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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
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EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

NMD: DECISION TIME FOR CANADA

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Syndicate 4

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ABSTRACT

The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction has created a new asymmetric threat to global security that renders Cold War deterrence doctrine increasingly irrelevant in the emerging geopolitical environment. The US National Missile Defence (NMD) programme is intended to counter this new and emerging threat by providing the US with a defence against a limited number of ballistic missiles from states of concern. There is, however, considerable international opposition to NMD. Many states fear NMD will be destabilizing to global security and facilitate a renewed arms race. Of particular concern are the perceptions of Russia, China and Europe and the survival of the ABM Treaty.

Canada's national security is predicated on a relatively stable world order, and therefore it is a strong proponent of deterrence doctrine to achieve strategic stability. Canada is thus faced with a strategic decision on whether or not to support NMD. The scope of this decision, including the timing, is examined in this essay. It is proposed that Canada support NMD but caveated with certain conditions. These conditions are explained in the essay and recommendations on how Canada should proceed to further global security after it announces its support for NMD are discussed.

NMD: Decision Time for Canada

"It would be a big mistake to think that, because our countries are so close, so alike in so many ways, we are identical in all things: that we always operate as nations, and as governments in the same way; or that Canada shall always and automatically agree, in the realm of foreign or domestic affairs, either with what you do or how you do it."

Lester B. Pearson¹

INTRODUCTION

The Gulf War generated a considerable degree of interest in ballistic missile defence. Although the US was confident that the Coalition had superior military capability, the potential effects of a relatively few Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) launched by ballistic missiles into Israel threatened the Coalition cohesion. The overall effect of the Iraqi threat was out of proportion to the actual destructive effect on the ground. The Gulf War also introduced a new type of warfare to the public; one where precision overcame the inhumane aftermath of mass destruction. The tolerance level for collateral damage and excessive casualties has now been lowered considerably and should arguably be considered as a contender as the US Center of Gravity for future operations. Consequently, a mechanism for defending the US and its deployed forces against ballistic missiles was deemed necessary. The creation of the National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) programmes were announced by then President Clinton in 1996.

The development of NMD has serious implications for global security and in particular the current role of deterrence doctrine. The US has determined that the threat to its homeland and deployed forces is real and significant because of the proliferation of WMD and must be

¹ Joseph T Jockel, *Security to the North: Canada-US Defence Relations in the 1990s*, (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1991), p 3. During his tenure as the Canadian Secretary of State, Mr Pearson clearly outlined Canada-US defence relations during a 1954 address to an American audience. In essence, he stated that, notwithstanding the close Canada-US ties, Canada is an independent and sovereign state and hence must make its decisions in its own interests and not simply follow the US lead. His words ring particularly true today, as Canada faces a decision on NMD.

effectively countered. However, the development of NMD would give the US a perceived decisive edge over Russia and China with respect to nuclear "strategic stability."² The resultant strategic instability may well be a potential catalyst to a new arms race leading to increased nuclear arsenals, further weapons development and increased proliferation.

Canada's national security is predicated on a relatively stable world order, and therefore it is a strong proponent of deterrence doctrine to achieve strategic stability. Fundamental to this is the control of arms proliferation and stockpiling. NMD may put this all at risk. Canada has an enduring strategic relationship with the US and a negative stance on NMD could have long lasting consequences for this relationship. This potential dichotomy is the situation Canada finds itself in. For Canada, the decision on whether or not to support the US and participate in NMD should be based on a vision of the future global security environment and not the Cold War parameters that have dominated its security arrangements since WWII. Canada must determine its role in the post Cold War era and be proactive in it, ensuring that a strategic deterrence remains in place in order to maintain the present strategic balance. Failure to become involved in NMD, however, might lead to Canada's status as an influential but medium power slowly diminishing over time.

This essay will argue that NMD, if properly introduced, furthers global stability in the post Cold War era and that Canada should support the US, but caveated with certain conditions.

To accomplish this, this essay will first distinguish between NMD and its predecessor, the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). It will be argued that the two are distinctly different and an NMD decision is independent of Canada's earlier decision not to support SDI. The essay will

