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# CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE CSC 27

## EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

### **Optimizing Senior Officer Selection & Development:**

#### *Identifying the Need for A PER Tailored for Majors and LColts*

By

Major David M.N. Gosselin, CD

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## Abstract

The process by which Development Period (DP) 3 officers destined to fill senior appointments in the Canadian Forces (CF) are selected and developed must be accurate and effective if the CF is to be capable of fulfilling its 21<sup>st</sup> Century defence mission. This paper re-examines the current appraisal system and the Officer Professional Development (OPD) System, with its division of responsibilities based on strategic, operational and tactical knowledge requirements, and the fact that these two systems are currently separate from each other. An alternative view is suggested that wholly integrates the appraisal and development schemes, based on a model of command responsibilities that reflect the 'realistic' division of roles and responsibilities exercised in the CF, divided into strategic, institutional and tactical command. Based on this model, this paper concludes that there is a need to introduce a Performance Evaluation Report (PER) for Majors and LCol, specifically tailored to reflect the command responsibilities of DP 3 officers and the qualities required of officers at DP 4. This PER will assist in the timely succession of DP 4 officers and ensure that the CF can develop into a viable military force in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

# Optimizing Senior Officer Selection & Development: *Identifying the Need for A PER Tailored for Majors and LCol*

*By Major DMN Gosselin, CD*

*"The Defence Team will generate, employ and sustain high-quality, combat-capable, inter-operable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces. We will exploit leading-edge doctrine and technologies to accomplish our domestic and international roles in the battlespace of the 21st century and be recognized, both at home and abroad, as an innovative, relevant, knowledge-based institution. With transformational leadership and coherent management, we will build upon our proud heritage in pursuit of clear strategic objectives."*

*Department of Defence Vision Statement, Strategy 2020<sup>1</sup>*

*"Knowing where the organization should be headed is one thing; developing a strategy for getting there is quite another."*

*Burt Nanus, Visionary Leadership<sup>2</sup>*

## INTRODUCTION

Transforming today's Canadian Forces (CF) into a military force capable of operating effectively in the battlespace of the 21<sup>st</sup> century will require a unique form of leadership at the strategic and operational levels of command. The challenges facing the CF's senior leaders are particular to the institution and to the accomplishment of the national defence mission.<sup>Note 1</sup> Senior leaders have the dual responsibility of transforming the institution over an extended period while simultaneously maintaining operationally viable forces throughout its transformation. The selection and succession of senior leaders is a critical element in fulfilling the CF's mandate. However, the selection process may be flawed. The selection of officers destined to fulfil the **long-term transformational** goals (Colonels and above) is based on a promotion system that evaluates their performance while carrying out **near-term goals** and activities at the rank of LCol and below. The current officer appraisal system does not account for the differences in criteria-for-success particular to each goal type and the responsibilities associated to each rank level, and exacerbates the challenge of identifying officers sufficiently early in their career to develop their skills as a senior leader later on.

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<sup>Note 1</sup> Although not a defined term, the term 'senior leader' derives from the term 'senior officer' (Majors and above), but rarely refers to LCol and below. For the purposes of this paper, it refers *generally* to those CF officers of the rank of Colonel and above, but more *specifically* to Level One CF officers (VCDS, DCDS, the Environmental Chiefs, and the ADMs), i.e., those officers who have the distinct responsibility for the well-being and transformation of the CF.

In order for an appraisal system to be effective, it must be wholly integrated in the organization's personnel development scheme and must reflect the division of roles and responsibilities throughout the organization. The Officer Professional Development (OPD) system is divided into four Development Periods (DP). It provides a comprehensive, integrated and sequential development process that consists of education, training, job experience, and self-development activities.<sup>3</sup> However, the OPD system does not reflect the current-day division of roles and responsibilities in the CF, and the use of the CF Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) and Senior Officer Performance Evaluation Reports (PER) are not wholly integrated into the OPD system.

There is a need to introduce a PER for Majors and LCol, specifically tailored to reflect their institutional roles and responsibilities, in order to assist in managing the succession of CF senior leaders and posture the CF as a viable military force in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Although this essay will address issues regarding the entire OPD system, it will concentrate on officers in DPs 3 and 4, paying particular attention to the transition between these periods. Specifically, this paper will focus on justifying the need for a Major-LCol PER and not on a discussion about its design. The design discussion will be limited to the identification of several features upon which its development should be based.

