

## Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

## Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY CAMPAIGN  
FROM 1945 TO 1960:  
AN OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS ANALYSIS

By

Major Jeremy G. Mansfield

Canadian Forces Command and Staff Course 28

<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>THE CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS IN CAMPAIGN DESIGN.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<i>End State .....</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Criteria for Success.....</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Centre of Gravity .....</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Decisive Points.....</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Lines of Operation .....</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>Sequencing.....</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>Critical Vulnerabilities .....</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Culmination.....</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Tempo.....</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Summary of Operational Concepts.....</i>	<i>8</i>
<b>HISTORICAL/POLITICAL CONTEXT .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS OF THE MALAYAN GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN FROM 1945-1960.....</b>	<b>10</b>
CENTRES OF GRAVITY .....	10
END STATE .....	11
CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS .....	11
LINES OF OPERATION .....	12
DECISIVE POINTS .....	12
SEQUENCING.....	15
<b>ANALYSIS OF DECISIVE POINTS .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>POLITICAL LINE OF OPERATION .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<i>Achieve Economic Stability.....</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Dislocate the MCP.....</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>Create Political Stability.....</i>	<i>23</i>
<b>MILITARY LINE OF OPERATION .....</b>	<b>26</b>
<i>Stabilize Domestic Situation .....</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Establish Effective Security Forces .....</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Defeat the MCP in the Field.....</i>	<i>38</i>
<i>Culminating Point.....</i>	<i>43</i>
<b>CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>43</b>
 <b>Annex: The Canadian Forces Operations Planning Process: A Primer .....</b>	 <b>1-2</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>1-3</b>

## **Introduction**

The Malayan Emergency Campaign between 1945 and 1960 stands out as a classic example of how to win a counter-insurgency battle against organized and motivated revolutionaries.<sup>1</sup> Malaya (now called Malaysia) is today one of the five pearls of the Orient whose economy and democratic institutions rival those of most Western nations. Yet even a cursory examination of the Malayan Emergency, or quick scrutiny of other nations which underwent similar insurgencies in the post-war period, shows what could have happened to Malaya had the insurgency not been countered by an effective military/political campaign.

Why was the Malayan Campaign so successful? Other nations such as Viet Nam, North Korea, Indonesia and Myanmar, nations which share many traits, characteristics, and historical benchmarks with Malaya, were unable to emerge from the shadow of imperial colonization and Japanese aggression and rise to regional prominence, economic stability and democratic rule. Countless articles, books, films, and memoirs have been written that attempt to explain what happened in Malaya and why it was successful. Many scholars have looked at elements of this campaign and compared them to the American disaster in Viet Nam.

This paper examines the Malayan Emergency Campaign between 1945 and 1960 using the framework of the Canadian Forces Operations Planning Process (CFOPP, or in short, OPP). First the Operational Concepts of the OPP will be briefly examined and explained. The paper then demonstrates how these elements were brought into play in Malaya. It can be useful and instructional to conduct a review of an historical campaign using a modern day planning tool. It provides the author and his readers an opportunity to understand the somewhat complicated process. By comparing an actual campaign, whether a success or a failure, to the OPP, the reader is given concrete, historical examples of how the OPP's Operational Concepts are meant to be employed. Terms

---

<sup>1</sup> Although the official declaration of the State of Emergency was not proclaimed until June 1948, the insurgency may be said to have begun shortly after the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945.

such as Centre of Gravity and Decisive Points have much more meaning once their relevance is explained using an historical example.

The paper does not attempt to prove that the main leaders in the Governments of Malaya and Great Britain were using the OPP or some similar precursor.<sup>2</sup> Nor does it attempt to prove that only the effective use of the principles inherent in the OPP could be used to solve the emergency. The aim is to demonstrate that the key structures, components, and operational concepts that comprise the modern day OPP and campaign planning were present in the Malayan Campaign of 1945-1960. Ultimately, this paper will show that the Malayan Government counter-insurgency campaign waged from 1945 to 1960 was successful because it correctly deduced and attacked the Malayan Communist Party's Centre of Gravity using two Lines of Operation; one military, and one political.

### **The Canadian Forces Operations Planning Process**

The OPP is based upon current concepts of campaign planning and Operational Art. Every modern military needs a tool such as the OPP that can be employed by Commanders and their staffs when operations planning is begun. Without such a tool, staffs would have to assimilate an enormous amount of seemingly unrelated information from myriad sources and agencies and attempt to determine Art. Eeosh7 T, when ow 12 0 0 12 90.00003 5

present form since 1992 and is similar to operations planning processes currently in use by most Western militaries.<sup>4</sup>

Before continuing with any further discussion of the OPP, it is important to understand why this tool is used in the first place. The OPP assists a commander and his staff to develop a plan for the successful conduct of a campaign. It allows a commander to translate strategic direction into operational objectives or plans. A campaign is described in the CF Publication “Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army” as “a series of related military actions undertaken over a period of time to achieve a strategic objective within a given theatre.”<sup>5</sup>

There are six steps to the CFOPP, – although some other countries’ OPP’s are organized differently. Each step consists of several other sub-steps or components. It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe each step in any great detail. Indeed, given that the OPP was not in existence in 1945, it is unreasonable to assume that any amount of analysis of the Malayan Campaign would ever reveal all of the required sub-components of the OPP as many may have been skipped or conducted in an unrecordable way. Nonetheless, it is important to understand the complete process to be able to see how those Campaign Planning steps that were followed in Malaya fit into the larger OPP context. For a review of the CFOPP see the attached Annex.

### **Operational Concepts in Campaign Design**

Within the OPP and in the design of any campaign, there are fundamental operational concepts and that serve as planning tools around which the whole campaign can be described. A review of the Malayan Emergency Campaign shows where these fundamentals existed, how they were interlinked, and how their successful attainment

---

<sup>4</sup> The Canadian Forces College Staff Officer Handbook publication CFC 106 (3) CJ SOH states that the CFOPP was developed by the CFC in 1992.

<sup>5</sup> Canadian Forces Publication Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army. B-GL-300-001/FP-000. 1996-09-15. 4-0.

secured the eventual victory over the Communist Insurgents. First, an explanation of each of these operational concepts is required.

### End State

The Allied Publication AAP-6 describes the End State as “the political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved.”<sup>6</sup> A purely military and land-centric explanation of the End State is offered by Col Thomas E. Brown of the US Army: “The end state is how the commander visualizes the battlefield will look after mission accomplishment.”<sup>7</sup> In any operation it is critical that a commander communicate to his subordinates and staff what it is he is trying to achieve, and what that achievement will actually look like.

### Criteria for Success

To describe the End State, commanders use Criteria for Success. A single Criterion for Success can be as simple as “the destruction of the enemy forces” as was used by Gen Schwarzkopf, the operational Commander of all forces in the Gulf War’s Operation Desert Storm.<sup>8</sup> Typically, campaign plans have several Criteria for Success, each one of which must be attained before ultimate success can be declared.

### Centre of Gravity

The keystone operations manual of the US Army defines the Centre of Gravity as “the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends”.<sup>9</sup> This definition is perhaps a bit too ambiguous and all-encompassing. In non-specific lexicon, an enemy’s Centre of Gravity is also described in the CF Operations publication as “that aspect of the enemy’s total capability, which, if attacked and eliminated or neutralized, will lead either to his inevitable defeat or his wish to sue for peace through

---

<sup>6</sup> AAP – 006 Allied Publication 006 .

<sup>7</sup> Brown, Col Thomas E. Commander’s Guidance. Extract from Military Review (US Army Command and General Staff College April 1994) 2-7.

<sup>8</sup> Schwarzkopf, Norman H General. It Doesn’t Take A Hero, (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1992) 470.

<sup>9</sup>US Army Field Manual FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, D.C. Department of the Army, June 1993). 6-7.

negotiations.”<sup>10</sup> If an enemy has a Centre of Gravity that can be attacked or neutralized, then so must the friendly forces that are prosecuting the Operational Campaign. The protection of the friendly Centre of Gravity, therefore, becomes a key activity of any Commander. If destruction of the enemy’s Centre of Gravity leads inevitably to his eventual downfall, so must destruction of the friendly Centre of Gravity lead to the downfall of the friendly forces. However, this paper focuses specifically on the Centre of Gravity of the Malayan Communist Party and on the Malayan Government campaign plan which attacked it. The MCP were never in a position to threaten directly the Malayan Government’s Centre of Gravity.

Military planning staffs spend considerable time and effort to identify correctly the enemy’s, as well as their own, Centre of Gravity in any operation. In most military operations the desired End State of a campaign and the Centre of Gravity of a force are closely linked. Only once the Centre of Gravity of this force has been successfully neutralized or destroyed has a desirable End State been achieved.

### Decisive Points

A foe’s Centre of Gravity is often described in rather subjective, broad terms such as “the enemy’s will to fight” or his “cohesion as a military body”. Such depictions of Centres of Gravity, are difficult to attack directly. Often a Centre of Gravity can only be threatened by attacking several elements that constitute, in the whole, the Centre of Gravity. Each of these elements is key to an enemy’s operation but is not so overwhelmingly important that its loss or compromise will lead automatically to the defeat of the enemy. These elements are called Decisive Points and can be events, activities, capabilities, pieces of ground, or many other entities and concepts, depending on the nature of the Centre of Gravity being attacked.

