CANADA'S DEPENDENCE ON MILITARY ALLIANCES:

A PATH FOR THE FUTURE

"We declared ourselves ready to consider an

arrangement that could extend to land and sea."

- Lieutenant-General G. Macdonald [1]

INTRODUCTION

Canada has historically participated within military alliances, as a means of accomplishing its security needs. As a colonial member of the British Empire, Canada derived much of its early defence needs from its relationship with the United Kingdom. In addition, the Royal Canadian Navy and the United States (US) Navy entered into a short-lived North American joint defence relationship in 1918. [2] Canada continues to participate in such alliances as those under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and with the US in the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement. For a country of Canada's geographical makeup and relative geopolitical position and aspirations, the possibility that distinct benefits may be derived from membership within an alliance is of great importance when considering such commitments. The value and nature of these benefits, and their inherent contribution to Canada's security needs, must form the basis of participation in such alliances.

In the previous century, Canada made considerable contributions within the context of military alliances. For example, the Canadian army's performance at Vimy Ridge in World War

[1] Paul Koring and Daniel Leblanc, "Canada aims to join 'Americas (sic) Command'". Globeandmail.com, 29 January 2002. Lieutenant-General G. Macdonald, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, was speaking as a representative discussing a continental defence command concept with US counterparts, in the context of expanding the existing NORAD agreement.

I, remembered for its inspired performance and marked by the sacrifice of great numbers of soldiers, was a definitive moment in establishing the national will of a young nation. During its contribution to the Cold War, primarily through its participation within the NATO alliance, the level and nature of Canada's contribution became an issue of national concern, in that it began to dwindle below what had been traditionally provided or expected.

Prime Minister Trudeau and his government of the day questioned the membership in such alliances as NATO, despite the reality that the Cold War remained at a critical juncture. Prior to his coming to power and while still in opposition, future Prime Minister Trudeau, in 1963, "complained that instead of a Canadian defence policy shaped by foreign policy, 'Canada's foreign policy was largely its policy in NATO, through NATO.' Did we really need troops in Europe 23 years after the end of the war?"[3] Despite Canada's continued military presence in NATO, Canadian defence spending became somewhat modest in comparison to its NATO allies. "In 2000, Canada ranked 17th of 19 NATO countries in Defence expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product."[4] Canada has been the subject of some criticism for the perceived absence of a more substantial commitment, but the level of contribution to the NATO alliance has been indicative of its overall defence posture in the last forty years.

The role of NATO's military forces in bringing about the end of the Cold War, and the set of circumstances that brought about the dissolution of the Soviet Union, remains a subject of considerable variance in viewpoint. That said, the conclusion of the Cold War was followed with reductions of Canada's military contribution in Europe and such actions as the withdrawal of permanent forces from Lahr and Baden-Soellingen, both in West Germany. Political

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[2] J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillier, "For Better or Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s", page 69.
[3] Ibid, page 242.
[4] Report /TT0 1 Tf0.0018 Tc101.82001 Tm.8 Tm(/TT0 1 Tf0.0018 Tc10196.48 72 101.82001 Tm(61 T2 0 0 10.02 137.767620018 Tc

developments within Europe since that time are cause to re-evaluate Canada's role and aspirations in this region. The dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the creation of the European Union (EU) are two such events that have shaped the uncertainty of Canada's role within NATO.

Most recently, Canada has committed considerable forces, in relative terms to the overall capability levels of the Canadian Forces (CF), to the 'War on Terrorism' within Afghanistan and the surrounding region. The events of 11 September 2001 (9/11) have certainly highlighted the asymmetry of today's security threats to Canada and its allies within the NATO and NORAD agreements. In a relatively short period following the end of the Cold War, the need for the CF to shift from a stance aimed at opposing Warsaw Pact forces within a large and powerful alliance to a force capable of dealing with the asymmetric threats became evident. Since 9/11 there has been a much renewed and focussed emphasis on such internal security issues as border control, immigration policy and defence postures, akin to the all-encompassing focus on 'homeland defence'[5] in the US.

The changes in the past ten years, from the end of the Cold War to the events of 9/11, have created the need for a review and renewal of defence expectations as laid out in the "1994 White Paper on Defence". The following observation by Graham Fraser echoes such a call that is being made from many quarters: "The last review was in 1994, only five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and as [Defence Minister] Eggleton puts it, 'Much of the thinking that would have gone into the White Paper of '94 was still influenced by Old Think coming out of the Cold War'".[6] General Martin, Commander of the US Air Force Europe (USAFE), has observed that the concept of a post-Cold War period was short-lived, and we are in an era of "simmering

[5] 'Homeland defence' is a term that seems to have gained popular acceptance, particularly in the US, following the events of 11 September 2001. This term has been too widely used for the author to ascribe its origins to one source.

peace".[7] Given the magnitude of the change in global geopolitics, a meaningful defence review must follow an updated assessment of foreign affairs objectives. The Standing Senate "Committee [on National Security and Defence] believes that Defense (sic) Policy should flow from Foreign Policy and that a Foreign Policy review should precede a Defence review".[8]

Such a defence review does not come without opportunities. This activity could serve as the initiating catalyst for a serious and thorough look at what the CF must be able to achieve in light of limited funding and current threats – as well as addressing, in an honest and realistic fashion, the commitments and security capabilities that serve no value-added benefits in pursuing these defence obligations. "We have at hand tremendous opportunities for a mid-sized power like Canada with finite personnel and material resources. Innovation will take place regardless of contrary views or limited budgets. The challenge that we face is to choose wisely and exploit affordable and effective technological, doctrinal, and organizational change"[9]. Also evident following the budget release of 10 December 2001 by Canada's Finance Minister is that, with the exception of funds targeted at very specific activities, the CF will have to achieve its myriad of tasks within a very constrained funding environment. Of significance is the role that membership within alliances is to play in a challenging fiscal environment.

THESIS STATEMENT

This paper portrays that Canada's most productive alliance 'path for the future' lies within an expanded North American defence command. Canadian security and defence needs

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[6] Graham Fraser, "Soldiering Forward", The Toronto Star, 26 January 2002, page H-1.
[7] General Martin, Commander USAFE, in a presentation to Command and Staff Course (CSC) 28, at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany, 21 February 2002.
[8] Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness", February 2002, page 104.

would be best served by an enhanced 'homeland defence' alliance structure with the US. In that Canada has historically depended on alliances for military security concerns, and faced with a rapidly changing security environment, Canada's alliances within its own continent become paramount. Provided as a contribution to the debate of appropriate alliance roles for the CF in the contemporary security context, this paper will look at: Canada's security and defence needs in a rapidly changing global environment, potential alliances and their applicability to address Canada's security and defence needs, and a recommended alliance 'path for the future' addressing Canada's current security and defence needs.

DISCUSSION

CANADA'S SECURITY AND DEFENCE NEEDS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

As a key participant in World Wars I and II and a 'police action' on the Korean peninsula, Canada demonstrated its willingness to provide military forces in response to global instability. In the post-World War II and Korean conflict, Canada maintained its commitment to the NATO alliance throughout the Cold War. The NATO alliance arguably contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union in the sense that it was partially the thrust to maintain military forces capable of countering NATO forces that created an atmosphere for reform in the Soviet Union. The significant effo

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limited resources. The following sections explore Canada's defence and security needs in a rapidly changing global environment including: implications of the end of the Cold War, the ramifications of 9/11, American 'homeland defence' aspirations and Canadian national interests, and the need for inclusion within an alliance.

The End of the Cold War.

