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THE FAST LANE TOWARDS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE

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Abstract

This paper begins with a short historical review of the origins of missile defence and describes the arguments, pro and against, that have been proposed over the years. The second section presents the effects of 'Sep 11' through a review of the 'new' threat assessments: the White House, Defence and State Department announcements and speeches, and the proposed enhanced security agenda. It then reviews the resulting dissension and surrounding debates that have emerged over the past months. Based on the elements presented and the evidence of recent U.S. actions, it proposes a probable American course of action.

The second part of the paper addresses missile defence from a Canadian perspective. In order to understand Canada's position, it begins with a review of Canada's Foreign policy in general terms and then focuses on the military aspects of it. It continues with a discussion on Canada's current position as a minor stakeholder and the lack of control in which it finds itself in the post-Sep 11 context. It then analyses the options that remain open to Canada and assesses whether or not Canada could maintain its 'middle of the road' position for very long. It proposes that Canada's close relationship with the U.S. combined with the 'new world order' has removed much of its ability to make its own decisions. The last section proposes a likely Canadian course of action and concludes that time has come for Canada to get off the fence and join the missile defence team.

THE FAST LANE TOWARDS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE

Introduction

If human history is a long sinuous road traveling through the valley of time, major world events like the terrorist attacks of Sep 11 are the road signs indicating sharp turns, abrupt slopes and dead-ends. Since that dark day, journalists and politicians alike speak of a new world order. In his address to the Nation following the terrible terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush declared that America had lost its innocence and sense of security forever.[1]

This sense of security has in fact been sought after for many years. Since the end of World War II, throughout the numerous conflicts that characterized the past 55 years, the Western Nations have faced a multitude of threats. One such threat dominated the Cold War and resulted in the doctrine known as MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction. MAD doctrine was based on the reciprocal fear of total retaliatory destruction to prevent either opponent from making the first move (known as the 'first strike'). One can hardly describe a nation protected by such a doomsday umbrella as "innocent" or having a real sense of security. It is, therefore, not surprising that after 40 years of tension, the end of the Cold War brought with it high expectations of a peace dividend. These expectations were especially high for North Americans who believed that the protection granted by large oceans on each coast would stop the remaining regional threats from ever reaching

[1] George W. Bush, President of the United States, Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation, 11 September 2001.

their fortress. North Americans were finally feeling safe. And then, on 11 Sep 2001, without warning, their dream ended with the biggest single terrorist attack in U.S. history.

In a matter of a few minutes, terrorism had become the catalyst that would launch the world's most powerful military and economic nation into a crusade for the holy grail of national security. Using arguments of 'good versus evil', the U.S. mobilized most of the nations of the world into its 'war on terrorism'. But they did not stop there. Taking advantage of a permissive political climate, arguments were almost immediately made by the Bush administration linking the concept of 'rogue nations' with 'terrorism'. This proposed link is being used to sway the American people, and other nations, into supporting the U.S. ballistic missile defence efforts. Possibly intimidated by the U.S. position on its high moral ground and the atrocity of the terrorist acts, surprisingly few people seem interested in making the important distinction between terrorist threats and ballistic missile threats. It appears that for North Americans, security has become a Boolean equation – you are either safe from all threats or not safe at all. Indeed, since Sep 11, the U.S. has taken a sharp, almost unilateral turn towards missile defence. Other nations, and Canada among them, are being taken along. Although there are other roads that Canada could decide to take, the road to NMD seems to have been paved and the wind of American support might be too strong to resist. It is now time for Canadians to make an important decision. But does Canada really have a choice? When President Bush states that "you are either with us or against us", is he referring only to the war on terror or perhaps to a more aggressive American attitude towards homeland defence in general. Given the Canadian geography and its close ties to the U.S., it occupies a

strategic position in the concerns over homeland defence. Will the U.S. offer much room to manoeuvre?

"The story [of missile defence] is complex and contentious. It is a tale of disputed intelligence assessments and reactive political decisions, of hurried technical development and embarrassing misfires, of dated old world treaties and ill-defined new world orders."[2] In order to highlight the principle arguments, this paper will first offer a rapid historical review of the origins of missile defence and describe the arguments in favour and against the various concepts and programs that have been proposed over the years. We will then look at the second Bush Administration position on National Missile Defence as it was proposed in the early months of their mandate. The next section will present the effects of 'Sep 11' through a review of the 'new' threat assessments: the White House, Defence and State Department announcements and speeches, and the proposed enhanced security agenda. We will also look at the resulting dissension and surrounding debates that have emerged over the past months. Based on the elements presented and the evidence of recent U.S. actions, we will propose a probable American course of action.

The second part of the paper will address missile defence from a Canadian perspective. In order to understand Canada's position, we will start by reviewing Canada's Foreign policy in general terms and then focus on the military aspects of it. This will be followed by a discussion on Canada's current position as a minor stakeholder and the lack of

[2] Graham Bradley, Hit to Kill: The New Battle Over Shielding America From Missile Attack (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) xxiv.

control in which it finds itself in the post-Sep 11 context. We will then analyse the options that remain open to Canada and assess whether or not Canada could maintain its "middle of the road" position for very long. It will become obvious that Canada's close relationship to the U.S. combined with the 'new world order' has removed much of its ability to make its own decisions. The last section will propose a likely Canadian course of action and conclude that time has come for Canada to get off the fence and join the missile defence team.

The Long Road to U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence (1944 – 2000)

The idea of Anti-missile defence dates back to 1944 and initially emerged from the fear of German V-2 Rockets. The 1957 Russian tests of intercontinental missiles, followed soon after by the launch of the Sputnik, did nothing to re-assure the early proponents. In 1966, China entered the race with its own tests and raised a little further the American concerns. The controversy of missile defence and its feasibility culminated in 1969 in Congress testimonies by various scientists where the core arguments in favour, brought forward by the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation, and the core arguments against missile defence, brought forward by the Federation of American Scientists, were first voiced officially. At that time, the prospect of such a program was already labelled as the most costly, complex and controversial weapon system to be developed by the U.S.

In 1972, the U.S. and Russia concluded the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement to freeze strategic launcher development. This led to the Anti- Ballistic

Missile (ABM) Treaty that restricted its signatories to two antimissile system complexes. This was further reduced to one complex in the 1974 Protocol, and this complex was capped at one hundred interceptors. During that period, the mindset of MAD was well established in the strategic community, and a pervasive sense that defence in general was nonsensical marginalized discussions on missile defence. However, by the end of the 70's, the failure of the SALT II talks and the invasion of Afghanistan by Russia renewed the interest in defence. This eventually led in 1984 to the SDI program proposed by the Reagan administration. Although this expensive and ambitious program never materialized, it established the paradigm that would influence the following twenty years.

Following the fall of the Berlin wall in 1991, the first President Bush proposed a new system aimed at protection from accidental launch. This proposal was mostly in response to the crumbling Soviet infrastructures and the growing concerns that nuclear devices would fall in wrong hands. Incidentally, the use of Patriot against SCUD missiles in the Persian Gulf War demonstrated not only the willingness of certain nations to use ballistic missiles, but also confirmed a certain need for missile defence. Incidentally, it also indicated that technology was possibly mature enough to finally tackle this difficult challenge.

The following American administration, led by President Clinton, proposed an ambiguous tri-party National Missile Defence (NMD) program that attracted more controversy and criticism than support. The White House had published in 1998 its security strategy for the next century. In this analysis, terrorism ranked first of six in the 'Transnational

Threat' category. The proliferation of advance weapons to rogue states, although at a lower threat level, still finished on top of the 'Spread of Dangerous Technologies' list. Improvements in offensive capabilities were only reported as concerns under the 'Regional or State-Centred Threat' category.[3] This analysis would be corroborated a few years later in an academic analysis that ranked the 'transnational threats' in order of top security concerns. In this more theoretical study, terrorism gets the highest score while proliferation of major weapons system finishes in the middle of the list as a medium concern.[4] Regardless of both analyses, the Clinton Administration position on missile defence did not satisfy the proponents of a strong defence.

One of the very informative products of the Clinton Administration was the nine men, bi-party commission chartered by Congress in 1998. Their goal was "to provide an independent assessment [of] the rate at which Third World countries were developing missiles capable of striking the United States."[5] Known as 'The Rumsfeld Commission', it reviewed the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). The earlier NIE report had concluded that no country outside the U.S., Russia, China, United Kingdom and France would develop missiles in the next 15 years that could threaten the 48 U.S. states and Canada.