For example, during the Gulf War it was determined early on, that achieving mastery of the air would be required before Iraq could be attacked on the ground; thus air superiority became a Decisive Point. As Gen Sir Peter de La Billiere states: “This air

---

<sup>10</sup> CF Operations. 3-2.



effort was undoubtedly a major contributing factor in the overall allied success.”<sup>11</sup>

Decisive Points, then, are a major component of any campaign and by attacking Decisive Points, which protect the Centre of Gravity, a foe can move on to victory. The CFC Staff Officer Handbook (SOH) describes Decisive Points as “an event, the successful outcome of which is a precondition to the defeat or neutralization of a Centre of Gravity.”<sup>12</sup>

### Lines of Operation

It is rare in Operational Campaigns that the Centre of Gravity is protected by only one Decisive Point. The more complicated the operation, the more likely that the Centre of Gravity is surrounded by several Decisive Points. Many of these Decisive Points will be inextricably linked such that the precondition of launching an attack on one Decisive Point is the successful destruction of one or more previous Decisive Points. The way that a commander chooses to attack a Centre of Gravity through elimination or attainment of successive Decisive Points is called a Line of Operation. A Centre of Gravity may be protected by a number of Lines of Operation each consisting of numerous Decisive Points. It may be possible to approach or attack the Centre of Gravity by a number of different Lines of Operation. Commanders may seek the most efficient or most effective route. The combination of these Lines of Operation and the manner in which they are prosecuted defines the Commander’s Campaign Plan and is the essence of Operational Art.

### Sequencing

The process by which the attack of various Decisive Points is orchestrated is called Sequencing. An operational Commander will select a Centre of Gravity, determine that it is protected by a number of Decisive Points and decide to attack these in a logical sequence. These sequenced sets of activities are collectively referred to as Lines of Operations.

---

<sup>11</sup> Gen Sir Peter de la Billiere Address to Royal United Services Institute. Extract from RUSI Journal, Winter 1991.

<sup>12</sup> Canadian Forces College Staff Officer Handbook . CFC 106 (3) CJ SOH 2001 Edition. II-1-4/17.

### Critical Vulnerabilities

Just as Centres of Gravity can be difficult to attack directly, Decisive Points need not be attacked head-on either. To use the example of the Air Campaign in the Gulf War, in order to defeat the Iraqi Air Force, the Coalition could have taken several approaches. They could have destroyed all Iraqi Command and Control centres and radars; all runways could have been rendered inoperable; aircraft fuel could also have been destroyed. Each of these elements in their own right was a critical vulnerability of the Iraqi Air Force; it was not required of the Coalition to attack all of these Critical Vulnerabilities at once, or even sequentially, as the destruction of any one element would have had the same ultimate effect on the Iraqi Air Force. By identifying and attacking a Critical Vulnerability, an Operational Commander seeks the attainment of a Decisive Point.

### Culmination

Culmination occurs when a force is incapable of increasing its rate of activity; it may only sustain its current rate. It is said that a military commander prosecuting a campaign has reached his culminating point when he is only just able to maintain his tempo, he cannot plan and conduct new offensives and he is only able to hold in his present defensive posture. Operational art is focussed on ensuring that an enemy reaches his Culminating Point before friendly forces do. Napoleon's advance into Russia was brought to a standstill when his logistic ability was outstripped by the needs of his forces; he had reached a culminating point and the outcome of the campaign was no longer in doubt.

### Tempo

In operations, the ability to act faster than one's enemy provides a force with a distinct advantage. The enemy is always trying to react to your activities and not vice versa. The rate at which one force can commit successive, independent acts is called the tempo. In most campaigns, the ability to maintain a faster tempo than the enemy can lead to a decisive advantage.

## Summary of Operational Concepts

These operational concepts were all present in the Malayan Government campaign during the period 1945-1960. The ability of various leaders of the government to recognize the importance of these operational concepts and then plan and launch a campaign which successfully attained each sequential element can be seen to be one of the key elements of success of the Malayan Government Campaign. Before understanding how the operational concepts of the OPP can be applied to an analysis of the Malayan Emergency Campaign, it is first important to set the stage for the discussion by putting the campaign in a proper historical context.

## Historical/Political Context

With the stunning capture of Singapore and Malaya in February of 1942, the Japanese Army was poised to inflict hardship and suffering on the Malay people for the duration of the War.<sup>13</sup> As early as August 1941, British forces had begun to organize, equip and train stay-behind parties with the intent of continually harassing the conquering Japanese. Their role was to “supply intelligence and, in the event of being overrun by the enemy, to operate against his lines of communication.”<sup>14</sup> British, Australian, Indian, Chinese and Malayan troops made up these small teams that were to work under appalling conditions throughout the remainder of the war.

The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), a mainly ethnic Chinese organization, which had been established in Malaya for almost 13 years, proposed to the British Government of Malaya that they should be allowed to “form a military force to fight the Japs, and it should be armed by the British.”<sup>15</sup> It is said that love and war make for strange bedfellows, and clearly this arrangement verifies this axiom. The MCP, up to 1941, had been a continual thorn in the British Administration’s side. It was made illegal

---

<sup>13</sup> The British Forces under LGen AE Percival surrendered to Gen Yamashita on 15 Feb 42 at the Ford Factory's Board Room in Bukit Timah. It had taken only seven days, since the initial landing by the Japanese, for Singapore to fall.

<sup>14</sup> Chapman, F. Spencer. The Jungle is Neutral. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1950) 25.

<sup>15</sup> Chapman 26.

in 1937 and was “strong enough to foment a serious wave of strikes with the intention of crippling the economy of the country.”<sup>16</sup>

It was in the best interests of both the British, who wanted to defeat Japanese aggression globally, and the MCP, who wanted to transform Malaya into a Communist state, to cooperate during the war years. Both the British and the MCP changed the focus of their aggression and acrimony during the Japanese occupation. British planes dropped arms and provisions to MCP groups working deep in the jungle.<sup>17</sup> MCP leaders and operators linked up with British special forces and proved invaluable because of their knowledge of the jungle and the type of warfare needed to be successful in it.

During the war, the MCP transformed themselves into the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army, (MPAJA) a clever tactic which allowed for pro-British, Chinese and non-Chinese Malaysians alike to join them regardless of their political leanings. It must be remembered that Malaya at this time was not an ethnically homogenous country, nor had it been throughout its history. Tamils, Chinese, Indians, and Europeans formed significant portions of the population in Malaya and each group held important positions in the country’s economy, government, and work force. By uniting the “Malayan People” under the banner of the MPAJA, the MCP were able to promote themselves as a truly unifying party whose sole aim was the defeat of imperialist Japan. The fact that the MCP was drawn almost entirely from the Chinese community was camouflaged by the “Malayan Peoples” appellation.

After the war, the MPAJA were quick to rename themselves the Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army or MPABA, but because the British were seen as saviours and liberators, and not as invaders, by the majority of the Malayan people, this name was ineffective and was soon changed.<sup>18</sup> Britain and Malaya had both suffered enormously

---

<sup>16</sup> Jackson, Robert. The Malayan Emergency : The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948-1966. (London: Routledge, 1991) 7.

<sup>17</sup> Not all of the arms dropped for the MCP were used in the fight against Japan, many were hidden and used later when the MCP again turned its attention to British forces after WW II.

<sup>18</sup> Labelling of the MCP became a major battleground in the psychological warfare campaign. The MCP liked to call themselves the MPABA , a name that did not stick. In February 1949 they changed their name

during the War. Britain's once mighty empire was too extended and undefendable. Economically, the task of rebuilding Britain was huge; any diversion of funds to prop up a declining empire was severely scrutinized by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Malayan economy had also suffered under Japanese occupation. Tin and rubber plantations were not well administered and Malaya had been economically squeezed by the Japanese. At the end of the War, with the sudden and unexpected surrender of the Japanese, a power vacuum was created that was quickly filled in many outlying areas by elements of the MPAJA, who were now openly flying the hammer and sickle flags of international Communism. The MPAJA were quick to claim credit for the defeat of the Japanese in Malaya.

Japan had been defeated, Malaya had been saved, and the world had been changed: Malaya, in 1945, was at a crossroads. On the one hand, a resurgent and emboldened MCP looked to champion the international struggle of the masses and was buoyed by the success of the Stalin's Russian Communists and the struggle of Mao's Chinese Communists. On the other hand, a withering but victorious nation looked to consolidate its empire while maintaining its rightful place on the international stage. The Malayan people, it appeared, were soon to be forced to make a choice between the Chinese-led MCP and the British-supported Malayan Union. It is at this point where an analysis of the Malayan Government campaign can begin.

## **Operational Concepts of the Malayan Government Campaign from 1945-1960**

### Centres of Gravity

Research for this paper has determined the Centre of Gravity of the British/Malayan Government to have been: *The promise of a politically and economically stable, Independent Malaya*. This definition meets the requirements of a Centre of

---

once again to the Malayan Races Liberation Army in an attempt to portray themselves as a multi-ethnic saviour of Malaya; this name did not stick either. The British called MCP members CTs for Communist Terrorists, a name which did stick. CTs is used at times in this paper.

Gravity. Had independence not been promised to the Malayan people and had this promise not been taken seriously, then the defeat of the Malayan/British Government would have been inevitable. If economic and political stability had not been assured, then the MCP would have continued to threaten the long term viability of the Malayan State.

In contrast, the Centre of Gravity of the MCP was: *The Legitimacy of the MCP to Represent the Malayan People*. Without the perceived legitimacy of the Malayan people, the MCP could never hope to form a government. If the Malayan people did not believe that the MCP represented their collective interests, then the MCP would never acquire sufficient popular support and would only ever rule through brutality and coercion.