In the period following World War II, 'East versus West' ideological struggle that came to symbolize the 'Cold War' became manifest. From the Berlin Airlift of 1948 to 1949, the "first battle of the Cold War" [10], it became apparent that the aspirations of the Soviet Union and its former allies were not harmonious. Given the common security threat that the former Soviet Union posed to Europe and North America, the creation of an alliance to counter Soviet and Warsaw Pact 'initiatives' made considerable sense. In that Canada had maintained strong ties with Europe following World War II and lay geographically between the Soviet Union and its antithesis, the US, participation in the NATO alliance was easily rationalized. Mutual security requirements formed the basis of a solid alliance and led to the formation of NATO in 1949.

For years, Canada geared a significant portion of its defence and security policy at countering the threat posed by Warsaw Pact threat. However:

> In the history of the Canadian defence policy there has been a continuing tension between two poles, the defence of Canada at home and the defence of Canada overseas. Since 1949 that tension has been evident in the struggles in Canadian defence policies that have in turn emphasized NATO and Canadian priorities. [11]

The coming down of the Berlin Wall, with the subsequent demise of the Warsaw Pact alliance and the break-up of the former Soviet Union, changed the defence climate considerably.

[10] The History Channel – As It happened video documentary," Berlin Airlift: The First Battle of the Cold War".
[11] Douglas L. Bland, "Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century", page 220.

Following the conclusion of the Cold War, the question of NATO's follow-on role becomes apparent. According to Kori N. Schake, "[t]he initial survival of NATO at the end of the Cold War is attributable to a basic agreement among Europeans and North Americans that even without a Soviet threat, the residual insurance of continuing U.S. involvement was desirable at least for a transition period until Russian reform was well along." [12] Given that this initiative has perhaps been surpassed by events, the new strategy for NATO is more generic and less definitive: "extending stability throughout Europe both by engagement and projecting military power".[13]

Initiatives to redirect the 'peace dividend' have created a tenuous situation; however, it is not apparent that Canada's current and evolving security requirements have been identified, articulated or addressed. "Today, in the aftermath of the Cold War, as the Department of National Defence comes to grips with some of the most severe spending and organisational upheavals since the Second World War, public discussion of official thinking remains characteristically muted". [14]

Canada's current security needs in Europe are international stability and, to some degree, economic in nature. The 'spectre of armageddon' that prevailed in the Cold War environment has passed. Conflicts between European nations do not present a direct threat to Canada. It is in this vein that care must be taken in expressing Canada's security interests in a post-Cold War European context. For example, the EU initiative is likely to provide a good basis for stable international relations within Europe. Such initiatives are an expression of autonomy that is exclusive of direct Canadian involvement.

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[12] Kori N. Schake, "NATO Chronicle: New World Disorder", Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999, page 18.
[13] Ibid, page 18.
[14] B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, "Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century", page 1.

Canada has strong economic interests in Europe that, although somewhat overshadowed by Canada's trade relationship with the US, they are similar in magnitude to the trade relationship Canada maintains with all of Asia. The objective of fostering a stable political environment among European nations is of importance to strengthening Canada's economic relationship. The creation of the EU, with its inherent objective of solidifying relations between European member nations, may impose a challenge to Canada's ability to generate trade growth with this region. Canada will need to take care in preserving current security relations with Europe as a strategy to gain further access to their markets.

The Ramifications of 9/11.

A dramatic shift in the need for Canada to address its security and defence needs within North America was signalled by the events of 9/11. In this context, Canada's relationship with the US, and the effects on the US as the main target of 9/11 attacks, must be considered.

Not since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 has the US suffered an aggression on its territory of the magnitude perpetrated by terrorist forces on 9/11. The events of 9/11 have altered, or renewed, the emphasis by the US and, in fact, many nations on security within its or their own borders. While it is evident that the US suffered the brunt of the attacks committed by the al-Qaeda terrorist network, vulnerabilities to such attacks can be identified by virtually all nations. In the context of the US and Canada, the events of 9/11 have had significant effect on public confidence.

It has become apparent that the existing American domestic security apparatus has some weaknesses in such areas as the sharing and distribution of intelligence information, and the US is taking steps to resolve this situation. Paramount in any approach to domestic security is a

robust defence against the illegal entry of individuals into the US. This, of course, will have significant effects on both Canada and Mexico, as both countries are potential conduits for illegal immigration (as evidenced, in the Canadian instance, by a network that purportedly spirited Chinese immigrants through Canada's West Coast on their way to the US).

Canada, as a major trading partner of the US, cannot ignore the potential threats of terrorist activity. Canada's close ties and geographical proximity to the US, and its relative wealth internationally all conspire to make Canada a potential target for terrorism. Sharing a border, Canada will be affected by decisions taken in Washington about security. Hence, Canada's security needs are now more closely linked with the US in areas such as border control, immigration policies, aerospace system controls and possibly emergency preparedness for events of a biological or chemical nature.

On the issue of trade, the repercussions of restricted trade with the US can be significant. An example of the possible ramifications of inhibiting trade resulted from a clash of 'trade protectionism' with valid security concerns. This came prior to the events of 9/11 – and involved the application of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Canada was historically exempt from the ITAR restrictions, American-imposed regulations for the control of import and export of defence articles and services. In 1999, Canada lost special status regarding its ability to import, and subsequently export, advanced technologies designed or manufactured in the US. The American assessment was that the Canadian export regulations were allegedly too 'porous', thus allowing some restricted technologies and equipment to find their way to markets unintended under US law and trading practices. The denial of special status was aimed at prohibiting Canada from being a conduit of such technology to restricted markets. Although

the situation has been resolved to some degree, it remains a sensitive area. [15] "The proposed changes to the ITAR negatively impact on numerous fundamental US/Canada issues ranging from the future of defence economic relations to the loss of jobs to the question of who controls national technology assets".[16]

It is clear that Canada's security environment has changed. The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) has issued warnings that the threat of acts of terror perpetrated against Canadians, on Canadian soil, by Islamic militants is one example. The case of Ahmed Ressam, a member of an Islamic militant cell based in Montreal, and was arrested while entering the US in preparation for an alledged strike during Year 2000 festivities, is an example of this type of threat. What is very significant is that the threat to Canadians intensifies as other potential targets become untenable for terrorist planners:

> The next step will be attacks on Canada itself, Mr. Kelly [a senior intelligence agent in CSIS's counterterrorism branch] warned. "So far, no one has attacked Canada because there are other, more interesting targets," he said, referring to Israel and the United States, the principal symbols of anti-West hatred. "But as those targets become less available" – as Israel and the United States demonstrate a willingness to defend themselves – "and as Canada becomes more involved in the war against terror, I think there's a considerable (threat) to Canada." [17]

The US will enforce any measures it deems necessary to enhance and ensure its internal security, and the security of its citizens abroad. If Canada is perceived as unwilling to participate in such initiatives, some of which are very likely to be more 'progressive' in nature than Canadian society is accustomed to, the US will act unilaterally. Those who make and implement Canadian

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[15] Mr. Ron Kane, Vice President, Policy and Research, Aerospace Industries Association Canada (AIAC), in a presentation to Command and Staff Course (CSC) 28, at Toronto, 1 March 2002.

[16] Author unknown. ITAR comments in Canadian Forces College presentation, "Domestic Factors in Canadian Security and Defence Policies" (NSS/NCDM/513/S-1), 30 October 2001.