The requirement for a Major-LCol PER must be analyzed in the context of the inter-dependencies that exist between the vision of officership in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the OPD system, and the CF appraisal system. Its necessity will be derived via three complementary avenues of analysis. Once the problem is framed in the context of what is required of the officer corps in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the first avenue of analysis will present the benefits of having an integrated appraisal system coupled with the OPD system. The second will provide a renewed perspective of DP 3 and DP 4 by placing the OPD system in a command framework that realistically reflects the exercise of command responsibilities throughout the officer corps and the CF. The third analysis will highlight a gap between the two types of PERs, which is typified by their inability to assess officers in DP 3 and to satisfy the timely transition between DPs 3 and 4. A Major-LCol PER would remedy this gap and would assist in the selection, training and development of potential senior leaders.<sup>Note 2</sup>

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<sup>Note 2</sup> **Developmental Period (DP).** A developmental period (DP) is a time-frame in a member's career during which the member is trained, employed and/or given the opportunity to develop occupational and/or professional skills and knowledge. DPs are distinguished by a progressive increase in the levels of responsibility, authority, military leadership ability and war fighting knowledge. (DAOD 5038-1)

## CANADIAN OFFICERSHIP IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY: FRAMING THE PROBLEM

The topical areas of command (of which leadership is a component), the OPD system, and the appraisal system cannot be divorced from each other. Brigadier-General Leclerc, Director General Military Careers, emphasized the importance of this relationship and cited the challenges of developing the Senior Executive PER so that its design meshed with the developmental requirements of DP 4. He also stressed the difficulties in providing appropriate performance feedback using the current suite of PERs while attempting to develop a suitable and timely individual professional development plan.<sup>4</sup> The difficulty stems from the need to determine an individual's 'command or leadership' potential at a future rank based on current performance observations. Several DND documents discussed below, stress the importance of 'renewed' leadership as a defining component of the Officer Corps in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and identify how the OPD system will adapt to many of these changes, but fail to suggest changes to the appraisal system. This is a critical shortfall. As highlighted by Brigadier-General Leclerc, DGMC, one topical area cannot change without affecting the others.

*CF Strategy 2020* advocates **transformational** leadership, also known as *strategic leadership, visionary leadership or charismatic leadership*, as the form of leadership that offers the greatest degree of flexibility to the Officer Corps.<sup>5</sup> The senior officer equipped with this form of leadership would be capable of adapting to ongoing changes in technology, doctrine and the international system.<sup>6</sup> The Officer Professional Development (OPD) 2020 (*Statement of Operational Requirement*) calls for "men and women who are outstanding leaders who demonstrate superior intellect capacity based on a broad liberal education."<sup>7</sup> The *Defence Planning Guidance 2001* (DPG 2001) offers some insight into the CF's unique leadership dilemma of harmonizing the CF's near and long-term requirements. The type of senior leader required in the future must accomplish simultaneously the *Defence Objectives* needed to fulfill the current Defence Mission and Tasks and the *Change Objectives* required to accomplish the Strategy 2020 Vision Statement.<sup>8</sup> Although Level One Managers are bestowed with the responsibility to implement both types of DPG objectives, the leadership requirements at all levels of command will necessitate revision and refinement throughout the CF's transformational period. To this effect, ADM (HR Mil) has the responsibility to define and present the standard for the selection, development and assessment of military and civilian leaders to DMC by April 2001.<sup>9</sup>

Any attempt to codify a list of senior leadership traits that would guarantee success at the strategic level, and then to assess individuals against these criteria as a means to selecting suitable senior officers, may be a simplistic solution to a complex problem. The OPD 2020: SOR advocates that the OPD system *must* be based on well-understood command and leadership theories that are appropriate to the institutional and external environments in which the officer functions.<sup>10</sup> Consequently then, a suitable appraisal system must be based on well-understood command and leadership theories as well. A problem arises from the fact that command and leadership theories are evolving, the operational environments are changing, the existing OPD system is being updated, and the CF is in the midst of implementing two relatively new PERs.

## **THE OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM**


The goal of OPD 2020 is to ensure that officers demonstrate the highest quality of leadership at each successive rank.<sup>11</sup> This goal implies the *need* to assess individuals at each rank, which presupposes that the leadership requirements are unique at each rank. These two ideas coupled together infer the necessity of an integrated appraisal system. The goal, as stated, also implies that the timeliness of an individual's assessment within the OPD system is critical to allow for sufficient time to develop further within a DP.

