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**INTEGRATION AND UNIFICATION EQUALS JOINTNESS
IN 21ST CENTURY CANADIAN FORCES**

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ABSTRACT

This paper suggests that the Canadian Forces (CF) must now revisit integration and unification, and embrace jointness as the solution to the current challenges of operational effectiveness, efficiency and dwindling budget. It discusses the formal goals and the implementation of integration and unification in Canada, as well as the impact of inter-Service rivalries and the influence of Service parochialism throughout the last eighty years. It examines American lessons in jointness, specifically their quest to overcome inter-Service rivalries and the progress that they have made with developing jointness. The paper concludes that the only logical solution to address the operational and administrative difficulties of the current CF military structure is this: The elimination of Service parochialism and, in turn, a return to Canada's integration and unification heritage and the adoption of jointness, not only in principle, but also through its aggressive implementation.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

If the United Kingdom were today a recently created State organizing her fighting forces, it is inconceivable that they would be separated into three services.¹

By all accounts, the world today remains a very unstable place. The tempo of Canadian Forces' (CF) operations and deployments continues to escalate. Not only are the operations becoming more numerous, but they are also increasingly complex, demanding and dangerous. Moreover, the continuing downsizing and restructuring of the CF has provided little leeway to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force able to meet the current, let alone anticipated, domestic, continental and global security challenges. Indeed, as endorsed by the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, in a recent report: "The capacity of the CF to deploy and sustain a significant contribution to a number of successive or simultaneous contingencies [both at home or] abroad . . . will continue to dwindle without increased funding."² However, there is a 'proverbial' light at the end of

¹ Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein as quoted in Paul Hellyer, Damn The Torpedoes, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc, 1990) 32.

² Jim Fergusson et al, To Secure A Nation: The Case for a New Defence White Paper (Calgary: Report for the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, 2001) 18. This report, prepared by the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, represents the rationale for a Canadian defence and security policy review. A national council of distinguished Canadians helped the Centre shape and also endorsed recommendations contained in the report.

the tunnel, if we choose to accept it, and it is one that has been flickering for over the last thirty-five years.

Paul Hellyer, Minister of National Defence (MND) from 1963 to 1967, tabled the 1964 *White Paper on Defence* in the Canadian Parliament, with the primary aim of amalgamating the three individual Services³ and creating an integrated and unified force. At the time it was, and to this day it remains, in some sense controversial.⁴ In legislating integration and unification, Hellyer's intent was to create an integrated and unified military defence force — with a single chain of command from the MND to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The goal was to improve military effectiveness and efficiency within the defence establishment. More importantly, integration and unification were to produce savings by combining the three distinct Services — Army, Navy and Air Force — into a single structure, and thereby eliminate excessive redundancy within the recruiting, administrative, logistic, personnel and procurement functions.⁵ With the passage of two Bills⁶, Hellyer's intent was arguably met. However, it did not fully address integration and unification as a concept for military operations, nor did it eliminate "the rigidities inherent in the tri-[S]ervice

³ To avoid confusion, the word 'Service', when capitalized, shall be used to refer to the individual military Services — Army, Navy, and Air Force.

⁴ Hellyer 203.

⁵ Canadian Armed Forces Integration/Unification: A 1979 Perspective (Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 1979) 12.

⁶ Bill C-90 and Bill C-243 were the official legislative changes that resulted in the reorganization of Canada's armed forces into a single unified force.

structure."⁷ As a result, the integration and unification of the CF have only been partially implemented, and thus, their preparedness for jointness — the essential hallmark of 21st century military operations — is flawed.

An examination of both the literature and the practice of other military forces clearly reveals that jointness is the key to the future. Indeed, things 'joint' — joint operations, joint headquarters, joint education, and joint doctrine — permeate contemporary military literature and recent history.⁸ For example, in the United States, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has actually established a web site for joint doctrine⁹ and, in 1999, Joint Forces Command was officially formed to advance American Services' interoperability.¹⁰ The United Kingdom is putting real meaning into the term 'jointery' with the formation of its Permanent Joint Force Headquarters, responsible for planning joint and combined military operations¹¹, as well as developing joint warfare doctrine.¹² In Japan, there is a thrust

⁷ G.M. Fyffe et al., Task Force on Review of Unification of The Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 1980) 28.

⁸ F. Mike Boomer, "Joint or Combined Doctrine? The Right Choice for Canada," Paper prepared for AMSC 1. (Canadian Forces College, 1998) 1.

⁹ Boomer 1. The web site is located at <<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/>>. Furthermore, the fact that the periodical, *Joint Force Quarterly*, has been in publication since 1993 is also indicative of the universality of jointness within western military culture, particularly the United States.

¹⁰ "DoD Dictionary of Military Terms," 19 December 2001, <<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>> (25 February 2002). Interoperability refers to the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

¹¹ See Key Concepts on pages 5-7 for definitions.

¹² Stuart Peach, ed., Perspectives on Air Power: Air Power In Its Wider Context (London: The Stationery Office, 1998) 54.

to improve jointness in the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF). This move towards jointness has been supported by amendments in their law, which has improved the overall co-ordination between the SDF Services.¹³ Here in Canada, jointness has been approached guardedly. A deployable Joint Headquarters was only created in June 2000, and previously, in 1995, the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) produced its first volume of joint and combined doctrine.¹⁴ The future of all western militaries, it appears, will be centred on jointness, especially, as I argue and most officers would agree, because the *raison d'être* for jointness is to increase overall combat effectiveness.

Aim

It is time to revisit the fundamental reasons for establishing joint doctrine and examine, from a Canadian viewpoint, if jointness is really working elsewhere, and, if it is, to determine if jointness will meet the needs of the CF well into the current century. Does the concept of jointness increase efficiencies and operational effectiveness through the joint consolidation of structure and administration of the three existing Services — which have been re-introduced in the decades since unification? Today, the CF is faced with many challenges,

¹³ Fumio Ota, "Jointness in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces," Joint Force Quarterly 27 (2000-01): 58.

¹⁴ Joint Doctrine for Canadian Forces Joint and Combined Operations (Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 1995). Interestingly, this document revised and re-published under a new title — Canadian Forces Operations — in 2000, now has a decreased focus on jointness.

including the shortfall in money. Will jointness create a more efficient budget and add to the functional efficiency of the CF? It is my contention that integration and unification, as it was originally conceived thirty-five years ago, has not gone far enough. *The Canadian military must now embrace jointness as the solution to the current challenges of operational effectiveness, efficiency and dwindling budget.*

Key Concepts

An understanding of the key concepts and terminology used in this paper is important to the development of the thesis. Of significance, it is important to observe that the terms integration and unification are "merely different stages of the same process."¹⁵ Integration is something that stops short of unification and is defined here as the fusion of different groups into one body while permitting the retention of group identities.¹⁶ Unification, on the other hand, "means the merging of the armed forces and their supporting structures into a single organization with a unitary hierarchy."¹⁷ Furthermore, in this paper, 'jointness', as a concept, is defined as a fusion of integration and unification. Mere unification of headquarters does not create jointness or a unified force. Jointness, then, refers to unity of command and structures and "improved

¹⁵ Fyffe 6.

¹⁶ Vernon J. Kronenberg, All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973) 9.

procedures for joining the unique, specialized capabilities of the different Services" of a nation in order to enhance overall operational effectiveness and efficiency.¹⁸

The term 'joint' refers to those "activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments [or Services] participate"¹⁹, whereas 'combined' describes those activities, operations and organizations in which the forces and/or agencies of more than one nation participate.²⁰ Coalition operations, or multinational operations, are operations in which the military elements of several nations have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose.²¹

Operational effectiveness and efficiency are two notions that are obviously continuous goals of any military organization. Operational effectiveness is the "overall degree of mission accomplishment of forces when used by representative personnel in the environment planned or expected for operational employment of the forces considering organization, doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulnerability, and threat."²² Efficiency, (or more correctly, the military principle of war called 'economy of effort'), means concentrating an operationally effective balanced

¹⁷ Kronenberg, All Together Now 9.

¹⁸ Mackubin T. Owens, "The Use and Abuse of Jointness," Marine Corps Gazette 81.11 (1997): 51.

¹⁹ "DoD Dictionary."

²⁰ Canadian Forces Operations (Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 2000) GL-E-2.

²¹ "Military Definitions," n.d., <<http://www.fas.org/news/reference/lexicon/mildef.htm>> (3 May 2002).

²² "Military Definitions."

force with sufficient resources at the most important task or objective.²³

Methodology

At this point it is appropriate to clarify the methodology used to conduct the research for this paper, so that the reader can better understand the resulting recommendations and conclusions. I have drawn on both my personal experience and a variety of published sources. From the numerous unclassified official reports and publications on policy and doctrine published by the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND), to the collective works of Desmond Morton, Douglas Bland, William Owens and Kenneth Allard, there is a good cross-section of literature regarding unification, jointness and the challenges posed by inter-Service rivalry and Service parochialism. However, except for Bland and Vernon Kronenberg, there are no other published sources available on Canadian integration and unification. Paul Hellyer's autobiography provides an excellent firsthand account of his trials and tribulations (as the MND), in implementing integration and unification.²⁴

Many newspaper articles and internet sites provide timely insight into the operational challenges faced by the CF today. The recent scholarly papers and professional analysis of Lynn Mason and Raymond Crabbe, G.E. Sharpe and Allan English, and

²³ Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy 224.

²⁴ Hellyer 1-298.

the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary provide credence for furthering Canadian jointness and increasing interoperability with our American neighbour. A variety of opinions expressed in journal articles, specifically *Joint Force Quarterly*, provide a very good explanation as to the reasons for the success, or failure, of jointness in western militaries. Finally, it is also expected that choosing integration and unification, and jointness as the central theme of the paper will permit most CF readers to relate their own experiences to the discussion.

Approach

The paper is divided into four chapters to assist in presenting my argument. Chapter I is the introduction to the paper that sets out the aims, objectives and its methodology. Chapter II begins by reviewing the early attempts at integration and unification. It discusses both the formal goals as expressed by Paul Hellyer, and the initial implementation of integration and unification, as well as some of the later developments that affected both. This chapter will attempt to identify if the formal goals of integration and unification were achieved to the level of success originally envisioned, particularly in its efforts to eliminate inter-Service rivalry and "military [S]ervice unilateralism."²⁵ Chapter III examines both the

²⁵ William A. Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000) 152. Admiral Owens equates military Service unilateralism to

unification and joint experiences of our closest ally — the United States — in order to draw comparisons for the Canadian experience, and also to explore lessons in jointness that would suit the CF environment. It will also elucidate the challenge of Service parochialism.²⁶ Finally, in Chapter IV, the paper will highlight present operational and administrative difficulties

CHAPTER II

INTEGRATION AND UNIFICATION IN CANADA

This chapter will examine the early attempts at integration and unification in Canada. It will review the formal goals and the initial implementation of unification, as well as its impact on the CF. The remainder of the chapter will assess some of the resulting developments and issues that have occurred since integration and unification were confirmed into law, as well as the effect these developments have had on the CF's ability to achieve jointness.

