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EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS

PARATROOPS OR SPECIAL FORCES

By / par

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PARATROOPS OR SPECIAL FORCES

Advance guards and outposts belong to the category of measures where the threads of tactics and strategy are interwoven.

- Carl Von Clausewitz¹

He who understands how to use both large and small forces will be victorious.

- Sun Tzu²

INTRODUCTION

Carl Von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are regarded as the pioneers of modern military theory. While neither refers directly to the employment of Special Forces, as we know them today, both address the utility of the employment of small forces on the battlefield. While their theory is dated, Clausewitz writing in the early nineteenth century and Sun Tzu around 3000 BC, one can say that with the exception of modern day military hardware, both writings, in the main, remain applicable to modern day warfare. The message which one may extract from Clausewitz's quote is that the use of advance guards, or, in this case, outposts, is the fact that the use of such forces may "make the enemy disclose his dispositions and intentions prematurely"³, therefore, that observation is important to know the disposition and or possible intention of the enemy. An additional link is made between strategy and tactics; this is important as Special Forces can be employed throughout the spectrum. On the other hand, Sun Tzu's quote is more to the point when considering Special Forces. Tu Yu, the Duke of *Ch'I-Kuo*, follows Sun Tzu's quote by stating that "there are circumstances in war when many cannot attack few, and others when the weak can master the strong."⁴ It is important that one does not misunderstand Tu Yu's use of the

¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed., and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey, 1976) 302.

² Tzu, Sun, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, 1971) 82.

³ Clausewitz, 302/3.

⁴ Sun Tzu, 82.

word “weak”. Weak in this sense is small in relation to a superior force. Tu Yu goes on to say “one able to manipulate such circumstances will be victorious.”⁵ It was in 3000 BC that Sun Tzu realized the benefit of having small, or Special Forces, on the battlefield. Today, the use of small, highly specialized forces remain exponential combat multipliers when employed in the business of warfare. Allen Holmes, an U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, is quoted as saying that Special Forces “provide remarkable capabilities for our government – not just as commandos and force multipliers for the Defense Department, but also as warrior-diplomats increasingly in demand to help carry out foreign policy assignments around the world.”⁶ In brief, Special Forces are “small, carefully selected, and superlatively trained for specific rather than general purposes.”⁷

Moving from theory to reality, it is necessary to consider where the Canadian Forces stand today and its future intention in relation to Special Forces. Where the Canadian Forces would like to be tomorrow is pertinent today, as there is no use in writing on any topic concerning change if one does not fully appreciate where one wishes to be tomorrow. In this context, one must focus on the only tool at hand, this being the Canadian Forces’ Strategy 2020 document, for it is this script which outlines where the Canadian Forces would like to be tomorrow. In brief, Strategy 2020 deals with the protection and promotion of Canadian values on the one hand and the investments required to support current and future requirements on the other. The foundation of Strategy 2020 rests with the maintenance of “modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat-capable forces that can respond quickly to crises at home and

⁵ Sun Tzu, 83.

⁶ No Author, U.S. Army Special Forces: The Green Berets, <http://users.aol.com/armysof1/Important.html> 2.

⁷ John M. Collins, Green Berets, SEALs & Spetsnaz: U.S. & Soviet Special Military Operations, (U.S.A., 1987) 2.

abroad, in joint or combined operations.”⁸ The document then goes further to highlight those attributes deemed critical toward attaining the vision.

This paper will begin with a brief background on Airborne and Special Forces, focussing on the Canadian experience. Conflict is critical as Special Forces do not operate in the traditional manner of force on force and so a brief synopsis will be presented. As this paper purports that the Canadian Forces can benefit from the establishment and employment of Special Forces, a comparison of paratroops versus Special Forces will be presented. The paper will then address the question as to why the Canadian Forces should entertain the thought of creating a Special Forces Battalion. It will then propose a skeletal organization based on the three existing para-companies and the Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) as the foundation. The intent of this paper is to convince the reader that the Canadian Forces can benefit from the formation of a Special Forces Battalion.

