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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
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EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

Principles of War for Canada in the 21st Century

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Abstract

The global security environment of the 21st Century, and the exponential growth of information technology, has introduced new threats and has provided military forces with new means and methods of waging war. The current Canadian principles of war are out of date and must be reviewed, and updated to reflect the nature of 21st Century conflict and Canada's approach to warfighting. This paper reviews the current principles of war and proposes an updated list of principles for the 21st Century. The principles of selection and maintenance of the aim, economy of effort, security, and flexibility should remain unchanged. The principles of offensive action, concentration of force and administration should be modified to seize, exploit and retain the initiative, synchronization of effort, and sustainment. The current principles of surprise, co-operation and maintenance of morale are no longer valid as they are subsumed by other principles. Information dominance is proposed as a completely new principle of war. The list incorporates some of the traditional concepts, ideas and themes, but updates and reorganizes them to better reflect the conditions of the 21st Century.

Principles Of War For Canada In The 21st Century

Principles are developed in schoolhouses, not handed down from Mount Sinai. Regardless of our prejudices or our conclusions, we can benefit by a rigorous scrutiny of the principles. Either we will graduate to a newer, better way of thinking about war, or we will confirm for ourselves that the current list is about right. Either way, we have thought critically about what is literally a matter of life and death.

Robert R. Leonhard

The Origin Of Our Principles Of War

For centuries, many military organizations have subscribed to the idea that there exists a set of guiding principles or ideas that guide the conduct and study of war. We have come to know these guiding principles as the principles of war. There has never been universal agreement on one common list of principles, and most nations have developed their own list based on their military culture, experience and heritage.

Napoleon believed that principles of war directed all great commanders, and during his last years of life in captivity on St Helena, he dictated his own 78 military maxims.¹ The principles of war, as we currently know them, were only developed in the early 20th Century. Prior to World War One, Marshall Foch of the French Army wrote of only four principles of war.² Today, France only maintains three principles of war. In his 1923 book *The Reformation of War*, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller commented that "Before the Great War of 1914-1918,

¹ David G. Chandler Editor, *The Military Maxims of Napoleon* (London: Greenhill Books, 1987), p. 17.

² Marshall Foch, *The Principles of War* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1918), p. 8 [it is interesting to note that Marshall Foch placed the word "etcetera" at the end of his list - perhaps indicating some uncertainty as to the list's completeness].

every [British] Field Service Regulation made mention of principles of war and pointed out their importance, but did not name them."³ In the same book, Fuller continued on to list and define the following eight principles of war:

- The principle of the objective
- The principle of the offensive
- The principle of security
- The principle of concentration
- The principle of economy of force
- The principle of movement
- The principle of surprise
- The principle of co-operation⁴

These eight principles were later incorporated into British Military doctrine when they were officially published in the 1932 British Field Service Regulations.⁵

Canadian, American and British principles of war are quite similar, and appear to be linked back to a common heritage in the writings of Major-General Fuller. The current ten Canadian principles of war, which follow, are very closely related to the eight principles articulated by Fuller in 1923:

- Selection and maintenance of the aim
- Offensive action
- Security

³ J.F.C. Fuller, *The Reformation of War* (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1923), p. 27.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 28.

⁵ Major General W.H.S. Macklin, "The Principles of War", Canadian Army Training Pamphlet 5M-8-54 (M-7634-488), reprinted from the Canadian Army Journal, April 1948, p. 6.

- Concentration of force
- Economy of effort
- Surprise
- Maintenance of morale
- Flexibility
- Co-operation
- Administration

Written after World War One, these principles reflect the nature of conflict during the industrial age, where advances in mechanization changed the face of war. The introduction of wireless communications, and weapons such as the airplane, machinegun and tank, forever changed the manner in which battles were fought. Over time, the old principles of war were developed and amended slightly to reflect the advances in the conduct of armed conflict during the Second World War, the Korean conflict and the Cold War. They served us well; complementing our doctrine, they clearly reflected the manner in which we fought and planned to fight during the 20th Century.