Central to the effective management of the OPD system is the need to harmonize individual needs with institutional demands. Within this dynamic, the timeliness of a proper assessment scheme that is predicated on a recognized standard that must be met in order to progress to the next DP becomes critical. Based on the foundation of the Officer General Specification (OGS) document, DAOD 5038-1 divides the OPD system into four Development Periods (DP), as described in Diagram 1. The *'Levels of War'* column describes both, the levels of 'war knowledge' that officers acquire during the DPs and the level at which they are best employed within the organization. This division in rank and responsibility is a systemic attempt at addressing the needs of the individual with the demands of the organization. Of concern is the insinuation that officers at DP 3 are employed at the operational and tactical levels of war. Although this may be the desired end-state, it does not reflect the current employment of most of the DP 3 officers. Nor does it reflect the *OPD 2020: SOR* philosophy of Canadian officership that emphasizes command as both operational leadership and resource management expertise.<sup>12</sup>

Developmental Period	Rank	Levels of War
<b>Basic Officer (DP 1)</b>	2Lt/ASLt OCdt/NCdt	Conceptual Awareness
<b>Junior Officer (DP 2)</b>	Capt/Lt(N) Lt/SLt	Tactical
<b>Advanced Officer (DP 3)</b>	LCol/Cdr Maj/LCdr	Operational and Tactical
<b>Colonel and General Officer (DP 4)</b>	Gen/Flag Officer Col/Capt(N)	Strategic and Operational

**Diagram 1 - OPD Development Periods and Levels of War**

Key to Diagram 2, which depicts the OPD system, is the premise that the three foundations should continually progress by means of the four pillars throughout the duration of an officer's career. Close examination of this framework reveals the need to standardize the prerequisites to progress to the next DP and highlights the difficulties associated to assessing an individual with asymmetric progression through the pillars.



<sup>Note 3</sup> Diagram 2 shows the framework of the OPD system based on the foundation of the OGS, military leadership abilities, and war fighting knowledge, and depicts the relationship between the DPs and the four pillars that form the crux of professional development activities: education, training, experience and self-development. OPD 2020:SOR provides a similar framework of the four DPs, melded together by three mechanisms: the Leadership Institute, the Officer General Specification, and the OPD Core Curriculum. (DAOD 5038-1)



The pillars are indicative of specified *activities* required to progress to the next level. Therefore, an individual may display more proficiency or competencies from one pillar disproportionately to the other pillars. For instance, an individual may have met the DP 3 level in training, while having not met DP 1 in education. In a case like this, how could this individual's 'command' ability be properly measured? And, how could his potential be properly assessed? Further, how can this individual be compared to someone who has met the DP 3 level in training and experience, but not in education or self-development? Neither the existing OPD fra

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Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5
<b>RANK</b>	<b>Development Period</b>	<b><i>Exercise of Command:</i> Direct and Indirect</b>	<b><i>Refined Model:</i> Direct, Institutional and Strategic</b>	<b>Scope of Responsibility and Influence</b>
<i>Gen</i>	DP 4	INDIRECT COMMAND	STRATEGIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political-military interface</li> <li>• Provide CF vision and strategic goals</li> <li>• Influence long-term objectives</li> <li>• Influence people through staffs and subordinate organizations</li> </ul>
<i>LGen</i>				
<i>Mgen</i>				
<i>Bgen</i>				
<i>Colonel</i>	DP 3	DIRECT COMMAND	INSTITUTIONAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Influence formations and development of policy</li> <li>• Conduct operational planning</li> <li>• Expend resources (PD, PM)</li> <li>• Staff positions</li> <li>• Mastery of skills and technical knowledge</li> </ul>
<i>LCol</i>				
<i>Major</i>				
<i>Capt</i>				
<i>Lt</i>				
<i>2Lt</i>	DP 2	DIRECT	DIRECT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Influence several to several hundred</li> <li>• Personal interaction with people</li> <li>• Primarily environmental employment</li> <li>• Execute plans</li> </ul>
<i>Ocdt</i>				

**Diagram 3 - Command and Responsibility Framework**

In Column 3, the exercise of command is broken down into two broad categories: *direct command* and *indirect command*. Direct command is face-to-face, front line leadership, while indirect command is that command exercised through the intermediary of others. Placed at each end of the rank continuum, the distinction is obvious, however, it does not address all ranks. Our model of command needs further refinement in order to remove the ambiguous area, as seen in Column 3, which coincides with the latter portion of DP 3. Consequently, Column 4 now reflects the notions of *direct command*, *institutional command* and *strategic command*. These terms describe the division of command responsibility within the CF based on the exercise of command and the scope of responsibility and influence, as depicted in more detail in Column 5.