[17] Leonard Stern, "Canada faces 'real' terrorism threat", The Ottawa Citizen (Canada.com News), 8 March 2002; Mr. Michael Kelly is a senior intelligence agent in CSIS's counterterrorism branch.

policy must be prudent in assessing the ramifications of its actions (or non-actions) in that Canada may become a more eligible target than what may be expected.

The current threat to Canada is not necessarily of a direct external nature as existed in the Cold War era. The threat is of an asymmetric nature, and more indirect in its attack on the Canadian 'way of life'. In the post-9/11 environment, Canada has a myriad of security issues to address, including: the arrival of illegal immigrants on both coasts; the protection of its interests in the Arctic; the ability to provide a reasonable level of protection to Canada's critical infrastructure; the requirement to monitor the nature of traffic through its ports; and, ultimately, the inherent protection of Canada's society and its quality of life. Of course these issues have always been of importance but have taken on a new light following 9/11.

American 'Homeland Defence' Aspirations.

As alluded to in the previous section, it is necessary to consider Canadian security issues in combination with the renewal by the US in improving American domestic security. While Canada's focus on security is more subdued than the US, due in part to Canada's lesser prominence in world affairs, Canada's geographical proximity and considerable intertwining of its national fabric with the US, including shared borders and trade, have implications for Canada's own security posture. Sharing the North American neighbourhood with the US comes with certain benefits and drawbacks. As the smaller member in a relationship with a nation that is an order of magnitude larger (in such areas as population and economic activity), Canada's influence with the larger US is not as pronounced as the reciprocal – that being American influence with Canada. However, when such a relationship involves two members with

reasonably consistent societal values and aspirations, as well as political expectations, such a relationship can have reciprocal benefits.

Canada and the US share numerous areas of mutual interest regarding each country's ability to control its own destiny domestically. Such areas of commonality include border control, immigration policies, aerospace system controls and trade and commerce. In some of these areas, a good example being trade and commerce, it is heavily weighted in Canada's interests to ensure that there is no disruption at the border. Given the extremely significant proportion of Canada's export trade with the US, any closure or slow-down of trade through the border has, and will continue to have, serious repercussions on Canada's economy. "Canada now exports 87 per cent of its produce to the United States, making the latter more or less a home market (the more so since Canada is the United States' biggest export market, too)."[18] It is clear that an open border with the US, given the inherent trade benefits of such a circumstance, is of paramount importance to Canada's economic growth and stability aspirations.

Although some are wary of establishing too close an association with the US, the arguable reality is that such a close relationship is both necessary and somewhat inevitable. The ramifications to Canada's economy, in the event of restricted access to specific segments of the US markets, are quite significant. NAFTA and other trade agreements have provisions that somewhat protect Canada's position. However, the effects in commerce simply due to a slow-down or interruption to cross-border traffic at US-Canada checkpoints are startling. Because of this, the US has renewed its expectations that its neighbours take seriously the denial of opportunity to terrorist suspects from making their way into the US. To that end, implementation of what are seen as adequate measures to address immigration and border

[18] John Lloyd, "Can we stop continental drift?", The Globe and Mail, 21 February 2002, page A21. NAFTA – the North American Free Trade Agreement – involves Mexico as well as the US and Canada.

concerns is necessary. Renewed co-operation with the US in the development and implementation of sufficient measures to impede trans-border passage of terrorists must be part of Canada's national security strategy.

Security developments in the US present a number of challenges for Canada in its desire to ensure the well being of its own national interests and can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the strong indication that the US will undertake measures for enhancing security in the region, with or without the participation of its neighbours is significant. This may unwillingly leave Canada more vulnerable to threats if Canada does not enhance its security posture. Finally, the modicum of influence that Canada has in North American affairs may also be compromised. It is in Canada's interest to play an active role within its own geographical region.

Canada's Need for Alliances.

Canada maintains a somewhat unique position in the internati488.10.0007 Tc -0.000tains a somewhat un

> Military forces have always played an important part in Canada's history, most obviously in terms of their responsibilities for defending Canadian territory and interests, but also in terms of our economic and political vitality and, in no small measure, in defining our national sense of self. [19]

In the instance of a nation such as Canada that has much to value and lose, the prospect of creating and maintaining a force capable of protecting its interests is daunting. The fostering and maintenance of military alliances, particularly with countries with similar aspirations and consistent outlook as Canada regarding society and humanity, has and generally provided and will continue to be the basis of Canada's external security arrangements, as laid out in the "1994 White Paper on Defence".

There are a number of benefits to be achieved through participation in an effective alliance. Such benefits in the context of Canada's interests include "enhanced deterrence of attack on oneself, enhanced capability for defense against attack on oneself, elimination of the possibility of attack by the allied state, and increased control or influence over the allied state"[20]. These benefits will be considered as criteria in the analysis of existing or potential alliances that will permit Canada to achieve its security needs into the future. In pragmatic terms, Canada often seeks participation in such alliances for the intrinsic benefits as an expression of national will, but also as a means to promote our international prestige and attain a greater role in determining the course of events. Speculative advantages to trade and commerce also form a premise for continued participation.

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Of course there are drawbacks in entering alliances, primarily based on the reality that it is necessary for a nation to give away a portion of its independ

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consideration of Glenn H. Snyder's assessment of such risks, those most relevant to Canada are encapsulated in the following excerpts.

> The potential costs of alliance are:
> 1. The risk of having to come to the aid of the ally, when one would have preferred not to do so in the absence of commitment. This risk subsumes not only the simple failure of deterrence but also the possible provocation of an opponent to attack.
> 2. The risk of entrapment in war by the ally, more confident of one's support, becomes reckless, intransigent, or aggressive in disputes with its opponent.
> 3. General constraints on freedom of action entailed in the need to coordinate policy with the ally and perhaps to modify one's preferred policy to suit the ally's preferences. [21]

As with the identified benefits, these drawbacks will be considered in the analysis of existing or potential alliances that will permit Canada to achieve its security needs. An excellent historical example of a significant drawback regarding an alliance with the US arose from the necessity to store nuclear weaponry on what was traditionally Canadian soil during the Cold War. In fact, Canada's modern day stance on nuclear weaponry is at odds with the policies of its alliance partners within the NATO and NORAD alliances.

Overall, Canada's security and defence needs are evolving in a changing global environment. The external Cold War threat has diminished, and Canada's current security interests are less European-centric. Highlighted by the events of 9/11, the current threat to Canada is asymmetric in nature and has the potential of affecting Canadians within their territorial borders. To that end, Canada's security and defence needs must be focussed continentally. Ultimately, Canada's national interests include a robust, strong and stable economy; the preservation of critical infrastructure; continued control over natural resources; and

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[20] Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Politics", pages 43 and 44. Benefits listed are those deemed most relevant; Mr. Snyder lists a number of additional benefits in the original source material.
[21] Ibid, page 44.

protections for the rights and freedoms of its citizenry. In effect, the maintenance of Canadian societal expectations and Canada's enviable quality of life form the basis of Canada's national interests. It is the role of the Canadian Forces to contribute to such national interests through the safekeeping of Canada's territory, resources, and critical infrastructure.

ALLIANCE OPTIONS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO CANADA'S DEFENCE AND SECURITY NEEDS

It is the synergistic properties of an alliance that merit consideration as Canada addresses its security and defence needs on a limited budget. Given numerous issues, including many in which both Canada and the US maintain a vested interest - the arrival of illegal immigrants on both coasts, the ability to provide a reasonable level of protec

There are fundamentally two political initiatives in NATO that demand consideration when considering security needs. These initiatives have taken place in the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union. The first initiative is the formation of the EU as a political entity. Such a level of cooperation and collaboration has never been attempted or achieved in the modern context of Europe. Such cooperation is intended to develop and foster closer ties among its member nations. In that Canada is not a member nation of the EU, the potential implications on Canada's relationship with EU members must be considered. The other initiative is the expansion, or 'enlargement', of the NATO alliance to the East as it accepts former Warsaw Pact countries into its fold or participates in join activities through the auspices of 'Partnership for Peace' (PfP).

