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MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES THESIS

**THE NORTH AMERICAN DEFENCE IMPERATIVE:
AN HISTORICAL SOURCE OF STRENGTH FOR CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY**

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“Our common values and political ideals bind us. It is our willingness to defend these very ideals, indeed our very societies, (which) unites us. The government and the people of Canada have demonstrated our solidarity with the United States, whatever it takes.”ⁱ

– John Manley, Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, Monday, 24 September, 2001.

Introduction

Throughout much of Canada’s history there has been a fear of domination by the United States that has found expression to varying degrees in political, élite, and public opinion. Given the tensions of the War of 1812-14, “54-40 or Fight!”ⁱⁱ, the Fenian Raids, and the looming threat of a victorious Union Army finishing the job of consolidating US power in North America following the Civil War in the 1860s, that fear was reasonably well founded. But that, so to speak, was then, and this is now. The experiences of the twentieth century repeatedly highlighted the congruence of Canadian and American interests, and more than sixty years of expanding and evolving defence integration provide a direction for productive defence relations between the two nations into the twenty-first century. This essay will review selected aspects of the Canada-US defence relationship as it evolved since the tumultuous year of 1940. An historical approach will demonstrate the existence of a profoundly durable, common approach to defence. This suggests that, contrary to the fear of Canadian independence deteriorating under the weight of American influence, the continental defence relationship can be viewed as a source of strength that should be exploited by the Government of Canada and the Canadian Forces as a means of creating a national security strategy integrated with, but independent of, the United

States. Through such an alliance-based strategy, a viable Canadian defence capability can be maintained.

The paper begins with an examination of the necessary birth of the North American continental defence alliance in the dark years of the Second World War when Britain was under siege and it seemed possible Canada and the United States might become the last bulwark against totalitarian victory. The evolution and expansion of defence commitments throughout the West is examined in the context of fascism giving way to communism as the primary threat at the beginning of the Cold War. The discussion follows the gaze of Canadian and US policymakers as it was drawn from Europe to Asia as the struggle between East and West was played out on the Korean peninsula. The paper returns to the North Atlantic with a review of Canadian involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the many profound repercussions of those events. A parallel is drawn between Canada's roles in the crises of 1962 and the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 almost 30 years later. Following a discussion of the changing nature of the global community and Canada's place in it, the essay concludes with a prescription for the evolution of a national security strategy based strongly on the North American continental relationship. The question remains whether or not the dangers of the post-Cold War/post-Sept. 11 world are sufficient to overcome traditional Canadian public and political apathy toward the military. It is to be hoped that this review might encourage policy makers to confess their continental "sins," embrace their continental responsibilities, cease apologizing for the synchronicity of Canadian and American defence policy, and begin enjoying the positive public support that will inevitably result.

Necessity forges a continental alliance

“The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defence in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States. It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall be set up at once by the two countries.”

– Opening lines of the Ogdensburg Agreement, 18 August, 1940

As Nazi Germany overran Europe in the spring of 1940, Great Britain barely held on as the last bastion of resistance to the *blitzkrieg*. With the United States still neutral, the Commonwealth alone stood by Great Britain, with Canada shouldering the bulk of the burden due to her relative proximity and vast resources. “Canada poured itself into the rescue mission, so much so that it had few resources left for continental defense.”ⁱⁱⁱ President Roosevelt, constrained by the Neutrality Act, developed the lend-lease programme^{iv} as a method of circumventing an isolationist Congress to help Britain resist the Nazis. Despite the flow of American military aid, German pressure was unrelenting and the unthinkable became a distinct possibility – Britain might surrender. Canada was committing the bulk of her effort to supporting London but “[i]f Britain fell, a defenceless Canada would endanger the United States.”^v Prime Minister MacKenzie King and Roosevelt met at Ogdensburg, New York on August 17, 1940, where Roosevelt proposed a permanent joint board of defence. With uncharacteristic speed and lack of reference to Parliament, the normally cautious King accepted the proposal after one night’s solitary deliberation.

The agreement had significant, long-term implications for Canada, which could not have been lost on King who was an intellectual, sophisticated politician with vast experience working in the United States. There is little doubt that King trusted both his political instincts and his solid relationship with Roosevelt sufficiently to risk establishing a defence agreement that was both permanent and predicated on the United States taking command of Canadian forces in the event of a British surrender. King's leadership and clear assessment of a situation are evident in this action. Ever mindful of Canada's fragile national unity, King understood that continental defence would not rub the anti-conscription sensibilities of Quebec the wrong way. Furthermore, it would clearly resonate with English Canada, made anxious by the "phoney war" for some concrete action. Continental defence was clearly necessary, so no further deliberation was evidently required. Public sentiment was assured, and in the event seems to have accepted the proposal without serious comment. Still, there were limits to Canadian acquiescence and when the later development of plans in the event of American entrance into the war included the United States taking command of both nations' forces, King balked. "Although he regarded United States-Canadian military co-operation as vital, he did not want Canada slipping into American control."^{vi}

King held together a fractious nation and steered as independent a course as possible as Canada emerged from under the dominion of Great Britain and re-aligned itself with the United States. King was the ideal man for a time of transition from British to American dominance – he combined a vestigial, cultural appreciation of, and connection to, the colonial power of Great Britain with a pragmatic understanding of the United States and its ascendant economic and political power. King's own appraisal was that defence of the continent had been a consistent

theme between himself and Roosevelt for as long as they had been meeting as elected leaders.^{vii} This is hardly surprising given common memories of bloodshed during the Great War and the gloomy, inevitable prospect of a reprise of the slaughter. In explaining the Ogdensburg Agreement, King insisted to Parliament that the primary interests of the two leaders were the defence of their respective countries.^{viii} From that it can be concluded that King did not perceive the Permanent Joint Board of Defence, and the associated staff planning, as threats to the sovereignty of Canada. As with many aspects of Canada-US relations, the cementing of closer bonds occurred less by design or coercion than by the dictates of common sense.

Granatstein and Hillmer note “[t]he change in imperial masters was fateful. So too was the shift in economic power southwards.”^{ix} The true significance of the Ogdensburg Agreement comes into sharper focus when one considers the result of the subsequent Hyde Park Declaration of April 20, 1941 – the economic corollary to the Ogdensburg Agreement. With the considerable involvement of the United States business community, Canadian industry was pumping out a huge amount of weapons for both the domestic war effort and to support Great Britain. A pre-war trade deficit with the United States, normally equalized by a trade surplus with Britain, began to grow rapidly as resources flowed north to keep the munitions factories operating. Unfortunately for Canada, Britain was now not only insolvent; she was also receiving arms from the United States through lend-lease without having to pay in hard currency. “If Britain could lease war matériel from the United States without putting cash on the barrelhead, why should it buy dominion goods for which it had to pay sterling or Canadian dollars? Unfortunately, the generous measure (lend-lease) might have the unintended effect of destroying the Canadian economy.”^x Halting war production was not an option, but neither was King

prepared to sell off Canadian assets or risk accepting lend-lease and thereby drive Canada deep into the Americans' debt.^{xi} King and Roosevelt met again and struck a shrewd deal. The resulting Hyde Park declaration stated in part, "each country should provide the other with the defence articles which it is best able to produce, and, above all, produce quickly, and that production programmes should be co-ordinated to this end."^{xii} The triumph of Hyde Park for King was the rather convoluted logic whereby imports of American supplies to Canada would be covered under the Lend-Lease Act as it was assumed the finished products would be supplied to Great Britain. With that sleight of hand, Canada received badly needed credit with which to continue war production – extended under the guise of common support to London. The looming financial crisis was resolved and Canadian war industry hit its stride. King explained the Hyde Park Declaration to Parliament on April 28, 1941.

The problem of exchange was the most urgent problem we faced in our economic relations with the United States. But we also realized a growing danger of possible unnecessary duplication of production facilities on the North American continent, with consequent undue pressure on scarce labour and materials if Canada and the United States each tried to make itself wholly self-sufficient in the field of war supplies. We felt it imperative to avoid such waste, which might well have had the most serious consequences...It was, therefore, only common sense to extend to the production of war materials the same reciprocity in which, at Ogdensburg in August last, our two countries had permanently placed their defence.^{xiii}

With the very real threat of a Nazi victory, King had no option but to tie Canada economically and militarily to the United States. It made sense, and there was no reason to see any sinister intention in the methods of King's counterparts in Washington. The real threat from

the United States was the trade deficit, and to King's relief, the Hyde Park agreement resolved it. King's statement to Parliament, however, somewhat disingenuously subordinated the seriousness of the balance of trade crisis to the necessity of economic coordination and efficiency. It is hard to imagine either "duplication of production facilities" or "self-sufficiency in the field of war supplies" being hardships to the United States. Presumably, the "growing danger" and "most serious consequences" were accruing predominantly to Canada.

From Roosevelt's point of view, grafting economic integration onto military co-operation cost the United States little and gained them much in terms of a physical buffer zone, a compliant subordinate in continental defence, and access to practically unlimited raw materials for military production. It was a situation that has as much relevance in 2002 as it did in 1941. King too was a shrewd politician who cannot have been ignorant of the implications of his decisions – although, neither could he acknowledge their long-term effects. The Ogdensburg and Hyde Park agreements were necessities that resolved pressing crises for King and Canada. If they had the unintended effect of mortgaging future economic and military sovereignty to purchase immediate security in a period of overwhelming danger, that was a compromise King could accept. One could do far worse than having the United States as an involved neighbour.

Creating a bilateral defence arrangement between the two nations was the natural extension of generations of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural similarities – even if there had been significant political tensions in the past. At a subliminal level, the Permanent Joint Board of Defence embodied the inexorable, southerly journey of the Canadian military mind away from its traditional roots in Great Britain and into the arms of its erstwhile adversary. The

combination of the Ogdensburg Agreement and the Hyde Park Declaration represented the relatively seamless transfer of colonial domination over Canada from London to Washington.

The emerging threat of communism

The Second World War had a profound effect on the political, cultural, and economic orientation of Canada. Over a million men had taken up arms against the Germans, Italians, and Japanese and the economy had expanded dramatically in its efforts to put weapons into the hands of Canadians and their allies. Unlike Europe and Japan, which lay in ruins at the end of the war, North America remained unscathed. The lack of physical wounds, and a healthy economy buoyed hopes for a peaceful future. “After almost two decades of depression and then war, Canadians wanted to get on with their lives. For most, military matters were a low priority.”^{xiv} Such was the case in both Canada and the United States, and the result was that both countries rushed to demobilize and demilitarize as quickly as possible.

The Canadian government was wary of both a British-dominated Commonwealth, posited by Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador to the United States, at a speech in Toronto in 1944,^{xv} and the growing, preponderant weight of the United States in Canada’s affairs. King quickly put paid to Halifax’s proposal and avoided joining a “Washington-inspired hemispheric defence agreement signed at Chapultepec late in 1945. In urging their post-war organisations, Canadian service chiefs used the United Nations, not continental defence, as their justification.”^{xvi} King and his Cabinet hoped to formulate a post-war foreign policy based on a distinct Canadian nationalism born in the 1920s. “Their nationalism was not negative, and it was

not directed against the United States or...Great Britain.... It was, instead, a belief that Canada would soon fulfill its own destiny, even if that destiny was, in part, to act in concert with those Anglo-Saxon nations that had given birth to it and would continue to strongly (sic) influence its social and political institutions.”^{xvii} Canada’s contribution to the war, particularly her military efforts, the only solid currency in international affairs, earned her status as a “middle power” and Canadian diplomats were anxious to use that status to help arrange the new world order along more multi-lateral lines. Despite the failure of the League of Nations to prevent war in 1939, the initial thrust of Canada’s foreign policy was another universal international body, the new United Nations Organisation, which had suffered its birth pangs in San Francisco in the spring of 1945.

