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EXERCISE/EXERCICE ...

MASTERS IN DEFENCE STUDIES – RESEARCH PAPER

**Towards a Stable and Effective Military Workforce: Strategic Human
Resource Management Challenges and Changes for the 21st Century**

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Abstract

People are our most important asset; to ensure that this statement becomes more than just words, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (CF) have articulated human resource (HR) related objectives in several important documents. These guiding documents provide good strategic direction for human resource management (HRM) at the operational level, but they lack the impetus for HRM to become a strategic partner in deciding the future of the CF. At the same time as lacking a coherent HR strategy, the CF presently face a manning crisis. If current rates of retention / loss are not improved radically, quickly and effectively for the long term, the future of the CF as a strategic national asset is in jeopardy. In order to meet stated HR objectives, and solve the manning crisis, the CF must adopt and apply principles of effective strategic human resource management. Recognizing the need for strategic focus in HRM, a model of strategic HRM for the CF is developed in this paper and specific recommendations for change are made to position the CF as an effective strategic human resource manager.

Towards a Stable and Effective Military Workforce: Strategic Human Resource Management Challenges and Changes for the 21st Century

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Towards a Stable and Effective Military Workforce: Strategic Human Resource Management Challenges and Changes for the 21st Century

1 Introduction

“Twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:

1. To have a good recruiting system;
2. A good organization;
3. A well-organized system of national reserves;
4. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as well as those of a campaign;
5. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality, based on convictions rather than on the formalities of service;
6. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation;
7. The special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed;
8. An armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to defensive and offensive arms;
9. A general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical education of its officers;
10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general administration;
11. A good system of assignment to command, and of directing the principal operations of war;
12. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people.

To these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field of battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the troops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives and health of veterans.

None of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without grave od eetans.”ve

several important documents, such as, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A strategy for 2020 (Strategy 2020)*, *Defence Plan 2001*, *People in Defence: Beyond 2000*, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020)* and the draft *HR Strategy 2020 (HR 2020)*. These guiding documents provide good strategic direction for human resource management (HRM) at the operational level, but they lack the impetus for HRM to become a strategic partner in deciding the future of the CF. Along with these guiding documents, there have been several reports criticizing HRM in the CF and providing recommendations for change. These reports include: *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, *Senate Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs (SCONDVA)*, *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces - Final Report*, *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness* and, most recently, the *2002 Report of the Auditor General of Canada*. For the most part, the recommendations of these reports provide good individual initiatives for change, but they lack coherent strategic coordination and direction. It is only in *HR 2020*, a draft document, that the requirement has been identified to “integrate with the operational strategic process [and] synchronize HR strategy across all planning horizons”.²

At the same time as lacking a coherent HR strategy, the CF presently face a manning crisis. If current rates of retention / loss are not improved radically, quickly and effectively for the long term, the future of the CF as “the core of Canadian security ... [and] force multipliers for Canada”³ is in jeopardy. In order to meet stated HR objectives, and solve the manning crisis, the CF must adopt and apply principles of effective strategic human resource management. Recognizing the need for strategic focus in HRM, specific recommendations for change are

² Canada, Department of National Defence, “HR Strategy 2020: Facing the People Challenges of the Future”, (DRAFT dated 02 April 2002), 3.

made in this paper to position the CF as an effective strategic human resource manager. Without improving HRM at the strategic level, the CF will not be able to fulfill its roles and will cease to be a national strategic asset.

In order to analyze strategic HRM in the CF, a comprehensive literature review was conducted to determine current principles or best practices in other organizations. The review included academic, private sector, public sector and military organizations, both foreign and Canadian. Each of the academic sources used also includes extensive surveys of business practices; thus, academic theory and business practices are presented as combined solutions. The academic sources cited cover Canadian, American and European perspectives and provide very similar standpoints; however, where significant differences exist, they are highlighted. The public sector sources are Canadian and Australian, while the other militaries examined are Australia, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States, each of which is also experiencing recruiting and retention problems.

The paper commences with background information on some of the reports and strategic documents referred to in the introduction. The background information is followed by definitions of terminology key to understanding where HRM fits in the overall organizational strategy. A conceptual framework of strategic HRM for the CF is then developed based on selected models identified in the literature review. The conceptual framework is then used in subsequent sections as a basis for further assessment of strategic HRM in the CF. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze each component in detail. The components of the new CF conceptual framework having the most effect on strategic HRM are analyzed, using current principles from the literature to assess their appropriateness for the CF from a modern strategic HRM perspective. Where deficiencies or weaknesses in CF strategic HRM are identified,

³ Canada, Department of National Defence, "People in Defence: Beyond 2000", (Ottawa: May 2001), 3.

recommendations for improvements are provided. The paper finishes with an examination of some factors affecting the implementation of strategic HRM for the CF and an overview of the recommendations for improving strategic HRM in the CF.

1.1 Background

In March 1997, the Minister of National Defence tabled his *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*. In the report, the Minister identifies the roles of the CF and the CF's contribution to national and international peace and security. With respect to the balance of roles, the Minister stated that the CF "has made progress in responding to new international and domestic realities.... Few would suggest that they have taken all necessary measures.... Not only *can* they do better, they *must* do better".⁴ The Minister then went on to make specific recommendations for change in the areas of discipline, values and ethics, leadership, command structure, operations, terms and conditions of service, the integrated national civilian-military headquarters and communications. While the recommendations were aimed at improving leadership and management of the CF, they were not strategically focused or coordinated into HRM strategy. The Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change stated concerns that the CF have taken the Minister's recommendations as individual initiatives to be checked off and have not viewed the reform program as "a strategic challenge that requires strategic solutions."⁵ The committee went on to state: "because the Department and the CF have deemed most of the reform program to be complete, there may be little incentive for them to revisit the original ministerial decisions from a strategic point of view. It is not, however, too late

⁴ Canada, Minister of National Defence, *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, (Ottawa: 25 March 1997), 3.

⁵ Canada, *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces: Final Report – 1999*, (Ottawa: Department of National, December, 1999), 8.

for such a re-assessment.”⁶

In June 1999, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) projected the changes begun by the Minister into the future when they jointly issued *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A strategy for 2020* (Strategy 2020). “The strategy articulates Defence’s long-term objectives and short term targets for the future. It serves as a bridge between current policy and the future....[T]he strategy will be ... used to guide our planning, force structure and procurement decisions, as well as our investments in personnel, education and training.”⁷ *Strategy 2020* lists five strategic imperatives, three of which – Coherent Strategy, Pride in the Institution, and Resource Stewardship – have implications for HRM. Human resources is also listed as one of the critical attributes of the strategy and has been provided with strategic direction as follows: “Position Defence as an employer of choice for Canadians by expanding the knowledge and skills base of our personnel and by providing them with progressive opportunities for development, career mobility and recognition for service.”⁸ Further, *Strategy 2020* lists five areas where “Defence must invest to reinforce and deepen distinctive competencies.”⁹ Three of the areas – Command and Leadership, Multi-skilled People and Management Practices – will affect HRM. Finally, *Strategy 2020* introduces the eight long-term Strategic Objectives (SO) with associated five-year (short-term) targets designed to guide the department towards achieving the strategic position identified. Of the eight SO, two are directly the focus of HRM – SO 2: Decisive Leaders and SO 6: Career of Choice – and two have HRM linkages – SO 1: Innovative Path and SO 8: Resource Stewardship.

⁶ *Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change*, 13.

⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A strategy for 2020*, (June 1999), Foreword.

⁸ *Strategy 2020*, 6.

⁹ *Strategy 2020*, 8.

Despite *Strategy 2020* having HR implications, a report reviewing HRM in the CF by V. Catano et al states that *Strategy 2020* is seen by senior members of the CF “as having little direct mention of ‘HR’ beyond DND becoming an ‘employer of choice’...HR, as such, is seen ... to lack any strategic vision – or at least a statement of such a vision...”¹⁰ Thus, despite objectives that can be construed to have HR implications, the document is not viewed as strategically focusing HR for the future of the CF.

One of the inputs into *Strategy 2020* was a Defence Management Committee discussion paper, which states:

"the objective of any HR management system is to address three (often competing) requirements:

- producing the right person in the right job to meet the mission
- addressing members' expectations for a suitable career and standard of living
- complying with social norms and legislative/regulatory standards."¹¹

The paper goes on to identify specific changes required by the CF, and the implications of the changes. Yet, even with this input, *Strategy 2020* did not reflect the recommended changes, contributing to the document being seen as lacking a strategic HR focus.

As a follow-on to *Strategy 2020*, the CF released *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020)*, which was produced with input from a wide range of officers representing all three services. The *Officership 2020* documentation identified that "there is no long-term strategic HR plan that permits long-range planning, anticipates demands and positions the CF to exploit opportunities in the future."¹²

¹⁰ V. Catano, I. Jackson and D. Macnamara, “A Framework for Effective Human Resource Management in the Canadian Forces: Report on Canadian Forces Human Resources System Review”, (December 2000), 12.

¹¹ Cdr A. Okros, *Into the 21st Century: Strategic HR Issues*, (Department of National Defence, 1999), 10/15.

¹² Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century: Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching Implementation*, March 2001, I-19.

Based on *Strategy 2020*, the Department issues annual guidance listing three-year Capability Programs and Key Result Expectations for business planning. Specific Defence Tasks are also assigned to organizations within DND to contribute to the Capability Programs and associated Key Result Expectations. The ADM (HR-Mil) group is assigned specific Defence Tasks in three of the Capability Program areas – Sustain Forces, Generate Forces, and Corporate Policy and Strategy. In *Defence Plan 2001*, for fiscal years 2001/2 to 2003/4, the Defence Tasks of importance to organizational HRM cover health, management of personnel production and assignment systems, HR research, and development of HR policies, plans and strategic guidance. The annual guidance also designates HR initiatives as the number one priority for the three years covered by the plan and identifies health care, recruiting and retention, and professional development as the most significant HR issues.¹³

In January 2002, the new CDS issued his Key Messages for the Military Leadership in which he states: “we have placed a great deal of emphasis on putting our people first and will continue to do so”¹⁴ and he places people as his number one priority. To do so, the CF requires an HRM strategy that is inextricably linked to the overall strategic direction of the Department.

Finally, in February 2002, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence issued a report entitled *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness* in which they address aspects of HRM that still require improvements. These areas include health care, pay and benefits, morale issues, recruiting and retention, and the employment of the reserves. Again, like the *Report to the PM*, the recommendations are meant to improve the situation for members of the CF, but they lack strategic focus and coordination.

¹³ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence Plan 2001*, 19 April 2001, 4-2/4-3.

¹⁴ CDS e-mail, “Key Messages for the Military Leadership”, January 21, 2002.