This conclusion had been proven grossly inaccurate in August 1998 when, against all expectation, the North Koreans launched a multi-stage missile, supposedly aimed at

[3] The White House, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century", Washington D.C., October 1998, 6-7.
[4] Franco, Patrice M., Toward a New Security Architecture in the Americas (Washington D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2000).
[5] Bradley 2001, 31.

putting a satellite in space. The level of concern rose immediately. In fact, North Korea had leapfrogged several development levels that, based on U.S. and Russian experience, had been predicted as unavoidable steps on the way to mastering the science and engineering of ballistic missile technology. North Korea quickly confirmed their use of a three-stage missile, obviously aware of the surprise they had caused. "Although it never came close to U.S. territory, the missile provided the first concrete evidence that an impoverished militant state like North Korea had worked out the technology for multi-stage rocketry and thus was coming closer to producing intercontinental missiles capable of threatening American soil."[6] This had happened less than 5 years after the NIE assessment, and the Rumsfeld commission harshly criticized the intelligence community over the accuracy and method of their work[7]. Although the Federation of American Scientists' own independent evidence produced a few months later concluded that the development efforts of North Korea were being exaggerated, in the end, it introduced doubt on the real level of threat. The North Korean launch, combined with the Pakistan and Iran tests of medium range missiles as well as the nuclear tests conducted that same summer by India and Pakistan, provided solid ammunition to the National Missile Defence advocates that time was of the essence in building a credible defence against the rogue nations. There is no doubt that the North Korean test launch in the summer of 1998 precipitated the Clinton investment in supporting a limited ground based system, but the most profound effect was its impact on the Clinton Administration's thinking: the rogue nation threat was no longer perceived as theoretical.

[6] Bradley 2001, 54.
[7] Bradley 2001, 32.

However, many obstacles continued to prevent the NMD program from making substantial progress. Despite this newly found government support, the research and development program remained plagued with budgetary pressures. In 1999, the need to renew the programs budget timeline forced a hard look at every detail. Interestingly, NMD was receiving little support from within the military establishment. In fact, "[t]he Chiefs viewed every cent spent on national missile defence as money that could be better invested in modernizing and revitalizing the armed forces."[8] Senior military officers pointed out that the threat of terrorism was more pressing than that of ballistic missiles and the resulting funding priority should be placed there. In reality, they were willing to support NMD only if it was not at the sacrifice of their own service budget.

Although the military was lukewarm about the program, politicians and academics were fully engaged in debating the advantages and disadvantages. Many voiced strong opinions. Daniel Gouré from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published in June 2000 a Technical and Policy Issues review.[9] The review's recommendations, aside from recommending to the Clinton Administration not to lock the program into an irreversible course of action, were:

- Recast the program to provide for more capable defences of the homeland;
- Revise the ABM Treaty compliance policies and negotiating strategy in recognition of the changes in threats and defensive requirements;
- Provide adequate funding to the program to bring it along as soon as possible;

[8] Bradley 2001, 85.
[9] Daniel Gouré, "Charting a Path for U.S. Missile Defences" (Washington: The CSIS Press, 2000) 23-24.

- Develop and test follow-on defences that should be pursued in an effort to demonstrate to potential aggressors the ability of the U.S. to counter any threat;
- Not to limit development efforts to Treaty renegotiations. The U.S. must maintain its freedom to develop and test defences capable of addressing an evolving threat;
- Consider entering into negotiations with China without legitimizing the notion that China had the right to hold the U.S. or its allies and friends at risk;
- Provide an interim defensive capability;
- Control the flow of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) technology and expertise to potentially dangerous nations, perhaps by being more aggressive in identifying and supporting alternative forms of economic development and supporting Russia's efforts to reduce its nuclear weapons infrastructure and stockpile; and,
- Undertake serious effort to counter WMD threats delivered by means other than ballistic missiles to complement missiles defences.

These opinions were well known to the Clinton Administration. As well, the future of NMD was also influenced but a number of other events: START II and III, the Russian elections, the Balkan situation, NATO enlargement discussions, the safety of the Russian nuclear arsenal and obviously, the upcoming U.S. presidential elections were all impacting on the program.

After much consideration and delay, President Clinton indicated that he would support NMD based on four criteria:

- The readiness of the technology;
- The assessment of the threat;
- The projected deployment costs; and,
- The impact on arms control negotiations it was likely to have.[10]

However, it was well understood by the administration that the NMD development was going on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, which embodied the principle of mutual vulnerability and left very little room for defence. Furthermore, missile defence advocates regarded the accord as a barrier to sensible technological development. But in order to pursue the program, U.S. officials had to engage Russia on making changes to the ABM Treaty. Unfortunately the Clinton Administration was generally naïve about the complexity of the NMD program. Many politicians believed that the turn around time to produce a credible NMD could be measured in months.[11] This lead to a dangerous complacency where no one realized that negotiations needed to start rapidly since the only alternative would be a crisis with Russia. In the end, none of the efforts materialized into concrete progress, perhaps caused by the half-hearted dedication that the Clinton Administration admittedly gave the program. However, unknowingly, their continued efforts had one very positive impact: they maintained opened an important debate and brought international attention to the Americans' ultimate intent.

This international attention caused other unwanted effects. The proposal of a North Korean threat and the concept of rogue nations were not receiving a lot of support worldwide. In

[10] Bradley 2001, 107.
[11] Bradley 2001, 80.

fact, in mid November 1999, a brief by Strobe Talbott from the U.S. State Department to the permanent representatives of NATO received such negative response from the allies that it prompted the Clinton Administration to deal more intently with European concerns. Similarly, on 1 December 1999, the UN general assembly passed a resolution with France, China and Russia condemning NMD. The assembly voted 80 to 4 with 68 abstentions, demonstrating the fears that NMD were generating worldwide.[12] Russia clarified its concern a few months later. The main Russian concerns were not so much with the initial phases of NMD but rather with the breakout potential – the possibility of NMD expanding relatively easily into a powerful defensive shield. This was perceived as highly destabilizing and unwise. President Clinton pursued his efforts to comfort the Russian worries during a meeting with President Putin in June 2000. Although the Russian President eventually acknowledged the mounting rogue threat, he did not support the NMD program, describing it as "a cure which is worse than the disease."[13]

The Road Turns Towards a New Attitude (January 2001 – 10 September 2002)

The Clinton Administration efforts, although hesitant at best, set the stage for the second Bush Administration and the return of the American Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) dreams. In fact, deploying missile defences ranked among the new administration's top priorities.[14] During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld made it clear that the rogue nations were not going to be allowed to blackmail or "intimidate the

[12] United Nation, Resolution 54/54A Adopted by the General Assembly on 1 December 1999.
[13] President Vladimir Putin, Press Conference, Grand Palace of the Kremlin, 4 June 2000.
[14] Bradley 2001, 350.

United States and its friends and allies."[15] The new administration's view was that missile defence was a reality, not a possibility. President George W. Bush's initial proposal was based on two pillars:

- What he qualified 'common sense views' that a good defence is as necessary as a good offence, the strategic situation has changed and the policy of MAD is no longer applicable; and,
- His faith in the American Research and Development community.

In fact, President Bush needed to do three things:

- Build political consensus at home;
- Resolve the technology aspect in a timely and cost effective manner; and,
- Get China, Russia and NATO on his side.

In order to obtain and maintain support for the program at home, President Bush had to continue to provide satisfactory answers to a number of critics. The first critic targeted the very need for missile defence. The administration's justifications for NMD were the risk of accidental launch and the threat posed by rogue nations.

During the first few "Post Soviet" years, the former countries of the Soviet Union seemed out of control, posing an immediate threat to international security. This situation was quickly addressed, but the concerns immediately shifted to the ageing infrastructure and

[15] Bradley 2001, 351.

the lack of necessary funding to maintain the ICBM fleet. It was feared that a breakdown in command and control, paired with potential increase in system errors, could lead to an accidental launch. Although this fear continues to exist in certain circles today, it is generally perceived as very improbable with the re-birth of the Russian Federation. Similarly, a similar risk exists in other ballistic missile capable nations, but it is considered to be very unlikely.

