

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards.

As per the [Communications Policy of the Government of Canada](#), you can request alternate formats on the "[Contact Us](#)" page.

Information archivée dans le Web

Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n'a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s'appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada.

Conformément à la [Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada](#), vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « [Contactez-nous](#) ».

Aligning the CF with government policy

Major Vaughn Cosman
CSC 28

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	2
NATIONAL GOALS, SOVEREIGNTY, AND FOREIGN POLICY.....	6
NATIONAL GOALS.....	6
SOVEREIGNTY	10
FOREIGN POLICY.....	14
DEFENCE POLICY	19
CANADIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS	26
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS.....	26
THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS AND THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE	31
RWANDA.....	36
ZAIRE.....	39
THE NATURE OF WAR AND MILITARY TRENDS	44
CAUSES OF WAR	44
GLOBAL MILITARY TRENDS	48
INTEROPERABILITY	54
ALLIANCES	55
SOVEREIGNTY AND STATEHOOD	58
THE NEXT TWO DECADES	60
SOVEREIGNTY	61
FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY IMPERATIVES	64
DEFENCE PLANNING	65
OPTIONS.....	67
CONCLUSION	80
BIBLIOGRAPHY	83

Introduction

Canada has an enviable position of being largely immune from attack by reason of geography and neighbours. Since the War of 1812, defence has occupied a low priority on the Federal Government's agenda. Canadian popular mythology is that Canada is not a war-like nation. Instead, Canadians think of themselves as friendly and accommodating, taking great pride in undertaking roles as peacemakers and peacekeepers to the world. Yet the world doesn't necessarily view Canada in that light, nor does it even consider Canada in many scenarios: even by Canada's own metrics the nation matters little to most of the world.¹

For the first half of this country's existence, Canada's only significant ties were with Great Britain and the US; the rest of the world didn't matter. In the latter half of this century, however, Canada assumed an important role as an intermediary between both opposing and allied forces: between major and minor powers, between ideologically opposed forces, and between combatants around the world. The benefits to Canada of such international participation have been immense, but such engagement is not without cost; a country must invest resources, arms, and blood to realize the returns of prosperity, security, and peace.

Canada has embraced foreign and defence policies which have each been remarkably consistent over the past half century. Throughout, strong internationalist positions are coupled with national economic well-being in foreign policy, and sovereignty in defence

¹ Michelle Hibler and Anne Chevalier, editors. Canadian Development Report 2000. (Ottawa: The North South Institute, Renouf Publishing Inc. 2000) 84-87.

policy. The consistency in foreign and defence policies is so strong that even with the end of the Cold War, no significant change occurred in either. Study of the policies provides an indication of what foreign and defence policies are likely to be for the next two decades.

The change in Canadian military capability since World War II is graphically illustrated in a comparison of Canadian military operations between mid- and end-century: specifically, Canadian participation in the Suez crisis of 1956, and Canadian participation in Rwanda and Zaire in 1994 and 1996, respectively. Canadian statesmanship and military capability was unquestioned in 1956, but in 1996 Canada had not the military resources even to conduct surveillance to independently support its position for action in Zaire. Canadian efforts to attract allies for the proposed mission in Zaire were also unsuccessful; neither Canadian diplomacy nor Canadian military credibility were sufficient guarantors.

The Canadian Government must adjust to an emerging reality. Conflict, and the military forces involved, are evolving. The Canadian Forces must evolve as well, to meet new threats, to improve operations in support of sovereignty, and to maintain the capability to operate in coalitions with close allies. If Canada wishes to influence events internationally, Canada must develop and employ appropriate tools – one of which is an effective military force. Should Canada fail to choose to this approach, Canada must accept marginalization and consequent inability to direct or sway international events in support of national goals and objectives.

Ideally, national goals and objectives beget foreign policy, which in turn begets defence policy, which in turn determines the funding, structure and activities of the Canadian Forces. In practice, national goals and vision are not clear, foreign and defence policies are not symbiotic in nature, and funding of the triad of foreign policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Canadian Forces (CF), has been cut dramatically since 1993. The CF are a significant instrument of Canadian foreign policy, but the CF cannot continue at the current level of support.

Canada is once again at a crossroads, and must choose between greater participation in international affairs but at greater cost, or remain within current funding levels but retreat from the international arena. A review of Canadian foreign and defence policy and national progress since WWII suggests Canada should choose greater participation. From the perspective of the CF, the current policy of sending formed units to operate under another nation's command supports neither national sovereignty nor foreign and defence policy objectives. The CF should develop the resources to operate autonomously, albeit within the framework of a coalition if appropriate, either as leader of the coalition or as a participant, but not relinquishing operational control to another organization at the expense of national goals. Canada will accede to a position of influence in international affairs, able to influence the outcome of events in support of national goals and foreign policy, by investing in the CF, CIDA, and DFAIT.

Only by aligning CF force structure with CF doctrine, actively pursuing participation in operations and exercises in theatres of interest to demonstrate capability and resolve, and by establishing a visible and credible presence domestically through monitoring and control of activities, will the CF be able to carry out its assigned missions. This can be demonstrated by reviewing Canadian national goals, foreign policy, and defence policy over the past decades in an effort to identify trends or consistent themes. The degree to which the CF supports or contributes to national aims and policies can be qualitatively estimated by comparing the ability of Canada to influence events related to military operations mid- and end- 21st century. Examining the nature of conflict, and military trends will provide some insight into the likely nature of conflict over the next two decades, perhaps the maximum length of time over which to forecast events. Finally, a comparison of options in light of the earlier findings will yield support for substantially increasing funding of the CF.

National Goals, Sovereignty, and Foreign Policy

National Goals

In 2002, Canadians find themselves in an unsettlingly different world from just ten years ago. The institutions which for half a century have defined the country are now in a state of serious decline: public health care is under siege; the expansion of the Canadian Parks system and commitment to environmental objectives has stagnated; and the CFare unable to undertake more than token military operations abroad, whether in support of alliance or coalition efforts or in peacemaking and peacekeeping missions. The Canadian dollar has been battered and fallen to an all time low relative to the U.S. dollar. Despite these setbacks, Canada continues to be ranked by the UN as one of the best places in the world to live.² Canada continues to have an abundant supply of resources, including fresh water and territory, and the Canadian military continues to serve the nation as best it can, fielded by the government to conduct both national and international missions. Canada, relative to the world, remains a safe, clean, stable, prosperous nation. It falls largely to the Federal Government to address the issues facing the nation; to preserve and promote the best of Canada; and to discard, replace, or rebuild those aspects of Canada in need of attention.

² “Human Development Indicators” Human Development Report 2001 Making Technologies Work for Human Development. (New York: <http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/> downloaded 15 Apr 02). Currently Canada is ranked number 3, after Australia (2) and Norway (1).

Canada has no clearly articulated national goals or vision for the long term. Canadians were often told, “the 20th Century belonged to Canada,”³ but current prognostications make no such claim for the next century. There is no single Federal Government publication that delineates the Canada of the 22nd Century or a strategy to move the nation to that goal. However, there are short-term statements, and some conclusions regarding national goals and objectives may be drawn from the Federal Government’s actions.

The Federal Government has produced “The Canadian Way in the 21st Century”⁴, which is “an opportunity ... to articulate Canada’s strategy to achieve the highest quality of life for Canadians in the new global economy and to promote our values internationally; and, second, to raise questions about our shared challenges and our choices for the future”. In this paper a “distinct Canadian model” for pursuit of the “Third Way”⁵ is described, and a list of 17 descriptors of Canada is identified. The military is not part of any of these, although it is implicated in the third (a strong, vibrant economy) and seventeenth (a coherent international agenda).

In the text of the statement, Canadian domestic policies revolve around “fiscal sovereignty”. Freedom from oppressive national debt would present choices not

³ Attributed by various sources to Sir Wilfred Laurier, 1900.

⁴ The Canadian Way in the 21st Century. For presentation "Progressive Governance for the 21st Century", Berlin, 2-3 Jun 2000. (Ottawa: http://pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=keyinitiatives&Sub=thecanadianwayinthestcen&Doc=thecanadianwayinthestcen_e.htm, downloaded 17 Jan 02) .

⁵ The Canadian Way in the 21st Century (Ottawa: http://pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=keyinitiatives&Sub=thecanadianwayinthestcen&Doc=thecanadianwayinthestcen_e.htm downloaded 17 Jan 02). “the Third Way is an approach to governance that stresses technological innovation, a mixed economy, and education as the keys to economic opportunity and security.”

currently available to the government, ranging from diminishing the tax burden on Canadians to restoration or resumption of dormant national programmes. Therefore, the government has de facto established the reduction of the national debt as its number one priority. Nearly all federal programmes, including national defence, CIDA, and foreign affairs, have seen their budgets reduced dramatically since 1993.⁶ Canadian foreign policy is described as the mirror image of domestic policy, and linked to stability, trade, and a rules-based international system. The only direct military role identified is “Canada continues to play a disproportionate role in conflict avoidance, peacekeeping and peace-building.”⁷ There is no direct reference to sovereignty as there was in the 1968 White Paper “Foreign Policy for Canadians”, which listed only six national aims (“sovereignty and independence” appearing in the second three).⁸

Amplification of the Government’s national aims and objectives exists in the Liberal Party’s pamphlet “Opportunity for All – The Liberal Plan for the Future of Canada”.⁹ The Liberal Party has formed the Federal Government for the past ten years, and this third edition of the “Little Red Book” specifies the actions proposed by the Liberal Party during this term. In lockstep with the Government paper, the Party paper identifies reduction of the national debt as the highest and overriding priority. However, it goes one step further than the government document in that “Canada in the 21st Century” identifies net public debt as dropping to 50% by 2004, but the Little Red Book

⁶ Canada’s Fiscal Progress Through 2000 – 2001, Budget 2001 - Budget Plan. (Ottawa: <http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget01/bp/bpch3e.htm#fp2>, downloaded 17 Mar 02). See Bullet # 6, Highlights, Chapter 3.

⁷ The Canadian Way in the 21st Century.

⁸ Allan Gotlieb and Charles Dalfen. “The Changing Focus of Canadian Foreign Policy”. American Journal of International Law. Vol 67 (2) Apr. 1973: 230.

⁹ Opportunity for All – The Liberal Plan for the Future of Canada. (Ottawa: <http://www.liberal.ca/lpc/common.asp?language=eng&pageview=platform&origin=index> downloaded 15 Apr 02).

plans to decrease the “debt to GDP ratio to about 40% by 2005.”¹⁰ The Little Red Book identifies foreign policy as continuing to be based on Canada’s tradition of international leadership, strengthening multilateral organizations, and pursuing “good governance, democracy, and human security”, and further states that “government will continue to ensure that the Canadian Forces are properly equipped and prepared to respond quickly to calls for help at home and abroad.”¹¹

If the government were to change, would Canadian national goals change? The other parties sitting in Parliament, in their published policy statements^{12,13, 14, 15} do not vary substantially in their proposals but for the BQ¹⁶. Differences lie principally in emphasis or priority, but in all cases domestic policy generally remains focused on fiscal responsibility and foreign policy on multilateralism and peacekeeping. Some proposals, such as increasing the economic exclusion zone beyond 200 nautical miles to include that part of the continental shelf which is outside the 200 nautical mile limit (such as the Nose and Tail of the Banks and the Flemish Cap)¹⁷, or the somewhat more isolationist perspectives of the Canadian Alliance and New Democratic Party could impact upon Canadian military tasking levels and priorities over a period of time. However, in the short term, there would be evolutionary change, not revolutionary, in Canadian national objectives and even in the consequential plans to achieve them.

¹⁰ Opportunity for All, 4.

¹¹ Opportunity for All, 29.

¹² Election 2000 Platform (Ottawa: <http://www.pcparty.ca> downloaded 17 Jan 02).

¹³ Declaration of Policy January 2000. (Ottawa: <http://www.canadianalliance.ca> downloaded 17 Jan 02).

¹⁴ New Democratic Party. (Ottawa: <http://www.ndp.ca> downloaded 17 Jan 02).

¹⁵ Le Quebec Gagne a Voter Bloc. (Montreal : <http://www.blocquebecois.org/> downloaded 17 Jan 02).

¹⁶ The BQ’s avowed aim is to establish a sovereign Quebec, after which it states the party has no reason to exist. No statement regarding Canadian domestic or foreign policy, nor defence, exists in their pamphlet.

¹⁷ Election 2000 Platform 21.

The Canadian Forces influence a wide range of Canadian national goals. Symbolically and pragmatically, the Canadian Forces are a national unifying force,¹⁸ a source of national pride and heroes. On a more pragmatic note, equipping and basing the Canadian Forces supports regional economies and research and development objectives. However, these impacts are collateral benefits from the Canadian Forces, not primary tasks or missions. The Canadian Forces directly supports Canadian national aims, goals, and policies in three arenas:

- a. sovereignty (domestic issues);
- b. foreign policy; and
- c. defence policy.

Sovereignty

Implicit in the existence of a nation is the desire for sovereignty: states that relinquish sovereignty cease to exist. Not an end in itself, rather, sovereignty is a means to an end: the end being the attainment of the goals and objectives of the sovereign state. Nonetheless, without sovereignty, the state cannot effect its policy, therefore the first, though perhaps not most important, goal of any nation must be sovereignty. Having achieved sovereignty, a state can then progress towards attainment of other, more important goals.

¹⁸ Department of National Defence 2001-2002 Report on Plans and Priorities. (Ottawa: http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/dfppc/pubs/rpp01/intro_e.asp, 2001) 1.

Since Gen Middleton was dispatched to quell the NorthWest Rebellion in 1885, the Canadian Forces have been called upon to establish or maintain Canadian. The Canadian Forces responded immediately to domestic emergencies ranging from patrolling the streets of Montreal in 1970 to building dykes in Winnipeg and surveying infrastructure damage or shoveling snow. The Canadian Forces have also responded to direct threats to Canadian sovereignty including the “Turbot War” of 1995 and incursions or potential incursions into Canadian territory, territorial waters, and airspace. Sovereignty must be earned, and defended: “... history has not granted the people of Canada, or of any country, the unequivocal “right” ... even to exist at all.”¹⁹

The Federal Government defined sovereignty as “ensuring that, within our area of jurisdiction, Canadian law is respected and enforced.”²⁰ Sovereignty is the supreme power or authority of the state over a population and/or a territory. The establishment of authority increasingly has its legitimacy in the modern democratic, electoral state. A recent Freedom House survey states that 40.7% of the world’s population, the highest proportion ever, now lives in “free societies” and that from 1988-1989 to 1999-2000, the number of electoral democracies increased from 69 to 120²¹. Stein notes that, “the rights to free elections and participation in public affairs are becoming – or have already

¹⁹ Jack Mintz. “Global Economy Offers Canada’s Best Bet.” Canadian Speeches. V15(2) May/June 01 (CBCA 21 Jan 02): 2.