**Direct Leaders** (DP 1- DP 2) have the responsibility to interface directly with subordinates and consequently influence several to several hundred people.<sup>Note 4</sup> Their primary role is to execute plans. **Institutional Leaders**, however, exercise a mixture of direct and indirect command. Their influence is to the institution as a whole. Aside from the few Majors, LColts and Colonels who fill "command" billets, they are the Project Directors, Managers and primary staff officers, and the consequences of their decisions have potentially grave monetary and political ramifications. **Strategic Leaders** are the CF's highest level thinkers, warfighters and military-political experts. Their unique expertise lies in their ability to provide a vision that enables the CF to transform effectively through time, while simultaneously considering the current and future national security implications to Canada. Strategic leaders rarely exercise direct command, and the consequences of their decisions affect the institution, the Canadian Government, Canadians and the world. In the Canadian context, strategic leaders also encompass those leaders responsible for exercising the operational art or level of war. Within this framework, institutional leaders share more characteristics of strategic leadership than they do with direct commanders.

The current employment of officers offers some insight into the validation of this model. Even with a conservative estimate, only 20 % of the CF personnel are officers and of these, over 60% are employed in various CF headquarters.<sup>15</sup> This highlights the CF's lack of command (field) billets and the skewed population from which to select senior leaders. Based on these statistics an OPD system that places emphasis uniquely on the levels of war, as depicted in Diagram 1, is insufficient and does not reflect the CF's current employment strategy nor does it encompass the future vision of the officer corps. Diagram 3, however, depicts a more realistic distribution of roles and responsibilities within the CF because it relates the current rank structure and OPD system to a division of responsibilities based on the exercise of command and the scope of influence. Understanding the OPD system as it relates to the *exercise of command* instead of the *skills* needed to progress to the next DP is instrumental in establishing suitable factors for the design of an assessment scheme used to select strategic leaders.

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
<sup>Note 4</sup> Colonel John P. Lewis et al., "United States Army Leadership Doctrine for the twenty-first Century.", p. 131. As a comparison, the US Army has maintained at the core of their command framework the notion of "**Be. Know. Do**". "**Be**" comprises the personal *values* (loyalty, duty, etc) and *attributes* (mental, physical, emotional) that the individual embodies; "**Know**" are his skills and knowledge; and "**Do**" is the *act* of commanding, which is further described as influencing people, operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. Lewis uses the terms: direct, organizational and strategic leadership, however, the scope is different from what is proposed here. The US use 'organizational leadership' to represent the leadership exercised at brigade, division and corps. Institutional command is more appropriate to the CF and describes DP 3 and DP 4 responsibilities more accurately.

Command emphasis in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century must balance the responsibilities of mission accomplishment and resource management, i.e., fulfil the near-term and long-term objectives set out in DPG 2001 in a complex military, social and economic environment.<sup>16</sup> Of primary concern, within this context, is the transition from *institutional* to *strategic* command. This model, therefore, does not represent a "warfighting" model; it represents the reality of CF operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The tactical employment of troops is the cornerstone of our profession, however, only a few officers in the CF carry out tactical responsibilities beyond Major or LCol. Increasingly, most Majors and LCols play an expanded role in the CF, very distinct from the officers below them, and more in line with strategic leadership. The notion of institutional leader, as opposed to a depiction of Majors and LCols as superior tactical commanders, may serve the CF better in its responsibility to properly select and develop potential senior (and strategic) leaders. The challenge, therefore, is to conduct an assessment of potential senior leaders at a suitable period in their career. This will be addressed before ascertaining whether the existing appraisal system will assist in the identification of those qualities particular to DP 3.

### **TIMELINESS OF ASSESSING POTENTIAL STRATEGIC COMMANDERS**

Central to the effective management of the OPD system is the need to harmonize individual needs with institutional demands. Within this dynamic, the timeliness of a proper assessment scheme that is predicated on a recognized standard that must be met in order to progress to the next DP becomes critical. Diagram 3 provides a template for such a recognized standard. Regarding the notion of timeliness, however, several observations reinforce the need for a Major-LCol PER in order to ensure the smooth succession of senior leaders.