The second critique, the threat posed by rogue nations, was also being challenged. The fear of the missile defence proponents lay in the lack of trust they had in certain leaders of smaller countries. The concern was that those leaders might behave irrationally under certain extreme circumstances. On the other hand, no one really believed that those leaders would overtly attack the strongest nation on earth and risk a massive retaliation. The proposed scenario was that those small nations might use their armament to blackmail U.S. authorities and hence influence the U.S. foreign policy. In fact, North Korea's possession of ballistic missiles was not aimed at defending its territory but rather at providing political leverage. The Chinese perceived their ballistic missile as 'food for thought' to prevent the U.S. from bombing them into submission, as they perceived had been done in Yugoslavia.[16] This situation was unacceptable to the Americans who regarded the situation differently. Indeed, for President Bush, the intent was not to use NMD but rather to allow Americans to act abroad without the fear of subjecting its homeland to attack. "You can't be an internationalist if you allow yourself to be blackmailed… If you believe like I believe that our values are so good and we can spread those values in a way that hopefully is not arrogant – in a humble way – if you believe

that's important, which I do, then the corollary is: How do you make sure you're able to do that without somebody saying, 'If you move, if you act, if you decide to get involved, we'll blow you up'?"[17]

In an analysis delivered on 24 April 2001 at a meeting of the IEEE Life Fellows at MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Charles A. Fowler proposed that a deployed NMD system would not influence the U.S. decision-making process if the postulated "nuclear blackmail" threat scenario ever materialized. On this topic, Fowler echoes the opinion expressed in the scientific community and points out that no system would be one hundred percent effective. It is, therefore, important to note that the probability of missiles getting through would always be present. Would a U.S. President make a different choice about intervention based on the belief that there was 'only' a ten percent probability of an American city (or two) being the target of a terrifying retaliatory strike? Obviously, the answer is that ninety percent is not enough – but could a system ever be fool proof? Fowler points out a few additional facts based on history[18]:

- "The performance of weapons in combat is one-half to one-tenth of that obtained on test ranges, with defensive weapons falling on the low end";
- "Reactive Defensive Systems hardly ever work the first time or two or three around. And those who rely on them are in for real trouble if anything ever really happens."

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[16] Bradley 2001, 145.
[17] Bush Interview, 2 July 2001.
[18] Charles A. Fowler, "National Missile Defence (NMD)", IEEE Aerospace and Electronics Systems, January 2002, 4-12.

He also adds: "But for strategic defences against ICBMs with nuclear warheads, the first few times around are really all that matter."

- Deterrence has worked for fifty years and although it is not a final solution, it buys time to find more permanent solutions. Perhaps a more 'pro-active' stance would be needed where the President, supported by a resolution from the Congress, could let everyone know that "a nation threatening the U.S. would be subject to pre-emptive strikes and massive retaliation against the infrastructure and leadership of any nation carrying out such a threat."

Obviously, the President also had to put to rest concerns about the technical challenges posed by NMD. Despite some successes[19], recent experiments and tests have done little to re-assure the American public that this program was achievable. In fact, the issue of feasibility has been discussed for a large number of years. Although groups such as the Heritage Foundation considered missile defence as workable and necessary, others like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pointed out that such a system has never existed in any effective form and they doubt it could ever be constructed. In fact, history tended to support their claim. The missile defence programs had faced technical difficulties since inception and continued to do so. Among those problems, critics point out that building a defensive posture always gives the attacker the initiative. In fact, building missile defence was similar to building the Maginot Line of the Second World War; the offence would always find and exploit your weakness. This is well illustrated by the debate the surrounds the selection of countermeasures as well as the difficulty level and realism to which NMD was subjected during testing. Critics from the scientific

community pointed out that the program had been based on an earlier NIE that downplayed the countermeasures and their impact. This explains why the scientific community supported a boost phase solution. They voiced their opposition to the government's position by publishing a letter in July 2000 signed by half of all living U.S. Science Nobel prize laureates. As demonstrated by many scientists, the 'rogue states' would always be in a better position to build and integrate increasingly effective countermeasures for a fraction of the cost that would be incurred by the missile defence program in trying to defeat those countermeasures. [20]

The American administration was well aware of the justification and technical issues being thrown at them. Their concerns about ally support would prove to be equally challenging. On the surface, they made light of the matter by stating that "consultations with China will make clear that the U.S. missile defence program does not threaten China but seeks to counter limited missile threats from rogue states and the danger of accidental or unauthorized launches."[21] However, they remained concerned about the Chinese developments of their long-range nuclear capabilities, the development of their shorter-range missile capabilities, and their continued proliferation activities and imposed sanctions.[22] President Bush also regularly offered to team up with the Russians to build a 'joint defence', but those offers were either ignored or rejected. In an effort to gain some support from its allies, the Bush Administration started dropping the "National" out of

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[19] United States, Department of Defence, News Release: Missile Intercept Test Successful, 3 December 2001.
[20] Bradley 2001, 223.
[21] United States, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary, 5 September 2001.
[22] Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Transcript: Defence Official Feith on Russia, Missile Defence, Moscow, 4 September 2001.

NMD, a move that was well received in NATO.[23] But these appeasement efforts did not detract the U.S. from its ultimate goal. In July 2001 the Bush Administration issued a policy statement confirming its intent to develop missile defence without the constraint of the ABM Treaty. On 7 September 2001, the U.S. Department of State - Bureau of Arms Control published a fact sheet describing the threat posed by WMD delivered using ballistic missiles and described it as one of the most direct and serious threats facing the U.S. national security, and the security of its friends and allies.[24] A separate fact sheet appeared on the same day describing the need for deterrence as a critical component of the U.S. security posture. However, it expanded the definition of deterrence to include the ability to prevent potential adversaries from achieving their objectives by using missile defence to enhance the traditional deterrence of counter-offensive capabilities. This new form of deterrence would deny rogue states the ability to inflict reliably and predictably mass destruction on other nations.[25] Although the offer for joint development was still on the table, the U.S. intended to send a clear signal to Russia, and to other potential adversaries, that the ABM Treaty would either be amended or they would walk away from it.

Despite all of the Bush Administration's efforts at home and abroad, not everyone would agree with the advancement of the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program. On 10 September 2001, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Joseph Biden (a Democrat from Delaware) delivered a broadside against the Bush

[23] Bradley 2001, 361.
[24] United States, Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Washington D.C., "Fact Sheet: State Dept. on Ballistic Missile Threat", 7 September 2001, [http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/nmd/].

Administration's missile defence proposal referring to it as dangerous nonsense that could propel a new arms race and warning that it stole scarce funds from real defence needs. He also warned that moving away from the ABM Treaty and other arms control pacts could severely damage America's standing in the world. He expressed his strong belief that despite all of the missile defence rhetoric, deterrence still worked.[26] He also pointed out the fact that the greatest potential threat, according to the threat assessments, was terrorism and that ICBM launch ranked last on the threat spectrum.

In summary, during the days preceding Sep 11, the rationale for NMD would still be based on a fear of rogue nations developing a 'blackmail' capability against the U.S. President Bush had recently re-affirmed his belief in the international 'humble' projection of American values and the need of protection from intimidation. His list of rogue nations varied but membership always included countries like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Growing concerns were also emerging about India and Pakistan and a potentially disastrous armament race between these two countries, initially aimed at regional control, but potentially resulting in a threat to others. Very little attention was given to terrorism. America was debating missile defence from the perceived safety of its fortress.

A Sharp Turn Towards a New World Order

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[25] United States, Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Washington D.C. "Fact Sheet: State Dept on Missile defence and Deterrence", 7 September 2001, [http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/nmd/].
[26] Ralph Dannheisser, The Washington File, Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 10 September 2001.

On 11 September 2001, the U.S. was the victim of its most devastating terrorist attack in history. An extremist Islamic group launched a coordinated attack by hijacking four commercial jetliners and flying two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City and one into the west wing of the Pentagon in Washington D.C. The fourth plane crashed in a forest in Pennsylvania following heroic action from some of the passengers More than 3000 lives, mostly Americans, were lost. This type of attack and its severity came as a total surprise to Americans and to the world at large. America did not feel safe any longer and as soon as it recovered from the initial shock, the U.S. Administration mounted their response. A forceful counter-attack against an elusive enemy, terrorism, began almost immediately. This campaign is being waged on many fronts: diplomatic, economic and military. The military portion is being waged in Afghanistan for the moment, but the administration made it clear that it would not necessarily stop there. A forceful counter-attack did not satisfy the public's need for safety. In parallel with the campaign against terrorism, actions needed to be taken to defend Americans from further attacks. This led to the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security and vigorous discussions about the need to defend North America against all possible threats.

At first, the terrorist's success raised criticism aimed at the Bush Administration for "concentrating on the wrong threat".[27] Low-tech terrorism, although identified for a long time in threat assessments, had received little to no attention and been the subject of very few concrete actions. A few days after the Sep 11 attacks, the U.S. published its

[27] Bradley 2001, 376.