² George Lindsey, "Strategic Defence in the 1990s", in *Nuclear Strategy in the Nineties: Deterrence, Defence and Disarmament*, ed by Alex Morrison, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS): 4 May 1989), p 32. Dr Lindsey contends that a state of strategic stability exists between two adversaries if neither side has a rational motive to strike first with its nuclear weapons. The acquisition or development of a

then look at the emerging geo-political environment, providing the context within which the NMD decision must be made. This will include an analysis of the emerging threat to the US and the rest of the world. It will be argued that Cold War deterrence doctrine is increasingly irrelevant in the emerging geopolitical environment, and that NMD furthers global stability. The way ahead for Canada will then be discussed. This presents the main argument of the essay, which specifically recommends an early Canadian decision in support of NMD. This support would be caveated with certain conditions in order that NMD does not hamper the existing fragile thread of deterrence. The essay will define the conditions for Canada's support and identify where Canada can best leverage its influence to ensure NMD supports global stability. This will include recommendations for Canadian diplomatic efforts towards Russia, China and Europe, as well as arms control within the context of a revised Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, in the transition to a realistic post Cold War security environment.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE

It is essential that NMD is clearly understood, because any association with previous ballistic missile defence initiatives might taint the new debate. NMD is a defence network of ground and space based sensors and ground based interceptors intended to provide an effective defence against a limited number of ballistic missiles.³ The present scope envisions the deployment of 100 ground-based interceptors in Alaska by 2007.⁴ The final planned NMD

new weapon or technology by one side motivates the other to acquire new offsetting weapons. This could potentially lead to politic tensions or an arms race, thus creating conditions for strategic destabilization.

³ Dean A. Wilkening, *Ballistic Missile Defence and Strategic Stability*, International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 334, (New York: Oxford University Press Inc, May 2000), p 30. The ground based interceptors employ exo-atmospheric kinetic kill vehicles. These are essentially small rockets which use a multi-spectral sensor suite (including long wave infra-red) to home in on their targets outside the atmosphere.

⁴ Daniel Goure, *Charting a Path for U.S. Missile Defenses: Technical and Policy Issues*, (The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): June 2000), p6. Initially, 20 interceptors were envisioned to counter five ballistic missiles. The increase of 80 interceptors for the initial deployment is to allow for multiple launches of interceptors against each incoming warhead. US Officials feared the initial 20 interceptors would be overwhelmed. In addition to the increase of interceptors, increased engagement radar capability will be fielded.

architecture sees 250 interceptors deployed at two different sites by 2011.⁵ This is distinctly different from SDI.

SDI was designed in the bi-polar environment of the Cold War. It was an attempt at "developing a defensive shield against Soviet [ballistic missile] threats to the US homeland."⁶

Canada declined to support SDI based arguing that it would destabilize the then existing deterrence philosophy of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) and hence lead to a further arms race between the US and the then USSR. NMD, however, is oriented against a small ballistic missile threat to the US from any nation across the globe. It is not directed solely against Russia nor does it undermine Russia's retaliatory capabilities, even at levels specified for START III.⁷ NMD must not be dismissed based on an association with SDI, as the scope of NMD and the emerging geopolitical environment are very different.

THE GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The world today is a far different place than the 1980's when then President Reagan first announced SDI. The bipolar world of the Cold War has given way to a uni-polar world where US military dominance is unchallenged. However, the peace that was hoped for was short-lived.

Although the threat of a world war between the US/NATO and the USSR/Warsaw Pact has diminished, there is an increasing escalation of inter and intra-state conflicts as the enforced and temporary stability created by the Cold War gives way to the presence of nationalism and many asymmetric threats. Whereas the Cold War "bounded the competition"⁸ between two

⁵ Wilkening, p17. Designated C3, there will also be increased sensor and discrimination capabilities, to provide full coverage of all 50 states by 2011. This is intended to counter from 50 to 75 ballistic missiles.

⁶ Wilkening, p5.

⁷ Dr James Fergusson, *Forum Report: Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence, Occasional Paper #38*, (Center for Defence and Security Studies: University of Manitoba, 26-27 November 1998), p 13.

⁸ Richard Haas, "The Emerging Geopolitical Situation", in *Security, Strategy and Missile Defense*, ed by Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, (Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 1996), p8. Between the US and USSR, most global issues were resolved and escalation controlled before the "big two" were involved. The collapse of the USSR has signalled the end of the regulatory function provided by the US-USSR relationship.

superpowers, this condition no longer prevails. There are more state actors, with different national agendas, making it a far more complex and potentially unstable world.⁹ Globalization has tended to blur borders and economics has become a major influence in global affairs. The intrusion of media has placed constraints on government actions and also on the willingness to take civilian and military casualties, all of which limit a legitimate government's freedom of action. International legitimacy has become essential in inter and intra state conflict resolution, lessening a state's ability to act unilaterally.