1.2 Strategic Human Resource Management

“An organization’s HRM policies and practices must fit with its strategy in its competitive environment and with the immediate business conditions that it faces....Because they are the most valuable, and the least easy to understand and control of all management resources, effective utilization of human resources is likely to give organizations a significant advantage. The human resource dimension must therefore be fully integrated into the strategic planning process.”¹⁵

In order for HRM to be effective, it must fall within a strategic framework that links it to external factors and the overall organizational strategy. The demands for HR cannot simply be finding replacements for current attrition. Human resource management must be forward looking for long-term changes to HR requirements and for trends in HR availability that may impact strategic direction. “Strategic human resource management is systematically linked to the strategic needs of an organization and aims to provide it with an effective work force while meeting the needs of its members and other constituents in the society.”¹⁶ It is only when HRM functions correctly at strategic levels that HRM can be effective. “Consequently, the implementations of strategic business plans become more problematic if the human resource component is not an integral part of the strategic planning process.”¹⁷

Human resource management can be considered strategic on two levels. The highest level of strategic HRM is the link to organizational strategy and the external environment. Strategic HRM policies should always reflect and support an organization's overall strategic direction and must be responsive to external influences. At a lower level, strategic HRM requires “the integration or cohesion of HR policies and practices in order to complement each

¹⁵ Guest, 1987, cited in John Bratton and Jeffrey Gold, *Human Resource Management: Theory and Practice*, 2nd Ed, (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, 2000), 47.

¹⁶ Hermann F. Schwind, Hari Das and Terry H. Wagar, *Canadian Human Resource Management: A Strategic Approach*, 5th Ed, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd, 1999) 21.

¹⁷ Bratton and Gold, 47.

other and to help achieve strategic goals.”¹⁸ HRM policies must be coordinated and evaluated so that changes in one component do not adversely impact another.

In defining strategic HRM, it is necessary to define operational and tactical HRM in order to distinguish the components that are the focus of this paper. Operational HRM involves the development and implementation of personnel policies, within strategic guidance and coordination, at the national and environmental levels, in order to meet strategic objectives. The operational level of HRM links tactical HRM to HRM strategy. Activities at the operational level ensure that tactical battles can be achieved successfully by assigning assets and providing support. The operational HR manager transforms strategic guidance into operational policy and direction.

As an example of the difference between strategic and operational HRM, the strategic and operational aspects of recruiting can be identified as follows:

“Strategic: Understand CF strategic direction, analyze HR needs, analyze Canadian demography and labour market, [and] develop recruitment strategies; and

Operational: Identify and attract candidates, select according to needs /capability requirements [and orient].”¹⁹

Tactical HRM is the line managers' leadership responsibilities with respect to personnel, whether in garrison or on ops, and extends to unit administration of personnel policies. It should be kept in mind though, that the members of the CF are at all times part of all three levels of HRM: as individuals, they are tactical assets; as members of a unit, they are operational assets; and as members of the CF, they are strategic assets. There is a need for strategic direction to the

¹⁸ Bratton and Gold, 47.

¹⁹ Macnamara, "Principles of MilitaryHR Management", 6

operational level to ensure that policies developed remain flexible vice prescriptive, to allow tactical HRM decisions to be made within the spirit of the policies, rather than the letter of the policies (i.e. don't try to write regulations for every situation and then exclude situations that fall outside the listed ones). Leaders at the tactical and operational level must be able to interpret personnel policies in a manner that best supports the member and the CF. In order to assist leaders in the tactical application of HRM, a set of HR principles is required “to provide a recognizable and reliable foundation for military HR activities....If the ‘Principles of War’ govern the strategic management of military operations, then a set of principles for military human resource management may be seen to have equal importance.”²⁰ While the HR principles should guide all levels of HRM, it is at the tactical level that the daily HR decisions are made affecting our people. Thus, in the absence of a policy directly applicable to a given situation, a HRM decision based on HR principles should prove acceptable.

The draft *HR 2020* lists a newly developed set of HR principles and states that the “HR strategy ... demands that we conduct our daily affairs consistent with a set of human resource principles and that we keep our vision foremost in our mind.”²¹ To be effective, these principles must be promulgated throughout the CF, to leaders at all levels. At the operational level, the HR principles must be understood to be the foundation for any personnel policy development and implementation decision. At the tactical level, leaders should be confident that policy interpretations made using the HR principles as guidance should withstand scrutiny.

Recommendation: Widely promulgate the HR principles and ensure leaders at all levels understand the meaning, purpose and application of the principles.

Criteria for Success: HR managers at all levels are confident that they can make a HRM decision that will prove acceptable to the management of the CF.

²⁰ Macnamara, "Principles", 3.

²¹ *HR 2020*, 3.

2 Conceptual Framework of Strategic Human Resource Management for the Canadian Forces

Before strategic HRM in the CF can be analyzed, a model of strategic HRM appropriate to the CF is required. “The term ‘model’ is used interchangeably to denote conceptual frameworks, theories, typologies, flowcharts, forecasting equations and even literature summaries...[and] systematic representation or structure of key variables and the relationships among them.”²² The model developed in this paper is a conceptual framework providing a visual representation of the important components of strategic HRM and their internal and external relationships. It forms the framework upon which further analysis is based. “The goal is to provide a ‘heuristic’ device to help orient strategic HR research and policy planning, and it is more conceptual than administrative in nature...[and] incorporates relevant findings abstracted from the extant literature.”²³

The method used to determine a strategic HRM model for the CF is to examine other models for suitability to the CF. There are many models provided in the literature from which to select. What is examined is whether any of the models can be directly applied to the CF given that military structure and purpose do not align directly with the private sector or even necessarily with the Public Service. In addition, models developed for other militaries do not necessarily reflect what is considered important for the CF. The other militaries studied all have individual service policies (Army, Navy and Air Force) supporting an overarching guiding framework, whereas the CF has a centralized policy framework applicable to all services. In


²² C. Hamel, and F.C. Pinch, *Models of Military Service: Influences on Joining, Leaving and Staying in the Canadian Force*. (Ottawa: HDP Group Inc, July 2000), 5/27.

²³ Hamel and Pinch, 5/27.

order to develop a model for the CF, academic, public sector and military models are reviewed and their components are analyzed

The Guest model has been adapted to incorporate some components of a Harvard model. The bottom two HRM outcomes, competence and congruence, come from Harvard, while the final column (Long Term Consequences) reflects Harvard, rather than concentrate, as Guest does, on purely financial outcomes (profits). The other models surveyed by Bratton and Gold provide a good link to external factors and organizational strategy, but they are weak in HRM content. Thus, they are discounted in this paper; however, their strategic framework and external context can be combined with the Guest model to make it more robust, as in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Guest Strategic Human Resource Management




Source: Adapted from the Harvard HRM Model, 1984 (cited in Bratton and Gold, 2000²⁶)

²⁶ Bratton and Gold, 19.

From a purely Canadian perspective, Schwind, Das and Wagar present a HRM model within a strategic framework linking HRM to the external environment and the organizational strategy, mission, goals, strengths and culture. Their strategic HRM model is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Schwind, Das and Wagar Model of Strategic Human Resource Management.



Source: Schwind, Das and Wagar, 1999.²⁷

The HR planning function includes the need to conduct a thorough job analysis upon which the demand for HR can be compared to the supply of available personnel and their respective skill sets to produce the requirement for additional workers. The function of attracting HR then generates a pool of applicants from which are selected those who best match the job requirements. Once an applicant is hired, the placement, development and evaluation function provides for orienting the employee to the organization as well as training the employee for initial employment and developing the trainee for future employment. The function also

²⁷ Schwind et al, 24.

provides the appraisal framework for determining employee performance against expected competencies and possibly for identifying HRM change requirements. The motivation and reward function is then responsible to provide appropriate pay and financial and non-financial benefits to compensate the employee for acceptable performance. Motivation also includes a supportive work environment. The final function, maintaining high performance levels, is concerned with employee relations, internal communications, discipline, counseling, diversity, safety and union-management relations. However, the model poorly depicts the interrelationships or any sequence in the HR process.

For an American perspective, Kossek and Block provide a five-part model with "HRM policy clusters"²⁸ depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Kossek and Block Human Resource Management Model



Source: Kossek and Block, 2000.²⁹

²⁸ Ellen Ernst Kossek and Richard N. Block, *Managing Human Resources in the 21st Century: From Core Concepts to Strategic Choice*, (Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing, 2000), 3.11.

²⁹ Kossek and Block, 3.12.

The HR strategy and organization cluster deals with organizational culture and structure, including job design aligned with business objectives, recognizing the external environment. The talent identification and deployment cluster deals with attracting the right type and number of full and part time people, deploying them to the right place and releasing them at the right time. The human capital development cluster deals with managing the socialization, development (for present and future employment) and performance (via appraisals) of employees. The reward management cluster deals with pay, benefits, recognition and intrinsic rewards and how they affect the attitudes and behavior of employees. The final cluster, employee relations, quality of work environment and voice, deals with the level of employee influence and participation, grievances, discipline, diversity, health and safety, internal communications and flexible work arrangements. While not explicitly stated, the model can be interpreted as having each cluster affecting each of the others through the center. What the model lacks is clearly defined linkages to external context.

2.2 Foreign Military

The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), like the CF, has undergone a series of inquiries and reviews over the last ten years. Each of the reports provided has identified requirements to improve HRM in the armed forces of the UK. The MOD has also gone through downsizing and budget reductions. It is no wonder, therefore, that the problems being faced and the changes being introduced in the UK are very similar to the problems and changes being discussed for the CF.

The UK forces

"have radically altered their traditional approach to people issues by adopting and implementing some of the latest HRM practices. This has been driven by the need to update and improve internal management systems relating both to the organization and to the workforce in terms of achieving greater efficiency, rationalization and flexibility."³⁰

The MOD has adopted best practices from other private and public sector organizations to produce the *Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy (AFOPS)*, which is an integral part of their Defence Strategic Plan. The *AFOPS* lists one central theme and five key themes: Central (common across all services), Cultivate (public awareness), Obtain (attract, acquire, train), Retain (rewarding career, foundation for second career), Sustain (work environment) and Remember (resettlement, help and support). Within *AFOPS*, there are 28 Personnel Strategy Guidelines (PSG) to provide direction to the three services in the application of policy to meet *AFOPS* objectives. Each PSG is identified as being led centrally or by individual services. The 28 PSG are assigned to one of the key themes as depicted in Table 2:

Table 2. UK Ministry of Defence *Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy*.

Theme	PSG No	Title	Lead Agency
Central	1	Service Personnel Organization	Center and Services
	2	Research	Center
Cultivate/Obtain	3	Youth	Center
	4	Recruitment	Center and Services
	5	Reserves	Center
	6	Individual Training	Center and Services
Retain	7	Career Structures	Services, Central overview
	8	Manpower Structures	Services, Central overview
	9	Mobility	Services, Central overview
	10	Career management	Services, Central overview
	11	Pay and Charges	Center
	12	Allowances	Center
	13	Education	Center
	14	Conditions of Service	Center

³⁰ Alex Alexandrou, Richard Bartle and Richard Holmes, eds, *Human Resource Management in the British Armed Forces: Investing in the Future*, (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 1.


	15	Equal Opportunities	Center
	16	Discipline	Center
	17	Complaints Procedures	Center
Sustain	18	Welfare	Center
	19	Health	Center
	20	Living Accommodation	Center
	21	Pastoral and Spiritual	Services, Central Overview
	22	Sport and Recreation	Center
	23	Health and Safety	Center
	24	Families	Center
Remember	25	Resettlement	Center
	26	End of Service Benefits/Pension	Center
	27	Veterans	Center
	28	Bereaved Families	Center

Source: United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, 2000

The last military models to be described come from an Australian Department of Defence report, which refers to human resources as the 'workforce'. Their model of strategic HRM is based on one designed for their public sector in 1991, shown in Figure 4, with strategy and organization design components shown driving workforce requirements, and feedback from the workforce influencing organizational requirements. The report then goes on to provide a simplified military model, which includes a step where strategic direction becomes capability development, from which workforce requirements and planning can be developed. The military model is shown at Figure 5.