The Need For Change

The global security environment of the 21st Century, and the exponential growth of information technology, has introduced new threats and has provided military forces with new means and methods of waging war. Doctrinally, the Canadian military claims to have changed the manner in which it intends to fight in future conflict. Army doctrine in particular has been changed and updated to reflect a manoeuvrist approach to warfighting. We acknowledge that to win in conflict we must defeat the enemy "by shattering his moral and physical cohesion, his ability to fight as an effective coordinated whole, rather than by destroying him physically

through incremental attrition."⁶ Normally our combat power will be directed against an enemy's weakness and critical vulnerabilities, not his strength.

Military doctrine establishes "the framework of understanding of the approach to war"⁷ and as such it should complement the principles of war. The doctrinal manual *Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, claims that our doctrine is built on "our understanding of the nature of conflict and is consistent with the principles of war."⁸ This, unfortunately, is not the case. Our doctrine reflects the nature of 21st Century conflict; however, it is not entirely consistent with the principles of war. It is not consistent because we have not reviewed and updated the principles of war to reflect the changing nature of conflict.

Our current industrial age principles of war are out of date. Originating from post-World War One writings, the current principles of war must be reviewed within the context of the information age, and updated to reflect the nature of 21st Century conflict and Canada's approach to warfighting. The ten principles of war must be reviewed in light of modern conflict with the understanding that the future will likely bring surprises. We must be conscious of the dangers of attempting to predict the future; we must, however, avoid the trap of preparing to fight the last war. This paper will review the current ten principles of war and propose an updated set of eight principles that are more relevant to 21st Century conflict. A concerted effort has been made to minimize the overall number of principles, and to develop principles that are applicable to the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.

⁶ Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Conduct of Land Operations -- Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998), p. 17.

⁷ United Kingdom, Army Code 71451 *Design for Military Operations: The British Army Military Doctrine* (London: MOD United Kingdom, 1996), p. 4-4.

⁸ Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-001 *Conduct of Land Operations -- Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998), p. 16.

Predicting The Future And Avoiding The Past

"Accelerating rates of change will make the future environment more unpredictable, presenting the [military] with a wide range of plausible futures."⁹ Developing principles of war, doctrine, or any military policy for future conflict, is a challenging and risky task. It is a challenging task, because we cannot accurately predict the future with any degree of certainty. It is a risky task, because any changes would be only be based on a "best guess" or prediction. At best, the consequence of error could mean that we get it all wrong and we waste time and resources. In the worst case, it could result in the loss of soldiers' lives and the possible defeat of the nation.

We must also ensure that we do not rely entirely on lessons learned from past wars. Although many good lessons are learned from the past, those wars are over and will not be fought again. During the Gulf War, for example, we witnessed the effectiveness and tremendous impact of modern airpower. Yet our potential adversaries were also observing and learning. Consequently, during the Kosovo conflict, the Serb Army in Kosovo effectively dislocated and neutralized the potential effects of NATO airpower by hiding their vehicles in built-up areas, and in underground parking garages in Prishtina.¹⁰ They protected their forces by placing them where NATO would not attack them for fear of collateral damage. It would be irresponsible to rely entirely on lessons of past wars, and therefore, we must make certain that we do not train and prepare our military forces to fight the last war.

Given that we cannot predict the future, and we cannot rely entirely on the past, we must look at present day and consider what we know to be true. "There is much that we can

⁹ "Joint Vision 2010: America's Military Preparing for Tomorrow", *Joint Force Quarterly*, Summer 1996, p. 37.

¹⁰ The author served in Kosovo with KFOR during the period July-December 1999.

reasonably forecast based on current and emerging trends as well as observable patterns of behavior."¹¹ Understanding the current situation and making reasonable forecasts will provide us with a better idea of what we must be prepared for in future conflict. The number of publications addressing the nature of future conflict and the emerging strategic environment is almost overwhelming. Among these many writings some concise and reasonable assessments and forecasts can be found in Canada's *Defence Strategy 2020*, and similar American documents such as *Joint Vision 2020* and *Marine Corps Strategy 21*.