Quadrennial Defence Review Report.[28] This report clearly stated the need for a paradigm shift in force planning. The proposed force-sizing construct is based on four pillars:

- "Defend the United States;
- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions;
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and
- Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations."[29]

Each element of this new construct supports a proactive defence strategy. Firstly, it "restores the defence of the United States as the Department's primary mission."[30] In its mission description, it mandates the defence of the U.S. from all enemies, not making direct distinction between the types of threats. Furthermore, within that mission, it clearly states the need to provide strategic deterrence, air and missile defence, and uphold U.S. commitments under NORAD. Secondly, it shifts the focus from a region centred paradigm to "building a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across the spectrum of possible force requirements, both functional and geographical."[31] It also directs the U.S. military to "be prepared to respond in a decisive manner to acts on international terrorism

[28] United States, Department of Defence, "Quadrennial Defence Review Report", 30 September 2001.
[29] QDR 2001, 17.
[30] QDR 2001, 17.
[31] QDR 2001, 17.

committed on the U.S. territory or the territory of an ally."[32] These statements are early indicators of the new mood projected by the administration on the topic of defence.

Proponents of missile defence immediately started portraying the terrorist attacks as reinforcement of their position. "After all, they argue, if terrorists could sow such destruction by turning planes of peaceful passengers into guided missions, imagine what they or small hostile nations could do with actual ballistic missiles armed with nuclear devices or biological or chemical warfare agents."[33] These feelings were echoed by the administration as well, quickly taking advantage of politically permissive conditions. In a news briefing conducted in October 2001, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld pointed out that the "countries supporting terrorists and terrorist networks are the same countries that have 'weaponized' chemical and biological weapons – agents, some of which are working to acquire nuclear weapons and to develop ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States, its friends and allies."[34]

Critics of the BMD program, however, were not immediately convinced. They first pointed out that the "patriotic word 'homeland' was deliberately chosen by Bush to reinforce nationalistic thinking and to sway Americans into setting aside their hyphenated ethnic differences"[35] Previously known since the early 50's as 'civil defence', this terminology had in fact been introduced in 1981 by President Reagan when he asked Congress to fund a missile defence program under the banner 'Homeland Defence'. The

[32] QDR 2001, 18.
[33] Bradley 2001, xxiv.
[34] Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defence, Transcript DoD News Briefing: Department of Defence Briefing, 25 October 2001.

term had caught on mostly with conservative organizations at first but gradually appeared in government documents and had become popular parlance by the time George W. Bush was inaugurated president. However, regardless of its origin, the term did not impress the BMD critics, nor did the link between the terrorism threat and the ballistic missile threat.

As a result, many of the old questions were still being asked. What is the real threat? Would a country really consider the use of ICBMs in the face of a potential massive retaliation from the U.S.? Would non-state actors attempt to use complicated and expensive technologies like ICBM when cheaper, more feasible alternative like truckloads of homemade explosives, cruise missiles from the black market, or even nuclear bombs in a box were available? What was BMD really defending against? It still seemed that only the blackmail situation presented by President Bush remained a valid cause for concern. Was it enough to justify an expensive program? Critics were not convinced. In fact, in a report updated in October 2001, the Centre for Defence Information (CDI) dispelled the association between terrorism and ballistic missile by pointing out that any potential terrorist would employ other weapons and delivery means and that simpler means could be used to disable the remaining missile threat posed by other countries.[36] On the same line of thought, Senator Biden would come back to the charge in December 2001, pointing out that the real threat "need not arrive on the tip of an intercontinental ballistic missile with a return address"[37].

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[35] Douglas Brinkley, "Why 'homeland security'?", Editorial in The Boston Globe, 2 November 2001.
[36] Bruce Blair, President CDI Terrorism Project, "What if the terrorists go nuclear?", 26 September 2001, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/nuclear.cfm].
[37] Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., "Missile Defence Delusion", The Washington Post, 19 December 2001.

But the most recent National Intelligence Estimate[38] was putting fuel to the administration's fire. Although the report dispelled once and for all the threat of unauthorized or accidental launch of a Russian strategic missile, it restated the presence of the longstanding missile threat from Russia and China. However, that threat was not new. The new critical element of the report was the projection from most intelligence agencies that before 2015 the United States would most likely face ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran, and possibly from Iraq. The NIE estimate pointed out that short and medium-range ballistic missiles already posed a significant threat overseas to U.S. interests, military forces, and allies. It also projected that Chinese ballistic missile forces would increase several-fold by 2015, reaching between 75 and 100 warheads which would be deployed primarily against the United States. It also stated that North Korea might already be in position to flight-test multiple-stage missiles capable of reaching parts of America with a nuclear weapon payload. Iran was listed as pursuing short and long-range missile capabilities and Iraq, although interested in long-range missiles, would likely retain a small covert force of Scud-variant missiles due to constrains posed by international sanctions and prohibitions. This report strongly supported President Bush's 'Axis of Evil' threat scenario and placed ballistic missiles as a central element of the military arsenals of nations around the globe for at least the next fifteen years. In fact, it concluded that the probability of a missile equipped with a weapon of mass destruction being used against U.S. forces or interests was higher today than during most of the Cold War. Although the report stated that the U.S. territory was more likely to be attacked by

[38] United States, Central Intelligence Agency, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015", Produced by the National Intelligence Council, December 2001.

non-missile delivery means, it also predicted that this threat would continue to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries matured. Moreover, it pointed out that missiles provided a level of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and deterrence that non-missile means did not. Overall, it gave the Bush Administration the moral support needed to move forward.

That next step had long been feared because of its possible destabilizing effect. The ABM Treaty still stood in the way of missile defence development. To prepare the terrain, the diplomats had embarked on serious negotiations with the Russian Federation in an attempt to put in place a bilateral agreement for the post ABM Treaty era. Although not explicitly stated by either government, it was obvious that the U.S. had given early signals to the Russian Federation of its intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty to build its new protective shield. As late as November 2001, the administration was still attempting to convince Russia of the new perceived world order. During a three-day summit in November 2001 between Presidents Bush and Putin, the two leaders still could not agree on the future of the 1972 ABM Treaty. In the end, President Putin acknowledged the American's argument about the threat but still believed that the ABM Treaty had its place in a post-Cold War era.[39] However, this element of U.S.-Russia relationship had become relatively less important than it was before Sep 11.

The U.S. indicated their intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on 13 December 2001. In their diplomatic note, the U.S. stated the on-going development of ballistic missiles,

[39] Dr. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. National Security Advisor, Transcript: Press Briefing by National Security Advisor on visit of President Putin, Office of International Information Programs, 15 November 2001.

including long-range ballistic missiles, as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction as posing "a direct threat to the territory and security of the United States and jeopardise its supreme interests."[40] It clearly indicated its intention to "develop, test, and deploy anti-ballistic missile systems for the defence of its national territory, of its forces outside the United States, and of its friends and allies."[41] President Putin's expressed concerns over the U.S. withdrawal, calling it a mistake. Regardless, the U.S. administration ignored the criticism and instead praised the Russian President for acknowledging that the withdrawal posed "no threat to the national security of the Russian Federation".[42] In fact, Russia's lower house of parliament rejected a motion of condemnation of the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty, perhaps an indication that the diplomatic efforts spent before the announcement had reduced considerably the fears over the American intent. An article in Voice of America[43] indicated that, despite the words that were pronounced against the U.S. withdrawal, the move was not expected to hurt bilateral relations. Russian journalist and political analyst Masha Lipman proposed that President Putin purposely chose to deliver a muted response, indicating that cooperation with the United States on non-proliferation and the reduction of the number of offensive nuclear weapons would continue.

However, the Bush Administration's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty had received harsh critiques at home from diverse organizations. Among them, the FAS

[40] Text of the U.S. Diplomatic Notes on ABM Treaty sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 13 November 2001.
[41] Diplomatic Notes on ABM Treaty, 13 November 2001.
[42] United States, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Response to Russian Statement on U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal, 13 December 2001.
[43] Sonja Pace, "US ABM Treaty Withdrawal Not Expected to Hurt Ties With Russia", Voice of America, Moscow, 14 December 2001.

called it "unnecessary and unwise"[44]. They point out the irony that as the U.S. rediscovered the need for international cooperation in their efforts to fight terrorism on a global scale, they would take an action almost universally opposed by its allies. They were not alone with this belief. In fact, one of the loudest critiques had come in a letter from 50 American Nobel Laureates addressed to Congress and urging them to respect the ABM Treaty.[45] Regardless of all the critiques, the Bush Administration's position was gaining momentum.

