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**CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLEGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES**

**CSC 27**

**EXERCICE / EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS**

**THE WAR ON DRUGS: HOW DOES THE CF MEASURE UP?**

**by**

**MAJOR WILLIAM M. SNEDDEN**

**19 APRIL 2001**

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*The United States has a material incentive as well as moral motive to stop the commerce in drugs across its borders. We have the moral authority to designate it as piracy, and we have the power to act on this designation. If we are at all serious about a “war on drugs,” let’s begin by taking appropriate military action.*

Irving Kristol<sup>i</sup>

*This wave of public support for military participation in the drug war is fed by the widespread belief that the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines will be able to do what the police haven’t: stop crack-dealing gangs in the U.S. and knock out the “drug lords” in Latin America. But, as some administration and Pentagon officials admit, a military victory in the drug war would be neither quick nor certain.*

Jo Ann Kawell<sup>ii</sup>

**INTRODUCTION**

In 1873, with the establishment of a new Canadian military unit – the North-West Mounted Rifles – the early descendants of the Canadian Forces entered into their first counter-drug missions.<sup>iii</sup> The Northwest Territories Act of 1875, which prohibited the use of alcohol seems simplistic compared to the realities of the illicit drug situation in present-day Canadian society. Alcohol has now been replaced by more socially prevalent drugs such as cocaine, cannabis, and a variety of basement pharmaceuticals, such as “ecstasy.”<sup>iv</sup> In recognition of the potentially destructive effects of drug use within society, the Canadian federal government has adopted a soft mandate of reducing the harm associated with drug and alcohol abuse. Canadian

law enforcement agencies (LEA) are tasked, as part of this mandate, to restrict access to these illicit drugs but find themselves ill-equipped or under-funded to accomplish these goals. As a result, these LEAs routinely look to the military to satisfy their resource shortfalls who have historically been willing participants. Counter-drug aerospace surveillance missions are already part of the Canadian Forces' ongoing commitment to NORAD,<sup>v</sup> and military naval vessels routinely contribute to counter-drug operations as part of their normal assigned maritime surveillance mission.<sup>vi</sup> Close cooperation between the RCMP and CF tactical helicopter units is exercised regularly and has clearly been defined as a typical "operations other than war" task of tactical aviation.<sup>vii</sup>

Canada is not alone in its use of domestic military forces to assist law enforcement in fighting "the war on drugs." The United States has a comprehensive drug-eradication programme that goes beyond their continental borders into neighbouring states of the Caribbean and Central America. The United States views the production, transport, and domestic consumption of illicit drugs to be a direct threat to their military, political, economic and even environmental security.<sup>viii</sup>

*International narcotics control rests upon the central premise – or pretense – that by helping foreign governments stamp out drugs abroad, the United States can avoid curbing its own demand for them at home.*

Jonathan Marshall – Drug Wars: Corruption,  
Counterinsurgency, and Covert Operations  
in the Third World<sup>ix</sup>

United States' foreign counter-drug operations are routinely conducted and financial incentives for select foreign governments are actively developed in order to staunch the flow of drugs at its source. Canada; however, does not resort to counter-drug interdiction within other foreign sovereign territories.

The popular term, “the war on drugs” implies that the problem requires a military solution and that it involves a distinct enemy with clearly defined goals, established doctrine, and articulated mission statement. The reality is not so clear. Canada’s drug problem ranges from the import of drugs across a largely undefended border, to the incessant violent control of drug profiteering by criminal organizations to low-level domestic production of drugs for personal consumption. Canadian public support is not unanimous for military style enforcement particularly when there is a growing demand for the decriminalization of “soft drugs”<sup>x</sup> akin to the removal of the prohibition on alcohol. These changing values complicate the participation of the Canadian Forces in counter-narcotics.

Canada’s federal drug strategy is articulate in the methodology for achieving federal anti-drug goals.<sup>xi</sup> It is a strategy that focuses primarily upon socially palatable, and largely successful, methods of illicit drug control through education and treatment.<sup>xii</sup> Regardless, current federal guidance effecting legislation, enforcement, and control of illegal drugs in Canada will mean that the Canadian Forces will continue to be a key participant in the war on drugs as well as an active partner in elements of national and international drug eradication coordination and cooperation. As military resources dwindle as a result of government fiscal constraints, the Canadian Forces will, of necessity, be forced to limit its participation to those counter-drug tasks where success can be accomplished using existing military skill sets without creating a deficit in other critical areas.

Canada’s federal drug policy provides the vision from which the Department of National Defence (DND) has derived a counter-drug mandate and progressively developed the Canadian Forces’ comprehensive counter-drug policy and doctrine. DND regularly assesses the results derived from its participation in counter-drug tasks.<sup>xiii</sup> This is a narrow measurement of results

achieved but to effectively measure how well the Canadian Forces ultimately fulfills its counter-drug task it is essential that a basic assessment system be developed. This assessment system should subjectively measure the effectiveness of the Canadian Forces' employment within the federal drug strategy, but, more importantly, should also assess the impact that providing this support has upon the combat readiness of the Canadian Forces. This methodology will lead to distinct recommendations for improvements in successful mission accomplishments while maintaining or improving training benefits for the military units involved. This assessment will show that currently, the Canadian Forces are very successful in accomplishing their Canadian counter-drug mission.