The creation of the EU has brought with it expectations of solidarity and cohesion of a quality not achieved previously. The linkage of such important national aspects as currency, border control and airspace management, to name a few, have invariably and somewhat irrevocably intertwined many European nations. The high standards being imposed for membership in the EU somewhat guarantee a certain level of security in the ability of the EU to address its own issues and challenges. In the natural course of developing as a solid and stable 'state', the question of security of EU common interests has come to the fore. Such initiatives as the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), fundamentally a standing army, have been established to address regional concerns outside the auspices of NATO. Therein rests the problem – the issue of having EU formations created out of military units potentially earmarked concurrent with NATO commitments. The following statement, made in a study by University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, summarizes the conflicting initiative:

> In the past two years, the European union has moved quickly to develop a European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) and is

> currently implementing plans to form a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) by 2003. The implications for Canada of a European security force, outside NATO oversight, are serious – if the European initiative is driven by political, rather than security, imperatives, and if there is no clear financial commitment on the part of the European Union to invest in a credible ERRF standing alongside NATO, then EU military deployments will threaten NATO's military strength and create more, rather than fewer, crises for NATO and Canada and lead to Canada's further marginalization in European security matters. [22]

The creation of 'Fortress Europe' could quite possibly marginalize Canada's perceived influence in the region. It is speculative to suggest that Canada's contribution to NATO, ostensibly in its European collective security role, has much effect in matters of business and trade. Indeed, the possibility exists that the EU, with a population of 300 million people, may reach international super-power status. The strength of Fortress Europe will lie in the commitment of its members to fellow EU states. Canada's position in such an atmosphere will be tenuous, to say the least. The likelihood that Canada will be denied full participation in European markets due to preferred status being given to partner nations by EU member states is significant. Apportioning scarce military resources, through continued contribution to NATO, with the political objective of augmenting her influence in European affairs is fraught with danger. According to Dr. Douglas Bland:

> Too often Canadians seem to have higher expectations of foreign policy than the circumstances suggest. For instance, many Canadians, including most of Parliament, believe that Canada is an important participant and leader in international peacekeeping missions worldwide. They appear convinced that Canada has "influence" in NATO and the United Nations because of the commitments made there, but the reality is different. [23]

[22] "To Secure a Nation: The Case for a New Defence White Paper", Centre for Canadian Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, page 9.
[23] Douglas Bland, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?", Policy Matters, February 2002, page 46.

The expansion of NATO to the East, with the addition of Eastern Block and Warsaw Pact nations, is another undertaking that should be implemented with caution, as suggested in this quote by Helle Dale:

> Current thinking in Europe favors an expansion to include five new members – Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, plus Slovenia and Slovakia. The Bush administration seems to think that a southern flank is needed, which would bring in Romania and Bulgaria, as well. But will further enlargement eviscerate the alliance? If Russia is included that becomes almost a foregone conclusion. [24]

Such expansion may also be somewhat destabilizing. If Russia is threatened by the perception of an overwhelming alliance of nations on its doorstep, it may take steps to ensure its ability to counter a potential adversary, at the expense of its fragile transition to democracy and open markets. Of concern should be the expectations of some of the new members, which collectively are likely to draw on NATO's resources as opposed to augmenting the same.

The aforementioned concern about Russia's interpretation of NATO intentions regarding expansion presents a real threat to European security. NATO's expansion has the potential to introduce very serious destabilizing influences. According to Charles C. Pentland, "The Russians … may have begun to shift away from a relatively benign interpretation of EU expansion into former Soviet domains, toward suspicion that indeed it might be NATO expansion by another name" [25]. It is intriguing that the very alliance that was able to garner tremendous gains in the interests of stability in the European continent through its Cold War victory may very well bring about regional instability through its efforts to find a post-Cold War 'raison d'etre'. Pentland also surmises "[t]he best prospect of expanding the European security

[24] Helle Dale, "Yesterday's alliance?", The Washington Post, 30 January 2002.
[25] Charles C. Pentland, "Enlarging the Security Community: NATO, the EU, and the Uses of Political Conditionality", page 79, Chapter 4, "New NATO, New Century: Canada, the United States and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance", edited by David G. Haglund.

community may indeed be through EU, rather than NATO, enlargement" [26]. The role of NATO must be considered as it searches for appropriate missions by which it can justify and rationalize its continued existence.

NATO's quest for a mission has also created potentially destabilizing perceptions in the regions of Northern Africa and the Middle East. Steps have been taken to mitigate negative impressions of NATO intentions, including such initiatives as the Mediterranean Dialogue. Established in 1995, NATO entered into a security dialogue with a number of Mediterranean countries. This dialogue, with the purpose of contributing to security and stability in the region, strives to reduce misperceptions between NATO and the participating nations. [27] Like the example of NATO's relationship with Russia, its reaction to festering sensitivities is laudable. However, the reality that NATO's quest for survival is unsettling to other entities within the region.

Canada's continued and significant commitment to NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans reduces her ability to contribute to UN missions and her own domestic needs. The Balkans effort will likely be a lengthy one – a modern day Cyprus, poised to consume peacekeeping forces well into the future. While enduring stability and harmony in the region is undisputedly a laudable objective, the benefit to Canada by this pursuit, given its limited military capability, is not clearly evident.

Consideration of the workings of NATO cannot avoid at least a passing observation of the dominant political implications of working within such an alliance. The tremendous number of headquarters and such entities, spread throughout the NATO area of operations - primarily its European domain at least – is somewhat startling. For example, there are nine permanent

[26] Ibid, page 79.
[27] "The Mediterranean Dialogue", NATO Topics on World Wide Web.

Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs) spread across Europe despite the fact that those interested in the military context of NATO are in agreement that this is excessive. However, the political fallout of rationalizing redundant headquarters is likely to be hindered by the inherent national interests in such infrastructure, despite NATO's intention to carry out a review of its force structure. Also of interest is that Canada does not share equitably in the benefits of such infrastructure, making the effects of a bloated organization 'double-edged'. Canada is forced to accept this "plethora of useless headquarters"[28] throughout NATO while enjoying limited direct benefits herself.

As previously discussed, the significant changes in the European context with ramifications for Canada's security policy include the formation of the EU and the expansion of the NATO alliance to the East. The EU, of which Canada is not a member, is comprised of a group of nations that will use this framework to strengthen mutual commerce and, potentially, defence concerns. Canada's influence and relative position with EU members may be eroded by the EU initiative. Enlargement initiatives for NATO, aside from creating some apprehension on the part of Russia, are likely to encourage the already Euro-centric nature of NATO. The impact on Canada may be two-fold, including the loss of some of the few leadership positions within NATO as new participants are apportioned their 'fair share', and the further dilution of influence as the alliance grows in size with an increasing focus within Europe. While the objective of increased stability within Europe through enlargement is laudable, such an initiative threatens Canada's influence in NATO.