Within the emerging political landscape, military force remains a key instrument of national power. "States want to accumulate military power, because it remains one of the principle forms of international influence."¹⁰ Conventional forces, however, are costly to employ and maintain. Therefore, ballistic missiles are seen as an effective means for a smaller state to use against the greater conventional military might of larger nations, in particular in the absence of a bi-polar world. Just as the Gulf War taught the US many lessons, other states have also learned lessons from the conflict. "The desire to proliferate...unconventionally has...not gone away because of Iraq's defeat; on the contrary, it has increased."¹¹ Most states cannot compete with the US conventionally, hence they need to be able to operate asymmetrically. Ballistic missiles provide this capability. Such weapons provide a less powerful nation with the ability to potentially make a large strategic impact with a relatively small and inexpensive capability, thus creating a new threat to global stability that did not exist during the Cold War.

⁹ Robert Joseph, "Discussions to the Emerging Landscape", in *Security, Strategy and Missile Defense*, ed by Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, (Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 1996) , p27.

¹⁰ Haas, p10.

¹¹ Haas, p 9.

Russia remains the primary ballistic missile threat to the US. Russia retains a significant strategic force and will continue to do so into the future. US assessments are that the "Russian threat will continue to be the most robust and lethal."¹² However, the ballistic missile threat goes well beyond that posed by Russia. The US has projected the current development and proliferation of ballistic missile technology by "states of concern"¹³ into the future. The assessment is that the threat posed by ballistic missiles is real and growing.¹⁴ China is continuing to develop its strategic arsenal, with the intent of maintaining a retaliatory capability to threaten potential adversaries. Other states of concern are developing or acquiring ballistic missile capabilities. Although non-proliferation efforts have been moderately successful, "countries of the greatest threat to US interests in regions vital to [US] security are also those states most actively and aggressively pursuing NBC and missile programs."¹⁵ Aside from the five major nuclear powers, there are currently "25 other states that either have, or are trying to acquire, ballistic missiles."¹⁶ Current projections see the USA facing likely ICBM threats from "Russia, China and North Korea, and possibly from Iran and Iraq during the next 15 years."¹⁷ With the threat of ballistic missile attack expanding beyond Russia, Cold War deterrence doctrine will become less relevant.

¹² Bob Walpole, National Intelligence Council, *Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015*, September 1999, p6.

¹³ David Rackley, "A Time to Revisit the Logic of the US Approach to national missile defense", *Defence and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, Sep 2000, p4. Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on 19 June 2000 officially discounted the use of the term 'rogue' favoring instead 'states of concern'. The meaning remains the same however, specifically referring to a state that may deliver a nuclear weapon onto a target in the US using a ballistic missile.

¹⁴ Walpole, p 4. North Korea's three-stage Taepo-Dong-1 has the capability to deliver small payloads at ICBM ranges. The second generation two stage Taepo Dong-2 is expected to have even greater range and payload, able to carry WMD anywhere in the US. This missile is assessed as being available for testing at any time.

¹⁵ Joseph, p26.

¹⁶ Wilkening, p 9.

¹⁷ Walpole, p 2.

Deterrence is predicated upon the concept of "unacceptable damage."¹⁸ During the Cold War, this manifested itself in the "existential reality"¹⁹ of MAD, where the cost in damage and human lives of a nuclear attack exceeded any possible benefit. In the bi-polar world of the Cold War, reliable deterrence was achieved by maintaining a mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation between the US and the USSR.²⁰ However, Russia will no longer be the only threat over the next 15 years. Maintaining a mutual vulnerability against Russia that other state players can now leverage is no longer a viable deterrence doctrine. The US must now prepare for "deterrence failure."²¹ Specifically, in the future, where diplomacy and deterrence fail, the US will require a suitable defence capability.

In light of the US aversion to massive casualties, even the possession of a small number of ballistic missiles of limited accuracy and reliability, but capable of reaching the US, has a coercive diplomatic effect.²² Many smaller nations assess that the "threat of their use would complicate American decision-making during crisis."²³ These small ballistic missiles become, in effect, "strategic weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy,"²⁴ especially if a nation has a WMD capability. This may deter or delay the US from acting in its best interests.²⁵ The US

¹⁸ Dr James Finan, "The Utility of Nuclear Weapons", in *Nuclear Strategy in the Nineties: Deterrence, Defense and Disarmament*, ed by Alex Morrison, (Toronto: The Canadian institute of Strategic Studies (CISS), 4 May 1989), p 21. The property of Unacceptable Damage is a threat that promises the opponent greater losses than he could hope to gain from any action which the deterrer wishes to avoid.

¹⁹ Dr Blema Steinberg, "The Doctrine of Deterrence: An Historical Overview", in *Nuclear Strategy in the Nineties: Deterrence, Defense and Disarmament*, ed by Alex Morrison, (Toronto: The Canadian institute of Strategic Studies, 4 May 1989), p 6.