²⁰ 1994 Defence White Paper. Reprinted in Doug Bland’s Canada’s National Defence. Vol I Defence Policy, 2 vols. (Kingston, ON: Queen’s University School of Policy Studies, 1997) 314.

²¹ Democracy’s Century - A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century. (Washington: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html> downloaded 17 Jan 02).

become – part of the cluster of basic rights protected by general international law.”²²

Although sovereignty is legitimized in popular elections, it must be maintained by a state.

The maintenance of sovereignty over a particular community or territory presumes the ability to monitor and control activities within claimed territories; to respond to emergencies such as aircraft crashes in the High Arctic; to respond to environmental emergencies on coastlines; and to actively enforce national laws, whether challenged or not. Abrogation of these responsibilities is tantamount to the abandonment of sovereignty.

In Canada, sovereignty is sub-divided into many categories that evolve and change largely with public perception. Fiscal and cultural sovereignty enjoy considerable attention at this time. Fiscal sovereignty permits economic choice, or selection from options in the face of a challenge, hence a definition of sovereignty as the power to choose. Cultural sovereignty is “the country's attempt to protect, preserve and promote Canadian culture, particularly in the face of the overwhelming cultural presence of the United States.”²³ Other sub-categories include, for example, Arctic sovereignty. While these categories have little or no basis in legal terms, politically they have value. Copeland observes “The highest authority is the court of public opinion, where image is everything.”²⁴ In spite of the absence of any mention of sovereignty in the current policy

²² Eric Stein. “International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight”. American Journal of International Law. Vol 95(3) Jul 2001: 490.

²³ “Cultural Sovereignty”. (Ottawa: <http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/issues/cultural/> downloaded 26 Jan 02).

²⁴ Darryl Copeland. “Hard reality, soft power: Canadian foreign policy in the era of globalization” Behind the Headlines v.55(4) Summ’98: 2-4.

statements of the Federal Government as a whole, it is clearly important at the level of Federal departments.

The most recent Department of National Defence White Paper,²⁵ identifies the protection of sovereignty as the most important defence mission, and this position of primacy is retained through to current defence planning.²⁶ Despite the absence of a clear military threat²⁷ to Canadian sovereignty, sovereignty is identified by DND as the most important mission. Paradoxically, the Canadian Government statement of 1995, Canada in the World, ignores sovereignty, and states instead “... today, direct threats to Canada’s territory are diminished, the Government considers it necessary to maintain a military capability appropriate to this still uncertain and evolving international environment. However, we are making adjustments within that capability to enhance our ability to contain conflict.”²⁸ Given that the government does not perceive threats to sovereignty as important enough to make sovereignty a stated national aim or priority, it is curious that sovereignty is ranked so highly within departmental priorities. On the other hand, Canada in the World also notes that national sovereignty has become wedded to foreign policy: “... Canada is not an island able to resist a world community...”²⁹ The government further notes that “borders have become more porous to the flow of ideas, people and capital. This has diminished the ability of states to act independently since they can no longer isolate themselves from the world without unacceptable domestic

²⁵ 1994 White Paper on Defence. (Ottawa: http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/pol_docs/94wp/white_paper_94.html, 1994).

²⁶ Defence Plan 2001. (Ottawa: http://www.vcds.forces.ca/dgsp/dplan/intro_e.asp downloaded 11 Mar 02): 2-1, paras 201, 202.

²⁷ Not necessarily a threat by a military force, but a threat for which an effective counter is military action.

²⁸ Canada in the World: Government Statement. (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995) 24.

consequences. However, especially for smaller and medium-sized countries, sovereignty has also been enhanced since the growing number of international rules on security, trade and other matters better protects states from arbitrary and unilateral action by other international actors.”³⁰ Further, as Jack Mintz observes,

“Fear of loss of sovereignty is said to drive opposition to globalization.

But isolated sovereignty leads to poverty and national impotence. The

best chance to increase Canada’s strength as a nation, the prosperity of

all its people, and the influence it has in the world, is said to lie in a

wholehearted embrace of globalization.”

retrenchment and withdrawing from full international participation.³³ However, Canadian prosperity is reliant upon trade and a stable international system. Ethical considerations aside, Canada has clear pragmatic motivation to be able to influence international perspectives and events. “Only states with clear objectives, acting on a strong domestic consensus, will be able to deploy significant influence and play an effective role in this new world.”³⁴

Canada has, at least since the end of the Second World War, seen itself as a “Middle Power”: tacit recognition that although the nation played an important role in WWII, it is not a “Great Power”. A “Middle Power” may be defined in terms of economic and/or military size and strength, or it may be defined in terms of the influence the country exerts in the world. Roussel describes a Middle Power as

“a state which has significant international and global interests and defends them by adopting a security and foreign policy style distinct from that of the Great Powers. Among other things, this policy style includes the pursuit of policies which seek to promote stability in the international system, a tendency towards specialization, a role centred on mediation, conciliation, and coalition-building, and a sustained commitment to multilateral institutions.”³⁵

³³ Kim R. Nossal. “Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of “Good International Citizenship” in Canadian Foreign Policy”. *International Journal* v. 54(1) Winter 98/99 (CBCA 21 Jan 02) 8.

³⁴ *Canada in the World*: 4.

³⁵ Stephane Roussel and Charles-Philippe David. “Middle power blues: Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War”. *American Review of Canadian Studies*. V.28(1/2) Spr/Summ’98 (CBCA 21 Jan 02) 3.

During the first half of the Cold War, Canada was able to establish itself as a peacekeeping and mediating nation, which, though loyal to its greatest and closest ally, the United States, followed a separate, humanitarian high road in international affairs.³⁶ Canada's foreign policy was "structured loosely around the notions of Pearsonian Internationalism – honest broker, helpful fixer, boy scout to the world..."³⁷ However, economic considerations led the country to review foreign and defence policies in the 1970s. In 1973, Gotlieb and Dalfen stated "Under the new foreign policy, the stress would be on national self-interest and the development of national goals which would reflect this self-interest."³⁸ In 1999, Kim R. Nossal observed "... we are losing the voluntarist element that so marked Canadian internationalism in an earlier era: acts of 'good international citizenship' – whether leading the way in development assistance or maintaining the capacity to pursue a robust policy in zones of conflict – are no longer valued as much as they once were."³⁹ In both instances, Canada placed a higher priority on domestic economic issues. However, Nossal also notes "...the will to be internationalist remains as strong as it was in the 1950s; only the ability is lacking and that will change when the Federal Government puts its political and fiscal houses in order ... selective internationalism is the order of the day."⁴⁰ The return to a more prosperous economy as a result of wrestling the national debt to the ground may well bring about a return to active internationalism on Canada's part.

³⁶ Stephane Roussel and Charles-Philippe David: 5.

³⁷ Darryl Copeland. "Hard reality, soft power: Canadian foreign policy in the era of globalization". Behind the Headlines. V.55(4) Summer 98 (CBCA 21 Jan 02) 2.

³⁸ Allan Gotlieb and Charles Dalfen. "National Jurisdiction and International Responsibility: New Canadian Approaches to International Law". American Journal of International Law. Vol 67(2) Apr 1973 (JSTOR 21 Jan 02) 230.

³⁹ Kim R. Nossal. "Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of "Good International Citizenship" in Canadian Foreign Policy". International Journal v. 54(1) Winter 98/99 (CBCA 21 Jan 02) 8.

Or will it? The emergence of new Great Powers and a changing world order may force Canada to either accept a minor role or take the next step up on the international stage. Roussel and David observe “The changes in the international system are such that the stature of Middle Powers can be expected to decline and lose much of its lustre in the years to come. This trend is already discernible and may be explained by the combination of a number of factors which are acting to erode Middle Power influence.”⁴¹ While the government insists “There is consensus that such a broader orientation can best be achieved – at least cost, and to best effect – through approaches that broaden the response to security issues beyond military options and focus on promoting international cooperation, building stability and on preventing conflict”⁴² academia disagrees. As Kim R. Nossal points out

“... the ability of Canadians to get the world to “want what we want” simply does not measure up to the comparable ability of Americans to get their way in the world. ... soft power ... seems little more than an elaborate justification for not spending more on so-called ‘hard’ power resources, such as well-equipped military forces, well-endowed intelligence services, and a diplomatic service that is not constantly being downsized and reorganized.”⁴³

⁴⁰ Kim R. Nossal. “Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of “Good International Citizenship” in Canadian Foreign Policy”. *International Journal* v. 54(1) Winter 98/99 (CBCA 21 Jan 02) 2.

⁴¹ Stephane Roussel and Charles-Philippe David: 2.

⁴² *Canada in the World*: 25.

⁴³ Kim R. Nossal: 3.

The Great Powers, including the US, are adopting behaviours and strategies which once were typical of the Middle Powers. Where once Canada lead peacekeeping forces into the Suez,⁴⁴ now Great Britain leads the International Stabilization Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Canada attempted to reassert itself in this arena in Zaire/Rwanda in 1996. “As a result of its leadership role, Canada was asked to chair the International Steering Group set up by the main contributors to the operation. However, the limits of Ottawa’s leadership soon became apparent. Without the means to determine the number of refugees or to track their movements, the government became embroiled in a battle of figures ... and it [the multinational force and UN effort] was finally cancelled on 13 December 1996.”⁴⁵ Canada has been firmly marginalized, in part by the Great Powers usurping the roles of the Middle Powers, and in part by Canada’s own retreat from assertive, proactive foreign policy. “Never since the 1930’s has Canada’s international presence seemed so wan, so self-enfeebled, so marginal.”⁴⁶

Canada continues to support and emphasize multi-lateral organizations. The Federal Government identifies ten organizations regulating trade, economy, or finance in “Canada in the World”, in rough order of priority, starting with NAFTA.⁴⁷ The Federal Government also identifies the UN and NATO in “Canada in the World”, but notes shortcomings in each organization⁴⁸. Canada participated in coalitions, fighting in the Gulf War and seeking out a role in counter-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, but at a

⁴⁴ Evan Potter. “V. 1956 - The Suez Crisis and the Peacekeeping Debut” (Ottawa: http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/med/class/teamedia/peace/part1/p1_11.htm downloaded 29 Jan 02).

⁴⁵ Stephane Roussel and Charles-Philippe David: 11.

⁴⁶ Kim R. Nossal: 3.

⁴⁷ Canada in the World: 14.

⁴⁸ Canada in the World: 27 (UN), 30 (NATO).

relatively minor level.⁴⁹ As the UN General Assembly becomes even less credible in the eyes of the Western powers,⁵⁰ the UN Security Council becomes ever more important to the West as guaranteeing legitimacy for their actions. However, that legitimacy can be granted retroactively, as the U.S. is clearly prepared to act unilaterally (Enduring Freedom) in advance of UNSC endorsement. The U.S. also has a clear preference for Coalition operations, in which the members of the coalition agree upon the terms of the operation when they join, avoiding situations where a single member of a large alliance can delay or detour the action of the entire alliance. It is likely that the U.S. will continue to operate as a coalition leader, possibly seeking legitimacy from other organizations such as the UN or NATO. To participate, Canada must be prepared to operate within the coalition. If Canada attempts to undermine the US's objectives once committed to an operation, Canada could face marginalization within the operation, and diminished prospects of subsequent participation.⁵¹

Defence Policy

Douglas Bland identifies five “white papers” on defence issued by the Canadian Government since World War II.⁵² All five white papers share three principal thrusts, though they are expressed somewhat differently:

⁴⁹ Darryl Copeland: 2.

⁵⁰ Julian Harston. “Responding to Crises; are Current Policies and Practices the Answer?” Policy Options, March 2001, <http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/po0301.htm>: 52.

⁵¹ Daniel Leblanc. “Canada defies U.S. on PoWs.” <http://globeandmail.com/> January 17, 2002: A1. With reports from Canadian Press, Agence France-Presse and Reuters Thursday. Downloaded 29 Jan 02.

⁵² Douglas Bland. Canada's National Defence Volume I: Defence Policy.

- a. all five identify sovereignty, or threats to Canada by aggression;
- b. all five identify participation in coalitions or alliances as essential military capabilities; and
- c. all five imply or state outright, a rejection of isolationism.

The international and domestic environments of the five papers all varied considerably. Brooke Claxton's "Canada's Defence" (1947) was written when Canada was in possession of very large armed forces, and the government of Mackenzie King "was determined to demobilize the nation and to reintegrate members of the services into the civilian community without dislocating the country or sparking a recession as had happened after the First World War."⁵³ Paul Hellyer's "White Paper on Defence" (1964) followed the Korean War, the Suez Crisis, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Donald McDonald's "Defence in the 70s" (1971) followed the invocation of the War Measures Act by Trudeau, and the declining days of the Vietnam War. "Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada" (1987) was issued by Perrin Beatty and represented a pro-active military posture which would have put Canada militarily among the European Great Powers with, for example, a fleet of 10-12 SSNs. Canada could not afford all the programmes identified in "Challenge and Commitment" without making politically unacceptable sacrifices elsewhere in the federal budget, and seven years later, in David Collenette's "1994 Defence White Paper", the Canadian military's fortunes were reversed.

⁵³ Douglas Bland. Canada's National Defence Volume I: Defence Policy: 1

In the “1994 Defence White Paper”, Collenette makes three notable changes from the earlier papers. First, he does not specifically list or prioritize broad defence objectives though he does structure the paper along the lines of objectives, and most of the chapters end with a list of specific directions. Second, Collenette appears to diminish the importance of NATO and the UN, by discussing each in a chapter devoted to international relationships that include other organizations of relatively minor military importance to Canada.⁵⁴ Finally, an entire chapter is devoted to “affordability”,⁵⁵ and throughout the document reference is made to “appropriate” military size. Maintenance of multi-purpose, capable military forces is identified, along with preservation of “core capabilities” and specific direction including:

- a. 24 hour disaster response sustained indefinitely;
- b. national search and rescue;
- c. regular demonstration of the capability to monitor and control activity within Canada’s territory;
- d. maintain the ability to operate effectively ... with the military forces of the United States;
- e. participate in multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices, or in the defence of a NATO member state ...

⁵⁴ Douglas Bland. Canada’s National Defence Volume I: Defence Policy: 329 – 345.

⁵⁵ Douglas Bland. Canada’s National Defence Volume I: Defence Policy: 305-307.

Collenette is also specifically critical of the UN, but concludes with strong Canadian support for participation in UN lead or sponsored military activities.⁵⁶ Collenette's white paper, in principal, supports "multi-purpose, capable military forces" but in practice, the military was submitted to cuts in funding for the rest of the decade as the Federal Government pursued its primary aim of debt reduction.