Canada participates in the NATO alliance with the expectation of a beneficial effect on its overall security climate. As suggested in the previous section, participation within an alliance

[28] Term suggested by unknown briefer during a presentation to Command and Staff Course 28, at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 18 February 2002.

environment comes with somewhat of a loss of control over that nation's 'destiny'. Canada's role in the aerospace bombing campaign of Kosovo and Serbia exemplifies an international coalition force within which Canada was expected to participate. Consider NATO's motives for such a war effort:

> NATO did embark on the bombing for many humane reasons, and together these do justify the noble-cause claim. There was also apparent self-interest in restoring the alliance's credibility, as well as the accumulated frustrations of dealing with Milosevic. [29]

There are a number of outstanding issues with what was fundamentally a campaign in the application, and quite possibly the misapplication, of aerospace power, in pursuing a humane resolution to the Kosovo situation. Furthermore, a concern raised by Glenn Brown is the damage inflicted on NATO's relationship with Russia during this campaign. [30] In its quest for a bona-fide role, it appears that the steps taken by NATO were at times counterproductive to its overall intention of stability in Europe.

A topical example that highlights the antiquity of Canada's continued participation in NATO was provided in the aftermath of 9/11. NATO invoked Article 5 following the attacks of 9/11 in support of the US, for the first time in the alliance's history. According to NATO's Article 5:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the united nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic

[29] Glenn Brown, "Noble Cause, or March of Folly? NATO and Kosovo", page 24, Chapter 1, "New NATO, New Century: Canada, the United States and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance", edited by David G. Haglund.
[30] Ibid, page 25.

area. [31]

Prior to this declaration, many of the significant nation states (from a military stand-point) were already clearly on-board in a military sense with the US, including the United Kingdom and Canada. The following statement attributed to a member of the American Center for Strategic and International Studies during a seminar convened on the topic of Russian security issues summarizes the effect of the Article 5 invocation on the military campaign in Afghanistan:

> After September 11 … NATO's relevance to its core mission is in question. NATO faces irrelevance. We face a new security world, with new security mission. NATO invoked Article 5 after the September attack, but NATO is not the instrument on which the United States has chosen to rely to defeat the threat it faces. [32]

The reality is that the composition of the forces deployed to the Arabian Sea and Afghanistan do not reflect that Article 5 declaration.

The US has moved away from operating within a politically constrained environment such as that imposed during the air strikes on Kosovo and Serbia in Operation Allied Force. The military capability gap that the US maintains over many of its allies permits it the ability to conduct operations unilaterally from a strictly military viewpoint. However, it is likely in American interests to continue to conduct military operations in conjunction with the military forces of other, albeit compatible, nations. To that end, Canada has proven its ability to conduct military operations with the US, in and out of the context of NATO.

As with Canada's overall commitment to the maintenance of a military force in line with its expectations, the level of Canada's contribution to NATO has long been a source of some concern. "Canada spends about $400 per capita on defence, compared to the NATO average of

[31] William V. Roth, Jr. and Stanley R. Sloan, "The Atlantic Alliance: A View from Capitol Hill", Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999, page 26.

$890 per capita." [33] The expectation that Canada attend to perceived shortcomings in its contribution to the alliance has been strongly voiced by no less than NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson. "Canada and Europe were warned yesterday they must boost their defence budgets if they expect to be consulted by the United States in advance of future military operations against terrorism". [34] Canada has limited funding to apply to her security needs, and the necessity for Canada to focus on security priorities prevails.

The case for Canada to remain within NATO is a complex one, for there are benefits that come with such membership. Participation by the CF in NATO missions and exercises permits exposure to operations within a coalition force, as exemplified by the participation of Canada's navy in the Standing Naval Fleet in the North Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). Regarding Canada's Naval contribution to NATO, Peter Haydon maintains that "Despite the mutterings of a few "nay-sayers", NATO remains a useful international organization and the standing naval forces have proven their diplomatic utility as well as their operational value". [35]

However, the utility of the NATO alliance to Canada's changing security needs must be called into question. The original NATO mission has been successfully concluded. Given the shift towards 'Fortress Europe' and Canada's weakened presence, it may very well be prudent for Canada to refocus its limited defence and security potential in other areas. Possible exceptions could involve a substantially reduced role in areas of particular relevance for Canada, an example being continued participation in STANAVFORLANT. Peter Haydon supports Canada's Naval contribution to NATO, but suggests: "[o]perationally, though, it is probably

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[32] Attributed to Celleste Wallander at a seminar discussing 'New Approaches to Russian Security', convened by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and reported by Helle Dale in "Yesterday's alliance?", an article in The Washington Post, 30 January 2002.

[33] Allan Thompson, "Canada's troops fight budget battle", The Toronto Star, page A-24, 26 January 2002. He further stipulates: "But seen from another angle, Canada is the sixth-largest contributor to NATO in real dollar terms and is still among the top 20 military spenders in the world".

[34] Nicolaas van Rijn, "Beef up defence, Canada warned", thestar.com, 4 February 2002.

more important to retain the ability to integrate a Canadian frigate or destroyer into a US carrier battle group than it is to be able to work with NATO". [36]

In consideration of the benefits to be derived through participation in an effective alliance, as presented by Glenn Snyder [37], Canada's inclusion in NATO comes up short in some respects. Each of the following criteria is achieved to some degree through continued participation in the alliance: "Enhanced deterrence of attack on oneself, enhanced capability for defense against attack on oneself, and elimination of the possibility of attack by the allied state".[38] With the exception of the US and perhaps the United Kingdom, countries with which Canada maintains distinct ties with outside the auspices of NATO (such as the Commonwealth in the case of Britain), the remaining NATO nations do not collectively or individually provide a credible deterrent force for threats to Canada's security. It is significant that the substantial presence of NATO is influenced considerably by the presence of the US as an ally. To that end, there would be little in the way of negative ramifications if Canada were to reduce its contribution to NATO, with the caveat of continued relations with the US.

With reference to Snyder's drawbacks, each of them can be applied to Canada's position within NATO due to the heterogeneous composition and complexity of the alliance. The following drawbacks, or 'costs', are potentially inflammable in the context of Canada's participation within NATO: "the risk of having to come to the aid of the ally, when one would have preferred not to do so in the absence of commitment; and the risk of entrapment in war by the ally, more confident of one's support, becomes reckless, intransigent, or aggressive in

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[35] Peter Haydon, "What Naval Capabilities Does Canada Need?", page 2.
[36] Ibid, page 4.
[37] Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Politics", pages 43 and 44. Benefits listed are those deemed most relevant; Mr. Snyder lists a number of additional benefits in the original source material.
[38] Ibid, pages 43 and 44.

disputes with its opponent". [39] The risk of Canada becoming embroiled in an international predicament, brought on by such considerations as EU aspirations and failing economies of NATO members, is exacerbated as NATO pursues enlargement to the East.

> [I]f Canada wishes – as it should – to continue to stand astride two cultures, European and American, it should know this balancing

asymmetric threat (exemplified by the deployment of forces to quell the al-Qaeda terrorist network), the requirement to monitor the nature of traffic through its ports – in effect, the protection of Canada's society and its quality and way of life.

North American Continental Security.