The First Attempt

In Canada, the road to jointness has taken a long and arduous journey. In fact, the integration and unification of its armed forces can be traced to the early 1920s. The 1922 National Defence Act amalgamated "the forces under one Chief of Staff in a single, very small Department of National Defence, with one Minister."²⁷ The focus of this union was to save money and improve defence policy co-ordination.²⁸ As would become the pattern, this amalgamation suffered from Service rivalry, an absence of political will, and an inability of the senior officers to

²⁷ Canadian Armed Forces Integration/Unification: A 1979 Perspective (Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 1979) 4.

achieve meaningful cooperation. "The government issued no defence policy statements: there was no new equipment; and the planning process remained in limbo."²⁹ As nothing of significance was accomplished during the next four years, this first attempt was deemed a dismal failure.³⁰

Attempts Of Brooke Claxton

There were no further serious attempts at integration and unification until after World War II. In 1947, for reasons of economy and efficiency, the Minister of the day — Brooke Claxton — began again to look towards the amalgamation of the armed forces. His statement on defence matters, titled *Canada's Defence*, outlined a fourteen-point programme to achieve this aim.³¹ He was "determined to streamline its organization and to find efficient and inexpensive ways to meet Canada's defence needs."³² Although he advanced numerous reforms and "policies intended to foster integration and, where possible, the unification of responsibilities and functions in the Department and in the [three] Services"³³, there are three specific aspects

²⁸ B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, ed., Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1993) 72.

²⁹ Hunt and Haycock 73.

³⁰ Hunt and Haycock 74. Subsequently, in 1928, the armed forces were reorganized with a Chief of General Staff and a Chief of Naval Staff.

³¹ *Canada's Defence* as cited in Douglas L. Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 1: Defence Policy (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1997) 24-25.

³² Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy 13.

³³ Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy 13-14.

of this undertaking that are pertinent to the jointness argument. These include: first, the reasons presented for the proposed integration to be delayed/postponed; secondly, the minor successes that the project achieved; and third, the debates that ensued centring on the creation of a supreme commander of all three Services.³⁴

Reasons for Postponing Integration

Although the integration of the armed forces was a high priority for Claxton, his efforts were repeatedly met with substantial opposition from within the Department. The reasons presented for delaying any forms of amalgamation were similar to those that would be encountered in future integration and unification attempts. Of these, three were indicative of the procrastination tactics being employed within the Department. They also serve to illusty m4l.335dng empe. Claxto'is phiall succes, ats wallasn the onceptuialdififiultiens

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integration could be delayed indefinitely. Secondly, they stated that "a serious loss in efficiency would result from integrating supporting services under one or other of the armed forces as the other [S]ervice would no longer have full control of their supporting services."³⁶ It was argued by the opponents to integration that any such arrangement was inefficient from the command and control perspective, particularly as command and control were considered an essential part of the military. Finally, it was consistently argued that although there were many ways to amalgamate similar services, there would be minimal savings realized from such reorganization.³⁷ Therefore, the argument ran, there was no need to consider such changes, and thus, the Minister's initiative was undermined.

The above reasons were symbolic of the persistent and continuing multi-Service non-cooperation. With this ongoing bureaucratic, or inter-Service rivalry, there was little chance for any substantial gains on the integration front, and even less the opportunity to build any momentum towards unification. At this rate, it appeared, jointness within the armed forces would never become feasible.

Minor Successes

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Claxton did achieve some minor integration successes between 1947 and 1960, albeit at a

³⁶ Kronenberg, All Together Now 12.

³⁷ Kronenberg, All Together Now 12.

slow and sometimes tedious pace. These included the integration of six supporting services:³⁸ namely, dental, medical, chaplain, food procurement, postal and legal.³⁹ Another achievement credited to Claxton was the reorganization of the Canadian Military Colleges on a common tri-Service basis.⁴⁰ From these two accomplishments, I would like to highlight two points of significance.

First, these initial amalgamations of common service functions differ from the integration of Hellyer's time. Most of these amalgamations saw the assignment of a common service function to a single environment, and more often than not, the army was the beneficiary of this increased span of control.⁴¹ However, I believe the significance of designating the military academies, of which only The Royal Military College of Canada now remains as tri-Service, cannot be ignored. The creation of an institution where naval, army and air force officer cadets wear the same uniforms and are educated together over a four-year period was a positive step towards unifying the armed forces. Although on a relatively small scale, the insistence by Claxton that the military academies be reorganized was a crucial first step to promoting a joint force, and minimizing future inter-Service conflicts.

³⁸ Supporting services are those service-oriented functions that are common to two or three of the existing three Services.

³⁹ Kronenberg, All Together Now 13 and Canadian Armed Forces 7.

⁴⁰ Canadian Armed Forces 6.

A Supreme Commander?

The final issue that is relevant to the jointness argument was Claxton's attempt to establish a supreme commander to coordinate "the [three] Services in an operational wartime theatre. . . ." ⁴² The challenge for Claxton was not if a supreme commander of all three Services should be created, but if it could be achieved, considering the prevailing climate which opposed such an initiative. Predictably, the papers and studies prepared on this subject always concluded that many benefits had been achieved by having one minister of defence, but any further integration would not prove advantageous to the organization. ⁴³ Even though it was agreed by the three Service Chiefs that a supreme, or operational, commander was necessary for the co-ordination of the three Services in wartime, there remained much apprehension about adopting such a 'joint' initiative in a peacetime environment, and thus, it never materialized. ⁴⁴

The benefits to be gained by maintaining such a setup, even in peacetime, should have been obvious to most, and particularly, to those within the armed force's hierarchy with the power to make such an organizational change a reality. These benefits include: the "co-ordination of the three [S]ervices as a single

⁴¹ Canadian Armed Forces 7.

⁴² Kronenberg, All Together Now 14.

⁴³ Kronenberg, All Together Now 13-14. The conclusions of the studies and papers on the subject of a supreme commander—usually entitled 'Central Organization for Defence'—that were presented to Claxton by the Chiefs of Staff Committee were consistent, at the time, with the findings in the United States and the United Kingdom.

⁴⁴ Kronenberg, All Together Now 14.

instrument"; efficient and effective decision-making; and, the elimination of "faulty compromises arrived at by chiefs of staffs purely to attain agreement."⁴⁵ The main counter-argument presented centred on the high probability of sparking inter-Service conflict and placing the appointed supreme commander in a difficult predicament, particularly when he made a decision that would favour his environmental Service, even when such a decision was obviously sound and just!⁴⁶ Here, as evident in Claxton's inability to overcome the earlier procrastination tactics, a strong ministerial drive was absent.

Attempts Of Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes

Building upon the earlier integration achievements of Claxton, it is imperative to describe the impact of Lieutenant General Foulkes, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee during the first half of the 1950s.⁴⁷ "Like Claxton, Foulkes' interest in defence reform continued to mature around the idea of unification and a single chief of staff for the armed forces."⁴⁸ Although he was aware that neither "the United States [nor] the

⁴⁵ Kronenberg, All Together Now 14.

⁴⁶ Kronenberg, All Together Now 14.

⁴⁷ Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy 151. The Chiefs of Staff Committee was composed of the three Service Chiefs, civilian government representation and DND. The Minister appointed the first independent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1951. "The Chairman had limited power over the Service Chiefs but he provided Ministers with yet another instrument to bring unity to defence policy and administration."

⁴⁸ Douglas L. Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto: Brown Book Company Ltd, 1995) 51.

United Kingdom had established a unitary minister system,"⁴⁹ Foulkes was keenly interested for Canada to be the first nation to adapt a single Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

In 1956, Foulkes prepared his vision for the reorganization of the CF. He described a three-phased process to amalgamate the armed forces and the department into a new, leaner structure, so that the armed forces would operate "with decisions taken on the basis of available facts and not on the basis of [Service-inspired] compromise"⁵⁰ as had previously been the norm. Certainly, he was one of the first Canadian military advocates of integration and unification. Unfortunately, with the change in government a year later, Foulkes' proposal was lost in the transition. Nonetheless, primarily due to the efforts of Claxton and Foulkes, the wick of the candle was then ready to be lit.

The Glassco Report And The Special Commission On Defence

In September 1960, the Diefenbaker government appointed the "Royal Commission on Government Organization", chaired by J. Grant Glassco, to assess all federal departments, including Defence.⁵¹ In reviewing the Canadian defence organization, the 1962 Glassco Report identified several areas for review. The most significant was its analysis supporting tri-Service integration, and, specifically, the recommended integration of the three armed

⁴⁹ Kronenberg, All Together Now 14.

⁵⁰ Bland, Chiefs of Defence 51.

⁵¹ Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy 25.

Services rather than the continuation of the then current committee system based on Service co-ordination.

The situation that then existed required the co-ordination of the three Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Defence Research Board — each with a power of veto — and encompassed "more than 200 [different] standing tri-[S]ervice committees."⁵² Without a designated single military authority, this Service co-ordination committee system permitted procrastination to abound, and undermined any chance of achieving significant military effectiveness. As Hellyer noted subsequently: "Cooperation was given lip-service, but in reality the Services were three separate fiefdoms, each jealous of its own terrain."⁵³ Not surprisingly, therefore, the Glassco Commission concluded that the lack of a commanding voice could very well lead to "failure in any matter of joint concern to the three Services."⁵⁴ The Commission underlined the necessity to minimize the negative effects of inter-Service rivalries and emphasized the positive impact of becoming a joint force. Unfortunately, before the government could respond to the Commission's recommendation, it was defeated in the election of 1963.

However, in response to the review by the Glassco Commission, the new Liberal government, under Lester Pearson, commissioned a Special Committee on Defence to verify the

⁵² *The Glassco Report* as quoted in Douglas L. Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2: Defence Organization (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1998) 70.

⁵³ Hellyer 36.

⁵⁴ *The Glassco Report* as quoted in Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 70.

recommendations and conclusions detailed in the Glassco Report. Specifically, the Committee received favourable comments from numerous retired and serving senior officers on the subject of integration and unification, though with reservations as to its actual form.⁵⁵ Collectively, the Glassco Commission and the Special Committee on Defence provided strong support for integration in the CF.

Integration was also being championed in the government as the economic solution to budgetary shortfalls. Specifically, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Department had suffered a series of programme delays, cost overruns, and procurement disasters, such as the CF105 AVRO Arrow.⁵⁶ The percentage of Defence budget attributed to capital procurement was plummeting — from a high of 42 percent in 1954 to 16 percent in 1963.⁵⁷ The Government could address these inflationary effects by implementing any one of the following three options: first, by making more money available for the Defence budget; secondly, by reducing Defence commitments; and thirdly, by restructuring the Defence management system to produce a more efficient armed forces.⁵⁸ The Pearson government would choose the third course of action.

⁵⁵ Kronenberg, All Together Now 17.

⁵⁶ Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy 35. The CF105 AVRO Arrow was a Canadian-designed supersonic interceptor aircraft.

⁵⁷ The Glassco Report and The Fyffe Review as cited in Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 90 and 286.

⁵⁸ Canadian Armed Forces 11.

Contributions Of Paul Hellyer

It was at this time that Paul Hellyer entered the Defence Ministry with a clear government mandate to effect changes in the Defence administration. His first acts were to cancel a number of previously approved equipment procurement programmes and to call for a study of defence requirements.⁵⁹ Drawing on the recommendations of the Glassco Commission, the initial result was the *White Paper on Defence*, tabled in March 1964, in which the Minister's thoughts on the future organization of the Canadian Forces were clearly spelled out.