## **CANADA'S FEDERAL DRUG POLICY**

To develop an assessment system for CF counter-drug operations, it is essential to understand the current federal drug strategy. Canada's federal drug strategy published in 1998 identifies that a balance must be struck between stopping the supply of illicit drugs and reducing drug demand within Canada. The government's long-term goal "is to reduce the harm associated with alcohol and other drugs to individuals, families, and communities."<sup>xiv</sup> This broad, long-term goal is to be accomplished through the achievement of several sub-goals. One of these sub-goals is particularly suitable for military participation - restricting the supply of illicit drugs and reducing the profitability of illicit drug trafficking.<sup>xv</sup> The CF can provide many unique capabilities in restricting the flow of illicit drugs and will be examined later.

Three key objectives fall out of this specific sub-goal: the reduction of the illegal importation of illicit drugs; the reduction of the reported availability of illicit drugs at the street level; and the reduction of the ability of persons involved in the supply and trafficking of drugs

to make use of the profits from their illegal actions.<sup>xvi</sup> According to *Canada's Drug Strategy*, LEAs are responsible for the enforcement of the *1997 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act* - an act which contains no reference to the participation of CF assets. As a result, the CF contribution to counter-drug operations occurs largely through direct requests by these LEAs or through the mandated activities through the CF partnership in NORAD. The CF is not committed to a specific level of support and requests are examined on a case-by-case basis although some military guidance subsequently flows from the federal government's vision.

With the federal government's drug strategy defined, the examination must now extend to the DND's interpretation of this guidance. The *1994 White Paper on Defence* provides further, albeit limited, guidance for CF counter-drug activities. Chapter 4 – *Protection of Canada* demonstrates that the CF is only an assisting agency to other governmental departments and does not possess an initiating role.<sup>xvii</sup> It does identify the NORAD surveillance mission as an ancillary task that is governed by the 1991 NORAD Agreement.<sup>xviii</sup>

From the White Paper comes the *Defence Planning Guidance (DPG)* which is published annually by National Defence Headquarters as a planning and resource allocation tool. *DPG 2001* tasks the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff with providing support to government for assistance in drug interdiction.<sup>xix</sup> While methodology at this stage is vague, assistance is the operative word here.

A review of the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff's (VCDS) *Canadian Joint Task List VI.3* identifies counter-drug tasks at the strategic and the tactical level.<sup>xx</sup> These tasks include providing advice, support, and coordination for joint and combined counter-drug missions. These tasks place the Canadian Forces in a strong supporting role in pursuing Canada's federal drug strategy.

## THE DRUG PROCESS AND THE CF

Before an analysis of the Canadian Forces' effectiveness in the war on drugs is conducted, it is important to briefly discuss the illicit drug process and what the Canadian Forces has historically contributed. The process begins, and ends, with the demands of the user, which necessitates the supply of illicit drugs.

Tasks, which are typically conducted by the CF in direct support of other government departments, include:

- a. provision of intelligence, geomatics, and imagery;
- b. planning coordination and direction of CF contributions;
- c. aerial surveillance and interception through normal NORAD operations;
- d. small patrol insertions of LEA officers by tactical helicopter; and
- e. interdiction within territorial waters by naval vessels conducting normal maritime tasks.




Figure 1 – The Drug Process and Spectrum of CF Involvement

Figure 1 graphically presents the drug process with essentially five major stages. Superimposed upon this process are the areas where the CF contributes manpower and



equipment resources through requests by OGDs – either through Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or other formal agreements. Reducing user demand and consumption is beyond the scope of CF involvement and will not be discussed further.

**Production at source** – A large portion of the drugs used in Canada is produced outside her borders. As of 1983, the Colombian “Cali” cartel controlled up to 80% of the world’s cocaine production and distribution.<sup>xxi</sup> While US military resources are employed in military support operations in Colombia – both direct and indirect – the Canadian Forces do not venture in counter-drug operations within other sovereign states.<sup>xxii</sup> What the CF is capable of providing is limited access to suitable intelligence information about drug producing countries and other pertinent details of illicit drug production. This information can assist LEAs in predicting where and when to target drug shipments entering Canadian domestic territory.

**Transit across national boundaries** – The international drug problem is relatively unimpeded in its permeation of Canada’s large, undefended borders. Gaps in border surveillance allow drugs to flow with little impunity. The Canadian Forces contribute to Canada’s border security needs through the use of NORAD surveillance assets. Airborne maritime patrol platforms, such as the CP-140 Aurora are regularly employed in maritime surveillance missions. Additionally, CF surface ships and submarines are used to augment Coast Guard vessels to intercept suspected drug delivery platforms within territorial waters.