Building on efforts begun at Dumbarton Oaks near Washington in September, 1944, difficult negotiations over the structure and administration of the United Nations began in San Francisco in April, 1945. Consensus demanded compromise, however, and middle power aspirations would be the most likely victims. “Everyone wanted to keep the Soviet Union, still bleeding from its wartime wounds and suspicious of the intentions of the West, happy enough to join the organisation. To accomplish this, it was imperative not to challenge great power unity – hard won at Dumbarton Oaks – on important points.”^{xviii} A critical part of that important unity was the veto the great powers had granted themselves over any proceedings of the Security Council that infringed on their individual national interests. The reality Canadian diplomats faced in the spring of 1945 was that international relations had changed little in six years of war, and the five “great powers”^{xix} had no intention of heeding the interests of smaller nations in substantive matters, regardless of their contribution to the defeat of the common enemy. Whatever its birth defects however, the United Nations provided a venue in which middle

powers could genuinely strive to influence the agendas of their larger neighbours. King and his ministers, the men who would guide the nation for most of the foreseeable future, were pragmatic enough to understand their relationship to the United States in all its complexities. The United Nations was a pressure valve from which domestic public and political concerns about the decay of sovereignty could be harmlessly vented without affecting the underlying reality of the Canada-US relationship.

Initial optimism about the United Nations was, inevitably, short-lived. In 1945, with Germany prostrate, with the Red Army not following the lead of the demobilizing West, and with revelations of an extensive Soviet spy network, based in Ottawa but with tendrils in Washington and London, anti-communism quickly blossomed into a significant motivator of government policy. Louis St. Laurent, one of King's most powerful lieutenants, was "deeply religious, feared godless communism and, working with his under-secretary, Lester Pearson, he played a critical role in mobilizing the West to resist Marxism."^{xx} Churchill proclaimed, "an iron curtain ha[d] descended across the Continent."^{xxi} Fears grew in official Ottawa that Soviet intransigence and designs on Eastern Europe would lead to confrontation with the West. The government "decided in July 1945 that defence ties with the United States had to be maintained in the peace. The reason was clear: the glowering presence of the U.S.S.R."^{xxii} Still, growing paranoia about the sinister intentions of the Kremlin did not impress King who, believing any Soviet attack on Canada or the US would be diversionary, remained determined to return the Canadian military, having fulfilled its wartime duty, to its traditional domestically irrelevant status.

King appointed Brooke Claxton, a Montreal lawyer and First World War veteran, as Minister of National Defence in 1946. The rapid expansion of the armed services during the war had resulted in three separate departments that, in the early post-war period, competed needlessly among themselves for scarce resources. Claxton, a social reformer and strong Canadian nationalist, had introduced the family allowance benefit during the war. King used Claxton's predilection for welfare programmes to motivate him to accept a post he did not want, "argu[ing] persuasively that the social reforms that Claxton had fought for could not come about as long as the armed forces were taking up so much of the public purse; Claxton's mandate would be to reduce the size of the forces."^{xxiii} The reduction would occur despite another gathering storm in Europe.

On March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman addressed the US Congress and requested \$400 million to aid Greece and Turkey resist the spread of communism in southeast Europe. Three months later, in a speech at Harvard University, George C. Marshall, the US Secretary of State, outlined the need for the United States to provide massive aid to restore the shattered European economy. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan provided a post-war strategy that both contained communism and restored the European markets for American goods. The impetus for the strategy was perhaps best summed up by General Marshall's comment that "[a]side from the demoralizing effect on the world at large (of Europe's economic collapse) and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, *the consequences to the economy of the United States* should be apparent to all."^{xxiv} As closely integrated as the Canadian economy was to the American, the consequences to Canada were equally apparent to the King government. The government's political sympathy for the

American approach deepened when Bulgaria and Romania became communist in July and December of 1947 respectively and when Czechoslovakian communists, supported by the Red Army, staged a bloodless coup in Prague in February 1948.

By this time, the post-war four-way split of Germany was becoming increasingly untenable, and it was evident that the Soviets would be unlikely to relinquish their growing authority in Eastern Europe by allowing the establishment there of democratic governments. Britain, France, and the United States agreed to merge their sectors into a single political and economic entity with a common currency. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and finally the re-constitution of a German nation, were more than the Soviets could bear. In April 1948, they imposed a partial blockade of Berlin to force the Western powers out of the jointly controlled city, which was deep inside the Soviet sector. Fearing a loss of prestige in the face of Soviet defiance, the Western powers remained. The new currency was introduced in Berlin on June 23, 1948, and two days later the Soviets sealed off the city to all ground transportation. “But the western powers would not give in. To demonstrate their resolve, the Americans orchestrated a monumental airlift which (sic) flew necessities such as coal and food into the western sectors of Berlin. This airlift lasted for 324 days, and approximately 13,000 tons of supplies a day were delivered.”^{xxv}

Canada’s response to the Berlin Blockade showed the vestigial resentment King held for what he perceived as British assumption of Canadian support, as well as his traditional reluctance to get involved in military adventures in which Canada had neither responsibility nor interest. While St. Laurent, Pearson, and Norman Robertson, the Canadian High Commissioner

in London, advised a contribution, King, supported by Claxton, overruled them. Ultimately, not a single Canadian plane or serviceman participated in the airlift. The government's position "ignored the basic fact, one that even King admitted, that if war broke out over Berlin, Canada would be in it up to its neck."^{xxvi} Such a response reveals the underlying continental nature of Canadian defence orientation. Despite a serious crisis affecting Europe, and the apprehension of a Soviet threat, whether real or imagined, King chose not to act. Nevertheless, he did not seriously undermine Canada's relationship with the United States, which, since 1945, had been solidified through a series of bilateral agreements worked out for the most part between officials of both nations' defence departments. This suggests the Americans did not consider Canadian participation in a European crisis such as the Berlin airlift necessary, while the facts of geography would demand participation in a North American situation. This was clearly understood by the generation of Canadian leaders who succeeded King in 1948, with the notable exception of John Diefenbaker, which will be discussed later.

With the impotence of the United Nations increasingly evident, continental defence would be the foundation of Canadian military thinking, with the Permanent Joint Board on Defence defining the middle ground between the impossibly expensive task of Canada defending herself unilaterally against Soviet aggression and total abrogation of that responsibility to the United States. The margin of sovereignty would be determined by how much of the burden of continental defence Canada would be willing – or forced – to bear. The Second World War had demanded considerable integration of effort, but the Cold War was to make the United States a sterner mistress still and integration expanded inexorably in the immediate post-war years.

The most likely route for Soviet long-range bombers carrying out a nuclear attack on the United States was over the North Pole and the Canadian Arctic. “Canada’s vast Arctic became a buffer zone that it could not hope to defend alone.”^{xxvii} As part of their new forward defence strategy, the American service chiefs planned an extensive network of radar coverage and fighter bases stretching from Alaska to Greenland. In support of the defence system, American military planners requested and received authorization to build and staff Arctic weather stations in Canada. Subsequently, agreements were reached on the sharing of research and development information, and leases on bases in Newfoundland, Labrador and northern Canada were re-negotiated. The Military Co-operation Committee, a sub-committee of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, was formed in 1946 to manage co-operation at the military planning level in mapping and charting, meteorology, oceanography, communications and electronics, and logistics.^{xxviii} “On February 12, 1947, a bilateral agreement cautiously committed Canada to American weapons, equipment, training methods, and communications...As a legal counterpart, a Visiting Forces Bill...gave American...officers command of their own forces on Canadian soil...More than Ogdensburg, the 1947 agreement[s] marked Canadian military integration with its historic enemy.”^{xxix} Over the years, the defence establishments of the two nations have become deeply intertwined through more than eighty treaty-level agreements, 250 memoranda of understanding, 145 bilateral fora, and frequent combined military exercises and operations. The extent of military education exchanges serves well as an indication of the broad integration between the countries. As Bercuson observes, “[t]his programme was part of a larger attempt to move the Canadian military closer to the US forces as continental defence became the top Canadian defence priority.”^{xxx}

While St. Laurent and Pearson were both avowed anti-communists, convinced of the necessity and inevitability of a continental defence partnership with the Americans in the dawning nuclear age, they harboured a latent sensitivity about encroachments on Canadian sovereignty. This was a sentiment shared wholeheartedly by Claxton, who understood

“...Canada had to be realistic and could not deny the United States its legitimate defence requirements. Canada should do as much as possible on its own, but it would never be able to do all that was necessary. Canada was a friend and ally of the Americans, but it had separate interests to protect and had to do so in ways that were both pragmatic and diplomatic. He did not fear the United States, but he did worry that US demands might one day become insatiable.”^{xxxix}

The search for a counterweight to the growing influence of Canada’s leviathan neighbour and protector would continue.

With the United Nations hamstrung as an effective conflict resolution forum by the use of the veto in the Security Council, and with the Soviets consolidating their hold on Eastern Europe, the nervous governments of Britain, France, and the Benelux^{xxxii} countries concluded a mutual security agreement in the spring of 1948. Churchill had proposed a defensive alliance, formed within the parameters of the charter of the United Nations, in his famous “sinews of peace” speech in Fulton, Missouri in March 1946. It was a theme that St. Laurent took up six months after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine. “Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1947, Mr. St. Laurent expressed the concern of the peace-loving nations at the inability of the Security Council to ensure their protection. 'If forced', he said, 'these nations may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security'. Events soon confirmed his opinion.”^{xxxiii}

The Brussels Treaty^{xxxiv} became the nucleus around which the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation would be formed, embodying Truman's intent to contain communism. The Europeans hoped to gain the commitment of the United States to their defence against the deepening Soviet threat. Uncomfortable with a surfeit of American commitment in that arena, a wider Western front against communism presented Canada with an opportunity to dilute what was becoming an overbearing, purely continental alliance without actually turning away from it. Beginning in 1948, secret talks were held between the signatories of the Brussels Treaty, Canada, and the United States on the mechanisms for broadening the alliance. Within six weeks of St. Laurent publicly floating the idea in Parliament of the Brussels Treaty being expanded into an overarching Atlantic alliance, both Britain and the United States had confirmed their support. The trans-Atlantic thread that had come so close to breaking under the weight of the Nazi onslaught in 1940, was being rebuilt in the face of potential Soviet aggression.

Despite numerous efforts from Moscow to filibuster the proceedings and intimidate various smaller nations considering joining, the Washington Treaty, which created the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), was signed on April 4, 1949. For Canada it provided a critical forum at which the country had real influence. The nation's foreign policy now rested on three main pillars: the continental alliance, the United Nations, and NATO. Of the three, the former would remain the most influential and command the most immediate political attention, while the latter two offset domestic criticism of selling out to the Americans by providing visible, if not always effective, countervailing influences.