Canada has been provided with a historically fruitful alliance structure through the auspices of NORAD. It has survived its somewhat sketchy origins to become, arguably, Canada's most effective defence agreement. [41] From its inauspicious start it has served as an effective alliance through the Cold War years and many viewpoints of ideologically varied Canadian governments. "Canada renewed the NORAD agreement as recently as May 2001 because it continues to be one of the key aspects of the Canada-United States defence structure."[42]

The relevance of NORAD and its inherent aerospace security posture has been elevated in importance, at least in visibility, following the events of 9/11. The nature of the threat to North America has become clearer, at least in terms of putting a defence and security infrastructure in place to counter. The reality that a significant threat to the Canadian public was clearly demonstrated by the horrific and random nature of the attacks, and steps taken by governments to safeguard its citizens are more likely to be received with some degree of awareness and approval than was formerly the situation. The nature and extent of mutual

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[40] John Lloyd, in "Can we stop continental drift?", an article in The Toronto Star dated 21 February 2002, page A-21.
[41] Joseph T. Jockel, "The Military Establishments and the Creation of NORAD", page 175, "Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century", edited by B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock.
[42] Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness", February 2002, page 64.

security initiatives by the US and Canada are issues of topical importance, highlighting the need to focus on a North American defence perimeter through homeland security.

The role of Canada in the defence of North America remains to be seen. Such a role could vary from Canada's status quo in NORAD to an expanded role, as suggested by Canada's Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant General Macdonald (himself a former Deputy Commander of NORAD, the top Canadian military position in NORAD), within a North American defence command. US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld provided the American perspective on such an initiative in an address to the Canadian Senate during a fact-finding visit to Washington, D.C.:

> He [Secretary Rumsfeld] said that Americans were pleased with the way NORAD functioned and assumed that Canadians were as well. He then said he would welcome similar Canadian participation with both the sea and land elements, but that it would be up to Canadians whether it was in their national interest to participate in either or both. He indicated that Canada and the United States had a long history of cooperation, and that he would be happy with whatever decision Canada made. [43]

NORAD has historically focused its efforts on an 'outward looking' concept for threats penetrating the North American perimeter. In the context of homeland defence, NORAD must develop a more robust ability to assess and respond to actions within the entirety of the continent. One example of the enhanced nature of internal vigilance is provided through the constitution of a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), under the auspices of Operation Noble Eagle, with the mission of "defending continental US from airborne attacks and maintaining air sovereignty until the threat of terrorist attacks has been diminished or

[43] Ibid, page 66.

controlled" [44]. The mission of NORAD is focused on providing meaningful air defence for specific targets like large urban centres, strategically significant sites (one example is nuclear power generating plants) and the National Command Authority.

In consideration of the benefits to be derived through participation in an effective alliance such as NORAD [45], Canada's inclusion in this alliance has been beneficial. Considering the following criteria, each has been achieved to a large degree through continued participation in the alliance: "Enhanced deterrence of attack on oneself, enhanced capability for defense against attack on oneself, and elimination of the possibility of attack by the allied state".[46] As with NATO, the third of these is somewhat irrelevant in the context of NORAD and the US in that an overt attack by American forces is truly not a realistic threat to Canada's security. The expectation that Canada garners an "increased control or influence over the allied state"[47] is realistic to some degree, in that Canada is conferred with a 'favoured partner' status with the US in many instances. All things considered, Canada benefits substantially from its alliance with the US. Furthermore, it is in Canadian interests to look after its relations with the US given Canada's significant dependence in matters of commerce.

With reference to Snyder's drawbacks, each of them can be applied to Canada's position within NORAD in the context of maintaining suitable relations with the US. The following drawbacks, or 'costs', exist within an alliance with the remaining global super-power: "the risk of having to come to the aid of the ally, when one would have preferred not to do so in the absence of commitment; the risk of entrapment in war by the ally, more confident of one's

[44] Lieutenant-Colonel Keddy, in a presentation on "Command and Control of Aerospace Forces" to Command and Staff Course 28 Air Students, 27 February 2002. Of note is that Canada falls under a different region within NORAD, controlled by 1 Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters at Winnipeg, Manitoba.
[45] Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Politics", pages 43 and 44. Benefits listed are those deemed most relevant; Mr. Snyder lists a number of additional benefits in the original source material.
[46] Ibid, pages 43 and 44. Benefits listed are those deemed most relevant; Mr. Snyder lists a number of additional benefits in the original source material.

support, becomes reckless, intransigent, or aggressive in disputes with its opponent and constraints on freedom of action entailed in the need to coordinate policy with the ally and perhaps modify one's preferred policy to suit the ally's preferences".[48] The risk of Canada becoming intertwined in a campaign not of her choosing is a reality, just as the invocation of NATO's Article 5 could draw Canada into an undesired conflict. In the instance of entering into an alliance with the US, it is unlikely that Canada would be forced into an undertaking not seen to be in Canada's national interests.

Canada's continued participation in the NORAD agreement was reasonably stable prior to 9/11, with the exception of one major issue at hand. That is the position Canada would adopt if the US were to undertake development of its National Missile Defence (NMD).[49] In a view echoed from many corners, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence concluded that NMD "will have a profound effect on the future of Canadian-US military co-operation, particularly in NORAD, and on Canadian defence and foreign policy in general".[50] Based on the assessment that the US "decision to deploy NMD is inevitable, and its timing will most likely hinge on the results of successful testing"[51], it is likely that Canada's policy makers will need to address this issue sooner rather than later. The University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies has made the following recommendation:

> The Government of Canada should develop, and clearly articulate, a national policy on ballistic missile defence based on the realties of ballistic missile proliferation around the globe and the inevitability of US deployment. At the same time, Canada should

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[47] Ibid, pages 43 and 44.
[48] Ibid, page 44.
[49] NMD has also been referred to as ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and has evolved from the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).
[50] Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness", February 2002, page 69.
[51] James Ferguson, "National Missile Defence, Homeland Defence, and Outer Space: Policy Dilemmas in the Canada-US Relationship", Canada Among Nations 2001, page 235.

> support both regional and global co-operative approaches to missile defence. [52]

The issue of Canada's role in the NMD initiative is replete with pitfalls. Such a system will come at a considerable price, even if Canada only takes on a minor role. The US is likely to accept nominal financial support for Canadian involvement in exchange for its 'support' for implementation of such a weapons capability. Providing that support may be at odds with some of Canada's foreign affairs policies. However, failure to provide a modicum of support for this undertaking by the US is quite likely to jeopardize US-Canada relations in many areas of mutual interest. Realistically, the only hope of retaining any semblance of influence regarding NORAD is to remain active in NMD.

The concept of an attack carried out from within the American domestic airspace structure, and not from that historically anticipated from ballistic missiles or strategic bombers penetrating from outside American airspace, brings on tremendous new challenges. In light of 9/11 the focus of NORAD has shifted to the magnitude of cooperation that will be pursued in the near future, fundamentally in response to the threat of terrorist activity. That both the US and Canada have made alterations to respective internal security organizations – such as the civilian Homeland Defense Organization under the direction of Governor Ridge in the US, and additional responsibilities for Deputy Prime Minister Manley in Canada – is indicative of the importance and urgency given to such initiatives. "Use of the NORAD model would mean that Canadian sovereignty and national security would be maintained, and that the Canadian Forces would not be employed without the express authorization of the Prime Minister."[53]

Dr. Douglas Bland summarizes the issues at hand in the following passage:

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[52] "To Secure a Nation: the Case for a New Defence White Paper", Centre for Canadian Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, page34.