**Local production<sup>xxiii</sup> / local distribution** – This includes the production of drugs within Canada’s national boundaries, the transferal of international drugs to

Canadian distribution sources, and the local distribution of drugs by organizations operating in Canada. Intervention at this stage is largely conducted by LEA's – predominately the RCMP. Canadian Forces' support consists of provision of intelligence and the aerial delivery of LEA teams to production and distribution sites by helicopter.

## **THE MEASUREMENT OF SUCCESS**

*There is no definitive recipe for using resources more effectively and efficiently. We are too large and diverse for a 'one-size-fits-all' methodology or sequence of steps.*

[Canadian National] Defence 2000

The demise of the Cold War caused many western militaries to frantically substitute a viable threat with which to justify continued military spending. A sudden willingness to support peacekeeping missions solved part of the problem. Counter-drug missions formed another method widely supported by society as a viable mission for the military, and particularly the Canadian Forces, to become actively involved.

Counter-narcotics is not an obvious military mission and, therefore, must be closely scrutinized to ensure the mission's validity, effectiveness, and contribution to overall military combat readiness. Canadian Forces planners and force employers must be cognizant of the value provided and the capabilities gained or lost by the organization. The Canadian Forces' impact upon drug eradication is less tangible.

*The central problems in the design of analyses to aid military decision-makers lie in selecting operationally useful objectives, measures of their attainment, and criteria.*

The effectiveness of the Canadian Forces' contribution to the counter-drug mission must be measured against relevant and measurable criteria. These criteria must show that the CF is suitable for this type of mission, that the support provided delivers valid successes without degrading other important CF capabilities, and that the methodology to achieve these results is publicly palatable. An inexhaustible list of criteria could be developed; however, the list can be simply distilled to five key criteria - viability, priority, relevancy, productivity, and accountability. Each of these subjective criteria is to be examined against a measurement of attainment (Figure 2). To develop objective criteria would imply that the CF has developed definitive objectives with measured desirable outcomes. This is not the case. The CF, as support providers, can only respond to the needs of the supported agency and has no capability to create a vision for the mission. The CF, in a way, is a form of alternate service delivery for other federal agencies. As a result, these criteria are designed more to assess whether CF participation provides any positive value to the overall CF mission and capabilities.

<b>CRITERION</b>	<b>MEASUREMENT OF ATTAINMENT</b>
<b>VIABILITY</b>	<i>Does the counter-drug support provided meet the Government's strategic goals? Is this a task assigned within the White Paper and the DPG?</i>
<b>PRIORITY</b>	<i>Is this support being conducted in accordance with established CF priorities?</i>
<b>RELEVANCY</b>	<i>Does this support contribute to the combat readiness of the CF? Are there more effective alternate methods of delivering this support?</i>
<b>PRODUCTIVITY</b>	<i>Is this support contributing sufficiently to the overall counter-drug mission? Is this support achieving its desired results?</i>
<b>ACCOUNTABILITY</b>	<i>Is this mission acceptable in the eyes of the public?</i>

**Figure 2** – Criteria and Measurement of Attainment

### **Viability**

Perhaps the most important criteria against which to measure CF involvement in counter-drug missions is viability. Every mission the CF undertakes must be guided by a task assigned

by the Government of Canada, otherwise a case may be made that the CF is self-serving and not pursuing federal objectives. Clear linkages to federal strategies must be apparent.

A viable mission must have the tacit support of the federal government and the other government agencies that are associated with the mission. Because of the covert nature of most counter-drug strategies there is tremendous potential for inadvertent “mission creep”<sup>xxv</sup> that may exceed the mandate provided the military. Close and constant scrutiny by unbiased observers is essential to maintaining the aim. Viability also implies that the mission is supportable in terms of resource availability. The necessity for specialized equipment may make it non-viable for the CF to become involved in a particular support mission.

Canada’s stated goals in the federal strategy against illicit drugs is “to reduce the harm associated with alcohol and other drugs to individuals, families, and communities.”<sup>xxvi</sup>

Incumbent within this goal is the specific task to restrict the supply of illicit drugs.

Subsequently, DND has been tasked in the government’s 1994 White Paper on Defence to provide routine support to OGDs in the task of drug interdiction.<sup>xxvii</sup> The Canadian Forces has interpreted the White Paper accordingly and tasked the DCDS to provide assistance in counter-drug operations.<sup>xxviii</sup>

Further review of defence guidance, specifically *DPG 2001*, finds specific tasks for the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) and the Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS). Interestingly, there are no specific counter-drug tasks assigned to the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS). Level 1 business plans for the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (responsible for force employment) CAS, CLS, and CMS show a further refinement of the counter-drug responsibilities in line with superior guidance.<sup>xxix</sup>

*DCDS Business Plan* – DCDS plainly articulates the form of support to be provided by the CF and the desired level of effort to be achieved. With an established performance criteria of “timely and effective” the business plan states “Working with OGD reps (sic) and CF regional commanders...provide prompt effective military response options to support government ...with no less than 90% availability...”<sup>xxx</sup> A clear understanding of what 90% availability implies is not apparent and could be cause for misunderstandings and false expectations by the supported agency.