The last two blocks in the military model relate to the bottom of the public sector model, previously described. 'Workforce requirements/planning' equates to 'workforce requirements and availability' of the McGregor model and 'personnel management', equates to 'personnel operations' and 'operations affecting employees' of the McGregor model. Again, what both models lack is a firm link to external context influencing the models. As with the Guest/Harvard model, this can be rectified with the addition of external framework from another model.

Figure 4. Australian Public Sector Strategic Workforce Development



Source: McGregor, 1991, cited in Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, 2000.³¹

Figure 5. Australian Military Strategic HRM Model



Source: Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, 2000.³²

³¹ Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, *Strategic Workforce Management*, (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2000), 2-3.

³² Commonwealth of Australia, *Strategic Workforce Management*, 2-5.

2.3 Public Service

The Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada has produced a *Framework for Good Human Resources Management in the Public Service*. The framework identifies five key result areas each with several success criteria, as depicted in Table 3. The framework does not provide any internal or external context; yet, reports such as *Partnering for People*, which gave rise to the development of the framework, do include statements concerning increased stakeholder input, unpredictable environment, organizational design and organizational strategy.³³

Table 3. Canadian Public Service Human Resource Management Framework.

Key Result Area	Success Criteria
Leadership	Mission and Vision
	Management Structure
	Contribution to Objectives
	Management Behaviour
	Management Development
Productive Workforce	Service Standards
	Clarity of Responsibilities
	Staff Relations
	Language of Service
	Continuous Improvement
	Performance Management
	Orientation and Training
Enabling Work Environment	Information Systems
	Communication
	Supportive Culture
	Wellness and Safety
Workforce Built on Values	Recruiting and Staffing
	Employment Equity
	Official Languages
	Human Rights
Sustainable Workforce	HR Planning
	Continuous Learning
	Competency Profiling
	Workload Management

Source: Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 1999³⁴.

³³ Canada, Government of Canada, *Partnering for People: Report of the COSO Sub-Committee on the Human Resource Community*, undated, 2-3.

³⁴ Canada, *Framework for Good Human Resources Management in the Public Service*, (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 1999), Executive Summary.

2.4 Strategic Human Resource Management Model for the Canadian Forces

How do the above models translate into a strategic HRM model for the CF? It would be convenient to simply adopt the Canadian Public Service framework, for simplicity and consistency within the department, but doing so would indicate that there is nothing unique about the military. “[T]here are major differences....Military personnel are subject to unique terms of service that require equally unique arrangements for their support and care.”³⁵ Instead, the Public Service model will be further analyzed along with the others to determine the best model for the CF.

The next step is to compare and contrast the various models to determine their relative strengths and weaknesses. Then the options are to a) determine best fit against known requirements for the CF and adopt an existing model, or b) pick the most applicable components amongst all models and create a unique CF model.

Each strategic HRM model presents several major groupings (themes, clusters etc), with each grouping containing several concepts or elements. In order to compare the models, they are presented in tabular format. The groups under each model have been horizontally aligned to indicate similar policy content. Group names are repeated in the table if they relate to more than one group from other models. The results of the comparison are shown in Table 4.

³⁵ “People in Defence: Beyond 2000”, 3.

Table 4. Comparison of Strategic Human Resource Management Models

	Guest/ Harvard	Schwind, Das and Wagar	Kossek and Block	UK AFOPS	Australian Military	Australian PS	Canadian PS
1	Stakeholder Interests & Situational Factors	Analysis of External Environment and Organization Strategy, Mission, Goals, Strengths and Culture	Human Resource Strategy and Organization	Integral to Defence Strategic Plan	Strategic Policy and Direction	Strategy and Mission & Organization Design	Requirement to link to Strategic Objectives of the respective Department or Agency.
2					Capability Development		
3			Human Resource Strategy & Organization	OrgagagagaC	0	ral)	10.02

The HRM models compared above do not match each other exactly, but they do correlate well. From the comparison table, there appear to be ten overall components that emerge. Each component is examined for its applicability to the CF before a decision to adopt an existing model or create a new one is made.

Line one indicates a high level strategic context and, as outlined in Chapter 1, is a requirement for any strategic HRM model. Human resource management must be a consideration at the strategic level of the organization and the strategic objectives of the organization must take the HR factor into consideration; thus, senior HR management must have input at the strategic level of organizational decision making. Most models also include the influence of the external environment in this component. The external environment consists of such factors³⁶ as the economy, technology, politics, social issues, demographics, legal concerns, and culture.³⁷ The external influence on strategic direction cannot be discounted, since “a military that is not in synch with the society that generates it cannot be effective.”³⁸ However, it may be best left as a separate component since it can directly influence HRM without doing so through the strategic influence. Thus, the model for the CF should have an organizational strategy component and an external environment component. The external environment is further discussed in following sections with respect to each component that it affects.

³⁶ When considering external factors, it is worth distinguishing between types of factors that are encountered, including trends, events, and issues. Trends are factors that can be predicted with some certainty and must be taken into consideration in HRM, but which cannot be altered. An example is the demographic trends in the Canadian population from which the CF recruits new members. An event is an occurrence that generally cannot be predicted or altered, but which usually requires a response affecting HRM. An example would be the events in the USA of September 11th, 2001. Finally, an issue is a situation that may be predictable, and in providing a HRM response, is alterable, or manageable. An example is the provision of retention bonuses for pilots. All types of external factors are encountered in HRM and must be dealt with strategically.

³⁷ Schwind et al, 5

³⁸ David J. Bercuson, “A Man (or Woman) for All Seasons: What the Canadian Public Expects from Canadian General Officers” in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, eds, (St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 409.

In line two, only one model (a military model) identifies the need to integrate strategic HRM with capability requirements, although David Ulrich³⁹ makes reference to it when he defines the purpose of strategic HRM as “translating business strategies first into organizational capabilities and then into HR practices.”⁴⁰ Determining capability requirements must be an integrated process, with all outputs totally reflective of each other; thus, all outputs of the capability requirements decision process must reflect the HR dimension and the HR requirements output must reflect the capabilities required. Adding a capability requirements component is required in a strategic HRM model for the CF.

Line three can be considered to be the second level of strategy explained earlier in the paper, the need to strategically coordinate all personnel policies and initiatives. Having already been identified as a requirement for strategic HRM, human resource strategy should be included in the CF model. This component also includes the organizational structure changes that may be required for the organization to achieve new capability requirements or strategic HRM capability.

The fourth line refers to the functions of job design, determining future HR requirements, analyzing current and future HR availability and determining the mix of full and part-time employees. Human resource planning is based upon the identified capability requirements and also exists within the context of external environment and organizational structure. Another required function of HR planning is structuring terms of service to support sustainable occupation flows in support of meeting current and future HR requirements. Human resource planning is a required component of CF strategic HRM.

³⁹ Ulrich is considered the top educator in HR according to *Business Week*.

⁴⁰ David Ulrich, *Human Resource Champions: The Next Agenda for Addi*

Line five, recruiting, is a combination of attraction (generating applicants), selection (“hiring the most suitable or who meet eligibility and/or suitability standards, based on need”⁴¹) and orientation (“transforming those enrolled into organized groups willing to carry out the CF’s mission effectively and efficiently”⁴²). The selection process determines, from those attracted, which should be provided the opportunity to undertake orientation. As discussed by Hamel and Finch, the three parts of the process affect each other. Attracting poor quality candidates reduces the likelihood of selecting appropriate recruits. Having a poor orientation program increases the likelihood of attrition, which causes the need for more recruiting. Recruiting is directly affected by the external environment, not only through competition for hiring, but also because once hired, it is civilians who then undergo military orientation. Military orientation is the militarization of the individual, the socialization of the recruit to the unique military ethos, including the concept of unlimited liability.⁴³ Recruiting is a required component of any strategic HRM model.

The sixth line deals becoming a ‘learning organization’. Theorists and practitioners alike believe that becoming a learning organization is critical to an organization’s continued effectiveness. A learning organization encourages employee development and is concerned with how employees are trained and developed from their initial job after they enter the organization until the end of their career with the organization, referred to as HR development. In a military context, since career management plays an important role in HR development, a more applicable term may be career development. Career development includes formal and informal learning (training and education), for both personal and professional development, through courses and

⁴¹ Hamel and Pinch, 7/27.

⁴² Hamel and Pinch, 7/27.

⁴³ Unlimited liability means that every member of the CF is subject to be sent anywhere, any time, in any weather, to possibly suffer grievous bodily harm or lose one's life in the defence of the country and its national objectives.

experience; thus, in a military context, it is important that placement (postings) into successive positions provide experience and development opportunities to the employee and not just fill organizational holes. Another aspect of managing employee careers is the administration of the terms of service contracts to the right people. Career development also includes appraisal, or the newer concept, performance management.⁴⁴ However, more than just training and development needs depend on accurate appraisal; thus, it may be useful to separate appraisal as its own component (which will also ensure its importance is not lost within a larger component). Therefore, the CF model of HRM should include both appraisal and career development components.⁴⁵

Line seven deals with rewarding performance through remuneration (pay and benefits) and recognition of high performance. Recognition can be achieved through awards and recognition programs and through promotion. Benefits may be financial or non-financial. Included in this section are pensions and release benefits. Since each individual's remuneration needs vary, current business practice is not to pay similar personnel the same, but to provide a pay and benefits envelope from which the employee determines which benefits (health and insurance coverage, amount of vacation time, pension, etc) that he or she wishes. The Netherlands' Armed Forces utilize the pay envelope system and also pay personnel based on responsibility; thus, two members of the same rank, occupation and seniority, doing different jobs, are provided different pay envelopes. Whether or not the CF adopts any of these current

⁴⁴ Kossek and Block differentiate appraisal and performance management as the difference between "looking back over the previous year and judging how well one did ... and... looking forward and planning for future skill enhancement while taking account of an individual's context" page 3.14.

⁴⁵ For specific discussion on development of General Officers, see Horn and Harris, eds, *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, (St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001).

remuneration practices, rewarding is a required component of a HRM model for the CF.⁴⁶

The eighth line involves aspects affecting the employees' work environment and commitment. In the military, commitment is also reflected in members' morale and motivation. Also in the military, leadership must move from being transactional, where members do the right thing for fear of consequence, to being transformational, where members do the right thing because it is the right thing to do. Private and public sector practices stress the following factors, which should be considered in this component: employee involvement, diversity, health and safety, ethical/values-based workplace (CF ethos), pastoral/ spiritual support, sports and recreation, internal communications, flexible work arrangements, recognition of the increased importance of family life (family/work balance), grievance procedures and discipline. However, in the military, discipline takes on a more important role than in civilian organizations, as stated by the Minister of National Defence in his Report to the Prime Minister in March 1997:

"There is no doubt that the armed forces have unique military disciplinary requirements and need a separate and distinct system of justice. Discipline is the life-blood of the armed forces. Whether in peace or in war, it spells the difference between military success and failure. It promotes effectiveness and efficiency."⁴⁷

The Minister appointed a Special Advisory Group to study the CF disciplinary and justice systems and make recommendations for changes.⁴⁸ Given the Minister's emphasis on discipline, and the unique nature of discipline in a military, it is deserving of being a separate component from motivation/morale in the CF HRM model.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ For specific discussion of pay issues in the CF, see Maj H. Bondy, "Canadian Forces Compensation and Benefits: Fundamental Principles and Strategic Policy Vision", (Ottawa: Directorate of Pay Policy development, 28 June 1999) and Major W.F. Veenhof, Command and Staff Course Report, "Overtime Compensation Benefits for Canadian Forces Personnel", (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 1 May 1997).