Given these two Centres of Gravity, the Malayan Government Campaign, which attacked the MCP Centre of Gravity, can now be analyzed using Operational Concepts of the OPP. This paper will not attempt to analyze the MCP campaign, which failed in its attempt to threaten the Malayan Government Centre of Gravity.

### End State

Although never described using these terms, the desired End State for the termination of the Malayan Emergency can be stated as follows:

*The desired End State of this Campaign is that Malaya will be an independent nation with a functioning economy and viable, democratic political structure which is no longer threatened by the MCP.*

### Criteria for Success

The Criteria for Success that served to bench mark progress in the achievement of this End State were as follows:

- ◁ Malaya is no longer threatened by internal struggle from the MCP.

- ◁ Free and fair elections have been held.
- ◁ Independence has been granted from the UK.
- ◁ Malaya has the instruments of government of an emerging democracy.
- ◁ The Malayan economy is viable.
- ◁ Malayan Security forces are capable of defending Malaya without the intervention of outside powers.
- ◁ The MCP is no longer considered a viable political alternative in Malaya.

These end states are directly tied to the Centre of Gravity. Only when all of these End States were actually met could it be said that the Emergency was truly over. It is of note that the granting of independence to Malaya in 1957 was followed by a further three years of the Emergency. This is because independence in and of itself was not the campaign leaders' desired End State; it was only one of several criteria that had to be achieved before the End State could be reached.

### Lines of Operation

In the analysis of this campaign, two clear Operational Level lines of operation were at work in Malaya during the Emergency. The first is that of purely military operations which form a distinct Line of Operation. In this line are included all aspects of the military operations in Malaya including the police, special forces, the psychological warfare teams, and locally recruited security personnel whose distinct role will be explained in detail later. The second Line of Operation is in the political sphere. Here the economic aspects of the campaign are included as is the strategy of dislocating the MCP.

### Decisive Points

As was explained earlier in this paper, each Line of Operation is made up of Decisive Points linked together in a time sequenced continuum. Each Decisive Point can

be attacked or secured through the defeat or attainment of any number of Critical Vulnerabilities. The following nodal analysis shows all the Decisive Points in each of the two Lines of Operation which together attacked the MCP Centre of Gravity. In reviewing this nodal analysis, it is important to remember that each Decisive Point must be attacked, or in some cases be attained, before the MCP Centre of Gravity can be defeated. In defining their campaigns the former High Commissioners of Malaya would have structured a Campaign Plan designed to establish certain conditions that they knew would lead to the eventual defeat of the MCP. In the OPP this is called Campaign Planning.






Figure 1: Nodal analysis of Malayan Emergency Campaign 1945-1960


## Sequencing

In the nodal analysis above (Figure 1) a sequence of events is established; however, in the Malayan Campaign, often activities aimed at some Decisive Points occurred concurrently with activities aimed at subsequent Decisive Points. Not every Decisive Point was completely achieved or defeated before the next Decisive Point was attacked. As can be seen in the analysis of Critical Vulnerabilities, the blurring of time lines and the intermeshing of several Critical Vulnerabilities were the norm in the Malayan Campaign. Nonetheless, the logical flow of events from one Decisive Point to the next is generally maintained throughout the campaign.

## Analysis of Decisive Points

This analysis begins by looking at the Political Line of Operation which contains the Decisive Points: Achieve Economic Stability, Dislocate the MCP, and Create Political Stability. Each Decisive Point is surrounded by a number of Critical Vulnerabilities, each one of which could be attacked or established in support of its associated Decisive Point.

## Political Line of Operation



## Achieve Economic Stability

If the Malayan people were ever going to be able to govern themselves in an independent Malaya, then a functioning, flexible and vibrant economy was imperative. In 1945, the Malayan economy was based upon four main activities: subsistence farming, fishing, rubber production, and tin mining. Of these four activities, tin mining and rubber production were the main components of Malaya's external trade and a source of significant wealth for many in Malaya. The viability of these two industries was a Critical Vulnerability of the Malayan Economy and the MCP was fully aware of this fact. In order to harvest the rubber trees, large amounts of unskilled labourers from India and China had been brought in to work on the rubber plantations located throughout the country. These labourers became targets of Communist recruiters. Many of the trade unions, which had been established on plantations and mines, were thoroughly infiltrated by the MCP to the point that in 1947 "the rubber and tin industries were affected by more than 300 strikes."<sup>19</sup>

Strikes were not the only weapon in the MCP's arsenal; direct coercion and attacks on labourers (called tappers) were common. Those labourers and middle managers who did not assist the MCP, and their support organization the Min Yuen, were often subjected to horrific and brutal torture "pour encourager les autres". One episode serves to demonstrate this point:

On one estate where tappers had refused to pay levies to the MinYuen, three children were dismembered with *parangs* as their parents were forced to watch. More would die in the same way if the tappers persisted in their obstinacy, they were warned. More children were killed in Jahore, some shot, one eight-year-old burnt to death with her family, to encourage others to toe the party line.<sup>20</sup>

In an effort to rid the country of Capitalist, and mainly European, estate owners, the MCP directly targeted them for assassination. On 16 June 1948, two rubber

---

<sup>19</sup> Miller, Harry. Jungle War in Malaya: The Campaign Against Communism 1948-60. (London: Arthur Barker Ltd. 1972) 34.

<sup>20</sup> Mackay, Donald. The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino That Stood. (London: Brassey's, 1997) 68. (A parang is local knife similar to a machete used in the rubber industry.)

plantation managers, an assistant manager, and two Chinese contractors were murdered at their respective plantations, acts which precipitated the declaration of the emergency by Sir Edward Gent.<sup>21</sup>

Tin mines did not escape the attention of the CTs, although it can be said that attacks on tin mines did not display the same level of barbarism and terror as attacks on rubber plantations. The Pacific Tin Mine near Ampang was attacked by gunfire on twenty-one consecutive nights, although, throughout the entire emergency, no European mine manager was ever killed by CT attack.<sup>22</sup>

The campaign to secure Malaya's economic livelihood from rubber and tin industries was launched in many stages and on many fronts. Estate managers, many of whom were unarmed, lobbied for weapons to arm themselves against the CTs. Money, very tight in post war Britain, was not immediately available for this purchase even though the US had made the weapons available. Ultimately, the oil-rich Sultan of Brunei provided a very low interest loan to the Government of Malaya, a Special Constabulary was rapidly recruited, trained and armed, and the plantations began to resemble armed camps.<sup>23</sup>

As the emergency progressed, the police and military units stepped up their patrols in and around rubber plantations. Eventually, villagers were armed and trained and formed into units called "Home Guards", a sort of paramilitary force which protected their families, their villages, and ultimately the economy of Malaya. Initially, the Home Guard lacked any punch and cohesion and was thus not an effective fighting force. In the early stages, many British administrators were quite reluctant to arm the Home Guard for fear that these weapons would merely migrate to the MCP, or worse, be used against their masters. In response to these concerns, in 1952, a retired British officer named MGen de Fonblanque was appointed Inspector General of the Home Guard with "instructions to

---

<sup>21</sup> Cloake, John., Templer: Tiger of Malaya. (London: Harap, 1985) 193.

<sup>22</sup> Barber, Noel., The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated the Communist Guerrillas 1948-1960. (London: Collins, 1971) 126.

<sup>23</sup> Barber 246.

build an organization which was independent of the police and capable of defending the rural population against guerrilla attacks.”<sup>24</sup>


The impact of increased patrolling and presence by the police and military as well as the establishment of an effective Home Guard was not limited to the tin mines and rubber plantations dotting the Malayan countryside. As the size of the military increased substantially and their range of activities increased proportionately, a zone of security encompassing the major infrastructure and routes of Malaya was established.<sup>25</sup> Thus, over time, the Lines of Communication, so vital to the promotion of trade and an effective economy, were secured.

Revenues from the rubber and tin industries peaked during the early days of the Korean War as demand was driven up and commodity prices rose. However, by 1952 demand slowed and prices dropped. The Malayan government lost \$2 million in tax revenue for every cent drop in the price of rubber; this drop occurred at a time when governmental expenditures peaked to service the Emergency effort. In 1953, Gen Sir Gerald Templer, then High Commissioner of Malaya, lobbied the British Government for additional loans to make up for a shortfall in the Malayan budget, due to the increasing financial demands of the emergency. These loans were secured and a financial crisis was averted; thus with more money to be spent on fighting the emergency, the campaign became more successful. As the campaign became more successful, more trade flowed and governmental revenues from rubber and tin taxation increased. Eventually, less money had to be spent on costly military action. By spending less money on the military, more money was available to spend on social programs and nation building. By achieving economic stability in Malaya, it can be seen that an intertwined sequence of events was set in motion, which led the government of Malaya ever closer to the defeat of the MCP Centre of Gravity.

---

<sup>24</sup> Stubbs, Richard, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960. (London: Oxford UP, 1989) 158.

<sup>25</sup> The military build up and transformation will be addressed in greater detail in latter stages of this paper.



### Dislocate the MCP

Communism, in an organized fashion, came to Malaya as early as 1927. It was pushed outward from China and embraced rather weakly by a few thousand young Chinese males. The chances of Communism flourishing in South East Asia might well have been minimal but for two separate, but related factors. When World War II erupted and Japanese aggression spread throughout the Pacific rim, “the communists alone retained any organization within the population capable of offering any further resistance to the Japanese.”<sup>26</sup> Suddenly, nationalist Malaysians, of both Malay and Chinese origin, had common heroes who were actively engaging and killing the hated Japanese. The fact that these heroes were also Communist, or had at least sprung from Communist origins, was on the whole irrelevant (such was certainly the mindset of the British forces fighting the Japanese alongside members of the MCP).