*CAS Business Plan* – Annex D of the CAS Business Plan identifies several air force assets designated for support to several OGD missions on eight hours response time.<sup>xxxi</sup> Fixed assets such as the regional and sector air operations centres, long and short range radars, and transportable radars are assigned a standby posture as well as flying assets such as CF-18 fighter aircraft, KCC-130 air-to-air refuelers, and CP-140 coastal patrol aircraft.<sup>xxxii</sup>

*CMS Business Plan* – The CMS Business Plan allocates one ready duty ship per coast for support to OGD missions, which includes fisheries and environmental protection, and drug interdiction.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

*CLS Business Plan* – The army does not specifically allocate troops to the task of drug interdiction, instead relying upon existing force compositions, such as the Immediate Response Unit (IRU).<sup>xxxiv</sup>

Supported by a governmental strategy, a reasonably clear White Paper task, and a documented military mission – the support provided by the Canadian Forces is deemed to be

viable. While many of the resources assigned to the counter-drug mission are multi-tasked, this is not unreasonable given the limited role the CF plays in the law enforcement mission.

## **Priority**

*Activities may be value-added but not equally so. Within any matrix of activities carried out by a unit, there is usually a hierarchy of importance. Core activities are so key that, without them, a unit would lose their reason for existing. Others are important, but could be scaled down or carried out by someone else. Other activities will be “nice-to-have”; still others, which may have been essential or important at one time, are now continued only because of tradition or difficulty in closing them down.*

### Defence 2000 – Framework for Renewal

With a viable mission identified, the mission must then be assessed for its conduct within identified priorities found in the appropriate Defence Planning Guidance and subordinate business plans.<sup>xxxv</sup> Priorities are difficult to assess well since an organization will plan to accomplish all of their Priority 1 requirements, a large percentage of their Priority 2 requirements, and perhaps a smaller percentage of their Priority 3 requirements. This implies that some Priority 3 tasks are conducted before some Priority 2 tasks and this is, in fact, the case. Experience and judgement must be the final deciding factors.

Concomitant to priority is funding. If the mission is assigned the correct priority, its approved funding is allocated within the tasked agency’s business plan. If funding hasn’t been allocated, yet the mission is in fact being conducted, this mission may be degrading a capability elsewhere and must be investigated further.

A review of *DPG 2001* shows that the assigned tasks for each environmental command does not come with an associated priority. Each commander is left to determine the priority and weight of effort to be applied to each task and indicate it within their Level 1 business plans.

This initially places the allocation burden upon the force employer or force generator in deciding what the correct priority of support is. As a normal part of the business planning process, negotiations would occur between tasked units and the tasking authority before final allocations are approved.

To be effective from a resource allocation perspective, all tasks must be assigned with an associated priority. Since none have been indicated for the counter-drug task, an accurate measurement cannot be acceptably deduced. Counter-drug tasks can be short-notice and clear priorities are essential to ensure that counter-drug missions conducted are reasonable (and affordable).

### **Relevancy**

The general paucity of CF resources demands that every tasked activity contribute sufficiently to the combat effectiveness of the CF. Dedicated training opportunities are becoming rare and other methods of collateral training must be sought out. For instance, conducting helicopter insertions of RCMP personnel could be considered as a relevant contribution since it is a necessary aircrew skill and applicable to combat readiness.

If, however, there are other important core CF tasks that provide similar valid training in this skill and further LEA support missions will lead to the degradation of other aircrew capabilities then a closer review is dictated. If a counter-drug task does not contribute appreciably to military readiness then alternatives should be explored and measured. Perhaps it is a task more suitable for a civilian contractor to provide the service.

The Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL) identifies those tasks that the CF can be expected to be called upon to perform.<sup>xxxvi</sup> The CJTL clearly identifies counter-drug tasks as a military task at the strategic and the tactical level. The lack of an operational task, while not tremendously

significant, displays a lack of continuity in the CF's approach to counter-drug support. It fails to provide a logical link between strategic tasks and tactical tasks and needs to be rectified in future iterations of this document.

Counter-drug tasks were also identified to varying degrees within the appropriate business plans and were largely accomplished through the "double-hatting" of similar OGD support tasks such as environmental protection, fisheries protection, and other common OGD support missions. As such, this methodology prevents an excessive dedication of resources to the counter-drug role while retaining flexibility of tasking. Existing military skills are capitalized upon without the necessity of developing new skillsets.

Interoperability with OGDs is a CF requirement and military support to counter-drug missions provide a valuable opportunity to exercise this. For example, providing appropriate intelligence support can facilitate cooperation with other federal intelligence agencies where the sharing of information could be beneficial to all involved. Maritime interdiction operations by naval forces enhance CF interoperability with the Coast Guard or Department of Fisheries and Oceans while concurrently providing valid training for all.