²⁰ Keith Payne, "Discussions to The Emerging Strategic Landscape", in *Security, Strategy and Missile Defense*, ed by Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, (Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 1996), p20.

²¹ Payne, p23.

²² Payne, p23. Mr Payne posits that a weaker nation with ballistic missile capability may reduce the West's capacity for regional deterrence because it will have the effect of undermining both the capability and the will of the US and its allies to project power in response to regional aggression.

²³ Walpole, p5. The National Intelligence Council assessment contends that a weaker state with ballistic missile and WMD is will be able to do three things it previously could not: deter, constrain and harm the US.

²⁴ Walpole, p5.

²⁵ Walpole, p5.

might only intervene in situations that are in its own strategic interests, and not necessarily the best interests of the global community. Whereas in the past, the prospect of US intervention may have helped to deter aggressors, in the future, the possibility of US caution due to a ballistic missile attack on its homeland may encourage some prospective aggressors to action.²⁶ This would not further global stability. The US, and the West, must be free of any such diplomatic coercion in order to project power to deter regional aggression.

The emerging geopolitical environment, with new states that can asymmetrically threaten the US, has made Cold War defence doctrine less relevant. NMD, if properly implemented, could restore the degree of stability that was lost with end of the Cold War. If the US proceeds with NMD without regard for international concerns, however, it could precipitate a renewed arms race, leading to further global instability. What is needed is an independent state, such as Canada, to facilitate NMD as a stabilizing mechanism in a new global security environment.

CANADA - A WAY AHEAD

With an impending US decision to deploy NMD²⁷, Canada is faced with making a strategic decision. Canada presently limits its involvement in NMD to "research and consultation with the US and other like-minded nations."²⁸ There are no indications of a firm Canadian decision being made soon, either in support or against. Prime Minister Jean Chretien has avoided

²⁶ Payne, p23.

²⁷ Goure, p1. The US is committed to developing NMD. Former President Clinton signed into law the "Cochran-Inouye bill" that calls for the deployment of an NMD as soon as is technologically feasible. Once this condition has been met, the only questions remaining are when the US will deploy NMD and under what circumstances.

²⁸ Department of National Defence, *Canada's Policy on Ballistic Missile Defence*, 19 Aug 99, p1.

making a commitment, calling missile defence "hypothetical as the US hasn't perfected the needed technology."²⁹ This will soon be unacceptable if Canada wishes to have a voice in NMD development or the design of a new post Cold War security environment. Canada must not simply support NMD in the face of US pressure as this would compromise Canada's independence and hence status in the world. Nor can Canada simply oppose NMD in order to distance itself from the US in an attempt to appease nations and regions that fear or oppose the US. Rather, Canada must make an informed decision based on the interests of its own national security and what is best for global security.

It is suggested that a clear position in support of NMD is in Canada's national interests. In recognizing the US analysis of the emerging ballistic missile and WMD threat, support for NMD would acknowledge Canada's assessment of the growing irrelevance of Cold War deterrence. This would set the stage for development of a new security framework that maintains stability while accommodating the changing geopolitical environment. Canada's support of NMD, however, would not be unilateral but caveated with certain conditions to ensure NMD furthered stability and will not create a renewed arms race. If the US does not agree with these conditions, Canada should withdraw its support of NMD. These conditions are:

²⁹ Joel Baglole, "Canadians Fret over some of Bush's pet Policies--As Leaders get set to meet, A Divide is growing on Missiles, Alaska", *Wall Street Journal*, 1 Feb 2001, p 2.

The US must maintain the scope of NMD as a defence against a limited ballistic missile threat and not develop it into a defence umbrella like SDI. An increased NMD capability that could threaten Russia's strategic capability would undermine START agreements and lead to a renewed arms race. The number of interceptors should remain at 100 and only expand to 250 should the threat warrant.

The US must remain committed to a revision of the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty is internationally regarded as fundamental to global security. An arbitrary US withdrawal could precipitate a renewed arms race.

Key to Canada's support is the timing of its decision. Announcing its support for NMD after the US announces an NMD deployment date or after it can determine that the international community accepts NMD would reduce the significance and impact of Canada's decision. Canada's influence in the development of NMD and in the promotion of stability mechanisms would be lessened. However, an early response, even before the system is proven technically feasible, would be significant. International legitimacy of NMD is important to the US. Former US Defense Secretary William Cohen has stated that the US will have a difficult time fielding an effective NMD system without the support of its Allies.³⁰ In assessing support for NMD, Cohen also said "US Allies won't support NMD if the Russians oppose it, and the Russians won't agree unless they see Allied support."³¹ Canada's status and influence in most regions of the world³²

³⁰ Kerry Gildea, "NMD won't work without Allies Support, Cohen says", *Defense Daily*, (Potomac: 26 Jul 2000), p 1-2.