> Thus, Canada's most important coalition [with the US] may be headed for radical transformation, from one based since 1950 on a threat of over-the-pole air attacks and from 1989 on no threat at all, to an overwhelming, all-encompassing concern for the security of the homeland. In this circumstance, the United states will undoubtedly look to Canada to share the burden of homeland security in hitherto unimagined ways, which will impose considerable tangible and intangible costs on Canadians… Canada faces no greater foreign and defence policy challenge than finding an appropriate and credible way to reassure the United States that Canada can live up to the 1938 Roosevelt-Mackenzie King agreement under which the Prime minister assured the President that no attack on the United states could come through Canadian territory. [54]

In light of the events of 9/11, Canada's defence and security priorities rest in the defence of Canada through the ability to ensure the integrity of critical infrastructure in both preventative and reactive manners. Suitable procedures and capabilities must be put in place to permit timely response as need be. Canada must be able to wage war on those deemed intent on attacking Canada's national interests including our way of life. The US is pursuing similar objectives, and because of the intertwined nature of North American geography as evidenced by the extensive border shared by Canada and the US, a cooperative venture may be prudent for all concerned.

Canada's Alliance Options

To this point, existing and developing issues with the military alliances within which Canada participates have been examined. Canada's defence and security needs have traditionally been pursued through the NATO and NORAD alliances. However, a wide variety of issues and events such as 9/11 now make it necessary to review such relationships, as well as exploring possible alteration of these alliances. This section deals with a proposal regarding

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[53] Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness", February 2002, page 103.
[54] Douglas Bland, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?", Policy Matters, February 2002, pages 26 and 27.

Canada's participation in both NATO and NORAD and perhaps other alliances, and a potential and pragmatic 'path for the future' for Canada's alliance strategy.

Canada is a member in a number of organizations in addition to NATO and NORAD. Examples of such organizations include the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Francophonie. Both organizations are primarily political in nature, and each is comprised of a considerably diverse, and often disparate, group of nations. Realistically neither organization provides a framework by which an effective alliance focussed on defence and security needs could be achieved.

An organization that has the potential to provide somewhat of a framework for establishing effective military coalition forces is the United Nations (UN). That Canada is seen to have a role in establishing and maintaining global stability is evident through its contribution to the UN. The prospect of restoring some semblance of normalcy in 'failed' states by addressing such issues as gross human rights abuses and organized crime is a daunting challenge. However, Canada will be incapable of providing very much by way of military force in light of current commitments to Bosnia and Afghanistan. It will be necessary to determine what missions it should, and is capable of, taking on to further its resolve to enhance global stability, likely through the auspices of the UN.

The concept of Canada maintaining some form of military neutrality, evidenced by little to no participation in international military operations, is highly unlikely, and may be untenable in its application. Canada has fostered strong diplomatic, and in many instances, military ties with a large number of the world's countries. Furthermore, participation in forums like the G-8 give Canada a somewhat prestigious position, at least through the recognition of being a relatively rich and stable nation; however, with such prestige comes the responsibility to

contribute to the stability of lesser fortunate countries and regions of the world. Of some significance is evidence that the concept of coalition participation has evolved considerably, particularly among countries of similar societal values and economic interests as Canada. The current situation was evidenced by the reaction against terrorism in response to the events of 9/11.

> Can you conceive nowadays in this circumstance where Britain is being bombed every night by Germany, and thousands of Londoners killed every night, and the United States remains neutral? And yet, that's what happened from September, 1939 (sic) until December, 1941. Nowadays it is inconceivable. The moment London was bombed once, the United States would feel that somehow it had to intervene. So I think in that sense there has been a lesson learned, and a very definite change. [55]

The relevance of this evidence is that, irrespective of alliance dynamics, such nations as Canada, the United Kingdom, and US would feel the need to intervene and contribute in instances of attack on its 'friends'. Current American policy, as stated in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, highlights just such an approach as to what the US perceives as its global responsibilities:

> The United States cannot retreat from the world. The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitment to allies and friends. The U.S. military plays a critical role in assuring allies and friends that the nation will honor its obligations and will be a reliable security partner… toward these ends, the U.S. military will promote security cooperation with allies and friendly nations. [56]

Although certainly not capable of the same deterrence or responsiveness with force as the US, Canada would likely consider similar actions in support of 'allies and friends'.

As European nations strive to achieve the benefits of EU membership, priority in all manners of those nation's activities, including such areas as commerce and security, will be

[55] Sir Martin Gilbert. "The history maker", Maclean's interview, 18 March 2002, page 36.

given and received from existing and aspiring EU partners. Through no discernible fault of its own, Canada stands to be shut out of Europe in many respects by EU interests. NATO enlargement may also reduce Canada's influence within NATO; furthermore, as NATO pursues more enlargements, possibly with some countries with considerable domestic issues of their own, Canada's influence within NATO, and Europe, stands to undergo further erosion.

As Canada reaches a juncture at which a plethora of challenges are manifest, decisions about its security relationships will need to be taken. The challenges at hand include a diverse set of issues and circumstances that demand attention. Significant of things to be considered are Canada's intentions regarding defence expenditures, US expectations, Canada's international security role and, ultimately, the provision of adequate security to its citizenry.

The need to prioritize defence and security requirements is evident, particularly given what is arguably a restrictive funding envelope accorded to the CF. "This limited funding has forced the Department of National Defence to focus on a cost-driven, resource-limiting approach to operations, capital acquisition and training in order to live within tight budgets." [57] There have been widespread demands for additional funds to be provided to the CF to address personnel and equipment deficiencies from virtually all parties nationally and internationally with some stake in Canadian defence (including the US Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, [58] and NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson [59]). However, indications are that Canada's defence expenditures will not be adjusted in a substantial fashion in the foreseeable future. "The Prime Minister said he was proud of the performance of Canadian soldiers in

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[56] "Quadrennial Defense Review Report", Department of Defense, United States of America, 30 September 2001.
[57] Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness", February 2002, page 82.
[58] Paul Knox, "Cellucci urges Canada to hike defence budget", globeandmail.com, 3 October 2001 and Douglas Bland, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?", Policy Matters, February 2002, page 19.
[59] Nicolaas van Rijn, "Beef up defence, Canada warned", thestar.com, 4 February 2002.

Afghanistan but dismissed calls for increased military funding, saying the Armed Forces can always rent the equipment they need [in reference to strategic airlift in this instance]." [60] Given that "military equipment will essentially be worn out in the next 7-10 years" [61] and the ongoing operational tempo may very well be unsustainable for the long term due to personnel shortages or intended manning levels [62], some tough issues remain to be tackled with regard to Canadian expenditures and capabilities in the realm of defence and security.

Canada is going to have to address a variety of issues with respect to its defence and security relationship with the US, and in a 'sooner' rather than 'later' timeframe. Two important issues include Canada's role within a North American defence command structure and its position on NMD. Given Canada's economic reliance on the US and the benefits derived from existing agreements with the US, including NORAD, it may prove hard to undertake a major shift in this area. The issue of NMD, among others, will remain somewhat contentious to many Canadians. "The United States' refusal to sign the treaties banning land mines, or chemical and biological weapons, or its intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with Russia, all remain bones of contention". [63] However, the potential security benefits inherent with the NMD concept may prove to be significant despite its cost and impact on existing international agreements pertaining to the use of outer space for purposes of defence.