In 1941, when Germany attacked Communist Russia forcing her to side with the Allies for the remainder of WW II, Communism received a moral boost and tacit legitimacy on the world stage. This legitimacy was strengthened when Mao’s Communist forces snatched victory from the jaws of defeat and pushed Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist Chinese Army out of mainland China. This legitimacy was further enhanced when British Prime Minister Clement Atlee’s Labour government in London officially recognized Mao’s Red China in January 1950.

---

<sup>26</sup> Thomson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya to Viet Nam. (London: Chatto&Windus, 1966) 14.

To attack and defeat this perceived legitimacy was a decisive point in the Malayan campaign. As long as the MCP and its leadership continued to recruit new members, circulate their propaganda and mount an effective and coordinated military campaign, they would continue to threaten the Centre of Gravity of the Malayan Government.

One of the steps on the road to discrediting the MCP leadership was taken even before the Malayan emergency began. The first leader of the MCP, Loi Tak, “had been a British agent long before the Japanese war.”<sup>27</sup> When he failed to attend a key meeting of the MCP Central Committee and absconded with the party funds in May 1947, the effect within the party was devastating. A new leader was soon appointed. Chin Peng had worked very closely with British Special Forces during the war. At the end of the war he was flown to London to march in the Victory parade and to receive the award of the Order of the British Empire from his soon-to-be enemies. Chin Peng remained in control of the MCP throughout the remainder of its existence in the emergency. He was a devoted communist who “was not to be deflected from his ideas”.<sup>28</sup> Chin Peng’s Deputy, Yeung Kwo, was of similar ilk and remained a dedicated Communist until the day he was killed by British forces in 1956. Any attempt to compromise or discredit either of these two leaders was fruitless; thus, a different, more indirect approach, was sought.

One such approach was through psychological operations. The Psychological Warfare campaign during the Malayan Emergency was at all times a pitched battle. Each side tried to discredit the other and each side attempted to win over converts through misinformation, coercion, and overwhelming propaganda. By winning the Psychological Warfare battle, the Malayan Government was able to further discredit the MCP and its leadership and effectively deny any attempts at successful recruiting for the MCP.

---

<sup>27</sup> Miller 35

<sup>28</sup> Miller 52

Wing Commander A. F. Derry, formerly of the Malayan Psychological Operations section, describes in detail the intricate techniques used in Malaya to persuade CTs to leave the jungle and to discredit the MCP and its leadership in his book *Emergency in Malaya*.<sup>29</sup> Among the most effective and pervasive tactics in the campaign was the use of air dropped leaflets. Not all leaflets carried the same message and different areas would be targeted with different techniques. One particularly successful leaflet campaign used defected CTs to taunt their former comrades still eking out an existence in the jungle. A photo of the defector would be taken immediately upon his capture; another photo would be taken only a few weeks later after he or she had been considerably fattened and cleaned up. Leaflets carrying the defectors own handwritten message to his peers and the “Before and After” photos would then be dropped in the area inhabited by the defector’s old comrades. This tactic had a significant impact and was cited as a key reason for many defections from the MCP.

Another tactic involving leaflets which directly targeted local commanders was the practice of dropping leaflets designed to sew discontent and disaffection and build upon the existing air of malcontent in most of the MCP jungle camps. Messages pointing out the apparent disconnect between the Communist ideals of equality for the masses and the reality of the tiered approach to benefits and perks (including access to nubile, young female MCP members) were disseminated by leaflet and propagated by low-flying Voice Aircraft.<sup>30</sup>

Another key activity in the dislocation of the MCP was cutting off the supply of fresh recruits. Any organization bent on taking over a country needs the continual injection of new blood, particularly an organization that was losing membership to both death and defection at an alarming rate. The propaganda campaign had a very negative effect upon volunteer recruitment. Given the freedom of an informed choice, very few young Malayan men and women would have chosen the lifetime of deprivation and

---

<sup>29</sup> Derry, Archie, F., *Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension* (Published by the Psychological Operations Section Joint Warfare Wing National Defence College, Latimer UK. 1982) Chapter 5.

<sup>30</sup> A more detailed analysis of the Psychological Warfare campaign is contained later in this paper.



persecution virtually assured by membership in the MCP. Again, leaflets and Voice Aircraft were highly successful in pointing out the differences between the two options.

However, not all MCP members were offered a membership choice. Coercion and brutality tended to be far more effective recruiting incentives than the promised Communist Val Halla. But as Bard O'Neill points out in his book *Insurgency and Terrorism*, coercion is "the least effective [recruitment incentive] because of the resentment it causes and the weak commitment of those who are directly victimized."<sup>31</sup> One critical initiative of the Malayan Government in 1951 served to turn off even the trickle of new recruitment into the MCP. This tactic was the Government's Resettlement campaign, or the "Briggs Plan" named after the Malayan Director of Operations from April 1950 to Feb 1952, LGen Sir Harold Briggs.<sup>32</sup> The plan was as simple in concept as it was difficult in execution.

Chinese squatters, who had taken over large areas on the fringes of the jungle and were trying to carry out subsistence farming during the Japanese occupation, were a lucrative and productive target for MCP recruiters. It is estimated that by 1948 there were over 300, 000 such squatters living off the land in shanty villages throughout Malaya. The Briggs Plan called for resettlement of these squatters and members of other remote villages, which were also MCP strongholds, into "New Villages". The New Villages were model microcosms of rural Malay life, each surrounded by barbed wire fencing and perimeter lighting for security, and protected initially by military guards until the Home Guards could be left to this task by themselves. Inside the village was a police station, a community centre, and a medical facility manned by one of the newly arrived British nurses, many who had fled Mao's uprising in China.

With effective perimeter security and positive control over the inhabitants, the New Villages were a very effective tool in denying the MCP any new members or


---

<sup>31</sup> O'Neill, Bard E., *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Virginia: Brassey's, 1990) 84.

<sup>32</sup> Sir Henry Gurney had conceived the plan but by the time he was killed in an ambush very little action on the "Resettlement Programme" had occurred.

continued sustenance. The “Resettlement Plan”, as it was called, started off slowly but by 1952 over 500 New Villages had been created with a population of 461,822 inhabitants.<sup>33</sup> The Briggs Plan had several other aspects which will be discussed further later in this paper.

By directly attacking the credibility of many of the senior leaders in the MCP and by denying the party additional recruits, the top and bottom rungs of the MCP ladder had been dislocated. Any attempt to rebuild the credibility and strength of the party was further denuded by a highly aggressive and creative Psychological Warfare campaign which sowed disaffection amongst the entire MCP. By 1952, many pre-conditions for success in Malaya were well on their way to being achieved and the Centre of Gravity of the MCP was ever closer to being directly threatened.



### Create Political Stability

In his seminal work *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, Robert Thompson offers five key principles of counter insurgency. The first and most important warrants listing in its entirety: “The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically

---

<sup>33</sup> Jackson 20.

stable and viable.”<sup>34</sup> In other words, the government’s desired End State must be a nation which is both politically and economically viable. This viability can only be established if the nation has achieved a sufficient degree of political stability. In Malaya, political stability was the enemy of the MCP. As with most terrorist organizations, the MCP thrived on chaos and the people’s belief that their government was ineffective. To attack this belief was, therefore, key to the successful Government campaign. Earlier it was shown how achieving “Economic Stability” was a key Decisive Point in the campaign, it will now be shown how “Creating Political Stability” was another Decisive Point.

Chinese labourers and squatters were an important element of the labour-intensive economy of Malaya in 1948.<sup>35</sup> Unfortunately, the Chinese did not share the same political status with their Malay co-workers. Chinese immigrants, even second and third generation Chinese, were not considered Malayan citizens. The majority owned no land and few were allowed to vote. This situation was a major dis-satisfier for the Chinese community but was not likely to be addressed by the Malay majority without considerable outside pressure.

That pressure came from both Briggs and Templer and resulted in the granting of citizenship on 7 May 1952 to “1,200,000 Chinese and 180,000 Indians... while many others were eligible to apply for citizenship.”<sup>36</sup> Citizenship for the Chinese was a huge step forward in the path to the democratization of Malaya. The next step was holding free elections at both the state and federal levels.

Malaya, in 1952, was governed by a complex association of Rulers who held the power of veto on all legislation. They were neither democratically elected nor did they harbour democratic notions. General Templer was untiring in his efforts to develop the structure of democracy in Malaya. His approach was from the bottom of the democratic strata upwards. He secured elections for both village and municipal councils in 1952 and

---

<sup>34</sup> Thompson 51.

<sup>35</sup> Chinese and Indians provided the majority of manual labour in Malaya at the time of the emergency, this discussion focuses on the Chinese as they were in the majority although conditions were the same for all non-Malay workers.

<sup>36</sup> Cloake 304.

then aimed his sights at free State elections. Finally, in 1955, both State and Federal elections were held which led irreversibly to the granting of full independence or “Merdeka” on 31 August 1957.

The party that won the inaugural free elections in Malaya was the Alliance Party which took 51 of the 52 seats available in the federal parliament. Tunku Abdul Rahman, a Malay Nationalist who had led his former United Malay National Organization (UMNO) into an alliance with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in 1953, became the country’s first democratically elected leader. The path to the formation of this multi-ethnic and democratic party began in 1949 when Tan Cheng Lok formed the MCA whose aim was to divert Chinese Malaysians living in outlying villages from joining the MCP.