Non-governmental organizations have also commented upon Canadian foreign and defence policy. Both the Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI) and the Conference of Defence Associates (CDA) have called for an increase in defence spending in support of both domestic and international policies, and identified the need for increases in establishment and equipment updates as well.^{57,58} Project Ploughshares, in commenting upon Canadian foreign and defence policies, notes "the total amount of international assistance has fallen sharply and bilateral donors have increasingly focused their aid on a small number of countries that meet strict criteria of economic performance and good governance."⁵⁹ Ploughshares calls for increased spending through DFAIT or CIDA, but omits the third leg of the triad, the CF. Project Ploughshares made representations to the Standing Committee On Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) 27 May 1999 and noted that although Canadian military spending has declined, the relative decline was less than either Canadian non-military security spending or the global decline in military

⁵⁶ Douglas Bland. *Canada's National Defence Volume I: Defence Policy*: 332.

⁵⁷ Matthew Gaasenbeek et al. *A Wake Up Call For Canada – The Need for a New Military*. (Toronto: The Royal Canadian Military Institute, 2001). The RCMI document specifically attempts to remain within a \$12B budget, but advocates a major restructuring of the CF.

⁵⁸ Sean Henry, Peter Haydon, and Robert Morton. "A Strategic Assessment – Canada's Response to the New Challenges of International Security". (Ottawa: <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/english-frame.htm> downloaded 19 Mar 02) 42.

spending.⁶⁰ In their brief to the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA), Ploughshares made the following recommendation:

“In the context of a review of security policy and funding, in the context of a foreign policy emphasis on human security, and given the fact that current wars are primarily intrastate armed conflicts in states incapable of meeting the human security needs of their people, it is urgent that Canada explore ways of increasing its contribution to human security measures. This requires a reassessment of the relative levels of military and other forms of security spending, and the exploration of increased human security funding by restoring [Official Development Agency] ODA spending and by increasing the funds earmarked for peacebuilding.”⁶¹

Project Ploughshares (Ernie Regehr) identifies human security as the basis for Canadian Defence Policy, and explicitly defines human security as “the well-being and safety of people, which is necessarily rooted in favourable social, political and economic conditions. Regehr continues by arguing that a corollary to this is “that when basic political, economic and social conditions essential to the well-being of persons are absent, military force cannot in the long-term ensure stability, maintain order or “enforce”

⁵⁹ The European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. “The G8 and Conflict Prevention” Ploughshares Monitor, June 2000. <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/monj00d.html>. Downloaded 21 Jan 02: 2.

⁶⁰ Ernie Regehr. “Human Security and Military Procurement.” Ploughshares working paper 99-1 A Project Ploughshares' Brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs. (Waterloo: <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/WORKING%20PAPERS/wp991.html>). Downloaded 18 Mar 02).

peace.”⁶² Regehr correctly links foreign and defence policy, and includes “official development assistance (ODA)” in the funding envelope for human security. Project Ploughshares views appropriate Canadian military tasks as:

- a. coastal patrol;
- b. search and rescue;
- c. aid to the civil power;
- d. Disaster Assistance Response Team;
- e. “medium airlift capabilities”; and
- f. exploitation of imaging capabilities that might be achieved in ...
Radarsat.⁶³

Whether “soft” or “hard” power will yield better results in the long term, presently “hard” power is undergoing a resurgence of support. U.S. diplomat David Jones described “soft” power as “flaccid follies”,⁶⁴ and Deputy Prime Minister John Manley publicly linked military effort with success in pursuing Canadian interests internationally.⁶⁵ However, the Federal Government is unlikely to suddenly boost Canadian defence spending.⁶⁶ Although Defence Policy and Foreign Policy are both due for review, it seems unlikely that either will change significantly, or that the funding envelope for

⁶¹ Ernie Regehr, Human Security and Military Procurement.

⁶² Ernie Regehr, Human Security and Military Procurement.

⁶³ Ernie Regehr, Human Security and Military Procurement. (Endnote 4).

⁶⁴ David Jones, “Flaccid Follies (Canada and the World)” *Macleans*, 04 Mar 02.

⁶⁵ Simon Tuck. “War role beneficial for Canada, Manley says”. *Globe and Mail*, 18 Mar 02. p. A-7.

⁶⁶ Robert Fife. “No more money for defence: PM”. <http://www.NationalPost.com/home/story.html?f=/stories/20020319/378899.html>. 19 Mar 02.

either DND, CIDA, or DFAIT will change at least until the Federal Government has achieved its targets with respect to debt.

Canadian Military Operations

There is obfuscation surrounding the capabilities of the Canadian military: some claim it is adequate or better than it has been, while others claim the military is unable to function as a combat force. A review of Canadian military performance domestically and internationally will shed light on the operational readiness of the CF.

Much of the discussion with respect to Canadian military preparedness, capabilities, or operational readiness, is confined to the last 10 years, since the end of the Cold War, or the last 20 years, since the peak of Canadian military spending. An alternative approach is to take a longer view – Canadian military operations after the Second World War, compared to recent Canadian military operations. Equally important is the response of the CF to domestic imperatives over that period of time, and to compare representative deployed operations. Domestic operations are many and varied, but deployed operations are nearly exclusively related to peacekeeping (Cold War deployments in support of NATO excepted). A reasonable comparison is of similar, Canadian-lead, deployed operations: peacekeeping missions to the Suez in 1956, and to Rwanda and Zaire, in 1994 and 1996 respectively.

Domestic Operations

The Canadian military undertakes both routine and ‘emergent’ domestic tasks. Routine tasks include activities in support of sovereignty such as surveillance of airspace, coastlines and waters of interest, Arctic patrols, interception of unidentified aircraft and ships, and search and rescue. Some emergent domestic tasks may be planned, such as preparation for Y2K or the G-8 summit planned for 2002, but some are reactive – there may or may not be a contingency plan in place.

It is often difficult to quantify the contribution of an activity to sovereignty. However, a good example of the direct impact military operations have in support of sovereignty is that of reporting pollution violations off the East Coast. Transport Canada is responsible for legal enforcement of laws regarding marine pollution, but the surveillance of the marine areas is done by the Canadian Coast Guard, an arm of Fisheries and Oceans, as part of the National Aerial Surveillance Program (sic), and by the CF. Three agencies account for very nearly all the court cases against alleged pollution violations, the CF through aircraft flown out of 14 Wing Greenwood, East Coast Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) aircraft, and Provincial Airlines (PAL) aircraft flying under contract to Fisheries and Oceans.⁶⁷ The number of potential violations reported by each agency from 1989 – 2000 is illustrated in Figure 1. The flying hours of the CP140 aircraft conducting surveillance patrols and other missions⁶⁸ off the East Coast for the same decade is shown in Figure 2. Neither the CP140 fleet nor the PAL aircraft are tasked with searching for

⁶⁷ Fisheries and Oceans Canada Coast Guard. National Aerial Surveillance Program 1997-2001 Final Report (Ottawa: Canadian Coast Guard Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2001)

⁶⁸ Four 14 Wing Greenwood units operate CP140 (Aurora) and CP140A (Arcturus) aircraft. Most flying takes place South of Nova Scotia. This is largely crew training and is not dedicated to surveillance although contacts are investigated and reports are made of everything from marine mammal activity to unanticipated encounters with military units. Surveillance and other missions may be flown anywhere within the 200 NM limit, from the Georges Banks to the Flemish Cap to the Davis Straits.

pollution violators, but in the course of conducting surveillance or other primary tasking, the crews observe a large number of vessels. Any vessel that appears to be polluting (usually, visible signs of pollution directly associated with the vessel) is investigated and reported. If the evidence supports charges being laid, legal action is initiated either in Canadian or foreign courts. Note that by far the greatest contributor to catching pollution violators is DND. Note also the decrease in yearly flying rate (YFR) from 14 Wing Greenwood, and over the same time frame, the decrease in reporting of pollution violations. The correlation is clear: the number of polluters is unlikely to have diminished at the same rate as the violations observed, illustrated in part by the increase in PAL reports over this period, and recent observations of wildlife dying as a result of pollution off Nova Scotia.^{69,70} Clearly, investment in surveillance missions results in direct tangible benefits to Canada.

⁶⁹ Alison Auld. "Nova Scotia fisherman hauling in 'pathetic' catch of dying oiled birds." <http://ca.news.yahoo.com/020308/6/kpxs.html>. 08 Mar 02.

⁷⁰ John Demont. "When lazy captains come to Canada". Maclean's. 25 Feb 02: 11.




Figure 1. Aerial Surveillance Sightings of Alleged Pollution Violations at Sea⁷¹




Figure 2. CP140 YFR Trends (1990 = 100%) 1990 – 2000.⁷²

⁷¹ Mihai Balaban. Transport Canada Enforcement Division. Address: “Transport Canada Briefing, Pollution violations and A/C (aircraft) flying.” 14 Wing Ground Training Day Lecture, 14 Wing

In terms of routine domestic operations, there is a steady erosion of funding which in turn is leading to an erosion of surveillance, and ultimately an inability to know what's "normal", what's not, and take corrective action.

Emergent tasks include crises involving armed threat, or the potential for the same, which are beyond the capacity of the police to manage, ranging from the FLQ crisis in Quebec, during which the War Measures Act was implemented, to "Oka". Emergent tasks also include assistance following environmental events such as floods, storms, or fires, and events such as counter-narcotic operations, tracking of ships such as those carrying illegal migrants, responding to unidentified submarine sightings, and responding to states of heightened tension such as during the "Turbot War" in 1996.

The CF responses to these tasks are usually the employment of the most appropriate units that are available to assist. Sometimes, units are employed in creative tasking well outside their "normal" operations.⁷³ Although plans of a general nature are in place for coordinating responses to some events, responses to domestic crises are perceived as subsets of deployed operations. Thus, with the exception of the national Search and Rescue (SAR) effort,⁷⁴ whatever the military is trained and equipped for in operations abroad can be applied to domestic operations, without specifically equipping or training

Greenwood, Nova Scotia. Received 05 Feb 02 (prior to address).

⁷² Figures provided by Maritime Air Component (Atlantic). Received Mar 02.

⁷³ For example, during the Ice Storms in Quebec in 1998, CP140 aircraft were tasked with using their infrared sensors to determine which parts of Montreal had power and which didn't, as well as photograph power lines in remote areas using high resolution KA-107 "belly camera" correlated with time and position.

⁷⁴ SAR specific training and equipment exists primarily in the Air Force, which uses Labrador helicopters and Buffalo fixed wing aircraft, and trains SAR technicians, Labrador, Buffalo, and Hercules crews

for domestic operations.⁷⁵ To this point, the CF has not been tested in terms of combat during domestic operations: the threat of combat and the display of resolution has been sufficient. In most cases the CF response to domestic operations has been satisfactory or, at least, passed public scrutiny.

In contrast to domestic operations, CF capabilities for deployed operations may be said to have followed a consistent downward trend throughout the latter half of the 20th Century. Whether discussing Cold War or peacekeeping operations, two events highlight the changes in CF capabilities from the 1950's to the 1990's: the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1994-96 Rwanda/Zaire events.

The 1956 Suez Crisis and the United Nations Emergency Force

Middle East nations have been struggling to resume their perceived places in the world since the turn of the 20th Century. Various leaders have emerged with the intention of shrugging off the colonial yoke, uniting the scattered and divided peoples, and forming a renewed, reinvigorated nation. Israel is an example of a semi-successful effort in this regard, Egypt another. Lester Pearson, in "The Crisis in the Middle East", traces the

specifically for SAR. In addition, SAR courses are run for SAR planning positions (such as Search Master).

⁷⁵ Training specific to domestic operations can be argued to be Arctic operations. Army and Air Force training does routinely accommodate cold weather, Arctic operations. The Navy also operates in cold weather in the North Atlantic, but ventures infrequently into the Arctic. The CF is specifically equipped for Arctic operations as well, to some degree. However, the training and equipping was intended to be applicable in areas other than Canada, as well, for example, defence of Norway.

beginning of the Suez crisis of 1956 to the establishment of the state of Israel by the United Nations in 1948.⁷⁶

In 1952, Colonel Gamal Abder Nasser led the “Free Officers” in a coup in Egypt.⁷⁷ Nasser hoped that he could reunite the Arab people, and restore dignity to the Arab world. He pursued a foreign policy intended to accomplish this by remaining independent and non-aligned. Nasser courted both the West and the Soviets in pursuit of his aims, which included building the Aswan Dam and arming the Egyptian military. The American government agreed to finance the building of the Dam, but would not provide arms to the Egyptian military – probably because of the strong pro-Israeli influence exerted upon the American government.⁷⁸ Consequently, Nasser felt obliged to obtain armaments from the Soviets. The Soviets obliged, and the arms were supplied through (then) Czechoslovakia. The U.S. and Britain subsequently refused to finance the Aswan Dam project on 19 and 20 July 1956, respectively. One week later, 26 July 1956, Nasser annexed the Suez Canal - intending to use revenue from the Canal to pay for the Aswan Dam project.

The British, French, and Israelis each began planning attacks upon Egypt. The Europeans wanted to invade because of the annexation of the Suez Canal (in which the principal aggrieved parties were British and French), and the Israelis wanted to invade out of security concerns. The French proposed that Israel invade, after which Britain and

⁷⁶ Lester Pearson. *The Crisis in the Middle East*. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1957) 1.

⁷⁷ Chris Leininger. “Suez 1956.” 01 May 1996. <http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/suez.html>. Downloaded 31 Jan 02.

⁷⁸ Chris Leininger. “Suez 1956.”

France would intervene to separate Israel and Egypt, and seize control of the Canal. On 29 Oct 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and on 30 Oct 1956, the British issued an ultimatum to the effect that the Israelis and Egyptians were to withdraw 16 kms either side of the Canal, after which the British and French would occupy the zone immediately surrounding the Canal. The U.S. acted to position two carrier groups (Coral Sea and Randolph) in the vicinity to assist in evacuating U.S. nationals. Another CVBG was dispatched from Norfolk, and a fourth put on 72 hour notice.⁷⁹

The British and French launched “a series of large-scale air strikes”⁸⁰ on 31 Oct 1956. The next day, Canada’s Minister of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, arrived in New York to attend an emergency session of the UNGA, which was debating an American proposal for a cease-fire and withdrawal. When called to a vote, Canada abstained but in accordance with UN procedures, seized the opportunity to explain the abstention. Pearson stated that the cease-fire and withdrawal were not sufficient measures, that they must be accompanied by arrangements to police the cease-fire and to prepare for a political settlement. He proposed an “international police force”. After two days of “back-corridor negotiation”, Pearson was successful in having this idea adopted. “Even while their invasion forces were still at sea on the way to Egypt, Britain and France had announced that they would stop their own military campaign if Egypt and Israel would accept a UN force to keep the peace and to ensure a satisfactory

⁷⁹ Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network. “Suez Crisis.” 21 Feb 98. (Washington: <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/suez.htm> , downloaded 31 Jan 02).

