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EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY AND NATO:

IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

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ABSTRACT

The European Security Defence Identity is an initiative designed to give the EU an independent voice with respect to security issues, including independent means in responding to these issues. By its very nature it is intended to shift the European/Americas balance within the NATO alliance, instilling greater influence on the European side. By both intent and structure ESDI has the potential to marginalize Canada's voice not only within NATO but also in the European security debate as a whole.

For Canada, engagement with Europe and active participation within NATO have been central to Canada's foreign and defence policies, and have directly served Canada's vital interest of remaining active on the world stage. It is imperative that Canada immediately becomes actively engaged in the ESDI debate and firmly articulates Canada's requirements, including recognition that Canada is a stakeholder in European security issues and therefore must be accorded representation at both the political and military levels in any ESDI/NATO accord.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY AND NATO: IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA

The European Security Defence Identity (ESDI) issue has come to dominate the debate on the future of NATO on both sides of the Atlantic. Contained within ESDI are initiatives to allow the European Union (EU) greater autonomy from NATO when addressing security issues, including conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. The communiqués and analysis surrounding ESDI are both far reaching and often in conflict. Proponents of ESDI, such as NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, see the initiative as a means to "make for a stronger Europe, a stronger NATO, and a healthier, more balanced transatlantic relationship."[1] The critics of ESDI, such as Henry Kissinger, warn that the initiative "could produce the worst of all worlds: disruption of NATO procedures and impairment of allied co-operation without enhanced allied military capability or meaningful European autonomy".[2]

At the heart of the issue is the effect ESDI will have on the transatlantic link, which has been a cornerstone of NATO since its inception. On both sides of the Atlantic, the analysis of this transatlantic link has centred on the American reaction to ESDI, and whether it could cause an American re-assessment of their commitment to NATO. Conspicuous by its absence is any similar debate or analysis as to what ESDI could mean to Canada. As the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs concluded: "the obvious question for Canada in contemplating the possible emergence of a European Security Defence Identity is where do we fit in – if at all?"[3]

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[1] Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, The Transatlantic Link (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2000) 29.
[2] Toby Harnden, "Kissinger urges Bush to shore up Nato," Electric Telegraph issue 2072 26 Jan. 2001(www.telegraph.co.uk)
[3] Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, The New NATO and the Evolution of Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada (Ottawa: Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Apr 2000) 66.

Although both Canada and the United States are viewed as the Atlantic side of the transatlantic link, each country has different viewpoints and interests within the NATO alliance. Consequently, the ESDI issue has completely different ramifications for the United States and Canada. When analyzing Canada's interests, and the reasons for remaining in the NATO alliance, it is obvious that ESDI has the potential to marginalize Canada, and remove the benefits Canada enjoys as a NATO member. Given this risk, it is imperative that Canada immediately becomes actively engaged in the ESDI debate and firmly articulates Canada's requirements, including recognition that Canada is a stakeholder in European security issues and therefore must be accorded representation at both the political and military levels in any ESDI/NATO accord.

To study the ESDI issue and what it means to Canada, it is necessary to answer a series of questions. First, what are the driving forces behind ESDI and what is the desired end-state of the ESDI proponents? Second, what are Canada's interests within NATO? Finally, how could the ESDI initiative impact on Canada's interests and what are Canada's options?

ESDI

ESDI is the latest attempt to answer the question of, "how can the states of Europe provide for their security and pursue their interests in the world?" [4] For the members of the European Union (EU) this issue has been a dominant and evolving security concern since the end of the Second World War. While seemingly a simple question, the answer is invariably complex and controversial, for Europe's answer to the security part of the question – NATO, has not fully answered the requirement to independently pursue their

[4] Jeffrey Becker, "Asserting EU Cohesion: Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Relaunch of Europe," European Security Vol. 7 No. 4, Winter 1998: 12.

interests in the world, from a security viewpoint. This has led to a tug of war between the alliance requirements for concensus and the European Union requirement for a greater, and in some cases independent, voice on security issues. This tug of war has been influenced by the changes in the perceived threat, as well as the political integration of the EU states.