White Paper on Defence

This White Paper proposed the elimination of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, as well as the three Service Chiefs, with the promise to create a single CDS along with an integrated headquarters, referred to as Canadian Forces Headquarters.⁶⁰ In addition to the creation of a CDS and his staff, the White Paper also proposed: a headquarters based on function, rather than Service; the elimination of duplication and unnecessary overhead; and, the introduction of programme planning to "enable defence resources to be allocated [to military operations and activities] in the most effective manner . . .

⁵⁹ Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 1 58.

⁶⁰ Kronenberg, All Together Now 78.

with a clear and detailed plan."⁶¹ These measures were expected to achieve two significant results: first, the expected reduction of incumbent headquarters staff would release more officers and other military personnel for operational duty; and secondly, according to Hellyer, "[s]ufficient saving should accrue from unification [of the headquarter staff] to permit a goal of 25 percent of the budget to be devoted to capital equipment being realized in the years ahead."⁶²

Bill C-90

Bill C-90, or the Bill for Integration, came into effect on 1 August 1964.⁶³ Integration was largely accepted and there was "general agreement amongst defence principals that the reorganization was worthwhile."⁶⁴ The relatively more successful implementation of integration from 1964 to 1966, in contrast to earlier attempts, is attributable to two factors: first, a firm plan had been developed based on the Glassco Report, the Special Committee on Defence, and significant debate among the military circles and political elite; and secondly, unlike the earlier attempts at integration and unification that had been stalled or

⁶¹ White Paper on Defence, (Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 1964): 19-20.

⁶² White Paper on Defence, (1964): 19. In hindsight, with the capital procurement budget only approximately 16 percent in 1963, it is hard to fathom that such a dramatic increase could be achieved by the mere reorganization of the headquarters.

⁶³ Kronenberg, All Together Now 30.

⁶⁴ Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy 41.

diverted by the senior military staff, this initiative benefited from the persistence and personal ambition of Hellyer.⁶⁵

Notwithstanding its impact in reorganizing the CF military structure of the day, integration did not merge the three Services. This was to happen later, with the passage of Bill C-243 — the Bill for Unification. However, Bill C-90 represented an important first step, as it initially promoted cooperation and unity of purpose among the Services of the national command staff at Ottawa. In fact, Hellyer believed that the successful integration of the strategic (military) staff would eventually purge inter-Service rivalries from the Defence establishment.⁶⁶

Bill C-243

Perhaps a catalyst for unification was Hellyer's desire to centralize the control and administration of defence policy, and thereby, on behalf of Parliament, strengthen civilian control over the military. In fact, in 1966, Hellyer clearly made civilian authority an issue during the debates on Bill C-243, and this ultimately led to the 'Admiral's Revolt'.⁶⁷ He effectively deflected criticism and "successfully presented himself as the

⁶⁵ Kronenberg, All Together Now 15-16.

⁶⁶ Hellyer 42.

⁶⁷ Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy 49. The 'Admiral's Revolt', as it was proclaimed in the newspapers, refers to the "voluntary and forced retirement of dozens of officers" over the proposed contents of Bill C-243.

champion of progress over the rebels of reaction."⁶⁸ Undoubtedly, the principle of unification was much more controversial than his earlier integration and organizational reforms.

In moving the second reading of Bill C-243 on 7 December 1966, Hellyer spoke at length reviewing the development that led to the reorganization of the command structure (i.e., integration), the reasons for unification, and the envisaged force structure.⁶⁹ In essence, the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act would unify the three armed Services into a single armed force identified by a single name, the Canadian Armed Forces, and attired in a common uniform.⁷⁰ Hellyer also presented the following four reasons as to why he considered unification, as well as integration, to be desirable for the military, the serviceman, and Canada:

1. Identity

With the establishment of a common identify . . . [servicemen] will have an overriding loyalty to the whole force and its objectives on behalf of Canada.

2. Careers

For able and highly motivated individuals, both officers and other ranks, wider, more challenging and rewarding career opportunities will be available.

3. Adaptability to Change

The unified force will provide much greater flexibility to meet changing requirements in defence organization made necessary by advances in military technology and changes in the international situation.

4. Demands of Modern Warfare

⁶⁸ Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy 49.

⁶⁹ Hellyer 198. The CF Reorganization Act was officially passed on 1 February 1968.

⁷⁰ *Hellyer's Reorganization* as cited in Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 145-149.

The nature of modern warfare has resulted in a compaction of time and distance [i.e., space] to the point where decision-making and reaction-time must be swifter than ever before in history. A unified force best meets this demand.⁷¹

These, then, are the rationale and the stated advantages. Though some analysts have argued that "the major impact . . . was upon the bureaucratic organization of the CF and DND, and [that it had] relatively little impact on . . . joint operations"⁷², from a conceptual, as well as an organizational standpoint, it is undeniable that Hellyer's concept of integration and unification, as well as its passage into law, in fact, represented an important first step, and the initial introduction of the potential for 'jointness' in the CF.

One common aspect of jointness is that it involves participation by more than one Service of the same country. Therefore, it could be argued that the CF, as a unified force, could not, by definition, be joint unless the Services were integrated in operations and administration.⁷³ Based upon various developments that occurred over the next several decades, it is argued that although the CF, officially a single Service by law, has continued to function as three separate Services and effective integration and unification is still a far cry away.

⁷¹ *Hellyer's Reorganization* as quoted in Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 135.

⁷² G.E. Sharpe and Allan English, Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces (Kingston: Report for the Department of National Defence, June 2001) 31.

⁷³ Based upon Canadian law, I understand some readers may wish to consider the CF as a unified single-Service force. However, as there are still three distinct environmental Services, I will treat the CF as such—a multi-Service force comprised of three distinct Services. The normal practice has been to

Issues And Developments

There can be little argument that Hellyer's ideas of integration and unification were the most significant changes to occur in Canadian defence administration. Unfortunately, these concepts and ideas were never fully accepted by the military hierarchy. Moreover, continual changes to the organization over the subsequent decade made it nearly impossible to determine the success or failure of his original unification vision. In fact, Hellyer's "idea and policy of unification has been the centre of controversy since the first day it was introduced."⁷⁴ It is not surprising, then, that the intended goals of integration and unification have never been fully achieved.

Why was this the case? To help answer this question, I will examine three significant developments that have had a marked influence on the development of integration and unification, as well as the restructuring of the CF and DND. Specifically, I will review some issues during the initial period of implementation, namely, from the reorganization of the new headquarters in 1964 to the creation of NDHQ in 1972. I will next examine the implications of Service loyalty. Finally, I will discuss some of the recommendations of the 1980 Fyffe Report.⁷⁵ I will also highlight how each of these developments has influenced the

use the terms (distinct) 'environment', (referring to sea, land and air), and 'Service' interchangeably.

⁷⁴ Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 1 62.

current military structure, including their impact in either retarding or promoting the growth of jointness in today's CF. As shall become apparent, inter-Service rivalries and Service parochialism have continued to persist unabated, and mostly to the CF's detriment.

Initial Developments And Reorganizations

I have suggested that Hellyer's ideas and concepts on integration and unification are relevant to the CF and jointness. Indeed, a closer examination of the 1964 *White Paper on Defence* reveals the following: "To the extent that operational control is exercised by Canada, it is the view of the government that it can be most effectively exercised by a single command."⁷⁶ Evidently, unification was proposed, in part, to support an increased emphasis on operational effectiveness. The White Paper also suggested that the armed Services would undergo a significant restructuring to ensure maximum flexibility for deployment in a variety of peacekeeping operations.⁷⁷ It is quite likely that had the intended restructuring actually taken place, the CF would have become the prototype of a "truly joint"⁷⁸ force.

Unfortunately for Hellyer, his [operationally focused] plans and policies were not supported by the Cabinet [nor the Prime Minister], but by the time he discovered

⁷⁵ G.M. Fyffe et al., Task Force on Review of Unification of The Canadian Forces, (Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 1980).

⁷⁶ White Paper on Defence, (1964): 19.

⁷⁷ White Paper on Defence, (1964): 12.

⁷⁸ C.P. Ankersen, "A Little Bit Joint — Component Commands: Seams, Not Synergy," Joint Force Quarterly 21 (1998): 121.

this critical flaw, he had already committed himself in the defence department . . . and could not easily back away from his ideas.⁷⁹

He then had to reorient his explanation to focus more on the economic and administrative requirements of unification. Consequently, "[b]ecause Hellyer could not provide convincing operational logic for . . . [unification,] he was forced to impose it on his advisors, many of whom objected and resigned"⁸⁰ in disapproval. In the subsequent disarray, some senior military leaders took the opportunity to 'jump on the unification bandwagon' either to further their own careers or to pursue their own Service's capital procurement initiatives.⁸¹ Obviously then, Hellyer's unification ideas to improve operational effectiveness were thwarted and, inter-Service rivalry did not disappear.

Canadian Forces Headquarters

As previously noted, integration resulted in the creation and staffing of the Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) in 1964. The new headquarters was reorganized on a functional basis, rather than its traditional Service hierarchical structure. The eight functional components were: Intelligence, Strategic Plans, Continental Plans, Force Development, Operational Requirements, Programs, Operational Training, and Operations.⁸² CFHQ was

⁷⁹ Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 96.

⁸⁰ Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 96.

⁸¹ Kronenberg, All Together Now 48.

⁸² D.G. Loomis et al., "The Impact of Integration, Unification and Restructuring on the Functions and Structure of National Defence Headquarters," Supporting Paper to the NDHQ Study S1/85 Report, 1985: 21.

intended to develop policy, as well as to coordinate and assign tasks to the subordinate commands.⁸³ From a joint perspective, this functional reorganization within the new CFHQ was a significant step towards increasing Service co-ordination and cooperation at the strategic (military) level. Arguably, however, as suggested by a published report in 1985, integration and unification did not go far enough, since the jointness of the CFHQ "did not extend very deeply into the organization as the three main divisions in each group were organized in terms of the three Services", albeit buried two layers down in the new organization.⁸⁴ The new structure enabled inter-Service rivalries to persist in the new organization.

A refinement to the external command structure, outside of CFHQ, was achieved the following year, in 1965, when the existing eleven regional commands were reduced to six functional commands.⁸⁵ Combining the operational assets of two former Services contributed to these reductions. For example, the air and naval assets assigned to provide anti-submarine defence were joined to form Maritime Command, and the army and air assets responsible for land operations were joined to create Mobile Command.⁸⁶ These, then, were two additional steps towards the

⁸³ The Service-centric regional commands were responsible to direct operations and to provide the necessary forces to complete the task/mission within their specific region.

⁸⁴ Loomis 23-24.

⁸⁵ Canadian Armed Forces 13. The six functional commands were: Air Defence Command, Air Transport Command, Training Command, Materiel Command, Mobile Command, and Maritime Command.

⁸⁶ Canadian Armed Forces 13.

creation of a unified and joint force structure. However, this would be the closest the CF would get to being a joint force until the later stages of the 20th century.

Management Review Group

The other significant change to occur in the early years of unification was the reorganization initiated by "the Minister's [Donald McDonald] announcement in June 1971 that he was appointing a Management Review Group [MRG] . . . to evaluate the present relationships between the civil [and] military organizations."⁸⁷ Comprised mainly of businessmen from outside consultant firms, the MRG submitted several recommendations. The following two were indeed significant for the future structure of the CF: first, to reorganize DND and the CF into a single entity, similar to the earlier integration of the three military Services; and second, to separate operational responsibilities from support responsibilities.⁸⁸

There are two points of significance that arose from these recommendations. The first is that, in 1972, a new National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) replaced CFHQ. The second — more an outcome of the first — was that NDHQ

provided the institutional rationale for the ascent of the deputy minister from departmental head to 'alter ego' to the minister in all aspects of defence policy and management. [O]perational issues withered, civil

⁸⁷ Kronenberg, All Together Now 94.