⁸⁰ “Suez Crisis”. Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network.

arrangement of the Canal problem.”⁸¹ On 04 Nov 56, Pearson proposed a specific resolution outlining his plan for establishing a lightly armed force to interpose itself between the combatants, which was passed by the UNGA.⁸²

On 05 Nov 56, the Soviets advised the British, French, and Israelis that Soviet forces would crush the aggressors (the British, French, and Israelis) and restore peace by force. The British and French agreed to a ceasefire on 07 Nov 56 (partly due to pressure from the US), but the Soviet military continued to move, and the U.S. carriers Forrester and Roosevelt, along with their escorts, were sent to the Mediterranean to augment the 6th Fleet.⁸³ Finally, on 08 Nov 56, hostilities ceased. On 21 Nov 56 the first peacekeepers arrived in the zone and on 22 Dec 56 the last British and French troops departed. The next spring, Israeli troops withdrew from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai, and in March of 1957, the Suez Canal was reopened to shipping.

The United Nations Emergency Force was made up of troops from ten nations, including Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. Initially, Canada’s participation was veto’d by the Egyptians as being “too British”: for example Canadian units incorporate reference to the British monarchy and the uniforms include insignia derived directly from British traditions. Canadian units were shuffled and a numbered, composite unit without reference to the British monarchy was established for the purposes of the UNEF. On 17 Nov 01 after

⁸¹ Brian Urquhart. “Suez and the First Peacekeeping Force – The Front Line of a Moral Force” Ralph Bunche: An American Life. (New York: WW Norton and Company, 1993) 266.

⁸² “Suez: The Full Story”. Our Past: The History of The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. (Ottawa: <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/hist/suez-e.asp>, downloaded 31 Jan 02).

intervention by UN Secretary-General Hammerskjold on Canada's behalf, in part because of Pearson's initiative and in part because Canada had been a strong and consistent supporter of peacekeeping, Nasser accepted the Canadians. U.S. and Canadian airlift was used to deploy the peacekeeping troops via Capodocchino (Naples), to demonstrate resolve and to have the troops ready to land in the Suez as soon as Egypt agreed to the force.^{84,85}

The first leader of the UNEF was Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns. Canada sent 800 troops, the largest contingent, including a reconnaissance squadron, signals unit, engineers, and logistics personnel. Navy and Air units were also deployed, as well as a medical detachment for the first three years of the mission.⁸⁶ Canada handed over command to India in January, 1960.⁸⁷

Pearson's success was attributable to the high regard in which he was held by the UNGA and foreign ministers, including principals on both sides of the dispute, because he had the support of the USA, and because he knew the rules and procedures of the UN.⁸⁸ Canadian hard power and U.S. political and military support undoubtedly also contributed substantially to the acceptance of Pearson's proposal by the UNGA, either directly or indirectly in that Canadian combat strength and performance had been tested not long before, in Korea and in World War II. In 1956, Canada's military capabilities

⁸³ Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network "Suez Crisis."

⁸⁴ Brian Urquhart: 268.

⁸⁵ Record of UN Advisory committee, November 14, 1956. Quoted in Brian Urquhart "An American Life": 270.

⁸⁶ "The United Nations and the Suez Crisis." (Calgary: http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/outreach/module2/Readings/UN_Suez.html, downloaded 31 Jan 02).

⁸⁷ "Suez Canal & Gaza Strip, 1956-1967." (<http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/CONFLICTS/Suez.html>, downloaded 31 Jan 02). The UNEF remained in place until 1967, when it departed at the request of Egypt.

and credibility enabled Pearson to speak from a position of strength, and gave credence to the Canadian proposal both in terms of expectations of performance and in terms of Canada's capacity to lead the Force. Although U.S. military aid (strategic airlift) was required, Canadian military strength was still significant and respected. By 1994, and still more by 1996, the situation had changed dramatically.

Rwanda

Fighting between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) broke out in Oct 1990, along the border between Uganda and Rwanda. Intermittent ceasefires, brokered by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Tanzania, were ultimately unsuccessful, resulting in continuous hostilities after February 1993. On 22 Feb 93, Rwanda and Uganda separately requested UN observers be deployed along the border, to prevent military use of the area largely controlled by the RPF. Two days later, SecGen Bhoutros-Ghali elected to send a mission to the area, which visited Northern Rwanda 4-18 Mar 93. During this time, Rwanda and the RPF met in Dar-Es-Salaam and agreed to a cease-fire and negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania. Following further negotiations and a technical mission to the area, Security Council 846 authorized the establishment of a UN Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda (UNOMUR) on the Ugandan side of the border only, intended to monitor road and tracked access (ie. roads and tracks which could support vehicular traffic) to Rwanda. UNOMUR was lead by Canadian LGen Romeo Dallaire.

⁸⁸ "The United Nations and the Suez Crisis." (Calgary: http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/outreach/module2/Readings/UN_Suez.html, downloaded 31 Jan 02).

In August of 1993, a separate UN reconnaissance mission was sent to investigate the potential for a peacekeeping force to supervise the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement of 04 Aug 93, in which a neutral international force (NIF) was to supervise implementation of the accords of the Agreement. The leader of this mission was also LGen Dallaire. Before the Security Council received LGen Dallaire's report, the Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Rwandan Government sent delegates to New York to ask for the rapid deployment of a force of 4,260 troops, to prevent the Arusha Peace Agreement (APA) from faltering. The Secretary General recommended to the Security Council a force half the size requested by the parties, and a force of this was unanimously approved 05 Oct 93. The UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) was to be essentially a Chapter VI peacekeeping force, intended to intervene between two opposing forces and supervise the implementation of the accords of the APA. LGen Dallaire was appointed Force Commander, arriving in Kigali on 22 Oct 93.

On 23 Nov 93, LGen Dallaire proposed, and requested approval of, rules of engagement (ROEs). The request was never answered, nor was LGen Dallaire provided with ROEs. On 11 Jan 94, LGen Dallaire sent a telegram advising UNHQ of Hutu plans for killing Belgian soldiers, exterminating Tutsi's, and noting the location of a weapons cache. LGen Dallaire noted that he intended to take action within 36 hours, but required guidance on extracting an informant from Rwanda. UNHQ replied to the effect that he was to take no action without clear guidance from UNHQ, but provided no further

guidance. On 06 Apr 94, a plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, returning from a sub-regional summit, was shot down. Both leaders were killed.

In the subsequent three months, Rwandan forces murdered approximately 800,000 Rwandese men, women and children. Political figures were assassinated, in some cases with their families, in one case inside a UNV compound to which the Prime Minister and her family had fled. At the same time, UN troops were disarmed and ten (Belgians) were killed while others fled, leaving the persons they were assigned to protect to the mercy of the Presidential Guard.

Four countries mounted unilateral expatriate evacuation operations, and the Belgian contingent withdrew from UNAMIR. UN troops abandoned compounds, in one case even lying (“attempting to pretend to the refugees that they were not in fact leaving”) to the people they left behind at the mercy of the killers.⁸⁹ On 22 June 1994, the French and Senegalese governments received approval for Op Turquoise from the UNSC, a Chapter VII operation in the same area but with far greater powers and resources.⁹⁰ Op Turquoise commenced on 23 Jun 94. On 17 Jul 94 Goma, Zaire was shelled. The French commander of Op Turquoise advised the RPF through UNAMIR to cease shelling Zaire or the French would intervene by force: the shelling ceased. The next day, 18 Jul 94, the

⁸⁹ “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda”. (New York: http://www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm, 15 Dec 1999, downloaded 05 Feb 02) 31.

⁹⁰ “The United Nations and the Situation in Rwanda”. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995). (<gopher://gopher.undp.org/0/unearth/pko/rwanda.txt> 03 Feb 02) 15-16. Op Turquoise was commanded by the French, and according to the UNSC was to last not more than two months, bridging the gap until UNAMIR was up to full strength.

RPF announced they had seized control of all Rwanda and implemented a unilateral ceasefire.

Rwanda had been victim and party to a “terrible and humiliating situation of a UN peacekeeping force almost paralyzed in the face of a wave of some to the worst brutality humankind has seen in this century.”⁹¹ Canada’s role in UNAMIR and associated events included LGen Dallaire, Chief Military Observer, UNOMUR and later Force Commander, UNAMIR, and MGen Baril, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, 105 troops and 20 observers.⁹² Canada had committed no combat units, and when LGen Dallaire and UNAMIR were in desperate need of assistance, none was forthcoming from either the UN or Canada.

Zaire

In the autumn of 1996, the continuing conflict in Rwanda spilled over into neighbouring countries, notably Zaire and Tanzania. The situation in Zaire was reportedly desperate, with refugees exceeding upwards of 1.2 million fleeing the fighting. In a briefing note to the CDS and DM, it was stated “Canada has volunteered to lead an international coalition of military forces to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in Eastern Zaire. While mission composition, size, and costs are still being developed, this mission is characterized by the leadership role which Canada is playing, one which Canadians have

⁹¹ “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda”. (New York: http://www.un.org/News/oss/rwanda_report.htm, 15 Dec 1999, downloaded 05 Feb 02) 20.

not seen since Canada lead an international coalition in Egypt in 1956.”⁹³ Canada proposed to lead a multinational force of 6,000 to 10,000, whose mission would be to ensure the humanitarian relief agencies could deliver aid and to facilitate the return to Rwanda of those refugees who wanted to return.

Canada was prepared to offer 1300 – 1600 personnel, nearly all of who would be in the headquarters. The code name of the multinational force, under the command of Lieutenant General Maurice Baril, was called “OP ASSURANCE.” The mission was to be a Chapter VII operation; authorized under UNSCR 1080 dated 15 Nov 96. Canada’s conditions for leading the force included:

1. “a force adequate to the task which reflects international will and is committed to field deployment;
2. a clear command and control structure;
3. a maximum of six months of commitment; and
4. Canada is prepared to lead.”⁹⁴

The OP ASSURANCE supplementary warning order⁹⁵ describes the planned mission in some detail, including identifying Stuttgart, Kigali, and Goma as airbases, identifying

⁹² “The United Nations and the Situation in Rwanda”. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995). (gopher://gopher.undp.org/0/unearth/pko/rwanda.txt 03 Feb 02).

⁹³ Briefing Note for DM and CDS, prepared by LCol R. Capern, DB3, dated 13 Nov 1996. In Canada’s Decision in the Fall of 1996 to Propose and Lead a Peacekeeping Force to Zaire as well as the Subsequent Decision to Withdraw the Force (A)96-1168. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996) 3-6.

⁹⁴ Briefing in Canada’s Decision in the Fall of 1996 to Propose and Lead a Peacekeeping Force to Zaire as well as the Subsequent Decision to Withdraw the Force (A)96-1168. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996) 154-172.

desired numbers of troops, and providing some command and control details. Two days later this warning order was followed by a message to selected CF Attaches, requesting them to contact their host nations and solicit participation of 6,000 to 10,000 “well-disciplined troops”. The message also identified certain specific troop requirements to be filled by allies.⁹⁶

Considerable disagreement over the scale of the problem existed. Humanitarian relief agencies (HRA) figures were not universally accepted, and U.S. and UK aircraft were sent to determine independently the scale of the problem. HRA were prepared to deal with up to 2 million refugees, but the reconnaissance aircraft could identify only a fraction of that number. Canada had no independent intelligence source, and was forced to accept either the HRA figures or those of the U.S. and UK. Additionally, some countries would not commit unless the U.S. guaranteed participation of U.S. ground troops. In Nov 96, LGen Baril and advance elements of the headquarters went to Zaire and the Great Lakes Region to gain first hand insight into the situation.

On 3 Dec 96, LGen Baril assessed the refugee situation and decided the mandate of the Multi-National Force (MNF) had been fulfilled, without its deployment.⁹⁷ Most of the refugees were accounted for and a majority had apparently returned to Rwanda, the

⁹⁵ DCDS 810 091841Z Nov 96 OP ASSURANCE Supplementary Warning Order . In Canada’s Decision in the Fall of 1996 to Propose and Lead a Peacekeeping Force to Zaire as well as the Subsequent Decision to Withdraw the Force (A)96-1168. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996) 177-185.

⁹⁶ DPFL 2 3477 110200Z Nov 96 OP ASSURANCE Supplementary Warning Order . In Canada’s Decision in the Fall of 1996 to Propose and Lead a Peacekeeping Force to Zaire as well as the Subsequent Decision to Withdraw the Force (A)96-1168. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996) 177-185.

⁹⁷ Enclosure to 3350-1 (OP ASSURANCE – Comd) “MNF Commander’s Assessment” dated 10 Dec 96. In Canada’s Decision in the Fall of 1996 to Propose and Lead a Peacekeeping Force to Zaire as well as the

fighting had significantly diminished, and the HRAs were able to resume delivery of aid. In a letter dated 10 Dec 96, he recommended the termination of OP ASSURANCE,⁹⁸ and on 16 Dec 96 he addressed the UN Steering Group with the same recommendation.⁹⁹ In his prepared text, LGen Baril noted that no state but Canada had committed troops, although there had been airlift support from the US, UK, and Italy, some participation in the advance party by WEU, Belgian, and Dutch troops, and U.S. and UK reconnaissance aircraft.¹⁰⁰

In stark contrast to both the brave declaration in the briefing note to the CDS and Canada's role in conceiving and executing the UNEF mission of 1956, Canada was unable to rally support from other countries, unable to gather intelligence to support its position, and unable to commit sufficient troops, including combat troops, to provide a nucleus around which more hesitant participants could be enticed to join. The best that could be said of the mission was that the threat of the introduction of a MNF may have facilitated the achievement of the mandate without actually carrying out the threat, but there is little or no evidence to support this perspective.

Post-Zaire

Subsequent Decision to Withdraw the Force (A)96-1168. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996) 97-126.

⁹⁸ 3350-1 (OP ASSURANCE – Comd) “MNF Commander’s Assessment” dated 10 Dec 96. In Canada’s Decision in the Fall of 1996 to Propose and Lead a Peacekeeping Force to Zaire as well as the Subsequent Decision to Withdraw the Force (A)96-1168. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996) 97-126.

⁹⁹ Annex A to point form Minutes to Steering Group meeting. MNF Commander’s prepared text In Canada’s Decision in the Fall of 1996 to Propose and Lead a Peacekeeping Force to Zaire as well as the Subsequent Decision to Withdraw the Force (A)96-1168. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996) 86-96.

¹⁰⁰ Annex A to point form Minutes to Steering Group meeting. MNF Commander’s prepared text In Canada’s Decision in the Fall of 1996 to Propose and Lead a Peacekeeping Force to Zaire as well as the

Canada has participated in operations since that in Zaire in 1996, notably in the Balkans, Eritrea/Ethiopia, and Afghanistan. Canadian participation is proportionately significant in terms of effect: although possessing fewer attack aircraft and personnel nationally than France or Great Britain for example, approximately the same number of Canadian, British, and French attack aircraft were deployed in support of the Balkans air campaign - second only to the US, and proportionately Canada recently has had more troops deployed than any other nation.¹⁰¹ However, assigning tactical units to operate under the command and control of another nation, even in proportionately large numbers, achieves little in establishing international visibility. Canada had a relatively modest force in the Suez, but the leadership role coupled with the combat troop contribution yielded substantial influence internationally. In Zaire in 1996, Canada proposed contributing twice the number of troops and leading the force, but attracted no participants.