Historically, ESDI predates NATO, in that it can trace a direct ancestry back to the Brussels Treaty of 1948, whereby the five states of the Western Union (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and the Netherlands) formed an alliance of collective self-defence against the threat posed by an expansionist Soviet Union. This initiative can also be viewed as a direct precursor to the Washington Treaty of 1949, which created NATO.[5] Although the collective defence requirement of the Brussels Treaty had been assumed by the larger NATO alliance, the Brussels Treaty remained extant. In 1954 the Brussels treaty was modified and the organization's mandate de-conflicted with that of NATO by the addition of Article IV. This article not only directed the Western Union organization to work in close cooperation with NATO, but also "recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters."[6] Consequently, in the face of the Soviet threat, the requirement for an independent European voice was held in abeyance, in favour of a strong NATO. However, it never went away.

By 1966 the French in particular were unhappy with the lack of an independent voice and in reaction to the perceived domination of NATO by the US, withdrew from

[5] Alfred Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO (London: Brassey's, 1989) 2.
[6] Cahen 71.

the integrated military structure. Since then, France has been the undisputed champion of the need for an independent European voice in security issues, but she has not been alone. In 1984 the Western European Union (WEU) was reactivated to "increase the co-operation of member states in the field of security policy".[7] This policy was further strengthened in 1987 by the Platform on European Security Interests, in which the WEU states agreed that they were "convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence."[8]

The equilibrium between the forces in the tug of war, representing the need for NATO solidarity and the expression of a distinct European voice, took on a radical shift in the 90s due to two factors. First, the end of the cold war, ended the period where the Soviet threat eclipsed all others as the immediate and over-riding security concern for Europe. Second, the advanced integration of Europe had reached a point where the extension of the integration into foreign policy and security issues was not only possible, but was actually logical. These two factors were given added political impetus and urgency by the break up of Yugoslavia. The inability of the Europeans to effectively handle this military crisis graphically illustrated that they were reliant on US military power and political will to handle security situations; even those that occurred in the EU's backyard.[9]

The effects of these shifts in the equilibrium were very apparent in the growing EU political will to develop an independent security voice. This political will was formally articulated in the EU Maastricht Treaty of 1992, in which the EU states

[7] Cahen 83.
[8] Cahen 91.
[9] A detailed analysis of this shifting dynamic is given in: Tom Lansford, "The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security After the Cold War," The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol.

"resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy."[10] This resolution has been reiterated and strengthened in EU declarations throughout the 90s, with the EU Helsinki Summit of 1999 actually creating the structures to implement the common security policy. Dr Javier Solana, acting in his role as High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, articulated the issue from the European Union perspective, as the "need to complement the political and economic instruments at our disposal by developing an effective Command and Foreign Security Policy, including capabilities, both civilian and military, to enable us to intervene in international crisis. We have now to begin to take seriously our responsibilities as a global actor for regional security."[11]

The material outcome of the renewed ESDI focus has been the establishment of an autonomous EU military capability, with European states providing forces to both NATO and the EU force. If not replacing NATO, how does the EU see this organization fitting into the security debate and interacting with NATO? As Solana states, "the union has stressed that ESDP[12] is not about collective defence. NATO will remain the foundation of the collective defence of its members."[13] From the EU perspective this force in no way replaces or competes with NATO. It does give the EU a security voice outside NATO. Politically, this is important, for the memberships of the EU and NATO are by no means identical. At present there are four EU members who are not part of

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22 No. 1, Mar 1999 and Alistair Shepherd, "Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defence Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capacity?" European Security Vol. 9 No. 2, Summer 2000.

[10] Maastricht Treaty, Introduction of Signatories

[11] Javier Solana, "Common European Foreign and Security Policy Targets for the Future," NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace 1/2000: 107.

[12] ESDP is the acronym for European Security and Defence Policy. This acronym has largely become interchangeable with ESDI in that ESDI is viewed as the initiative and ESDP the outcome.