This increasing momentum could be noted through increases in both organizational and financial support given to the program. The creation of the Missile Defence Agency was "[e]levating the BMDO to agency status recogniz[ing] the national priority and mission emphasis on missile defence."[46] Along with the creation of the new agency, the scope of the missile defence efforts was re-aligned to address many of the concerns previously voiced over the technology pursued and the resources attributed to the effort. Its priorities were clear:

- Defend the U.S., deployed forces, allies and friends;
- Employ a Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS) that layers defences to intercept missiles in all phases of their flight against all ranges of threats;
- Enable the Services to field elements of the overall system as soon as practical; and,

[44] Michael Levi, "ABM Treaty Withdrawal an Attack on American Security", Statement by the Federation of American Scientists, 13 December 2001, [http://www.fas.org/press/011213-abm.htm].
[45] Michael Levi, "Nobel Laureates Urge Congress to Keep ABM Treaty", The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, Vol. 54, November/December 2001, [http://www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n6/abm.htm].
[46] United States, Department of Defence, News Release No 008-02, "DoD Establishes Missile Defence Agency", 4 January 2002.

- Do what it takes to provide early capability, or if necessary improve on the existing capabilities.[47]

Under its new umbrella, missile defence research could now look not only at mid-course intercepts but also at boost phase and terminal phase interceptions. In the words of Lieutenant General R.T. Kadish, USAF, first Director of the Missile Defence Agency: "Based on the results of last year's rigorous missile defence review, the Department has moved away from an independently managed, element-centric approach and established a single program to develop an integrated BMD System. The BMD System will consist of elements configured into layered defences to provide autonomous and mutual support, including multiple engagement opportunities, along a threat missile's flight path."[48] This realignment was intended to create synergies between the segments and improve the depth of the protective umbrella that will eventually be developed.

But organizational changes would not be sufficient unless accompanied by increased financial support. In fact, on 7 September 2001, the Senate Armed Services Committee had approved a defence authorization bill for fiscal year 2002 that cut some $1,300 million from the Bush administration's top priority missile defence program. This was not the financial support that the expanded program would need. Although some budgetary support came in December 2001 from moving the budgets for Space based

[47] United States, Department of Defence, Secretary of Defence Memorandum, "Missile Defence Program Direction", 2 January 2002.
[48] Lieutenant General R.T. Kadish, Director Missile Defence Agency, "Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Joint hearing before the Procurement and Research and Development Subcommittees", 27 February 2002.

laser technologies to BMDO in the 2002 budget[49], more money would be required. On 14 December 2001, Congress passed the 2002 defence authorization bill. It included $8,300 million in funding, $3,000 million more than the previous year, for an expanded missile defence program.[50] This level of funding was a clear vote of confidence in the potential of the program and its perceived necessity. The Bush Administration's argument had overcome the first hurdle. It now needed to ensure the momentum would be maintained.

In his January 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush stressed the need to "prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world."[51] Once again, both threats were linked together, a continued effort to ensure missile defence support was maintained. He made the connection again later in his speech when he discussed the threat and concluded that "States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an Axis of Evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world."[52] In this call, the President echoed his earlier statements that the U.S. "will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them."[53] "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."[54] This call to join the cause

[49] United States, "CRS Issue Brief for Congress. U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military and Commercial", 6 December 2001.
[50] Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr., "Congress Approves $343,300 Million Defence Funding Bill", U.S. Department of States, The Washington File, Office of International Information Programs, 14 December 2001.
[51] George W. Bush, President of the United States, State of the Union Address, Washington DC, 29 January 2002.
[52] Bush, 29 January 2002.
[53] Bush, 11 September 2001.
[54] George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001.

of the righteous would set the stage for the 2003 Budget[55]. This new budget included the "biggest increase in defence spending in 20 years, to pay the cost of war and the price of transforming our Cold War military into a new 21st Century fighting force." In his message to Congress, the President stressed that the "first priority must be the security of [the] homeland."[56] This effectively paved the road for the continued financial support. Although no one really knows how much building such a system will eventually cost, (estimates greatly vary, from 30-60 billion in conservative circles, to numbers in excess of 200 billion[57]) the Bush Administration has provided it with enough to make a solid step forward. The long-term future would be another political battle to be waged later.

The Next Mile

The Bush Administration has made clear their intention to pursue the homeland defence agenda in a unilateral manner. Their aggressive stance on the termination of the ABM Treaty is a sure indicator of the deep commitment of the U.S. to its security. The increased focus on terrorism has had a catalyst effect on the missile defence program and has gelled the American nation into supporting substantial increases to their military spending. President Bush made it clear from the beginning that other nations were either with them or against them[58]. At this point, it is only fair to assume that for the foreseeable future, and at least until the Americans regain a sense of security, the U.S.

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[55] United States, The White House, Office of Management and Budget, Department of Defence Budget 2003, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/bud12.html].
[56] United States, The White House, Office of Management and Budget, "The Budget Message of the President to the Congress of the United States", 4 February 2002.
[57] Charles Babington, "A primer on Missile Defence", the Washington Post Newsweek Interactive, 2 May 2001.
[58] Bush, 20 September 2001.

government will remain very direct and forceful in its efforts to protect the homeland from all threats and ensure the continued prosperity of the U.S. It is, therefore, important to consider what this future might look like.

On March 11 2002, the U.S. Counter Intelligence Agency (CIA) issued a warning stating that the United States is now facing a more serious ballistic missile threat than during the Cold War. In another document, the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), it is proposed that the Cold War approach to deterrence is no longer appropriate. The review proposes the transition to a new triad of forces. This new triad, although still including a smaller balanced nuclear force, will now include defensive systems, both active and passive, and a responsive infrastructure.[59] Part of this review "ordered the Pentagon to put together contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, naming not only Russia and the 'Axis of Evil' – Iraq, Iran and North Korea – but also China, Libya and Syria."[60]

The latest U.S. nuclear targeting plans indicate a possible demonstration of growing American unilateralism. A renewed interest in nuclear weapon research and development, a call for 'a new strike system', as well as direct mention of North Korea as an enemy of the U.S. is igniting emotions at home and abroad. President Bush's earlier comments including North Korea in the so-called 'Axis of Evil' is in fact perceived as being little short of a declaration of war by North Korean authorities.[61] In a communiqué

[59] United States, Department of Defence, Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, 9 January 2002.
[60] William M. Arkin, Los Angeles Times, Commentary, "Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable", 10 March 2002, [http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-arkinmar10.story].
[61] Associated Press, "North Korea denounces Bush warning on terror", The Boston Globe, 1 January 2002.

through its News Agency, the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea clearly states that it will not be intimidated and would "not remain a passive on-looker to the Bush Administration's inclusion of the DPRK in the seven countries targets of U.S. nuclear attack, but would take a strong countermeasure against it."[62] Although the agency did not elaborate on what this meant, it certainly shows the volatile diplomatic environment surrounding missile proliferation and the aggressive posture taken by the Bush Administration. A feeling of unease towards U.S. unilateralism was loudly echoed in Chicago, on 27 February 2002 when the Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moves the symbolic hand of the 'Doomsday Clock' from nine to seven minutes to midnight, "the same setting at which the clock debuted 55 years ago. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, this is the third time the hand has moved forward."[63]

Strong from the conclusions of its latest National Intelligence Estimate, the future will likely see the U.S. pursue its forceful politics. A trend towards unilateralism seems to be emerging. Although this continues to raise concerns with its Allies, the U.S. seems determine to maintain its course. Fortunately, interventions from many nations including Canada has ensured the maintenance of some dialogue. This dialogue is expected to continue and expand. However, in the new context of U.S. dominance, one must question the weight of the allies' concerns in American decision-making. This unilateralism might have important consequences for Canada. However, before we can address Canada's future relationship with the U.S. and the possible impact of the

[62] Sang-Hun Choe "North Korea says it is ready to fight back against U.S. nuclear strikes", Associated Press, 13 March 2002.
[63] The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "From the Board of Directors: It's seven minutes to midnight", 27 February 2002, [http://www.thebulletin.org/media/022702pr_print.html].

increased support given to the missile defence program, we must go back to the basics and quickly review the development of Canadian military and foreign policy. We will then review the country's current position with regard to missile defence and finally propose some thoughts on the evolution of that position.

The Unpaved Road of Canadian Foreign Policy

"It is false perspective to have a military alliance determining your foreign policy. It should be your foreign policy which determines your military policy."[64] These words from former Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau highlight the detachment with which the Canadian government should look at military alliances. However, Canadian geo-political realities have always led to a more pragmatic approach where foreign and defence policies were "developed in concert with each other, based upon national interests and concerns."[65] However, some worry that this is sometimes taken to the extremes when "defence policy appears to be excessively influenced by federal budgets and regional economies."[66] In fact, a gradual erosion of foreign and military policy to the benefit of trade and short-sighted prosperity has gradually affected the credibility of diplomats and soldiers in their own country and perhaps even their influence abroad. Senior Canadian government officials have openly referred to Canada as a 'nation of joiners', referring to Canada's strong multilateralism policy but at the same time questioning with a certain

[64] Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Address to the Alberta Liberal Association, Calgary, 12 April 1969.
[65] David L. Bashow, Canada and the Future of Collective Defence (Ontario: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1998) 11.
[66] Bashow 1998, 11.

cynicism the wisdom behind it. When left unexplained, this policy is often misunderstood and perceived by many as a lack of national direction.