Canada has clearly lost credibility in terms of military capacity, and consequently confirmed what most informed observers had already concluded; Canada is no longer a leader of peacekeeping operations.

Subsequent Decision to Withdraw the Force (A)96-1168. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996) 86.

¹⁰¹ Col Dwight Davies. Briefing to Command and Staff Course 28 "Command in Operations," Canadian Forces College, 01 Mar 02.

The Nature of War and Military Trends

War and military organizations are dynamic: each is a reflection of the civilizations and cultures from which they derive. The juxtaposition of military thinking, in which military leaders study history in an effort to prepare for conflict in the future, and conflict itself, in which military leaders attempt to surprise their opponents by departing from history, yields endless debate. Field Marshall the Viscount Bill Slim once noted

“Generals have often been reproached with preparing for the last war instead of the next – an easy gibe when their fellow-countrymen and their political leaders, too frequently, have prepared for no war at all.”¹⁰²

War, or conflict, may be inevitable, but the nature of war is not predetermined and, equally, neither are the forces that fight them.

Causes of War

Over the past decade, the nature of combat and conflict, including peacekeeping, has changed from our images of the earlier wars of the 20th century. Wars are fought not between ideological blocs, and are often not even inter-state. Now wars are usually intra-state or asymmetric, between non-state, terrorist, agents and states. The threat of nuclear exchange coupled with devastation of the European continent and the destruction of military forces on a scale not seen since WWI has receded and is currently viewed as

remote or even nonexistent in some quarters. The prevailing perspective is that use of force until at least 2020 will be characterized by regional containment or asymmetric warfare. Overlaid on this assessment is a trend to diminishing casualties (from millions in WWI, through hundreds of thousands in WWII, now down to single or at worst, low double digits) coupled with public intolerance for own losses. The capability to excise targets while inflicting minimal or no collateral damage has led to the expectation on the part of the Western public of minimal or no collateral damage, as well. “First generation” peacekeeping operations still occur, as in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and “classical” wars between large military forces from neighbouring states may also occur (Iraq and Iran, India and Pakistan), but the preponderance of armed conflicts is now along the Balkans pattern. Arms control efforts, whether those pertaining to nuclear weapons such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or to small arms may one day diminish the likelihood and incidence of armed conflict, but in the interim Project Ploughshares has identified a resurgence in armed conflicts throughout the world (up approximately 10% in 1998 over 1999).¹⁰³ Armed conflict will be a feature of civilization for the foreseeable future.

Addressing the potential and varying causes of war often lies outside the traditional military domain, involving diplomacy or financial and developmental assistance, for example. “A culprit stands in the center of most generalized explanations of war. While

¹⁰² Field Marshal the Viscount Bill Slim, *Defeat Into Victory* (London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1988) 535.

¹⁰³ Ernie Regehr. “Armed Conflicts in 1999” *Ploughshares Monitor*, March 2000. (Waterloo: <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/WORKING%20PAPERS/wp991.html> 21 Jan 02).

there may be dispute in naming the culprit, it is widely believed that the culprit exists.”¹⁰⁴ At the end of the Cold War, declarations of the end of war, even the end of history, were made virtually coincident with the outbreak or intensification of lesser wars around the world. That wars have causes, that these causes are common across all, or most, wars, and that they can be identified, are commonly made assumptions. Causes of war, or perceived causes, have varied over time. Military forces don’t become engaged until political leaders decide to go to war. Death of a monarch, periodicity, “national exhaustion”, resources, territory, and human emotion, has each been proposed as a cause of war.¹⁰⁵ Geoffrey Blainey identified seven main factors nations consider when determining whether they will go to war,¹⁰⁶ however, his factors don’t necessarily apply to non-state actors, nor are they predictive. In a vacuum of explanations for the demise of the end of war and the re-ignition of history, Samuel Huntington proposed the “clash of civilizations” as a paradigm for assessing where, and between whom, wars would be fought.¹⁰⁷ Consequently, “The increased extent to which people throughout the world differentiate themselves along cultural lines means that conflicts between cultural groups are increasingly important ...”¹⁰⁸ Huntington also identified three other prominent predictors of war: wealth (economy), demography, and oil.¹⁰⁹ Don Hubert, in the *Ploughshares Monitor*, breaks down contemporary thought on causes of war as falling into one of two camps;

- a. violence in response to a range of grievances; and

¹⁰⁴ Geoffrey Blainey. The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1988) 146.

¹⁰⁵ Geoffrey Blainey. The Causes of War. 5+.

¹⁰⁶ Geoffrey Blainey. The Causes of War. 123.

¹⁰⁷ Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) 125.

¹⁰⁸ Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations. 128.

¹⁰⁹ Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations. 314.

b. irrational violence, possibly originating in “ancient hatreds”.¹¹⁰

Unequal distribution of wealth, resources, or power falls into the first category, and Huntington’s clash in the second. Hubert proposes a third category, in which war is carried out for profit. He postulates “If economic gain is a prominent motivation for armed conflict, the very basis for the resolution of violent conflict through negotiation is undermined and the search for a political settlement may be futile ... [warring parties may] oppose a negotiated settlement; even more challenging to traditional thinking on war and peace, they may not even want to win.”¹¹¹ Conflict in Sri Lanka and parts of Africa and South America may fall into Hubert’s third category.

Legitimacy of interstate warfare has apparently receded significantly. Given the global consensus against war, the overwhelming military, and hence, diplomatic, strength of the US, and the slow emergence of a rules-based international system as an alternative means to settle disputes, the likelihood of wide-scale war seems remote. Neither Russia nor China is likely to become a source of global conflict. Some analysts see Putin as an extension of a Russian past, others see him as seeking legitimacy in the eyes of the West, but in either case Russia is becoming stronger and more stable, albeit slowly.¹¹² Russian military spending dipped sharply in the first half of the last decade, but then stabilized in 1997-1998 and is now on the rise again, having risen 40% from 1998 to 2000.¹¹³ Russia

¹¹⁰ Don Hubert. “Resources, Greed, and the Persistence of Violent Conflict”. Ploughshares Monitor, June 2000. (Waterloo: <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/monj00c.html>, 21 Jan 02).

¹¹¹ Don Hubert. “Resources, Greed, and the Persistence of Violent Conflict”.

¹¹² GP Armstrong. “Spotlight on the Russian Federation”. Strategic Assessment 2001 (Ottawa: Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Policy Planning Division, Policy Group; Department of National Defence, 2001) 29.

¹¹³ Elizabeth Skons et al. “Military Expenditures and Arms Production.” SIPRI Yearbook 2001 – Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security. (Stockholm: <http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yb01.html>, 2001) 7.

is no longer a superpower, but it is clearly a great power on par with the EU great powers. China, though enormous in economic and military potential, has yet to realize that potential. China, too, is facing greater instability from within than without, and though clearly a regional power with ambitions, China will not threaten global peace within the next two decades.¹¹⁴

However, regional wars may ignite, and in some cases they may involve the rest of the world. In the case of India and Pakistan, the two nations most recently equipped with nuclear weapons, there is considerable potential for a regional war to result in human and environmental catastrophe. A regional war in the Middle East which threatens the global economy would almost certainly involve the U.S. and European powers. Other potential sources of conflict are related to crime, demographics, and terrorism: the “narco-wars” of South America or the war in Sri Lanka are closely associated with criminal activities, and the widespread unrest throughout South Asia, Africa, and the Middle correlates strongly to the high proportion of young men in the population.

Global Military Trends

Global military force structures have changed dramatically over the last decade. The maintenance of overwhelming masses of ground, air, and naval forces characteristic of the Cold War is now untenable and members of both NATO and the former Warsaw Pact have disarmed to varying degrees and enjoyed substantial “peace dividends”, diverting monies formerly demanded by security concerns to other imperatives ranging from

¹¹⁴ Elizabeth Speed. “Spotlight on China”. Strategic Assessment 2001 (Ottawa: Directorate of Strategic

national debt to infrastructure to social programmes. SIPRI notes that global expenditures in arms reached their post-Cold War nadir in 1998, but have been steadily increasing since.¹¹⁵ However, spending in relative terms (relative to GDP) has stabilized, as illustrated in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Relative spending of selected military forces, as a per cent of GDP.

Conventional ground forces are diminishing in size within the Western nations, as the threat from Russia has vanished. Sheer numbers are being replaced with highly trained,

Analysis, Policy Planning Division, Policy Group; Department of National Defence, 2001) 34.

¹¹⁵ Elizabeth Skons. "Military Expenditures and Arms Production."

rapidly deployable units. The advantages of heavy armour and heavy artillery on the battlefield are outweighed by the difficulty in getting them to the battlefield in a timely manner, although they will remain significant components of military forces for the foreseeable future. Heavy armour and artillery are widely regarded as legacy systems and investment in future ground forces is being directed elsewhere. The U.S. Army, in Joint Vision 2020, has identified legacy systems which they will not support, some which they will support as an interim measure, and some new systems they will acquire or develop. Vehicles half, or a third the weight of a heavy tank will be procured,¹¹⁶ which will fit into an aircraft's cargo bay, and can be transported with their crews rapidly across the globe. Lighter, more easily transportable (ie. air transportable) armour integrated within "mission tailored" infantry units, supported by advanced artillery, globally deployable on very short notice, has become the most efficient solution to foreseen conflicts. There is also a Western trend away from drafted, minimally trained, "basic" infantry towards highly trained, professional, multi-purpose forces, approaching special operations forces (SOF) in calibre of training, equipment, and capability, as well as a trend to expanding SOF. Prime Minister Chretien's announcement that JTF-2 will be expanded is in line with this trend.¹¹⁷ Although the Canadian Army still has "legacy systems", the Army is moving towards a light, rapidly air-transportable posture.

Naval forces are no longer training for open ocean naval warfare. While naval warfare continues to be important, the focus is shifting to interdiction operations, littoral

¹¹⁶ Army Transformation Panel Institute for Land Warfare. Briefing "Army Transformation." (<http://www.army.mil/usa/AUSA%20Web/PDF%20Files/Mod%20Brief%20Web%20Version.pdf>, 17 Oct 2000) 30.

operations, and support of operations ashore. Naval technologies continue to evolve. The launch of the first Type 212 AIP submarine¹¹⁸ heralds a significant, though subtle, change in submarine forces – submerged endurance of ‘conventional’ submarines will increase dramatically, virtually eliminating their principal vulnerability – the requirement to recharge batteries. As these submarines become widespread, they will enable smaller navies to legitimately threaten even carrier battle groups (CVBGs), tilting the balance of power at sea. The U.S. Navy, principal operator of CVBGs, is also evolving, but CVBGs will remain the principal power projection tools of the USN for the foreseeable future, at least until another weapon system proves itself capable of defeating one.

The U.S. Navy is the only navy with a significant global capability. Many mid-size navies have achieved a stable size and capability – exceptions include that of Russia, in decline, and of China and India, each of which have expressed desires to expand to become major regional navies. Canada’s Navy, a self-described “third rank” navy,¹¹⁹ plays a role in domestic operations but it is essentially an expeditionary force, proving its utility repeatedly as a flexible tool of policy – easy to insert into a theatre, almost seamlessly interoperable with the USN, and relatively easy to support. Although much slower than air forces, the relative immunity of navies from political considerations such as overflight clearances means navies often get into theatre first. Transitioning from a

¹¹⁷ “Enhancing Security for Canadians.” Budget 2001. (Ottawa: http://www.fin.gc.ca/toce/2001/budlist01_e.htm, 2001).

¹¹⁸ Defence Systems Daily. “First fuel-cell submarine is christened at HDW.” (<http://defence-data.com/current/page13976.htm>, 25 Mar 02).

¹¹⁹ Leadmark – The Navy’s Strategy for 2020. (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, Department of National Defence, 2001) 44.

“third rank” to a “second rank” status is probably unachievable for the Canadian Navy¹²⁰: maintaining existing capabilities and rendering the Victoria class operational are the principal challenges facing the Navy for the next two decades.

Air forces are also evolving rapidly – in part in response to the assumption of a much more significant role by air power. The U.S. Air Force is moving to expeditionary air forces, self-sufficient organizations that can deploy globally. Air forces are moving to fewer airframes in type and number, but incorporating far greater processing power and combat capability than ever before. The introduction of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) will support the avoidance of own casualties by taking on the most dangerous roles (SEAD, for example). The emergence of low-density, high-demand assets such as AWACS, JSTARS, and ABCCC, has added new dimensions to the flexibility, responsiveness, and efficiency of air power. It has also altered the balance of numbers in air forces, diminishing the relative importance in numbers of ‘tactical’ (weapons delivery) aircraft in favour of C4I/ISR and air mobility aircraft.¹²¹

The existence of a small number of forward deployment sites throughout the globe coupled with AAR gives the USAF the ability to operate globally but also represent the chief weakness of any expeditionary air force – the requirement for forward basing. The

¹²⁰ For Canada to build a Navy the equivalent of the Royal Navy or the French Navy is not impossible but implies a large influx of funding. This funding is not likely to come unless driven by circumstances such as engaging independently in naval combat outside Canada’s EEZ (beyond range of shore based aircraft) – at this point highly improbably.

¹²¹ Col (USAF) Rich Reynolds. Briefing to CFCSC Air Symposium. 27 Mar 02. . The relative decrease in numbers of weapons delivery platforms should not be interpreted to mean their operational importance

American heavy bomber force (B-52, B-1, B-2) can operate globally from the continental USA, but all other aircraft must deploy. Canada faced this problem at the start of Op Apollo. Canadian aircraft were technically capable of getting in theatre within hours of the decision to go. However, slowly progressing diplomatic efforts to obtain basing privileges kept the aircraft (except the Sea Kings) out of theatre for almost two months: after both the Army and the Navy were in theatre. The Canadian Air Force has recognized equipment deficiencies and is struggling to address them¹²² but there are also personnel and interoperability issues challenging the Air Force, all in the face of insufficient resources.

Space is also growing in importance. Space-based communications and navigation support is commercially available, though subject to interception and deception. Space-based applications enabling better navigation, communication, data handling and management, and precision targeting are becoming widespread. Access to these applications is readily available on the internet. In the next 20 years, state-sponsored military forces will exploit these capabilities and some non-state, terrorist organizations will exploit some or all of these capabilities as well. Canada has a small but active space programme, in which DND is a significant player, and the CF is starting to exploit global communications capabilities as well as space-based surveillance capabilities.

has diminished: what took 10000 men in 1000 bombers in WWII can now be achieved by two men in a B-2 with modern weapons.

¹²² John Ward. "Air force plans for new transport planes appear dead, say analysts." (Waterloo: <http://www.therecord.com/news/national/n040613A.html>, 06 Apr 02).