The UMNO had been formed in 1946 as a response to an unpopular constitution that Britain had unilaterally introduced to Malaya in 1945 and imposed upon them a year later. This constitution was a political blunder for Britain but served to offer Chinese and Indian labourers citizenship and strip power away from the undemocratic state Rulers who had up to this time ruled Malaya as they saw fit. The constitution, and the Malayan Union that it created, were supported by the Chinese and Indians but detested by the Malays. At the official signing of the new constitution, “not one Malay ruler, government official, or representative attended the ceremony.”<sup>37</sup> So unpopular was the Malayan Union that it was abandoned in 1948 in favour of the Federation of Malaya.

Dato Onn bin Jaafar had formed UMNO with a view of uniting Malaya in its opposition to this constitution and the concept of the Malayan Union. The shortcoming of the party was that it represented only ethnic Malay interests and as such had no hope of ever forming a national government. Meanwhile, the Indians had also taken the initiative of forming their own party, the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). Therefore, as was pointed out by Richard Clutterbuck in his analysis of counterinsurgency in Malaya:

---

<sup>37</sup> Clutterbuck, Richard, The Long Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Viet Nam. (New York: Praeger, 1966) 24.

Thus, prompted by the ill-starred Malayan Union, the people of Malaya had by 1949 formed political parties on the worst possible basis – race.<sup>38</sup>

In 1951, Dato Onn quit the UMNO to form his own multi-racial party, the Independence of Malaya Party, or IMP, and handed over UMNO to Tunku Abdul Rahman. From then on, an informal alliance between the UMNO and MCA began to evolve as each party agreed not to run candidates in the other's strong ridings. This agreement ensured that no candidate from either the MIC nor Onn's IMP won any seats in the key Kuala Lumpur municipal elections in 1952. When the MIC dissolved away into the Alliance Party, Malaya finally had its first multi-racial party, a significant step towards achieving lasting political stability in Malaya.

### **Summary Political Line of Operation**

The Political Line of Operation, which aimed at defeating the legitimacy of the MCP, contains three Decisive Points whose sequential achievement made the future of the MCP uncertain and their ability to form a legitimate government unlikely. Thus, based upon a purely political campaign plan, the MCP Centre of Gravity had been directly attacked. It is possible that this Political Line of Operation would have been sufficient to bring about the Culmination of the MCP on its own. However, the Malayan Emergency Campaign was a classic example of political and military campaigns operating at the same time with the same ultimate goal. The Military Line of Operation was also key to bringing about the eventual victory of the Malayan Government over the MCP as it too threatened the MCP Centre of Gravity. The analysis of the Military Line of Operation in the Malayan Emergency Campaign follows.


### **Military Line of Operation**

The Military Line of Operation involves actions taken by all elements of the various security forces involved in the Malayan Emergency Campaign. It contains three Decisive Points: Stabilize the Domestic Situation, Establish Effective Security Forces and

---

<sup>38</sup> Clutterbuck 138.

Defeat the MCP in the Field. Many of the Critical Vulnerabilities that support or attack these Decisive Points are intimately interlinked with Critical Vulnerabilities and Decisive Points of the Political Line of Operation. This is not problematic, as the campaign in Malaya was a synergistic combination of military and political activities, well coordinated and implemented at all levels in the Malayan community.



### Stabilize Domestic Situation

As with most insurgencies dealing with irregular armies, among the most difficult tasks of the government security forces in Malaya was differentiating between those on the side of the MCP and those loyal to the government. Many Chinese workers and their families remained loyal to the government throughout the campaign. However, there were also those who were either MCP members or communist supporters as part of the Min Yuen. Sir Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner to Malaya from October 1948 to October 1951, recognized this problem and devised a simple but effective solution: “He decreed that every man, woman and every child over twelve years of age, had to possess an identity card bearing name, photograph and thumbprint.”<sup>39</sup> It would soon be easy to separate MCP members living in the jungle, who would occasionally attempt to blend into Malayan society in the pursuit of either provisions or

---

<sup>39</sup> Miller 49.

new recruits, from regular Chinese workers. The senior leadership of the MCP recognized the brilliance of this tactic and its potentially devastating effect on their membership.

They fought the registration at every opportunity; photographers and registration officers were murdered and holders of cards were intimidated. When these tactics proved ineffective, the MCP attempted to paint the registration as a government way to conscript men for the British Army. Finally, when the registration proceeded unimpeded, they adopted another tactic of stealing cards and changing the photograph and name of the holder. This technique was undertaken with amateurish skill and resulted in the capture of many CTs holding poorly forged registration cards.

Once registration had been completed, it became easy to discern between CTs who had not dared to sign up for registration, and legitimate workers who had their card with them at all times on pain of incarceration. This policy enabled security services to control the flow of people, which further facilitated the restriction on the freedom of movement of Min Yuen couriers and their supporters.

As described earlier, the New Villages plan also served to dislocate the MCP and deny them new recruits. The plan had other effects as well. To understand them it is necessary to understand the manner in which the plan was brought into effect. Although the plan was originally Gurney's, it was Briggs who was to implement it. He realized that an incredible amount of planning, coordination, and perseverance would be required if successful resettlement into the New Villages was to occur.

His first task was to convince the nine Rulers to give up sufficient arable land for the resettled Chinese squatters. Next, he had to secure the substantial funds required to construct the buildings and utilities for the villages. He then made an appeal to various international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) for them to provide social workers, nurses, and doctors to assist in relocating almost 500, 000 people and for their continued administration once inside these New Villages. Finally, he had to coordinate

the actual resettlement so that a major decrease in food production did not occur. The Resettlement Plan was a painstaking and labourious undertaking which tapped into the complete fibre of the Malayan Government and its various arms. Each resettlement was kept secret until the day of execution for fear that any prior information would allow the MCP and local Min Yuen to organize resistance and target the activity.

On the day of the resettlement, a team consisting of soldiers, police, health specialists, and administrative officials would descend upon a squatter area or village before dawn and awaken the people to their new reality. Personal possessions, including farm animals and agricultural implements were loaded in vast convoys of military vehicles. Each resident would individually be seen by a nurse and given medical treatment for any illnesses; many had never received proper medical attention in their lives.

Land registration officials took on the task of ensuring that each family was allotted land outside its New Village and that compensation was given for possessions unable to be moved. In the end, almost 600 New Villages were created, a huge task, which “was one of the greatest social experiments ever carried out by any government in the world.”<sup>40</sup> Once established, the New Villages offered the Chinese a secure environment, protected from the brutality of the CTs, a guaranteed job, tilling the Malay soil, and, perhaps most importantly, a sense of belonging. This land would now be theirs, or as Maynard Dow pointed out in his detailed analysis of the Resettlement Plan in his book *Nation Building in Southeast Asia* “villagers have a permanent stake in their village because they have, or will have, shortly, title to their land.”<sup>41</sup>

Politically, the new village would be led by one of the newly relocated villagers. Village councils were the first exposure most Chinese had ever had to democracy. Finally, they had a stake in their future and the future was starting to look much better.

---

<sup>40</sup> Miller 74.

<sup>41</sup> Dow, Maynard W. *Nation Building in Southeast Asia*, (Colorado: Pruett Press Inc., 1965) 59.



The MCP could not match with its rhetoric, the reality of land possession, and security that the New Villages provided the Chinese.


With the establishment of New Villages, a large part of the Malayan population was now protected from the indiscriminate barbarism of the CTs. Workers on rubber plantations and tin mines formed Home Guards and received additional attention from the police and military units in their area; thus, a more secure and stable environment was provided to them as well. As for the urban residents of Kuala Lumpur, Segamat, and Johore Bahru, their stability would come as a byproduct of rural stability and security coupled with a stable economy. This stability was to become evident first in Kuala Lumpur in 1954. Indeed, one of Templer's major concerns was the perceived complacency amongst government officials and wealthy businessmen which prompted him to threaten: "I'll shoot the blighter that says this Emergency is over."<sup>42</sup>

By 1955, with the approach of federal elections, a stabilizing economy and the results of the Resettlement and Registration Plans starting to show significant effects, Malaya began to make its way out of the emergency. In Kuala Lumpur, a visiting doctor who had seen the city in bleaker times remarked: "It was a feeling hard to describe, as though someone had given the whole city a pep pill."<sup>43</sup> Much more work remained to be done, particularly by the military and police forces, optimism; however, was present.

---

<sup>42</sup> Mackay 140.

<sup>43</sup> Barber 226.



### Establish Effective Security Forces

The police force has been modernized, equipped and strengthened; armed forces have been drafted in to meet the serious situation which was developing. The police have always been, and still are, in control of operations; the military act in support of the civil power.<sup>44</sup>

This quote is how the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Mr D. Rees Williams, apprised the situation with respect to security forces in Malaya in 1950. Mr Williams was obviously trying to put a good face on a bad situation for the sake of public morale, for the situation in 1950 within the security forces was not very good. At the beginning of the declared Emergency in 1948, “the British and Malay armed forces in the country amounted to thirteen Battalions, together with about 100 aircraft of the RAF. The strength of the Federation Police, which consisted mainly of Malays was given as 10,223.”<sup>45</sup> When it is considered that the MCP regulars numbered almost 5,000, and their support structure, the Min Yuen, was estimated to be as large as 150, 000, it is clear that a significant shortfall in military and police forces existed.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup>Rees Williams, D., Mirror, Terrorism in Malaya Vol III No 27 September 1950 19.

