THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF UN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS IN
INTRASTATE CONFLICTS
AND
MILITARY DOCTRINE

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"Peace enforcement is fundamentally "war" in its new guise."[1]

United Nations (UN) troops have been patrolling the 'Green Line' and buffer zone
in Cyprus for 38 years now. For the past 25 years this has not been a militarily difficult
task, requiring the precise and brilliant application of military operational art. Rather,
during this latter period "the situation in Cyprus has remained calm,"[2] and it has been a
matter of showing a daily presence, in a buffer zone between interstate rivals – the Greek
and Turkish Cypriots – and ensuring that neither side encroaches onto the territory of the
other. Aside from the presence of weapons and the therein always-attendant possibility of
death, however remote, this is a peacekeeping operation that could probably be run by a
civilian executive. In marked contrast to this, UN operations undertaken in the 1990s
have tended to involve peace *enforcement* operations between intrastate rivals, and have
been characterized by explosive, fluid, and dangerous situations, requiring the intelligent
application of military operational art.[3]

According to the precepts, or doctrine, of military operational art, the requirements
for a successful military campaign are, very generally, a clear mission from political and
military masters at the strategic level, a clearly articulated end-state, a sufficient mandate
and authority, and adequate troop levels for the task to be undertaken. This paper will
attempt to persuade the reader that not only has the above doctrine not been applied
correctly in UN enforcement operations of the 1990s, but that the political considerations
and limitations of UN operations in intrastate conflicts do not actually allow for the
proper application of this doctrine. Although one might be tempted to dismiss this thesis
at the outset by reasoning that peace operations need not have any relation to military
doctrine since these operations are not military campaigns, that perspective is not shared
by the U.S. military, whose doctrine points out that forces employed in peace enforcement
operations "conduct many of the same missions as they would in war," and that,

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[1] Gerard D. Roncolato, "Military Theory and Peace Enforcement Operations," Essays on Strategy XII, ed.
John N. Petrie (Washington: National Defense UP, 1994) 327.

[2] United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: United
Nations Department of Public Information, 1996) 167.

[3] This view is supported by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) which has stated that the
number and scope of UN operations has increased in the 1990s. See F.T. Liu, "United Nations Peace-
keeping: Resurgence, Retrenchment and Reflection," UNIDIR Newsletter, 39 (1998): 42-43. This is not
to say that traditional peacekeeping missions are no longer carried out. Indeed, the UN Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) which commenced in July 2000 is an example of just such a traditional
peacekeeping mission.

"executing combat missions is an important part of unit training in preparation for a PEO [peace enforcement operation]."[4]

The paper will begin by more properly differentiating between the two broad categories of peace operations: traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The discussion will then turn to the mechanics of the UN, and why UN operations have evolved towards peace enforcement. The basic argument as to why military doctrine and UN peace enforcement considerations are generally, though not fatally, irreconcilable, will then be introduced. Basic warfighting doctrine will next be presented, and this will be contrasted with the actuality of a 1990s UN peace enforcement operation. Next, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) doctrine and peace operations doctrine will be examined. It will be shown, once again with reference to a specific 1990s UN peace enforcement operation, that even this purpose-built military doctrine proved incompatible with the complications of intrastate interventions under the auspices of the UN. Finally, the paper will discuss to what extent the identified dichotomy is addressed by the recent Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, commonly known as the Brahimi Report.[5]

Although this paper has peace enforcement as its topic, the UN does not actually list enforcement as one of its peace operations. Its four principal activities, as detailed in the Brahimi report, are: conflict prevention (low-profile diplomatic activity); peacemaking (halting conflicts in progress by diplomacy and mediation); peacekeeping (to be defined below); and peace-building (post-conflict activity to rebuild society).[6] As well, the UN Charter is silent on humanitarian intervention. And yet, as will be shown, the UN does conduct interventions in intrastate conflicts to enforce UN Security Council mandates designed to protect civilians put at risk by these conflicts. Chapter VII of the Charter is the vehicle that the UN uses to authorize intervention in these situations, arguing that they constitute a threat to "international peace and security."[7] (This is not just a specious argument – massive refugee flows into neighbouring countries do affect the security of those countries.) Though, as will be discussed later in the paper, the UN increasingly eschews this type of operation, the Security Council ruled in 2000 that "the targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations afflicted by war may themselves constitute threats to international peace and security and thus be triggers for Security Council action."[8] Therefore, the UN can and

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[4] Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations,</u> (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), 12 February 1999) IV-6.

[5] United Nations, <u>Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,</u> (New York, 2000), hereinafter referred to as the 'Brahimi Report'. The panel was formed to perform a comprehensive review of peace operations and develop recommendations on how better to carry out these operations in the future. The report derives its unofficial title from the Panel's chairman, Mr Lakhdar Brahimi.