⁴⁷ *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, 8.

⁴⁸ A summary of these recommendations can be found in *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, (Ottawa: 25 March 1997), 52-57.

⁴⁹ For a discussion on motivation in the CF see Col. C.J. Corrigan, Advanced Military Studies Course Report, "Attacking our Cohesion – Who Needs Enemies?", (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 1999).

The ninth line of the table is that of 'separation' or 'remember'. This component appears only in the military models, but this is understandable, given that the service provided by the military to society is unique and may result in grievous bodily harm or death. Had a model for police or firefighters been examined, it would not be surprising to find 'remember' in that model. The CF model should incorporate such a component. Any provision for post employment benefits can be captured under 'remuneration' as rewards for service/contribution to the organization. The 'remember' component should deal with support to the member or the member's family after the member's departure from the organization.


The last component to be added to the strategic HRM model is a reflection of the Guest/Harvard model, the outcomes. Rather than split this component into HRM, behavior, performance and long term outcomes as the Guest/Harvard model indicates, they will be left as one combined component. It is the combined effect of all outcomes that will determine the effectiveness of the organization and provide the feedback to the top of the model to determine if changes to HRM are required to steer the organization.

It should be noted that retention is not one of the proposed components of the strategic HRM model for the CF. The ability to retain personnel is imbedded in the successful implementation of personnel policies in all components of a HRM model. In addition, while retention is important in the current HR crisis facing the CF, if current recruiting and retention initiatives become successful, retention should decrease as a principal focus. Rather, retention would then move from a drive to retain as many members as possible to a balance of retaining adequate personnel to ensure the long-term sustainment of the military occupation (including age distribution and promotion flows). The long-term sustainment of a military occupation is part of the HR planning function. Retention, then, is a desired outcome, not a stand-alone component.

Analyzing retention against required HR levels generates the feedback used to alter the HRM strategy, if correction is needed.

With the required components of a strategic HRM model for the CF identified, a quick scan of the model comparison table indicates that no model includes all the required components described above; therefore, a decision can be made to create a new model. The new model can be developed with the required components mapped showing internal and external context. The resulting model, a conceptual framework for strategic HRM in the CF, is illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Conceptual Framework of Strategic Human Resource Management for the CF



Where deficiencies or weaknesses in CF strategic HRM are ascertained, recommendations for improvements are provided.

As described in Section 1.2, the HRM strategy of an organization must be in synch with the organizational strategy, or strategic objectives. The most effective method of achieving synchronization is by ensuring that senior HR managers have a voice at the strategic table. It is not the intent of this paper to assess the strategic objectives of the CF from a HRM perspective. More will be stated about the requirement for senior HR managers to be strategically involved in the direction of the CF in Chapter 4. Given that the focus of any analysis of HRM should be on the outcomes, not on what HRM does,⁵¹ according to David Ulrich, the analysis of strategic HRM in the CF will commence with the final component of the framework, the outcomes.

3.1 Outcomes

As per the Guest/Harvard model described above, outcomes include all results of HRM policies and practices, including an increased commitment of employees to the organization, increased convergence of individual and organizational goals, increased competence and flexibility (individual and organizational), and increased organizational effectiveness (performance and cost). It is the increased organizational effectiveness that is the focus of strategic HRM principles, especially for the CF.

The draft *HR 2020* does not adequately address outcomes, other than to state:

“The CF HR Military Group and the Environmental Commands, have a responsibility to develop and implement HR policies and programs that ensure that a ‘competent, committed and professional’ work force is available to successfully contribute to the accomplishment of the assigned operational mission.”⁵²

⁵¹ Ulrich, vii.

⁵² *HR 2020*, 7.1

By listing only three outcomes, and tying them to the need to be 'available' to 'contribute' to an assigned mission, leaves a range of possible outcomes, which would not meet the Department's requirements, but would meet the *HR 2020* requirements. For example, through poor recruiting and retention strategies, the CF might only be able to field half of the required strength of personnel for a mission, but if the personnel were 'competent, committed and professional' and were available to contribute, then the desired *HR 2020* outcomes have been satisfied, while the desired Departmental outcome, effectiveness of the CF, has not.

As previously mentioned, one outcome of strategic HRM that is currently being emphasized and monitored closely in the CF is retention. However, the major outcome that must be given the highest priority for the CF is the ability to generate and sustain adequate numbers of properly trained personnel to meet operational requirements. Retention affects the ability to meet requirements, but it is the requirements that are the driving factor. If the CF cannot meet operational requirements, then changes to HRM policies, or even the organizational structure itself, are required. Additionally, all changes to HRM policies must be measured against their impact on operational requirements. For example, changes in HRM policies to improve quality of life (QOL) in the CF must not affect the operational commanders' abilities to meet operational requirements when deployed. When the CF sent Rotation 8 to Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 2001, the CF had just changed from deploying January to June, to deploying April to September to fall in line with fiscal years. At the same time, there had just been QOL-related HR policy changes regarding deployment of personnel. A policy was implemented which stated that personnel returning from deployment were not to be sent out of area on employment or training for 60 days. With many career courses commencing in the Fall, the new policy meant that those personnel on deployment proceeding on course on return were returned to Canada early to

receive post deployment leave and stability before their courses. Since they left the deployment after the halfway point, they were not eligible to be replaced. Thus, the combination of various policies served to reduce the operational commander's ability to meet operational requirements.⁵³

Recommendation: Ensure all proposed amendments to HRM policies are assessed for impact on the critical outcome of the ability of the CF to meet operational requirements.

Criteria for Success: Operational capabilities are not adversely affected by amendments to HRM policies.

Measuring the potential impact of HRM policy amendments on outcomes requires an overall coordination effort, which is part of the focus of the organizational structure component.

3.2 Organizational Structure

The purpose of the organizational structure component in strategic HRM is two-fold. Firstly, there is a requirement to ensure that the overall functional structure of the organization contributes to the ability of the organization to meet its strategic objectives and goals. Secondly, there is a requirement to have a HRM strategy that is coordinated internally (i.e. HRM policies aimed at one outcome do not adversely affect others).

In the CF context, coordination of the HRM strategy is now being conducted within ADM(HR-Mil). Until recently, there had been over 130 initiatives developed in response to various studies and reports with no link to corporate HRM strategy.⁵⁴ In future, each HRM policy initiative will be assessed using scenario-based analysis for force impact and achievability (financial, time, personnel).⁵⁵ The requirement to coordinate HRM initiatives also fits into the *HR 2020* goal to “synchronize HR strategy across all planning horizons” previously mentioned.

⁵³ Interview, Colonel Corrigan, Commander Task Force Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canadian Contingent Commander and National Command Authority - Rotation 8, (April – September 2001), 6 March 2002.

⁵⁴ Briefing by Director General Military Human Resource Policy & Planning to Armed Forces Council, April 2001.

⁵⁵ Briefing by Director General Military Human Resource Policy & Planning to Armed Forces Council, April 2001.

Since late in Fiscal Year 2000/2001, ADM(HR-Mil) has produced a Long-Term Capability Plan (Human Resources) (LTCP(HR)) to link all HR initiatives to long-term funding. Unfortunately, what is not present is the influx of significant additional funding to ensure the implementation or long-term sustainability of initiatives. As an example, CFRETS, in conjunction with the three services and support elements, expended substantial staffing on improvements to officer and NCM professional development (NCMPD) in response to the various inquiries and reports on leadership and management in the CF. However, when input into the LTCP(HR), funding for NCMPD implementation did not appear in the five year plan. This sent the wrong signal to the many officers and NCMs who gave considerable time and effort over more than two years to produce a plan that had been concurred up to Armed Forces Council. If the CF are serious about HR, as espoused in high-level documents previously described, then the HRM strategy must be elevated to the highest levels of strategic management in the CF (see also Chapter 4).

Recommendation: Ensure the LTCP(HR) has visibility outside ADM(HR-Mil) and is at the top of the CF LTCP as a reflection of its number one priority status in Defence Plan 2001 and the CDS Message to Commanding Officers.

Criteria for Success: The LTCP(HR) is merged with the CF LTCP with HR issues as top priority.

David Ulrich describes the purpose of HRM strategy as building a strategy, organization, and action plan focused on making HR more effective.⁵⁶ According to Bratton and Gold, “the design of organizational structures and the way work is performed are critical features of the HRM model.”⁵⁷ Most improvement will occur as a result of considerable organizational change.

An area of organizational structure that requires re-evaluation is the Total Force concept. The *1994 White Paper on Defence* recognizes a force structure "based on a Total Force concept

⁵⁶ Ulrich, 191.

⁵⁷ Bratton and Gold, 100.

that integrates full- and part-time military personnel to provide multi-purpose, combat capable forces."⁵⁸ There has been considerable effort expended lately in treating reservists more like regulars, in areas such as employment, training standards, unlimited liability, pensions, benefits, and pay. The CF have already implemented paying reservists 100 percent of regular pay, vice 85 percent, for those who deploy on Class B service in support of operations.⁵⁹ In addition, the CF have announced the intention to provide pension benefits to members of the reserve force.⁶⁰ These initiatives signal the CF' recognition of the contribution of part-time members of the CF.

The private sector also recognizes the importance of part-time workers, to give flexibility to an organization to react to swings in employment requirements. The private sector has also recognized the need to remove distinctions between full and part-time workers. In the words of one author:

"In some organizations today it is impossible to determine from their activities whether a person is a part-time worker ...or a full-time employee. Artificial distinctions in terms of pay, benefits, and status of these classifications don't fit the new reality....[D]ifferences, particularly those of status, should be minimized, if not eliminated. In the final analysis, we are all temps, and artificial distinctions...do not fit the necessary flexibility of the new reality."⁶¹

The Department recognizes the importance of part time workers in *Strategy 2020*: "Key to our success in the future is a strong, self-disciplined and well-motivated workforce, both full and part time...".⁶² In the CF, the use of part time workers occurs at two levels. At the unit level, each unit within the organization can employ part time workers from their own operating

⁵⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 7.

⁵⁹ Capt(N) Tremblay, Deputy Commander Naval Reserve Headquarters, briefing on Canada's Naval Reserves, 6 March 2002. See also Canada, Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness", (First Session, Thirty-Seventh Parliament. Ottawa: February 2002), Part I, Section 6.

⁶⁰ CANFORGEN 081/01 ADMHRMIL 045 111330Z JUL 01 Modernization OF CF Pension Arrangements, para 4.