⁸⁸ Loomis 102.

servants advanced in power and influence, and command authority and responsibility in the CF atrophied.⁸⁹

In effect, this reorganization in 1972 did nothing to improve upon the initial integration and unification efforts of Hellyer.

By 1978, it was generally acknowledged that NDHQ "was 'civilianized' and that policies, regulations, and decisions generally were based on civilian and public service concepts, values, and interests."⁹⁰ The civilianization of the military was so prevalent that subsequent defence policies and procedures negatively impacted operational effectiveness. This would become particularly evident during the Somalia Commission of Inquiry.⁹¹ Consequently, in some ways, the reorganization of CFHQ to NDHQ helped to arrest any remaining unification momentum, as well as any serious move towards a joint force. However, this was not to be the only blow to integration and unification.

Service Loyalty

Much of the opposition to integration and unification after 1966 continued to be centred on a single issue: the protection of the existence of the three Services.⁹² Unfortunately, for the advocates of integration and unification, this persistent retrograde movement was fostered, in large part, by Hellyer's

⁸⁹ Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 164.

⁹⁰ Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 249. See also Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, "The Canadian Armed Forces and Unification," Defense Analysis 17.2 (2001): 166.

⁹¹ "Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry," 2 July 1997, <<http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol0/indexe.htm>> (3 May 2002).

⁹² Kronenberg, All Together Now 79.

lack of clarity on the details and rationale of the reorganization, and his unwillingness to address the obvious communication flaw between himself and his military opponents.⁹³ The primary argument presented by the dissenters to unification was: "A single Service would destroy Canadian traditions, harm military morale, and incapacitate the operational arms of the Services."⁹⁴ In 1966, during the initial discussion stages, the misconception arose that Hellyer wanted to do away with all regiments and squadrons and eliminate the actual fighting units. That is, it was believed by the traditionalists that merging the three different Services — with their unique training, tactics and organization — would degrade their overall capability.⁹⁵

This was not in fact the case. As noted previously, unification was intended to place an increased emphasis on operational effectiveness by reorganizing the forces under unitary control. There was never any intention to abolish the unique operational capability provided by each Service. However, there was a goal to eliminate Service biases from the planning side, and thereby attempt to ensure operational decisions were based on identified operational requirements, and not on any specific environmental Service issue.⁹⁶

Not surprisingly, then, this lack of a clearly articulated vision on the part of the Minister created a misconception that

⁹³ Hellyer 209-211.

⁹⁴ Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 95.

⁹⁵ Kronenberg, All Together Now 80.

⁹⁶ Kronenberg, All Together Now 80.

was easily manipulated by those officers determined to undermine the process. In turn, the dissenters have continued to misconstrue this aim of unification, all in the guise of promoting Service loyalty, to oppose Service extinction. This has continued to be a challenge for the Canadian military. Consequently, the melding of the three Services — devoid of Service loyalties and biases at the operational and strategic levels — is still one of the major obstacles for the CF to navigate in order to achieve a fully realized unified status and an effective joint force capability.

The Fyffe Report

The continuing dissatisfaction over the integrated, unified and restructured CF⁹⁷ throughout the 1970s resulted in the 1980 *Task Force on Review of Unification of The Canadian Forces*, or the Fyffe Report, as it is more commonly named. Initially, G.M. Fyffe and the task force attempted to review the formal goals of integration and unification.⁹⁸ Since the formal goals were never clearly articulated, Fyffe assumed that they were financial savings, increased operational effectiveness, common identity in the CF, and enhanced career opportunities. The task

⁹⁷ Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 249. It is Dr. Bland's opinion that "dissatisfaction with the 'single-Service' concept and the operating procedures at NDHQ were the liveliest concern in defence. Unification, never popular in the senior ranks of the armed forces, was crippled by the reappearance of Service-based headquarters first in the army and navy and then in 1975 with the authorization of Air Command."

⁹⁸ Fyffe 57-60. Fyffe was the chairman of the task force.

force observed that there had been subsequent reorganizations and changes in the application of integration and unification, which made it significantly difficult to relate the current structure to the initial design.⁹⁹ Consequently, Fyffe decided to tackle this challenge by providing recommendations on a vast array of issues that the task force had uncovered.

The task force provided thirty specific recommendations, of which almost one-third applied to visible Service distinctions and the colour of uniforms.¹⁰⁰ Clearly, a lesson evident from the recommendations was that integration and unification had gone too far, and fast enough, in its desire to ensure a common identity. Paradoxically, it helped to undermine positive support for integration and unification. According to one analyst "[m]orale within the [Canadian] forces never recovered, even after several [subsequent] concessions about uniforms."¹⁰¹ Arguably, the subsequent reversion of the three uniforms has helped balance off the morale issue, as well as eliminate any lingering perceptions that this issue could be the cause of deficiencies in today's CF. One over-riding challenge for jointness, however, still remained insurmountable: How to promote "higher loyalty beyond that given to a particular [S]ervice"¹⁰² and overcome military Service unilateralism.

⁹⁹ Fyffe 60.

¹⁰⁰ Fyffe 79-80.

¹⁰¹ Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, "The Canadian Armed Forces and Unification," Defense Analysis 17.2 (2001): 168.

¹⁰² Fyffe 58.

Although not specifically identified in the recommendations, Fyffe, assessing the operational effectiveness of the CF, found serious deficiencies, such as "the lack of modern equipment, the insufficient manpower and resources, and a feeling of lack of support from the Government."¹⁰³ These deficiencies could be largely attributed to the earlier civilianization of the military — a problem Fyffe hoped to address in his report.¹⁰⁴

Two recommendations by Fyffe are relevant: first, that membership in the Defence Council be extended to the Commanders of Commands to ensure their influence in matters of operations, training, personnel and support; and secondly, the establishment of the three environmental heads of Service at NDHQ, responsible to the CDS for the command of their respective Service.¹⁰⁵ The impact of both these recommendations was, in effect, to implicitly recognize the Commanders of Commands as distinct entities, and thereby undermine the single-Service concept.¹⁰⁶ Undoubtedly, Fyffe believed that by elevating environmental influence to the central headquarters, he would help address the deficiencies evident in achieving an effective level of operational readiness.¹⁰⁷ In essence, although superficially this would appear to be reversion to past practice, in fact, it proved to be an important initial step, especially in setting the scene

¹⁰³ Fyffe 82.

¹⁰⁴ Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 254.

¹⁰⁵ Fyffe 77.

¹⁰⁶ Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 253.

¹⁰⁷ Fyffe 82.

for the formation of a more effective 'joint-like' headquarters. Furthermore, because NDHQ was not being responsive to operational requirements, the military response was to suggest the creation of an American-styled Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system.¹⁰⁸ Although supported by the majority of the serving and retired general officers at the time, this has not occurred in the CF so far.¹⁰⁹

Hellyer's vision of integration and unification came under scrutiny, especially in the later stages of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s. There should be little doubt, the insurmountable challenges of competing Service interests and loyalties throughout that decade did much to discredit integration and unification as both a concept and as an organizational structure. Before reviewing the current situation and the potential for jointness in Canada, I will examine both the unification and joint experiences of the United States. A review of the recent history of American defence policy and administration will help to draw comparisons for the Canadian experience. Many of the United States experiences and lessons in jointness could suit the CF environment.

¹⁰⁸ Shaw 166. The JCS as an all-Service, or "joint" Service office, supports the Chairman of the JCS in his capacity as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. Its "board of directors" consists of the Chairman, his deputy, the Vice Chairman, and the four-star heads of the four military services.

¹⁰⁹ Fyffe 40.

CHAPTER III

AMERICAN EXPERIENCES IN UNIFICATION AND JOINTNESS

There seems to be a general agreement that, from a structural and a doctrinal perspective, the pursuit of military jointness worldwide has significantly increased since the passage of the United States Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986.¹¹⁰ Subsequently, a large amount of military restructuring has taken place, not only in Canada, but also in several other countries, namely, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan and Australia. In fact, joint doctrines have been formulated and promulgated at an ever-increasing pace within numerous western military structures.

Why is jointness on the upswing? An examination of the joint experiences of our closest ally — the United States — will provide a large part of the answer. In this chapter, I will first look at the their unification experiences in order to draw comparisons for the CF. I will explore American lessons in jointness, specifically their quest to overcome inter-Service rivalries and the challenge of Service parochialism, and the relevance for the Canadian military.

¹¹⁰ Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Unification of the United States Armed Forces: Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1996) 2.

Unification

The preceding chapter has provided a brief examination of the unification experience in Canada. However, in 1945, at the time Claxton was struggling to integrate and unify the CF, the United States was also involved in "a very bitter unification debate."¹¹¹ By all accounts, reorganizing the military establishment in the United States was a subject of considerable American governmental interest throughout much of the last century.

As early as 1921, Congress began considering proposals to combine or unify its military departments under a single central authority.¹¹² Between 1921 and 1945 Congress considered as many as fifty proposals aimed at reorganizing the United States armed forces.¹¹³ Of these, some contemplated the complete unification of its separate Services into one military force.¹¹⁴ Other proposals were based on the premise that unification referred to the centralized direction of its armed forces being controlled by a centralized structure.

In the end, there were three pieces of unification legislation passed between 1947 and 1958, and of these, only the last two are significant to this argument: The National Security Act of 1947 and the 1949 Amendment to it; and the Department of

¹¹¹ Kronenberg, All Together Now 15.

¹¹² Laurence J. Legere, Unification of the Armed Forces, (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1988) 76.

¹¹³ Lovelace, Unification 1.

¹¹⁴ Lovelace, Unification 63.

Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act of 1958, which amended the National Security Act of 1947.¹¹⁵ The 1949 Amendment directed the Army, Navy and Air Force (AF) to be separately administered military departments under the general direction of the Secretary of Defence.¹¹⁶ The 1958 Act gave the Secretary of Defence authority over the "separately organized" DoD and "established the chain of command from the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the . . . [JCS], to the unified and specified commands."¹¹⁷

The relevance of these two Acts is twofold: first, they broadened the Secretary's powers over DoD; and secondly, and as importantly, they established the Secretary's control over the separately organized military departments, including such functions as defence budgeting.¹¹⁸ However, although the Secretaries of Defence had the power to demand changes or cuts on various defence programmes, it was the generals and admirals who had to provide the necessary justification and defend their requests. This, then, had two inter-related implications. First, the organizations responsible for commanding and controlling the American armed forces, namely the Joint Staff and the unified and specified commands, had no procurement funds to effect the development of any systems.¹¹⁹ Second, because most programmes

¹¹⁵ Legere 352 and Lovelace, Unification 4-5.

¹¹⁶ Legere 352-355.

¹¹⁷ Lovelace, Unification 5.

¹¹⁸ James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Force Quarterly 13 (1996): 11.