U.S. forces have now formally designated command and control mechanisms as weapons systems, and use global communications networks to link combat elements anywhere in the world to command and control elements located in the continental USA.¹²³

Command and control systems will now follow similar programme protocols to warships, aircraft, and vehicles, and will enable U.S. commanders and staffs to run a campaign from the continental U.S. – minimizing deployment requirements and risk to command and control staffs.

Interoperability

Canadian forces must be interoperable amongst themselves and with their allies in order to achieve the degree of coordination required for modern military operations, but the three services are diverging.¹²⁴ However, Canadian Forces units have been highly compatible within combined forces. Canadian naval units are readily integrated into U.S. naval battle groups, and until very recently Canadian aircraft were readily integrated into USN, USAF, or NATO operations.¹²⁵ Canadian Army units are equally readily integrated into U.S. and coalition operations, and the CF is a participant in some U.S. C2 systems. The lack of interoperability within the CF is due to the requirement to be

¹²³ Note the headquarters for operations in Afghanistan is in Florida: the requirement to deploy large numbers of headquarters staff is evaporating – forward deployment is politically-driven requirement more than operationally-driven. Technological advances in command and control systems will continue to ameliorate this requirement. Although it will likely always be necessary for the commander to visit the troops in situ as well as meet local leaders and stake-holders on scene, the growing support tail will more often be left at home.

¹²⁴ The Army has just implemented the IRIS (Tactical Command and Control System {TCCS}) communications system, but the Air Force and Navy have no TCCS capability. The Navy and Aurora communities use Link 11, but no Air Force aircraft use Link 16, the de facto standard Western air force data link. The Aurora is incorporating new imaging sensors which could be of direct benefit to the Army, but the data link standard for downlinking imagery from intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) assets such as Joint Surveillance Targeting and Reconnaissance System (JSTARS) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)s, the tactical common data link (TCDL), is not planned for the CP140 fleet.

interoperable with allies taking precedence over the requirement to be interoperable within our own force. The unofficial expectation is that since Canadian units will always operate as part of a combined force, it is more important to be horizontally interoperable (interoperable with similar units from other nations) than vertically interoperable (interoperable with dissimilar units from the CF). As our allies move to become more joint, we will also inevitably become more joint. For the CF to effectively conduct independent operations, however, the Canadian Forces must be proactive and take concrete steps towards establishing joint interoperability in order to ensure that if the worst comes to pass, Canadian forces can operate independently to complete their mission.

Alliances

The U.S. is universally acknowledged within CF documents as the nation with whom it will most likely find itself allied in combat: this close relationship will continue for the next two decades. Our other alliances are less important and continue to diminish in importance both from our perspective and from theirs. The European Union has embarked on a programme to establish a European expeditionary force, and ultimately a standing European military force.¹²⁶ In the near term, European military forces will not

¹²⁵ Following the upgrade programmes to the Aurora and Hornet fleets, the ease with which integration used to occur should be reestablished, at least from a technical perspective.

¹²⁶ Chris Morris. "The EU's military ambitions." (London: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/in_depth/world/2001/review_of_2001/newsid_1735000/1735223.stm, 31 Dec 2001). Morris attributes Javier Solana with the drive to establish a European military. The Europeans, through the EU, have embarked on a programme to establish a European Air Group with its own airlift, air refueling capability, and air combat capability. It has announced its intention to establish an army 60,000 strong, deployable within 60 days. It has also postulated that a standing European military force, controlled by the EU but funded by the member states should eventually be created, and that nations which insist on retaining own forces would be

rival U.S. technical or operational superiority but in two decades the situation may be different. The population, economic power, and wealth of the European Union could enable the Europeans to achieve a status not dissimilar to that of the US.¹²⁷

The status of NATO is cast into question as the EU grows in power and influence. Eventually, NATO may best be remembered as successfully imposing peace on the European continent for over half a century, and that role may continue in terms of a political alliance. It may be that over the next two decades, the EU will become the second of twin pillars of NATO, the U.S. being the first, with non-EU countries aligned with the West (such as Canada, or Australia) either bolstering their forces and becoming important middle powers, or accepting something less and fading into impotence.

Alternatively, the EU may supplant NATO as the organization responsible for collective defence of Europe. NATO must then seek another mission, perhaps as a “regional UN” intermediate in scope of powers and ambition between the UN on the one hand, and the EU and North America on the other. NATO might fall victim to its successful enlargement, in that consensus becomes impossible to achieve and the momentum of leadership and relevance slips to another

The United Nations, for all the criticism it suffers and the faults it may have, is the one forum bringing all the world's nations together. The UN fosters a wide variety of activities and organizations, and extends legitimacy to state actions by requesting or sanctioning them. It also provides a venue to condemn state actions if appropriate. Although UN-controlled military actions have fallen out of favour, obtaining UNSC or UNGA approval is an important, perhaps indispensable step in establishing a coalition and taking concrete action. The UN is facing evolutionary pressures, but it will evolve and it will remain a critically important forum in which Canada will pursue its national goals and foreign policy objectives. In light of its expressed desire to support rules-based international organizations, Canada must continue to support the UN, and should plan to again lead peace-keeping missions.

There is a clear trend away from large, permanent alliances and international military organizations in terms of command and control for a given operation. Instead, "coalitions of the willing" are becoming the norm: small groups of nations sharing common objectives, means, and will undertake operations against a foe, ordinarily soliciting approval and hence legitimacy from other agencies. A coalition can be specifically constructed of compatible forces, and the emerging popularity of coalitions supports the notion that no one nation will undertake major military action unilaterally.¹²⁸ Examples include the U.S. in the Gulf War (Desert Storm), France in Rwanda (Op Turquoise), and the U.S. again in the on-going Enduring Freedom. In each case, the UN and/or NATO support was solicited but the coalitions acted without submitting to UN or

¹²⁷ Chris Morris. "The EU's military ambitions."

¹²⁸ James Travers. "Share defence or be tossed aside." [The Toronto Star](#).

NATO command and control. Coalitions will not threaten the existence or purpose of alliances such as NATO, but they may become the principal means of effecting military aims.

Sovereignty and Statehood

The trends to globalization, particularly with respect to commerce, notwithstanding, legitimacy of the state remains strong. Canadian efforts in the 90s to disengage from “states” and support “human security” are reversing. The power of the state to control traffic across its borders, at one point thought to be diminishing, may ultimately be enhanced by global information networks. The flows of people, money and goods will become more transparent and even “private” mechanisms such as hawala will be incorporated into “above ground” financial systems.^{129, 130} The continued integration of global banking systems and intelligence networks, and the emerging legitimacy of visibility into trade and flow of funds, will ultimately lead to greater difficulty in funding terrorist or major criminal networks without attracting scrutiny to both the perpetrators and the supporters. The perceived loss of sovereignty due to the internet and an increasingly assertive international arbitration system is counterbalanced by the increasingly strong rules based international system in which states are the key actors – arguably resulting in a net gain in sovereignty. A new world order is arising, but nation-states remain principal actors in it.

¹²⁹ Robert McMahon. “UN: Security Council Begins to Assess Country Actions on Terrorism.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Report. (<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/14012002102730.asp>, 14 Jan 2002).

¹³⁰ Manuel Perez-Rivas. "Terrorists' money trail probe relies on familiar tactics."
(<http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/11/01/inv.money.trail/index.html>, 01 Nov 01).

The Next Two Decades

Canadian foreign and defence policy is unlikely to change over the next two decades, nor is Canadian fiscal support of the military likely to change significantly in the next few years, but there is an apparent window of opportunity in the 2004-2005 time frame to seek increased long-term funding. Clearly, over the next 20 years the Canadian Forces will be expected to support Canadian sovereignty not just over the Canadian land mass and territorial waters including the Northwest Passage and Arctic Archipelago, but over waters of economic interest at least out to 200 nautical miles, possibly further. The Canadian Forces will also be expected to perform a range of tasks which are not necessarily military but which cannot be readily performed by any other organization on short notice. Equally clearly, the Canadian Forces will be expected to perform expeditionary tasks in concert with Allies and the CF must also prepare to lead coalitions, providing the bulk of combat and combat support elements.

Wars of the next 20 years will be regional in terms of combat operations, but may be global in terms of impact. Major threats to stability include “rogue” states acting directly or indirectly, ideological or religious conflicts, terrorists, and armed conflict which supports economic interests and thus will continue as long as it is in the economic interest of one or both parties to continue. Suppression or prevention of armed conflict may be enhanced by improved insight into the flow of funding, by increased intelligence sharing, and in the long term, by arms control efforts. If peace enforcement is 80-90 % political

and economic factors and 10-20 % military factors,¹³¹ then it is important that the combat phase be short, violent, precise and controlled. This necessitates efficient, responsive command and control, and implies extensive networks tying weapons delivery platforms, ISR platforms, and combat support functions into one cohesive unit.

After a steady decline to 1998, global military spending is on the rise in absolute terms, driven mostly by the U.S, but level in relative terms. Military forces are modernizing and have declined in size but some are now better trained and equipped with more sophisticated weapons systems. Land forces are becoming lightly equipped, highly trained, and accompanied by vehicles and equipment which is specifically designed to fit airlift limitations. Air forces will be equipped with long range sensors and precision-guided weapons, and will be capable of all-weather, day or night operation around the globe. Navies will continue to refocus on littoral operations, supporting the inland battle: open ocean, blue-water warfare is unlikely for the foreseeable future if only because no state will be able to challenge the US.

Sovereignty

In terms of sovereignty, the CF meets or exceeds the expectations of the government and the public in general, with the exception of surveillance.¹³² With the possible exception of the Rangers, no resources exist specifically and exclusively to support sovereignty.

¹³¹ Dr Thierry Gongorra. Lecture “The Use of Air Power in Peace Enforcement/Peacekeeping.” Toronto, Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course 28, 28 Feb 02.

¹³² A possible exception to this rule is SAR in the high Arctic. In 1991 a CC130 crashed near CFS Alert, on Ellesmere Island. The inability of SAR assets to quickly get to the crash site, either overland from Alert or by air from Southern Canada, highlighted serious operational limitations to SAR efforts in the high Arctic.

Sovereignty is assumed by most Canadians, who also assume that it is not challenged. Consequently, Canada has not applied much effort to asserting sovereignty. The development of “Northern Command (NorthCom)” in the U.S.¹³³ will impose upon Canada a more stringent approach to surveillance of Canadian waters, airspace, and territory. Canada must either participate in NorthCom, or risk subjugation to U.S. defence imperatives as the U.S. pursues the NorthCom mission.

Severe erosion of surveillance activities, coupled with the absence of a common operating picture (COP) encompassing all Canadian areas of interest, are the principal obstructions to monitoring Canadian territory: Canada must correct these deficiencies by resuming surveillance activities and by establishing an integrated surveillance system. The Canadian Forces have been experimenting with coastal radars, a chain of which would provide continuous coverage of territorial waters out to approximately the limit of the exclusive economic zone (200 nautical mile limit). Coupling this system with surveillance efforts of other government departments and the other surveillance assets of the CF would enable the establishment of a national COP – a depiction of air and maritime activity, and potentially land activity, over all Canadian areas of interest and updated in real or near-real time. Currently, the coastal radar system is only envisaged for the East coast but it could, and should, be extended to all three coasts.¹³⁴

¹³³ Colin Robinson. “Northern Command finally announced: details still to be worked through.” Terrorism. (Washington: Centre for Defense (sic) Information, <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/northcom.cfm>, 30 Apr 02).

¹³⁴ LCdr Steve Jorgensen. “Surveillance of Canada’s EEZ with High Frequency Surface Wave Radar.” Ex Leonardo da Vinci essay, Canadian Forces College, 2002, 13.

Marine traffic, including fishing vessels, should be required to participate in a marine traffic control network, similar to that in which aircraft participate. Surveillance aircraft could be used more efficiently, having an on-board display of the COP, and assuming a reactive, cued role in investigating contacts which are not participating in the maritime traffic control system. In addition, patrols would be conducted for unreported, illegal activities such as polluting, or surveillance of gaps in the coastal radar sweeps. The areas of interest must extend to “interior” waters such as the Gulf of St Lawrence and Hudson Bay. Surveillance units such as Air Force aircraft and vessels of the Navy, DFO, and CCG would receive a real or near-real time broadcast of the COP while conducting operations, aiding them in deciding what targets should be pursued. The technology to do this exists today, and similar nets are in operation amongst our allies.¹³⁵

As the NorthWest Passage opens up and becomes important commercially, traffic between the Pacific and the Atlantic can be expected to increase. Additionally, natural resources in the Arctic will become more accessible, economically competitive, and thus subject to competing claims. The fragility of the Arctic environment, the requirement to monitor activities such as shipping traffic and to be able to respond to incidents mandates a visible presence. Dedicated patrol should be undertaken particularly at times and locations of suspected incursions, such as by poachers or prospectors. Actions such as these will serve to increase the ability of the Canadian Forces to operate in the Arctic, and respond to calls for assistance – solidifying Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic.

¹³⁵ Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange System (OTCIXS), for example.

Ultimately the Canadian Forces must be capable of confronting and defeating armed incursions into Canadian areas of interest. The “Turbot War” of March 1995 did not escalate into an armed confrontation, but the potential did exist. Recently, arrests similar to that which triggered the Turbot War have been made.¹³⁶ Whether Canada could muster sufficient forces to enforce the Canadian position either in a “Turbot War”, or to catch an unidentified submarine is not the point so much as the fact that entirely unforeseen events are occurring, some of which could result in an armed conflict. The Canadian Forces must be armed, trained, lead and publicly determined to resist any armed threat to Canada and Canadian interests.

Foreign and Defence Policy Imperatives

The basic tenets of Canadian foreign policy are likely to continue to be:

- a. security through alliances;
- b. promotion and participation in international organizations to ensure rules-based interactions between states; and
- c. promotion of Canadian values and beliefs.

Similarly, Canadian defence policy is likely to continue to be:

- a. protection of sovereignty; and
- b. participation in alliances or coalitions with nations which share our interests, possibly in support of UN missions.

¹³⁶ “Foreign vessel accused of illegal fishing, dumping oil off Grand Banks.” (http://cbc.ca/stories/2002/03/21/olga_fish020321, 21 Mar 02).

Although reviews of both foreign and defence policy are expected in the immediate future, significant departure from precedence is highly unlikely, as discussed earlier.

The Canadian military, therefore, should expect its tasks (apart from sovereignty enforcement and domestic tasks) over the next two decades to be combat and peace-keeping or peace-making operations either as participant or lead nation, and also, in the worst case, independently. Combat is likely to be in the context of limited, regional war although a larger, more complex war is possible (for example, with Iraq or North Korea). Peace-keeping or making/enforcement operations might be “classical”, as in the Suez Crisis or Ethiopia/Eritrea, or they might follow the model of the Balkan conflicts. The notion that Canada will only ever deploy as part of a coalition is false and runs against the government’s demonstrated expectations: the Canadian military may be required to act independently the next time a Rwanda or Zaire arises. In order for Canada to influence the outcome of international events, the Canadian military must prepare itself to lead a military coalition, and when leading, to contribute a significant share of the combat and combat support capability – not just a headquarters.