[6] Brahimi Report, para 10-13. (Due to the various formats in which this report is available, references will be to paragraph numbers rather than page numbers.) The term 'peace enforcement' is not even listed in the UN's on-line glossary.

[7] Wording from the 1945 Charter of the United Nations. See, for example, the resolution that first authorized the formation of the UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia, Security Council Resolution (SCR) 743 (1992), which states "concerned that the situation in Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security…"

[8] Brahimi Report para 50, citing SCR 1296 (2000).

does engage in enforcement operations, and the two peace operations that will be examined did have elements of enforcement that were clearly outside the realm of the principal UN activities discussed above, and thus they are appropriate for illustrative purposes. These qualifying elements will be discussed when the cases are introduced.

Traditional Versus Modern-Day Peace Operations

Classical, or traditional, peacekeeping has typically involved "the employment of an international military contingent under UN control in order to help belligerents maintain a ceasefire."[9] These missions have usually been interposed between warring countries at their request, where a peace or ceasefire agreement exists, and carried out "in 'permissive environments' where the host country has been in de facto control of its territory ...and has lent continuous support to UN operations."[10] As indicated above, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) best exemplifies this traditional peacekeeping model.

Modern day UN operations, however, typically involve intrastate conflicts where UN forces are unilaterally inserted into the country without the consent, and often over the objections, of some or all parties to a dispute. This has been termed "peace enforcement" by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and is defined as "The application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."[11]

Why Things Have Changed

The changing nature of peace operations is not necessarily solely because the world has become much more violent, but also because the dynamics of the UN Security Council relationships have changed in response to changes in the relationship between the two Cold War superpowers. Traditional peacekeeping "evolved as a non-coercive instrument of conflict control at a time when Cold War constraints prevented the Security Council from taking more forceful steps permitted by the charter."[12] The removal of these constraints has allowed for more coercive, interventionist activity.

In accordance with the UN Charter, although the UN General Assembly (representing all member countries) may recommend actions regarding disputes, they must forward these recommendations to the UN Security Council, as the Security Council is the authorizing body for such actions. This is regardless of whether the action is to be taken under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter. (Very generally, mandates for

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[9] Donald Daniel, "Wandering Out of the Void? Conceptualizing Practicable Peace Enforcement," Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution, eds. Alex Morrison, Douglas A. Fraser and James D. Kiras (Cornwallis Park: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997) 5.

[10] Mats R. Berdal, "Whither UN Peacekeeping?" Adelphi Paper 281 (London: Brassey's (UK) for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993) 10.

[11] Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, (Washington: U.S. DOD), from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html, updated 19 Dec 01.

[12] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs, Winter 92/93: 89.

traditional peacekeeping operations fall under Chapter VI of the Charter, while Chapter VII authorizes more forceful coercion or enforcement action in the absence of compliance with Security Council resolutions.)[13] The Security Council is comprised of five permanent members – United States, Russia (originally the Soviet Union), China, United Kingdom, and France – and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. Decisions of the Security Council on peacekeeping matters must have the concurrence of nine of the fifteen members and, more specifically, the concurrence of the five permanent members, meaning that each of the five permanent member nations has a veto over proposed actions.[14] The ideological struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union carried over to the Security Council and shaped the nature of UN actions throughout the Cold War.

During the Cold War the two superpowers were extremely averse to allowing the UN the ability to influence events in countries that they considered to be within their spheres of influence, and used their veto to preclude this.

> "[The] lack of cooperation, demonstrated by the extensive use
> of the veto, amongst the key decision makers during the Cold
> War prevented the Security Council from carrying out some of
> its major functions – particularly those that required a Chapter
> VII mandate."[15]

This was especially true of the Soviet Union, which perceived the UN as serving mainly western interests. Exactly half of the 242 vetoes cast by Security Council members between 1946 and 1986 were cast by the Soviet Union (the U.S. had the second highest total – 57).[16] Agreement was usually possible only when neither superpower had any overwhelming vested interest in the area or when UN action would serve to preclude the possibility of the two superpowers themselves directly confronting each other.[17] However, with the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, and the thawing of relations between the U.S. and Russia, increased cooperation on the world stage, exemplified by increased UN peace enforcement activity, became a reality.

Another reason for the increase in UN peace enforcement operations (in contrast to peacekeeping operations) is that "a perception is growing in the world that individual

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[13] Chapter VI, comprised of Articles 33 to 38, is entitled, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." Chapter VII, Articles 39 to 51, is entitled, "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." (Sanctions and embargoes are the most commonly authorized chapter VII actions.)