³¹ Gildea, p2.

³² DFAIT Website [<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/geo/menu-e.asp>]. Canada has a large influence world wide. Canada is a member of NATO, one of the G7 nations, has permanent representation with the EU, is a member of La Francophonie (52 states), APEC (21 Pacific rim states including the US), The Commonwealth (54 states), OAS (35 sovereign states in the Western hemisphere) and the Arctic Council (unique exposure to

may serve as a catalyst to wider international acceptance of NMD, but under the conditions Canada has stipulated.

There is a risk for Canada in declaring early support of NMD. Canada could lose influence with certain nations adamantly opposed to NMD. These states would regard Canada as a puppet of the US. Thus the effective dissemination of Canada's vision and the attached conditions to its support of NMD are essential. However, continued indecision will lessen Canada's impact in the NMD debate and, more importantly, its relationship with the US. Canada must be cautious not to be overly sensitive to international outcry. Many of the states that vehemently oppose NMD are the same states that would rely on an asymmetric ballistic missile capability to further their own national agendas. Canada's decision must be based on a clear debate of what is best for Canada and global stability and not based on a 'popularity contest'.

This will result in long term respect and credibility.

A decision to not support NMD might be detrimental to Canada's national security. It could diminish Canada's diplomatic influence with the US and even put the future of NORAD at risk.³³ This is a risk Canada may not be able to afford. The US is "Canada's most important ally and the two countries maintain a relationship that is as close, complex and extensive as any in the world."³⁴ Canada's national security is closely tied to the US. A ballistic missile threat does not distinguish between nationalities. "If the continental US is threatened, then Canada is

Russia). As well, Canada is a standing member of many international organizations. Many of these organizations serve as a political forum for human rights and world security, giving Canada a respected and significant voice in international politics.

³³ Fergusson, *Forum Report*, p11.

³⁴ Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper On Defence*, (Ottawa: DND 1994), Chapter 5, p1.

threatened."³⁵ Canada needs to remain clearly within not only the physical protection umbrella of NMD but also the political decision making process and the command and control structure. This is only likely with a positive support decision.

As an early supporter of NMD, Canada might take the opportunity to champion a new global security architecture. In addressing the increasingly irrelevant Cold War deterrence doctrine, Canada must clearly articulate the stabilizing features of NMD and its conditions for agreement to NMD support. If done correctly, Canada could project its own Human Securities³⁶ platform as a possible foundation for the future. This would strengthen Canada's international status as a major player and middle power. Canada's conditions and vision of the future would inject a degree of objectivity and logic into the NMD debate. The challenges facing Canada would be many. Of particular importance is the Russian and Chinese argument that a ballistic missile defence could destabilize the existing equilibrium of deterrence.³⁷ Therefore, to become a stabilizing mechanism of modern deterrence doctrine, the perceptions of Russia, China and Europe must be managed carefully. The international concern that NMD will upset existing arms control mechanisms needs to be addressed. These challenges are not insurmountable. The difficulty will be how Canada sells its support internationally and manages to leverage its international credibility to take the lead in diplomatically resolving these key concerns.

³⁵ The Honourable Art Eggleton, "Factors Affecting Canada's Approach to National Missile Defence" in *Canada and National Missile Defence*, ed by David Rudd, Jim Hanson, Jessica Blitt, *Proceedings of CISS Spring Seminar 2000* (Toronto: CISS, Spring 2000), p42.

³⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Human Securities*, p 1. Canada's Human Securities platform focuses on the security of people. This constitutes a major shift and necessary shift in international relations which are focused on the security of the state. Fundamental to this platform is the intervention, where necessary and with military force, to protect populations at great risk.

³⁷ Finan, p21. Dr Finan is discussing nuclear deterrence from a US-USSR perspective. However, his use of deterrence remains as valid in this scenario of NMD.

RUSSIA

Russia perceives NMD as a threat to its strategic power because of the potential for rapid expansion of NMD into a robust anti-ballistic missile defence that could mitigate a Russian retaliatory strike capability.³⁸ Russia would then be vulnerable to a first strike by the US. Russia is hesitant to trust the NMD as they perceive it to be a "harbinger of SDI [and] that NMD is directed against Russia."³⁹ This could be destabilizing if it motivated Russia to expand its current ABM system from point to national coverage, increase its arsenals of offensive weapons or develop countermeasures to NMD such as the use of decoys. All this would lead to further global instability.