[13] Javier Solana, "Common European Foreign and Security Policy Targets for the Future," NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace 1/2000: 107.

NATO (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) and 8 members of NATO not part of the EU (Canada, United States, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Czech Rep, Hungary and Poland). Consequently from the EU perspective, to rely solely on NATO for reaction capability means 3 members of the EU have no voice in the debate, while 8 non-members of the EU do have a voice, in fact a veto.

ESDI has in effect created a new military alliance organization, which will get its political direction from the European Union. It has also established political and strategic structures to support this military organization. These structures closely resemble those of NATO with a political control and strategic direction body, in the form of the Standing Political and Security Committee, a military advisory body in the form of the Military Committee, and an embedded military staff within the Council structure. At the sharp end this organization has an EU commitment for a 50,000 to 60,000 man military corps, available within 60 days for international operations and sustainable for a year.

Militarily, what the EU has done is draw a divide across the traditional spectrum of conflict, and grouped all the operations deemed to be within European capabilities as "Peterberg tasks."[14i] Effectively it has created a military organization capable of operations up to crisis management, which includes conflict prevention and humanitarian relief operations, leaving the upper scale military tasks such as collective defence to NATO. In creating a military structure, responsive to the EU and capable of calling on a significant military force, the EU has achieved their aim for a mechanism to articulate and enforce an independent European security agenda, while retaining the security

[14] The Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and evacuation missions, peace-keeping missions and combat-force missions for crisis management, including missions to restore peace (European Union Military Capabilities Commitment, Brussels 20 Nov 2000)

guarantees of NATO. In doing so however, they have also threatened the viability of Canada's role and the realization of Canadian aims within NATO.

Canada in NATO

Canada was one of the founding members of NATO, and was an outspoken advocate for the importance of the transatlantic link. From the beginning, Canada's view of NATO differed from that of her NATO allies. For the European members, the over-riding purpose of NATO lay in the Article Five collective defence measures, which ensured their physical security in the face of the Soviet threat. For Canada, the concept of NATO as a counter to a direct threat to Canadian territory was never a salient factor. Even if the old adage that Canadians "live in a fireproof house far from inflammable materials"[15] did not stand up to the Cold War realities of nuclear missiles, NORAD and not NATO was the key to homeland defence. Instead, from the beginning, NATO was first and foremost a political alliance, wherein Canada would have a voice in shaping the security environment in Europe and more importantly retain links within Europe. Canada's view of the purpose of NATO was clearly articulated in Article 2 (also known as the Canadian Article) of the North Atlantic Treaty, which reads:

> The parties will contribute toward the peaceful development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage collaboration between any or all of them.[16]

[15] Raoul Dandurand in an address as the Canadian delegate to the League of Nations Assembly, Oct 2, 1924. John Colombo, ed., Colombo's Canadian Quotations (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1974) 137.
[16] Lewis Hertzman, John Warnock and Thomas Hockin, Alliances and Illusions: Canada and the NATO-NORAD Question (Edmonton: Hurtig Ltd, 1969) 139.

This view as to the political saliency of the alliance, and the requirement for Canada to remain politically engaged in Europe, has since been regularly reinforced as a matter of Canadian policy. In 1956 a group led by Lester B Pearson, studying prospects for greater unity within the Atlantic Community noted the requirement to create "the habits and traditions and precedents for such co-operation and unity."[17] In 1972, the Trudeau government's enthusiasm for the "third option" trade links with Europe, caused it to "rediscover the importance of the transatlantic ideal that had moved policy makers in the 1940s and 1950s to commit Canadian resources to the defence of Europe."[18] In 1990, Joe Clark continued this theme, noting that "Canada's associations with its European allies are important not only in pursuit of tangible economic or political interests, but also because they reflect a desire for a flexibility which is essential to our success as a smaller power whose next-door neighbour is a superpower."[19]