[14] The Secretary-General has no decision making or veto authority (with respect to Security Council resolutions), but must rely on moral suasion. According to the Charter, the Secretary-General is the "chief administrative officer of the Organization."

[15] Stephen M. Hill and Shanin P. Malik, Peacekeeping and the United Nations (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1996) 13.

[16] During this same period, China cast 22 vetoes, France 16 and the U.K. 26. N.D. White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Manchester UP, 1993) 12, cited in Hill & Malik 13.

[17] William J. Durch and Barry M. Bleechman, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order (Washington: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1992) 10.

rights surmount those of states."[18] The "human security" agenda has been championed by the UN and various governments as a rationale for increased intervention in what heretofore were considered sovereign affairs.[19] Certainly Boutros Boutros-Ghali the UN Secretary General from 1992 to 1996, believed in this agenda, and not in unassailable sovereignty, and so may have had some influence on the increasing number of interventionist missions.

> "While respect for the fundamental sovereignty and integrity of
> the state remains central, it is undeniable that the centuries-old
> doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands,
> and was in fact never so absolute as it was conceived to
> be....And underlying the rights of the individual and the rights of
> peoples is a dimension of universal sovereignty that resides in
> all humanity and pr10 07112 4360 00 12 224.3927 5229.543.(The "hum)Tj712 200 12 224.

"It becomes clear that policy sets the goal for the use of military force...policy also determines the level of effort to be expended in attaining that goal. In other words, war must be subservient to policy...with respect to objectives, means, and resources."[24]

This however, entails a corollary obligation on the part of the political leadership to recognize the tenets of military operations and to accommodate these as best they can when tasking the military. This is a well recognized and accepted dynamic within individual western-style democracies. A problem arises though, when a multinational coalition, representing widely disparate political philosophies and interests, decides to employ a military force; the corollary obligation dynamic is watered down or disregarded in the interests of unanimity.

As an illustration of this line of argument, when one country unilaterally sends in its armed forces to enforce peace on a region in which it has a vested interest, it also has a vested interest in seeing a clear resolution to the conflict, and so at least the objectives and the means will be clearly articulated and focused, and the required resources will usually be made available. However, when the UN sends in a force, each contributing country does not necessarily have the same interests and ideals at stake; those interests may extend only as far as "showing the flag" with a token force and ensuring that those forces are provided adequate force protection. Additionally, the means and ends that are eventually articulated (in the form of Security Council resolutions) may be watered down in the process of appeasing the sensibilities and interests of each of the Security Council members, especially those with a veto. The UN, itself, has admitted that compromises to mandates are required in order to gain consensus of member nations.[25] A diffused mandate can lead to an even wider gulf between what the political sphere deems permissible and what the military sphere deems doctrinally sound.

Warfighting Doctrine I – Mandate, Objectives, End-State

According to Sir Roger Palin, former commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2nd Tactical Air Force, "For the military commander the important issues are the clarity of the mandate and the operational guidance it gives, and the achievability of the objectives set."[26] He further states that, "commanders at all levels must have a common understanding of the criteria or conditions that constitute military success."[27] These criteria are also known as the military end-state. All the above matters are key tenets of warfighting doctrine.

A clear mandate from the UN enables the assigned military commander to set achievable objectives for his forces. It is patently obvious that an ill-defined mandate will make it problematic for the commander to do so. The Brahimi report acknowledges that,

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[24] Roncolato 334.

[25] Brahimi Report, para 56.

[26] Roger H. Palin, "Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects," Adelphi Paper 294 (London: Brassey's (UK) for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995) 31-32.

[27] Canadian Forces, Canadian Forces Operations, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, 2000-10-02, 3-2.

in regard to clarity of mandate, the "compromises required to build consensus [among member nations] can be made at the expense of specificity, and the resulting ambiguity can have serious consequences in the field if the mandate is then subject to varying interpretations..."[28]

The mandate must also be well crafted and broad enough so that it does not need constant updating or changing in the face of circumstances that could reasonably have been foreseen.[29] A mission's mandate can (and sometimes must) change in response to changing circumstances in-theatre, but these changes should be kept to a minimum and should be accompanied by revised force levels, authorizations, rules of engagement (ROE) and so forth.