BACKGROUND

Airborne

If a man has a tent of linen without any apertures...he can throw himself down from any great height without injury.

- Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519)

Leonardo da Vinci first theorized on the use of material to safely descend a man from any height, yet, it was the Wright brothers who, in 1902, were able to sustain equilibrium during flight, this leading to the birth of the modern day air transporter. It was these two pieces, which when finely tuned, made it possible for the employment of airborne forces during war.

Credit for the first use of airborne forces during war goes to the Germans. Their World War II invasion of Belgium saw the first employment of airborne forces, an unorthodox method

⁸ DND, Shaping the Future of the CF: a strategy for 2020, http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/cds/strategy2k/s2k06_e.asp 1.

of transporting a fighting force, to “capture the bridges across the Albert Canal and destroy the fortress of *Eban Emael*.”⁹ It was from this time forward that all modern militaries considered the addition of airborne forces to their strategic arsenal.

From a Canadian perspective, it was Colonel E.L.M. Burns who, in 1940, proposed the formation of a Canadian airborne unit. While proposed in 1940, Ministerial approval did not come until July 1, 1942, the time at which conditions were right to train such a force, the time at which the First Canadian Parachute Battalion was borne. While the initial intent for the use of the Battalion was to repulse an invasion on Canadian soil, it later joined ranks with the British 3rd Parachute Brigade, 6th British Airborne Division. The Battalion first saw action during Operation OVERLORD. The Canadian objectives were “to land one hour in advance of the rest of the Brigade in order to secure the Dropping Zone, and capture the enemy headquarters...”¹⁰ While the Battalion fought gallantly in Europe until V.E. Day, it was disbanded after the war as the threat for its creation had disappeared.

Canada re-instituted paratroopers in 1949 with the creation of, what was then named, the Mobile Strike Force. This force consisted of Battalions from the RCR, the PPCLI and the R22R. This force was “tasked with Canadian defence, particularly in the North.”¹¹, to counter any incursion by Soviet forces. Drastically reduced by 1958, it was revitalized in 1968 and formed part of the newly formed Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR).

The CAR was created as a light, highly mobile force and was to be capable of conducting operations in any climate or region of the world. Like its predecessor, particular emphasis was placed on winter warfare in order to counter Soviet threats from the North. The unit was 900 strong and was initially established in Edmonton until moved to Petawawa in 1977. The unit

⁹ B.J. Doucet, Airborne Forces: Are They Still Valid?, (CFC Toronto, 1978) 4.

¹⁰ John A. Willes, Out of the Clouds: The History of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion, (Port Perry, 1981) 45.

performed admirably during the 1970 October Crisis and was a United Nations (UN) standby unit while formed. Elements of the CAR were employed on UN duties in Cyprus, and the Regiment, while on standby for deployment to the Western Sahara, did not deploy due to UN mission cancellation. While much has been written and many debates have ensued as to the fate of the CAR, it was disbanded in March 1995 “following considerable public reaction to the events in Somalia and disclosure of certain “hazing videos””.¹²

Following the demise of the CAR, a compromise was reached within the military hierarchy and three paratroop companies were formed; one each going to one of the infantry battalions within each of the Army’s three Brigade Groups. The Canadian Forces retain these three para-companies today, yet they remain without doctrine. The Directorate of Army Doctrine has the development of this doctrine identified for active consideration, yet it may be a non-starter, as senior leadership is currently undecided on the utility of retaining this capability.

Some would argue that the CAR was an “elite” or Special Forces unit. Donna Winslow, when conducting her socio-cultural inquiry into the CAR’s actions in Somalia, confirms this. She concluded that the CAR was an “elite” unit even though there were those who disagreed. Brigadier General Beno, during the Somalia inquiry, is noted as responding to panel questioning: “Are they elite? No. I repeat, Are they elite? No. Do they think they are? Sometimes, yes, but it is similar to the sense of elitism one finds in recce [reconnaissance] platoons within the infantry...”¹³ Of course, Winslow then contrasts Beno’s statement by citing the first commandment given to airborne soldiers during their airborne indoctrination course: “You are the elite of the Canadian Army”¹⁴ She further states that “even though the CF constantly

¹¹ Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry*, (Ottawa, 1997) 88.