¹¹⁹ Kenneth Allard, Command, Control and The Common Defense, Rev. ed. (Washington: National Defense University, 1996) 131.

would be developed to best suit the needs of their respective Services, the joint option — although the most likely employment option — was destined always to be relegated to second choice.¹²⁰ Consequently, from the American perspective, it was important to ensure that any future reorganization was properly funded, and that joint capital acquisitions were given priority over single-Service options. Furthermore, the establishment of an effective joint command and control structure must be given equal importance.

Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act

During the next three decades there was little initiative to unify the American armed forces. However, several military mishaps¹²¹ in the early 1980s helped to influence the Congress to proceed with some additional DoD reforms. The initial report, published in 1985 by the Senate Armed Services Committee, criticized the military for failing to improve its joint cooperation in military operations.¹²² The eventual outcome was the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. This Act "represented a profound shift of power in favor of the joint institutions of the [American] defense

¹²⁰ Allard 132.

¹²¹ Lovelace, Unification 5-9. Three such incidents are identified and explained in detail: the Iran hostage rescue attempt; the explosion at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut; and the invasion of Grenada.

¹²² Allard 3.

establishment."¹²³ In fact, it centralized military authority in the Chairman of the JCS. Specifically, it gave the chairman additional authority over the Services, and, equally significantly, the Act formally designated the Chairman as the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defence.¹²⁴ Furthermore, service on a joint staff was now a legal prerequisite for any officer wishing to advance to the rank of general/admiral. Quite simply, the passage of this significant piece of American legislation was intended to make "jointness — the formal concept of inter-Service cooperation and planning — the law of the land."¹²⁵

Examining this legislation from a Canadian joint perspective reveals the following three key aspects: first, to maintain command authority, it is important to have it centralized within the construct of the joint organization; secondly, it should be mandatory for all officers to serve on a joint staff before advancement to senior ranks in order to understand the relevance and significance of jointness; and finally, the joint commander must be designated as the senior military advisor to the Minister of National Defence, as well as the Prime Minister, and have total authority over the Services to ensure that jointness is given its due.¹²⁶

¹²³ Allard 3.

¹²⁴ Owens, Lifting the Fog 163.

¹²⁵ Owens, Lifting the Fog 164.

Jointness And Inter-Service Rivalry

Ever since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, many American military analysts have maintained that increasing jointness within the United States military Services would produce a more efficient and effective armed force, particularly in the areas of Service cooperation and interoperability.¹²⁷ There is little argument that DoD has changed significantly in the past sixteen years, and that there have been some definite improvements along the way. However, although DoD has established doctrine centres, planning organizations, command structures and training all of which bear jointness in their descriptions, it remains questionable as to how joint the American military has actually become.

In fact, according to the literature, there remains one significant challenge that needs to be addressed, if the United States wishes to truly move forward in jointness and improved interoperability. That is, it must overcome Service rivalries, military Service unilateralism and Service parochialism. In 1996, General Sheehan underlined the need for greater integration and jointness at all levels in the United States military:

Resources are insufficient to allow each of the [S]ervices to maintain its current force structure, modernize . . . and perform all required missions. Thus [the United States] must reduce duplication and become more efficient. [They] must . . . restructure for a changed world, focus on core competencies, and shed overhead that does not add value. To maximize the

¹²⁶ Arguably, in some sense, this already exists in the CF. However, as has been previously demonstrated, there remains much Service parochialism.

¹²⁷ Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 92; Ankersen 118; and Locher 11.

capabilities of a *smaller force* [emphasis added], the remaining forces must . . . reduce unnecessary and burdensome command layers, improve joint training and exercises, and encourage much greater efficiency.¹²⁸

Acknowledging that the CF is in a similar predicament, and is a much smaller force than the American ones, the conclusions drawn by General Sheehan are particularly apropos to the CF's pursuit of jointness. There is also a need to overcome what Admiral Owens has characterized as the "crystalline stovepipes [which contain the Service traditions, doctrine and loyalties] that separate the [S]ervices. The stovepipes, in turn, force thinking and action toward duplication and redundancy."¹²⁹ I will further illustrate the extent of this one challenge — Service parochialism — by examining several additional examples.

Selection of Joint Commander

First, for any joint operation, there is always the issue of selecting who should be the joint commander. The current United States approach appears to be that whichever Service supplies the majority of the military forces also, by default, provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC).¹³⁰ There is obviously some logic to this option. However, the concern remains that a JFC from one Service would not, or could not, effectively employ the core

¹²⁸ John J. Sheehan, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," Joint Force Quarterly 13 (1996): 46.

¹²⁹ Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 94. He refers to the stovepipes as crystalline because they are hard to see, unless you look closely.

¹³⁰ Robert C. Rubel, "Principles of Jointness," Joint Force Quarterly 27 (2000-01): 49.

fighting capability of another Service. Frequently, senior officers are mis-employed under the guise of ensuring there are no injustices done by one Service against another. For instance, Captain Rubel reveals that the United States "Army assigned a three-star general to command a relatively small helicopter detachment in Albania to ensure that the Air Force [Joint Force Air Component Commander] JFACC would not misuse the aircraft."¹³¹

Joint Doctrine

Secondly, the formation of a Joint Doctrine Centre was designed to eliminate Service parochialism through its production of copious volumes of 'new' joint doctrine.¹³² Unfortunately, this challenge remains unresolved, and two new related problems have been created: first, the creation of joint doctrine that is joint in name only; and secondly, the preponderance of land-centric¹³³ joint doctrine. Why is this happening? The producers of joint doctrine are all a product of the Service in which they have been trained, and thus, they have no crystal ball or independent information source on how to "generate new synergism from the interaction of the Services."¹³⁴ Consequently, the United States is ultimately dependent upon the creators of single Service doctrine to develop joint doctrine.

¹³¹ Rubel 49.

¹³² Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 94.

¹³³ Rebecca Grant, "Closing The Doctrine Gap," Air Force Magazine 80.1 (1997): 48. Ms. Grant suggests that joint doctrine "perpetuates a 'land-centric' focus because it is largely based on Army concepts."

¹³⁴ Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 94.

The reason for a bias towards land-centric joint doctrine is easy to determine. As in Canada, the army in the United States, has been, historically, the leader in the development of doctrine. Furthermore, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that army doctrine both fostered joint doctrine, and in turn, has produced a land-centric spin on joint doctrine.¹³⁵ Regrettably, the army "with the largest staff devoted to joint doctrine has [had] the greatest influence, and their outputs reflect current difficulties."¹³⁶ The difficulties can be attributed to the fact that joint doctrine is mainly

based on dominant surface maneuver. Key air concepts — and some naval concepts — receive short shrift. Differences between land and air components generally are resolved in favour of the land commander. Most of all, it is striking how closely joint doctrine runs parallel to the Army doctrine of maneuver, fires, and force protection.¹³⁷

Lieutenant Colonel Szelowski points out that was never more apparent than during Desert Storm when the United States Army discovered that its Air-Land battle doctrine was not compatible with the United States AF doctrine, and furthermore, the targets identified by the JFACC were significantly different from those prescribed in the Air-Land battle.¹³⁸

Trust and Component Commands

¹³⁵ Grant 52.

¹³⁶ David W. Szelowski, "Disjointed: Just How Joint Are We?" United States Naval Institute Proceedings 126.9 (2000): 61.

¹³⁷ Grant 52.

¹³⁸ Szelowski 58.

The third, and final factor that is significantly influenced by Service parochialism is the lack of trust within the component commands and commanders.¹³⁹ Most officers would acknowledge that jointness, in any military force, can only be maximized when there is trust in the capabilities of the other Services. Yet a review of the current situation in the United States reveals that the American component commands do not cultivate such trust. As Captain Ankersen describes it: "All the advantages realized by combining various [air, sea and land] forces under a [JFC] . . . are tempered by jealously reapportioning forces to component commanders."¹⁴⁰ Under the current United States joint structure, the component commands and commanders, although supposedly supporting the same JFC mission, in fact, reduce jointness as the JFC segregates his forces into single Service-oriented groupings. By allowing this, the JFC loses any chance for jointness synergy within his unit, and, in turn, perpetuates Service rivalry and the "perceived needs to guard [S]ervice requirements, capabilities, and traditions."¹⁴¹ Clearly, as jointness was designed to eliminate Service rivalries, the premise underscoring component commands and commanders requires further tweaking. This is a valid lesson, and one that can be applied to any military force contemplating a shift to increased jointness.

These examples and lessons learned suggest that further tweaking of the United States jointness vehicle is necessary;

¹³⁹ Ankersen 118.

¹⁴⁰ Ankersen 118.

however, in most instances, such initiatives lead back to the challenge of eliminating, or at worst, minimizing Service rivalry. In reviewing the Canadian military experience, I would suggest that this is also the greatest hurdle for the CF to overcome to progress towards a more joint force. What, then, are some of the American solutions being proposed to help eradicate this problem?

Possible Solutions

One solution, as proposed by Admiral Owens, envisions the traditional naval, ground and air forces organized as a general-purpose force or by the task to be performed — such as long-range aerial strike, sea control, or armoured ground assault — rather than by any Service affiliation.¹⁴² In his vision, there would be approximately twenty-five "*standing joint forces* that . . . would be located together, train together full-time, and deploy as a single entity."¹⁴³ The intent, perhaps, is to create as an efficient fighting force as possible, specifically one that embraces jointness. This approach also has the added benefit of reducing duplication and redundancy throughout the military hierarchical structure.

¹⁴¹ Ankersen 118.

¹⁴² Owens, Lifting the Fog 204.

¹⁴³ Owens, Lifting the Fog 204.

Another solution, not quite as drastic, is to focus on educating and training the officer corps on the uniqueness of jointness. The challenge, then, would be to instill a "cohesive [joint] culture of shared values that [will] transcend Service interests."¹⁴⁴ One way of doing this is to significantly increase the joint requirements, through additional schooling or courses, for officers to advance to the next rank. If this can be achieved, then Service rivalries will dissipate, and eventually, jointly educated officers will be able to develop joint doctrine.¹⁴⁵

In this chapter I have focused on the legislated unification and joint experiences of the United States. The chapter has also looked at how the United States military is tackling the challenge of Service parochialism in its efforts to achieve what has been coined 'true' jointness. The progress that they have made with developing jointness provides a good example for the CF, as well as for all other allies. Undoubtedly, the Americans' lessons learned concerning the need to address Service rivalry, as well as the approach they are taking to achieve 'true' jointness, are useful considerations for the Canadian military in our quest for 'jointery'. In the final chapter, I will review our present status of jointness and provide my rationale for offering jointness as the solution to the operational and administrative difficulties of the current Canadian military structure.

¹⁴⁴ David T. Fautua, "The Paradox of Joint Culture," Joint Force Quarterly 26 (2000): 86.

¹⁴⁵ Ankersen 121.

CHAPTER IV

THE CF AND POTENTIAL FOR JOINTNESS

Although the CF has been formally integrated and officially unified for over the thirty-five years, numerous difficulties, as well as inefficiencies, remain evident within its existing structure and administration due to the absence of actual integration and unification. These difficulties, as shall be demonstrated, continue to create challenges to the effective and efficient employment of our armed forces across the military spectrum of conflict.¹⁴⁶ There could be several solutions to these problems.