As regards military end-state, Shawn McCormick, deputy director for African studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, points out that,

"a plan to withdraw military forces must be carefully crafted around an end date or event (such as a passing of the torch to another force or to a newly constituted government); otherwise the tendency exists to perpetuate a mission beyond its original goals. UNOSOM I was so crafted; UNOSOM II was not. Without an end date or milestones to judge progress, many Somalis began to see the UN as a new colonial master."[30]

Although McCormick was speaking of one specific situation, this caution applies to all UN peace operations. One final point should be made regarding end-states. The end-state must be achievable within the means made available to the UN by member nations. If it is not, then although it seems doctrinally backward, the UN must as a practical reality adjust the ends to the available means. These ideals – clear mandate, unchanging mandate, achievable objectives, and defined end-state – will now be contrasted with conditions actually present during a past peace operation.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was establish on 5 October 1993 by Security Council Resolution (SCR) 872 in the wake of the Arusha peace agreement between the Rwandan government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels, with a mandate to:

"contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, *inter alia*, within a weapons secure area established by the parties in and around the city; monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional government's mandate, leading up to the

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[28] Brahimi Report, para 56.

[29] As a particularly egregious example of an ever-changing mandate, the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia received at least 15 changes or "enhancements" to its mandate in approximately 18 months. Source: Adelphi Paper 281, 31.

[30] Shawn H. McCormick, "The Lessons of Intervention in Africa," Current History, April 1995: 163.

elections; assist with mine clearance; investigate non-compliance with the peace agreement; monitor repatriation of Rwandese refugees; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities."[31]

Although UNAMIR was not initially mandated as a peace enforcement operation, it became one with the passage of SCR 918 on 17 May 1994, which gave the so-called UNAMIR II mission authorization to use force against "persons or groups who threaten protected sites and [civilian] populations." Even prior to 17 May, MGen Dallaire, the UNAMIR commander, interpreted the mandate as having enforcement elements:

> "Dallaire told [UN headquarters] New York he could accomplish the task [stop the ethnic cleansing] under the existing chapter six mandate, since he had included his paragraph seventeen in the ROE, allowing UNAMIR to intervene with lethal force when human rights were threatened."[32]

According to SCR 872, the original UNAMIR mandate was to end once a democratically elected government was installed (scheduled to occur in October 1995). This then, was a reasonably clear mandate, from which a set of seemingly achievable military objectives could be inferred, and a well-defined end-state. From that point however, events began to unravel and conditions continued to change so frequently that there was no hope of maintaining the original mandate, or even the subsequent mandates, nor of being able to clearly articulate what the military end-state had become.[33]

Two weeks after the genocide had begun the UN issued SCR 912, which "adjusted" the mandate of UNAMIR to acting as an intermediary between the warring factions to try to secure a cease-fire, assisting in the resumption of humanitarian aid, and monitoring the safety and security of Rwandan citizens.[34] This was more than an adjustment, this was a significant reduction in the mandate. At that time, UNAMIR was also "ordered to be prepared for a complete pullout."[35] Less than one month later, the UN reversed itself and issued SCR 918 which expanded the UNAMIR mandate to include contributing to the protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk, and providing security for the distribution of humanitarian aid.[36] Later that year SCR 965 once again expanded the UNAMIR mandate.[37] This amounted to four different mandates in less than 14 months. Although this was a result of the changing situation on the ground, the point can be made that warfighting operations are even more fluid than the

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[31] SCR 872, 5 Oct 1993.
[32] Carol Off, The Lion, the Fox & the Eagle (Random House Canada, 2000) 58.
[33] Approximately 800,000 Rwandans were slaughtered over a 100-day period commencing 6 April 1994. The majority of the genocide was carried out by Rwandan Hutus and directed at ethnic Tutsis (and some moderate Hutus).
[34] SCR 912, 21 April 1994.
[35] Off, 59.
[36] SCR 918, 17 May 1994.
[37] SCR 965, 30 November 1994.

Rwandan example, but generally require just one initial mandate. During UNAMIR, the successive mandates led to the military end-state becoming decidedly blurred. As indicated in a previous paragraph, these mandate changes might have been acceptable had they been accompanied by changes in other appropriate areas such as force levels or ROE; this was not the case, however. Further, these mandate changes might have been less burdensome and of more efficacy had they been timelier. The crucial mandate that gave enforcement authority to UNAMIR (SCR 918) was issued a full six weeks after the genocide began.[38] The additional troops began arriving after a further six weeks. By way of contrast, NATO commenced Operation Allied Force just five days after the Belgrade delegation walked away from the Rambouillet peace talks and four days after the commencement of a major offensive by Serbian troops into Kosovo; the first bombs fell on Serbia 10 days later.[39]

Warfighting Doctrine II – Sufficient Troops and Authority

Another key tenet of warfighting doctrine is ensuring a sufficient "troops-to-task" ratio.[40] As stated in Canadian military doctrine, "...the structure of the peacekeeping force must enable it to realistically enforce the mission's mandate."[41] Indeed, the UN itself has stated that "until the Secretary-General is able to obtain solid commitments from Member States for the forces that he or she does believe necessary to carry out an operation, it should not go forward at all."[42] Yet often, missions are initiated with known manpower deficiencies in order to be seen to be doing something.