In an analysis of recent Canadian foreign policy statements, Hampson and Oliver from Carleton University summarized what they call the 'Axworthy Doctrine' in the following assertions:

- "The end of the cold war had fundamentally changed the nature of International politics;
- Security goals should be focused around human security and not state security;
- Soft power is the new currency of International politics;
- Military force is of declining utility in international politics;
- Public diplomacy is increasingly effective in a wired world;
- Non-governmental organizations are in the vanguard of the 'new diplomacy';
- Canada can lead 'coalitions of the willing'; and
- International change will come through the promulgation of new norms of which the key priorities for Canada are small arms, children's rights, international human rights, and peacebuilding."[67]

Although Mr Axworthy has moved on, "his philosophy that international relations should be motivated by concepts of human security"[68] seems alive and well in the current Liberal government. In fact, it is probable that the 'Axworthy Doctrine' "will continue to

[67] Fen Osler Hampson and Dean T. Oliver, "The Axworthy Doctrine", International Journal, Summer 1998, 380.

resonate in Canadian defence debates for at least two reasons. First, it provides a useful framework for those who have already come to believe that Canada does not need to maintain overseas combat capability". Second, it provides the current liberal government a justification for "further diminution, if not the disappearance, of Canadian overseas combat capability [without the appearance of undermining] fundamental Canadian interests abroad."[69] In a strategic framework where the need of a military is put into question, it is not surprising to find little debate on the need for missile defence. Despite some recent advocacy for such a program within National Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) continues to steer clear of the debate. Comfortable in the old deterrence paradigm, and savvy of the expected peace dividend of the post-Cold War, Canadian policy makers remain focused on the 'Axworthy Doctrine' of human security.

On the other hand, the Canadian Liberal government could have further restrained the military in the years that followed its 1993 election. In fact, they were faced with a bleak economic situation that needed immediate attention while at the same time their military was in disarray as a result of many years of neglect. Although the Liberals did make dramatic cuts in the military budgets, cutting by twenty-three percent the military budget between 1993 and 1998, it did not transform the military into a domestic disaster relief force as some Canadians had requested it. On the contrary, the 1994 Canadian Defence White Paper called for the military to be ready to 'fight with the best, against the best'.

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[68] News Release, "Axworthy to Receive CARE International Humanitarian Award", CARE International, 31 May 2001, [http://care.ca/info/pr/010531_e.shtm].

[69] Joseph T. Jockel, The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999) 7.

The human security agenda would in effect provide the strategic rationale for the forces set out in the defence white paper, and make a financial recovery politically acceptable once the national economic difficulties were properly addressed.[70] Modest increases in the 1999-2001 military budgets produced by the Liberal government confirm this course of action. But could this discrete support for military needs be extended into support for more controversial programs like missile defence?

During the last decade, Canada has become increasingly involved in coalition operations and peace enforcement missions. In fact, many were surprised to see the strong support given by Minister Axworthy to the Canadian military participation in the Balkans. This was perceived by many as a move away from the deterrence dogma. Dr Ferguson from the University of Alberta proposes that we are effectively stepping away from the 'RMA-Deterrence' phase during which defence had become a useless (marginalized) concept. However, the effects are still being felt. As Dr Ferguson points out, a lot of the thinking surrounding missile defence today is still influenced by the deterrence dogma. This frame of mind fuels the continued fear of a renewed arms race.[71] It also partially explains the strong position of Canada on the issue of proliferation and its active participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Canada has always been a strong proponent of the MTCR as the "only multilateral arrangement dealing with ballistic missile and cruise missile and other WMD delivery

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[70] Jockel 00/01, 3.
[71] Ferguson, James, Dr., "Thinking the unthinkable: on Revolution, Outer Space and Canadian Policy", Space in the 21st Century, ed. Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis Margueratt and Dr Allan English (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2000) 12.

vehicle systems and related equipment, material and technology."[72] "On the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament front, this means that strengthening rules-based international systems' ensuring their full implementation, promoting the acceptance of norms, and enhancing transparency and verification measures are the best means to assure our collective security and to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems."[73] This is important to Canadians because "Canada is strongly committed to multilateralism while the national interests of the United States often drive its foreign policy along unilateral tracks."[74] "In Canada's view, the MTCR is the front-line in the fight against missile proliferation."[75] As Chairman of the MTCR in 2001-2002, Canada expressed increasing concerns about missile proliferation, an area where the U.S. had shown a tendency towards unilateralism. Obviously, those concerns would have to be addressed before Canada would get involved in BMD participation.

The Canadian military position on missile defence was expressed informally on a number of occasions and formalized in the 1994 Defence White Paper. In fact, although most of the justifications provided by the American government in support of missile defence apply to Canada, it remains important for a sovereign nation to assess the situation for itself. The results of such an assessment were integrated in the 1994 White Paper. The cornerstone document of military prioritization acknowledges concerns about ballistic

[72] Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Missile Proliferation: Issues and Challenges", (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2001).
[73] The Honourable Rey Pagtakhan, Secretary of State (Asia-Pacific), Address to the 2001 Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Ottawa, Ontario, 25 September 2001.
[74] The Honourable John Manley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Address to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Toronto, Ontario, 12 April 2001.
[75] Pagtakhan Sep 01.

missiles when it points out that "nuclear weapons continue to occupy a central role in Russian military doctrine" and that "the vast majority of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal remains in place".[76] The paper goes on to cite the threat posed by the Chinese nuclear force and its continued modernization of the intercontinental delivery systems. Grave concerns are expressed about the growing number of states that have acquired and continue to seek nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missile delivery capabilities.[77] Finally, the White Paper points out that the "transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies to so-called 'rogue' regimes is of particular concern.[78] On the topic of missile defence, the paper indicates a requirement to gain a better understanding through research and consultation on missile defence with like-minded countries. It stresses that any program must be "cost effective and affordable, [and] make an unambiguous contribution to Canada's defence needs".[79] It also states the need to build on these missions the Forces already perform such as surveillance and communications. These statements can hardly be described as closing the door on the U.S. program.

There is also recent evidence within Canadian military reports that "ballistic missile and WMD proliferators of the 1990s are the same ones that existed in the 1980s, and it is unlikely that the list of players will measurably change over the coming decade."[80] The 2000 Space Appreciation report concludes that "the Cold War deterrence paradigm is

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[76] Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1994) 20.
[77] White Paper 1994, 20.
[78] White Paper 1994, 7.
[79] White Paper 1994, 25.
[80] Department of National Defence, "Space Appreciation 2000", Report by Study Team Stephen L. James and Dr James Ferguson, Winnipeg, Canada, 2000, 10.

being replaced by a defence paradigm."[81] The overall conclusion indicates that the new strategic concerns are increasingly being seen as outweighing the traditional ones associated with Russia and China. According to the report, in the long run, BMD will not be limited to the U.S. However, it does not take position with regard to Canadian participation in the program, in probable deference to the DFAIT position on the subject. However, we can easily find other indicators of the level of support that the missile defence program might find in Canada.

Although some believed that the real aim of a U.S.-sponsored proposal for a ballistic missile defence program was to solidify American military and political power, rather than protect against so-called "rogue" states,[82] the annual Defence Planning Guidance documents provide insight on the general consensus. Throughout the years, they have acknowledged concerns over issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.[83] In fact, when one looks at the three stated Canadian defence missions of defending Canadian sovereignty, participating in the defence of North America and contributing to international security, it becomes apparent that each of those missions is faced with a ballistic missile threat. It is, therefore, not surprising to find as part of Defence Objective 4 of the Defence Planning Guidance issued in 2001: "With the U.S., develop options for Government consideration on

[81] SA 2000, 11.
[82] Canadian Press Newswire, "Military questions U.S. motives for missile defence", 24 May 2000.
[83] Although the specific wording varies, this can be found in all versions of the defence planning guidance since 1997 and most recently in: Canada, Department of National Defence, "Defence Planning Guidance 2001", Ottawa, 2001) para. 102.

possible Canadian participation in a ballistic missile defence program"[84]. This clearly identifies the continued interest in missile defence, at least by the military authorities.