The Strategic Environment In The 21st Century

In *Defence Strategy 2020* Canada acknowledges that the United States is likely to remain the dominant global power for the foreseeable future. It is expected that regional conflicts will continue to challenge our efforts at maintaining a stable global security environment, with ethnic tension, religious extremism and resource disputes remaining the major source of conflict. These regional disputes will likely be further complicated by the continuing tension and disparity between developed and developing nations. Non-state actors such as non-government organizations, global corporations, organized crime, terrorists and religious extremists will have increasing influence on the global security environment. Advanced military technology and chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction are available to most states and to many non-state actors.¹² Non-state actors that possess a military capability will likely pose a significant threat to our armed forces in the 21st Century.

From a military perspective "the emerging cyber-space environment [will add] another dimension to the battlespace. Military operations will be conducted at an accelerated pace,

¹¹ Department of National Defence, *Defence Strategy 2020* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1999), p. 4.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 4.

requiring rapid co-ordination of political and military objectives and increasing dependence upon information. The portability, range, precision and lethality of weapons will continue to improve, while the effective life span of sensors and weapons systems will decrease due to the rapid pace of technological change."¹³ Budgetary challenges will likely remain the norm; therefore, the high cost of technology and modernization will demand increased efficiencies during both peace and war. To achieve the nation's political and strategic aims, a smaller, more efficient armed force will have to function as part of multi-national operations. This will only increase the importance of technical and doctrinal interoperability amongst allies.

With access to off-the-shelf military technology at a relatively low-cost, our potential adversaries will make maximum advantage of asymmetric approaches. The successful adversary will not attack our strength, but rather he will focus his attack on our weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities. He will attempt to defeat the will of the nation through means other than attacking the strength of our Armed Forces deployed on operations. Attacks, whether they be conventional, terrorist or cyber based, could be waged against relatively vulnerable command and control, transportation or logistics systems to affect our ability to conduct military operations. Attacks could be made against military dependants to break the will of the soldier fighting or otherwise serving abroad. The United States has accepted the realities of the asymmetric threat and *Joint Vision 2020* states that "the potential of asymmetric approaches is perhaps the most serious danger to the United States in the immediate future -- and this threat includes long-range ballistic missiles and other direct threats to US citizens and territory... These

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 4.

asymmetric threats are dynamic and subject to change, and the US Armed Forces must maintain capabilities to deter, defend against, and defeat any adversary who chooses such an approach."¹⁴

The rapid advances in technology will continue to be a critical factor in influencing the nature of future conflict. Computers are omnipresent in our daily lives. Their ability to move and process data, and man's ability to convert this vast amount of information into understanding, will affect the manner in which we approach warfighting and conflict resolution during the 21st Century.

Re-Examining Our Principles Of War

Our ten principles of war must now be re-examined in light of what we know and expect in the way of conflict during the 21st Century. Where change is necessary it is important that we be cautious in the manner in which we effect this change. Given the time and resources associated with equipment procurement, doctrine development, training, and manning, military forces are generally not very quick to respond to sweeping or radical changes in military policy. Radical changes to military policy are costly and often slow to implement, and slow and costly to correct if they turn out to be wrong. In his book *The Principles of War for the Information Age*, Robert R. Leonhard provides insightful and extremely interesting arguments advocating change to the principles of war. Leonhard departs significantly from conventional military thought and argues that three laws control human conflict: the law of humanity, the law of economy and the law of duality of conflict. These laws are supported by seven principles that bear little resemblance to our traditional principles of war.¹⁵ His ideas provide an excellent basis for

¹⁴ Department of Defence, *Joint Vision 2020: America's Military Preparing for Tomorrow* (Washington: DOD United States), p. 5.

¹⁵ Robert R. Leonhard, *The Principles of War For The Information Age* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998), p. 251 [Complementing his three laws on conflict, Leonhard's seven principles include: knowledge and ignorance,

debate and discussion. Notwithstanding his perceptive arguments, Leonhard's proposed changes are so radically different from the existing principles of war and conventional military thought that it is very unlikely that any military organization would incorporate them in the near term. With this in mind, we should attempt to correct and update the existing list of principles vice propose sweeping or radical changes.