Despite the experience of the war, King remained an isolationist at heart and hated the notion of formal military alliances. They represented everything he had struggled against throughout his tenure as prime minister. He had driven Canada away from her subordinate position to Great Britain, and he wanted to avoid any hint of a return to that relationship, or one with the United States for that matter, which a formal military alliance would imply. St. Laurent, Pearson, Robertson, and Escott Reid, a senior diplomat involved in the establishment of NATO, were as internationally oriented as King was isolationist. But he was the boss and they needed to get his approval for Canada to join a North Atlantic alliance. In this regard, one can view Canada's insistence on the inclusion of Article Two, calling for *non-military* co-operation, in the North Atlantic Charter as a public relations effort, concocted by internationalist ministers and officials, and directed at an audience of one – King. Including the somewhat woolly notions of “promoting conditions of stability and well-being” and “seek[ing] to eliminate conflict in...international economic policies”^{xxxv} in the body of a *defence* agreement would suffice to maintain the fiction that NATO would be more than “merely an old-fashioned military alliance.”^{xxxvi} They would also serve to sell the alliance to a war weary population that was simultaneously being warned of the growing danger from the Soviet Union.

As it happened, the 73-year old prime minister was in his final year of office and turned out not to be that hard to convince. Unfortunately, having committed themselves to the pretence that the alliance was something it wasn't, the nation's leaders came to believe their own public relations. The provisions of Article Two, however, would not begin to have any resonance within the alliance until after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In the late-1940s, the self-delusional sleight of hand might have worked on Canadians, but it was ineffective on the

Americans, who recognized the alliance for what it was. Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, exposed the fiction when he bluntly wrote, "[t]he plain fact is, of course, that NATO is a military alliance. Its purpose was and is to deter and, if necessary, to meet the use of Russian military power or the fear of its use in Europe. This purpose is pretty old-fashioned. Perhaps to avoid this stigma, Canadian draftsmen had Article 2 inserted in the Treaty."^{xxxvii} No matter how disingenuous, the position must have been less discomfiting for Canadian politicians than acknowledging the depth of their subordination to the United States on matters of defence and foreign policy. It also conveniently meshed with the growing self-perception of Canadians as impartial mediators and solvers of intractable conflicts between misguided nations.

While St. Laurent's and Pearson's internationalism and anti-communism appeared to be setting the agenda, Claxton was wielding an efficient, well-honed knife at the Department of National Defence. Despite the rhetoric of a looming Soviet threat, there was a costly social safety net to weave in Canada and a flock of frightened, tired, and bankrupt nations in Europe that could scarcely afford to defend themselves. "NATO's real appeal for its members was that by pooling military resources, each partner could do less. Canada was typical in seeking cut-rate rearmament."^{xxxviii} Cheap defence and a socio-economic orientation were not what the Americans had anticipated from allies when the NATO agreement was framed, but parsimonious allies seemed better than confronting communism alone.

If Canadians gained any sense of security from the formation of NATO that spring, and felt that cutbacks to their defence forces were timely, that optimism was soon lost. On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. The test shocked the world, for it had

been felt up to that time that the Soviets were anywhere from five to ten years away from possessing a nuclear capability. Instantly, the ocean buffers protecting North America became meaningless, and Canadians and Americans felt exposed and vulnerable. NATO, it seemed, had been formed not a moment too soon.

“Like winter snow before the spring sun.”^{xxxix}

The West watched nervously as the Soviets consolidated their power throughout Eastern Europe and growing fears of communism were compounded by the victory of Mao Zedong’s communists over Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists in the Chinese civil war. As the threat of communism increased, the minor tensions between Canadian and American diplomats that attended the inclusion of Article Two in the Washington Treaty were echoed in diplomatic manoeuvring between the two over elections in Korea, informally partitioned between the Americans and Soviets since the end of World War Two. As the anticipated unity of the great powers^{xl} deteriorated after the war, a political and administrative stalemate descended upon Korea, with Korean nationalists impatient to take control of their own affairs. The US orchestrated the creation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to oversee democratic elections throughout Korea. Predictably, UNTCOK, of which Canada was a member, was unable to gain access to North Korea or the support of the Soviet Union. At the prompting of the United States, the commission resorted to holding elections only in the heavily populated south on May 10, 1948. This occurred over the strenuous objections of Canada and Australia who insisted the commission’s mandate covered the entire peninsula. Canada learned

an important lesson about its relationship with the United States in this relatively minor diplomatic wrangle.

Had the United States acted unilaterally in Korea in 1947-48, Canada would not have become involved. But, having thrown its not insignificant diplomatic and moral weight behind the fledgling United Nations, Canada was in no position to deny its support when the United States resorted to the international body to resolve the election i

Ottawa.^{xliii} The world received a sharp reminder of the fragility of peace when the communist North Koreans invaded the south on June 25, 1950, and within six weeks had rolled the South Korean and American armies up into a tiny pocket around the south-eastern port of Pusan. Drawing a parallel with the disastrous appeasement of Hitler in the late-1930s, President Truman acted immediately.^{xliv} Despite the direct threat to American forces and the opportunity to act unilaterally, the United States recognized the manifest benefits of international legitimacy and “worked diligently to ensure [the] call went out from the UN and not from Washington.”^{xlv} With the Soviets boycotting the Security Council over the question of Chinese representation in that forum (the nationalists, defeated by the communists in 1949, still represented China at the United Nations in June of 1950), the United States was able to orchestrate resolutions^{xlvi} condemning the communist invasion and calling on member nations to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security to the area.”^{xlvii}

In the early days of summer, Canadian politicians were dispersed to their cottages and camps, and so their initial response was delayed and equivocal. Furthermore, the sudden insistence by Washington that the attack be resisted head on took Canadian leaders by surprise. Some thought the attack was a diversion designed to draw scarce defence resources away from Europe and North America,^{xlviii} others believed the communists should be contained wherever they attempted to expand. This was neither an attack against North America nor Europe – how far did our alliance with the United States commit us? It was felt in most western capitals that the Korean aggression was indicative of the avowed global ambition of a monolithic, unitary, ideology antithetical to western political, economic and value systems – today Korea; tomorrow

NATO forces in Western Europe.^{xlix} The common enemy was threatening the interests of the West no matter how unexpected the quarter and it left policymakers with little choice but to rise to their own defence. After defeating Nazism only five years earlier, the West was not about to concede defeat without putting up a fight.

The imperative for Canadian politicians was to ensure the response came firmly from the United Nations, and in this they were abetted by their counterparts in Washington who “were as eager as their allies to sustain the viability of the United Nations as a collective security agent.”^l The American resort to the United Nations was a mixed blessing for Canada. On one hand it provided international legitimacy to the intervention and a considerable opportunity for smaller allies to exert some restraint upon American military enthusiasm; on the other, it eliminated any option Canada had to decline to participate. Stairs succinctly describes the horns of the Canadian dilemma. “[T]he government was in the unhappy position of being morally and politically committed to a course of action which its defence establishment regarded as strategically unwise, given the current level of Canadian military capabilities.”^{li}

It took a concerted effort by the United States government and the United Nations Secretary General to overcome Canadian inertia.^{lii} Finally sensing that all three pillars of their foreign policy (the continental alliance, the United Nations, and NATO) were threatened by either the communist invasion or their inaction, Canadian ministers found themselves compelled to answer the call to help drive the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel. Canada would have to do so, even if command of the UN forces would be vested in an American general,^{liii} neutralizing the much-desired counterweight to US dominance in international crises. Even

though he did not want to become overly committed to the UN “police action,” St. Laurent, by that time the new prime minister, “felt that participation in Korea was in keeping with Canada’s strong support for the notion of collective security.”^{liv}

Unfortunately, the depth of post-war cuts to the military had left few operational forces immediately ready to deploy for combat in Korea. As Hillmer and Granatstein note, “[t]he Canadian forces in 1950 were not in good working order. The great army, navy, and air force of 1945 had melted away like winter snow before the spring sun.”^{lv} The response would, therefore, have to be meted out piecemeal and was ultimately limited to the minimal possible within the bounds of alliance propriety. Canadian leaders fell back on the habit of splitting the influence of dominant powers by assigning small sea and air forces to American control while committing her land contribution to a Commonwealth Division. Bercuson’s view is that the formation of the Commonwealth Division was a “practical necessity”^{lvi} for a number of small contingents with common equipment, training, doctrine, and heritage. That Canada’s participation in the Commonwealth Division kept Canadian units together, visible, and as far removed from American control as it was possible to be in Korea, could not have been anything but the intention of Canada’s leaders. Thus, by taking seemingly decisive action, Canadian politicians skillfully negotiated the narrow middle ground between the continental defence partnership and a multi-lateral approach to international relations.

While their politicians prevaricated, Canadian military men, after five years of post-war atrophy, recognized the advantage that would accrue to their quest for sustainability with a solid commitment to defeating the worldwide threat of communism – exemplified by the present

danger in Korea. Mustering what forces they could to provide their government with military options, planners pushed off into new territory. It is worth noting that, with differing threats, this situation has since replayed itself regularly: the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Persian Gulf War of 1990/91, and most recently the “war on terrorism” begun in late-2001.

A squadron of three destroyers was deployed from the West Coast naval base at Esquimalt, BC on July 5, 1950. Two days later, five, four-engine North Star aircraft of 426 (Transport) Squadron, based in Dorval, Quebec, were committed to the effort. By the beginning of August, recruitment began for a specially minted Canadian Army Special Force, separate from the regular army, for service in Korea. The Department of National Defence “was anxious to re-enlist as many World War II veterans as possible, and particularly experienced officers with distinguished combat records.”^{vii} Men, often of questionable physical and moral quality, flocked to recruiting stations across the country to join the force. The painful memory of terrible losses of under-trained soldiers in Hong Kong during World War Two informed the Department’s insistence that no troops would be committed to battle until they were adequately trained. Also, with the Canadian government committed from the start to a limited engagement in the fighting, there would be no fear of a reprise of the conscription crises that had wracked the nation twice in the previous 35 years. The government would act, but it would be diligent about preventing domestic political crises as much as possible. Not unwisely, if somewhat frustratingly, caution and the maintenance of political flexibility were the hallmarks of the St. Laurent government’s response.

The West was holding on by its fingertips in Pusan until General Douglas MacArthur's masterful amphibious flank attack at Inchon near Seoul in mid-September sent the North Koreans reeling back across the 38th parallel. The UN attack provoked a vigorous Chinese intervention that reversed the flow of armies yet again. By April of 1951, the war of manoeuvre had stalled into a violent stalemate that dragged on for three years with negligible gains by either side. While conceding the apparent futility of the tactical situation, both Granatstein and Bercuson argue the strategic aim of containing communism was achieved; they also suggest that success should not be underestimated.^{lviii} Representing a contrary point of view, Warnock suggests the result, and by implication the aim, of the war was to rationalize increases in taxes and defence expenditures and ultimately the general rearming of the West, including Germany.^{lix} A less contradictory approach would acknowledge that the leaders were making the best decisions they could given the information and the apprehensions that existed at that time. The drawing of the iron curtain across Europe, the existence of a Soviet nuclear weapons capability, and global communism were perceived as real and serious threats.