Political posturing between the US and Russia, reinforced with historical mistrust, has been unsuccessful in resolving Russia's concerns of NMD. Canada is well positioned to lead a concerted dialogue on NMD. Canada has open and respected communications with both states. Russia's clear understanding of NMD will be essential to maintaining global stability. Canada must clearly articulate the scope of NMD and its stabilizing features. This would be supported by Canada's own conditions for NMD support. Canada could also use Russia's own proposal for a common ballistic missile defence system as a start point for discussion. The Russian proposal has received significant support in Europe and the rest of the world.⁴⁰ A joint Russia-US ballistic defence would serve both Russia and the US security needs while building a degree of transparency and trust between the two largest nuclear nations in the world. Whether through

³⁸ Bill Robinson, "The Case Against National Missile Defence", in *Canada and National Missile Defence*, ed by David Rudd, Jim Hanson, Jessica Blitt, Proceedings of CISS Annual Spring Seminar 2000 (Toronto: CISS, Spring 2000), p59.

³⁹ Fergusson, *Forum Report*, p12.

⁴⁰ Facts.Com, 28 June 2000, p 2. Russian President Putin proposed an alternative plan to the US NMD. It calls for a joint system that would intercept missiles during their ascent that were headed for the US, Russia and Europe. The Russian proposal would use a boost-phase approach keeping it within the bounds of the ABM Treaty. The US does not believe a boost phase system will be capable of meeting the threat by 2005 although former US Secretary of Defence Cohen has publicly stated the US was willing to listen.

explanation of NMD or facilitating a joint capability development, Canada must try and achieve a compromise between Russia and the US, or else NMD could become a destabilizing influence.

CHINA

China opposes NMD and any related TMD system, referring to it as "Washington's Sky Net dream."⁴¹ China's strategic nuclear arsenal is small to begin with,⁴² and, therefore, even a small US NMD system may be capable of defeating China's strategic retaliatory strike capability. China's main concern, however, is the extension of an NMD or even TMD coverage or technology to Taiwan or Japan. This would minimize China's leverage of its strategic arsenal as a coercive instrument of diplomacy to keep the US from interfering in what it considers to be its integral business: namely the reintegration of Taiwan into China. Veiled threats of exchanging Los Angeles for Taipei⁴³ would be less threatening to the US with NMD. China would be forced to either increase its arsenal or develop a counter to NMD. Furthermore, China would likely resort to the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies to its Allies to provide a greater threat to the US. China's concurrence is not essential to NMD, although as an emerging power, China must clearly be a major focus.

⁴¹ Dr Robert D'A Henderson, "The US-Proposed National Missile Defence System: The East Asian Response" in *Canada and National Missile Defence*, ed by David Rudd, Jim Hanson, Jessica Blitt, *Proceedings of CISS Annual Spring Seminar 2000* (Toronto: CISS, Spring 2000), p18.

⁴² Walpole, p8. China has an estimated arsenal of 20 ICBMs capable of reaching the US. By 2015, it is estimated China will have tens of missiles targeted against the US. The US NMD is seen as significantly impacting China's strategic capability, especially if it expands beyond the 100 interceptor scope. China is not considered a threat in terms of winning a nuclear exchange rather its strategy is based on negating the US influence of the US strategic arsenal in its own national strategy.

⁴³ *Why China Hates NMD*, *The Wall Street Journal*, New York: 11 July 2000. The statement is attributed to Chinese General Xiong Guangkai in speaking to a US envoy in 1995. In 2000, a Chinese government newspaper, the Liberation Army Daily, warned that a defence of Taiwan could lead to missile attacks on the US.

Canada's strong relationship with China provides the catalyst to initiate dialogue with China on NMD. Canada could pursue incorporation of China as a key member of a joint ballistic missile project with the US and Russia, although this would be difficult to sell to the US. Canada must be cautious, however, that its decision to support NMD does not become hostage to China's opposition. NMD poses no greater threat to strategic stability than a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. NMD could, however, lessen the risk of Chinese aggression towards Taiwan. This would make NMD a stabilizing mechanism to world security even without China's support.

EUROPE

Canada must remain cognizant of European attitudes towards NMD. There is a concern amongst many European nations that NMD will result in the political de-coupling of US strategic forces from European security.⁴⁴ NMD does not signal a US intent to adopt an isolationist posture. Rather, it is a limited means of countering an emerging ballistic missile threat. This threat applies equally to Europe, hence the ongoing development of various ballistic missile defence systems within Europe.⁴⁵ Although most European nations have the same set of concerns, each has different stance on NMD.⁴⁶ There is no European consensus. Canada must address each nation individually. Canada must use its influence to emphasize the emerging threat

⁴⁴ Dr Jim Fergusson, "The European Dimension of Ballistic Missile Defence", in *Canada and National Missile Defence*, ed by David Rudd, Jim Hanson and Jessica Blitt, Proceedings of CISS Annual Spring Seminar 2000 (Toronto: CISS, Spring 2000), p30.