⁶¹ David N. Noer, "Helping Organizations Change" in *Evolving Practices in Human Resource Management: Responses to a Changing World of Work*, Allen I. Kraut and Abraham K. Korman, eds, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999). 292.

⁶² *Strategy 2020*, 8.

funds. The part time workers can be contractors, 'temp' workers or reservists. At the strategic level, the CF have an inherent role for part time workers through the reserve components. The navy recognizes the continued importance of reserves to the Defence mission in *Leadmark*:

"An important part of meeting the navy's future personnel requirements will rest with the development of the naval reserve....the naval reserve does not exist as a basis for mobilization. Rather, reserve personnel will be required to help sustain the types of national military operations in which the CF may be engaged. Increasingly, the naval reserve will provide those skills not (or minimally) held by the regular force. The contribution of the reserves will be essential to the maintenance of the navy's ability to act in an expeditionary manner, in that reserve personnel and assets are, and will remain, an important feature in the Defence of Canada and North America. Their use in fulfilling roles ... will increase the flexibility and availability of regular force naval personnel and assets for other operations."⁶³

These statements apply equally to all environments of the CF, and the CF is employing more reservists in support of Defence missions. The army is attempting to have entire formations of reservists deploy overseas rather than as individual augmentees. The navy and air force have given reservists separate tasks to perform in the accomplishment of navy and air force missions. However, reservists are doing so on full-time employment, which creates an organizational structure issue that requires resolution.

To resolve the issue, it is time to consider a change to the organization of the CF to a 'Total Force' of 90,000 personnel with no regular/reserve distinction but only a distinction between being employed full-time and part-time. Such an organization would employ 65,000 to 70,000 full-time and 25,000 to 20,000 part-time personnel.⁶⁴ The movement of personnel

⁶³ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*. (Ottawa: 18 June 2001), 141.

⁶⁴ The figures are roughly based on the current authorized strength of 60,000 regular plus 30,000 reservists of which up to 5,000 reservists could be employed full-time with reserve or regular units. The total of 65,000 would fluctuate based on how many are in basic training and not yet at Trained Effective Strength – i.e., they are not employable. Replacement personnel are recruited based on anticipated attrition, thus they are in uniform and being paid full time before the person they are hired to replace actually releases from the CF, avoiding any vacancies. Through this process, trying to set a fixed figure for number of personnel on basic training is meaningless. There will always be a minimum number of personnel required full-time to fill actual jobs. The number on basic training will be in addition to the number of jobs.

between what are classically considered regular and reserve components would be seamless. This structure would allow full-time personnel to take time off for families, self-development or other reasons that are incompatible with full-time service. They could do so by moving to part-time employment without having to immediately take their release, as is currently required. The CF must let its members know that they have options, that their contributions are valued, even if they wish to take an 'operational pause'. The ability to take a break without having to release would also reduce the recruiting workload and time delay inherent in the re-enrolment process. If personnel policies are seen as friendly, then some might stay whom otherwise would consider release. As stated by Ankerson and Tethong: "Each and every talented, fully-trained and experienced person that can be convinced to remain in the CF equals ten people that need to be attracted, enrolled, and trained."⁶⁵ This statement applies equally to those who Component Transfer (CT), since each trained reservist who transfers to the regular force reduces the regular force recruiting requirement. Under the new structure, part-time personnel could move to full-time employment without having to go through the recruiting process again, a time-consuming process and major dissatisfier for reservists trying to CT to the regular force. Some reservists join during full-time education and then decide they wish to make the CF a full-time career, they should not be dissuaded by a cumbersome CT process; otherwise, they may then find other full-time employment, but also quit the reserves. On the other hand, there are arguments against the CT program based on the loss of personnel on strength in reserve units and the fact that the reserve units must then recruit and train replacements. However, according to Naval Reserve Headquarters, the approximately 150 members who underwent CT in 2001/2002 was almost

⁶⁵ Ankerson and Tethong, "Retain or Perish: Why Recruiting Won't Save the CF" in *Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies*, Strategic Datalink #95. March 2001.

matched by ex-regulars who joined the reserves.⁶⁶ How many more regular force personnel who are considering release might consider part-time employment under a Total Force organization with no regular/reserve distinction? “Every possible effort should be made to making the CF the kind of place where this pool of talent wants to remain.”⁶⁷ Reserves are part of the ‘pool of talent’. A Total Force with no regular/reserve distinctions would support the Minister’s decision “to make the administrative membrane that divides the Regular and Reserve Force more permeable, in order to allow consecutive and uninterrupted service between the Regular and Reserve components of the CF.”⁶⁸

Recommendation: Review the Total Force concept with a view to eliminating regular/reserve distinctions by implementing a CF of 90,000 personnel on either full-time or part-time service.

Criteria for Success: All administrative barriers between full-time and part-time service are removed.

3.3 Capability Requirements

Closely associated with organizational structure in determining HRM strategy are capability requirements. As previously outlined, the HR dimension must be an integral consideration in determining capability requirements for the CF to meet strategic objectives.

According to Bartlett et al (refer to figure 7):

“strategy is the linking of ends and means – a ‘game plan’ that tells how finite resources will be employed to accomplish declared objectives...Force planning is the process of appraising the security needs of a nation, establishing the military requirements that result from them, and selecting, within resource constraints, military forces to meet those requirements.”⁶⁹ “Force planners must...set

⁶⁶ According to Capt(N) Tremblay, in the Naval Reserves, the approximately 150 members who underwent CT was almost matched by ex-regulars who joined the reserves.

⁶⁷ Ankerson and Tethong.

⁶⁸ *Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces: Final Report – 1999*, 207.

⁶⁹ Bartlett et al, “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning”, in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), 19. See also Richmond Lloyd, “Strategy and Force Planning Framework” in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), 4.

priorities, resolve conflicting demands upon resources, and eliminate mismatches.”⁷⁰

Like budgets, human resources are also finite and must, therefore, be fully considered when establishing military requirements. Where conflict over scarce resources occurs, HR must be a top priority, for without HR, future capabilities may not be realizable. “Strategy conceptualizes resources as means in support of policy. Resources are not means until strategy provides some understanding of how they will be organized and employed. Defense budgets and manpower are resources.”⁷¹ The DND is moving away from a procurement program based on replacing existing platforms to one based on capability requirements. Integral to any capability is the HR requirement, ensuring the right mix of personnel to operate and maintain any new equipment procured to meet a new or existing capability.

Figure 7: Bartlett Model of Strategic Development



Source: Bartlett et al, in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2000.⁷²

⁷⁰ Bartlett et al, 33.

⁷¹ Mackubin T. Owens, “Thinking About Strategy” in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), 427.

⁷² Bartlett et al, 20.

In the CDS' Key Messages for the Military Leadership, he also identifies the requirement for "investing in the right mix of people, equipment and training".⁷³ To do so, the CF requires HR to be an integral consideration in determining capability requirements. To determine HR requirements after capability requirements are determined relegates HR to a follow-on process, rather than a strategic driver.

Recommendation: Ensure that HR considerations are fully integrated into determining future capability requirements.

Criteria for Success: Future capability requirement decisions fully reflect HR considerations.

Also highlighted in the CDS message was training. Training is an important consideration with respect to new capability requirements. The training requirements created by new capabilities not only require new training and cross-training packages to be developed, but also have implications for both the career development and HR planning components of the strategic HRM framework.

3.4 Human Resource Planning

Human resource planning can be considered as identifying the demand or the requirement for the right number of people, with the right skills for employment at the right time. The first step to determining the skills required is to perform job analysis and design based on organizational structure and capability requirements. According to Bratton and Gold, job design allows organizations to restructure work to broaden employee responsibilities, resulting in increased commitment, competence, effectiveness and congruence.⁷⁴ Based on the job analysis and design, the competencies required of new members are identified. Job design must be

⁷³ CDS e-mail, "Key Messages for the Military Leadership", January 21, 2002.

⁷⁴ Bratton and Gold, 100.

continuously reviewed to ensure that competencies required are still relevant to the strategic direction and functional structure of the organization. "A successful [HR] strategy must also be focused on providing the organization with the right individuals for the jobs at hand."⁷⁵

Once job analysis and design is complete and the required employee competencies are identified, it is then in HR planning that the first look is taken at comparing the demand to supply, where the internal and external labour markets are examined to forecast future recruiting requirements. Supply is the number of personnel predicted to be available to meet demand. The internal labour market refers to the personnel already employed in the organization who may be available for internal transfer and is dependant on the competencies available and forecasts of release rates and current recruiting.

Human resource planning is directly affected by external factors. Demographic trends can have a significant impact on the external labour supply and must be considered as part of strategic HRM. In Canada, there is a rise in the percentage of ethnic minorities and a drop in the percentage of youth available for employment expected over the next decade.⁷⁶ Thus, diversity issues and the competition for employees currently being experienced are expected to grow. These realities must be taken into account in strategic HR planning and recruiting strategy.

An example of the link between HR planning, capability requirements, organizational structure, and recruiting can be made based on the predicted drop in youth available for employment (external labour market) commencing in 2015. When this anticipated drop in employable youth is fed into the organizational structure component, it may cause a shift in strategic focus in future capability requirements. *Leadmark* forecasts that as "part of the

⁷⁵ *Leadmark*, 140.

⁷⁶ DSP Update: "HR 101", Version 2.0 "Human Resources in the CF" Briefing by Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military) to Armed Forces Council, 5 September 2001.

solution, future naval units (static and mobile) will need to make use of technology to reduce manning levels."⁷⁷ The reduced manning levels will require new job analysis and design to determine the new skill and knowledge set required. In turn, occupation structures and, thus, organizational structures will be affected. Recruiting will then have to be altered to attract and select the new personnel required (external labour market). New training programs will have to be developed and existing personnel cross-trained (internal recruiting) or released (attrition). All these issues affect HR planning.

There is currently one issue related to release that has important HR planning implications for the CF, that is, the predicted high number of personnel reaching compulsory retirement age (CRA) in 2004/2005. The navy response to this retirement spike was to recommend that the navy be allowed to commence promotions above the rank ceilings in the years leading up to the CRA release spike, thus smoothing out promotion flow and not having to promote everybody in one year. However, in 2001, as part of the retention strategy, the CF response to the CRA release spike was to increase CRA to age 60. One effect of the change to CRA prior to the release spike year was to reduce the number of promotions available over the next few years. While retaining a few older personnel, the CF contributed to the dissatisfaction of younger personnel by reducing their chances of promotion. Lack of promotion prospects is one of the top-five reasons personnel leave the CF,⁷⁸ correlating exactly with results from the private sector.⁷⁹ The unintended outcome of this one HR policy amendment serves to again highlight the requirement to coordinate all HR policy amendments and analyze them against

⁷⁷ *Leadmark*, 140.

⁷⁸ C.D. Lucas, Contractor's Report 01-01, "Trend Analysis of Reasons People Seek Voluntary Release From the CF: Comparing Element, Gender, and First Official Language", (Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation, August 2001), i.

⁷⁹ Bratton and Gold, 172.

other components of the HRM framework. It is not suggested that the CF should not have amended the CRA, only that the full implications of the timing of implementation should have been analyzed. An implementation during the CRA spike year could have achieved the same positive results, while potentially avoiding the negative ones.