Defence Planning

The Defence Plan establishes a series of benchmarks, for which the CF is to prepare itself. These include policy, forces, and response times. The Department of National Defence 2001-2002 Report on Plans and Priorities¹³⁷ (RPP) also identifies spending priorities and projects which are being pursued by the Department. However, the

Canadian Forces are undermanned and under-funded for the tasks identified in the Defence Plan and RPP. The Defence Plan reads more like a list of what the CF has, and should do with it, than a plan which aligns policy with funding, capability, and on-going operations, highlights deficiencies, and provides either a road-map or recommendations for correcting the deficiencies. The RPP provides a list of projects, but doesn't align them with either policy or capabilities. Other plans exist, but carry little weight,¹³⁸ and at the end of the day the best planning tools all depend upon the entering arguments: what does the government expect of the military, and what is the government prepared to pay?

Canada gets good value for money with respect to the CF, however, the CF is unable to sustain the current level of deployment: recruits are too few, retention is too low, equipment is becoming obsolete, and the CF is not adequately supported on diplomatic fronts. The OAG stated "We found continuing problems in readiness, internal efficiency, and program affordability during the 1990s."¹³⁹ The gap between funding and requirement ranges from \$750M to \$5B annually, depending upon the source of the estimate. If the government is not prepared to address the challenges confronting DND, then it must revise its expectations of the CF sharply downwards. The Australian government's 2000 White Paper delineates in detail the expectations of the government, matches those expectations to resources, and provides funding over the long term to the

¹³⁷ Department of National Defence 2001-2002 Report on Plans and Priorities. (Ottawa: http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/dfppc/pubs/rpp01/intro_e.asp, 2001).

¹³⁸ An Aerospace Capability Framework (ACF) exists in the Air Force, for example, but it appears more as a wish list of one environment than a roadmap to the future.

¹³⁹ "Reflections on a decade of serving Parliament." Report of the Auditor General February 2001 (Ottawa: http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/01cap_e.html#0.2.O8ADB6.QK0WWS.49A09G.Y4, downloaded 12 Mar 02).

Australian Defence Force (ADF) to meet those expectations.¹⁴⁰ The clear guidance and the stable funding matched directly to expectations will allow the ADF to develop a realistic, achievable plan and accordingly will enable supporting industries to plan their programmes. The Canadian Government and DND provide guidance, but do not match funding or resources to that guidance nor is a funding plan for the balance of the decade provided: Canada would do well to follow Australia's lead.

Options

Under no circumstances is the status quo acceptable – all stakeholders from the political parties to the Department of National Defence agree on this point.¹⁴¹ The Department conducted three reviews, one for each environment, from 1999 to 2001. The consequence has been an attempt to maintain fleets but at a lower level of numbers, activity, or readiness. The Maritime Forces are assessed by the Auditor General as having successfully adjusted to the lower budget already,¹⁴² and the Land Forces expect to have realigned successfully by 2004. The Air Force, however, is unable to operate to expectations within the current restraints. The Air Force has cut some activities, is only modernizing approximately 2/3 of the CF18 fleet and plans to dispose of 25% of the CP140/140A fleet. Savings attributable to these kinds of cuts are negligible and may yield false economies as the remaining fleet is subject to a higher usage rate. Either

¹⁴⁰ Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/>, downloaded 14 Apr 02).

¹⁴¹ Department of National Defence 2001-2002 Report on Plans and Priorities. (Ottawa: http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/dfppc/pubs/rpp01/intro_e.asp, 2001) iv.

¹⁴² "Reflections on a decade of serving Parliament". Report of the Auditor General February 2001.

entire fleets must be cut along with associated capabilities, or funding must be increased to match commitments.

The Department's plans lack guidance on achieving joint interoperability across the CF, nor are there plans to address doctrinal issues. Alignment of requirements to support a rapidly deployable force globally is not in place: the Army is buying vehicles (LAV IIIs) which don't fit in the Air Force's CC130 transport airplanes, and the Air Force's desires to operate a fleet of aircraft which could handle the Army's vehicles are stymied by the Government, which balks at increasing the defence budget. Under these conditions, there are a number of options which present themselves:

1. Decreasing expectations (no increase in funding):
 - a. "niche" capabilities; and
 - b. the Royal Canadian Military Institute model.
3. Funding expectations (increasing funding to match expectations):
 - a. the Conference of Defence Associates model; and
 - b. an independent capability model.

Niche Capabilities

The first option is for the CF to abandon all pretenses of being a multi-purpose force. Instead, the CF could pursue "niche capabilities", and provide specialized units to coalitions. An example would be light infantry or reconnaissance units incorporating the Coyote: these units would participate in the operations of others, relying upon the others

to get them to and from the operations area. Under this model, the existing funding and personnel envelopes would not be altered. The Navy and the Army being nearly in line with current budget constraints, most of the cuts would necessarily be applied to the Air Force. Essentially, the search and rescue, tactical helicopter, and maritime helicopter fleets would have to be maintained, leaving the air transport, surveillance, and fighter fleets subject to elimination. Selecting this option fails to meet Canada's requirements in support of sovereignty, and undercuts Canada's expressed desires to influence international events, military and non-military. This option, then, is not tenable without a major realignment of Canadian foreign and defence policy.

Royal Canadian Military Institute

Another option is to restructure and re-equip the CF entirely. In the Royal Canadian Military Institute's (RCMI) publication, "A Wake Up Call for Canada – The Need for a New Military", the RCMI calls for the establishment of two amphibious forces comprising "naval, air/helicopter, infantry, artillery, engineer and support elements to form a Joint Task Force", and "three air portable battle groups". "A training facility and a skeleton HQ would be established in the Arctic."¹⁴³ The RCMI proposal also departs significantly from the doctrinal basis of multi-purpose combat capable forces. Like the niche option, air power is virtually abandoned in their proposal, and little attention is paid to sovereignty and surveillance issues. The military becomes very much an expeditionary force, supporting Canadian foreign policy. Although the RCMI expects their proposal to remain within the existing funding envelope, it is hard to envisage a

complete re-equipping and retraining of the CF while remaining within the existing budget. On the grounds that surveillance and sovereignty are not supported, and the CF would become a specialist force rather than a multi-purpose force, this option is also untenable without a reorientation of foreign and defence policy.

If Canada wishes to remain a key player internationally, funding to the diplomatic (DFAIT), aid (CIDA), and military (DND) arms of the government simply must increase.

No one of these is any less important than the other – all three play a role in ensuring Canadian concerns are given fair consideration in international deliberations.

The next two options both involve increasing resources to meet expectations.

CDA

The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) published “A Strategic Assessment – Canada’s Response to the New Challenges of International Security,”¹⁴⁴ advocating a revitalized Canadian Forces not too different from the current Force in structure, but manned and equipped fully and with the militia integrated into Army operations. The CDA used a three level model of conflict and associated forces with each:

- a. rapid reaction: a naval task group of 4-5 combatants with helicopters and at least two naval support vessels with temporary accommodations for up to 1500 personnel, an infantry battle group, 1500 strong, with combat vehicles, fire

¹⁴³ Matthew Gaasenbeek et al., “The Restructuring of Canada’s Armed Forces”. A Wake Up Call for Canada – The Need for a New Military. (Toronto: Royal Canadian Military Institute, 2001) 2, 16-18.

¹⁴⁴ Defence Policy Committee of the Conference of Defence Associations. “A Strategic Assessment - Canada’s Response to the New Challenges of International Security.” (Ottawa: <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/strat99.htm>, 1999).

support, and integral armed and tactical helicopter support), airlift, fighters, a joint headquarters and a national support element;

b. reinforcement: a brigade group, with air transport and integral logistic support; and

c. restoration: military, other governmental departments and non-governmental organizations. The military component could include specialist capabilities such as the Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART).

The CDA proposes commitment to existing DND projects, such as the maritime helicopter replacement programme, the CP140 and CF18 modernization programmes, and a strategic AAR programme. The CDA further identifies the three Army brigades as operating well below strength, and proposes tailoring each one (general purpose, special forces, and mechanized). The militia is identified as also providing a brigade, to augment the regular force brigades when the combat phase of an operation is over. Other recommendations are made, including extracting the Army from the Balkans and reviewing Alternate Service Delivery (ASD), to maximize efficiency and capability.

The CDA assesses the defence budget must increase by approximately 10% annually to support a CF of this size on an on-going basis. In addition, a little less than \$1B is required in the near term to address looming equipment concerns. An effort of this magnitude on the part of the government would correct many deficiencies and restore the CF to its planned and oft-stated, but unrealized, capabilities. However, the CDA does not

address domestic operations or independent operations – both key to ensuring Canadian interests are considered internationally.

Independent Operations

If Canada is to truly exert influence internationally, the CF must be seen to be capable of mounting and leading meaningful military operations. Canada need not acquire nuclear powered submarines, or aircraft carriers to achieve this goal, nor weapons of mass destruction. However, Canada does need to establish a visible capability to enforce Canadian sovereignty over territorial interests, including 200 or even 250 nautical mile EEZs, and the CF does need to establish and demonstrate the capability of conducting independent operations indefinitely.

Beyond surveillance imperatives, most domestic operations can be successfully conducted by CF units as a consequence of their combat training. The single most important factor lacking in effective sovereignty operations is an operations and/or data fusion centre, which would correlate inputs from all assets from all government agencies to establish a common operating picture covering at least Canadian areas of interest, though there's no reason it could not be expanded to cover the globe. The operations centre would monitor and assign assets to investigate incidents or gaps in the surveillance picture. Once this centre is underway, further development and integration of surveillance systems can occur.

The CF must establish a visible presence to demonstrate resolve and operational capability, and the CF must publicize its activities so that the public understands the purpose and value of these operations. Military activities should be publicized throughout Canada, especially in the Canadian Arctic where sovereignty may be questioned: to wait until trouble arises will be far more costly than re-establishing an effective Arctic presence, and may be too late. In Southern Canada, military activities occasionally make the news but as isolated events – not as part of a long term, planned campaign. Small-scale deployments of military forces to the Arctic such as the Army’s “sovereignty operations” or Ranger patrols should be continued and widely publicized. The Air Force’s Aurora patrols in the High Arctic should be re-established, and Air Force operations in the Arctic publicized. Given the increasing importance of the North West Passage, Naval patrols of the passage should also be conducted routinely. Demonstration of resolve and capability can occur through public pursuit of suspected violations of any kind, whether pollution or fishing or penetration of airspace, territorial waters, or land.

The “veil of secrecy” applied to such operations, whether intended or not, is counterproductive. The CF must publicize both the triggers and the reactions to them – whether successful or not. By raising awareness of the existence and scale of the threat to sovereignty, and the CF’s ability to respond, the Canadian public will be better informed about suspicious activities in and around Canada.

For the most part, the operations of most interest will remain deployed operations. These operations must directly support foreign policy objectives. Comparing the Suez Crisis and the still-born deployment to Zaire highlights four principal lessons:

- a. presence;
- b. force composition;
- c. credibility; and
- d. command and control.

Presence

Canada must establish presence and routinely operate in theatres on a global basis. If a particular theatre is identified as being of interest over a given period of time, Canada should establish a relationship with a host nation in that theatre. This should be regarded as simply the cost of doing business as an internationally engaged nation. The delay in arrival in theatre of Air Force units in support of OP APOLLO could have been hours instead of nearly two months, had an arrangement been in place for Canadian Air Force units to operate routinely in that theatre. While future requirements can never be forecast, a small but visible and routine presence can be established globally which will greatly enhance Canada's ability to participate in any theatre.

Force Composition

Force composition must also be addressed in the context of deployed operations. In the Suez, Canada lead and contributed combat troops (not just headquarters and logistics support) to the peace-keeping force, and Canadian military credibility was high in the

aftermath of WWII and Korea. In Zaire, no Canadian combat troops were committed, Canadian military credibility was badly tarnished following Rwanda, and the offer of Canadian leadership did not attract support from any other country. Canada could not even support its assessment of the situation but relied upon reports from NGOs and other countries – each with their own idiosyncratic biases. It follows that to be more engaged internationally, Canada must be capable of mounting joint operations in order to successfully conduct operations independently. Canadian operations may be in support of UN missions, but should remain under Canadian national command.

Credibility

Canadian military credibility must be reestablished, if Canada wishes to be taken seriously internationally. There is little doubt that Canadian combat units are the equal of any, but the political resolve and the bureaucracy translating that resolve into policy and action are suspect. When Canada commits to an operation, the guidelines must be clear¹⁴⁵ and if support is required it should come immediately and unquestioned. Political will, on the part of the government and DND, must not waver and the bureaucracy must be streamlined and focused on supporting operations. Until this resolve is demonstrated consistently, Canadian offers to lead a mission will not attract much interest and, consequently, Canadian efforts to influence international events will be diminished.

To focus command and control on operations, operators must have primacy and command and control networks must be common throughout the CF. Common data link

standards must be established, and global transmission of information must be enabled. The data links must also be interoperable with our key allies, principally the U.S. and the rest of NATO, and to some extent they already are at a tactical level. At a national level, there is no need for internationally common transmission standards: a gateway to enable transmission of data or information back and forth, coupled with either an accepted format of data or a recognized format which can be converted by the recipient to support their needs is adequate. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance functions of the CF must feed the central, national data correlation centre which would “rebroadcast” the data to subordinate operations centres and appropriate tactical units such as long range patrol aircraft, air defence units, or warships.

Canadian command and control relationships are sometimes unclear and confusing. The DND matrix does not accommodate clear lines of responsibility or accountability, with the consequence that decision-making and action is impeded. The Canadian military currently divides itself into “force generation” and “force employment” activities. A third category of activity is “oversight” activities. Typically, the “force generation” activities are assigned to the environmental commanders, and the “force employment” activities are assigned to regional operational commanders domestically, or the DCDS internationally. The domestic operational commanders are environmental commanders, in that the positions are ‘always’ from one environment. This institutionalizes environmental parochialism and inter-service rivalry, and introduces an extra step in the

¹⁴⁵ BGen Robin Gagnon. “Multilateral Intervention Forces.” Policy Options, March 2000, <http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/po0301.htm>: 19.

transition from “peacetime” domestic operations to “wartime” (or combat) deployed operations.