With the end of the Cold War the direct military threat to Europe that led to the creation of NATO disappeared. With the requirement for NATO's defensive capability gone, many ask: why should Canada worry about loss of influence within the alliance, or in fact continue to invest in the alliance at all? When viewed from an Article Five collective defence aspect, NATO had served its purpose. However, when viewed from a political alliance aspect, NATO remains very important to Canada. First, "NATO remains the primary body for consultations and coordination of policy on issues affecting the

[17] Robert Wolfe, "Atlanticism without the Wall: transatlantic cooperation and the transformation of Europe," International Journal XI.VI Winter 1990-1:144.
[18] Ken Nossal, "A European Nation? The Life and Times of Atlanticism in Canada," Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, ed. John English and Norman Hillmer (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992) 92.
[19] Wolfe 137.

North Atlantic community of nations."[20] For Canada to remain meaningfully engaged in Europe, this body is extremely important if not essential. Second, a corner stone of Canada's foreign and security policy is multilateralism.[21] In the words of the 1994 Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, "for Canada, the search for multilateral ways to encourage peace and preserve stability is not an option – it is an essential element of our national interest and of our foreign policy."[22] The 1994 Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy went even further, describing "the capacity to play the sort of active and independent role in the world that Canadians demand"[23] as a national vital interest. As a body, NATO provides Canada with an important multilateral forum, as well as positioning Canada to play a meaningful and active role in security debates that would be well beyond our scope as an individual state. This is particularly true given NATO's more flexible and outward looking focus.

From a Canadian perspective, the transformation that NATO has undergone, since the end of the Cold War, has made it more pertinent to Canadian policy then it was in its original form. The NATO of today is "the preeminent security organization in the Western world, and has developed an elaborate array of outreach programs to Central and Eastern Europe."[24] In the last 10 years it has acted to enforce UN economic embargo measures, assumed peacekeeping and crisis management responsibilities and actively

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[20] Art Eggleton, Speaking Notes for the Honourable Art Eggleton Minister of National Defence to WEU Parlimentary assembly and Interim European Security and Defence Assembly Paris, 7 Dec 2000.

[21] Multilateralism is being used in the sense of a policy orientation directed toward broadly based international groupings and institutions formed to foster global cooperation in one or more policy areas. (Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future p81)

[22] Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canada's Defence Policy, Security in a changing world Summary 1994 (Ottawa: Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canada's Defence Policy, 1994) 4.

[23] Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future (Ottawa: Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canada's Foreign Policy, 1994) 77.

engaged in dialogue and cooperation with other countries. The Alliance's Strategic Concept approved in 1999, specifically notes, "it's growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states … (and) its commitment to … conflict prevention and crisis management, including peace support operations."[25] As David Haglund noted in 1997, "Canadian policy-makers are coming close to realizing the alliance of their dreams: a political community sustained more upon the basis of common values and interests than upon the need to respond to a common threat."[26] However, Canada's role in this political community could be seriously affected by ESDI.

Impact of ESDI on Canadian Interests

In assessing the impact of ESDI, it is necessary to expand the study beyond a simple assessment of what agreements or assurances have been tabled to date, for as Lord Robertson observed, "ESDI is a work in progress, so it is natural that there are still some unresolved issues."[27] Instead, three cases will be analysed to examine what ESDI could mean to Canada, and to explore the viability and advisability of potential Canadian responses.

Case One – ESDI fully embraced

As outlined earlier, ESDI as a concept can mean a number of things to a number of people, and is the latest in a long evolutionary process. If the aims of ESDI are fully embraced, the EU will have both the autonomous political body and the autonomous military capability to intercede in international crises. As well, the European members of

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[24] Allen Sens, "Living in a Renovated NATO," Canadian Military Journal Vol 1, NO 4 Winter 2000-2001: 84.
[25] NATO, The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington 23-25 April 1999 p49
[26] David Haglund, "The NATO of its dreams?" International Journal Summer 1997: p475.