At the strategic level, an important aspect of the decision to change the CRA was an external factor, in this case, the requirement for CF HR policies to comply with federal legislation. The use of the CRA in the CF has been challenged based on age-discrimination. Merely changing the CRA does not remove the discriminatory factor. The best option to stop the discriminatory practice is to eliminate the CRA. As outlined by Martha Stouffer, the CF can obtain the desired result of providing a release gate late in a member's career by offering terms of service based on years served rather than by providing an Indefinite Period of Service to CRA.⁸⁰

The CRA issue serves to highlight an element of HR planning that is important and unique from a military perspective. The CF must factor in the effect of job design on the structure and long-term sustainability of an occupation, including such items as rank-to-rank ratios, sea/shore ratios, age distribution, terms of service (contract lengths), and promotion rates. Occupational structure issues serve to complicate an already complex HR planning process. In the CF, the three services have re-introduced the annual military occupation review (AMOR) process where long-term occupational health issues are briefed to senior management. However, no overall sponsor provides the review for the support occupations. An appropriate champion for the management of support occupations will be designated in conjunction with the stand-down and transfer of responsibilities of the CF Recruiting, Education and Training System (CFRETS). The lack of a support occupation champion to manage the long-term sustainability

⁸⁰ Martha Stouffer, Command and Staff Course Report, "A Human Resource Framework – Shaping the Workforce", (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2001), 9-12.

of support occupations since devolution of centralized NDHQ functions in 1994, has resulted in serious impact on the ability to field support personnel to operations, thus, directly impacting the operational capability of the CF.

Recommendation: Ensure that support occupations receive strategic long-term management in cooperation with the three employing services.

Criteria for Success: Support occupation champion conducts AMORs with environmental input.

3.5 Recruiting

Once HR planning is complete and personnel requirements are developed based on the balance of internal and external labour sources, these requirements are passed to the recruiters for action. Recruiting, thus, becomes an operational level HRM function. However, because of the strategic impact that recruiting outcomes have, recruiting straddles the line between strategic and operational level HRM. Recruiting should be provided strong strategic guidance and direction, especially with respect to legislative employment requirements. In addition, the recruiting outcomes must be closely monitored for feedback into the HR planning process. It has recently been demonstrated that lack of good recruiting results can place the CF in a position of not being able to effectively meet its operational commitments.

As previously identified, recruiting is a combination of attraction, selection and orientation. There is competition amongst all employers for the best and brightest available workers. The challenge that faces the CF with respect to attracting new recruits is also complicated by the ethnic make-up of our diverse society and by the attitude of today's youth; they are not seeking a career within one organization, they are brought up believing they will have several jobs over one career. Major Jeff Tasserson paints a potentially gloomy picture of

the future of the CF with respect to recruiting in today's demographics.⁸¹ He highlights the difficulties of recruiting for the military and states that there is a requirement "to adapt our organizational structures and military social mind-set to meet the expectations of the upcoming generation...[or] see the gradual dissolution of the military (at least in Canada)."⁸² Thus, the CF must determine what currently motivates the work force to work for an organization, especially one such as the military, and then develop an appropriate attraction campaign.

For the most part, the CF recruits for intake at the bottom and then trains personnel for increased responsibility. There is minimal recruiting at any but entry-level. In response to an Office of the Auditor General recommendation to shorten training requirements for recruits based on training, education and experienced gained in the private sector, the CF implemented the CF Military Equivalencies Program (CFMEP). Equivalencies granted through CFMEP for military qualifications allow recruits to bypass some occupation-specific training and advance more quickly in rank after they have completed orientation, the Basic Recruit Training course. However, "recruiting does nothing to address the immediate CF-wide deficiencies at the corporal, sergeant, warrant and junior officer level."⁸³ There is some ability for college graduates who enroll in certain occupations with diplomas in appropriate disciplines to become Acting Corporals, but non entry-level recruiting is generally limited. For officers, university graduates get accelerated to the rank of Lieutenant. The ability to enroll above the rank of Private/Lieutenant is otherwise limited to component transfer from the reserves, re-enrolment of previously serving regular force members, some internal occupation transfers and the potential to

⁸¹ Major Jeff Tasserson, "Military Manning and the Revolution in Social Affairs" in *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 2, No 3, (Kingston: RMC, Autumn 2001), 53-62.

⁸² Tasserson, 61.

⁸³ Ankerson and Tethong. The authors critically analyze the results of the survey on why people leave the CF.

recruit former members of other military forces, predominantly from Commonwealth nations, who migrate to Canada.

A concern with enrolment above the rank of Private/Lieutenant is the rank issue. Reservists who component transfer, foreign applicants, and ex-regulars who re-enroll generally desire the same rank they previously held. The CF policy is to grant a maximum rank on transfer or re-enrolment of Corporal or Captain, since these are the highest non-controlled ranks, those that are not promoted to based on merit. However, there is some interest in making transfer, re-enrolment or enrolment more attractive by assigning controlled ranks. This has the potential to affect the morale of those on the merit list who stayed in the regular force and earned their right to promotion. Adopting the 'one force' organization would partially resolve the issue in future by removing the transfer barriers and by allowing full-time members to move to part-time employment rather than release to pursue other options and try to re-enroll later. Until then, and to capture foreign transfers and any applicants wishing to enroll with skill sets normally associated with higher rank, a revised enrolment rank and/or pay policy is required to make transfer/re-enrolment/enrolment more attractive, while not affecting the morale of serving members.

Recommendation: Revise the enrolment rank and/or pay policies to make it more attractive to personnel to transfer, re-enroll or enroll in the CF with desired higher rank skill-sets.

Criteria for Success: The CF is attractive to potential applicants with higher than entry-level skill sets. Serving CF members are not disadvantaged.

Implementation of policies to effect the above recommendation is supported by Catano et al in their report, which states: “To become an ‘employer of choice’, the CF must change from recruiting people who need skill development to recruiting people who bring skills with them from the civilian workforce and develop compensation structures that will recognize and attract

valued skill sets or competencies from the civilian workforce.”⁸⁴ The Auditor General has also recommended that “the Department should consider all options, including recruiting experienced people into its higher ranks.”⁸⁵

With respect to officer recruiting, in an attempt to ensure the officer corps is recruited from the best and brightest, the CF requires aspiring officers to have a degree prior to commissioning. The Rowley Report of 1969 indicated that by drawing only from university graduates, the CF would be recruiting from the top fifteen percent of the military age Canadian population.⁸⁶ Accordingly, Don Macnamara states that given “the anticipated growth of university education in Canada ... virtually all officers should be drawn from university graduates to ensure an appropriate level of intellectual ability, not only for generals, but also throughout the officer corps.”⁸⁷ David Bercuson explains the requirement for officers to have a rich education, encompassing Canadian history and Canadian military history, along with philosophy, ethics and critical thinking.⁸⁸ However, his requirement is for officers to have such an education by the time they become general officers. This goes along with the original recommendation of the Officer Professional Development Working Group (OPDWG), in 1996, to require officers to have a degree for promotion to Col/Capt(N), not for commissioning. An educated officer corps refers to the ability to analyze information, communicate effectively, understand the bigger picture and provide advice, it does not mean every officer must hold a

⁸⁴ Catano et al, 48.

⁸⁵ Canada, Auditor General of Canada, *2002 Report of the Auditor General of Canada*, (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, April 2002) paragraph 5.86.

⁸⁶ Don Macnamara, “Intellectualism in the General Officer Corps”, in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral: Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, eds, (St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 493.

⁸⁷ Don Macnamara, “Intellectualism in the General Officer Corps”, 493.

⁸⁸ David J. Bercuson, 415-421.

degree.⁸⁹ What is at issue is not that the officer corps should be educated, but whether a degree is the only indication that one has intellect, and if the CF are going to require a degree, when it is required. The CF are prepared to accept an officer commissioned from the ranks without a degree, based on their previous training and experience. The CF are also prepared to accept high school graduates and pay their way through a four or five year degree before they have proven their ability or commitment to the CF. Yet, the CF are no longer prepared to accept high school graduates directly into officer occupation training, even though after seven to nine years of training and experience and proven commitment, the officer can be accredited for all but one year of a baccalaureate degree.⁹⁰

The enrolment of high school graduates under the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan (CEOTP) gives Canadian youth the opportunity to go directly into challenging training and a rewarding job while gaining invaluable leadership experience and earning accreditation towards a degree. The CEOTP program requires officers enrolling to complete, or make significant progress towards, a baccalaureate degree in order to be eligible for continued employment past their initial nine-year contract. The requirement for a degree for progression as an officer, vice commissioning as an officer, is more in line with the OPDWG's original recommendation. It is also interesting to note that during the navy's Naval Officer Selection Board (NOSB),⁹¹ there have been high school graduates who have scored better than university

⁸⁹ Dr R Gimblet, presentation to CSC 28, 30 January, 2002.

⁹⁰ The army, navy and air force all have programs in place with Canadian universities to accredit military training and experience and allow officers to complete a baccalaureate degree within one year.

⁹¹ The NOSB is run twice yearly to provide an opportunity for candidates who have successfully completed the recruiting screening process to get a realistic job preview of the navy. The NOSB also provides the navy with the opportunity to assess the candidates for potential to succeed in navy training. The NOSB has been validated as a better predictor of basic officer training and naval officer training success than the recruiting system selection process (See V. Catano, Working Paper 89-9, "Naval Officer Selection Board: Methods for Assessing Utility", (Willowdale: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, December 1989), iii; A.C. Okros et al, Working Paper 88-1, "An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Naval Officer Selection Board as a Predictor of Success on the Basic Officer Training Course", (Willowdale: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, July 1988), ii;

graduates on potential to succeed in the navy. The CF should continue the use of recruiting through the CEOTP for candidates who compete favourably against Direct Entry Officer (DEO) candidates, or to top up DEO recruiting shortages, while maintaining the degree for progression requirement inherent in the CEOTP commitment. The continued use of the CEOTP will ensure that the CF do not cut off a valuable source of officer candidates, who have the potential to become 'educated', especially during a period of recruiting difficulties. Strategically, the CF may desire an officer corps that represents the best and brightest, but requiring a degree for commissioning may not be the only method to achieve the goal. What is more important, strategically, is that the CF recruit and retain adequate professionally developed officers to achieve the CF' operational requirements and maintain the CF as a national strategic asset.

Recommendation: Continue the use of the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan in addition to the Direct Entry Officer plan.

Criteria for Success: The CF continues to meet its officer recruiting requirements. CEOTP candidates are selected in competition with DEO candidates and meet degree requirements for continued service as officers.

and J.P. Bradley, Working Paper90-7, "A Validation Study on the Naval Officer Assessment Board's Ability to Predict MARS Officer Training Success", (Willowdale: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, July 1990), iv, vi.).

4 Making the Model Work - Factors Affecting Strategic Human Resource Management in the Canadian Forces

Regardless of the source, once members are recruited, they are managed through their careers under the umbrella of the operational level components of the conceptual framework of HRM for the CF, that is, career development, appraisal, reward, remember, motivation, and discipline. The staff that develops and implements the personnel policies in each of these components must do so under the guidance of strategic direction from senior management that places HR alongside all other aspects of the CF.