The focus of this chapter is on the perceived difficulties experienced by the CF today — the three distinct Services, the nine operational level headquarters¹⁴⁷, the regular and reserve force components, and National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa. Then, the chapter investigates the relevance for jointness as a remedy to many of the problems. Arguments assume

¹⁴⁶ The military spectrum of conflict spans across peace operations (i.e., domestic disaster relief, domestic civil support, environmental operations and peacemaking), through peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, to combat operations (i.e., counter-insurgencies, major theatre war, and international war—conventional and nuclear.)

¹⁴⁷ These headquarters are located, as follows: Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAF), Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT), Land Forces Western Area (LFWA), Land Force Central Area (LFCA), Le secteur du Quebec de la force terrestre (SQFT), Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA), First Canadian Air Division / Canadian North America Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) Region (1 CAD / CANR), the Joint Operations Group (JOG), and Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA).

that the government is unlikely to approve substantial increases in defence spending above the current annual amount of about \$11.3 billion.¹⁴⁸ This military funding reality reinforces the critical need to examine and resolve the shortfalls of the existing structure.

What, then, are the inherent difficulties of the current military structure? First, it is unlikely that the CF will ever have the monetary resources necessary to preserve "three larger, more modern, fully capable, but still basically separate [Service] 'environments'"¹⁴⁹, and this highlights the most immediate difficulty with the current force structure. That is, in its present configuration, and with no foreseeable change to budget limitations, the CF of today is incapable of maintaining a credible combat capability.¹⁵⁰ Second, with the majority of western militaries exploiting jointness, the CF's lack of both professional experience and training in jointness, especially if it intends to engage fully in coalition operations, is seen to be a significant obstacle.¹⁵¹ Third, the CF's current structure, although somewhat joint in principle, is still seen to be one focused "more on business practices than the virtues of the warrior necessary in a military culture."¹⁵² Fourth, the current

¹⁴⁸ Fergusson 18. According to their report, between 1993 and 1998, DND's budget fell by 23 percent, and its real purchasing power declined by more than 30 percent.

¹⁴⁹ Fergusson 19.

¹⁵⁰ Fergusson 16. "An effective combat capable force requires [state-of-the-art equipment], sufficient size, sustainability, and training, especially in higher-level exercises."

¹⁵¹ Lloyd Campbell, "2002 Air Symposium," Toronto, 28 March 2002. Lieutenant General Campbell is the Commander Air Staff.

¹⁵² Sharpe and English 40.

devotion to the three-Service military structure, coupled with an unclear division of responsibilities between the strategic and operational levels of command, has further exacerbated difficulties relating to the following areas: operational command and control, dual chains of command, the excessive number of operational level headquarters, and particularly, the lack of interoperability between the three Services.¹⁵³ Finally, the most significant difficulty, according to many military analysts, including Allard, Bland, and Owens, "is precisely that [the] tension between the traditions of [S]ervice loyalty"¹⁵⁴ is greatly enhanced within the current tri-Service organization of the CF. These five areas of difficulty will now be further elaborated.

Credible Combat Capability

The first difficulty that stems from a failure to fully embrace integration and unification is the current inability of the CF to muster a credible combat capability in any of the its three environmental Services.¹⁵⁵ The subsequent re-creation of the complex three-Service military structure — with its numerous Service-specific operational level headquarters — has led a rather pitiful state. Given the resource constraints imposed by

¹⁵³ Lynn Gordon Mason and Raymond Crabbe, A Centralized Operational Level Headquarters, (Ottawa: Report for the Department of National Defence, December 2000) 13.

¹⁵⁴ Allard 7.

¹⁵⁵ Fergusson 20.

today's government, the current three-environment military structure can no longer achieve a viable fighting capability.

As General Henault, Chief of Defence Staff, observed earlier this year, the CF needs to "ensure a tight match between capabilities, commitments and resources. The status quo is not sustainable. . . ." ¹⁵⁶ One possible solution is for each of the individual Services to 'sharpen its pencils' and improve upon its budgeting practices. Understandably, this 'solution' is believed to have reached its saturation point. ¹⁵⁷

A more promising solution, previously identified by Vice-Admiral Garnett, would be for the three Services to commit to selecting the most advantageous capability — regardless of Service affiliation — and thereby re-establish some improved level of combat capability. ¹⁵⁸ Arguably, this has been partially addressed in the new Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL) process. The CJTL "establishes a framework for describing and relating the myriad of capabilities that may be required by the CF, and is accepted as the core task framework for the entire CF." ¹⁵⁹ Although promoting a modest shift towards jointness, this

¹⁵⁶ Raymond R. Henault, Key Messages for the Military Leadership, Email to Brigadier General J.J. Robyn Gagnon, 21 January 2002.

¹⁵⁷ This is based upon the author's personal experience during a twenty-two year military career working in Construction Engineering.

¹⁵⁸ Gary Garnett, "The Canadian Forces and the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Time for Change," Canadian Military Journal 2.2 (2001): 9. Vice-Admiral Garnett was a former Vice Chief of Defence Staff.

¹⁵⁹ R.K. Taylor, "2020 Vision: Canadian Forces Operational-Level Doctrine," Canadian Military Journal 2.3 (2001): 37.

partially adopted solution, to-date, has failed to completely eliminate the bias of the individual Services.¹⁶⁰

Professional Experience And Training In Jointness

The second difficulty, focused primarily on operations, concerns the CF's lack of both professional experience and training in jointness, especially in light of the current practices of other western military forces. Recently, there have been attempts to address the shortfalls in this area, through the creation of the Joint Operations Group (JOG) and the Joint-staff at the NDHQ, as well as increased emphasis on jointness provided by the Canadian Forces College (CFC) courses in Toronto. However, there is still a huge void in these areas. Many members of the CF — regular and reserve force, non-commissioned members (NCMs) and officers — have no concept of, nor have served in, a joint headquarters.¹⁶¹

For most officers, joint operational training does not occur until they have reached the rank of major/lieutenant commander, and that is only for the regular force officers who are selected to attend a Command and Staff Course. After their graduation from the Staff College, the majority may never again be required to work in, or be impacted, by jointness. Their experience, so far as jointness is concerned, remains scanty. Lieutenant General

¹⁶⁰ Garnett 9.

¹⁶¹ This is drawn from the author's personal experience during a twenty-two year military career.

Campbell, Commander Air Staff, recognizes imperative that the CF postures itself for jointness, particularly, if it expects to continue working in coalition joint headquarters and participate in future coalition operations.¹⁶²

Another reason that the CF is continuing to experience difficulties in adapting to jointness revolves around two related issues: first, with the current three Service military structure, the majority of regular and reserve force members only obtain experience within a single Service; and secondly, within that single Service, there is a tendency to become platform-centric.¹⁶³ This, in turn, results in the inability of each Service even to fully appreciate and understand the capabilities and limitations of its own Service, let alone the other Services. As an example, an AF operator might never have the opportunity to train, or become familiar with, the different AF platforms, such as the Aurora, Griffon, CF-18, and/or C-130 Hercules. This inevitably leads to a platform-centric AF. This lack of professional experience on the different AF platforms, in turn, creates a shortfall for the AF operator designated to fill the roles of JFACC or Air Liaison Officer to a JFC. Without this breadth of experience, as JFC staff and JFACC, one would be disadvantaged and find it challenging to succeed in operational assignments. Such lack of experience and training in operational level jointness equally prevails in both regular and reserve forces.

¹⁶² Campbell.

Civilianization Of The DND And The CF

The recent focus placed on running the military like a business is the third difficulty evident in the current military structure and, in this instance, the result of flawed concept and implementation of integration and unification. This business-like approach is attributed to the "bureaucratization and civilianization" of both the DND and CF that occurred after unification.¹⁶⁴ Although there is little doubt that certain efficiencies resulted through the integration of the various support services, unification — as it was originally perceived — was never fully embraced by the three Services or its senior members. During the 1970s, values and attitudes developed which were contrary to those envisioned essential for the warrior in a military culture. As observed by Desmond Morton, a renowned Canadian historian: In the 1970s,

national defence drew seven ministers, three of them in a single year. Left to themselves, the [S]ervices stagnated . . . and cautiously rebuilt the old [S]ervice identities. An inflated rank structure became a costly solace for professional sterility: generals ['ivilianization 'became

more interested in balancing its budget, than in maintaining a multi-purpose, combat-capable military force. This, in turn, has often resulted in the senior leadership, especially at NDHQ, being more focused on improving their executive management and skills in diplomacy rather than maintaining "traditional military operational and generalship skills."¹⁶⁶ There is a lack of commitment to do what is best, or operationally 'right' for the CF members. This has become so pervasive that many outside of NDHQ now perceive that they are being "micromanaged and that NDHQ does not understand what is going on in the field."¹⁶⁷ Finally, while civilianization, "[c]oupled with downsizing and other personnel policies,"¹⁶⁸ has tended to support the current business-like philosophy of the military, it is evident that the business approach also places emphasis on financial management, rather than operational efficiency. This lack of commitment and motivation towards improving the combat capability of its forces is a circular, self-fulfilling prophecy that, if left to persist, will continue to create operational and administrative difficulties for the future CF.

Interoperability And Other Issues

Because of the CF's attempt to meld integration and unification with the re-creation of the three Services,

¹⁶⁶ Ross Graham, "Civil Control of The Canadian Forces: National Direction and National Command," Canadian Military Journal 3.1 (2002): 27.

¹⁶⁷ Sharpe and English 41.

superimposed on a half-hearted jointness and a decreasing budget, the current structure has failed to adequately address a fourth set of difficulties: dual chains of command, a proliferation of operational level headquarters, and particularly, the lack of interoperability among the three Services. Each of these difficulties can be traced to the stovepiping within the individual Services, which has created a top heavy, overlapping and confusing situation resulting in operational ineffectiveness.¹⁶⁹

In particular, the present difficulty that arises with dual chains of command occurs during the actual re-assignment of military forces from the force generators (i.e., the Army, Navy and Air Force Environmental Chiefs of Staff (ECSs)) to the CF's *de facto* force employer¹⁷⁰ (i.e., Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS)) for an operation. During this process, the forces are placed under operational command of the DCDS while still under the administrative command of their relevant ECS.¹⁷¹ Thus, the dual chain of command increases the complexity in determining under which commander's span of control the forces actual belong.

Vice-Admiral Garnett has noted, further, that "[t]he number and size of [operational level] headquarters in the Forces is

¹⁶⁸ Sharpe and English 40.

¹⁶⁹ Owens, Lifting the Fog 167. In this instance, stovepiping implies that information and decisions travel up and down the environmental Service chain of command, but infrequently stray outside this structure for answers.

¹⁷⁰ Mason and Crabbe 5. Force generators are responsible for "bringing forces, or part of them, to a state of readiness for operations . . . [and] includes the training, manning and equipping of forces." The force employer is responsible for "[t]he planning and activities related to the deployment, employment and re-deployment phases of an operational mission."

¹⁷¹ Mason and Crabbe 40.

becoming unsustainable. . . ." ¹⁷² The difficulties in maintaining nine such headquarters are threefold: first, there are obvious redundancies in personnel, infrastructure and overhead costs ¹⁷³ which could be eliminated if headquarters were joined, or reorganized in a joint structure; secondly, there is an inherent lack of a joint operational focus for CF operations, particularly when only two headquarters, the JOG and Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA), are currently joint; and thirdly, there is an unclear division of responsibilities between the strategic (i.e., NDHQ) and the numerous operational levels headquarters. The recommendations made by the Somalia Inquiry motivated the CF to place a greater emphasis on operational planning and procedures, and thus, there has been a slight impetus to address these latter two difficulties. ¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, although a 1999 Departmental Report that clearly articulates that "[a]dditional continuity training and evaluation of the operational planning process will take place for all joint staff training activities and operations," ¹⁷⁵ such training remains difficult to co-ordinate and organize on a regular basis, given the current number of single-Service operational level headquarters and their overwhelming emphasis on Service-centric training programmes. ¹⁷⁶

¹⁷² Garnett 8.