It is understood that the 'ideal' career progression does not exist and that not all officers will progress through all the DPs. The CF may still benefit from an individual who remains in a DP for an extended period. This highlights the subtlety that exists between progression within a DP and promotion. The two are not necessarily synonymous. However, Diagram 4, as a conceptual model, can provide some insight into the challenge of determining within DP 3 those individuals who will assume an ideal progression into DP 4 or a stunted one in DP 3 or 4.



**Diagram 4 - Graphical Comparison of OPD Ideal Progression and Stinted Progression** <sup>Note 5</sup>

The length of time in each DP is based on approximately three years per rank during a possible career of approximately 30 years. Ideally, an individual could attain the rank of Colonel within 15 years of commissioned service, which leaves half of this individual's career to develop throughout DP 4.<sup>17</sup> However, usually the length of time in each DP is extended, and more realistically, an individual could attain the rank of LCol after 15 years of commissioned service and Colonel by 20 years. This observation is critical in terms of timing the selection of potential senior leaders. An individual not recognized as a potential leader at the 15 or 20-year mark may decide to retire or remain at the DP 3 level for another 20 years. For Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) graduates, this period represents the end of their Intermediate Engagement (IE). If they do not receive a clear indication that they may be selected for senior appointment, then they may retire as well.

<sup>Note 5</sup> Diagram 4 provides a graphical *depiction* of some of the potential shortfalls of the OPD system regarding 'timeliness of assessment' by drawing a *general* comparison between rank, DPs, general competency and duration of service throughout an individual's career. The term competency is defined for our purposes as a combination of an individual's *acquired* skills through the four pillars of the OPD system, and *demonstrated ability* of those skills. The *Ideal Progression* curve (*solid line*) of Diagram 4 depicts a smooth transition between DPs. In this case, the officer continues to develop successfully through the each DP pedagogical and experiential phase. In contrast, the *Stinted Progression* curve (*dotted line*) depicts an individual whose rank and position has surpassed his development and competency level.

Although these retirements may be dismissed as inconsequential, they do represent serious losses of human resource investment. Individuals at this point in their career development have finally mastered some of the intricacies of their profession and every effort should be made to capitalize on this investment. The timeliness of identifying potential strategic leaders has three major benefits. First, it permits sufficient time to develop properly in DP 4, which is critical for the transformation of the CF. Secondly, it allows the individual to effectively plan and prepare for their future. And third, by possessing this knowledge sufficiently early, the CF will avoid premature retirements, thereby preventing unnecessary human investment losses. Finally, the risk of not getting this selection right is retaining a DP 4 officer whose potential has peaked, or potentially losing a viable strategic leader because they were not selected in a timely manner. An appraisal scheme that reflects the particular command responsibilities of DP 3 could assist in the selection of strategic leader and mitigate some of the risks associated to accomplishing the goal of OPD 2020, which is to ensure that officers demonstrate the highest quality of leadership at each successive rank.

#### **TOOLS OF THE EXISTING CF APPRAISAL SYSTEM**

An appraisal system wholly integrated into the OPD system is essential for the health and transformation of the CF. This would enable the CF to properly assess its members while managing their development. Dick Grote, in conducting research on the merits of performance appraisal systems, discovered that most companies who accomplished 'breakthroughs' in a methodology to assess and manage both *performance* and *potential* guarded their secrets; many others remained in denial about the benefits that a well executed performance-management system could generate.<sup>18</sup> This typifies the greatest challenge within the OPD system: the need to speculate on an individual's potential and performance at the next rank, based on measurements taken at the current rank, and to align that individual's development based on this measurement.

An "ideal" appraisal system, like the OPD system, would satisfy the needs of the individual while addressing the needs of the institution. Also idyllically, it would identify in advance those personnel who are destined to have an *Ideal Progression* through the OPD system and assist in their timely development. All too often, the appraisal system is perceived as being divorced from the OPD system. As stated earlier, the OPD 2020:SOR fails to acknowledge the inter-dependence between the OPD system and an integrated appraisal system. Nevertheless, the CF appraisal system is the only *formal* means to manage personnel development within the OPD System and therefore it must be

integrated and perfected. This section will study the intent of both PER systems in order to determine to what extent the two PERs overlap and to ascertain whether either one is suitable to assess officers in DP 3.