In order to keep HR in the CF overall from facing the same problems that face the support occupations, the inability to effectively contribute to operational requirements, the CF must actively practice effective strategic HRM. To do so, senior HR managers must have a voice at the table every time senior management of the CF gets together to discuss or decide everything from strategic objectives to the conduct of operations.

Strategic HRM includes active involvement in the following:

- a. the definition of organizational objectives and goals,
- b. the determination of capability requirements,
- c. the determination of organizational structure,
- d. the definition and coordination of a HRM strategy and HR planning,
- e. the provision of strategic guidance to the operational HR managers for the development and implementation of policies in the operational components of the conceptual framework (recruiting, career development, appraisal, reward, remember, motivation, and discipline), and
- f. the assessment of outcomes for feedback to determine any requirement for changes to overall strategy, objectives, organizational structure, etc.

The HR strategy for the DND and CF, *HR 2020*, has not yet been released in response to *Strategy 2020*, even though *Into the 21st Century: Strategic HR Issues* was provided as input to *Strategy 2020*. An interim document, *People in Defence: Beyond 2000*, was eventually promulgated in May 2001, almost two years after *Strategy 2020*, while *HR 2020* is currently under review in draft form. Yet, without either of these critical guiding documents, *Officership 2020* and *NCMPD 2020* have been written. These latter two strategic guiding documents were themselves written after extensive effort had already been expended on updating NCM and officer professional development. Fortunately, the effort expended on improving professional development was validated by the *Officership Professional Development 2020* and *NCMPD 2020* projects. However, the ends do not justify the means. Strategy should be driven from the top down, not from the bottom up. The strategic guidance for the CF should clearly identify the vision of HRM and its importance and the vision should be integrated through all strategic level documents and capability requirements decisions.

Recommendation: Ensure that future strategic HRM direction is issued in a timely, comprehensive manner, encompassing all levels of strategic direction, so that HR managers do not work in a strategic guidance vacuum.

Criteria for Success: Future updates of *Strategy 2020* clearly articulate an integrated vision of HRM and stress leadership responsibilities. Updates of *HR 2020* are issued soon after updates of *Strategy 2020*.

The draft *HR 2020* presents “a strategy that provides human resources guidance across all planning horizons and is integrated with the strategic planning processes of the Canadian Forces”,⁹² and that there will be considerable HR input into *Strategy 2025*. With an integrated process having HRM input into strategic objectives and capability requirements, determining the

⁹² *HR 2020*, 24.

direction *Strategy 2025* will take should provide ADM (HR Mil) with the required notice to provide *HR 2025* soon after *Strategy 2025*.

Strategic HRM is a function of leadership and requires the commitment of top management. The 2001 QOL survey identified a significant lack of confidence of CF members in the senior leadership of the CF.⁹³ "People want good leadership...if the leadership is poor, people leave the organization."⁹⁴

"The most important characteristic is having HR policies that support a corporate culture giving the message that employees are valued. Management ardently believes the firm's people are its most important assets and treats them with respect. Continual training and humane treatment are the most effective policies to ensure that the best employees stay."⁹⁵

"At the same time, of course, Canadian Forces general officers must struggle against the desire of some political leaders to use the armed forces as a captive instrument of social or political change at the expense of military effectiveness."⁹⁶ Senior management must ensure that policy changes in response to legislation are done in accordance with the legislation and do not go beyond the intent of the legislation, unless it is for the benefit of the members and not for political reasons.

Part of the requirement for leadership involvement is to act decisively on issues. Taking the time to conduct multiple studies on issues delays implementation. As noted by the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change:

⁹³ Craig Dowden, Sponsor Research Project 01-13, "Quality of Life in the Canadian Forces: Results from the National Survey", (Ottawa: Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation, October 2001), ii.

⁹⁴ Ankerson and Tethong.

⁹⁵ Kossek and Block, 3.10.

⁹⁶ Bercuson, 413.

“We do not think this sends the right signal about determination and a sense of urgency to get on with the change program.”⁹⁷ “The Monitoring Committee therefore urges DND and the CF to give as much priority as possible to these strategic planning initiatives and to accelerate them so that clear and focused guidance will become available for all elements ... at an early date. The purpose and goals of the reform program must be articulated and communicated broadly, and its transition secured by repeated assurances by the top leadership of their commitment to it and their willingness to explain what it is for and how it is to be achieved.”⁹⁸

Recommendation: Leadership at all levels of the CF must fully endorse HRM.

Criteria for Success: HRM is seen by the members of the CF to be a key element of leadership at all levels.

As alluded to by the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change, key to demonstrating leadership attention to HRM is the need for good, timely internal communications. The draft *HR 2020* also stresses that “a continuous, effective internal communications network is established. ... We must continually improve the effectiveness of our internal communications strategy to ensure that all members are aware of HR issues.”⁹⁹ Not just HR issues need to be communicated to members. Any information concerning the CF that may impact a CF member should be communicated. Information should flow early and often and requires that senior management be personally involved to ensure that it gets to the members of the CF before it is heard through the media. The CF must also not assume that placing information on the intranet will ensure that CF members are informed. Important messages should be delivered more directly. Some personnel do not have the desire or the time to spend checking the intranet for updates. According to Bratton and Gold, “there should be a combination of written and face-to-face methods of communication used in an organization and a genuine effort on the part of managers to make the

⁹⁷ *Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change: Final Report – 1999*, 35.

⁹⁸ *Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change: Final Report – 1999*, 13.

⁹⁹ *HR 2020*, 17.

communication two-way.”¹⁰⁰ The information passed must also be consistent, that is, the same message must be given internally and externally.

Recommendation: Ensure CF members are provided with timely, consistent communications relating to issues in the CF affecting them.

Criteria for Success: CF members feel that they are fully informed of important CF issues that affect their lives.

In order to have effective strategic HRM, an organization must also have effective HR managers. According to David Ulrich, “HR professionals must become partners, players, and pioneers. They are more than just people who pass through and happen to be assigned to work in HR; they are theory-based, competency-driven experts who draw upon a body of knowledge to make informed business decisions.”¹⁰¹ However, Ulrich also states that HR is a function of both line managers and HR professionals. This merging of the HR and line manager functions is more fully described in the literature by other academics as the requirement for line managers to participate more in the daily management of HR and for HR managers to have a better understanding of the daily operations of the organization.

In the CF, the practice of line managers being involved in HR management has been ongoing for a long time. The navy has had a divisional system in place for many years and the army has its regimental system, while the air force has generally had an almost personal relationship between staff and management given the reliance of the officers flying the aircraft on the ground crew who ensure the airworthiness of the aircraft.

As for HR managers, there are two types in the CF. There are specialists, such as Personnel Selection Officers, Training Development Officers and health care, spiritual and legal experts. These officers provide input into HRM in their specialized areas of expertise. There are

¹⁰⁰ Bratton and Gold, 314.

¹⁰¹ Ulrich, viii.

also non-specialists, or HR ‘generalists’, who are line and support managers posted into HR positions to meet manning requirements and to increase their individual professional development. This posting methodology provides the CF with a pool of more flexibly employable personnel and ensures that they have the understanding of the operations of the organization identified as a requirement for good HR management. A possible disadvantage of the CF posting policy of moving personnel around frequently to broaden their professional development without adequate training in their new responsibilities and duties is that personnel may not develop expertise in any one area. The CF may be falling into Ulrich’s stereotype of people who just pass through, especially given that the CF posts personnel to HR functions without giving them any training in HRM. According to the findings of Catano et al:

“Individuals are placed into significant HR positions with little or no training and even less orientation that is necessary to meet the ongoing demands placed upon them. There is a well-entrenched belief that anyone who has served in an operations role can easily assume a role within the HR system without any training or orientation. These beliefs denote a lack of respect for the skills and knowledge that are required...”¹⁰²

The lack of any continued development also leads to personnel posted into senior positions without adequate knowledge of HRM theory and practice to effectively manage in their new area of responsibility. Catano et al continue the above quote by stating: “Compounding this lack of professional expertise is an unacceptable level of instability within the senior leadership cadre of the HR system. The HR system will not achieve a meaningful role in the strategic planning process with the current level of instability.”¹⁰³ If HR is going to be considered at the strategic table, then HR managers must be knowledgeable in both operations and HRM.

¹⁰² V. Catano et al, 35.

¹⁰³ V. Catano et al, 35.1

The Auditor General also criticized the CF for lack of professionally developed HRM personnel in the latest OAG report:

“We are concerned that few military personnel assigned to military human resource management have previous experience or training in human resource policies and practices. While there are opportunities available to take some human resource courses, the Canadian Forces would benefit by having a knowledgeable group, trained and experienced in managing the human resource changes needed over the long-term.”¹⁰⁴

The Auditor General then goes on to recommend that the CF consider “a human resource management occupation to ensure that it maintains the experience and expertise it needs to identify issues, develop policy, and implement changes over the long term.”¹⁰⁵ A HRM occupation recruited directly from the civilian population would not have the operational knowledge required of HR managers.

The use of secondary career fields would provide the CF with continuity of development in a HRM occupation, while providing operational knowledge and posting flexibility. With secondary career fields, personnel commence their careers in an operational occupation and gain operational experience. At a later point in their career, they are selected for development and employment as an HR professional. The US Army provides secondary career fields for officers in combat occupations. After the first five years in operational employment, the junior officer selects "a secondary area of military employment in addition to his or her dedicated primary specialization."¹⁰⁶ About two-thirds of officers stay in the operations career field, while the remainder are split between information operations, institutional support (including HRM) and operational support (acquisition and systems engineering). The officer spends his or her career in jobs divided between the primary occupation and secondary career field and has career

¹⁰⁴ 2002 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, paragraph 5.6.

¹⁰⁵ 2002 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, paragraph 5.83.

¹⁰⁶ Alexandrou et al, 57.

development and competes for promotion in the secondary area.¹⁰⁷ The benefits of this system are increased expertise of personnel employed in secondary fields and "more tactical assignments available to fully develop those officers who have specialized in 'operations'."¹⁰⁸

The use of secondary career allows the CF to continue its practice of posting line managers into HR billets. The "process is wise as it also helps develop officers for more senior appointments. Managed properly, it provides knowledgeable, accountable and enlightened leaders."¹⁰⁹ However, there is also a requirement for the CF to quickly put in place a process to select and develop 'generalist' HR personnel who have the operational perspective required and can complement the specialists. What the development of generalists in the CF requires, is continuity in out-of-MOC employment, such as provided through the use of secondary career fields, which benefit the member in being able to concentrate studies in one area. They also benefit the CF by providing HR staff who are well studied and experienced in HRM by the time they reach senior levels; thus, the CF avoids having senior officers posted into HRM billets with little or no HR background.¹¹⁰

Once selected to become HR managers, HRM personnel must be managed in the same manner as other personnel in the organization. Thus, no matter which method the CF uses to select personnel for employment in HRM, these personnel also require career development, reward, motivation etc. However, the critical element for HR managers is development. HR managers must be adequately trained and educated in strategic HRM theory and practice in order

¹⁰⁷ Alexandrou et al, 57.

¹⁰⁸ Alexandrou et al, 58.

¹⁰⁹ BGen J.J.C. Bouchard, *Improving Human Resource Management in the Canadian Forces: Developing the People Persons*, (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 05 June 2001), 23.