Sufficient troops were not available for UNAMIR. Earlier, the term "seemingly achievable objectives" was used. The original objectives would have been achievable, but only with sufficient troops. Although MGen Dallaire, the commander of UNAMIR, had estimated that 4,500 troops would be required to carry out the original mandate, the SCR 872 authorized strength was 2,548 military personnel.[43] Even this troop strength was not achieved until March 1994, nearly six months after the first deployment, whereupon it was quickly reduced less than one month later with the departure of the Belgians after the murder of ten of their soldiers.[44] In recognition of the reality of member state refusal to commit adequate troops, the aforementioned SCR 912 reduced

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[38] The UN and contributing nations claim, by way of explanation for the delay, that they did not have the complete picture for some time.

[39] Department of Defense Report to Congress, <u>Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report</u>, 31 January 2000, A-7.

[40] Palin, 32.

[41] Canadian Forces Operations, 10-12.

[42] Brahimi Report, para 60.

[43] MGen Dallaire, during his initial reconnaissance mission to Rwanda in October 1993, had estimated that 4,500 troops would be required to do the job. However, the UN Secretariat doubted that the Security Council would support that number of troops, and so the number the Secretary-General requested was pared down to 2,548 bodies; the mandate remained unchanged. Source: Ingvar Carlsson, chair, <u>Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda</u>, 15 December 1999, sect. III, conclusion 2. (There is no pagination in this document.)

[44] MGen Romeo Dallaire and Capt Bruce Poulin, "Rwanda: From Peace Agreement to Genocide," <u>Canadian Defence Quarterly</u>, March 1995: 8-9.

authorized troop levels to just 270.[45] Although Dallaire managed to keep 503 troops,[46] this number was still woefully inadequate even to deal with the reduced mandate, and Dallaire lamented UNAMIR's "inability to do anything about the massacres and the on-going fighting..."[47]

The final tenet of warfighting doctrine to be discussed is ensuring that the military commander has sufficient authority to make required on-scene decisions – NATO's "freedom of action" fundamental.[48] In many instances, although possessing adequate troops, on-scene military commanders have not been given sufficient authority to accomplish those things they deemed necessary. The reluctance of the UN to empower on-scene military commanders can be understood if one thinks of the example of the "strategic corporal," whose poorly aimed or planned rifle bullet can have strategic consequences far beyond a single death. Looking at it from the UN's point of view, a commander has a much larger opportunity to negatively influence the strategic situation and may not have a sufficient awareness of strategic political considerations. Over-zealous action on the part of a commander raises the possibility of wide-ranging effects such as causing one of the belligerents to believe the UN is taking sides (thus complicating the UN mission) or, more seriously, causing a contributing nation to withdraw its troops or a permanent member of the Security Council to veto further action.

So, although at times Dallaire had sufficient UNAMIR troops necessary for certain desirable, militarily sound actions, he lacked sufficient authority to carry out these actions. For instance, Dallaire lacked sufficient on-scene authority to seize a known arms cache that he suspected was to be used to kill Tutsi civilians. Even his specific request for such authority, in January 1994, was denied by UN headquarters.[49] In a recommendation from the inquiry into the Rwandan genocide, the authors made a comment that applies as much to adequate authority as it does to adequate mandate:

> "Mandates must be made robust enough already from the beginning of a mission. They should also be flexible enough to allow the Force Commander the lee-way to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground."[50]

One might still be tempted to argue that, since the above case was not an example of warfighting, warfighting doctrine need not apply. So this paper will now examine MOOTW and peace operations doctrine, to determine whether peace operations allow for the application of this doctrine. MOOTW are defined as those operations "that focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises."[51]

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[45] The Blue Helmets, 729.
[46] Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide," Atlantic Monthly, 288.2 (2001): 99.
[47] Dallaire and Poulin, 10.
[48] Canadian Forces, The Strategic Framework for the CF, B-GG-005-001/AF-000 (Draft), Dec 99, 2-5.
[49] Off, 42-43.
[50] Carlsson, sect. IV, recommendation 2.
[51] Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War Publication (Washington: U.S. DOD), 16 June 1995, I-1.

Military Operations Other Than War and Peace Operations

Selected key principles and fundamentals of MOOTW and peace operations, as described in U.S. military doctrine, are listed in Table 1.

PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTALS OF MOOTW and PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
UNITY OF EFFORT
Seek unity of effort in every operation.
SECURITY
Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage.
COERCION
Methods of coercion may be the rule rather than the exception for peace enforcement forces and operations.
FORCE
Peace enforcement forces may have to fight their way into the conflict area and use force to separate the combatants physically.
OFFENSIVE ACTIONS
If the threat of force fails, the peace enforcement force may have to engage in offensive operations.