Selection And Maintenance Of The Aim

The selection and maintenance of the aim is often referred to as the master principle and has retained its position on the top of the list of principles since General Fuller's early references to its predecessor "the principle of the objective." The doctrine manual *Canada's Army* tells our soldiers "every military operation must have a single, attainable and clearly defined aim which remains the focus of the operation and towards which all efforts are directed."¹⁶ Canadian soldiers know that operations, at all levels, must have a limited aim that is clear, simple and direct. They also understand that diverging from the aim may lead to a waste of effort, resources and possibly lives. Unfortunately, what is not always made clear in our doctrine is that the selection of the aim starts at the political and strategic level. The aim of operations at each subsequent level of command must be "nested" within the intent of the higher aim so that each supports the next higher-level objectives. This ensures a unity of effort and efficient use of resources across the entire force. In 21st Century conflict the principle of selection and maintenance of the aim will retain crucial importance at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict. It will ensure the unity of effort of Canadian land, air and naval forces during the conduct of operations and it will assist in the ensuring the efficient use of valuable and

dislocation and confrontation, distribution and concentration, opportunity and reaction, activity and security, option acceleration and objective, and command and anarchy].

¹⁶ Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Canada's Army* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998), p. 96.

limited resources. The principle of selection and maintenance of the aim is a valid principle for the 21st Century and should be retained.

Offensive Action

Offensive action is often referred to as being the key to victory. We have been taught that defeating an opponent and imposing our will demands offensive action. In the doctrine manual *Canada's Army* it states that offensive action "embodies a state of mind to seize, exploit and maintain the initiative."¹⁷ We are taught that only through offensive action can we wrest the initiative from the enemy. In his book, Leonhard claims that this principle is no longer valid and that "belief in this principle has led commanders to embark on foolhardy ventures in war -- distractions that cause lives and sometimes national sovereignty... A distorted emphasis upon the offensive in the French plans for World War I resulted in 300,000 French casualties with nothing to show for them."¹⁸ Leonhard's observations that over-emphasis on this particular principle has led armies to failure in the past are valid; however, his conclusion that the principle of offensive action is no longer valid is debatable. Offensive action is only a means to seizing, exploiting and retaining the initiative. The focus of this principle in its current form is wrong. Seizing, exploiting and retaining the initiative is the key to this principle, not offensive action. Seizing, exploiting and retaining the initiative will allow us to impose our will on the enemy, to make him react to our actions. Initiative applies to all three levels of conflict and, apart from traditional concepts of offensive action, it could also include such actions as diplomatic measures at the strategic level, information operations, psychological operations, or computer network attack at the operational and tactical levels. Retention and exploitation of the initiative will allow us to

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 96.

¹⁸ Robert R. Leonhard, *The Principles of War For The Information Age* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998), p. 81.

get inside the enemy's decision cycle and disrupt his plans and his ability to fight as a cohesive force. The principle of offensive action is out of date and should be changed to seize, exploit and retain the initiative.

Concentration Of Force

The 20th Century principle of concentration of force has outlived its usefulness. The name alone incorrectly implies the massing of forces in space and time. At one time, during the conduct of industrial age warfare, the massing of forces in time and space was an important key in defeating the enemy. In the 21st Century the massing of forces in space and time is a vulnerability. Concentrated forces are more susceptible to enemy action, particularly to the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Extended ranges, and precise accuracy of 21st Century sensors and weapons systems, will allow modern forces to fight with much more dispersion than ever before.

This principle also implies only the concentration of combat power and does not take into consideration the focusing of other supporting efforts to achieve the desired aim. To overcome this problem this principle could be reworded to concentration of effort in order to account for the focusing of combat power, combat multipliers, and combat service support effort to achieve the desired effect on the enemy. Unfortunately this does not go far enough because it does not take into consideration the coordination and sequencing of these functions in time and space. It is actually the synchronization of combat power, combat multipliers, and combat service support effort that ensures the co-operation and synergy necessary to achieve the desired effect on the enemy. The principle of concentration of force should be retired and replaced with the principle of synchronization of effort. Synchronization of effort applies equally well to all levels of conflict. At the tactical and operational levels the importance of synchronizing military effort is

well understood. At the strategic level this principle reinforces the importance of the synergy achieved by the co-operation and synchronization of political, diplomatic, and military actions to achieve Canada's strategic goals.