According to the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "[t]he first obligation of the state is to guarantee the safety of its citizens". [64] In light of a security threat that is more evident to Canadians than was perhaps the case prior to 11 September 2001, expectations

[60] Robert Fife, "No more money for defence: PM", National Post Online, 19 March 2002.
[61] Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness", February 2002, page 52.
[62] Douglas Bland, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?", Policy Matters, February 2002, page 37.
[63] John Lloyd, "Can we stop continental drift?", The Globe and Mail, page A21, 21 February 2002.

of the Canadian public are likely centred on the concept of a robust domestic security posture such as that envisaged by Americans under the purview of 'homeland defence'. Ultimately it may prove difficult for the government of the day to rationalize rejection of US overtures regarding a North American defence command, particularly one based on the model of a productive alliance like NORAD. J.L. Granatstein raises these issues connected with the concept of a North American defence command:

> Now we are soon to be faced with another decision. The United States, homeland security to the fore, will soon create a new military command to co-ordinate continental defence. What should Canada do? Remain aloof, ever fearful of a loss of more independence to the United States? Or join in as a partner, ready to work with the United States? What does national interest demand?" [65]

Regarding Canada's participation in a continental defence command, J.L. Granatstein clearly articulated his vision – that Canada should embrace this opportunity and participate as fully as possible, and that full participation is realistically the only choice available.[66] As Vice Chief of the Defence Staff Lieutenant-General Macdonald did state: "We declared ourselves ready to consider an arrangement that could extend to land and sea". [67] Also of relevance to the issue of Canada's domestic security is the intention to address defence issues in the North, including the Arctic. "One of the areas Defence Minister Art Eggleton promises will be looked at in an upcoming review of Canada's military is the North." [68]

It is paramount that Canada prioritizes its defence requirements and objectives, and realistically addresses the fulfillment of higher priority objectives in a meaningful manner. The

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[64] Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness", February 2002, page 79.
[65] J.L. Granatstein, "Now as then, defence must be continental", National Post Online, 31 January 2002.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Paul Koring and Daniel Leblanc, "Canada aims to join 'Americas (sic) Command'", Globeandmail.com, 29 January 2002.
[68] CBC News, "Defence Review to consider Northern needs Eggleton", 25 February 2002.

proclivity to spread the CF too thin, causing undue stress on resources without actually achieving any objectives, in the interests of 'being all things to all people' must be resisted. A number of options exist for Canada to pursue its security and defence needs, ranging from unilateral neutrality through to continued participation in one or more existing or expanded alliances. Unilateral neutrality is unlikely, in that it compromises Canada's international standing and goes against Canada's historical tendencies.

Based on Canada's national interests, Canada's most productive alliance 'path for the future' lies within an expanded North American defence command. Such an association, based on the precedent of the existing NORAD model, would best address Canada's ability to ensure the adequate security for its citizenry. Meaningful participation in such a coalition will require refocusing the employment of existing resources. "A national foreign and defence strategy for 2020 must join ends to means and allocate resources appropriately between strategic imperatives and strategic choices. Care must be taken to avoid the allure of "double-hatting" assets (assigning multiple duties to the same resources) to cover gaps in capabilities". [69]

Personnel such as those currently contributing to NATO interests in redundant headquarters installations in Europe could be reallocated to the creation of a robust North American defence command headquarters structure within North America. The judicious application of Canada's limited defence expenditures – on personnel and equipment in support primarily of the North American defence command – would permit the two-fold objectives of satisfying US expectations and enhancing the domestic security posture on behalf of Canadians.

In a strategic sense, the natural evolution of the European/North American defence relationship would be to a partnership on equal footing of both 'continental' defence

[69] Douglas Bland, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?", Policy Matters, February 2002, page 44.

organizations. One of two components based on the European component of NATO in its enlarged state would be a natural by-product of the creation of the Eurocorps force (the ERRF) and ongoing European security initiatives under the auspices of the EU. The North American component of this 'over-arching' alliance would be provided by the North American defence command.

In consideration of the benefits to be derived through participation within a coalition like the North American defence command, in partnership with the US and perhaps Mexico, [70] Canada's inclusion in this alliance would clearly be advantageous. The following criteria would each be achieved to a considerable degree through participation in the alliance: "Enhanced deterrence of attack on oneself, enhanced capability for defense against attack on oneself, and elimination of the possibility of attack by the allied state".[71] As in the NATO and NORAD contexts, an overt attack by American forces is truly not a realistic threat to Canada's security. The fear that Canada may succumb to "increased control or influence over the allied state"[72] may be present, but it must also be tempered with the proven fact that in the case of Canada/US relationships, Canada's national policies have been respected. An example is provided by the delineation of responsibility regarding Cuban-US airspace in NORAD operations– Canadians in the NORAD chain-of-command do not address Cuban issues due to the vastly different positions of the respective Canadian and US governments. Finally, Canada would likely retain its 'favoured partner' status with the US, which is of great importance to Canadian economic goals.

Canada's historical dependence on military alliances to address its security concerns is relevant to the challenges following 9/11 in an expenditure-constrained climate. As previously stated, Canada's national interests include a robust, strong and stable economy; the preservation

[70] Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Politics", pages 43 and 44.
[71] Ibid, pages 43 and 44.

of critical infrastructure; continued control over natural resources; and protections for the rights and freedoms of its citizenry - effectively, the maintenance of Canada's way of life. Given Canada's diminishing role and presence in NATO, a military alliance with its own set of challenges imposed by the EU initiative, Canada's alliances within her own hemisphere become paramount. Canada's future within a powerful alliance clearly lies within a strengthened North American defence arrangement, building on the NORAD model already in place.

CONCLUSION

In light of 9/11 and the need to, first and foremost, ensure the integrity of domestic defence and security to its citizenry, Canada's preferred alliance path lies with the US. Canada has a long tradition of addressing its defence and security needs through participation within alliances. The value and nature of these alliances, and their inherent contribution to Canada's security needs, must form the basis of participation in such alliances. The primary organizations within which Canada has played significant roles following World War II have been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement.

NATO was an effective alliance that provided a comparable adversary to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. However, the demise of the Cold War has left this alliance in a somewhat awkward state as it seeks a genuine role. Furthermore, a number of initiatives have created a tenuous situation regarding Canada's continued and effective participation within NATO. The creation of the European Union (EU), comprised of a large number of NATO nations, has established a political alliance of sorts that also na00.26685.695988spirry orga aldlielop961 a (NOR

NATO over the use of over-lapping forces. NATO is also pursuing enlargement of the organization to the East, absorbing many former Warsaw Pact participants into the fold. Ultimately these initiatives will dilute the questionable influence that Canada has within NATO, and by extension, Europe. Canada may be marginalized despite its best intentions. Also, well-intentioned NATO initiatives are creating destabilizing conditions within Europe as NATO 'searches' for a valid mission.

Canada's participation in NORAD has proven to be effective throughout the course of this alliance. Not only is NORAD already playing a large part in the defence of North America but is seriously being considered as the model of an expanded North American defence command. Canada's role within such a command is a question of great consequence to Canada, particularly in light of both the intent and ability for the US to go it alone in the event of reticence on Canada's part. The thorny issue of National Missile Defence also remains to be resolved, although the events of 9/11 have likely softened dissenting viewpoints to some degree.

In the global context and given Canada's desire to be a performer on the international stage, participation within both the NATO and NORAD alliances would be desirable in a climate of adequate defence funding. However, the presence of some inadequacies within a Canadian military that is challenged by both personnel and equipment issues raises the distinct possibility that continued and meaningful participation within these alliances is fraught with some peril. Furthermore, the 'Canadian government of the day' has elucidated that it assesses the current level of defence spending as adequate. Without an incremental adjustment in funding to address existing and developing inadequacies in its capability, the Canadian military will need to target its limited resources if the objective is to provide meaningful participation within an alliance.

An expanded North American defence command, based on the precedent of the existing NORAD model, would best address Canada's ability to ensure the adequate security for its community. Given limited resources, Canadian defence and security requirements would be best served by an enhanced 'homeland defence' alliance structure with the US. Meaningful participation in such an alliance will require refocusing the employment of existing resources from NATO to that of North American defence command. This is Canada's alliance 'path for the future'.

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