Table 1. Selected Principles and Fundamentals of MOOTW and Peace Operations[52]

To illustrate the incompatibility of this doctrine with UN peace operations, the case of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be used. It is an appropriate example to use, since it was certainly a MOOTW as described by U.S. military doctrine, and, although it was referred to as a peacekeeping operation by the UN, it involved many elements of peace enforcement.[53]

This paper will not provide a full description or chronology of events of UNPROFOR – from its formation in 1992, to the massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, under its nominal protection in Srebrenica, by ethnic Serbian forces in July 1995. These are provided in a comprehensive report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly, issued in November 1999.[54] Instead, this paper will simply use selected incidents from this report, and others, to illustrate the thesis. To briefly set the stage though, UNPROFOR was formed in February 1992, by the terms of SCR 743, to oversee implementation of the Vance plan. This plan dealt with the disposition of the

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[52] Adapted from JP 3-07, figure II-1, p II-2 and JP 3-07.3, p III-2 and III-3.

[53] For examples, SCR 836 (1993) authorized the use of force in the event of obstruction of UN troops or humanitarian convoys; and air strikes were authorized against targets other than those required for immediate self-defence (i.e. artillery command facility, ammunition bunkers). (For source, see page 36 and 48 of next citation.)

[54] United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998): The Fall of Srebrenica (New York, 15 November 1999).

breakaway Yugoslav republic of Croatia. UNPROFOR was based in the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but initially had almost no mandate within that republic. By the time of its disbandment in December 1995 however, UNPROFOR had become heavily involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly with respect to the protection of six 'safe areas' for Bosnian Muslim civilians. In the end, UNPROFOR was unable to protect citizens in the safe areas, owing to an unclear, overly ambitious mandate combined with woefully insufficient troops, and approximately 20,000 people were eventually killed.[55] The most grievous failure of the UN mission occurred at Srebrenica, where up to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were killed by Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces.[56]

Unity of effort, the first principle listed at Table 1, was certainly not displayed in the UNPROFOR operation. The various players in the drama, the Security Council members, the Secretary-General, the Special Representative to the Secretary-General, the UNPROFOR commander, the Theatre Force Commander, and even the UN High Commissioner for Refugees had different views as to the best mandate for UNPROFOR. Even when working within a given Security Council mandate, these parties had differing interpretations of that mandate. To further complicate matters, the views of some of the above parties, as to the best role for UNPROFOR, sometimes changed over the three years in questions, depending on perceived progress.[57]

What made this disunity particularly harmful was the fact that the Serb commanders and political leaders dealt with the different players at different times, and thus were sometimes aware of this disunity and could use this knowledge to their advantage. Some of these differences of opinion existed because of the military-political ideological divide mentioned earlier, some were due to the various national sensibilities or to a lack of accurate information, while others (especially in the case of the Secretary-

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[55] Srebrenica Report, 6.

[56] BBC news web page http://news.bbc.co.uk, Europe page, accessed 18 April 2002.

[57] This is a thread running throughout the Srebrenica Report. As a first example, although UNPROFOR had been in existence for three months, the Secretary-General reported in May 1992 that conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina were "not the conditions which permit a United Nations peacekeeping operation to make an effective contribution," but reversed himself one month later when he recommended enlarging the mandate and strength of the operation (Srebrenica Report, 11). Further, though the UNPROFOR commander opposed the idea of a safe area without a prior agreement by the belligerents, the Security Council designated Srebrenica as a safe area in SCR 819 anyway, despite the absence of any agreement, and the secretariat (representing the Secretary-General) further muddied the waters by telling the UNPROFOR commander that the resolution "created no military obligations for UNPROFOR to establish or protect such a safe area." (This, despite the fact that the wording of paragraph 9 of the resolution says that the Security Council "Urges the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to use all the resources at their disposal within the scope of the relevant resolutions of the Council to reinforce the existing humanitarian operations... in particular [in] Srebrenica and its surroundings.") (Srebrenica Report, 20). As a final example (though there are more described in the report), although the Security Council's Special Political Advisor recommended against designating additional safe areas without the addition to UNPROFOR of a minimum of one brigade per additional town, the Security Council named 5 additional safe areas and authorized only an additional 50 *unarmed* observers for the entire mission (Srebrenica Report, 21-22.)