NATO will retain the security guarantees inherent in NATO's Article 5. This is certainly an understandable aspiration, as they receive the best of both worlds. Most importantly, they increase their political options and in doing so their influence. For example, in the event of a new crisis that affects European security, the debate as to how the European security community should respond will now have a dual focus, with the debate occurring at the NATO table as well as the EU table. EU members will be stating their views at both. However from the Canadian perspective, Canada only has a voice at one of the tables. What is then the impact of the Canadian voice? It is certainly not enhanced. In fact, the imperative to reach a NATO consensus will be lost, as there will be little reason or ability to compromise an agreed EU solution to account for a Canadian view. The result of such a split is that issues would come down to "EU with the United States", and "EU without the United States" debates. This is acknowledged in President Chirac's claim that ESDI "is a prerequisite for a revitalised transatlantic link based on a balanced dialogue between the United States and the European Union."[28] There seems to be little room for a Canadian voice in such a "balanced dialogue." Even in the case of a decision favouring the "EU with the US" option, it is by no means clear that such an operation would fall under NATO political direction, at least in its current form. The dynamic of who will lead the effort, effectively decides what group lose their voice in the political direction of the effort. A NATO lead would remove the non-NATO members of the EU from playing a direct political role. The sensitivity of this issue was clearly expressed by Austria, which "expects that all EU Member States will participate on an equal footing in all stages of an EU-led operation, including planning and other activities which might

[27] Lord Robertson 29.

take place within NATO."[29] This sensitivity will certainly bring a dynamic favouring an "EU led" or "EU-US coalition led" designation to any operation, vice a NATO led designation.

The other dynamic that will influence the debate is the EU's selection of autonomy for "Petersberg tasks" vice the entire spectrum of security issues. In doing so the EU has potentially created a hierarchy, whereby they will have priority for leading "Petersberg tasks", after all that is why it was created, while NATO's raison d'être will revert to its former Article Five collective defence role. The impact of this for Canada is obvious. Not only does it marginalize NATO's voice, and therefore Canada's, when dealing with crisis management or conflict prevention issues, but it leaves Canada with collective defence commitments that hold little interest or value to her. Effectively she retains the expense and commitment of NATO membership, while being excluded from the security debates which are of national interest.

To date, Canadian response to ESDI counters the argument that the ESDI scenario will marginalize Canada within NATO, by pointing out that Canada will retain a veto on the issue of the EU's use of NATO assets and infrastructure.[30] However, this hardly puts Canada in a position to influence the direction an operation is to take, for by the time the NATO asset debate happens, the political direction will have been decided. Canada will be placed in the position of rubber stamping the EU request, or earning the EU's wrath by invoking what could only appear to be an obstructionist veto. Neither role is conducive to Canada's goals for remaining within NATO. In fact it could be argued that such a

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[28] Jacques Chirac, "The Future of the Alliance Depends on the Strength of the Trans-Atlantic Link," NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace 1/1999: 62.

[29] Austrian Declaration on the Occasion of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Brussels,1

scenario effectively puts Canada in the reverse of France's position within NATO, by removing her from the political side of NATO, but keeping her in the Integrated Military Structure.

The other avenue Canada is following to retain a voice within the European Security Community, is to attempt to work out "consultation and participation arrangements … for EU led operations."[31] While this is definitely required, Canada must articulate her position clearly, and respond to what has already been adopted by the EU for consultation and cooperation with NATO. During the Helsinki European Council, it was agreed that "upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets."[32] Further, "in the case of an EU-led operation, an ad-hoc committee of contributors will be set up for the day-to-day conduct of the operation."[33] The fact that Canada, as a non-European NATO member, has been specifically excluded in this declaration, should be noted in Canada's response, especially in view of the fact that both Russia and the Ukraine are specifically noted later in the declaration as states which may be invited to participate. The wording of the declaration also makes it clear that states that are invited to participate will be restricted to involvement at the day-to-day conduct level, while the