The experiences of Canadian military men differed between the services, but they all benefited corporately from action in Korea. If no great strides were made toward improving interoperability,^{lx} Canadians certainly gained valuable battlefield experience that would stand them in good stead in future NATO activities.^{lxi} Of most significance for the Canadian services was the general rearmament throughout the West spurred by the war in Korea and the continued alignment of Canadian military policy with that of the United States. The impact of both would be felt in Canada for the next forty years. So too would the nature of the Korean War. It was a struggle dictated by political objectives rather than military imperatives, fought by a small body

of professional soldiers, about which the vast majority of the population was indifferent. As Bercuson writes, the Korean War was “the first Canadian war that elicited little interest from the folks back home.”^{lxii}

Strangely, while the threat of communism had grown steadily around the globe in the late 1940s, Western nations made few serious efforts to counter it militarily. “Chinese intervention in November 1950 changed the whole complexion of the Korean War and dramatically raised East-West tensions.”^{lxiii} Western fears were not realized for a number of reasons,^{lxiv} but they precipitated the largest ever, peacetime military build-up in Canadian history. Annual defence budgets ballooned, orders for aircraft, tanks, and ships were expanded, and personnel strength more than doubled in three years. Morton observes, somewhat grudgingly, that “[o]n the whole, Canadians accepted rearmament. Times were prosperous...Canada, in the 1950s could apparently afford both guns and butter and, indeed, there were influential economists who insisted that spending on guns helped put butter on Canadian tables.”^{lxv}

Public support for rearmament, however, was not only based on economic benefit. “A Gallup poll released in early January 1951 showed that 53 per cent of those interviewed thought that the threat of war was the nation’s most serious concern.”^{lxvi} Deepening the integration of continental defence was part of the response to those fears. Canadian and American officials agreed to the construction of the Pinetree Line, a chain of radar stations stretching across Canada from Atlantic to Pacific^{lxvii} that would be in place by 1954. The Mid-Canada Line was commissioned in 1955 to be followed shortly thereafter by the Distant Early Warning Line in the Arctic. Combined with increasing numbers of fighter jets, “these lines made possible far greater

tactical co-operation between the American and Canadian air forces.^{”lxviii} As air defences became increasingly intertwined, the challenge, and desire, of the two national air force commands was to integrate their efforts into a formal air defence structure. There were two main obstacles: the inability of the American forces to bring the disparate responsibilities for air defence, spread across a number of services, under a single command; and “the continuing wariness of Canadian civilian authorities toward bilateral defence arrangements with the United States which might affect Canadian sovereignty.”^{lxix} Ultimately, the first was overcome, but perennial Canadian apprehension would be relegated to a less influential position relative to the requirement to combine continental defence efforts when the integrated North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) was formed in 1959.

Additionally, while resources had been scarce at the outbreak of the Korean War, the procurement programme Claxton implemented in the mid-1950s allowed significant land and air forces to be committed to NATO and dispatched to Europe. It also allowed the rapidly expanding Royal Canadian Navy to work ever more closely with the United States Navy in the new NATO command in the western Atlantic.^{lxx} While Brock describes the trend toward synchronizing Canadian naval operations with the US Navy in generally unfavourable terms, Milner notes it as a positive development. Regardless of one’s outlook on continental defence integration, it was an increasing fact of Canadian life that had its echoes economically, socially, politically, and culturally. It was not, however, a relationship without its problems and the persistent worry over American domination of both continental and international affairs would precipitate a Canadian political crisis of enormous proportions with developments in Cuba in the autumn of 1962.

Asleep during “the long polar watch”^{lxxi}

In the twenty years between the signing of the Ogdensburg Agreement in 1940 and the election of John F. Kennedy as the President of the United States in 1960, Canada-US defence co-operation had steadily increased in its level of integration, collegiality, sophistication, and pervasiveness. Military men on both sides of the border understood and respected one another, and diplomats, defence bureaucrats, and their political masters, if they differed in their approach toward communism,^{lxxii} were more or less equally seized with the importance of a solid security structure for both North America and Europe. Many ordinary Canadians, however, came to abhor the terror of living under the threat of nuclear war, they questioned the virulence of American anti-communism, and they worried about the potential loss of sovereignty that a close relationship with the United States implied. Efforts were underway to define a new defence role as a mediator through the United Nations, with an increasing neutralist sentiment existing in influential academic and intellectual circles.^{lxxiii} Social tensions were slowly mounting, but by and large, the ship of state was on course and sailing as smoothly as possible on the dangerous, stormy waters of the Cold War. As historian Michael Bliss writes, they were “devilishly difficult, maddeningly unstable times.”^{lxxiv}

Since the Korean War, the Royal Canadian Navy had worked ever closer with the United States Navy as a partner in seaward continental defence.^{lxxv} Unlike their air force colleagues operating under the auspices of NORAD, the navies did so without any specific agreement other than mutual membership in NATO and a tacit understanding they had to work together to

counter the Soviet submarine threat in the North Atlantic. “It was the nature of seapower in the nuclear age that continental surveillance be maintained. Since there could be no certainty about the form an international crisis might take and whether it would abate or lead to war, forces had to be available at a moment’s notice for deployment along the seaboard.”^{lxxvi} It was the tradition of readiness that enabled the forces of Rear-Admiral Ken Dyer, the RCN’s Flag Officer Atlantic Coast, to detect an increase in Soviet submarine activity in the northwest Atlantic and increase anti-submarine air patrols eleven days before the crisis exploded on the public consciousness. Within a week, Canadian and American forces had solid contact with an undetermined number of submarines. While there was no question Soviet activity was increasing and American forces were surreptitiously preparing for action, it does not appear the Royal Canadian Navy understood the exact nature of the situation. Frankly, the specifics were irrelevant; an obvious threat to the alliance existed and “failure to honour such solemn obligations... would have been too degrading and traitorous to even contemplate.”^{lxxvii}

Finely tuned political and diplomatic antennae in Ottawa and Washington began to register hints of a brewing crisis. No details were obtained, however, until presidential envoy Livingston Merchant, former American Ambassador to Canada, personally briefed Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, Foreign Affairs Minister Howard Green, and Defence Minister Douglas Harkness, two hours before Kennedy’s famous television address on Monday, October 22. Curiously, during that meeting Merchant made no request for Canadian action other than to support the US appeal for a United Nations Security Council resolution demanding the removal of the missiles, nor was there any suggestion that military alert status should be elevated.^{lxxviii} The world was stunned by news of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba aimed at the American

heartland. Diefenbaker was furious Kennedy had ignored what he viewed as an obligation to consult his allies before announcing his intentions. Kennedy demanded the Soviets remove the missiles, and while the world marched toward nuclear disaster, a political crisis was developing in the Canada-US continental defence relationship.

While proponents of Diefenbaker, Canada's thirteenth prime minister and an ardent nationalist, paint him as a decisive leader "facing the Soviet colossus" with forbearance, clarity and firmness,^{lxxix} and a man with "deeply held principle[s] for which he would fight with great courage and would sacrifice political advantage[,]"^{lxxx} critics regard him as being "in a state of such desperate irresolution that he seemed somehow to have become allergic to the decision-making process itself."^{lxxxi} However one lines up in the indecision debate about Diefenbaker, it is indisputable that he suffered a remarkable personal conflict with Kennedy. Their dispute sent tendrils of mistrust into a wide range of policy areas including defence, trade, energy, and diplomacy. As Canadian journalist Knowlton Nash writes, "[n]ever before in Canada-US history has there been such a poisonous and dangerous personality clash as between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Diefenbaker. The aging, suspicious prairie populist, and the youthful, quick-witted Boston sophisticate were headed for trouble from the moment they met. Their differences were irreconcilable, their clash inevitable."^{lxxxii} That conflict was a signal example of the profound impact of individual personalities on relations between two otherwise fraternal nations.

Rather than provide immediate, unequivocal support for Kennedy's actions, Diefenbaker, speaking in the House of Commons after the broadcast, appealed for calm and suggested that a team of inspectors from non-aligned nations might be formed under the auspices of the UN to

determine what was really going on in Cuba. “To turn to the United Nations for assurance was not only consistent with Diefenbaker’s own position before the crisis broke but also a typical Canadian response.”^{lxxxiii} It was also a clear indication that Diefenbaker was not prepared to follow Kennedy’s lead blindly.

Later that night, American air forces under NORAD control were placed on an increased alert level known as “Defcon 3”, and it was assumed that Canadian air defence forces would be automatically put on a similar status. Harkness and his military chiefs of staff reviewed the situation, decided the minister probably had the authority to raise the alert level, and quietly set the wheels in motion. A bureaucratic doubt existed, however, causing Harkness to seek prime ministerial confirmation of the decision.^{lxxxiv} To his surprise and consternation, Diefenbaker, supported by Green, refused. “Since Kennedy had not consulted him beforehand...Diefenbaker was damned if he was going to agree automatically to a Defcon 3 alert, nuclear war crisis or not.”^{lxxxv} Having anticipated the prime minister’s approval and assented to the alert, Harkness was now in a terrible bind. The politically dangerous solution he lit upon was to direct the chiefs of staff to continue with their preparations quietly and to procure Diefenbaker’s consent the following day. That consent would not come until after two more days of tumultuous Cabinet debate over the manner and extent of Canadian involvement, withering media criticism, and intense pressure from Washington. By that time, Canadian forces were already actively engaged in “exercises”^{lxxxvi} with their American counterparts at sea and in the air. On Thursday, October 25, a day after the Americans imposed the blockade of Cuba and three days after the crisis had erupted, Diefenbaker, having reversed his decision about military involvement, rose in the House of Commons and announced Canadian actions in support of the United States. As Nicholson

pithily notes about the speech, “the loud bang which all Canadians heard at this point was not the feared Russian attack, it was only the slamming of the stable door.”^{lxxxvii}

In what remains a largely unheralded but significant naval operation, Canadian ships and anti-submarine patrol aircraft established a barrier in the mid-Atlantic, put to sea in the Pacific, patrolled the eastern seaboard as far south as New York City, and relieved American ships to participate in the blockade of Cuba itself. As Soviet submarines remained active in the area after Khrushchev had agreed on October 28 to dismantle the missile sites in Cuba, it was a job the RCN was to continue unabated until mid-November, long after the public thought the crisis had ended. Canadian air defence forces were placed on high alert, and in some cases were deployed to Florida to be closer to the anticipated invasion. But as the Bomarc air defence missiles and the Voodoo interceptor jets acquired by Canada as part of its NORAD commitment had not been equipped with the nuclear ammunition they required to be effective, it was “a largely meaningless gesture.”^{lxxxviii}

The extended failure to arm elements of Canada’s arsenal with nuclear weapons was a consistent thorn in the side of the United States government during Diefenbaker’s tenure. It was an issue over which Diefenbaker’s Cabinet, like the Canadian population, was deeply split. The fact remains, however, that the government had *voluntarily* agreed to acquire nuclear weapons, and had procured a considerable array of systems for their use. As the peace movement was growing, and influential politicians and officials were arguing persuasively for Canada to spearhead a UN effort at disarmament, Diefenbaker pursued a strategy of prevarication and delay in the fulfillment of Canada’s continental defence commitments.^{lxxxix} “In acquiring the CF-101B

(Voodoo interceptor), the Bomarc, the Honest John (artillery system), and the CF-104 (strike-reconnaissance jet) and then refusing to arm them, Canada under John Diefenbaker's management had spent \$685 millions for the most impressive collection of blank cartridges in the history of military science.^{»xc} The combination of that strategy and the appearance of indecision in the face of the direct Soviet threat in Cuba was to prove Diefenbaker's undoing.

His electoral downfall was precipitated by two events in early-1963 that have come to be regarded as a *coup d'état* orchestrated in Washington. The first was a news conference held in Ottawa by the recently retired Supreme Allied Commander Europe, an American general named Lauris Norstad.^{»xci} During that event, Norstad plainly stated Canada had not fulfilled its defence commitments by failing to deploy nuclear weapons. He also implicitly criticized the Canadian proposal to separate nuclear ammunition from the weapon system – a suggestion put forward by Diefenbaker in a fruitless attempt to fulfill Canada's NORAD commitment while maintaining her “nuclear virginity.”^{»xcii} Given his recent retirement from a position of tremendous international importance his remarks cannot be credited as a simple expression of personal opinion.