¹² Winslow, 90.

¹³ Winslow, 127.

¹⁴ Winslow, 127.

maintained that the Airborne were not different...Official documents referred to the Canadian Airborne as elite within the CF.”¹⁵ Suffice to say that airborne soldiers do receive special training in addition to that received by the average soldier, this certainly making them different. Traditionally, the prime role of Airborne Forces is to jump behind enemy lines to disrupt communications, or to take a headquarters, as was one of the tasks given the First Parachute Battalion during Operation OVERLORD.

Special Forces

In defense planning, decision-makers look to Special Operations Forces (SOF) to provide a strategic economy of force in support of conventional forces; to expand the range of available options; and to provide unique capabilities.

- Website¹⁶

There exist a variety of Special Forces units throughout the world, all of which retain elements of commonality yet are separate and distinct in their own right. It is important to determine from the outset that which makes an organization, or unit, special; special in the sense that they stand apart from conventional units. Many include the word “elite” when speaking of Special Forces. Zedic and Dilley, in their book on *Elite Warriors: 300 Years of America’s Best Fighting Troops*, define elite warriors as those who have a special purpose and whom form part of a special mission organization. They further outline seven criteria that define Special Forces, these being units that:

- Conduct missions atypical of units in its branch of service.
- Is formed to conduct a particular mission.
- Receives special training for a mission.

¹⁵ Winslow, 133.

¹⁶ No Author, U.S. Army Special Forces: The Green Berets, <http://users.aol.com/armysof1/Important.html> 1.

- Uses specialized or prototype equipment or standard equipment in non-standard roles.
- Performs scouting, ranging, raiding, or reconnaissance missions.
- Conducts or trains indigenous people in guerrilla-type or unconventional warfare operations.
- Results from separate recruiting efforts, either in-service or off-the-street.¹⁷

For purposes of this paper, the above definition of Special Forces will be used.

While Sun Tzu referred to Special Forces centuries ago and Alexander the Great and the Roman Empire had their companions and praetorians respectively, the modern day use of Special Forces can be traced to World War II. It was during the planning for Operation PLOUGH, an operation which “called for the deployment of special equipment to be used in snow-covered mountain terrain for the purpose of attacking critical hydroelectric plants in Norway.”¹⁸, that those planning the mission identified the requirement for the creation of a Special Force to deal with the special and unique requirements dictated by such a mission. Thus, the First Special Service Force (FSSF) was borne on July 20, 1942. This force consisted of volunteers from both Canada and the U.S., and attained an establishment of 2000 ranks at its height of existence. The unit became a separate branch of the service and trained in demolitions, ski techniques, survival, rock-climbing and amphibious and airborne assault. The FSSF fought with distinction and proved successful in the Aleutians, North Africa, Italy and Southern France. The unit was deactivated on December 5, 1944, when the Canadians withdrew from the ranks. Colonel Robert T. Frederick, the unit’s commander, named the famed unit the FSSF as he wished to avoid the normal terminology of Commando, Ranger or Parachute Infantry.¹⁹ In the end, the “men of the

¹⁷ Lance Q. Zedric and Michael F. Dilley, Elite Warriors: 300 Years of America’s Best Fighting Troops, (U.S.A., 1961) 10/11.

¹⁸ David J. Barratto, A Strategic Reorientation for Special Forces in the 1980s, (U.S. Army War College, 1982) 1.

¹⁹ Timothy Coderre, First Special Service Force, <http://members.tripod.com/TimothyCoderre/fssf.htm> 3.

First Special Service Force were a proud group, and as the elite unit they were, they had a right to be.”²⁰

Perhaps the best known Special Forces unit in the world today is the famed U.S. Green Berets, popularized by John Wayne in the 1970s epic movie *The Green Berets*, which was a fictional account of these forces operating within the central highlands of Vietnam. The Green Berets were formed in the early 1950s to conduct unconventional warfare. The Green Berets today, like most Army Special Forces, are trained to perform a variety of special missions: some of which include unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defence, counter terrorism, psychological operations, civil affairs, coalition warfare, and humanitarian and civic action.