¹⁷³ Overhead costs are usually associated with such service functions as pay and benefits, dental, medical, and, rations and quarters.

¹⁷⁴ John A. Fraser et al., Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in The Department of National Defence and The Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Canadian Department of National Defence, 1999) 6.

¹⁷⁵ John A. Fraser 146.

¹⁷⁶ The consistently high number of personnel deployed on operations adds to the challenge of coordinating realistic joint training at the operational level. The web site (<http://www.dnd.ca/menu/Operations/index_e.htm>) for

Because of an acknowledged lack of staff within the ECS organizations — which are now co-located in Ottawa at NDHQ — the majority of the operational level headquarters have become dual-hatted as both force employers and force generators. Although operational level headquarters exist to function primarily in the force employment role, the additional burden of being force generators has decreased the responsiveness of these headquarters. They cannot perform either role effectively, resulting in training delays, undeveloped Service doctrine and uncompleted joint doctrines.¹⁷⁷ This blurred line between force generator and force employer at the headquarter level has, thus, created an additional difficulty for the current military structure. As Vice-Admiral Garnett concludes, the CF has "become too small to be able to afford force generators that are concerned about operations and, conversely, for force employers to have to consider force generation issues."¹⁷⁸

There is little doubt that the lack of integration, or more precisely, interoperability, among the three Services is a significant difficulty for the CF. The currently problematic state of communications provides a telling example. Common data link standards within the CF include LINK 11, LINK 16, tactical common data link (TCDL), and tactical command, control and

CF Current Operations indicates there are currently more than 4,100 personnel deployed on operations. Given the current size of the CF, this figure is significant enough that such operations, although the *raison d'être* for the CF, actually make it near impossible for timely and effective individual and operational level joint training. This fact provides credence that the CF is lacking a credible combat capability.

¹⁷⁷ This is drawn from the author's personal experience and analysis of presentations at Staff College from August 2001 to April 2002.

¹⁷⁸ Garnett 8.

communications system (TCCCS). None of these links is interoperable, or widespread enough to become the CF standard. Currently, CF maritime forces use LINK 11; the AF use LINK 16; and, the army uses TCCCS.¹⁷⁹ This is but one example to illustrate the interoperability challenge that the CF faces today. The current military organization must be restructured to ensure that "future equipment acquisitions . . . serve the needs of integrated operations, and effective command, control, and communications."¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ This is drawn from the author's personal experience and discussions with colleagues at Staff College from August 2001 to April 2002.

¹⁸⁰ Fergusson 20.

Inter-Service Rivalry

Finally, in highlighting the fifth difficulty, I would again like to emphasize that the current military structure prevents the logical distribution of capital funds for military equipment, and, in turn, stimulates inter-Service infighting. This rivalry is particularly evident when the capital programme for a joint asset, like maritime aircraft, that "falls within the responsibility of one Service, in this case the AF, but the weapon system itself is required for and operated by another Service, in this case the Navy."¹⁸¹ In such circumstances, it is not surprising that the AF is reluctant to commit funds for a naval weapon system.¹⁸² This is but one difficulty imposed by the current military structure. Bland goes one step further by suggesting that in order to fully address inter-Service rivalry, any restructuring must produce "CF officers of a higher loyalty separated from [S]ervice preferences and direction."¹⁸³

By contrast, the current military structure does little to reduce or diminish inter-Service rivalry. In fact, maintaining three distinct Services fosters the development of stronger ties towards one's own Service, with less support and consideration for the needs of the other Services. As an example, consider the

¹⁸¹ Gordon Davis, The Contribution of Aviation to Canadian Maritime Security and the Requirement for the Future, (Dalhousie University, Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1998) 26.

¹⁸² Davis 26.

¹⁸³ Douglas Bland as quoted in David A. Charters and J. Brent Wilson, ed., The Soldier and the Canadian State: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations? (Fredericton, NB: Centre for Conflict Studies, 1996) 42.

possibility that the army commander will suggest that the AF should receive additional capital funds for its much-needed aircraft. In today's current CF environment, I believe this will be the exception, rather than the rule.¹⁸⁴ The reasons are twofold: first, the army commander, because of his background affiliation, would mostly advance his own Service interests; and second, if he could, acquire the funds for army projects, there would be greater likelihood of personal promotion within the army Service.¹⁸⁵ Such devise and parochial mindsets reflect the difficulties with the current military system that stems from a lack of jointness and synergy.

Jointness As Solutions To The Difficulties

Within the existing Canadian military policy framework, as outlined in the 1994 *Defence White Paper, Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces, Defence Planning Guidance 2001, Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, the CF recognizes the need to restructure to become a unified, multi-purpose, combat-capable force.¹⁸⁶ This suggests, perhaps, that Hellyer's efforts, thirty-five years ago, were perceptive and goal-oriented when he succeeded in the passage of Bills C-90 and C-243. Having previously examined the integration and

¹⁸⁴ The author recently learned of one such example. However, based upon the author's personal experience during a twenty-two year military career, this is an exception.

¹⁸⁵ Bland, "Canada's Officer Corps."

unification experiences of Canada (Chapter II), and the unification and the experiences of jointness in the United States (Chapter III), the paper will now concentrate on the scope and relevance of jointness for the CF. The purpose of this section is not to recommend a specific force structure¹⁸⁷, but to highlight the recognized necessity for the Canadian military to understand the need for integration and unification, and to embrace jointness as the solution to many of its current challenges. As such, this next section will selectively address solutions that jointness offers to the operational and administrative difficulties of our current military structure — previously outlined in this chapter. First, however, it is relevant to briefly address the growing debate revolving around the suggestion that the CF should focus more on combined doctrine, than joint doctrine.

Joint Or Combined Doctrine?

Based on recent experiences that the CF can be employed primarily two fashions: either in domestic, joint operations or multinational, coalition operations, Lieutenant-Colonel Boomer has suggested that as our allies, especially our most likely coalition partner, "the United States, work to achieve the degree

¹⁸⁶ Fergusson 18. At this time, the Canadian MND has requested his department to formulate a new defence policy, as the 1994 *Defence White Paper* is over eight years old.

¹⁸⁷ In December 2000, Mason and Crabbe released a report that examined several options aimed at creating a new force structure for operational level headquarters. This represents a recent attempt by the Canadian government and the CF to identify the difficulties and create study groups to recommend changes to the military force structure and increase measures for jointness.

of joint operations that they require, it is essential that Canada tailor its joint doctrine to ensure that it is compatible with its allies."¹⁸⁸ This assumption is also supported in the Department's *Strategic Capability Planning* document from 2000:

Internationally, the small size of the three Canadian [S]ervices results in comparatively few situations where they all operate together. More frequently, however, CF units will be combined with units of another nation of similar capabilities.¹⁸⁹

Boomer further argues that the CF needs to guard against any enthusiasm for joint doctrine, especially if it results in non-interoperability with our coalition partners.¹⁹⁰ Boomer's arguments bring some useful considerations in planning jointness: It is important that CF joint doctrine promotes interoperability with our allies. This leads logically to a follow-on corollary, one already identified in a report prepared for the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. According to the Council, the CF joint doctrine needs to ensure that future equipment acquisitions promote interoperability and seamless integration among our Services. Without delving too deeply into this debate¹⁹¹, it is fair to conclude that it focuses on two distinct needs of the CF: first, there is a necessity for CF joint

¹⁸⁸ Boomer 18. Dr. Elinor Sloan also supports the shift toward interoperability in her article, *Canada and The Revolution in Military Affairs: Current Response and Future Opportunities*, Canadian Military Journal 1.3 (2000).

¹⁸⁹ "Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces," 13 June 2000, <http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/dda/strat/intro_e.asp> (13 February 2002) 18.

¹⁹⁰ Boomer 20.

¹⁹¹ Boomer 21. The debate, as presented by Lieutenant-Colonel Boomer, remains inconclusive. In fact, he appears rather undecided as to which is the right choice for Canada: For him, the CF "must identify those issues that restrict joint operations in domestic situations and seek solutions that will be employed in multinational combined operations."

doctrine to support both domestic and international joint operations, as well as multinational combined coalition operations; and secondly, and of equal importance, CF joint doctrine must ensure maximum interoperability among the Services, and, when feasible, among our coalition partners.

Pursuing Jointness

The CF and the political elites in Canada by and large understand the need for restructuring the military to bring about more intrusive integration, unification and jointness. Recalling the earlier integration and unification challenges in Canada and the on-going difficulties in evolving a true jointness in the United States, it is apparent that the main obstacle to jointness in the Canadian military continues to be Service parochialism. No wonder that from 1972 to the current day, inter-Service rivalries have "continued unabated and for this reason the armed forces remain divided and vulnerable."¹⁹²

Indeed, Hellyer's aim in pursuing unification was the elimination of tri-Service rivalries with an increased emphasis on operational effectiveness, in light of a dwindling budget. It is only by negating Service parochialism that jointness can be achieved and many of the difficulties with today's CF military structure can also be addressed. There are two ways in which

¹⁹² Bland, ed., Canada's National Defence - Volume 2 98.

jointness could be pursued: first, at the macroscopic level; and secondly, at the microscopic level.

Jointness At The Macroscopic Level

Examining the current difficulties at the macroscopic level, and given today's fiscal environment, there is an overwhelming evidence to indicate that a shift to jointness is the only logical solution. Canada already possesses one working model of a successful joint operational level headquarters. CFNA, though not very large, is a joint headquarters with defined geographic responsibilities for domestic operations. Based upon this model, would not the consolidation of the remaining eight operational level headquarters, joined together into one or more joint headquarters, achieve positive results?

The creation of similar joint operational level headquarters across the country will achieve, at least, the following three goals: first, an increase in joint operational focus for CF operations enabling it to attain a credible combat capability; secondly, as implied in the writings of Vice-Admiral Garnett, there is the potential for significant payback through the joint consolidation of infrastructure and personnel¹⁹³; and finally, but just as importantly, it will prove a catalyst for interoperability and integration among the three Services. These three points will now be further elaborated.

¹⁹³ Garnett 8.

Joint Focus and Credible Combat Capability

The groundwork has already been laid for the restructuring of operational level headquarters into a joint structure. Specifically, on the east coast, the co-location of Maritime Forces Atlantic, Land Forces Atlantic and Maritime Air Components in the same building in Halifax is a significant development. All that remains to be done is the integration of these three entities into one consolidated joint operational headquarters. In fact, the planned signing of the Service Level Arrangement (SLA) between the Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS) and the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), is a positive step towards forging a renewed joint capability. Here, the joint focus is between the navy and the AF.¹⁹⁴ Recall that this is reminiscent of the first creation of a functional command, specifically Maritime Command, which was an outcome of integration in 1965.