General) were due to a concern with not setting precedents or damaging UN credibility and jeopardizing future UN peace operations.[58]

Regarding the next principle – security – the dictum of never permitting hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage accomplishes four things. It ensures that one's own forces are protected, enhances legitimacy and impartiality of the force, maintains international credibility, and ensures freedom of action throughout the area of operations.[59] However, during many specific instances and generally, overall, the BSA held the upper hand. During numerous instances they took UN soldiers hostage, shelled and overran UN observation posts, shot down UN-tasked aircraft, and encroached on the safe areas in violation of the SCRs. They accomplished all this with near impunity. Not only did their actions escape retribution by UNPROFOR, these actions (hostage-taking, for example) were used to coerce the UN to call off air strikes.[60] The UN's yielding to BSA coercion allowed the BSA leadership to continue to push their offensive. For example, after the passage of SCR 836 in 1993 which, *inter alia,* authorized air strikes:

> "the Bosnian Serbs continued to bombard the safe areas at
> about the same rate as before. In Sarajevo, for example, Serb
> shells continued to land in the safe area at an average rate of
> approximately 1,000 per day...This pattern, which had begun on
> 6 April 1992, continued, with lulls of varying lengths, until
> Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995."[61]

The use of coercion, force, and offensive action must always be one option when trying to protect populations from belligerents committing war crimes and disregarding the dictates of the international community or the presence of UN troops. Although there were instances of the use of force in UNPROFOR's history – periodic air strikes, shelling of BSA positions, (and in probably the most aggressive action) French troops retaking Sarajevo's Vrbanja bridge from the BSA in May 1995 – these instances were few and far between, and always fell short of accomplishing the aim (i.e. the UN mandate). This was certainly not due to a lack of bravery on the part of the UNPROFOR troops. These troops were faced with overwhelming odds and could not effectively employ force; to have done so would have been suicidal. For example, the Dutch soldiers deployed at Srebrenica numbered 600, with only 300 of these being infantry soldiers. In contrast, the BSA

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[58] For a good account of the positions of the Security Council members during 1993, see Srebrenica Report, 24-26. For the Secretary-General's concerns, see Srebrenica Report, paragraphs 26, 27, 66, 67, 130, 151, 168, and 171-173.

[59] Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations (Fort Monroe: U.S. DOD, 1995) 8.

[60] See Srebrenica Report paragraphs 138, 186, 190, 191, and 306 for instances of BSA troops having or gaining the upper hand. As a further example of the BSA having the upper hand, during their takeover of Srebrenica in July 1995, they forced UNPROFOR troops to surrender and turn over their weapons on at least four occasions (Srebrenica Report, paragraphs 254, 255, 265 and 272).

[61] Srebrenica Report, 26-27.

surrounding the enclave numbered 1,000 to 2,000, and possessed tanks and heavy artillery.[62]

The incidents and conditions described above would likely not have happened during a U.S. or NATO-led effort.   Those entities would not knowingly place their soldiers in a position where they were outnumbered, outgunned, or subject to hostage taking, even in a MOOTW. It is again pointed out that UN troops found themselves in such situations because the member states were not forthcoming with military might owing to disagreement or incomplete agreement with Security Council mandates, or to funding or manpower constraints. These situations do not tend to arise in military coalitions, not just because the U.S. usually leads, but because these coalitions are usually smaller, are more likely to have a common focus (in fact, a coalition would not undertake an operation without such a focus) and thus have unity of purpose. Further, being military entities, they understand the proper times and methods for the application of power, and also its limitations. True, they too are ultimately controlled by politicians, but they are politicians united in purpose.

Retrenchment

The Brahimi report states that:

> "…the desire on the part of the Secretary-General to extend
> additional protection to civilians in armed conflicts and the
> actions of the Security Council to give United Nations
> peacekeepers explicit authority to protect civilians in conflict
> situations are positive developments. Indeed, peacekeepers –
> troops or police – who witness violence against civilians should
> be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in
> support of basic United Nations principles…."[63]

Notwithstanding this sentiment, the UN has actually pulled back in recent years. The UN Institute for Disarmament Research points out the roots of this retrenchment:

> "Drawing lessons from the experiences in Somalia and Bosnia,
> Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recommended in January 1995
> that UNPKOs [UN peacekeeping operations] should adhere
> strictly to the traditional principles of consent, impartiality and
> the non-use of force except in clear cases of self-defence and
> should not blur the distinction between peace-keeping and peace
> enforcement. If enforcement operations were required, he
> added, the Security Council should delegate the responsibility
> for organizing and leading such operations to a Member State or
> a group of Member States."[64]

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[62] Srebrenica Report, 55.
[63] Brahimi Report, para 62.
[64] Liu, 44.

In fact, this is what has been done since 1996. In the wake of the Dayton peace agreement, UNPROFOR's mandate was assumed by the NATO-led Implementation Force. Three of the four enforcement operations since 1996 were led, or are being led, by non-UN entities. NATO led the effort against the Serbs in Kosovo, Australia led the multinational force in East Timor, and the U.S. is currently leading the effort against the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. (The UN Mission in Sierra Leone is the exception to this trend.)