The NORAD contribution is particularly relevant to the combat readiness of CF air assets – especially with the reduction of belligerent incursions of Canadian airspace has reduced since the end of the "Cold War."<sup>xxxvii</sup> Canadian NORAD aircrews and ground operators can maintain their high state of combat readiness equally as well by surveying for uninvited military aircraft or illegal drug runners attempting to evade detection.

In a "peacetime" military such as the CF, the counter-drug role is a very relevant task to support as part of the CJTL. Could the missions be conducted by more effective alternate methods? Although a civilian contractor could undoubtedly provide some of the capabilities that



are available within the CF it would not necessarily be cost-effective. CF assets are expected to be available at relatively short-notice. In most cases this posture is maintained for other military reasons as well (ie. the use of the ready duty ship on either coast – it was there anyway). Using dedicated contractor support may potentially be cost-prohibitive and would require closer examination.

The capabilities that the CF is called upon to deliver in support of the counter-drug mission utilize skills that the CF is required to possess on a daily basis. The overlaying of OGD tasks upon routine CF tasks provides a valid opportunity to maintain combat ready skills at little additional cost. Interoperability is enhanced and a sense of purpose is injected into what may be benign military missions. The use of the CF in the counter-drug mission is a relevant task and contributes significantly to overall combat readiness of the units involved.

### **Productivity**

The measurement of productivity places a significant challenge on the task of measuring effectiveness in the counter-drug mission. Detailed knowledge of the true magnitude of the drug problem is limited resulting in insufficient data to measure the overall impact of CF involvement. Providing intelligence assets for a specific mission generates obvious benefits but quantifying the productivity of this contribution is fallible.

What can be measured is the effectiveness of the support provided to the supported agency. Did this support enhance the overall effectiveness of the mission? For example, NORAD provides specialized surveillance tools that are extremely cost prohibitive for a federal agency such as the RCMP to replicate. The provision of this type of equipment greatly enhances the counter-drug effort because it reduces the federal police force's manpower and equipment

costs substantially. In this example, the NORAD contribution is assessed to be an effective contribution to the counter-drug mission.

The true effectiveness of the CF contribution to the eradication of the illicit narcotics trade in Canada will probably never be adequately quantified. The extent of the problem is not accurately known, therefore, any gains made cannot be properly compared to a reasonable baseline. That being said, there are many notable success stories in the Canadian “drug war.” In 1982, the CF naval interdiction of the ship “Ernestina” resulted in the largest seizure of marijuana in Canada at the time and also paved the way for “new standards in the open-sea chase law.”<sup>xxxviii</sup> Cooperation between the CF and the RCMP in 1989 led to the arrest of several drug smugglers when their aircraft was tracked entering Canada and was intercepted during its eventual landing at Weyman’s Air Park in New Brunswick.<sup>xxxix</sup> This interoperability between law enforcement agencies and CF organizations continued to develop and the normal bureaucratic challenges that are inherent in these types of operations progressively vanished as evidenced by the Defence Department’s confident comment that it only takes “[t]wo phone calls and something is rolling.”<sup>xl</sup>

The *Departmental Performance Report* for 1999/2000 highlights the successes experienced during that fiscal year. NORAD conducted a total of 736 aircraft intercepts during the period of which 82 were suspected of being drug smuggling aircraft.<sup>xli</sup> Operation SABOT 1999, an annual support operation conducted in conjunction with the RCMP by tactical helicopters from 1 Wing, reflects similar successes. Four hundred and thirty CH-146 Griffon helicopter hours were flown in support of Op SABOT – less than 2% of the total annual flying hours allocated to the entire Wing for all operations and training requirements. Despite the small

number of hours flown, nearly 54,500 illegal marijuana plants were confiscated and destroyed – a net value of \$136 million dollars. These cannabis plants were “not easily detected or accessible by any other means.”<sup>xlii</sup> As a result, the new Memorandum of Understanding between the Solicitor General and the Minister of National Defence reaffirms DND’s commitment to the counter-narcotic mission and “formally authorizes the employment of a wide range of defence capabilities in support of RCMP-led counter-drug initiatives.”<sup>xliii</sup>

As the current data proves, the use of CF resources in the support of the federal counter-drug mandate has produced results. While it is numerically difficult to truly quantify the comprehensive effectiveness of the CF’s contribution to reducing the supply of drugs and its subsequent profitability, the CF’s participation has undoubtedly made a significant impact upon the burgeoning domestic illicit drug trade. While only visible examples have been discussed, the effect of having the Canadian Forces involved in counter-drug operations may very well create an invisible deterrence upon illicit drug producers and traffickers that will never be measurable.

### **Accountability**

Each mission profile must be examined for accountability. Canadians are not willing to employ the full combat capability of the CF in eradicating drugs if it results in the employment of excessive violence and avoidable collateral damage. Support must be deemed reasonable by the Canadian public if it is to be conducted by the Canadian Forces.