Two types of PERs exist for officer appraisal: the CFPAS PER for officers from the rank of 2Lt to LCol, and the Senior Officer PER for those officers above the rank of Colonel. Introduced in the past two years, the CF Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS) is used as a means to facilitate and streamline career management. As stated in the CFPAS Handbook, the aim of CFPAS is "to develop CF members through constructive feedback and to accurately assess the level of performance and potential demonstrated for career administrative purposes". Insofar that the CFPAS removed some inequities of the previous system, especially in terms of score control and inaccurate reporting, and provides a generalized system for all ranks, it does not capture the subtleties required to properly administer the OPD system. Also, it does not reflect the distribution of responsibilities as laid out in the previous section and consequently, does not ensure effective succession from DP 3 to DP 4.

Also introduced in the past two years, the DND Executive/ Senior Officer PER (SO PER) was developed as an initial attempt to address some of the difficulties in managing strategic level leaders.<sup>19</sup> The primary motivation behind the development of the Senior Officer PER was to harmonize the appraisal system of senior military leaders with both their civilian counterparts in DND and in other government departments. Critical at this rank is the relationship between rank, performance and 'bonus pay'. Second, in terms of the OPD, Treasury Board had identified succession problems in the senior ranks in the Public Service/ CF and the need for better development of those with the potential to achieve those senior ranks.<sup>20</sup> The Senior Officer PER, although in its infancy, offers greater latitude in assessing an individual at the strategic level and highlights critical command attributes necessary at that level as well.

Diagram 5 compares the AFs from both PER systems. Of the two PERs, the intent of the Senior Officer PER, which is based on the need to identify and develop suitable leaders within DP 4, is more consistent with what is needed at DP 3. Many of the AFs outlined in the *performance* portion of Senior Officer PER are consistent with the attributes believed to be necessary to succeed as an institutional commander and reflect the expected *potential* of officers in DP 3. Based on the premise that the *potential* score reflects the expected *performance* at the next rank, it would be

reasonable to construct an appraisal system where the potential portion of the PER used at one rank coincides with the performance portion of the PER used at the next rank. Although such a system would enhance the importance placed on an individual's potential, as indicated by the Minister of National Defence, the management of such a scheme would be unwieldy.<sup>21</sup>

<b>CFPAS PER</b>	<b>Senior Officer PER</b>
<b><u>Performance</u></b>	<b><u>Performance</u></b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Supervising</li> <li>2. Evaluate and Develop Subordinates</li> <li>3. Team Building</li> <li>4. Leading Change</li> <li>5. Working with Others</li> <li>6. Problem Solving</li> <li>7. Decision Making</li> <li>8. Effectiveness</li> <li>9. Initiative</li> <li>10. Verbal Communications</li> <li>11. Written Communications</li> <li>12. Applying Job Knowledge/ Skills</li> <li>13. Resource Management</li> <li>14. Accountability</li> <li>15. Reliability</li> <li>16. Conduct On/ Off Duty</li> <li>17. Dress</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Cognitive Capacity</li> <li>2. Creativity</li> <li>3. Visioning</li> <li>4. Action Management</li> <li>5. Organizational Awareness</li> <li>6. Teamwork</li> <li>7. Partnering</li> <li>8. Interpersonal Relations</li> <li>9. Communications</li> <li>10. Stamina/ Stress Resistance</li> <li>11. Ethics and Values</li> <li>12. Personality</li> <li>13. Behavioral Flexibility</li> <li>14. Self-Confidence</li> </ol>
<b><u>Potential</u></b>	<b><u>Potential</u></b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Leadership</li> <li>2. Professional Development</li> <li>3. Communication Skills</li> <li>4. Planning and Organizational Skills</li> <li>5. Administration</li> <li>6. Dedication</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Leadership</li> <li>2. Judgement</li> <li>3. Courage</li> <li>4. Dedication</li> <li>5. Integrity</li> <li>6. Loyalty</li> <li>7. Communication</li> <li>8. Setting Priorities</li> <li>9. Professional Skills</li> <li>10. Administration</li> <li>11. Human Resource Management</li> </ol>

**Diagram 5 - Comparison of AFs between CFPAS PER and Senior Officer PER**

It would be difficult to tailor a PER that could properly reflect the responsibilities assigned to each rank or even each DP within the OPD system. Nevertheless, the argument of overlapping potential and performance AFs from two adjacent ranks is consistent with current promotion board practices and will be used to identify some of the key design features of a PER specifically tailored for DP 3. Regardless, the CFPAS does not satisfy the needs of the OPD system and does not reflect the division of responsibilities of DP 3 officers. There is a need, therefore, for a PER for Majors and LCol specifically tailored to reflect the institutional roles and responsibilities carried out while progressing in DP 3.