However, DFAIT's position remains mostly neutral. In fact, Canadian diplomats never subscribed to the rogue nation scenario as an important threat against Canada. They only acknowledged the remote possibility of collateral damage, a threat of much lesser importance. Their position is actually corroborated by the military assessment offered in the Space Appreciation 2000 report, which concludes, "[t]he direct threat to Canadian territory remains limited." However, this conclusion did not take into consideration the increased Canadian vulnerability and increased out of area coalition activities.[85] In reality, the increasingly interventionist positions adopted by Canada in its military actions might eventually modify the level of threat directed at its territory. In the meantime, the official position of Canada has still not changed. Fulfilling its habitual international negotiator role, Canada repeatedly offered to act as negotiator between the U.S. and Russia on the topic of missile defence.

During a press conference in Ottawa in May 2001, Ambassador Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, stressed the importance of the consultation efforts with the U.S. that were underway. He described their efforts as having two themes: firstly, they were engaged in consultations with people to listen to their views and secondly, they were facing the challenge of explaining to others that 2001 is not 1972.

[84] DPG 2001, para. 204.
[85] SA 2000, 19.

There were different threats out there that needed to be addressed.[86] However, remaining true to its multilateralism policy, Canada expressed its satisfaction of the process of consultation in which the U.S. has been engaged with NATO and others bilaterally[87], referring implicitly to on-going consultations with Russia. Canada now officially recognized the emergence or increase of new threats, "not just from weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles but also from terrorist threats, threats to critical infrastructure and threats from internal and regional conflicts."[88] Considering this changed world environment, Canadian diplomats started to consider that missile defences might be able to play a role in this new environment. "Missile defence is not in and of itself bad. It depends entirely on what is proposed and how it is pursued."[89] Those words seem to indicate that Canada was finally ready, if asked and if they found the justifications reasonable, to embark on missile defence.

Canada's support: Hitchhikers Don't Drive

It appears that the post- Cold War debate over the appropriate Canadian international involvement might be about to conclude. As demonstrated in its recent actions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Canada will not only continue to keep the peace but it will also take a proactive role in the human security agenda. "Human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk and taking remedial action

[86] Ambassador Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Transcript of On-the-record Press Conference, WorldNet Studio U.S. Embassy, Ottawa May 15, 2001.
[87] The Honourable John Manley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Address to the North Atlantic Council meeting, Budapest, Hungary, 29 May 2001.
[88] Manley May 2001.
[89] Manley May 2001.

where prevention fails".[90] Interestingly, in Canada and in the U.S., the Axworthy Doctrine of human security had initially attracted much criticism. This is surprising once you look past the American's policies and instead study their actions throughout the 1990's.

In fact, the U.S. has itself embarked on a human security agenda as demonstrated by its willingness to get increasingly involved in peacemaking and peace-building missions since the end of the Cold War. Although the current administration intends on being more 'humble' in its international involvements[91], it is being forced once again into a nation-building effort as a result of its war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Throughout that conflict, the U.S. has demonstrated a strong interest in the protection of the innocent Afghan populations by dropping foodstuffs and other aids. More importantly, its targeting and weapon selection is influenced heavily by collateral damage concerns, an obvious demonstration of human security preoccupations. Consequently, criticism of Canada's human security agenda has been marginalized by concrete U.S. action. Similarly, Canadians no longer perceive the re-alignment of Canadian foreign policy with the U.S. policies as inherently bad.[92] In fact, there is a growing sense in Canada that actions taken with "coalitions of the willing" promote human security and are in support of the core Canadian values. Canadians now readily accept the need to join the unipolar world power when it uses its unequalled military machine to 'do good things'.

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[90] Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World", Ottawa, April 1999, 5.
[91] Richard Gwyn, "Bush fear of 'rogue' states is laughable," Toronto Star, 18 February 2001, A13.
[92] Jockel 00/01, 9.

Military intervention, in this context, is actually being presented as another form of foreign aid. In fact, the "human security concept will endure as the justification for Canadian military intervention overseas"[93] and will probably be used to justify a Canadian participation in the NMD program. The argument will be made that NMD will ensure the security of the North American population from the uncontrolled threat of rogue nations and possibly from well-equipped terrorists. A further argument in favour of NMD is economic. In the past, many have complained that the human security agenda is too broad and could be used to justify countless commitments overseas. Threats to human security are numerous throughout the world and pose significant concerns to strategic planners both from a capability perspective as well as a financing perspective. Having too much to do while resources remain limited forces a nation to prioritize its efforts. As such, it seems apparent that Canada would promote human security of its own citizen before that of other nations. In that context, missile defence could easily be proposed as a cost effective solution to a problem that Canada will have to face, either alone or with its allies.

The actual threats faced by Canada are "directly related to Canada's increasing role as a good international citizen. Canada is, at present, one of a select few states possessing armed forces of a sufficient calibre (in terms of professionalism and skilled use of advanced technologies) capable of participation in coalition operations vital to the world economy or to global stability. The necessary use of force during such operations give

[93] Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolosky, "Lloyd Axworthy's legacy: human security and the rescue of Canadian defence policy", International Journal, Winter 00/01, 1.

rise to the possibility of terrorist reprisal actions."[94] In fact, this threat is not new. Graham Gordon of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service reported in 1997 that Canada "will continue to face a serious threat from terrorism for the foreseeable future."[95] After the realisation of the potentially devastating effects of such a threat on Sep 11, the Minister of Finance made it clear in an interview on 1 October 2001 that national security was now the number one priority of the Canadian financial thinking[96]. The government had in fact adopted on that day a resolution that effectively authorized the freeze of terrorist associated financing and made the fight against terrorism a top Canadian priority, and de facto, a Canadian foreign policy.

As stated by a Pierre Elliott Trudeau in 1968[97], "Foreign policy must drive military policy, not the opposite". "[T]he most predominant security challenge facing any civilized state is the protection of its sovereign territory… [S]ince actual invasion of the [Canadian] land mass… is virtually non-existent, aerospace and maritime sovereignty protection become the only realistic subsets of that larger mandate."[98] As such, Canada's current position is that if it decides to participate in a missile defence program, it would prefer to do so under the aegis of NORAD with a new and expanded agreement.

The integration of NMD into the existing North American Defence infrastructure is in fact one option entertained by the U.S. Brigadier-General D.W. Bartram, a former senior

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[94] Bashow 1998, 7.
[95] Gordon, Robert W., "Terrorism: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," in Canada and the World: Non-traditional Security Threats (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997) 73.
[96] The Hon. Paul Martin, Minister of Finance, Interview on The National, The Magazine, CBC News, 1 October 2001.
[97] Trudeau 1969.
[98] Bashow 1998, 7.

officer of NORAD describes the current NORAD aerospace warning mission by its ability to conduct "the monitoring of man-made objects in space and the detection, validation and warning of attack against North America, whether by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other Commands."[99] Although, the reduced perceived threat from the post Cold War 'peace dividend' era had resulted in a general relaxation of NORAD's security measures, it always protected its "emphasis on maintaining the necessary infrastructure to be able to regenerate a credible air defence in the event a new or re-emergent threat appears."[100] In fact, NORAD "is fully capable of providing ballistic missile warning to Canadian and allied service people deployed on operations around the globe [as demonstrated] during the Persian Gulf War of 1991."[101] Could it also support the (national) ballistic missile defence? In fact, "[t]he U.S. military wants to incorporate into NORAD's [integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA)] process the decision-making authority to use the national missile defence system."[102] The reason is simple: in this manner, it could easily take full advantage of the existing command and control arrangements, and special relationship, between NORAD and Space Command. Hence, the future might see the integration of NMD into NORAD's role and mission.

The best and simplest way to achieve this integration would be to make the existing Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) process the decision-

[99] Brigadier-General D.W. Bartram, "NORAD Briefing", National Network News, April 1997, 27.
[100] Bashow 1998, 12.
[101] Bashow 1998, 13.
[102] Jockel 1999, 105.

making authority to use NMD.[103] This would require that the assessor be authorized to launch interceptors. This would tightly intertwine NORAD and NMD processes together. Although the current NORAD Agreement includes room for the expansion of the roles in the collective defence organization, considering the very small contribution made by Canada to North American aerospace defence and the added significance of a system that would integrate NMD, would Canada be invited to remain involved in the ITW/AA process? In fact, some are surprised that the U.S. still trust Canadians to act as "assessor" under the current NORAD arrangements.[104] Regardless, if Canada does not support NMD, then how could it pursue a participation in NORAD? On the other hand, if it does pursue NMD, can it afford the "asymmetric contributions" that would be expected from the U.S.?[105] In the end, could Canada afford not to be part of NORAD? Leaving NORAD would also mean additional costs for Canada, as it would have to assume full financial responsibility for the monitoring and protection of its large territory.