*As the unsung support agency for drug interdiction, [the Canadian] military is again proving its worth without fanfare or public notice.*

Appleton/Clark - *Billion \$\$\$ High*

“We believe that the global war on drugs is now causing more harm than drug abuse itself” states an open letter in 1998 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations – a letter signed by over 800 distinguished and renowned individuals from all over the world.<sup>xliv</sup>

Disappointment in the lack of immediate and prolific success by military intervention and fears of dramatically escalating violence permeates the daily rhetoric of the newspaper columnists.

*Armies carry out assaults to control the fields where the plants grow. Airplanes and helicopters spray poison on them, platoons of workers dig them up by hand. Farmers are paid not to grow them. And still the plants are harvested.*

*Police forces, air forces and armies mobilize against those who turn the plants into drugs and ship them out. In this struggle, thousands upon thousands of law enforcers are killed. And still the plants are turned into drugs and shipped.*

*Satellites and advanced radar watch for the drugs in transit. Armies stand ready to intercept. At borders, behind steel walls, entire police forces stand guard to keep the drugs out. And still the drugs cross thousands of miles of ocean and land and get in.*

Dan Gardner – *The Ottawa Citizen*

The Canadian public is increasingly aware of the harm that is inflicted by the illegal drug trade in Canada and is supportive in efforts to bring the problem under control. Unlike the US military, which is a large and visible component of the drug strategy in the United States, the Canadian Forces walks softly in the “drug war” in Canada. As a result, Canadians tend to be more apathetic towards the CF contribution.

With Canada’s federal drug strategy focused largely on the reduction of drug demand through education programmes it is unlikely that the Canadian taxpayer would be willing to see a larger contribution by a non-traditional law enforcement entity. With a limited but effective support role in drug interdiction, the Canadian Forces seem to have found a publicly acceptable level of involvement.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Canadian Forces is a willing participant in the “drug war” and has historically provided meaningful contributions to the overall Canadian effort. The federal government has

developed a clear strategy for dismantling the illicit drug trade and has provided realistic responsibilities for the Canadian Forces to assume. While the CF has articulated this mandate in various high level documents, the CF must develop a clear, concise, and comprehensive mission statement to allow subordinate commanders to fully comprehend DND's commitment to the counter-drug mission.

Since the counter-drug mission is just one mission among many that the CF is expected to perform, it is essential that well-defined priorities be assigned for every aspect of counter-drug support. Counter-drug is not the *raison d'être* of the CF; however, it provides valid and vital opportunities to develop and maintain combat ready capabilities. Proper priorities will keep the mission in perspective and limit the potential for the mission to begin consuming too many expensive and sparse resources. Priorities will ensure balance.

Finally, the CF should celebrate and advertise their successes in this federally supported task. The Canadian taxpayer can be very results-oriented when spending of tax dollars is involved and advising the public of the wise investment of their money will only enhance public relations. The public, as a whole, desires the drug trade to be progressively reduced until it is ultimately eliminated. The CF's contribution is publicly acceptable and should be displayed for scrutiny and accountability.

## **CONCLUSION**

The federal government has documented their plan for eradicating the illegal drug supply in Canada. The main effort of this policy is education; however, federal and provincial law enforcement agencies have been tasked to enforce the legal initiatives in this policy. While LEAs are very capable organizations and are sincere in their desires to accomplish their counter-

drug task there are capabilities that police forces cannot provide. The CF possesses several of these deficit capabilities – from comprehensive intelligence resources to blue-water capital ships, long-range surveillance to expensive air assets - and can provide marked value in their participation. Attaining the goals of the federal mandate will be a long and arduous process, thereby ensuring CF participation well into the distant future.

How has the CF measured up in the “war on drugs”? The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces have striven to capture the essence of the federal strategy in its *White Paper on Defence* and the subordinate *Defence Planning Guidance*. The support that the CF provides clearly meets the government’s strategic goals and the assigned tasks ensure mission viability.

Decisive priority of effort expected from the DCDS and the three environmental chiefs is not clear in its execution and is the principle weakness in the assessment of the CF counter-drug mission. As a function of the normal business planning process priorities would be eventually established but in the future priorities need to be clearly articulated in the initial assignment of tasks to prevent ambiguity.

The CF is a world-class multi-purpose combat-capable military and every task assigned must contribute to the maintenance of the posture. The counter-drug mission provides valid and relevant training opportunities that enhance combat readiness. Canadian NORAD crews exercise their surveillance and intercept skills on suspected drug smuggling aircraft, intelligence assets have another customer for their quality products, maritime air and ship’s crews gain a broader purpose in their maritime surveillance mission, and tactical helicopter crews gain exposure to more diverse mission planning requirements. An additional benefit is that interoperability with

OGDs is strengthened or enhanced. The counter-drug mission is an extremely relevant mission for the CF.

Viability, priority and relevancy are important aspects for assessment but ultimately the question distills simply to results - productivity. The results achieved in 1999 are markedly encouraging and indicate that the CF contribution is providing value in achieving the federal mandate. These are the measurable results and they might be more significant if deterrence effects could be quantified. The magnitude of CF support is not well known by those in the illicit drug trade and this unknown aspect may deter would-be drug producers and traffickers from entering the trade or expanding their existing business. The CF role in counter-drug has improved the overall productivity of the federal drug strategy.