For three weeks after the Norstad news conference the nuclear debate raged in the Cabinet, the House of Commons, and the press. On January 25, Diefenbaker responded with a statement of Canada's position on nuclear weapons. Nash has described it as “a two-hour masterpiece of obfuscation filled with illusions, delusions, and confusions.”^{»xciii} In a move unprecedented in Canada-US relations, the US State Department, apparently without the direct approval of President Kennedy, issued its rebuttal in a news release on January 30 that landed

like a bombshell and convinced Diefenbaker he had an issue on which to fight an election. In it, the Americans revealed their frustration at Canada's acquisition of air defence missiles and fighters without the necessary nuclear ammunition, and stated "the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense."^{xciiv} Diefenbaker was convinced the news release was a plot by Kennedy and Pearson to unseat him and it "was to cause the sharpest Canada-US confrontation since the War of 1812."^{xcv} Harkness resigned and Diefenbaker called an election. Pearson, sensing a shift toward public acceptance of nuclear weapons following the brush with disaster of the Cuban missile crisis, reversed his position on their acquisition and won the election with a minority government.

While the feud between Diefenbaker and Kennedy had its basis in a personality clash, the policy area in which there was such a significant degradation of Canada-US political relations was the continental defence relationship. Despite the acrimony of events, the situation was somewhat mitigated by durable good relations, experience in bilateral operations, and interoperability between the defence departments of the two countries. The laudable professionalism and successful operations of the military, combined with the widespread criticism of Diefenbaker's indecision, however, serve to obscure the unfortunate, domestic heart of the matter. In a democratic society, civilian control of the military is vital for national survival, and that control rests on a widely recognized system of accountability and responsibility, with the prime minister at its apex. In 1962, that system broke down when Harkness effectively overruled the prime minister. It could be argued there was no breakdown of civilian control of the military; it was instead, a breakdown of the political hierarchy, with a

subordinate minister assuming the duties of the prime minister. Nevertheless, the military chiefs of staff, aware they did not have prime ministerial approval, chose to proceed on the Defence Minister's essentially illegal order.

This explains a certain amount of the understatement surrounding Canadian military action at the time. Senior officers, aware that they had acted beyond the limits of their authority, increasingly so as orders cascaded down the chain of command,^{xcvi} could hardly demand accolades after the fact without jeopardizing themselves or their superiors. Brock concedes as much when he writes of his boss, Vice-Admiral Herbert Rayner, Chief of the Naval Staff, "I also kept my Chief informed of as much of this as I thought he would like to hear. Knowing he could not confide in the Minister, I wanted to give my boss freedom from political accountability."^{xcvii} That it is believed Diefenbaker was aware of the military actions underway prior to his public approval, and thus he tacitly agreed to them, does not negate the fact that senior officers exceeded their authority.^{xcviii} Neither do the discreet thanks proffered by American authorities in the immediate aftermath, uncritical latter day re-examinations of the operations, or the fact that formal defence commitments demanded action. Military officers, whose role was and is to carry out the orders of the Canadian government regardless of their personal support for particular policies, technically undermined the authority of that institution. So too did the Minister of National Defence who made the original decision to increase the alert status of the forces and who did not immediately resign when he clearly had irreconcilable differences with his prime minister.

A rapid statement of unequivocal support for Kennedy's actions against Cuba and the Soviets would have mitigated the political situation dramatically, although, the operational military effects would have changed little, and the question of consultation would have remained unresolved. Consultation did not occur prior to Kennedy taking action because the actions of US allies were either irrelevant^{xcix} to decision makers in Washington or they raised concerns of obstruction of the intended course of American action.^c Ultimately, Diefenbaker's suspicion about Kennedy's motivations might not have been misplaced. Information released since the crisis showed that Kennedy was aware in advance "that Russia's missile inferiority would compel Khrushchov (sic) to back down before any US threat, if his initiative in attempting a rocket build-up in Cuba were detected before it had proceeded far enough to correct that inferiority."^{ci} Thus forewarned, it is reasonable to question Kennedy's brinkmanship and to reconsider the harsh criticism levelled at Diefenbaker's suggestion of an impartial UN inspection of the Cuban missile sites. Indeed, Thompson and Randall write, "[i]n retrospect, it is interesting that the prime minister's assessment of Kennedy now comes closer to the historical consensus."^{cii} Additionally, recent literature accords some credence to the Soviet contention they were trying to deter an American invasion of Cuba; it also considers the domestic political influences at play in a year of Congressional elections and Kennedy's concern over "the challenge to American prestige created by the missiles."^{ciii} Pressure from the Republicans, militating for aggressive action over Cuba, informed Kennedy's decisions, including his refusal to be seen trading US missiles in Turkey for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

Ultimately, the continental defence relationship weathered the storm, although the lack of information under which Ottawa laboured during the missile crisis underscores a pressing need

for information and reassurance from, and consultation with, Washington – not an unreasonable expectation from a putative partner in continental defence. While ironically criticized for insufficient support, Canada was “the only NATO ally to back the United States militarily[,]”^{civ} although the Canadian forces paid dearly for their enthusiasm.^{cv} The collegiality of military men acted as an important buffer in troubled political times. Diefenbaker lost power, Pearson was more agreeable to Washington and accepted the deployment of nuclear weapons in Canada, and tragically, Kennedy was assassinated within the year. Considerable efforts were made to formalize the process of consultation between allies, and as much as the West was sobered by the experience of staring into the abyss of nuclear war, Canadian and American officials were jolted out of complacency by the near undoing of their carefully constructed North American alliance.

From atrophy to renaissance

Following the election of the Liberals in April of 1963, Paul Hellyer, the new Minister of Defence, ordered an *ad hoc* internal review of defence “...under the leadership of Dr. R.J. Sutherland, a brilliant defence scientist, who had been told to look at alternative defence policies...Significantly, (Sutherland’s) report stated that creating a defence policy uniquely Canadian in character was an impossibility; Canada’s policies would always have to reflect not only the proximity of the United States but also the very nature of the international system and Canada’s traditional commitment to maintaining order in that system.”^{cvi} However, between the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Canada had a succession of federal governments whose willingness to benefit from the proximity of the United States and “the involuntary American guarantee”^{cvi} to protect North America was only outdone by their

parsimonious defence policies. A traditional lack of concern for her own defence caused Canada to fasten onto her Cold War alliance obligations, which evolved into, what Douglas Bland critically refers to as a “strategy of commitments.”^{cviii} It was, however, the negation of national defence strategy because it precluded national control, removed the necessary element of choice from the hands of the Canadian government, and fostered incoherent procurement and force structure programmes based on the commitments rather than logically considered national interests. Unaccustomed to a consistent commitment to national defence, Canadian politicians were increasingly hostile to the growing fiscal and political demands of the armed forces, which carried such high opportunity costs for competing social programmes. Additionally, the rhetorical opposition of some leading Canadian politicians to American foreign policy over the years was often churlish if not blatantly hypocritical. Their criticism tended to overlook strategic objectives and focus narrowly on tactical issues.

Concurrently, public sentiment swung away from the military in Canada as personal and collective memories of wartime faded. In the static strategic environment generated by the looming threat of nuclear annihilation, a generation of young Canadians tried to define a new role as honest brokers and peacekeepers. A naturally strong affinity between the fighting men of the two nations resulted in ambivalence within the armed forces toward this evolving Canadian defence policy. The military was perceived as advocating stronger ties with the US when such a course was running counter to predominant attitudes. Such lack of connection with the parent society led to public indifference, reinforced by political antipathy toward the armed forces. Repeatedly rebuffed in their calls for robust armed forces, intellectually cloistered from society, and convinced of the irrefutability of their arguments, the Canadian Forces at times both

presumed to know what was best for Canada and chafed against their perception of betrayal by their civilian compatriots. It was a protracted period of ambivalence and wilful naïveté toward national security, contrasted ironically with a loss of political innocence.

The years since the end of the Cold War have been characterized by uncertainty about the relevance and roles of Western defence alliances devised to counter the erstwhile Soviet threat. The nexus of uncertainty has ranged from an initial period of considerable optimism launched by President George Bush's proclamation of a "new world order"; through unprecedented activism by the United Nations; the subsequent era of profound disillusionment over the inability of international organisations to resolve conflicts; and finally to the current focus on "homeland defence." Despite profound change in international affairs, the coincidence of underlying Canadian and American national interests remained remarkably constant – if complimentary defence policies can be considered an indicator. Perhaps no event embodied that consistency more than the participation of Canada in the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91.

An interesting comparison can be made between Canada's response to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis described in the last section. In both cases, and at the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the inherent flexibility of sea power provided the government's most rapid reaction option. Canadian naval units were able to deploy quickly enough to satisfy the public and diplomatic demands for action, while moving slowly enough to provide whatever political space might have been necessary; for example, to resolve command and control issues, permit negotiations, or allow for the effects of economic sanctions to be felt. There are, however, some stark contrasts between 1962 and 1990. In 1962, the

installation of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba directly threatened Canada. The 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq posed no similar physical threat. In 1962, the standing level of operational readiness within the Royal Canadian Navy permitted the admirals to sail immediately over two dozen modern ships that were the technical match of their potential adversaries. What the fleet lacked was the necessary political direction for its actions. In 1990, the reverse was the case; a surfeit of political will was contrasted with a dearth of modern military capability. The crucial difference between the crises was the political recognition in 1990 that Canadian interests were, and continue to be, bound up in American interests.

In marked contrast to Diefenbaker almost thirty years earlier, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's political position was quickly and unequivocally established. Mulroney had come to power intent on rejuvenating neglected relations with the United States, and so was disposed to respond favourably when President Bush began soliciting allies for his anti-Iraq coalition. There were other stakes at play as well. Canada also saw the crisis in the Gulf as the first post-Cold War opportunity for the United Nations to come into its own as an arbiter of international conflict, thus the Canadian response was assiduously and consistently couched in United Nations terms.^{cix} Such an approach had the fortunate characteristic of being publicly palatable; Canada was able both to support American action and enjoy the "counterweight" to *unilateral* American action provided by United Nations sanction.

Unfortunately for Mulroney, he had inherited the hollow shell of a military as his instrument of foreign policy and had been unable to reconcile the widely accepted need for fiscal restraint with the enormous cost of re-capitalizing the armed forces. Compared to its 1962

predecessor, what the much smaller 1990 fleet lacked was combat readiness and the modern capabilities to counter the likely enemy threats. In fact, political indifference toward the armed forces since the mid-1960s meant the rump fleet had hardly advanced in the intervening years, while rapid advances in military technology worldwide had long since made Canada's navy almost totally obsolete and for all intents and purposes defenceless. Indeed, of the three ships dispatched in 1990, HMCS *Terra Nova* had also participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis and yet had received only the most modest of upgrades in the intervening 28 years. Those shortcomings had the unintended and unavoidable effect of making the Canadian contribution potentially more of a liability than an asset to the coalition. The record shows, however, a two-week frenzy of activity that succeeded in retrofitting onto the three ships recently acquired modern weapons awaiting installation in frigates then under construction. A small but relatively effective task group was created and dispatched, and served with some distinction in what turned out to be a reasonably safe war for coalition forces.