[30] Art Eggleton, "Speaking Notes for the Honourable Art Eggleton Minister of National Defence to WEU Parlimentary assembly and Interim European Security and Defence Assembly Paris," 7 Dec 2000.
[31] John Manley, "Notes for an Address by the Honourable John Manley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the North Atlantic Council Meetings" Brussels, 14 Dec 2000
[32] Annex IV to Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 Dec 1999.
[33] Ibid

EU Council retains responsibility for the higher level direction as part of the "Union's decision making autonomy."[34]

In this case, even if Canada does get herself included in a participation agreement, the only role on offer is that of military contributor without any associated political voice. In such a scenario, the Canadian debate would be limited to an expression of whether it would like to be invited to participate or not. A condition that has been described as "begging bowl diplomacy." This would neither provide a mechanism to keep Canada meaningfully engaged in Europe, nor active and independent in the world, so consequently it fails to meet the Canadian requirements for its NATO involvement.

Case Two – ESDI Ignored as a Non-Starter

As noted earlier, the near perfect match between NATO's strategic direction and Canadian defence and foreign affairs ambitions make the NATO status quo the optimal end-state from a Canadian perspective. This end-state is also favoured, both within and outside Europe, by some analysts that see ESDI as a threat to NATO itself. Optimists within this group note that ESDI can be seen as a parallel to the re-launching of the WEU as a military organization in 1984; an act of great political fanfare but of little lasting significance. They also note that even within the EU, the relationship between ESDI and NATO, and even the concept of ESDI itself, is not universally agreed. As late as March of 1999, Tony Blair went on record to state "that 'the European Parliament and Court of Justice would have no role…'. Nor would the European Commission 'have a decision-making role on military matters'"[35] Later, even as Britain was agreeing to contribute military forces to the EU reaction force, Geoff Hoon, the British Defence Secretary went

[34] Ibid
[35] Michael Codner, "Just how far can we go?" RUSI Journal Vol 144 (Apr/May 1999): 31.

on record to characterize the European Reaction Force as a "mythical creation."[36] Yet, despite these statements, ESDI continues to gain momentum and the Helsinki Agreement, notwithstanding Mr Blair's earlier statements, has turned concept into reality, with the creation of a military hierarchy with earmarked military forces. As Peter Schimidt notes, "with its Helsinki decisions, the EU not only goes beyond previous statements on European security and defence, it also moves significantly beyond the model of transatlantic partnership agreed at the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin."[37]

While the status quo would indeed be the optimal outcome from the Canadian perspective, it should not be considered a reasonable goal. The drive behind ESDI has been a reality for the entire history of NATO, and the present political and security climate within Europe certainly favor its further development. By ignoring it, it will not go away, and by opposing it, Canada cannot defeat it. This creates the requirement for a third option.

Case Three – Broker an ESDI/NATO Compromise

If it is accepted that ESDI is a reality, and the status quo cannot be maintained, then Canada must carve a path to minimize the negative affects ESDI could have on her position within NATO and the European security debate. The downside of the ESDI scenario has not been lost on other non-EU members of NATO. Even the United States has expressed concern that they could become excluded from EU defence and Security decision making. They are attempting to address this concern through what can be termed as sequenced decision making that would enshrine the NATO option as the preferred option. Rather than being faced with a fait accompli, that is, entering the debate faced

[36] Michael Evans, "Reaction force a 'myth'," The Times 30 Jan. 2001.
[37] Peter Schmidt, "Separable but not separate?" NATO Review (Spring 2000):12.

with a pre-agreed EU decision that would be very difficult if not impossible to reverse, the United States seeks EU agreement, that the EU would only act where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. The US Senate was even more forthright in passing Resolution 208, indicating that "the European Union should make clear that it would undertake an autonomous mission through its European Security and Defence Identity, only after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred it to the European Union for action."[38] These initiatives by the United States serve to indicate two issues. First, if the United States is worried that her voice will not be heard in the security debate, dangers to the much quieter Canadian voice are very real. Second, while it is very doubtful that the EU would accept the role of a referral service for NATO, there is the potential that Canada could use the clout of US concerns to engage the EU in the debate of where non-European members of NATO fit in, and potentially broker a compromise. Given this approach, what compromise, short of the US position of NATO having right of first refusal, will best serve Canadian needs?