The Canadian public accepts current level of support since the methodology is neither overtly violent nor does it restrict the civil liberties of the population. The federal drug strategy is very much a passive approach to the drug solution and predominantly mirrors the desires of the average Canadian citizen. The CF accepts this responsibility to conduct its counter-drug mission with moderation and holds itself open for public scrutiny and subsequent accountability.

The Canadian Forces are indeed successful in their counter-drug mission. It is a mission that the CF is equipped, trained, and motivated to conduct. It enhances combat capability and readiness without degrading other core mission requirements. The results attained are admirable and are acceptable in the face of growing distaste for a military war on drugs. Furthermore, it is a mission that can be maintained well into the future because of its inherent compatibility with other assigned tasks and missions. The CF is clearly “measuring up.”

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<sup>i</sup> Kristol, Irving. *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition.* April 4-10, 1988.

<sup>ii</sup> Kawell, Jo Ann. *In These Times.* October 25-31, 1998.

<sup>iii</sup> Alexander, Bruce K. *Peaceful Measures: Canada’s Way Out of the ‘War on Drugs’.* Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1990, p26.

<sup>iv</sup> Stares, Paul B. *Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World.* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p44.

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“Outgrowing LSD in popularity – certainly in Europe – is 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDMA), more popularly known as “ecstasy.”...Mexico, Brazil, and Canada have...become source countries for MDMA.”

<sup>v</sup> NORAD Pamphlet. *North American Aerospace Defence Counterdrug Operations*. 1990.

<sup>vi</sup> National Defence. *Defence Planning Guidance 2001*.

<sup>vii</sup> National Defence. *B-GA-440-000/AF-000 – Tactical Helicopter Operations*. Kingston, ON: 1 Wing Headquarters, 1998, p17.

“Any counter-drug operations involving Canadian Forces aviation assets must be coordinated with civil law enforcement authorities having jurisdictional authority. This will primarily be the RCMP. Support to these operations may also involve equipment loans or transfers and other assistance as requested. Aviation support may occur at any phase of the operation.”

<sup>viii</sup> Griffith, Ivelaw Lloyd. *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1997, p15, fig 1.

<sup>ix</sup> Marshall, Jonathon. *Drug Wars: Corruption, Counterinsurgency, and Covert Operations in the Third World*. Forestville, CA: Cohen & Cohen Publishers, 1991, p1.

<sup>x</sup> “Soft drugs”, according to most informal Internet sources, are identified as cannabis, hashish and ecstasy. The distinction is used to separate this category of drugs from those “hard” drugs such as heroin, crack cocaine and LSD.

<sup>xi</sup> Government of Canada. *Canada’s Drug Strategy*. Ottawa, ON: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1998, p1.

They are: 1. Research and Knowledge Development; 2. Knowledge Dissemination; 3. Prevention Programming; 4. Treatment and Rehabilitation; 5. Legislation, Enforcement, and Control; 6. National Coordination; and 7. International Cooperation.

<sup>xii</sup> Alexander. *Peaceful Measures...*, p96.

“Considered together, Canadian survey studies reveal that most Canadians do not currently use illegal drugs; of those who experiment with them, most do not continue; most of those who continue use moderate quantities; illegal drug use peaked in the late 1970s and has generally declined or remained stable since...”

<sup>xiii</sup> National Defence. *Departmental Performance Report For The Period Ending 31 March 2000*.

<sup>xiv</sup> Government of Canada. *Canada’s Drug Strategy...*, p4.

<sup>xv</sup> Government of Canada. *Canada’s Drug Strategy...*, p4.

Reduce the demand for drugs (through education); Reduce drug-related mortality and morbidity; Improve the effectiveness of and accessibility to substance abuse information and interventions; Restrict the supply of illicit drugs and reduce the profitability of illicit drug trafficking; and Reduce the costs of substance abuse to Canadian society.

<sup>xvi</sup> Ibid, p4.

<sup>xvii</sup> Government of Canada. *1994 White Paper on Defence*. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1994, Chap 4.

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“[The Canadian Forces will] assist, on a routine basis, other government departments in achieving various other national goals in such areas as fisheries protection, drug interdiction, and environmental protection.”

<sup>xviii</sup> Ibid, Chap 4.

“During the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Agreement in 1991, Canada and the United States agreed to give NORAD a role in counter-narcotic monitoring and surveillance. This is an ancillary mission to which the capabilities of our maritime and land forces have also been applied, and illustrates how existing structures and capabilities can be adapted to address new problems.”

<sup>xix</sup> National Defence. *Defence Planning Guidance 2001*, Art 305

**Defence Objective 5 (DCD05):** To assist other Government departments and other levels of Government in achieving national goals.

**Tasks :**

1. Plan, direct and control the CF contribution to protection and evacuation of Canadians from threatened areas abroad;
2. Plan and direct the CF contribution to national projects; and
3. Plan, direct and control the CF national level response to requests for assistance from other levels of government, such as assistance to law enforcement agencies, fisheries protection, drug interdiction, environmental protection and illegal immigration.