In brief, unconventional warfare includes guerilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, low visibility, covert and or clandestine operations. Unconventional warfare missions are generally long in duration and involve the training of and support to indigenous forces. Direct action missions would include, but are not limited to, the seizing, damaging or destroying of a target and or the capturing or recovering of personnel or material in support of strategic or operational objectives, or conventional forces. Direct action missions are generally short in duration and may include raids, ambushes, direct assault, the emplacement of mines and other munitions, the conduct of standoff attacks by firing from the air, ground, or maritime platforms, the designation or illumination of targets for precision guided munitions, support for cover and deception operations and or the conduct of independent sabotage within enemy held territory. Special reconnaissance missions include the infiltration of Special Forces behind enemy lines to provide intelligence on the enemy or to gather information on the terrain, or local populace. Recce would also verify, through observation or other collection methods,

²⁰ Coderre, 7.

information concerning enemy capabilities, intentions, and activities. Special reconnaissance missions are conducted at the strategic or operational level to compliment national or theatre level collection efforts. They would collect meteorological, hydrographic, geographic or demographic information. They could provide target acquisition, area assessment or post strike reconnaissance data. Foreign internal defence missions are designed to assist foreign police and military forces to improve their technical skills, understanding of human rights issues, and to help with humanitarian and civic action projects. These missions assist foreign governments to free and protect their society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. These missions foster the internal development of economic, social, political and military segments of a nation's society. Counter terrorism is offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. They preempt or resolve terrorist incidents. Psychological operations induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favourable to the government conducting them. Psychological operations are designed to influence emotions, motives and the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups or individuals. Civil affairs missions are used to establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations among military forces, civil authorities, and civilian populations in order to facilitate military operations. Coalition warfare ensures the ability of a wide variety of foreign forces to work together effectively. It draws upon the Special Forces' military and language skills and cultural awareness training.²¹

In addition to the Green Berets, the U.S. maintains a Delta Force, primarily concerned with international terrorism, and the Rangers, whose primary mission is to conduct raids or ambushes. The U.S. also identifies the Marine Corps as a Special Forces organization.

The most famed Army Special Forces unit is the British Special Air Service Regiment, or SAS. According to Sullivan, the SAS "has been hailed as the world's toughest antiterrorist

²¹ Allen Holmes, U.S. Army Special Forces: The Green Berets, <http://users.aol.com/armysof1/Missions.html> 1/2.

commando unit.”²² While one would think that the SAS is an Airforce unit, its ranks are recruited directly from the British Army. The SAS regiment consists of four squadrons, known as “Sabre Squadrons.” Each Sabre Squadron is divided into four 16-man Troops, including Boat, Air, Mountain and Mobility.

Within the Navy, the U.S. has the SEALs, an acronym for SEa-Air-Land. According to George Sullivan, in his book *Elite warriors: The Special Forces of the United States and its Allies*, the SEALs trace their roots to the underwater demolition teams that were formed to clear safe lanes for landing craft during World War II. The SEALs work in small groups and specialize in underwater demolition, intelligence gathering and commando assaults. The only equivalent to the SEALs within the Canadian Forces would be the Navy’s clearance divers.

As for the Airforce, the U.S. has its Airforce Special Forces, wherein it operates a variety of specialized aircraft to support the U.S. Army’s Special Forces. As for the Canadian Forces, the closest we come to having Airforce Special Forces would be the Airforce resources assigned to the Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), although these assets are double hatted: supporting more than just the JTF2.

Other countries retain special forces, including Germany’s Border Protection Group Nine, Belgium’s Para-Commando Regiment, France’s world renowned 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment, Italy’s Sub-Aqua Raider Commando Group, the Netherlands’ Different Circumstances Unit, and of course, Israel retains several Special Forces units within its Defence Force. While most Arab countries in the Middle East possess Special Forces units, “it is generally agreed that Israel’s are Number 1 and that those of no other nation come even close.”²³ Canada retains the JTF2.