Another comparison presents itself. In 1962, Canadian warships relieved United States Navy vessels to participate in the direct blockade of Cuba. In 1990, the Americans initially suggested that Canada relieve some American ships in the Mediterranean Sea to proceed to the Gulf.^{cx} While that did not occur, the Canadian assumption of command of the combined logistics force did enable additional US surface combatants to focus their efforts in the northern reaches of the Gulf. The tendency for Canada to act as a junior partner was reinforced; a position that had obvious utility to the senior partner and concurrently provided the opportunity for a recognizable national contribution. Mulroney's objective of repairing relations with the United States was greatly aided by Canadian military action in direct support of common

national interests, which also breathed new life into the stagnant continental defence alliance – a set of circumstances with echoes in the current “war on terrorism.”

The Gulf War of 1991 broke the Cold War mould and established the pattern for many future conflicts. The lesson for Canada was that to remain relevant one had to nurture constantly the ability to operate effectively with the armed forces of the United States. While this may also be true of many nations, it has significant resonance and implications for Canadians, sharing as they do the North American continent with the United States. The Canadian Forces of the 1990s were re-learning the value of “interoperability” their forefathers understood in the 1950s and early-1960s, while the population at large was maturing politically to the point that close co-operation in defence matters could be regarded as something other than a harbinger of doom for Canadian sovereignty. In fact, the message was so resounding that it has since been enshrined in government policy and the Canadian Forces include it as an underlying assumption in all strategic guidance documents.^{cxix}

Throughout the 1990s, Canadian warships integrated with American aircraft carrier battle groups operating in the Persian Gulf to the, admittedly asymmetrical, benefit of both navies. Shortcomings in fighter aircraft and munitions capabilities during the Gulf War were overcome during the same period and allowed Canadian CF-18 fighter/bombers to integrate fully with their American counterparts in the 1999 NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia in a way that many European NATO allies were unable to do. Deepening integration with United States forces has, perhaps inevitably, led to Canadian soldiers fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan in the spring of 2002. Again, the coincidence of the two nations’ interests and the political maturation

of the Canadian population suggest such combined operations have become the standard, and that they enjoy public support.

The tightening of the continental defence relationship that has occurred is in contradistinction to earlier predictions of its eventual demise. For example, in 1996 Jockel and Sokolsky suggested “the Canada-US defence relationship will continue to slide from marginality to obscurity”^{cxii} as the focus of Canadian international affairs shifts increasingly toward economics. They emphasized Canada’s involvement in UN peacekeeping as the likely future focus of defence policy at exactly the time that Canada, like much of the world, was becoming sceptical of its efficacy – political rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding. They could not have predicted Canada’s involvement in the NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia in 1999; her willingness to participate in the Australian-led International Force in East Timor in 1999 but aversion to remaining in a UN-led peacekeeping mission on the island in early-2000; huge gains in military interoperability between the two nations; or Canadian involvement in the response to terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. These activities, combined with recent public statements by senior government members,^{cxiii} suggest the Canadian government has concluded real influence is obtained through military contributions of practical utility.

There will be, rightly, limits to Canadian support for American policy or military operations that appear to be of questionable value to the goal of continental defence. For example, the recent review of nuclear weapons policy announced by the Bush administration threatens the growing public consensus on the need for a solid defence of North America post-September 11. So too does the widening of the “war on terrorism” to Iraq, for example, without

credible evidence that nation was complicit in the New York and Washington attacks. Furthermore, Canadians seem split on the necessity for, and concerned about the destabilizing effects of, the putative national missile defence system. In other words, Canadians will remain supportive of the ends of continental defence, without feeling compelled to agree with all of the means. It is incumbent upon the Parliament of Canada to accommodate public concerns while determining the very real requirements to participate in a meaningful way in the future defence of North America. Washington need not construe conditional support as a schism in Canada-US relations or as disloyalty. Neither should those who harbour anti-American sentiment exaggerate differences of national policy opinion for their own ends. As a sovereign nation, Canada has a right, indeed an obligation, to support only those policies that coincide with its independently determined national interests. History, culture, shared values, and most of all geography, will likely dictate that such policy differences will likely be minimal. This reality should come as no surprise to Canadians, nor should they inhere in it sinister intentions or the death of Canadian sovereignty.

Embracing continentalism

While Canadians appear to be increasingly supportive of the armed forces, there should be no suggestion the time is ripe for unbridled optimism. There are profound changes underway globally and in Canadian society and there is no room for complacency. The challenge for the Canadian Forces is to study those changes and develop a better understanding of Canadian society, where Canada fits in the world, and how armed forces can best be employed to advance

Canadian national interests. The search for stability in defence matters will end when the armed forces can outline a defensible military strategy, determine the capabilities required to carry it out, and then explain it to Canadians. They must concurrently and deliberately educate the political class of Canada about the relevance of armed forces so as to get the comprehension of decision makers synchronized with the intuitive and growing public appreciation of the necessity to maintain a credible military. Given the evolution of Canadian defence policy over the years, and the implicit understanding of the necessary interaction between Canada and the United States, this can be done, by and large, by building on extant government policy.

The objective is to develop a sustainable, publicly supported, national security strategy predicated on international awareness, historical precedent, and national self-knowledge. Planners must not only try to predict the future, they must understand their history and try to assess their own population so they can craft an approach that reflects the aspirations of society. To do otherwise invites disappointment and frustration and leads to the conceit that the military will recognize what is right for Canada even if Canadians cannot or will not. The starting point in the development of a national strategy is comprehending the nature of Canada as a nation within an increasingly interdependent community of nations.

The positive conceptual association of democracy with capitalism means that the conclusion drawn from the West's Cold War victory over communism is that economic growth inherently supports and fosters freedom and democratic institutions. This syllogism holds that because capitalism triumphed, it must, therefore, be permitted to flourish with fewer and fewer restrictions as a means of extending democracy. The irony is the subordination of economics to

democracy and individualism has been inverted and a global society is being re-ordered to protect commerce at the expense of people.^{cxiv} Nowhere is this belief held more strongly than in the United States; it is a belief that is the driving force behind the phenomenon of “globalization” and its handmaiden – American economic, diplomatic and military domination of the international arena.^{cxv} “Five elements of the current shift toward globalization have particular relevance for Canada.”^{cxvi} These are lower trade barriers, the global capital market, homogenization of culture, the supremacy of capitalism, and world public opinion.^{cxvii} Perhaps to this list should be added the inevitable coincidence of Canadian and American national interests and the increasing importance of regional economic and political entities such as the European Union, the Organisation of American States, and Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation. These are elements that comprise the global international system the prescient Dr. Sutherland insisted Canada had to commit to defending in 1963. Forty years later, the imperative is stronger still as the threats of the growing gap between rich and poor, ethnic and religious war, famine, disease, and environmental degradation make the consequences of failure increasingly dire. Insofar as the current global system rests on the willingness of nations to subject themselves to it, there would seem to be a benefit to Canada providing whatever tempering influence on American dominance is within its power if such an influence contributes to the maintenance of this fragile consensus.

At the same time that there is enormous uncertainty and disruption internationally, observers have noted a crisis in Canada’s domestic society. Unemployment and under-employment, an aging population, a shrinking work force, erosion of governance structures, the decline of deference and civility, the diminishment of public and political discourse due to

technological isolation, income disparity, elevated levels of incarceration, increasing pollution, and a plethora of other, profound issues, underscore the crisis. A significant fear in the country is over the loss of jobs through the transformation and automation of work, which is converging in Canada at an alarming rate with the globalization of the work force.^{cxviii} As the industrial economy shifts to a knowledge and services-based economy, demographics and immigration will have increasing influences on Canadian society. As a result, Canadians will continue to become more oriented toward security and family. This reality will only be intensified by increased numbers of Third World immigrants for whom the family has more relative importance.

These trends, while in some cases alarming, present opportunities for the Canadian Forces, in which there exists a moral element that might act as a touchstone for the dispossessed. In the new, post-industrial, information-based economy, where bonds of loyalty are weakening, people will seek some enduring entity that represents tradition, continuity, and citizenship. A family-oriented society struggling in this uncertain world will most likely appreciate the positive attributes of a national institution that offers stability, loyalty, education, and meaningful employment to its members. Additionally, the obligation to defend the nation ensures some level of employment for Canadians with the armed forces for the foreseeable future. Given the declining fertility rates in Western societies, increasing immigration will tend to widen the recruiting base, thereby diversifying the human face of the Canadian Forces to the nation's collective benefit.

From understanding and leveraging the changes occurring in Canadian society to strengthen the armed forces, one must turn to examining the potential advantage of a renewed

continental defence alliance with the United States. To do that, one must first resolve the perennial question, “Is Canada a maritime or a continental nation?” Do we look across our oceans to our European and Asian trading partners and sources of immigration? Or do we look south to the arguably benign economic and cultural behemoth of the United States? It is within the conflicting responses to this question that we discern the roots of the ambivalence that many Canadians feel toward their armed forces. Why is this so? One explanation is that choosing either characterization requires the admission of domination by another nation; and so Canadians cannot decide. Which yoke is better? Our impulse to consider ourselves maritime is rooted in our history as a British colony, yet the immense gravitation pull of the United States informs the contrary belief that we are a continental nation.

“Leadmark,” the recently published Canadian naval strategy statement, is predicated on the deceptively simple assertion that Canada is a maritime nation. Despite significant but largely intramural constructive criticism,^{cxix} “Leadmark” has provided the clearest expression of Canadian naval strategy in the ninety-two years of an independent Canadian naval service. The perennial conundrum of Canadian defence policy formulation is revealed, however, when naval officers, indicative of all the services, caveat their manifesto with a fallacy. Canada is *not* a maritime nation; Canada is a continental nation by economy, geography, history, tradition, heritage, and just about every criterion imaginable. As is so often the case in relationships of dramatic inequality, the smaller sibling tries desperately, and sometimes pathetically, to assert an existence separate from the larger. It is our self-conscious effort to define ourselves as a unique nation that causes such discomfort when we consider our continental reality, for it is then that we realize we have retained very little of what could objectively be called sovereignty. Denying its

continental nature by insisting on its maritime obverse is understandable in light of Canada's need for recognition. Sadly, that tradition bears much of the responsibility for the inability of Canadian defence policy to emerge from the shadows of its American mentor. In matters of national defence, Canadians cannot decide whether they are fish or fowl. That inability has made opposition to defence spending almost ludicrously easy, not to mention somewhat of a traditional cottage industry in Canada.

So how will renewing the defence relationship with the United States help? It is argued that when Canadian political and military leaders have pursued military policies that are consonant with those of the "senior" partner in continental defence, they have been rewarded with public support and the armed forces have tended to fulfill their considerable potential. Conversely, when nervousness due to excessive similarity of approaches tempts decision makers to diverge dramatically from the course of continental defence, the result has been an atrophy of public support and loss of purpose within the armed forces.