⁴⁵ Fergusson, "European Dimension", p37. There are several Theatre level missile defence systems being developed jointly within Europe to counter Middle East and SOUTH Mediterranean littoral threats. Dr Fergusson contends that Europe will develop and deploy a strategic defence for all of Europe sometime in the future.

⁴⁶ Fergusson, "European Dimension", p29. The concerns are the ballistic missile threat, proliferation, viability of deterrence, strategic de-coupling and differential security. As an example, the UK supports the US threat assessment but differs on the intent of rogue states to use these weapons. France is opposed to NMD as they fear a ballistic missile defence proliferating to Russia, which would undermine their own strategic arsenal. Turkey is supportive of NMD while Italy is concerned of a US de-coupling, as Italy has no strategic arsenal of its own. Germany is fearful of a dramatic impact to Russian relations.

and the inability of Cold War deterrence doctrine to counter it. With a parallel diplomatic effort towards Russia, Canada stands a good chance of gaining additional European support for NMD as a stabilizing security mechanism in the post Cold War security environment

ARMS CONTROL AND THE ABM TREATY

Fundamental to global security is an arms control framework. The introduction of NMD could compliment current non-proliferation initiatives. The motivation of states to pursue ballistic missile and WMD technology would be reduced given its limited value against an active defence. Non-proliferation remains central to Canada's foreign policy efforts and support for NMD compliments this position. Canada has fully supported the START series of talks and is a signatory to the MRTTC and NPT.⁴⁷ Canada's support of NMD would be a continuance of what Canada has represented historically in arms control. NMD affects many arms control treaties and is perceived by several states to be destabilizing. What is needed is a singular arms control issue that, if resolved, would lessen fears of NMD being destabilizing and likely promote support for NMD as a viable deterrence mechanism. The ABM Treaty is a sensitive topic and perhaps the most significant concern of NMD critics. The ABM Treaty should be Canada's initial focus.

Many states are concerned that NMD is not compliant with the ABM Treaty of 1972. A CSIS report confirms that "an NMD system adequate to meet the challenges posed by existing, much less emerging, ballistic missile threats will not be compliant with the existing ABM

⁴⁷ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canadian Position on Key Nuclear Policy Issues", *Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation*, [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/new_nuclear-e.asp], p 2 and 8.

Treaty."⁴⁸ The US has indicated that it would withdraw from the Treaty should Russia be unwilling to negotiate amendments. The ABM Treaty is seen by many Americans as constituting the "entrails of an expired security relationship with Russia."⁴⁹ Russia has stated that it is not willing to renegotiate the ABM Treaty for fears it would minimize its strategic capabilities. The treaty, in its present form, will not survive NMD. A lack of mutual trust and ignorance, compounded by political rhetoric, will likely keep both the US and Russia at odds over treaty amendments, increasing the likelihood that one or both will pull out of the treaty based on a lack of success. This situation is clearly evident in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's own words when, in speaking of the ABM, he concluded that "it is not in our country's interest to perpetuate vulnerability."⁵⁰ The validity of the ABM Treaty must be questioned in its present form as the assumptions it was based upon have fundamentally changed.

There remains a requirement for an ABM Treaty. The treaty is perceived as key to strategic stability, if only to ensure nations do not re-arm with offensive nuclear weapons to counter asymmetric defences. The ABM Treaty has, and continues to be, perceived by many nations as a "guarantor and a facilitator of drastic cuts in strategic offensive forces."⁵¹ Its dissolution would not be in the US or Russia's best interests. However, the treaty was established during the Cold War amidst the MAD deterrence philosophy. It was designed to maintain the vulnerability between the US and the USSR. The US cannot be held to a treaty that is deemed

⁴⁸ Steinberg, p18.

⁴⁹ William Schneider, "Discussions to Arms Control and Missile Defense Options: Contending Perspectives", in *Security, Strategy and Missile Defense*, ed by Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, (Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 1996), p64.

⁵⁰ Frank J. Gaffney Jr., "Missile Defense Signals", *The Washington Times*, [<http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/commentary-2001131165943.htm>], 31 Jan 2001, p 1.

⁵¹ Michael Krepon, "Alternative Approaches to the ABM Treaty", in *Security, Strategy and Missile Defense*, ed by Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, (Virginia: Brassey's Inc, 1996), p 61.

irrelevant in the emerging geopolitical environment. In order for the ABM Treaty to remain relevant in the post Cold War environment, and contribute to nuclear deterrence, it must be objectively evaluated to accommodate new and emerging threats.

