del Paraná Medio. Instituto de Limnología Nacional, Ciudad de Santa Fe, 2001.
26. Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos. La lucha contra el lavado de dinero. Periódico electrónico del Departamento de Estados Unidos, Vol. 6, No 2, Washington, mayo de 2001.
27. Department of State. Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism. Washington, 1999. <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/>.
28. Deutsch, Karl W. The Analysis of International Relations. First Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc, United States, 1968.
29. Di Lazzaro, Alejandro. El nexa entre Irán y la Jihad Islámica. Diario "La Nación", 13 de marzo de 1998.
30. Diouf, Jacques. La pobreza en América. FAO, <http://www.raj.org.mx/fdocument/pobydete.doc>
31. Donadio, Marcela Rosana y Tibiletti, Luis. Balance Estratégico y Medidas de Confianza Mutua: "El Concepto de balance estratégico y la seguridad regional en el cono sur". FLACSO, Santiago de Chile, octubre de 1995.
32. Donadio Marcela. Integración y Defensa Nacional en el Cono Sur. <http://www.ser2000.org.ar/articulos-revista-ser/revista-8>
33. Donángelo , Karina y Rodríguez Leirado, Pablo. La Memoria de la Impunidad. <http://www.almargen.ar/seba/seccion/politica/amial>
34. Druetta, Gustavo. Producción y Tráfico ilícito de drogas. Situación de América Latina y el Caribe. Revista Ser en el 2000 Nro 10, Buenos Aires, julio de 1997.
35. Enciclopedia Encarta. Historia de la República Dominicana. MICROSOFT, 2001.
36. Escobar, Raúl Tomás. Estrategia Contrarrevolucionaria. Editorial F.I., Buenos Aires 1983.

37. Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas. Diccionario para la Acción Militar Conjunta. Definición sobre Terrorismo. Buenos Aires, 1998.
38. Ferrari, Cristina. Historia de las Islas Malvinas. <http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Center/3665/malvinas/>.
39. Fitch, Samuel J. The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1998.
40. France-Press. Cumbre Mundial sobre la Pobreza. http://www.yupimsn.com/negocios/leer_articulo.cfm
41. García Sayan, Diego. Declaraciones del Canciller de Perú en relación del TIAR y los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre. Revista Poder.Com 20 de septiembre de 2001. <http://www.punto-com.com/NR/exeres>
42. Gellner, Ernest. Pos-modernismo, razón y religión. Ediciones. Paidós Ibérica S.A., Barcelona, 1994.
43. Goobar, Walter. Condena contra el Gobierno Iraní. Diario "Página 12", Buenos Aires, 4 de noviembre de 1997.
44. Gunaratna, Rohan. "Blowback". Jane's Intelligence Review. August 2001.
45. Guzmán, Eleonora. Brasil: cientos de campesinos armados en pie de guerra. Diario "Clarín", Buenos Aires, 3 de noviembre de 1996.
46. Haig, Alexander. Malvinas fue mi Waterloo. Diario "La Nación", Buenos Aires, 8 de octubre de 1997.
47. Harnecker, Marta. El Movimiento de los Trabajadores sin Tierra de Brasil Construyendo la Fuerza Social Antineoliberal. San Pablo, Brasil, Agosto de 2000. <http://www.sodepaz.org/Comunicaciones/marta>
48. Herrera de Noble, Ernestina. Conflicto Político y social en Bolivia. Editorial del Diario "Clarín", Buenos Aires, 2 de octubre de 2000.
49. Huntington, Samuel P. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. Simon & Schuster. New York, 1996.
50. Jobim, Nelson. Cartel de Cali Invade a Floresta Amazónica. Diario Jornal do Brasil, Brasil 21 de Julio de 1996.
51. Kandel, Pablo. Cuáles son las tácticas más usuales del lavado de dinero. Diario "Clarín", Buenos Aires, 13 de junio de 2000.