Suggesting Canada is a continental nation as opposed to a maritime one is in no way disloyal, nor does it suggest that maritime forces are not necessary. On the contrary, a continental power of *North America's* magnitude relies heavily on global sea-borne trade and thus demands robust naval forces, of which Canada's are a constituent part. Those naval forces, like their land and aerospace counterparts, must be closely integrated into the overall continental defence scheme if they are to remain relevant to the needs of Canadians, which are, no matter how uncomfortable we are to admit it, inextricably linked to those of the citizens of the United States. For proof, one need only regard the economic integration of North American nations,

which has advanced considerably in the past sixty years and grown exponentially in the post-Cold War era, first with the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and subsequently the North American Free Trade Agreement. The trend appears to be deepening with the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas. Arguably, one of the results of economic integration has been a corresponding homogenization of culture that has made Canadians less distinguishable from Americans, and diluted to varying degrees normative differences that might have previously existed. The resulting tension between the recognition of economic realities (both the costs and benefits of deeper integration) and latent anxiety about the disappearance of Canada provides constructive energy that, funneled wisely, could leverage the Canada-US defence relationship to promote and strengthen Canadian interests in North America and worldwide.^{cxx}

How can this be accomplished? A considerable degree of political and societal maturity is required to achieve this goal. Firstly, with a thorough understanding of Canadian history and an awareness of Canada's current position in the world, the Canadian public and its political leaders must develop the self-confidence to embrace the nation's continental nature and destiny. It must be remembered that security, like charity, begins at home. This will require the commitment of political and financial resources to the continental defence relationship commensurate with our relative size. The obvious starting point is a robust commitment to the new US Northern Command created on 17 April, 2002, which has the potential to include naval and land forces in a bi-national command similar to NORAD. Care must be taken to avoid a rift between defence planners, keen to advance their "interoperability" with US forces, and Canadian foreign service officers who "fear that closer military integration will be seen as a further erosion of sovereignty."^{cxxi} Those fears seem to revolve around the alerting of bi-national forces prior to

political consultation, which occurred on Sept. 11 as it did almost forty years earlier during the Cuban Missile Crisis.^{cxviii} But then, as now, such actions were in complete accordance with the defence agreements in place and, as such, had no marginal effect on Canadian sovereignty. Such a commitment must enjoy a defence-foreign affairs bureaucratic consensus, but need not be subject to partisan political wrangling, as presumably, the imperative to defend the nation is independent of the party in power. From that commitment will flow the influence previous governments believed accrued exclusively from Canadian diplomacy, goodwill, and integrity. While these are necessary and critical elements of successful international relations, they do not suffice to purchase influence in fora where the coin of the realm is military capability. While policy makers disavow links between military cooperation and positive outcomes in non-defence-related fields,^{cxviii} it appears intuitively obvious there is a *quid pro quo* for lending support to Washington.

Having unequivocally committed to the continental alliance, Canada must then pursue and nurture military relationships with other nations within the context of leveraging our extensive interoperability with the United States in order to enhance that of other allies. Of these, priority should be placed on Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand in what is known as “AUSCANZUKUS.” European defence is evolving quickly, and it remains to be seen how Canadian foreign and defence policy will interact with European policy with the advent of the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI.) In the meantime, and with the enlargement of the Alliance, NATO appears to be playing as important a role in collective defence for Canada now in the post-Cold War era as it did during the Cold War itself. There is the added benefit that the increasingly political focus of NATO appears to be vindicating Canada’s original insistence

on the insertion of Article Two in the Washington Treaty of 1949. Thus, relations with NATO must be scrupulously maintained and nourished, as historic and cultural links remain relevant in each of Canada, the United States and Europe. Additionally, there is enormous potential to develop links with Latin American nations, particularly within the context of Western Hemispheric integration. Like the continuation of NATO, ties to Latin American nations will provide a mutual counterbalance to the preponderant weight of the United States in the emerging hemispheric community. It must be emphatically stated that these many links are being constructed within the context of Canada's primary relationship with the United States rather than in opposition to it. There is wisdom in perpetuating the concept of an extra-continental anchor for Canadian foreign and defence policy, however, we would be wise to eschew the churlish reaction to American power that characterized the Third Option of the Trudeau years.

Conclusion

The foregoing review of continental defence milestones sought to demonstrate that, rather than erode national sovereignty, Canadian commitment to a strong continental defence relationship strengthens our position with Washington. North American continental defence began in the 1940s, motivated by the threat of Nazism, which eventually gave way to the threat of communism. Common goals in defence had their corollary in economic developments, with both nations benefiting from the partnership. Despite economic benefits, a predominant theme in emerging Canada-US relations was Canadian sensitivity to the inequality of the relationship. That ubiquitous worry motivated Canadian efforts to counteract American influence through multi-lateral organizations such as the UN and NATO. While there were some uneasy periods in

bilateral relations, the need to join forces for the defence of North America effectively spelled the end of a traditional mistrust of American intentions toward Canada. In fact, the years between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War are notable for the persistent congruence of national security policy in both nations, even in the face of significant political ambivalence toward defence within Canada throughout much of the period. Indeed, when Canada lost influence in Washington it correlated strongly with a weakening of the Canadian commitment to defence. This suggests that the United States is less interested in swallowing up the nation as it is in having Canada accept more responsibility for its sovereignty; the fears of Canadian nationalists about the erosion of sovereignty have effectively been turned on their heads.

Developments since the end of the Cold War, particularly those since 1999, have underscored the continuing importance of a solid defence relationship between Canada and the United States. Huge shifts in the geopolitical landscape have been mirrored by profound technological, political, economic, social and cultural changes occurring globally. These new realities are redefining Canada in ways as yet unknown, but which will likely have an impact on national security, such as the resurgence of appreciation of the role of defence forces in the country. Indeed, the growing interest displayed by the public in recent Canadian Forces activities suggests there is a considerable vein of latent support for powerful and effective military forces that Canada can contribute to a fight where it makes sense to do so. If recent experiences can be regarded as a predictor of future levels of public support, it is anticipated that public support for Canadian participation in continental defence will grow and as such, will very likely positively influence political and élite positions.

Sixty years of alliance with the United States have not resulted in the death of Canada so odiously predicted by writers such as George Grant and John Warnock. Instead, one can choose to take heart realistically and honestly from the tenets of more staid observers of Canadian history such as Douglas Bland and David Haglund. An independent foreign and defence policy is possible within the context of a strong continental alliance with the United States. The active participation of the Canadian Forces in the establishment and operations of the new US Northern Command is the obvious starting point. Furthermore, pursuing such a policy has the potential to enhance the influence of Canada in international councils where the yardstick of power is the possession of, and willingness to use, sufficient forces to support one's diplomatic positions. What is required is the concerted education of Canadian politicians and national self-confidence. This is because "the essence of parliamentary democracy is that we elect politicians to lead, to take risks, to stand for something more than the latest popular sentiment or the collective public wisdom, which may be based more on short-termed emotion or outright ignorance than on anything else."^{cxix} It is axiomatic that Canadians, including politicians, are unaware of the historical record of Canadian defence cooperation with the United States, and its enduring underlying imperatives. It is equally true those lessons need to be reiterated. Once Canadians recognize the continental nature of their nation, the challenge will become to define, and then protect, the margin of sovereignty available to Canada, wedged firmly between its Anglo-American history and its globalized future.

Notes

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- ⁱ Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley quoted in The Hill Times, cited at <http://www.thehilltimes.ca/terrorism/editorial.html> on April 6, 2002.
- ⁱⁱ The term “54-40 or Fight!” was a campaign slogan of James Polk, the Democratic candidate in the United States Presidential election of 1844. Polk was willing to fight Britain for possession of the territory from Oregon (a British possession at the time) north to 54°40' latitude, giving the United States possession of what is now British Columbia northward to the southern tip of Alaska. Following his election as President, Polk accepted the British proposal of the 49th parallel as the border between the US and British North America from Lake of the Woods to the Strait of Georgia, thus averting war.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Richard J. Walton, *Canada and the USA*, (New York: Parents' Magazine Press, 1972) pp. 149-150.
- ^{iv} While the Lend-Lease Act was not passed until Mar. 11, 1941, the United States had been providing war supplies to Great Britain much earlier. For example, the famous “destroyers for bases” deal had been finalized in the late-summer of 1940, thus I distinguish between lend-lease activities and the Lend-Lease Act.
- ^v Desmond Morton, *Military History of Canada*, (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1990) p. 182.
- ^{vi} Walton, *Canada and the USA*, p. 150.
- ^{vii} W.L.M. King, *Debates*, House of Commons, Ottawa, 12 Nov. 1940, pp. 55-58.
- ^{viii} *Ibid.*
- ^{ix} Jack L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, *Prime Ministers: Ranking Canada's Leaders*, (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1999) p. 97.
- ^x Norman Hillmer and Jack L. Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994) p. 162.
- ^{xi} *Ibid.*, pp. 162 – 163.
- ^{xii} Hyde Park Declaration, Apr. 20, 1941 cited in Norman Hillmer, *Partners Nevertheless: Canadian- American Relations in the Twentieth Century*, (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1989) p. 105.
- ^{xiii} W.L.M. King, *Debates*, House of Commons, Ottawa, 28 Apr. 1941, pp. 2286-2289.
- ^{xiv} David J. Bercuson, *True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton*, (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1993) p. 152.
- ^{xv} Hillmer & Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire*, pp. 178-180. For the relevant portion of Lord Halifax's speech see *Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? Peacekeeping*. (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969) pp. 13-14.
- ^{xvi} Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, p. 230.
- ^{xvii} Bercuson, *True Patriot*, p. 59.
- ^{xviii} Hillmer & Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire*, pp. 184-185.
- ^{xix} The list included: China, France, Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States.
- ^{xx} Granatstein & Hillmer, *Prime Ministers*, p. 119.
- ^{xxi} The Right Honourable Winston S. Churchill, speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946 cited at <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/sinews.htm> on April 15, 2002.
- ^{xxii} Hillmer & Granatstein, *Empire to Umpire*, p. 186.
- ^{xxiii} Bercuson, *True Patriot*, p. 151.
- ^{xxiv} Speech by General George C. Marshall at Harvard University, June 5, 1947, cited at <http://www.usaid.gov/multimedia/video/marshall/marshallspeech.html> on February 6, 2002 (emphasis added.)
- ^{xxv} “Berlin Blockade” cited at http://www.coldwar.org/articles/40s/berlin_blockade.php3 on February 6, 2002.
- ^{xxvi} Bercuson, *True Patriot*, p. 197.
- ^{xxvii} Jack L. Granatstein and David J. Bercuson, *War and Peacekeeping*, (Toronto: Key Porter, 1991) p. 92.
- ^{xxviii} Derived from “Canada - United States Defence Relations” a background document of the Canadian Department of National Defence, Directorate Western Hemisphere Policy, cited at http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/org/dg_is/d_wh/canus_e.htm on February 9, 2002.
- ^{xxix} Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, p. 230.
- ^{xxx} David J. Bercuson, *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War*, (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1999) p. 20.
- ^{xxxi} Bercuson, *True Patriot*, p. 190.
- ^{xxxii} “Benelux” refers to the combination of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