<sup>45</sup> O’Ballance, Edgar. Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60, (London: Faber and Faber, 1966) 83.

<sup>46</sup> Mackay 35.

The Army's shortfall was not only in numbers, but in organization and tactics as well. Most of the senior leadership were WW II veterans who had fought Nazi Germany using conventional tactics appropriate for the Northwestern European battlefield. Thus, major changes in tactics, equipment, and mindset were required before the Army could hope to achieve decisive victory. In October 1948, an additional brigade arrived from Britain to shore up Malayan defences, but even with this additional brigade, the Army was not sufficiently large to dominate the country or take on the MCP head-to-head. As well, because of a lack of other types of security forces, large portions of the Army were tied down providing static security throughout the country, which severely restricted their ability to carry out the most important role of the Army; namely closing with and destroying the enemy.

By 1951, the Army had increased in size to 20 battalions, but perhaps more importantly, other security forces had been established which were to reduce the draw on Army resources. After the official declaration of the emergency in June 1948 an urgent call went out to all parts of the British Empire for men to join the Malayan Police Force. Coincidentally at that time, the situation in Palestine had worsened to the point that Britain had chosen to pull out her forces rather than continue to fight the terrorist Stern Gang, and the like, in that troubled land. This action had freed up a large number of experienced police sergeants and officers, many of whom, with their recent taste of action, now looked to the east for further adventure.

At this time, most of the British leadership of the Malayan Police Force had spent the war under the brutal captivity of the Japanese. Any newcomer who had not shared this ignominious past was looked upon as an intruder, "but the fact remained that the police were not trained, equipped or organized to deal with the situation, which was worsening by the day."<sup>47</sup> Police officers from Palestine, with their credible training and operational experiences, formed a large part of the ever increasing force and contributed significantly to eventual victory over the MCP. They were key in establishing training

---

<sup>47</sup> Mansfield, Howard *Going Places: Memoirs of Howard Mansfield* 2000, (Personal collection of the author) 35.

schools, conducting jungle patrols and providing much needed leadership to their Malayan subordinates.

Another important effort of the government in 1948 was the creation of a Special Constabulary “into which some 24,000 Malays were enrolled during the first three months of the emergency.”<sup>48</sup> The role of the Special Constabulary, or SC as they were called, was to act as a form of government sponsored security service for the myriad tin mines and rubber plantations. Initially, the SCs were enrolled without training and many had no weapons. The Malayan Police policy, aimed at reducing the amount of weapons that could be stolen by marauding CTs, was to issue one and one half as many weapons as there were guard posts. During CT raids, many SCs were, therefore, unarmed and quite helpless.

Initially, only ethnic Malays were recruited into the SC and only rubber plantations owned by Europeans and Malays were allocated their platoon of SC guards. The fear from the central government was that any weapons given to Chinese rubber plantation owners or their guards would inevitably end up in the hands of the MCP. This fear, which may have had basis in fact, did not go a long way in appeasing the legitimate concerns of Chinese estate owners. Many of them were attacked as often as their European counterparts, but had no means to defend themselves. This situation was brought to a rather unsatisfactory conclusion later in the campaign when the various Commissioners of Police, whose job it was to allocate SCs, were allowed to place SCs at Chinese estates as long as the owner had been cooperating with the police in the area. Some Chinese estate owners did not cooperate with the police and were instead, out of legitimate fear for their own lives, supporting the MCP with money or food.

By securing the economic heart of Malaya, the Special Constabulary played a key role in the eventual defeat of the MCP. By the end of the war, the SCs were well-trained, well-equipped and battle-hardened. When one considers that this force was an all

---

<sup>48</sup> O’Ballance 83.

volunteer, coming from very inauspicious beginnings, it is impressive to consider their strength, which peaked at 41,000 in 1953.<sup>49</sup>

Getting the Chinese to play an active role in the security of the Malayan State and the defeat of CTs was an important way of wresting the Chinese people in Malaya from the grips and influence of the MCP. The SCs, as important as they were, were hamstrung because they consisted almost entirely of Malays whose loyalty was never in question. The Auxiliary Police force was established to act as relief for the regular police force in outlying towns and villages with the belief that Chinese would be more likely to join this organization because its *raison d'être* was to secure their own villages and towns. Recruiting efforts amongst the Chinese initially fell on deaf ears but by the end of the campaign almost one tenth of the over 100,000 strong Auxiliary Police force were Chinese and several towns were protected solely by Chinese Auxiliary Police force members.<sup>50</sup>

Since the end of the war, the regular Malayan Police Force was in dire need of a significant shake-up. Rural police stations worked only bankers hours and no weekends. The force lacked clearly enunciated policies and formal directives. As Anthony Short describes the situation in his book *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960*:

The organization, establishment and staff of police headquarters was totally inadequate and authority so centralized as to make it impossible for the functions of a headquarters to be performed.<sup>51</sup>

Col W. N. Gray, the former Inspector General of the Palestine Police and a former Royal Marine Commando officer, was selected to lead the transformation of the moribund force into a fighting fit organization. Together with the newly arrived High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, they developed a three step plan to equip and train the

---

<sup>49</sup> Short, Anthony., *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960* (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1975) 127.

<sup>50</sup> Short 129.

<sup>51</sup> Short 131.

police force.<sup>52</sup> The first step was to establish viable police stations throughout the country that would be responsive to emergencies twenty-four hours a day. The second step was to change the police force from its peacetime posture into a paramilitary force capable of defeating the CTs in any environs. Finally, the third step was to train the ever expanding force, mainly by using the constantly arriving ex-members of the Palestine Police Force.

Gray emphasized the need for better communications and had purchased a large number of radios to equip his police stations. He also supported the idea of “Jungle Squads”, teams of policemen who would pursue the CTs into the jungle and fight them there. Unfortunately, Gray and the Director of Operations, Briggs, disagreed on many issues and in particular, the reorganization of the Intelligence service. Gray had also alienated himself from his own police force by steadfastly refusing to allow any police vehicles to be armoured. He believed that any protection added to a police vehicle would have the effect of keeping the police from dismounting during a crisis and thereby becoming less aggressive and responsive. This policy led to the needless death of many policemen during CT ambushes in the early part of the campaign.

Gray and Briggs clashed over the restructuring of the Intelligence services in Malaya. Gray had been adamant that intelligence was the sole province of the police and in particular the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). As such, very little sharing of information with the Army and other security forces took place. There was no coordinated effort in the collection of information, and no central processing of it at the top. Any direction given was solely focussed on police activities, not on the intelligence requirements of other security forces. In short, the Intelligence cycle was broken and badly in need of repair

To address this glaring shortfall, the Special Branch was created in 1948 out of the Malayan Security System, itself part of the CID. The Special Branch was to act as the central agency for the collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence

---

<sup>52</sup> His predecessor, Sir Edward Gent, had been killed in an air crash over London on 4 July 1948.

throughout Malaya. Unfortunately, with Gray at the helm, this transformation did not happen. In 1950, when Briggs arrived, he commented in his first report: “Unfortunately our Intelligence organization is our Achilles heel and inadequate for present conditions when it should be our first line of attack... We have not got an organization capable of sifting and distributing important information quickly.”<sup>53</sup>

Given this shortfall the Special Branch received a new emphasis; it was detached from the CID, and many new British Army Intelligence officers with experience in India and other places were hired. An intelligence school was opened in a ramshackle villa in Kuala Lumpur and Asian Intelligence officers were hired and trained. These officers were the eventual key to success as they were able to infiltrate Min Yuen organizations, collect human intelligence about the MCP members, and assist in interrogations of Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP).

The importance of the Asian operatives cannot be overstated. By infiltrating Min Yuen organizations and compromising individual members, the Special Branch was able to build a complete picture of the Min Yuen and its activities. Information gleaned from compromised Min Yuen members was used to launch successful military and police operations against CT cells and to target individual MCP leaders with precision.

Up until 1950, the military and police acted as separate entities with a common foe. Information was not shared about MCP operatives in various areas. As well, successful tactics, techniques, and procedures were not shared at training establishments. It was Briggs, who as the first Director of Operations, developed a unified plan for the conduct of the war against the CTs. The Briggs Plan, as has already been discussed, was an all-encompassing plan to starve the CTs, make them fight on the conditions of the security forces’ choosing, and protect the people most vulnerable to intimidation. Briggs also “also aimed to bring proper administrative control to a population much of which had never been controlled before. He clearly defined the roles of the police and the

---

<sup>53</sup>Report by Sir Henry Briggs April 1950 as reprinted in, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 by Short, Anthony (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1975) 236.

Army”<sup>54</sup> By doing so he was able to bring the full weight of both forces to bear on the MCP. No longer acting as independent entities, the coordinated acts of all of the available security forces were a powerful opponent of the MCP.

The new Police Commissioner Colonel Arthur Young, formerly Commissioner of the City of London Police, was given the task of changing the Malayan Police Force from a “force” back to a “service”. It was feared that the police had migrated away from their traditional roles and now was no longer protecting the public from terrorism. “Operation Service” was launched, whose aim was to win back public confidence in and respect of the police force. The hat badge was redesigned to show two hands clasping together and the police stations were renamed from the Malay word meaning “lock-up” to the word meaning “police house”. As Templer himself later stressed in a broadcast describing “Operation Service”: “It would be a poor victory if, in rooting out terrorism, we were to replace one fear for another”.<sup>55</sup> Ultimately, these minor changes transformed the Malayan Police Force into a credible, effective policing agency that enjoyed the popular support of the people it served.