52. Larousse, Diccionario Ilustrado. Barcelona, 1999.
53. Leal Buitrago, Francisco. Surgimiento, Auge y Crisis de la Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional en América Latina y Colombia. Revista Análisis Político, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Nro 15 (Ene- Abr 1992).

54. Luna, Félix. Perón y su Tiempo. Tomo I: La Argentina era una fiesta (1946-1949). Sudamericana, Buenos Aires 1984.
55. Martínez, Carlos María. Bases para el Pensamiento Estratégico: El Conflicto".Vol I, Escuela Superior de Guerra, Buenos Aires 1994.
56. Menjivar Larín, Rafael; Kruijt, Dirk y Van Vucht Tijssen, Lieteke. Pobreza, Exclusión y Política Social. FLACSO, San José de Costa Rica. Enero de 1997.
57. Mendel, William y Munger, Murl. Las amenazas que representan los estupefacientes. Porque poner nuestras prioridades en orden. Revista Parameters. Estados Unidos, Julio 1997.
58. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. El Narcotráfico: Una Amenaza para la Seguridad Nacional:. República de Colombia, Octubre de 2000.
59. Ministerio de Salud Pública de México. Informe sobre Prostitución y SIDA. Ciudad de México, volumen 37, noviembre-diciembre de 1995
60. Moller, Bjorn. Conceptos Sobre Seguridad: Nuevos Riesgos y Desafíos. Centro de Investigación sobre la Paz y los Conflictos, Copenhague, Dinamarca. <http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protec/Archivo//d000d322.htm>
61. Moore, James W. The Arab-Israeli Cyberwar. Department of National Defence-Ottawa-Canada, January 2001.
62. Muñoz, Sebastián. El Nuevo Modelo del Sistema de Seguridad Europea y la Expansión de la OTAN. Revista Ser en el 2000 Nro 10. Buenos Aires, Argentina, julio de 1997.
63. Noriega, Carlos. La Fujicracia Vivió del Tráfico de Drogas, Según la comisión. Diario "Página 12", Buenos Aires, 18 de junio de 2001.
64. Nye, Joseph. El Nuevo Poder Mundial. Actualización de la Política. Buenos Aires, Argentina. Noviembre de 1991.
65. Office of Counterterrorism. Background Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Department of State, United States of America. http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/fto_info
66. O' Neill, Bard E. Insurgency & Terrorism. Brassey's Editorial. United States, 2000.
67. Organización de los Estados Americanos. Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca. Río de Janeiro, 09 de febrero de 1947. <http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29.html>
68. Organización de los Estados Americanos. Protocolo de Reformas al Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca.. San José de Costa Rica, 26 de julio de 1975. [http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29\(1\).html](http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/tratados/b-29(1).html)
69. OEA. La OEA y la Superación de la Pobreza. <http://www.oas.org/vdsa>.
70. OEA. Historia del CICTE. <http://www.cicte.oas.org/historia.htm>
71. Organización de las Naciones Unidas. Los conceptos de seguridad. Documento A/40/553. 1986.

72. Organización de las Naciones Unidas. Primer Informe Mundial sobre Drogas. <http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protec/Archivo/d000d59e.htm>
73. Organización Panamericana de la Salud. Tráfico de Mujeres y Niños para la Explotación Sexual en las Américas. Washington, Julio 2001.
74. OSCE. Cumbre de la Organización Para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa: La plataforma para la Seguridad Cooperativa. Estambul, 19 de noviembre de 1999.
75. Parsons, Talcott. Societies: Evolutionary and comparative perspective. Englewood Cliffs, United States, 1966.
76. Pastrana, Andrés. Discurso pronunciado en la sesión de apertura de la IIIra Conferencia de Ministros de Defensa de Las Américas. Cartagena de Indias, noviembre de 1998.