While the joint aspects of maritime patrol operations is seen as a positive development, the SLA structure, nonetheless, exacerbates the difficulties in the command and control structure. The Maritime Air Component Commander [MACC] is "to provide integrated aerospace expertise as well as a maritime air operations capability to both the Commander 1 CAD and Commander MARLANT."¹⁹⁵ The MACC has thus two chains of command. This is not something that Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, two well-known

¹⁹⁴ Service Level Arrangement Between The Chief of the Maritime Staff and The Chief of the Air Staff Concerning the Provisions of Services to Support Force Generation, Operations and Sustainment, Draft Document, (Halifax: Canadian Department of National Defence, 2002) 4.

Canadian defence analysts, envisioned when they suggested that "military processes require creativity [which may be] re-invented to suit the evolving need of the military situation."¹⁹⁶ The SLA is definitely a creative approach, but one that will require further evolution. If the problems of command and control are resolved, the joint operational level headquarters in Halifax will not only provide a renewed focus for maritime operations, but also achieve an equally important goal: The breaking down of Service parochialism between the navy and the AF.

Consolidation of Infrastructure and Personnel

The potential for a significant payback through the joint consolidation of infrastructure and personnel is the second goal of restructuring the operational level headquarters. Once again, this is not an original idea, but it is one that frequently demonstrates the extent of Service parochialism that frustrates attempts of consolidation and restructuring. The advantages, although not the extent of monetary savings quoted during the 1960s, are indeed substantial. As presented over thirty-seven years ago, they include: The elimination of triplication and unnecessary overhead and, the reduction of incumbent headquarters staff will release military personnel for operational duty.¹⁹⁷ The logic is compelling and benefits are enormous. The CF, therefore,

¹⁹⁵ Service Level Arrangement 4.

¹⁹⁶ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, "Strategic Thinking in Defence," Canadian Military Journal 3.1 (2002): 55.

¹⁹⁷ White Paper on Defence, (1964): 19.

must gravitate towards increased jointness, and that starts with the creation of joint operational level headquarters.

Interoperability and Integration

The creation of joint operational level headquarters will pay huge dividends in the area of enhanced interoperability and integration, especially during domestic operations, but also for coalition or combined operations. Elinor Sloan agrees with Boomer's earlier assessment: "[J]ointness and combined operations [are] making interoperability among [CF S]ervices and [other] militaries especially important."¹⁹⁸ Commander Taylor alludes to the necessity to create joint structures to achieve the benefits of interoperability, such as improved effectiveness in training and increased tri-Service integration.¹⁹⁹ Other benefits include, to address the budget deficiency; to reduce superfluous command layers; and finally, this would be "the most efficient way to fight."²⁰⁰ Taylor also suggests that integration and unification proves beneficial when it actually embraces jointness. He then concludes that "[t]ri-Service cohesion is founded in the ethos of joint operations"²⁰¹ which, by extension, fosters effective integration and interoperability.

¹⁹⁸ Sloan 8.

¹⁹⁹ Taylor 37.

²⁰⁰ Sheehan 47.

²⁰¹ Taylor 42.

The problems of interoperability on communication systems highlighted earlier are widely recognized as an on-going concern. Clearly, the CF would be well served, if it could resolve the on-going debate among the Services, and identify the joint solution that best meets its aim.²⁰²

Jointness At The Microscopic Level

There are two particular areas of difficulty at the microscopic level that also suggest a shift towards jointness is the best solution. First, there is a necessity to resolve the dual chain of command structure relating to the challenges and complexities inherent in force generation and force employment. The second deals with the current deficiency in professional jointness training.

²⁰² Garnett 9.

Force Generation and Force Employment

Vice-Admiral Garnett believes that the CF must address this issue by clearly delineating the respective responsibilities of force generator and force employer.²⁰³ A recent Departmental assessment has already identified the need for a solution:

Force generation . . . is still almost exclusively undertaken by the three Services. Arguably, this situation places undue emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, and does not foster a more unified approach amongst the [S]ervices. In particular, programmes that would benefit the CF as a whole but which are of only marginal utility to single [S]ervices often find it difficult to gain support.²⁰⁴

The introduction of clear lines of responsibility for the individuals serving at the various headquarters can best be achieved with a joint arrangement. The introduction of operational level joint headquarters is again the logical solution. This will formally separate the force generator from the force employer and, in the process, establish specific areas (or regions) of domestic responsibility for each operational level headquarters.

Professional Training and Experience

The final point I wish to address concerns the current level of professional jointness training and experience that is required for CF officers to advance to the rank of colonel or

²⁰³ Garnett 9.

²⁰⁴ "Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces," 13 June 2000, <http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/dda/strat/intro_e.asp> (13 February 2002) 11.

naval captain. There is currently no requirement for any specific training or experience to advance up the ranks.²⁰⁵ Most western militaries will continue to pursue jointness as the way of the future. It is imperative that each CF officer receives professional career training in more joint facilities than now available, as well as obtains valuable joint experience in their operational and administrative assignments.

Career training should involve repeated exposures to the major military systems and platforms used by each Service.²⁰⁶ Assuming that there will be an increase in the number of joint headquarters, CF officers, like our counterparts in the United States, must be required to work in a joint headquarters in order to advance to the colonel/captain rank.²⁰⁷ This will serve three purposes: first, it will provide all CF officers with a better appreciation of the capabilities and platforms of each Service; secondly, it will expose future commanders to the joint arena and make them better officers for the future; and finally, it will help reduce Service parochialism.

Although the process of integration and unification, put in to motion years back, has not achieved its potential aims and objectives, there can be no doubt that it laid the groundwork for

²⁰⁵ This is drawn from the author's personal experience and discussions with colleagues at Staff College from August 2001 to April 2002. Hypothetically, each senior officer requires Staff College where they would be exposed to joint training, but the author is aware of several officers who have been promoted to more senior rank without receiving such training.

²⁰⁶ Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 95.

²⁰⁷ There is currently no Canadian equivalent, like the American legislation, that stipulates officers must work in a joint headquarters for advancement to general/admiral.

the CF to become more joint. It also created foundations for further integration and the reaping of many potential benefits that 'true' jointness would offer.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

If given the opportunity to create its armed forces today, would Canada change the operating characteristics of its military structure significantly? Noting the comment by the Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein²⁰⁸, would the CF still be separated into three distinct Services or, would it be integrated and unified, both in theory and practice, free of inter-Service rivalry and underlying Service parochialism? Can our national military structure of today be transformed to represent a combination of integration and unification that truly embraces jointness as the solution to increase functional efficiencies and operational effectiveness? Undoubtedly, a newly born CF would be structured differently, but even a new structure would face the hurdles of an unstable, changing world: How to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force able to meet the current and anticipated, domestic, continental and global challenges.

This paper has constructed jointness, and integration and unification as a historical process, examined a parallel process in the United States and drawn lessons for the CF. Many difficulties and constraints of the CF illustrate how much the Services have suffered due to a lack of jointness. Some macroscopic and microscopic measures have been contemplated to

²⁰⁸ See Footnote 1 on page 1.

augment and intensify the process of integration and unification in the CF and strengthen jointness in every aspect both at the strategic and the tactical levels. Military imperatives of the 21st century call for joint operations by the army, navy and air force. The CF have been integrated and unified on paper, for over thirty-five years, but the restructuring has not achieved its rational end state. Addressing the current difficulties with the CF military structure would involve the elimination of Service parochialism and a return to Canada's integration and unification heritage, by adopting jointness, not only in principle, but also in its genuine implementation.

In Canada, a chronological review from 1922 to the passage of the two reorganization Bills in the 1960s demonstrates that the ideas behind integration and unification were not exclusively Canadian. In fact, in 1945, at the time of Brooke Claxton's initial attempts at unification, the United States was also involved in its own unification debate. During this time, the debates in both countries revealed that the envisaged changes to the existing military structure would meet fierce opposition, specifically through persistent and continuing inter-Service rivalry.

Attempts by Claxton and Foulkes to integrate and unify the CF were aimed at streamlining the decision-making process, and gaining the cooperation and co-ordination of the three Services as a single entity. The Glassco Report of 1962 recommended integration of the three armed Services rather than the

continuation of the then current committee system. These were the first attempts at Canadian jointness. In most instances, the overwhelming response from the military hierarchy (Foulkes, being an exception), was to negate the potential benefits for the CF in favour of its 'crystalline stovepipes' and continuing Service parochialism.

Paul Hellyer, from the time of his 1964 *White Paper on Defence* to the passage of Bills C-90 and C-243, took less than four years to integrate and unify the CF through a legislation. This, then, was a major step towards jointness. While integration had its opponents, unification, however, proved to be controversial and its intended goals were never fully achieved. There are numerous reasons for this, not the least of which was the dissenters' continuing adherence to their parochial Service loyalties. The recommendations presented in the 1980 Fyffe Report identified continuing Service-related concerns. Service parochialism was alive and well, while jointness continued to be elusive.

With the passage of the United States Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986, not only the United States forces became joint, but it also proliferated military jointness among many allies. Its passage made jointness the *de facto* law of the United States. Following on from this, the United States has evolved its jointness, building on its lessons and experiences of joint operations and administration. From a Canadian perspective, many lessons can be drawn from the American experience in our quest to achieve jointness: first, the

CF must make it mandatory for all officers to serve on a joint staff before advancement to senior ranks; secondly, the CF must be commanded by a 'truly' joint commander with total authority to ensure that jointness is given its due; and finally, Service rivalry and Service parochialism must be eliminated through sustained integration and jointness at all levels.

The difficulties that the CF, with its current organization and structure, face are: lack of a credible combat capability and a lack of professional experience and training in jointness; the structure is focused more on business practices than the virtues of the warrior necessary in a military culture; an excessive number of operational level headquarters; and finally, a visible lack of interoperability among its Services. The paper has scrutinized these operational and administrative difficulties and has illustrated that jointness would offer solutions to many of our difficulties.

To increase jointness across the CF, I have argued that the creation of joint operational level headquarters to replace the current seven single-Service operational level headquarters will not only reduce Service parochialism, but also achieve several additional goals. First, joint operations will receive priority, and as such, there will be an increased focus on attaining a viable tri-Service combat capability. Second, as anticipated in Hellyer's time, the joint consolidation of infrastructure and personnel will produce savings and free up personnel for operational taskings. Third, as the Services would work and train in a joint environment, this would, in turn, enhance

interoperability and improved cooperation among the three Services. Assuming that the government is unlikely to approve substantial increases in defence spending or increases to the military establishment, unless we exploit the potential benefits of jointness, our ability to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force will reduce even further.

Although the CF is officially a single Service by law, in reality it has continued to function as three separate Services, and an effective integration and unification has not yet been achieved. The CF must evolve to become a truly unified combat force, pursuing jointness beyond inter-Service coordination to achieve greater combat effectiveness through synergy from blending Service strengths. A former CSC Commandant hoisted a warning that,

[u]nless we are innovative and maintain the momentum of changing our cultural parochialism, we will not achieve the level of operational effectiveness expected . . . particularly given the potential scenario of a small force size and reduced budgetary allocation. If we cannot liberate our perspective, there will be little or no perceived value in the Canadian Forces. This, in the long term, would simply serve to undermine our very existence, neither a palatable nor very realistic alternative.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁹ K.A. Nason, "Joint Operations in the Canadian Forces: A Meaningful and Timely Start," Canadian Defence Quarterly 24.2 (1994): 9.

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