Canada should seize the opportunity to lead a revision on the ABM Treaty, the continued existence of which is a condition of its support for NMD. Although not a signatory, Canada is a firm supporter of the treaty and believes it to be the "cornerstone of stability."⁵² This belief is held by many nations, even if they believe the ABM Treaty to be fundamentally archaic and irrelevant in its present form. Canada would likely receive international support if it lead the ABM Treaty revision process. For Canada, the issue is not whether the NMD meets the spirit or the law of the Treaty, rather the continued existence of the treaty.⁵³

It will be essential that the ABM Treaty is revised prior to a US NMD deployment decision. This could be achieved by proposing a solution that caters for an NMD capability of 100 interceptors at one site to provide national coverage against a limited ballistic missile threat. The US would likely be in agreement as this would accommodate their short term security needs. Russia might also be supportive of a revision, especially if international support for the initiative was overwhelming. A compliant treaty with relatively few amendments from its original premise would help reduce Russian fears of NMD becoming a strategic defence umbrella. Stability would be enhanced as NMD, when deployed, would be treaty compliant. In recognition of China's growing power, Canada should also try to bring China into the treaty as a signatory. The concurrence of the US, Russia and China on the ABM Treaty would be a boost for non-

⁵² David J. Smith, "Beyond the Cold War", *Sea Power*, Washington: Nov 2000, p 2.

⁵³ Fergusson, *Forum Report*, p 16.

proliferation efforts. International acceptance of NMD would likely increase if the ABM Treaty issue was resolved. Global security would be enhanced.

CONCLUSION

NMD is not SDI. It is a defence against a limited ballistic missile attack from states of concern. The threat from ballistic missiles and WMD is real and growing. In addition to Russia, the threat comes from China and several other states of concern to the US. With this expansion of potential adversaries with the ability to deliver WMD with ballistic missiles, Cold War deterrence mechanisms are less relevant and the doctrine no longer viable. The US must protect itself when deterrence and diplomacy fail. Failure to do so puts the US at risk to coercive diplomatic pressures that threaten the US with unacceptable casualties. This would lead to an unstable security environment and could impact US involvement in international peace and security operations.

The US leadership believes it has a fundamental responsibility to provide its citizens with the best security it can afford. It will therefore deploy NMD. There will be considerable opposition to this decision, especially from Russia and China, which perceive NMD as an asymmetric threat that threatens their strategic relevance. Unless the concerns of China and Russia are managed, this could lead to a destabilizing environment, with the specter of a renewed arms race.

The ABM Treaty will be fundamental to continued stability. Designed in the Cold War to maintain a vulnerability between the US and the USSR, its applicability in the emerging geo-political climate is questionable. The Treaty must be revisited to ensure that it remains a viable deterrence mechanism in the era of NMD. This would assist in the maintenance of stability.

Canada's support of NMD would be in the best interests of its national security and world stability. It would strengthen its close and strategic ties with the US. The caveats to Canada's support are essential to ensure that Canada is not perceived as simply siding with the US. Rather, Canada would be seen as contributing to world stability. Properly communicated, this would strengthen Canada's international credentials. It would provide Canada with a unique opportunity to leverage its international status towards the creation of a new strategic security architecture based on the Human Securities platform. Canada would be ideally situated to initiate a dialogue with Russia, China and the major European nations to confirm the reality of the emerging threat while dispelling the myths of NMD. Canada could also initiate a revision of the ABM Treaty with the aim of making it relevant to the emerging geo-politic environment. A viable ABM Treaty is stabilizing: no ABM Treaty is the opposite.

The timing of Canada's decision to support NMD is also critical. Excessive delay could minimize Canada's overall contribution to the process. A negative response to NMD could jeopardize Canada's relationship with the US. This could affect Canada's national security, including adversely impacting NORAD.

The roadblocks to the NMD are many but it should be seen as a positive contribution to world stability. The development of a NMD will bring the world to a crossroad. Canada has the opportunity to help move the world away from Cold War deterrence doctrine to a new and viable security architecture. It will be a monumental task and fraught with risk. However, Cold War doctrine does not offer a sensible solution in the face of new and increasing threats. Canada's international credibility would be enhanced by clearly enunciating support for NMD, but with defined caveats to it. The US will most likely deploy NMD and so the issue is not likely to go away. Canada must therefore assess its position, based on its own national security and the emerging global security requirements. Canada should support NMD, and now is the time for Canada to decide.

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