<sup>xx</sup> National Defence. *VCDS Canadian Joint Task List v1.3*.

**S 3 Conduct Strategic Operations...**

S 3.2.8 Advise and Support Counter Drug Operations.

Support for counterdrug operations includes military planning, intelligence gathering, use of facilities and other assistance as requested and authorised.

**T 3 Conduct Tactical Operations**

T 3.3.7 Co-ordinate Counter Drug Operations.

Plan and implement national or multinational requests for Joint or Combined drug enforcement operations.

<sup>xxi</sup> Stares, Paul B. *Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p38.

<sup>xxii</sup> Mendel, William W. and Murl D. Munger. *Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997, p63.

“The result of the review [of the international counterdrug strategy] was Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 14, which now serves as the framework for U.S. overseas counterdrug strategy and the basis for interagency planning. PDD 14 provided the concepts for interdiction at the U.S. border, in the transit zone, and in the drug source countries...”

<sup>xxiii</sup> Malarek, Victor. *Merchants of Misery*. Toronto, ON: Macmillan of Canada, 1989, px.

“Foreign sources will continue to provide the majority of cannabis products on the Canadian drug market, although domestic cultivation, especially hydroponic and indoor growing operations, will account for a greater share of the market in the coming years.”

<sup>xxiv</sup> Rand Corporation, edited by E.S. Quade and W.I. Boucher. *Systems Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in Defense*. New York, NY: American Elsevier Publishing, 1968.

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<sup>xxv</sup> Over-exuberance, residual mission capability, or limited oversight of operations can lead some tasked organizations to provide support beyond their assigned mission. The effect is routinely referred to as “mission creep” since it is progressive and generally insidious in nature.

<sup>xxvi</sup> Government of Canada. *Canada's Drug Strategy...*, p4.

<sup>xxvii</sup> Government of Canada. *1994 White Paper on Defence*. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1994.

<sup>xxviii</sup> National Defence. *Defence Planning Guidance 2001*.

<sup>xxix</sup> Director General Strategic Plans Website, ([http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/level1bcp/intro\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/level1bcp/intro_e.asp)).

“A Business Plan/Strategic Letter is an accountability based process that links the department's program sub-activities to performances, through the establishment of a contract between superior and subordinate officers/managers. The contract identifies tasks to be performed or functions to be conducted, assigned resources and expected results.”

Level 1 applies to the strategic level environmental command business plans (CAS, CLS, CMS, DCDS).

<sup>xxx</sup> National Defence. *DCDS Level 1 Business Plan 00/01*, p46.

**DCDO5.2 - Assistance to other levels of government plans and coordination**

Timely and accurate defence, security, scientific and technical intelligence, geomatics and imagery to other levels of government; planning coordination and direction of CF contribution to other levels of government for fisheries protection, drug interdiction, environmental protection and illegal immigration.

<sup>xxxi</sup> The OGD missions identified include coastal patrol and aerospace surveillance and control operations in support of counter-drug and illegal-immigrant operations for national and North American law enforcement and immigration authorities.

<sup>xxxii</sup> National Defence. *CAS Level 1 Business Plan 00/01*, p D-16/27.

<sup>xxxiii</sup> National Defence. *CMS Level 1 Business Plan 00/01*, Part 3–4/16.

**CMO1C08 – Support to Other Government Departments.** The capability to provide maritime support to other government departments in areas such as fisheries protection, drug interdiction and environmental protection.

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“The Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL) establishes a framework for describing, and relating, the myriad types of capabilities that may be required, to greater or lesser degrees, by the CF. The CJTL will provide a common lexicon or "language" for CF/DND force development within the context of force planning scenarios.”

“The CJTL has eight major capability areas: Command; Information and Intelligence; Conduct Operations; Mobility; Protect Forces; Sustain Force; Generate Forces; and Corporate Strategy and Policy. The CJTL is also hierarchical in nature: there are three levels of joint tasks in it: military strategic, operational and tactical. The joint tasks within each level are further broken down into two additional layers of sub-tasks. Each layer of sub-tasks becomes more detailed and specific.”

<sup>xxxvii</sup> NORAD Pamphlet. *North American Aerospace Defence Counterdrug Operations*. 1990.

“The 1989 National Defense Authorization Act tasked the Department of Defense to serve as the lead agency of the federal government for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into North America.

Canada was consulted and has fully concurred in the use of NORAD assets to support the mission.”

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Clark, Doug and Peter Appleton. *Billion Dollar High*. Toronto, ON: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1990, p184.

<sup>xxxix</sup> *Ibid*, p184.

<sup>xl</sup> *Ibid*, p184.

<sup>xli</sup> National Defence. *Departmental Performance...*, p6.

<sup>xlii</sup> *Ibid*, p7.

<sup>xliii</sup> *Ibid*, p48.

<sup>xliv</sup> Public letter to Kofi Annan. 1 June 1998.