"Since 1957, the Canadian and U.S. efforts at North American air defence, and later at aerospace defence, have been conducted under the aegis of the jointly maintained North American Aerospace Defence Command. If the Canadian government decides not to participate in a new ballistic missile defence system for North America, the U.S. will probably bring NORAD to an end."[106] In fact, when discussing defence against strategic bombing, the "Canadian territory has become strategically irrelevant by the conjunction of the end of the Cold War and emerging space-based surveillance technology. In other

[103] Jockel 1999, 105.
[104] Jockel 1999, 105.
[105] Jockel 1999, 107.
[106] Jockel 1999, 92-93.

words, Canada is likely to pay a significant political price if it attempts to side-step U.S. NMD."[107] At the very least, NORAD will be marginalized by the CINCNORTH construct and over time its role would likely become second to a 'homeland defence' structure where Canada is still strategically relevant as a possible point of entry for terrorists.

The need for NORAD participation is confirmed in the latest report from the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SSCNSD). SSCNSD perceives the renewal of the NORAD agreement in June 2001[108] as a demonstration that it is one of the key aspects of the Canada-United States defence structure. However, the committee expressed its concerns over the establishment of a commander-in-chief for homeland defence, also referred to as CINCNORTH in the media. The committee was specifically worried about the relationship that NORAD would have with the proposed command. Their worries echoed the view of Lieutenant General Macdonald, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, on the risk of NORAD becoming "a subordinate command in such a way as to weaken the command and control of the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff over the Canadians and Canadian Air Force units integrated into NORAD's structure."[109]

During official visits in Washington, committee members had an opportunity to voice those concerns. In addressing them, Secretary Rumsfeld pointed to the recent renewal of the NORAD Agreement and his awareness of the importance of maintaining direct links

[107] Ferguson 2000, 12.
[108] United States, Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Statement by Richard Boucher on Extension of the NORAD agreement, 19 June 2001.

from the Commander of NORAD to the Canadian command structure. He praised the way NORAD had functioned so far and stated that he would welcome similar Canadian participation with both the sea and the land elements. The officials of the Department of State and the National Security Council expressed similar positions.[110] The committee concluded that the U.S. missile defence program would have a profound effect on the future of Canadian –U.S. military co-operation, as well as Canadian defence and foreign policy. At the root of those concerns were the way in which missile defence would fit into a broader framework of bilateral relations, how it will affect strategic stability, particularly with Russia and China, and, its effect on global non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. It noted that the U.S. did not need Canadian participation and how the Administration had "scant faith in the value of arms control treaties."[111] It appeared obvious that the U.S. was looking for a third option between nuclear retaliation and acquiescence if ever it is faced with an attempt to blackmail. Finally, the committee reported that the time for a decision was fast approaching. During their Washington visit, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Armed Services Committee all asked whether Canada would be prepared to support the United States in an armed conflict with [the 'Axis of Evil' countries, namely Iran, Iraq and North Korea].[112] Although the Americans were still satisfied with the vague answers that were provided, they were sending a clear signal that Canada would soon be asked to make clear commitments.

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[109] Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness", February 2002.
[110] SSCNSD Feb 02, section 19.
[111] SSCNSD Feb 02, section 22.

Canada is already committed to its human security agenda. However, if Canadians want to pursue this policy, they will require a truly interoperable military force, a requirement that did not exist during a cold war where a conflict would only last from a few hours to a few days. Canada has recognized this need and since 1994 has made interoperability the cornerstone of its force development. This interoperability can be achieved with exercises and training, but the most economic way to achieve it has been through the unparalleled exchanges made possible by the NORAD relationship. In short, it is in Canada's best interest to pursue NORAD as an entry point into the American military machine and a facilitator for technology sharing and transfer. However, as demonstrated above, to maintain our alliance with the U.S. might require our participation in missile defence. This is a cost-effective decision since the 'asymmetric participation' into the missile defence program would likely not require us to spend anymore than we currently plan on spending while it would allow us to maintain the closest alliance between any two countries on this planet. In fact, maintaining the NORAD relationship ensures that the most important national interest, survival itself, is ensured largely by U.S. financed efforts, while freeing our limited military resources to act abroad for other purposes, namely human security.[113]

But could Canada embark on a part of homeland defence while staying away from the NMD program? Is participation in NMD in conflict with the Canadian Foreign policy? Is it sacrificing its long-standing position on nuclear disarmament and human security? On the other hand, if Canada does not participate in the NMD efforts, would the U.S.

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[112] SSCNSD Feb 02, section 23.
[113] Jockel 00/01, 9.

retaliate with economic pressures? Can Canada afford any slow down at its U.S. borders? Would Canada be willing to take such a risk with 80% of its export market? Is Canada willing to take such a chance?

In fact, the U.S. has not expressed much interest in the Canadian views with regard to the missile defence program. Apart from the renewed message that consultation will continue, Canada's support has not been solicited or even mentioned. President Bush's omission to mention Canada in his early post-Sep 11 speeches[114] could be perceived as indication that Canada is unimportant on the global picture or that it can be taken for granted. In fact, the U.S. could easily deploy an effective defence shield without Canadian participation. Conversely, Canada's decision to support or not the missile defence initiatives will likely determine the shape of its relationship with the U.S. for years to come. The eager willingness that Canada demonstrated when it accepted to place American guards at Canadian border posts[115] might be an early indication of the declining control over Canadian sovereignty and the fear of any impact on the trade with the U.S..

Overall, Canada now finds itself in an unenviable situation. First, the Canadian economy has become so dependent on the American trade[116], as demonstrated by the results of the recent border difficulties, that unprecedented "alignment" of immigration and customs

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[114] United States, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Transcript: Remarks By the President and Prime Minister Chrétien of Canada, 24 September 2001.
[115] News Conference, The Honourable John Manley, Governor Tom Ridge, Signing of the Border Security Declaration, Ottawa, 12 December 2001.
[116] United States, The National Intelligence Council, "Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts", December 2000, [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html].

policies with American policies can no longer be escaped. This willingness to trade-off some of Canadian 'sovereignty' came with little hesitation to ensure a continued trade flow. Second, its military posture at home is already intertwined a

Treaty until the 1984 Strategic Defence Initiative, the Gulf War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, it has covered the assertions made by the proponents as well as the counter-arguments provided by the critics. It has followed the long and sinuous road of program development through the first Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration, highlighting the political as well as technical issues that have constantly hampered support to NMD. It also reviewed the results of the Rumsfeld commission and the eventual mitigated Democrat support that left the program on a collision course with Russia.

The paper then took a look at the second Bush Administration support of National Missile Defence as it was proposed in the early months of their mandate. This section presented the return of the Reagan dream to defend America from space and the difficulty that this position faced on the international scene. It presented the need for President Bush to build consensus at home, to resolve the technical issues surrounding feasibility and affordability and finally to obtain the support of America's allies. It also concluded that regardless of all the efforts invested, neither of these conditions would be met satisfactorily. However, despite these difficulties, there seemed to be little doubt that the Bush Administration would continue to move forward, although slowly and carefully with its development intentions.

All of these conditions would suddenly change in the new "post-Sep 11" era where homeland security became instantaneously the highest priority. This new world dominated by fear of terrorism would see the creation of an International coalition against

evil. In fact, the perceived need for security would be transformed into a need to protect citizens from all threats. This would create a new funding and justification opportunity for the renamed BMD. The administration would link terrorism to rogue states and propose that BMD was part and parcel of homeland security. They would point out that, without a doubt, if terrorists had access to ballistic missiles, they would not hesitate to use them, hence the need for missile defence. This would prepare the terrain for the creation of a Missile Defence Agency, a considerable increase in financial support and the withdrawal of the U.S. from the ABM Treaty. Finally, the paper proposed that the American tendency towards unilateralism would continue as demonstrated by the announcement of new nuclear weapons development and the need to protect against the 'Axis of Evil'. Others would have to adapt to the American dominance. In the words of President Bush, other countries would be either with them, or against them.

The second section of the paper took a look at missile defence from a Canadian perspective. A summary review of Canada's foreign and military policy showed the contrasts between the position of diplomats and that of the military institution. The review showed, however, that Canada was gradually bridging the gap and that mounting support for NMD could be found. In fact, the human security agenda was increasingly taking Canada on the world scene, alongside the U.S. The final section presented Canada's current position as a minor stakeholder and the lack of control in which it finds itself in the post-Sep 11 context. Forced to consider increased security for its own territory, a quick analysis of the options available to Canada clearly showed that the country could no longer maintain its "middle of the road" position. Considering the long-

standing Canadian policy of national, bilateral and multilateral measures[117] to ensure security and defence, Canadian would readily understand the need for missile defence within the NORAD context. In fact, Canada's close economic and military relationship

[117] Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation: Canadian Policy", Ottawa, 2001.

with the U.S., combined with the ‘new world order’, has removed much of the ability for an independent decision. Canada must join the missile defence team.

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