¹¹⁰ Bouchard, 24

for them to be effective. Their careers must be managed to ensure they also remain motivated, but above all, to ensure that they develop the expertise required by the CF.

Recommendation: Implement secondary career fields in the CF in order to properly develop HR generalists for senior positions.

Criteria for Success: Senior HR managers are selected from a pool of officers who have spent multiple postings in HRM positions.

The literature on the development of HR managers stresses the competencies required. Ulrich sees the HR professional as strategic partner, administrative expert, employee champion and change agent. To support these roles, Ulrich lists four competency domains: knowledge of business (strategy, finances and technology), knowledge of HRM, management of change (problem solving, creative thinking, build relationships, set agendas), and credibility (accurate, consistent, meet commitments, work well with others, confront appropriately, show integrity, think outside the box, maintain confidentiality, and listen to problems).¹¹¹ Kossek has a slightly different list: “global operating skills; business expertise; the ability to leverage technology; communications expertise; an employee champion; and change management capabilities.”¹¹² In a study of 314 member companies, The Conference Board “identified the following core competencies as essential to carrying out new roles and responsibilities:

- business savvy and acumen;
- HR leadership and coaching;
- conceptual and strategic thinking;
- broad human resource management expertise;
- consulting and advising;
- change agent;
- organizational development; and
- teambuilding.”¹¹³

¹¹¹ Ulrich, 251 – 254.

¹¹² Kossek, 3.25.

¹¹³ Louis S. Csoka, *Rethinking Human Resources: A Research Report*, Report Number 1124-95-RR, (New York: The Conference Board, 1995), 8.

The Officer General Specifications and NCM General Specifications are addressing some of these competencies in a broader context (non-HR focused), but there is still the requirement for HR generalists to receive training in some of the competencies once selected for employment in HR functions. As recommended by Catano et al: “The CF must create educational, training and qualification opportunities by which those placed in staff and/or management roles in the HR system have an understanding of HR principles and practices and have training in managing complex HR systems...”,¹¹⁴ including management of the LTCP(HR) process. The CF have commenced training programs for senior HR managers, but have not yet implemented training programs for personnel in lower levels of HRM. Even if secondary career fields are adopted in order to develop HR generalists, they will still require initial training and education when they first enter the field and continued upgrading as they increase in responsibility.

Recommendation: Implement HRM training and education programs for HR personnel at all levels to ensure they have the competencies required for initial and subsequent employment in the HRM field.

Criteria for Success: Personnel employed in the HR field have the competencies required for their job.

In order to determine which principles and practices require understanding by HR personnel, and which require change in the CF, Catano et al recommend benchmarking “be used as a strategic measurement tool to improve or confirm existing HR strategies, policies and practices, and to address perceived shortfalls...”.¹¹⁵ However, while benchmarking is valuable, it should be undertaken with caution. According to Ulrich,¹¹⁶ it is not always wise to adopt best practices. Best practices in organizations are situational and must be analyzed in context. What is best for one is not always best for all. Thus, in order to benchmark effectively, the CF must

¹¹⁴ Catano et al, 47.

¹¹⁵ Catano et al, 47.

¹¹⁶ Ulrich, 239.

continue to conduct an effective research and development (R&D) program into current/modern strategic HRM theory and practices, applying the CF context. The CF have commenced a benchmarking plan;¹¹⁷ however, the initial 141 benchmarking areas recommended by an external review have been re-reviewed and boiled down to only 18 items. While some of the reduction may be attributable to placing the benchmarks in a CF context, the CF should ensure that the full spectrum of strategic HRM principles and practices are reviewed. Once the benchmarking has been conducted, any decision to incorporate best practices into CF strategic HRM should affect the various components of the conceptual framework through strategic guidance and direction and through incorporation into the training and education programs for HR managers.

Recommendation: Continue R&D efforts into benchmarking across the full spectrum of strategic HRM principles and practices, ensuring that the benchmarks chosen are applicable in a CF context.

Criteria for success: R&D into modern strategic HRM principles and practices is funded and provides updated benchmarking data on practices applicable to the CF.


¹¹⁷ Memorandum 5000-28/1000-22-2 (DSHRC 4-2) 11 Dec 01, The CF Human Resources Benchmarking Plan.

5 Conclusion

The CF have received many recommendations for change in HRM and have produced good HRM initiatives; however, the recommendations and initiatives are not coordinated under a coherent HRM strategy. The CF also lack clear strategic direction regarding the place of HRM within the organization. The only strategic objective that senior officers surveyed identify as having a HR focus is to ‘become an employer of choice’.

In striving to become more effective strategic HR managers, including becoming an employer of choice, the CF should consider the best practices of other organizations. In this light, the HRM models from the private and public sectors, both Canadian and foreign, along with HRM models from other militaries are examined. These other models are compared and the components of strategic HRM applicable to the CF are identified in order to make a decision to adopt an existing model for use in analyzing the CF or to develop a new model. The components that are accepted for use in a model for the CF do not exactly match any existing model. Therefore, rather than select a model that does not fully match established CF requirements, a new model is developed. The CF is unique, different from the private sector and the Public Service; thus, it is not surprising that the development of a model of strategic HRM for the CF would not be a simple matter of adopting an existing model. The model developed is a conceptual framework that provides a visual representation of the important components of strategic HRM and their internal and external relationships. It forms the framework upon which further analysis is based and is summarized in figure 8.

Figure 8. Compressed Conceptual Framework of Strategic Human Resource Management in the Canadian Forces.



Human resource management has dimensions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The tactical level of HRM deals with the daily application of personnel policies, while the operational level of HRM deals with the development and implementation of personnel policies within guidance and direction provided from the strategic level. In attempting to remain at the strategic level, not all components of the new framework for strategic HRM in the CF are analyzed. Instead, the components of the new framework with the greatest strategic impact on HRM are used to analyze the CF for appropriateness against current principles from the literature. The remaining components, while having strategic dimensions, are more operational and must be managed within strategic guidance and direction. Where deficiencies or weaknesses in CF strategic HRM are ascertained, recommendations for improvements are provided. The recommendations are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5: Summary of Recommendations

Section	Recommendation	Criteria for Success
1.2 Strategic HRM	Widely promulgate the HR principles and ensure leaders at all levels understand the meaning, purpose and application of the principles.	HR managers at all levels are confident that they can make a HRM decision that will prove acceptable to the management of the CF.
3.1 Outcomes	Ensure all proposed amendments to HRM policies are assessed for impact on the critical outcome of ability of the CF to meet operational requirements.	Operational capabilities are not adversely affected by amendments to HRM policies.
3.2 Organization Structure	Ensure the LTCP(HR) has visibility outside ADM(HR-Mil) and is at the top of the CF LTCP as a reflection of its number one priority status in Defence Plan 2001 and the CDS Message to Commanding Officers.	The LTCP(HR) is merged with the CF LTCP with HR issues as top priority.
3.2 Organization Structure	Review the Total Force concept with a view to eliminating regular/reserve distinctions by implementing a CF of 90,000 personnel on either full-time or part-time service.	All administrative barriers between full-time and part-time service are removed.
3.3 Capability Requirements	Ensure that HR considerations are fully integrated into determining future capability requirements.	Future capability requirement decisions fully reflect HR considerations.
3.4 HR Planning	Ensure that support occupations receive strategic long-term management in cooperation with the three employing services.	Support occupation champion conducts AMORs with environmental input.
3.5 Recruiting	Revise the enrolment rank and/or pay policies to make it more attractive to personnel to transfer, re-enroll or enroll in the CF with desired higher rank skill-sets.	The CF is attractive to potential applicants with higher than entry-level skill sets. Serving CF members are not disadvantaged.
3.5 Recruiting	Continue the use of the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan in addition to the Direct Entry Officer plan.	The CF continues to meet its officer recruiting requirements. CEOTP candidates are selected in competition with DEO candidates and meet degree requirements for continued service as officers.

4. Factors Affecting Strategic HRM	Ensure that future strategic HRM direction is issued in a timely, comprehensive manner, encompassing all levels of strategic direction, so that HR managers do not work in a strategic guidance vacuum.	Future updates of <i>Strategy 2020</i> clearly articulate an integrated vision of HRM and stress leadership responsibilities. Updates of <i>HR 2020</i> are issued soon after updates of <i>Strategy 2020</i> .
4. Factors Affecting Strategic HRM	Leadership at all levels of the CF must fully endorse HRM.	HRM is seen by the members of the CF to be a key element of leadership at all levels.
4. Factors Affecting Strategic HRM	Ensure CF members are provided with timely, consistent communications relating to issues in the CF affecting them.	CF members feel that they are fully informed of important CF issues that affect their lives.
4. Factors Affecting Strategic HRM	Implement secondary career fields in the CF in order to properly develop HR generalists for senior positions.	Senior HR managers are selected from a pool of officers who have spent multiple postings in HRM positions.
4. Factors Affecting Strategic HRM	Implement HRM training and education programs for HR personnel at all levels to ensure they have the competencies required for initial and subsequent employment in the HRM field.	Personnel employed in the HR field have the competencies required for their jobs.
4. Factors Affecting Strategic HRM	Continue R&D efforts into benchmarking across the full spectrum of strategic HRM principles and practices, ensuring that the benchmarks chosen are applicable in a CF context.	R&D into modern strategic HRM principles and practices is funded and provides updated benchmarking data on practices applicable to the CF.

In order to achieve the recommendations, the CF require HR managers who are properly selected and developed to undertake the HRM role. It is only through a well thought out career development structure for HR managers that the CF will develop senior HR management adequately prepared to practice strategic HRM. In addition, the CF should conduct benchmarking to determine the best practices of other organizations. However, the benchmarking must take the situational context of the other organizations into account. The best method for the CF to properly conduct benchmarking is to continually conduct R&D into HRM theory and practices. Once determined from a CF context, the principles and practices should

then be used to update the development of HR managers and the strategic guidance and direction to the operational level HRM.

To become strategic, HRM must be taken beyond day-to-day management of issues to becoming involved in the highest levels of management decisions. Strategic objectives for the DND and CF must be developed with HR considerations integrated. Capability requirements must then also be determined with HR as a prominent factor. The CF must also look at its organizational structure to determine if it matches the stated capability requirements and supports a HRM strategy. The HRM strategy must include coordination of all HRM initiatives and must ensure that there are no unintended outcomes. The outcomes must continually be assessed for feedback at the strategic level.

"The long-term implications to force planning of the human resource component deserve special attention, particularly in a strategic-level document... While financial and materiel resources can be defined in terms of how they are acquired, prioritized, allocated and consumed, people cannot, and will no longer be so easily quantified."¹¹⁸

The above quote, written as part of the navy's strategy for 2020, summarizes the issue facing the entire CF. The senior management of the navy acknowledges the requirement to focus on HR, but the issues raised are just as applicable to all elements of the CF. For the CF to survive as a national strategic asset, HRM must become more strategic. As stated by the Minister in the conclusion of his *Report to the PM*: "For the military to perform effectively, they must keep pace with the changes taking place around them. This is obvious in terms of technology; it is no less true of people..."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ *Leadmark*, 139/140.

¹¹⁹ *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, 38.

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