Economy Of Effort

The principle of economy of effort requires the acceptance of risk by employing minimum forces or resources in one area in order to concentrate resources and efforts in support of the main effort against the enemy. In the 21st Century this principle will remain valid both in time of peace and conflict. Flat budgets and the high cost of technology and modernization will demand increased efficiency and may even result in further reductions in the size of the Armed Forces. For a smaller military force operating in an environment of limited resources during the 21st Century, the principle of economy of effort will continue to play a critical role.

Security

The principle of security will play a vital role during the 21st Century. Security gives a military commander, military force, or even the nation freedom of action to impose its will on an adversary. Traditionally, security involves the employment of active and passive security measures to protect the strength and cohesion of our force by denying enemy information, and preventing him from otherwise interfering with the force. In the 21st Century, the principle of security will play an important role in the protection and guarding of military information systems. It is also an extremely important principle of war when we consider the asymmetric threat. Security does not just apply to the protection of the military force; the security of the civilian population and, by extension, the nation will be critical to success in modern conflict. Security is a valid principle of war that will continue to serve us well in the future.

Flexibility

The principle of flexibility was introduced after the Second World War and was a modification of the principle of mobility¹⁹ (which seems to have evolved from General Fuller's principle of movement). During the industrial age, this principle focused on good communications and good physical mobility to allow forces to move rapidly to concentrate at the correct place and time. Today, the principle calls for the ability to react quickly to changing situations, in order to rapidly shift points of effort to react to unforeseen opportunities or contingencies. Consistent with the manoeuvrist approach to modern warfighting, the principle of flexibility calls for flexibility of mind, rapid decision-making, and a clear understanding of commander's intent. It still demands the ability to rapidly and efficiently deploy forces to the correct time and place. Applicable to all three levels of conflict, flexibility remains a valid principle of war for the 21st Century.

Co-operation

The principle of co-operation has not always been a Canadian principle of war and was in fact dropped from the list just after the Second World War (only to be added again in the following years).²⁰ The principle of co-operation is important in the conduct of combined arms, joint and multinational operations. This principle also applies to the co-operation between military and civilian authorities and inter-departmental co-operation at the strategic level. Co-operation between arms and elements, departments and nations, is a key sub-element of the concept of synchronization. The principle of co-operation should be subsumed by the 21st

¹⁹ Major General W.H.S. Macklin, "The Principles of War", Canadian Army Training Pamphlet 5M-8-54 (M-7634-488), reprinted from the Canadian Army Journal, April 1948, p. 7.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 7.

Century principle of synchronization of effort; therefore, it should no longer retain status as a principle of war.

Administration

A relatively new principle of war, the principle of administration was only added to the list after the Second World War.²¹ The successful conduct of military operations requires effective and efficient logistics and administrative support. Notwithstanding the importance of administration and logistics on the battlefield, the principle of administration in its current form is flawed. It is flawed because it fails to take into consideration the greater concept of sustaining a military force in the conduct of a campaign or operation. The act of sustaining a force deployed on operations involves much more than administration and logistics at the tactical and operational level. It entails the ability and will of the nation to continue its involvement in a conflict over a period of time. In addition to logistics, it may include such factors as the ability to endure and replace casualties, the ability to replace and maintain stocks of expensive precision munitions, and in the conduct of peace-support operations, it could involve factors such as personnel burnout after repeated deployments. The old principle of administration is too narrow in scope to properly serve us in the 21st Century; it should be changed to the principle of sustainment.

Surprise

"Surprise entails striking the enemy at a time, place or in a manner for which he is unprepared, creating confusion and paralysis in his chain of command and destroying his ability to fight."²² When surprise is achieved, a military force can obtain results that are out of

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 7.

²² Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Canada's Army* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998), p. 96.

proportion to the effort expended. In essence, surprise is an effect that is achieved on the enemy through speed and stealth. The concept of surprise will remain an important factor in future conflict; it is, however, not a principle unto itself. Surprise is an effect that is achieved on the enemy through the application of other principles of war.