77. Patiño Mayer, Hernan, Fuerzas Armadas y Narcotráfico. Base de datos SER en el 2000. <http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protec/Archivo/>
78. Patiño Mayer, Hernan María. La Seguridad Interamericana. Diario La Nación. Buenos Aires, Argentina, 19 de febrero de 1995.
79. PNDU. Publicación sobre la pobreza. Caracas, marzo del 2002. . <http://www.pnud.org/>
80. PNUD. Informe sobre el Desarrollo Humano. Organización de las Naciones Unidas, 2001.
81. Posse, Abel. Tiempo para una Urgente Estrategia Nacional-Continental. Revista Militar Nro 749, Buenos Aires, diciembre de 1999.
82. Pucheta, Luis. El Nuevo Orden. Ensayo de Maestría de Estrategia y Geopolítica de la Escuela Superior de Guerra. Buenos Aires, Junio de 2000.
83. Rey, Oscar. Colombia, Guerrilla y Narcotráfico. Editorial Militar, Vol 756. Buenos Aires, noviembre de 1994.
84. Rey, Oscar. Colombia. Un Problema Americano. Revista Militar Nro 750. Buenos Aires, marzo de 2000.
85. Romero, Mauricio. Guerra, Paz y Democracia . Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales de la universidad Nacional de Colombia, Investigación patrocinada por el Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de la República de Colombia, febrero de 2001 .http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/conflicto_armado/cainv01201_guerraypazun.html
86. Schroeder, Paul. The New World Order: A Historical Perspective. The Washington Quarterly. Cambridge, Spring 1994.
87. Selser, Gregorio. Reagan: de El Salvador a las Malvinas, Mex Sur Editorial, Ciudad de México, 1982.
88. Shevis, James. Maccaffrey, one to one with Diálogo. Revista Diálogo, United States Southern Command, Estados Unidos, Junio de 2000.
89. Sivan, Emmanuel. El Antisemitismo y El Fundamentalismo Islámico. Kivunim (español) Nro 5. Jerusalem, Israel, abril de 1995.

90. Slater, Jerome. Intervention and Negotiation (The United States and The Dominican Revolution). United States, 1970.
91. Statistics Canada. 13-569-XIB. Low Income Persons, 1980 to 1987. Ottawa, Canada 1998.
92. Stille, Alexander. La Mafia Universalizada. Diario La Nación, Buenos Aires, 29 de junio de 1996.
93. Taylor, Francis. El control de la Triple Frontera. Editorial del Diario Clarín. Buenos Aires, 23 de octubre de 2001.
94. The Terrorism Research Center. MRTA: Tupac Amaru. <http://www.terrorism.com/terrorism/MRTA.shtml>.
95. Tibiletti, Luis. El debate Intermilitar en el Cono Sur sobre la Seguridad Regional. <http://www.defensenet.ser2000.org.ar/foro/luis.htm>
96. Toffler Alvin. Librando una Batalla Mental. Revista "Pangea", 8 de octubre de 2001. <http://revista.pangea.org>.
97. Varela, Juan Carlos. Informe sobre narcotráfico y medio ambiente. Departamento Planeamiento de la Jefatura III-Operaciones – Estado Mayor General del Ejército Argentino. Buenos Aires, mayo de 2000.
98. Wilhelm, Charles E. Apuntes personales sobre la exposición del Comandante del Comando Sur de los Estados Unidos durante una visita de la Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejército Argentino a la sede del citado comando. Estados Unidos, diciembre de 1999.
99. Wilson, Brian S. The Case of Panama: U.S. Continues its Bully Ways as International Outlaw (Analysis of the Dec. 20, 1989 U.S. Invasion in Historical Context). United States, 1991. <http://www.brianwillson.com/awolpanama.html>
100. Zimmerman, Matilde. La Conexión Centroamericana: Ideologías revolucionarias entre 1959 y 1979. Tercer Congreso Centroamericano de Historia. San José de Costa Rica, 15 al 18 de julio de 1996.