An alternative command and control structure would leave force generation activities with the environments, under the VCDS, and all force employment activities under the control of the DCDS. A useful model to follow in establishing this is the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) of the UK. Environments “generate forces” and once they’ve reached a level of proficiency roughly at the unit level, they are assigned to the PJHQ. The PJHQ conducts training to bring the units to a “joint” standard, making them combat ready, and then employs them as required in fulfillment of tasks from the government. In Canada, domestic operations would essentially be a permanent joint operating area encompassing all operations within domestic airspace, waters of interest, and land mass, with a joint force commander under the DCDS. Deployed operations would also be joint operating areas, though not permanent, and each with a JFC under the DCDS. A notional organization chart is as follows:




Figure 4. Notional Organizational Chart. Compare with the organizational chart on the DND website.¹⁴⁶

Force generation and force employment activities should be the domain of the CDS.

“Oversight” or “watchdog” and policy defining activities could become the domain of the Deputy Minister.

Policy and Doctrine

¹⁴⁶ D-Net Site Map. (Ottawa: http://www.dnd.ca/inside/site_map_e.htm, 2002).

The structure of the CF should mirror doctrine and policy: which should derive both from what is known to work, and what is known to be the requirement. Given the U.S. Army has decided the minimum self-sufficient combat unit is a brigade, the CF must populate brigades in accordance with the CF's policy that the Army rotate on a 1:4 deployment ratio, the CF needs five fully equipped, fully populated Brigades for Coalition participation under some form of independent Canadian command. If the CF truly expects to deploy tactically self-sufficient units (TSSUs) which train and work as a functional organization, then all tactical level units should become self-sufficient. If Air Force squadrons are expected to be TSSUs, every squadron should include aircrew, groundcrew, and associated support personnel. The practice of drawing individuals from across the CF to fill in a vacant position on deployment should be terminated, or at least become the exception rather than the rule.

The CF has clear equipment shortfalls to overcome to achieve its missions to 2020. The CF is in line with other western military trends, planning towards a rapidly deployable, relatively light force, expanding ISR resources, and pursuing precision guided weapons. Although these requirements have been identified and are supported within DND, they are not being funded. The absence of airlift coupled with aging fleets in the Army and Air Force are perhaps the two most pressing equipment issues. More important than equipment shortfalls are personnel shortages: to meet the needs of an expanding CF over the next two decades, personnel recruiting and retention must be addressed.

Conclusion

Canada seeks to influence international events in order to promote Canadian values, international stability, and economic prosperity for Canada and the world. This foreign policy has been published and pursued since the end of World War II, in spite of changes in the international environment. Similarly, Canadian defence policy has been consistent in its support of sovereignty, and participation within international alliances or coalitions. However, the Canadian Federal Government has been relentless in its pursuit of reduction of the national debt, establishing the achievement of a debt:GDP ratio as the de facto national priority. The tenacity with which the Government pursued this priority has resulted in forecast achievement of their published goals within two to three years, but at a significant cost to other programmes, including the CF. This erosion has manifested itself in a severely eroded capacity of the CF to carry out its published, assigned missions domestically and internationally.

The consequence of the inability of the CF to carry out its missions, coupled with similar erosion in DFAIT and CIDA, has been a diminished influence of Canada in international arenas. Canada is not able to influence other nations to join in conducting peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations, the projection of Canadian values. Canada's credibility in taking a stand on issues involving military force is weak, further diminishing the projection of Canadian values and Canadian support for, and participation in the establishment of, international rules-based organizations. Canada's withdrawal from forward deployed operating locations has also minimized Canadian influence in regions,

and consequently lessened the potential for participation in economic growth in those regions.

For the next two decades, wars are likely to be regional, intrastate conflicts involving non-state actors. The causes of these wars are likely to be non-traditional, and peace may not be easily negotiated. Rapidly deployable forces, relatively small in number but highly trained and well-equipped will be most suitable. However, potential does exist for global involvement and locally catastrophic conflict, and Canada must be prepared to undertake combat under those conditions: heavy armour and large naval forces may be encountered under these conditions. In addition to expeditionary operations, Canada must demonstrably strengthen its ability to monitor and control activities in or near Canadian territories, waters, and airspace.

The Canadian Forces cannot retain its assigned missions and structure, and remain within its funding envelope. Eliminating or reducing further CF participation internationally implies a major reorientation of foreign and defence policy. Increasing funding marginally will enable the CF to retain its structure, but the CF will still be unable to conduct its assigned missions according to Government policy and CF doctrine. Only by aligning CF force structure with CF doctrine, actively pursuing participation in operations and exercises in theatres of interest to demonstrate capability and resolve, and by establishing a visible and credible presence domestically through monitoring and control of activities, will the CF be able to carry out its assigned missions. To achieve this re-entry onto the international stage will require significant investment in the Canadian

Forces by the Federal Government. Happily, there is a window of opportunity approaching during which the Federal Government may find it is able to increase its funding of the CF.

Bibliography

- “1994 Defence White Paper.” Ottawa: http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/pol_docs/94wp/white_paper_94.html, 1994.
- Armstrong, GP. “Spotlight on the Russian Federation.” Strategic Assessment 2001. Ottawa: Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Policy Planning Division, Policy Group, Department of National Defence, 2001.
- Army Transformation Panel, Institute for Land Warfare. Briefing (on-line): “Army Transformation.” <http://www.army.mil/usa/AUSA%20Web/PDF%20Files/Mod%20Brief%20Web%20Version.pdf>, 17 Oct 01.
- Alison Auld. “Nova Scotia fisherman hauling in ‘pathetic’ catch of dying oiled birds.” <http://ca.news.yahoo.com/020308/6/kpxs.html>. 08 Mar 02.
- Balaban, Mihai. Transport Canada Enforcement Division. Address: “Transport Canada Briefing, Pollution violations and A/C (aircraft) flying.” 14 Wing Ground Training Day Lecture. 14 Wing Greenwood, Nova Scotia, received 50 Feb 2002 (prior to address).
- Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. 3rd edition. New York: The Free Press, 1988.
- Bland, Douglas, ed. Canada’s National Defence. 2 vols. Kingston: Queen’s UP, 1997.
- Budget 2001- Budget Plan. Ottawa: <http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget01/bp/bpch3e.htm#fp2>, 2001.
- Canada in the World: Government Statement. Ottawa: Canada Communication Group – Publishing, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1995.
- Canada’s Decision in the Fall of 1996 to Propose and Lead a Peacekeeping Force to Zaire as well as the Subsequent Decision to Withdraw the Force (A)96-1168. 3 parts. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1996.
- The Canadian Way in the 21st Century. Ottawa: http://pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=keyinitiatives&Sub=thecanadianwayinthestcen&Doc=thecanadianwayinthestcen_e.htm, 2000.
- Copeland, Darryl. “Hard reality, soft power: Canadian foreign policy in the era of globalization.” Behind the Headlines 55(4) (1998): 2-4.
- Cultural Sovereignty. Ottawa: <http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/issues/cultural/>.

- D-Net Site Map. Ottawa: http://www.dnd.ca/inside/site_map_e.htm, 2002.
- Davies, Dwight. Briefing to CSC28 “Command in Operations.” 01 Mar 02.
- Declaration of Policy. Calgary: http://www.canadianalliance.ca/yourprinciples/policy_declare/index.html, 2000.
- Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force. Canberra: <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/>, 2000.
- Defence Plan 2001. Ottawa: http://www.vcds.forces.ca/dgsp/dplan/intro_e.asp, 2001.
- Democracy’s Century – A Survey of Global Political Change in the 20th Century. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html>, 1999.
- Demont, John. “When lazy captains come to Canada.” Maclean’s 25 Feb 02. p. 11.
- Department of National Defence 2001-2002 Report on Plans and Priorities. Ottawa: http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/dfppc/pubs/rpp01/intro_e.asp, 2001.
- Election 2000 Platform. Ottawa: <http://www.pcparty.ca/en/policy/index.asp>, 2000.
- The European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. “The G8 and Conflict Prevention.” Ploughshares Monitor, June 2000. Waterloo: <http://ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/monj00d.html>, 2000.
- Fife, Robert. “No more money for defence: PM.” National Post 19 Mar 02. <http://www.NationalPost.com/home/story.html?f=/stories/20020319/378899.html>, 2002.
- “First fuel-cell submarine is christened at HDW.” <http://defence-data.com/current/page13976.htm>, 25 Mar 02.
- “Foreign vessel accused of illegal fishing, dumping oil off Grand Banks.” http://cbc.ca/stories/2002/03/21/olga_fish020321, 21 Mar 02.
- Gaasenbeek, Matthew, et al. A Wake-Up Call for Canada – The Need for a New Military. Toronto: Royal Canadian Military Institute, 2001.
- Gagnon, BGen Robin. “Multilateral Intervention Forces.” Policy Options, March 2001, <http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/po0301.htm>, 2001: 19-24.
- Gongorra, Thierry. Lecture “The Use of Air Power in Peace Enforcement/Peacekeeping.” 28 Feb 02.

- Gottlieb, Alan and Charles Dalfen. "The Changing Focus of Canadian Foreign Policy." American Journal of International Law 67(2) (1973): 229-258.
- Gottlieb, Alan and Charles Dalfen. "National Jurisdiction and International Responsibility: New Canadian Approaches to International Law." American Journal of International Law 67(2) (1973): 489-534.
- Harston, Julian. "Responding to Crises; are Current Policies and Practices the Answer?" Policy Options, March 2001, 51-55. <http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/po0301.htm>, 2001: 51-55.
- Henry, Sean, Peter Haydon, and Robert Morton. "A Strategic Assessment – Canada's Response to the New Challenges of International Security." Calgary: <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/english-frame.htm>.
- Hibler, Michelle, and Anne Chevalier, editors. Canadian Development Report 2000. Ottawa: The North South Institute, Renouf Publishing, Inc., 2000.
- Hubert, Don. "Resources, Greed, and the Persistence of Violent Conflict." Ploughshares Monitor, June 2000. Waterloo: <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/WORKING%20PAPERS/wp991.html>, 2000.
- Human Development Report 2001 Making Technologies Work for Human Development. United Nations: <http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/>, 2001.
- Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
- Jones, David. "Flaccid Follies (Canada and the World)." Maclean's 04 Mar 02.
- Jorgensen, Steve. "Surveillance of Canada's EEZ with High Frequency Surface Wave Radar." Ex Leonardo da Vinci Essay. Canadian Forces College, 2001.
- Leadmark The Navy's Strategy for 2020. Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, Department of National Defence, 2001.
- Leblanc, Daniel. "Canada defies U.S. on PoWs." Toronto: <http://globeandmail.com/> 17 Jan 2002: A1.
- Leininger, Chris. Suez 1956. 01 May 1996. <http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/suez.html>.
- Maritime Air Component (Atlantic). CP140 Yearly Flying Rate (YFR) data base. Halifax: Received Mar 2002.

- McMahon, Robert. "UN: Security Council Begins to Assess Country actions on Terrorism." Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty: <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/01/14012002102730.asp> , 14 Jan 2002.
- Members of The European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. "The G8 and Conflict Prevention." Ploughshares Monitor, June 2000. Waterloo: <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/monj00d.html>, 2000.
- Mintz, Jack. "Global Economy Offers Canada's Best Bet." Canadian Speeches. 15(2) (2001): 41-46.
- Morris, Chris. "The EU's military ambitions." http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/in_depth/world/2001/review_of_2001/newsid_1735000/1735223.stm, 31 Dec 2001.
- National Aerial Surveillance Program 1997-2001 Final Report. Ottawa: Canadian Coast Guard Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2001.
- National Defence 2001-2002 Report on Plans and Priorities. Ottawa: http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/dfppc/pubs/rpp01/intro_e.asp, 2002.
- New Democratic Party. <http://www.ndp.ca/issues/>, 2000.
- Nossal, Kim R. "Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of "Good International Citizenship" in Canadian Foreign Policy." International Journal 54(1) (1998/1999): 88-105.
- Opportunity for All – The Liberal Plan for the Future of Canada. Ottawa: <http://www.liberal.ca/lpc/common.asp?language=eng&pageview=platform&origin=index>, 2000.
- Pearson, Lester. The Crisis in the Middle East. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957.
- Perez-Rivas, Manuel. "Terrorists' money trail probe relies on familiar tactics." <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/11/01/inv.money.trail/index.html>, 01 Nov 01.
- Potter, Evan. "V. 1956 - The Suez Crisis and the Peacekeeping Debut." Ottawa: http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/med/class/teamedia/peace/part1/p1_11.htm downloaded 29 Jan 02.
- Le Quebec Gagne a Voter Bloc. Montreal: <http://www.blocquebécois.org/>, 2000.
- Regehr, Ernie. "Human Security and Military Procurement." Ploughshares Monitor, June 1999. Waterloo: <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/WORKING%20PAPERS/wp991.html>, 1999.

- Regehr, Ernie. "Armed Conflicts in 1999." Ploughshares Monitor, March 2000. Waterloo: <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/WORKING%20PAPERS/wp991.html>, 2000.
- "Reflections on a decade of serving Parliament." Report of the Auditor General February 2001. Ottawa: http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/01cap_e.html#0.2.O8ADB6.QK0WWS.49A09G.Y4, 2001.
- Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New York: http://www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm 15 Dec 1999.
- Reynolds, Rich. Briefing to CSC28 Air Symposium. Canadian Forces College, Toronto. 28 Mar 02.
- Robinson, Colin. "Northern Command finally announced: details still to be worked through." Terrorism. Washington: Centre for Defense (sic) Information, <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/northcom.cfm>. 30 Apr 02.
- Roussel, Stephane, and Charles Philippe David. "Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and International Security after the Cold War." American Review of Canadian Studies. 28(1/2) (1998): 131-156.
- Skons, Elizabeth et al, editors. "Military Expenditures and Arms Production." SIPRI Yearbook 2001- Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security. Stockholm: <http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yb01.html>. 2001.
- Slim, William. Defeat Into Victory. London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1988.
- Speed, Elizabeth. "Spotlight on China." Strategic Assessment 2001. Ottawa: Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Policy Planning Division, Policy Group, Department of National Defence, 2001.
- Stein, Eric. "International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight." American Journal of International Law. 95(3) (2001): 489-534.
- "A Strategic Assessment: Canada's Response to the New Challenges of International Security." Ottawa: <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/library/strat99.htm>, 1999.
- Suez Canal & Gaza Strip, 1956-1967. <http://www.bharatrakshak.com/CONFLICTS/Suez.html>.
- "The Suez Crisis and the Peacekeeping Debut." Ottawa: http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/med/class/teamedia/peace/part1/p1_11.htm.

Suez Crisis. Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network. 21 Feb 98.
<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/suez.htm>.

Suez: The Full Story. Ottawa: Our Past: The History of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/hist/suez-e.asp>.

Travers, James. "Share defence or be tossed aside." Editorial ("Opinion"). The Star Mar 02.

Tuck, Simon. "'War role beneficial for Canada, Manley says.'" Globe and Mail, 18 Mar 02. p. A-7.

The United Nations and the Suez Crisis.
http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/outreach/module2/Readings/UN_Suez.html.

The United Nations and the Situation in Rwanda. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1985. <gopher://gopher.undp.org/0/unearth/pko/rwanda.txt>