For both Canada and the United States, the issue centres on having a meaningful voice at the table during security and defence debates. To do this, Canada should lead an initiative to shape the formal arrangements between NATO and the EU to meet Canadian requirements. Such an arrangement should seek formal EU and NATO recognition of some basic precepts for NATO/EU protocols including agreement that:

A. Any request for the use of NATO assets and infrastructure in an EU led operation, will include an invitation for all NATO members to participate as full partners in the operation,

[38] Allexander Moens, "NATO and ESDP: The Need for a Political Agreement," Canadian Military Journal Vol 1 No. 4 (Winter 2000-2001): 58.

B. Non-EU NATO countries participating in EU-led operations will be represented at both the political and military levels, for all aspects of directing the operation,

C. Non-EU NATO members are stakeholders in European security issues. This entitles them to a voice in the security debate. This fact should be recognized by inviting non-EU country representatives to participate in the EU debate, when security issues of potential interest to NATO are under consideration. (While the exact procedural issues would require fleshing out, France's role in NATO as a member of the political structure, without being a member of the integrated military structure, could be used as an example where such a hybrid arrangement has proven useful.)

While these arrangements would not provide Canada the same forum she enjoys under a non-ESDI NATO, they will ensure she can voice an opinion during the debate, vice after the debate has occurred. By staying in the security debate, Canada is in a position to shape the debate to her viewpoint, and can play the role of meaningful contributor, both politically and militarily – that is grey-ware and hardware - in the European security community.

It should also be noted that the time to engage in this debate is now, before positions are firmly established. To date Canada has played a passive role in the debate, supporting the general concept of ESDI while trying to determine how we fit in. This is inadequate. By merely commenting on EU initiatives, Canada is allowing the EU to determine where Canada will fit in. If Canadian interests are to be protected, Canada

must proactively assert her requirements. By acting early, Canada has the potential to harness not just US support, but European support as well. Non-EU European members of NATO, such as Turkey, are certainly potential allies. Even some EU members are worried about where ESDI is going, and as such are potentially influential sources of support. A European Military Attaché to Canada recounted an experience where he was talking to a countryman acting as Military Attaché to France. When the subject of ESDI came up, he found himself on the pro-NATO side of the debate while his colleague naturally took the pro-ESDI side. While this example might be anecdotal, it also illustrates that the ESDI debate is on, and Canada's position is not being well served by sitting on the sidelines.

Conclusion

ESDI is not a new concept, but rather represents the latest articulation of the requirement for an independent European voice with respect to security issues, including independent means in responding to these issues. By its very nature it is intended to shift the European/Americas balance within the NATO alliance, instilling greater influence on the European side. ESDI is not a phenomenon that will go away, and its potential impact is far too important to Canada for it to be ignored. By both intent and structure ESDI has the potential to marginalize Canada's voice not only within NATO but also in the European security debate as a whole.

For Canada, engagement with Europe and active participation within NATO have always been more important for their political dimension than their defence implications. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO's transformation from a collective defence organization to a politically active and widely engaged cooperative security organization,

have made it extremely valuable and pertinent to Canada's foreign and defence policies. NATO directly serves Canada's vital interest of remaining active on the world stage, consequently the threat ESDI poses to Canada's role in NATO is of immense importance. In order to minimize the negative affects of ESDI on Canada, it is imperative that Canada immediately becomes actively engaged in the ESDI debate. Canada must firmly articulate her requirements, including recognition that Canada is a stakeholder in European security issues and therefore must be accorded representation at both the political and military levels in any ESDI/NATO accord. If Canada is to protect her interests, she must clearly communicate that her goals within NATO are to contribute to European Security, both at the political and military level, and at all levels of conflict, from conflict prevention through to collective defence.

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