This does not eliminate the dichotomy between peace enforcement operations and military doctrine, but it is a convenient 'workaround.' It ensures that enforcement operations will be carried out by organizations and forces with more of a military doctrinal focus and with more freedom of action to perform the necessary tasks than the UN. However, it is not a definitive solution. (In fact, this paper has argued that there is no definitive solution to this problem.) There may come a time when the UN will wish (or be obliged) to mount another enforcement operation to intervene in a country's internal affairs. To that end, the Brahimi report has recommended that:

> "Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to
> carry out their mandate professionally and successfully. This
> means that United Nations military units must be capable of
> defending themselves, other mission components and the
> mission's mandate. Rules of engagement should not limit
> contingents to stroke-for-stroke responses but should allow
> ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire that is
> directed at United Nations troops or at the people they are
> charged to protect and in particularly dangerous situations,
> should not force United Nations contingents to cede the
> initiative to their attackers."[65]

and

> "…mandates should specify an operation's authority to use
> force. Bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able
> to pose a credible deterrent threat, in contrast to the symbolic
> and non-threatening presence that characterizes traditional
> peacekeeping."[66]

These are excellent recommendations, but so far they are just ideas. Proposals also exist to increase the strategic planning and policy development capability of the UN Department of Peacekeeping and to strengthen that department's Situation Centre in an effort to increase the speed and scope of information collection and dissemination during ongoing operations. A shadow deployable headquarters is being formed that will see approximately 100 military personnel available for deployment as a discrete unit on

seven-day's notice.[67] These are positive steps that will enhance a military mission's ability to accomplish its mandate.

The seemingly most promising initiative has been the formation of the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which consists of high readiness troops (on 15 to 30 day notice-to-move) notionally committed by various nations for employment in crisis situations. However, this arrangement has two large shortcomings. SHIRBRIG is, constitutionally, available for Chapter VI operations only, not enforcement operations. Secondly, even though nations may have committed troops to SHIRBRIG, they are free to withhold those troops if a proposed mission does not fit within national policy.[68] Thus, this initiative will not eliminate the irreconcilable problem of insufficient troops being available for given missions or mandates. Despite the ideas and initiatives described above, the complexities and limitations of Security Council deliberations and of troop-contributing nations' considerations will continue to prevail.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show that the complexities of the UN organization do not allow for rigorous application of the strict military doctrine required for peace enforcement operations. It is illustrative of the lack of attention shown to this dichotomy that the UN does not even list peace enforcement as one of its activities, and yet, as was shown, the UN does undertake enforcement activities. These activities increased through the 1990s as Cold War tensions among Security Council members abated.

The requirements for an effective and ideal military operation are a well-crafted mandate, a clearly articulated end-state, sufficient authority for the on-scene commander, and adequate troop levels for the task at hand. These are no different than the requirements for peace enforcement operations. However, the Security Council decisions required to ensure a broad and robust mandate are not capable of being made in an environment where there are such widely differing political viewpoints and interests. As has been discussed, without such a broad and robust mandate, changes are inevitable and these changes affect the ability of the force commander to focus his efforts on the end-state, or even to know what the military end-state has become. The reasons for the UN's reluctance to empower on-scene commanders have been postulated, but even if correct, the explanation does nothing to alleviate the situation. The differences of outlook and interest manifest when developing the mandate are carried over and affect the ability of the UN to raise troops from Security Council member countries and from non-Council member nations. This should (as the lesser of two "evils") result in the scaling back of the mandate to accord with the available troop numbers. What often happens however, due to international pressure driven by scenes of horrific suffering, is that missions are sent into untenable situations with inadequate troop levels.

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[67] UN Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (New York: United Nations General Assembly, 21 December 2001) 3-7.
[68] SHIRBRIG web-site, www.shirbrig.dk

Military doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War and for peace operations was developed in recognition that the full range of warfighting principles may not be applicable in peace enforcement operations. However, it was demonstrated that even these principles were not always capable of being brought to bear in UN peace enforcement operations.

After several sobering mission failures in the early 1990s, the UN has tended to devolve responsibility for hard-core enforcement operations to such entities as NATO and other military coalitions of a more focused viewpoint, that are able to bring military power more correctly and effectively to bear. The UN still does carry out some Chapter VII enforcement activities though, and with the aim of improving its performance in this area, continues to implement some reforms. As discussed, these initiatives will go some way towards mitigating the aforementioned deficiencies, but the political complexity of the UN organization will ensure that there will always be an irreconcilable gulf between what is politically possible and what is militarily sound.

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