By centralizing all security operations under one Director of Operations, Briggs established something he called “war by committee”. War Executive Committees were formed at every level whose sole aim was to coordinate the anti-CT campaign. These cabinets consisted of elected officials, military representatives, police, Special Branch and other members of the civil service. No longer would the police or army collect and keep their own information on the CTs. In time, a detailed picture of their activities, leadership, habits, and vulnerabilities was formed and the security services were then in a position to defeat the MCP in the field, the final Decisive Point in the Military Line of Operation.

---

<sup>54</sup> Miller 70.

<sup>55</sup> Cloake 233.





### Defeat the MCP in the Field

The Briggs plan was perhaps a turning point in the Malayan campaign, but it was not flawless. One of Briggs’ ideas was to have a revitalized Army conduct a clearance operation from the south of Malaya all the way to the north; he used the term “steam roller” to describe the desired effect. Steamroller might have been an appropriate metaphor in Northwest Europe in 1944 but it was not appropriate for the jungles of Malaya in 1950. The campaign petered out after only a few months of execution with only a handful of CTs being killed or captured.

It was not until the Army and Malayan Police force adopted tactics that were more effective in a jungle environment that the tide was turned against the MCP. Large formations thrashing through the jungle were ineffective and served only to provide the CTs with lucrative targets. The new tactics turned the Malayan Emergency into the “Subaltern’s War”. For, as Donald Mackay wrote in his book *The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino That Stood:*

Big squads made big targets, and they meant noise and large numbers into action. Increasingly junior commanders – subalterns, sergeants, and even corporals – found themselves in independent commands, fighting the battle virtually on their own once they were in the jungle.<sup>56</sup>

The force was changed as well; a unit called Ferret Force was assembled which consisted of British, Gurkha and Malay soldiers specially trained in jungle operations. This force formed small teams who would deploy into the jungle and track down CTs then call in larger, more robust, Army units to engage them in combat. Attached to these units were Dyaks, “the famous Borneo head-hunters, who were highly skilled in the art of tracking”.<sup>57</sup> Ferret Force was very successful in finding and destroying individual CTs and many of their well-hidden jungle camps.

Dyaks were not the only aborigines engaged to flush out CTs from the jungle. Malayan aborigines were used with great success once Templer’s staff learned how to get them on their side. During WW II, the MPAJA had used aborigines extensively as their eyes and ears in the jungle. The aborigines had been won over during a period of fifteen years when Communist cells would provide them with seeds and instruction on ways of improving their food production. In exchange, the CTs received information on security forces movements, the sights of air drops, and any new threat in the jungle.

When the great resettlement plan took effect, thousands of aborigines were moved from their jungle huts into “New Villages”; a tactic successful with the Chinese but disastrous for the aborigines. Unable to adapt to the new altitudes, climate, and living conditions, nearly a third died within the first year of their resettlement.<sup>58</sup> Realizing the disaster that was befalling the aborigine community and the effect that resettlement was having on the Malayan Army’s chances of soliciting the aborigines’ assistance, Templer ceased all aboriginal resettlement activities in 1953. From then on, a new program of jungle support for the aborigines was implemented. Jungle forts were constructed which gave a focal point to the efforts to win over the aborigines. Medical support and food

---

<sup>56</sup> Mackay 73.

<sup>57</sup> O’Ballance 87.

<sup>58</sup> Cloake 256.

were provided to aborigines and a special course was devised wherein aboriginal headmen were transported to Kuala Lumpur and “shown the sights of the big city” and more importantly “the power of the security forces.”<sup>59</sup>

Slowly the aborigines were brought over to the government side, mainly by members of the SAS who had been parachuted into the jungle for this purpose. Showing the patience of Job and refined diplomatic skills, the SAS learned to live with the aborigines and found out what motivated them. When a particularly vicious and dedicated Communist headman named Bah Pelankin was killed by his own aborigines, the tide was turned and a flood of information on CT activities, intelligence, and food storage sites was provided by the aborigines to the security services.

Military success in Malaya was not the sole province of the Army and other security forces; the Royal Navy and RAF also played key roles in bringing about the defeat of the MCP in the field. The prime task of the Royal Navy was coastal patrol; they were to ensure that no personnel, supplies or arms could be brought into the country by sea. Even when the MCP held the initiative early in the campaign, they were unable to resupply weapons or ammunition. Wavering Chinese squatters, who may have been tempted to join the CTs in the jungle, were kept at bay because there were no weapons to give them, nor any ammunition to fire. Occasionally, the Royal Navy played a more direct role in the defeat of the CTs by abandoning “their silent role and steam[ing] in to give fire support to particular operations near the coast.”<sup>60</sup>

The roles of the RAF were as diverse as the aircraft that they flew. Medium and heavy bombers were used with effect once any large concentrations of CTs were found or any large administrative or logistics compounds were detected. Bombs were not as effective in the deep jungle, because accuracy of the attack suffered and pre-mature detonation of the ordnance often occurred.<sup>61</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup> Cloake 258.

<sup>60</sup> Smith, E. D. Counter Insurgency Operations: 1 Malaya and Borneo (London: Ian Allan Ltd 1985) 35.

<sup>61</sup> Smith 81.

Transport aircraft carried out operations similar to those that had been employed during WW II in support of the MPAJA. This time, however, the drops were going to far deployed troops of the British and Malay Armies. By dropping supplies to security forces deep in the jungle it allowed these forces to stay for extended times in one location hunting down CTs. Unlike the unsuccessful tactics used by American Airmobile units in Viet Nam, where companies of soldiers would be lifted by helicopter into an area and then lifted out at the end of the day, security forces were brought into areas and stayed there until their mission was complete. Resupply by air represented their vital link and the key to their line of communication.

When helicopters began to arrive in Malaya in 1948, a new dimension to the air campaign began. Helicopters were ideal for the medical evacuation of wounded men and for the immediate evacuation of captured enemy prisoners. They were used as well to ferry in equipment and supplies to troops on the ground where air drops were impractical. Often they would bring in equipment and men who would then start to construct airstrips in the remotest parts of the jungle that would in turn be used to land the RAFs medium and heavy transport aircraft.<sup>62</sup>

The complete dominance that the government security forces maintained of the air had a psychological effect as well. CTs knew all too well that their camps and crops needed to be well concealed if they were to elude bombing. Surrounded security forces could always call in air strikes on their enemy and could rely on rapid reinforcements, or indeed, extraction if the situation deteriorated. The psychological effect was multiplied by the use of Voice Aircraft which would fly low over MCP territory and broadcast propaganda messages or messages of surrender targeted at individual CTs or specific groups.<sup>63</sup>

Aircraft were also used extensively in the very effective Psychological Warfare tactic of leaflet dropping. These leaflets were used to disseminate the government

---

<sup>62</sup> Short 369.

<sup>63</sup> Derry Chapter 4.

message and to encourage the surrender of CTs. The leaflets offered safe passage to surrendering CTs and, more importantly, a reward for any MCP member who they helped to turn in or have surrender voluntarily. As disaffection with the MCP began to spread and the effects of deprivation began to take hold, often only minor encouragement was needed to get formerly steadfast MCP members to surrender. Once surrendered, it was not uncommon for a Surrendered Enemy Personnel or SEP to go back into the jungle and actively assist the Army in finding and killing their former comrades. This phenomena was new to the Malayan Campaign and was well documented by Lucian Pye in his work entitled, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning*:

They were not only generally prepared to cooperate with the authorities but usually eager to lead patrols back into the jungle to attack their former comrades. Even when this meant killing people with whom they had lived and worked for many years, they were not troubled by the prospect, since their break with the party had been a personal one.<sup>64</sup>

As more and more surrenders occurred in an area and incidents of CT terrorism declined, Templer decided that he needed a way of rewarding the people of some secure areas. By doing this, he would also demonstrate that cooperation with the security service had its benefits. In the autumn of 1953 Templer introduced his “White Areas” concept. The first area to be declared white was Malacca “where Special Branch were satisfied that the MRLA was ineffective and the MCP organization had been disrupted over a number of districts.”<sup>65</sup> In each of these White Areas all emergency restrictions were lifted, rations were increased and curfews were ceased.

The granting of White Area status came with the threat of reversion should any MCP activity be noted. It was a calculated risk on the part of Templer but he was confident that the people, once granted their freedoms, would strenuously resist any reintegration of the MCP. In the end, his assessment proved right and once granted, no White Area ever had to be repealed. As the map of Malaya gradually changed from one

---

<sup>64</sup> Pye, Lucian W., *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning* (New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1956) 339.

<sup>65</sup> Clutterbuck, Richard. *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-1963* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973) 94.

of solid black to increasingly one of bright White Areas, it became evident that the MCP was no longer capable of representing the Malay people or of ever forming a government.<sup>66</sup>

### Culminating Point

To use the terms of the OPP, the MCP had reached its culminating point in 1955. Recruitment was stagnant, victories were few and far between, and morale had plummeted. Realizing that he had no future chance of affecting the political situation in Malaya with the use of force, Chin Peng asked to discuss a cease-fire and amnesty in October 1955, not surprisingly, only three months after the Federation of Malaya's first elections. In the end, the talks produced nothing because Chin Peng was bargaining from a position of complete weakness.