Surprise is achieved by the application of the principles of: seizing, exploiting and retaining the initiative, synchronization of effort, flexibility, and security. Seizing, exploiting and retaining the initiative forces the enemy to react to our actions. To achieve the best results these actions should be directed to strike an enemy where he is weak and/or unprepared. Synchronization of effort allows us to deliver a decisive blow against the enemy at a time and place for which he is unprepared. Flexibility allows us to quickly take advantages of unforeseen opportunities in order to quickly strike an unprepared enemy. Security allows us to protect our own forces from being surprised by the enemy and to prevent the enemy from learning of our intentions. To surprise an enemy we also require a high degree of information dominance. We must know where the enemy is and where his critical vulnerabilities lie. We require information dominance so that we can decide where, when, and how to deliver a decisive blow to surprise the enemy. Surprise retains its importance in modern conflict, but since it is an effect achieved by the application of other principles, it is no longer a principle unto itself.

Maintenance Of Morale

Canadian Army doctrine tells us "after leadership, morale is the most important element on the moral plane of conflict. It is essential to ensuring cohesion and the will to win."²³ Like leadership, morale is important; it should not, however, be a principle of war unto itself.

"[Morale] is nurtured through good leadership, sound discipline, realistic training, confidence in

²³ *Ibid*, p. 96.

equipment and sense of purpose."²⁴ It is a condition, attitude or sense of spirit that is maintained; it is not a principle of war that is applied to campaign planning or conflict resolution. Morale is nurtured in a force during peacetime and it is maintained and protected in conflict by good leadership, effective security, and information dominance. The importance of morale in battle

war for use in the 21st Century, four would remain unchanged, three would require major changes, and two are subsumed by other principles and should be deleted. Information dominance should be incorporated as a completely new principle of war. For comparison purposes the ten current principles of war and the proposed list of eight principles of war for the 21st Century are listed below.

<u>Current Principles of War</u>	<u>Principles of War for the 21st Century</u>
• Section and Maintenance of the Aim	• Section and Maintenance of the Aim
• Offensive Action	• Seize, Exploit and Retain the Initiative
• Concentration of Force	• Synchronization of Effort
• Economy of Effort	• Economy of Effort
• Security	• Security
• Flexibility	• Flexibility
• Administration	• Sustainment
• Cooperation	• Information Dominance
• Surprise	
• Morale	

Conclusion

Principles of war are not finite unchanging laws of war and there is no universal agreement as to their composition. Originating after World War I, our current Canadian principles of war have changed and evolved over the years to adapt to the changing face of war. Unfortunately, the principles of war are out of date and are in danger of no longer serving any useful purpose. The 21st Century has presented us with a new strategic environment, new challenges, and new tools and means for conflict resolution. Technology, particularly information technology and computers, is now an integral part of military systems, capability and doctrine. We have reacted to the changing circumstances by modernizing our forces,

adapting our doctrine, and changing our approach to warfighting and conflict resolution, but in the process we did not review and update the principles of war. Our current principles of war are more reflective of the way we fought in the past than they are of the manner in which we plan to fight today and in the future. Concentration of force and offensive action were great principles with names that embodied an aggressive warfighting spirit, but unfortunately they are better suited to the attritionist strategy and tactics of the industrial age than they are to the modern manoeuvrist approach to war. The principles of administration and concentration of force were too narrow in scope and probably should have been changed many years ago. Failure to revise the principles of war will only serve to anchor our military thought to outdated ideas and concepts of the past.

To be of any useful military purpose, the principles of war must be updated to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. Given the rapidly evolving nature of the information age, the revised principles must be general and flexible enough to be useful as we face new security challenges. They must complement our military doctrine and reflect Canada's approach to warfighting and conflict resolution at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. The proposed list of eight principles of war for the 21st Century is an evolution from the current list. The list incorporates some of the traditional concepts, ideas and themes, but updates and reorganizes them to better reflect the conditions of the 21st Century. The proposed list of Canadian principles of war will complement our doctrine, and our modern approach to warfighting well into the 21st Century.

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