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- xxxiii “Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty” cited at <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm#f> on February 9, 2002.
- xxxiv For the text of the Brussels Treaty see <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b480317a.htm>
- xxxv For the text of the of the North Atlantic Charter see: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>
- xxxvi L.B. Pearson quoted by Dean Acheson, “A Tart American Comment,” Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? ed. J.L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969) p. 46.
- xxxvii *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- xxxviii Morton, A Military History of Canada, p. 233.
- xxxix Granatstein and Bercuson War and Peacekeeping, p. 100.
- xl Denis Stairs, Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States, (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1974) p. 4.
- xli Denis Stairs, “Confronting Uncle Sam: Cuba and Korea,” An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? ed. Stephen Clarkson. (Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1968) p. 67.
- xliv Stairs, Diplomacy of Constraint, pp. 39-40.
- xlvi Granatstein and Bercuson War and Peacekeeping, p. 98. Jeffrey V. Brock, The Dark Broad Seas: Volume One, With Many Voices, (Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1981) supports this view. In the spring of 1950, Brock was Director Naval Plans and Operations and his memoirs give no indication the Navy was considering involvement in Korea in any way, shape, or form.
- xliv Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, p. 26.
- xlvi Granatstein and Bercuson War and Peacekeeping, p. 99.
- xlvi UNSC Resolutions 82 (Jun. 25, 1950) and 83 (June 27, 1950.)
- xlvi UNSC Resolution 83, June 27, 1950.
- xlvi Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century, (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1999) p. 201.
- xlvi See Granatstein and Bercuson War and Peacekeeping, pp. 99 –101.
- l Stairs, Diplomacy of Constraint, p. 51.
- li *Ibid.*, p. 81.
- lii Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, pp. 29-32.
- liii UNSC Resolution 84, July 7, 1950.
- liii Granatstein and Bercuson War and Peacekeeping, p. 100.
- liii Hillmer and Granatstein, Empire to Umpire, p. 214.
- liii Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, p. 129.
- liii Arthur Bishop, Salute! Canada’s Great Military Leaders from Brock to Dextraze, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997) p. 244.
- liii See Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, p. 229 and Granatstein and Bercuson War and Peacekeeping, p. 178.
- lix John W. Warnock, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada, (Toronto: New Press, 1970) pp.58-59.
- lix Jeffrey V. Brock, The Dark Broad Seas: Volume One, With Many Voices, (Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1981) p. 271.
- lix Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, p. 226.
- lix *Ibid.*, p. xi.
- lix Milner, Canada’s Navy, p. 204.
- lix These included: the high losses suffered by the Chinese Communists, who were also trying to consolidate their recently won position as the legitimate government of the country; the death of Stalin which created uncertainty about the continued commitment of the Soviet Union to the North Koreans; and the resolve of the United States to counter the threat of communism.
- lix Morton, A Military History of Canada, p. 239.
- lix Bercuson, True Patriot, pp. 222-223.
- lix *Ibid.*, p. 223.
- lix Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence 1945-1958, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987) p. 92.
- lix *Ibid.*, p. 95.
- lix For a detailed examination of the convergence of the RCN and USN see Milner, Canada’s Navy, Chapter 11.
- lix The term “the long polar watch” is the title of a book on continental defence – Melvin Conant, The Long Polar Watch (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1962).

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- ^{lxxii} Jocelyn Ghent-Mallett and Don Munton, "Confronting Kennedy and the Missiles in Cuba, 1962" Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases, Don Munton and John Kirton eds. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1992) p. 78.
- ^{lxxiii} Walton, Canada and the USA, p. 167.
- ^{lxxiv} Michael Bliss, Right Honourable Men, (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1994) p. 191.
- ^{lxxv} Definitive reviews of Canadian naval history in this period include: Tony German's The Sea is at Our Gates; "Canada and the Cold War at Sea" by Joel Sokolsky in RCN in Transition; volume two of Jeffry Brock's memoir, With Many Voices; Peter Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered; and Marc Milner's Canada's Navy: The First Century.
- ^{lxxvi} Joel Sokolsky, "Canada and the Cold War at Sea," The RCN in Transition, ed. W.A.B. Douglas (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988) p. 218.
- ^{lxxvii} Brock, The Thunder and the Sunshine: Volume Two, With Many Voices, (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1983) p. 108.
- ^{lxxviii} Ghent-Mallett and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy and the Missiles in Cuba, 1962" Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases, pp. 84-86.
- ^{lxxix} For a concise advocacy of Diefenbaker see Burton Richardson, Canada and Mr. Diefenbaker (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1962.) "Facing the Soviet colossus" is the title to chapter seven of Mr. Richardson's monograph.
- ^{lxxx} George Grant, Lament for a Nation, (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1965) p. 25.
- ^{lxxxii} Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power, (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1963) p. 333.
- ^{lxxxiii} Knowlton Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1990) p. 11.
- ^{lxxxiiii} Ghent-Mallett and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy and the Missiles in Cuba, 1962" Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases, p. 85.
- ^{lxxxiv} The doubt existed because the War Books, which outlined defence plans and authorities, were under review. The superseded version placed responsibility for the decision with the Cabinet while the revised, but not yet approved, War Book vested that authority in the Defence Minister.
- ^{lxxxv} Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, p. 190.
- ^{lxxxvi} Tony German, The Sea is at Our Gates (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1990) p. 266.
- ^{lxxxvii} Patrick Nicholson, Vision and Indecision (Toronto: Longmans, 1968) p. 168.
- ^{lxxxviii} Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 341.
- ^{lxxxix} A concrete example is a speech delivered by Diefenbaker to the Canadian Club of Ottawa on November 24, 1960 in which he stated: "We have taken the stand that no decision (on accepting nuclear weapons) will be required while progress toward disarmament continues... We have made it equally clear that we shall not, in any event, consider nuclear weapons until, as a sovereign nation, we have equality in control – a joint control." (cited in Diefenbaker, One Canada 3: 71) As "progress toward disarmament" provided an infinitely elastic deadline, and "equality in control" of nuclear weapons was contrary to American law and had not been a prerequisite for the acceptance of nuclear weapons by European NATO allies, this position is, given the most generous assessment, disingenuous. Curiously, Desmond Morton contends that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was Diefenbaker's only clear policy line (see A Military History of Canada p. 246.) Given the procurement of weapon systems designed to use nuclear ammunition, that view can only be credited to the consistency with which Diefenbaker avoided making a decision about the acquisition of the necessary ammunition rather than the clarity of his statements.
- ^{xc} Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 354.
- ^{xci} The salient portions of Gen. Norstad's comments are published in J.L. Granatstein ed., Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? Peacekeeping (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969) pp. 111-114.
- ^{xcii} The term "nuclear virginity" is derived from the title of chapter 23 of Peter Newman's Renegade in Power, which provides an excellent description of the nuclear arms debate at the time.
- ^{xciii} Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, p. 235.
- ^{xciv} United States, Department of State news release dated January 30, 1963, reprinted in J.L. Granatstein ed., Canadian Foreign Policy Since 1945: Middle Power or Satellite? Peacekeeping (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1969) pp. 126-127.
- ^{xcv} Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, p. 242.
- ^{xcvi} Nash writes, "Diefenbaker may have been aware of the situation, but he was not in control of it. Harkness had gone further than Diefenbaker wanted or knew; the chiefs of staff had gone farther than Harkness himself realized; the deputies to the chiefs of staff had gone even farther; and the RCAF and RCN operational officers in charge of

various commands had gone farther than anybody in Ottawa knew. But everybody in the military chain of command winked and nudged and went on a war footing, and said to hell with Diefenbaker's indecisiveness." Kennedy and Diefenbaker, p. 195.

^{xcvii} Brock, With Many Voices, vol. 2, p. 111.

^{xcviii} See Brock, With Many Voices, vol. 2, pp. 111-112, Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, p. 195, and Bliss, Right Honourable Men, p. 209.

^{xcix} Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, p. 176.

^c John Warnock, citing Ted Sorensen, special counsel to Kennedy, writes "In the United States, the policy-makers were concerned about the European reaction. The Kennedy Administration worried that the Europeans would feel that Cuba was not worth a major crisis. The Europeans were long accustomed to living within the range of Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles." (Partner to Behemoth, p. 164.) See also Nash, Kennedy and Diefenbaker, p. 187.

^{ci} Nicholson, Vision and Indecision, p. 175.

^{cii} John Thompson and Stephen Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, 2nd ed. (Athens: U of Georgia P, 1997) p. 225.

^{ciii} Warnock, Partner to Behemoth, pp. 158-159. See also pp. 172-174, and Ghent-Mallett and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy and the Missiles in Cuba, 1962" in Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases, pp. 80-83.

^{civ} Ghent-Mallett and Munton, "Confronting Kennedy and the Missiles in Cuba, 1962" in Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases, p. 93. Ghent-Mallett and Munton contrast Diefenbaker with British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, with whom Kennedy did consult in advance, and who gave immediate, highly visible political support to Kennedy yet refused to put his forces on alert.

^{cv} It is widely believed that the unification of the armed forces in 1964 by Paul Hellyer, which caused a significant loss of service cohesion and morale, was a concerted effort to prevent a repeat of unauthorized military action such as occurred in October 1962. The Canadian Forces have since been firmly under the control of the civilian Department of National Defence, with an integrated civilian-military headquarters designed to prevent military action from occurring in a policy vacuum.

^{cvi} Peter T. Haydon, "Canadian Amphibious Capabilities: Been there, Done it, Got the T-shirt!" Maritime Affairs, Winter 2001, p. 14.

^{cvii} R.J. Sutherland, "Canada's Long Term Strategic Situation," International Journal, vol. XVII, no. 3 (Summer 1962) p. 202.

^{cviii} See Douglas L. Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995) pp. 214-223.

^{cix} Jean H. Morin and Richard H. Gimblett, Operation Friction, 1990-1991, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997) p.17.

^{cx} *Ibid.*, p. 25.

^{cxii} The government's defence policy is contained in The 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994.) Departmental publications echoing the theme include Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: National Defence, 1999) and Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: National Defence, 2001). While there are no Canadian Army or Air Force strategy statements equivalent to Leadmark, the overarching authority of Strategy 2020 constitutes their strategic direction.

^{cxiii} Joseph T. Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, The End of the Canada-US Defence Relationship, Occasional Paper Series, number 53 (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996) p. 10.

^{cxiiii} On October 5, 2001, then Foreign Affairs Minister (now Deputy Prime Minister) John Manley said "You can't just sit at the G8 table and then, when the bill comes, go to the washroom... If you want to play a role in the world, even as a small member of the G8, there's a cost to doing that." Cited at <http://www.politicswatch.com/10-05-01.htm> on April 6, 2002.

^{cxv} See John Ralston Saul, The Unconscious Civilisation (Concord: Anansi Press, 1995.)

^{cxvi} The relative priority of commerce and humanity accorded by the United States can be seen clearly in the infamous "axis of evil" speech of President George W. Bush, his State of the Union Address of January 29, 2002. The order of the "non-negotiable demands of human dignity" is telling; free speech, equal justice, and religious tolerance were pointedly placed after private property. The text of the speech is available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

^{cxvii} Angus Reid, Shakedown: How the New Economy is Changing Our Lives, (Toronto: McClelland-Bantam Books, 1997) p. 119.

^{cxviii} *Ibid.*, pp. 119-129.

^{cxviii} *Ibid.*, pp. 139-158.

^{cxix} See Martin Shadwick, "The Leadmark Chronicles," Canadian Military Journal, vol. 2 no. 3 (Autumn 2001.)

^{cxx} See David Haglund, "Strategy 2020 and the Question of Continentalism," Over Here and Over There, (Kingston: Queen's University, Centre for International Relations, 2001.)

^{cxxi} Paul Koring, "U.S. set to unveil its plan to defend continent" Globe & Mail, 17 April, 2002, p. A1.

^{cxxii} *Ibid.*, p. A1.

^{cxxiii} For example, Deputy Prime Minister John Manley, while conceding Canadian participation in the "war on terrorism" in Afghanistan has "earned us some credit," denied a direct relationship between military involvement and a positive outcome to the protracted Canada-US softwood lumber dispute. See Simon Tuck, "War role beneficial for Canada, Manley says" Globe & Mail, March 18, 2002, p. A7.

^{cxxiv} Claire Hoy, Margin of Error: Pollsters and the Manipulation of Canadian Politics, (Toronto: Key Porter, 1989) p. 7.

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