## DESIGN FEATURES OF A PER FOR DP 3 OFFICERS

Grote's research in the *Secrets of Performance Appraisal* provides some insight into the value of designing an assessment form. By including institutional values directly into the form, it provides a better basis for establishing fair and visible selection criteria.<sup>22</sup> Officers in DP 3 must be assessed consistent with attributes that are present in strategic leaders and reflective of their roles as institutional commanders within the CF. The inclusion of DP 4 performance AFs in a DP 3 PER would render the assessment process more open, making it clear that the assessment process is simply part of the overall development process. Also, it would highlight the importance placed on the succession of strategic leaders and reflect the role of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century officer corps.

The comparison of these two PER systems highlights the inadequacy of the CFPAS to assess officers in DP 3 and identifies the discrepancy that exists between the two systems. A simple quantitative and qualitative comparison between the two lists at Table 3 indicates a serious discrepancy between how the CFPAS is used to assess the *potential* of a LCol to *perform* as a Colonel. The US National Defence University has conducted several studies to determine possible successful personality types present at the strategic level, and the *performance* AFs of the Senior Officer's PER are consistent with their findings.<sup>23</sup> The two AFs that stand out in much of the literature pertaining to strategic leadership is *intellect* (or cognitive capacity) and *visioning*.<sup>24</sup> These two AFs are critical at identifying strategic leaders and are not present in the *potential* portion of the CFPAS.

A PER tailored specifically to DP 3, which reflects their roles and responsibilities in the OPD system and encompasses many of the AFs that are present in the performance portion of the Senior Officer PER, would be an initial step in perfecting the transition of officers into DP 4. Consequently, this PER, once properly tailored, would ensure the proper succession of strategic leaders.

## CONCLUSION

The function that distinguishes officers from Non-Commissioned Members is their responsibility to command. Command is the primary building block of the Officer Professional Development system and therefore, it must be the cornerstone of an integrated appraisal system. The topics of command, the OPD system, and the provision of a suitable appraisal system cannot be

divorced from each other. A close examination of the current OPD system, within the context of how command is exercised by officers in the varying DPs, highlights the unique role that DP 3 officers play in the CF. The scope of their responsibilities and the influence that they have on the CF's strategic direction, as *institutional leaders*, reflects the need to assess their potential against many of the command attributes present in DP 4. The OPD system may be structured to provide a continuous transition between DPs, however, its emphasis is on the requirements to progress each of the four pillars through specified activities and not on identifying the officer qualities required at the next DP. In analyzing the two PERs, it becomes obvious that the CFPAS does not reflect the qualities needed at DP 4, and the two PERs do not provide a seamless appraisal system throughout the entire OPD system.

In planning for the succession of strategic leaders capable of operating in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, DP 3 becomes a critical node in that it often represents a juncture in an individual's commitment and usefulness to the institution, and a critical point in his professional development. The timeliness of selecting potential future strategic commanders is critical. As stated, based on the OPD system, this represents identifying potential strategic leaders in DP 3, or conversely, using Diagram 4, a period between 15 and 20 years of commissioned service. As depicted by the *Stinted Progression* curve of Diagram 4, there is a danger and risk to the entire transformation process in selecting an individual for senior appointment who does not possess the skills and competencies to handle a senior leadership role. Conceivably, an individual could excel at many of the *potential* AFs identified on the CFPAS PER while not satisfying many of the *performance* AFs of the Senior PER.

The dilemma is simple: the need to identify strategic leaders based on the assessment of *known* performance whilst attempting to identify potential capability, which is largely an *unknown* quantity. The need for intelligent and visionary leaders to fulfil this role is largely undisputed. The optimal solution then, is to identify those Majors and LCol's who possess these attributes, through the use of a properly tailored PER, and thus ensure the succession of senior leadership. The introduction of such a PER would be a first step in guaranteeing an effective transformation of the CF into a viable combat capable force in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

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## ENDNOTES

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