When talks broke down he returned to the jungle and led a half-hearted campaign destined for failure. The MCP had been defeated in the field and political stability had been achieved in Malaya. Two Decisive Points, that directly attacked his centre of gravity, had been achieved. In 1957 Malaya was granted full independence and in 1960 the Federation of Malaya declared the emergency over, Chin Peng retreated ever further into the jungle and was never heard from again after 1960.<sup>67</sup>

### Conclusion

The Malayan Communist Party was soundly defeated during the Malayan Emergency which endured from 1945-1960. Its defeat was brought about by coordinated military and political campaigns. Many reasons potentially explain why the victory was so one sided and complete. The Briggs Plan saw the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Chinese squatters into New Villages, which denied the MCP a source of recruits and sustainment. Successful military operations were launched directly against the MCP by small teams of well-trained jungle experts who transformed the campaign

---

<sup>66</sup> Cloake 260.

<sup>67</sup> Stubbs 230-243.

into a “Subalterns War”. Politically, the clever restructuring of the United Malay National Organization into a truly multi-racial party was key to uniting the country and turning away Communism. The campaign remains a model example of the successful way to defeat Communist insurgencies. It stands in stark contrast to the unsuccessful, US-led campaign waged in Viet Nam. S. C. Sarkesian, in his analytical comparison of the two campaigns, points out that the Centre of Gravity of both was the political-social milieu and that the success of the British-Malay campaign was in large order due to their “responses to unconventional conflict.”<sup>68</sup>

This paper used a modern day operations planning tool called the Operations Planning Process to analyze the Malayan Emergency Campaign from 1945-1960. The OPP contains several Operational Concepts which have been used to describe and understand the success of the campaign. First, the Centre of Gravity of the MCP was identified as their legitimacy to represent the Malayan people. In order for the Malayan Government to defeat the MCP, it was essential that a campaign be designed that directly attacked this Centre of Gravity.

Every operational Centre of Gravity is surrounded by many Decisive Points, each one of which must be attacked or attained before the Centre of Gravity can be attacked directly and successfully. An Operational Commander decides the sequence in which he wishes to attain the Decisive Points, this activity is called Sequencing. Once the Sequence is established, a Campaign Plan is designed using Lines of Operation.

In Malaya two Lines of Operation existed which directly threatened the MCP Centre of Gravity and which led to the Malayan Government’s victory. The first was the Political Line of Operation which contained the Decisive Points: Achieve Economic Stability, Dislocate the MCP, and Create Political Stability. The other was the Military Line of Operation which contained the Decisive Points: Stabilize the Domestic Situation, Establish Effective Security Forces and Defeat the MCP in the Field.

---

<sup>68</sup> Sarkesian, Sam C., Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Viet Nam (London: Greenwood Press, 1993) 179.

Many of the Critical Vulnerabilities that attacked or established these Decisive Points were interlinked with Critical Vulnerabilities from other Decisive Points. This phenomena was normal in a campaign which endured for 15 years and was led by five different men. By ensuring that each Decisive Point was attacked or attained through the establishment of a number of related Critical Vulnerabilities, an Operational Campaign with a clear End State was set underway. In Malaya, once the final military and political Decisive Points had been achieved, the MCP had reached its Culminating Point and was no longer able to increase its rate of activity, or Tempo. Chin Peng, the MCP leader, had no option but to sit down with his adversaries and seek favourable conditions for a cease fire. Negotiating from a position of utter weakness, the talks broke down when the Malayan Government refused to accept any of his demands.

Many scholars have noted the inextricable link between military operations and political actions in the successful defeat of insurgencies. Bard E O'Neill notes in his book: *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, that a government that wishes to fight a successful campaign against insurgencies must first evaluate its own response to the insurgency. He summarizes his views on these government responses as follows:

The more government responses are informed, prudent, relevant, determined, and disciplined, the greater the burden on the insurgents. Responses marked by such qualities do not come easily. As we have seen, they depend on many things, not the least of which is the recognition that an insurgency is a political and military phenomenon.<sup>69</sup>

The leaders of Malaya recognized that the MCP represented both a military and political foe. The Malayan Government counter-insurgency campaign waged from 1945 to 1960 was successful because it attacked the Malayan Communist Party's Centre of Gravity using two Lines of Operation; one military, and one political.

---

<sup>69</sup> O'Neill 152.



## **THE CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS:** **A PRIMER**

The following are the six steps of the Canadian Forces Operations Planning Process:

**Step 1 Initiation** - It is during this process that a commander will initiate a campaign by giving some early guidance to his key staff. Individual High Commissioners of Malaya may well have given some initiating directives to their staffs from time to time; however, as the campaign spanned a period of 15 years and five different leaders no single document stands alone as an Initiating Directive.<sup>70</sup>

**Step 2 Orientation** - During this step a commander will decide exactly what his mission or aim truly is. By analyzing the situation he will determine his initial intent, the desired end state of the campaign, the criteria he will use to determine his ultimate success, his main effort throughout the campaign and many other key planning milestones and benchmarks. It is also in this step that the commander will determine what he considers to be his own and the enemy's "Centres of Gravity" and the "Decisive Points" which lead to them. These concepts are key to the OPP, and campaign planning in general, this paper focuses primarily on this step.

**Step 3 Course of Action Development** - During this step the Commander and his staff will determine what are viable Courses of Action (COA) for both the enemy and his own force. As there is no evidence of this type of activity being prevalent in 1945, this step is not considered in this paper.

**Step 4 Decision** – Once several COA have been analyzed the commander will be asked to decide which COA he wishes to have further explored. This will eventually develop into a plan of action for the campaign. In Malaya campaign decisions were taken

---

<sup>70</sup> In the British tradition, colonial governors often bore the title "High Commissioner" as was the case in Malaya. The Malayan heads of government were the "Rulers" a concept which is explained in more detail in other portions of this paper.

by all leaders throughout the emergency but no single COA was adopted which proceeded unchanged for the duration.

**Step 5 Plan Development** – With the COA chosen, the staff will then proceed to further develop the COA into a unifying and synchronized plan. This step sees the staff ensuring that every aspect of the plan has been thought through, weaknesses and shortfalls are addressed and a final, cohesive operational directive is prepared. Such key activities as the “Briggs Plan”<sup>71</sup> and Templer’s “White Area” plan would normally have been products of this step of the OPP.

**Step 6 Plan Review** – Only when the strategic and operational objectives of the campaign have been attained can the planning process be deemed to be over. Until then the plan is continually reviewed, and modified if necessary, to determine its continued relevance and effectiveness. The Malayan emergency was officially over in 1960 even though Merdeka, or independence, was granted in 1957. Until that time the operational campaign was continually reviewed and updated.

---

<sup>71</sup> The “Briggs Plan” is further explained in other portions of this paper.

## **Bibliography**

Canadian Forces Operations B-GG-004-005/AF-000 Manual published by the CF , 2000-10-02

NATO Bi-SC Guidelines for Operational Planning

Canadian Forces Publication Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army B-GL-300-001/FP-000 1996-09-15

AAP – 006 Allied Publication 006

Brown, Col Thomas E. Commander's Guidance. Extract from Military Review published by the US Army Command and General Staff College April, 1994

Schwarzkopf, Norman H General. It Doesn't Take A Hero, Toronto: Bantam Books, 1992

US Army Field Manual FM 100-5 Operations Washington, D.C. Department of the Army, June 1993

Gen Sir Peter de la Billiere Address to Royal United Services Institute. Extract from RUSI Journal, Winter 1991

The Canadian Forces College Staff Officer Handbook publication CFC 106 (3) CJ SOH, 2001

Chapman, F. Spencer. The Jungle is Neutral. Chatto & Windus London, 1950

Percival, LGen A. E., The War in Malaya. London: Eyre& Spottiswoode, 1949

Jackson, Robert . The Malayan Emergency : The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966. London: Routledge, 1991

Haycock, Ronald. Regular Armies and Insurgencies, London: Croom Helm, 1979

Miller, Harry. Jungle War in Malaya : The Campaign Against Communism 1948-60. London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1972

Mackay, Donald. The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino That Stood. London: Brassey's, 1997

Cloake, John,. Templer: Tiger of Malaya. London: Harap, 1985

Barber, Noel,. The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated the Communist Guerrillas 1948-1960. London: Collins, 1971

Stubbs, Richard,. Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, London: Oxford UP, 1989

Thomson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya to Viet Nam, London: Chatto&Windus, 1966

Derry, Archie, F., Emergency in Malaya: The Psychological Dimension , Published by the Psychological Operations Section Joint Warfare Wing National Defence College, Latimer UK. 1982

O'Neill, Bard E., Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Virginia: Brassey's, 1990

Clutterbuck, Richard,. The Long Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Viet Nam, New York: Praeger, 1966

Crockett, Major Anthony, Action in Malaya, Reprinted in *Modern Guerilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961* Ed. Franklin Mark Osanka, Washington: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962

Dow, Maynard W. Nation Building in Southeast Asia, Colorado: Pruett Press Inc., 1965

Rees Williams, D., Mirror, Terrorism in Malaya Vol III No 27 September, 1950

O'Ballance, Edgar. Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-60, London: Faber and Faber, 1966

Mansfield, Howard Going Places: Memoirs of Howard Mansfield, 2000, Personal collection of the author.

Short, Anthony,. The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960, London: Frederick Muller Ltd, 1975

Report by Sir Henry Briggs April 1950 as reprinted in: The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960 by Short, Anthony., London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1975

Smith, E. D., Counter Insurgency Operations: Malaya and Borneo, London: Ian Allan Ltd., 1985

Moran, J. W. G., Spearhead in Malaya. London: Peter Davies, 1959

Pye, Lucian W., Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1956

Clutterbuck, Richard, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-1963, London: Faber and Faber, 1973

Sarkesian, Sam C., Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Viet Nam, London: Greenwood Press, 1993