²² George Sullivan, *Elite Warriors: The Special Forces of the United States and its Allies*, (U.S.A., 1995) 77.

²³ Sullivan, 122.

THE NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICT

The Directorate Land Strategic Concepts identifies two views on future conflict. View 1 is the least common and is related to the traditional approach to warfare. It involves “conventional conflict between national entities.”²⁴ View 2 is the most common form of conflict and is asymmetric in nature. It is the type of conflict that “envisions the nation state opposed by armed bodies that are not necessarily states, and fought by people who are not necessarily soldiers.”²⁵

Canada today enjoys a global geo-strategic position wherein it has no direct conventional threat. This is not to say that Canada, as a nation, will not employ its military power in conventional warfare: the Gulf War and Kosovo both provide examples. The prime threat today is View 2, or asymmetrical warfare; warfare brought about by rogue states, international terrorist groups, criminal elements of society at large and or various cult groups, to name a few. Activities such as the *Aum Shinriko* cult group’s 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack, left 12 dead, 5,500 injured and the world aghast. Closer to home we saw the New York World Trade Centre and Oklahoma City federal building’s bombed by two separate terrorist organizations. Even closer to home was a recent biochemical scare in Ottawa and the interception of a known terrorist entering the U.S. from Canada. An 11 March, 2001 Edmonton Journal article, entitled *Biological weapons pose threat to Canada, U.S.*, suggests that “police, physicians and the public-health system in both Canada and the United States are ill-prepared to deal with the threats.”²⁶ Dr. Ronald Atlas, an advisor to the U.S. government, suggested “the establishment of a national centre for preparedness training that would ensure that the front-line response to a

²⁴ DLSC, The Future Security Environment, (Kingston, 1999) 37.

²⁵ DLSC, 37.

²⁶ Edmonton Journal, Biological weapons pose threat to Canada, U.S., (Edmonton, 2001) B1.

biological attack is co-ordinated at every level.”²⁷ Such tasks could be assigned to a Special Forces Battalion and could be formed from the existing Canadian Forces’ NBC special unit in Borden, Ontario. Another article in the same Journal states that an internal Defence Department strategy paper says, “The Canadian military should take on new roles that...better defend overseas troops against terrorist strikes.”²⁸ The article further states that the strategy paper “proposes enhancing existing roles, such as strategic intelligence gathering...and aid to other departments in an attack involving weapons of mass destruction [both viable tasks for a Special Forces unit].”²⁹ This same article concludes that the line between terrorism and traditional conflict will become increasingly blurred and that these new threats do not target military forces, but society itself. Another threat to Canadian society is what is termed computer network attack (CNA). The Canadian government very recently assigned the Canadian Forces the task of countering such activity.

PARAROOPS VESUS SPECIAL FORCES

Today, the Canadian Forces retain three para-companies. As for Special Forces, Canadian Forces’ capabilities become less clear. To begin, there is the JTF2, a unit formed in 1993 to take over anti-terrorist duties from the RCMP. Their mandate is “to be ready to respond as a force of last resort to terrorist events or major disturbances of the peace affecting national security.”³⁰ In addition to the JTF2, the Canadian Forces could add clearance divers, NBC and or CNA experts to a Special Forces Battalion. However, these resources would only present the government with specific capabilities. A fourth activity for a Special Forces sub-unit could be

²⁷ Edmonton Journal, B2.

²⁸ Edmonton Journal, Cyber-attack capability in military’s plan?, (Edmonton, 2001) A1.

²⁹ Edmonton Journal, A1.

³⁰ Paul Mooney, Anti-Terrorism Unit Efficient. But Low Profile, The Chronicle-Herald (1995) 1.

based on traditional Special Forces missions (e.g. unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, psychological operations, etc.).

Airborne Forces offer commanders rapid employment and their existence in a theatre remains a constant threat to the enemy. They are well suited to conduct raids, act as mobile reserves and or conduct diversionary operations. On the other hand, the range of their delivery platform limits their use. Conditions must be right to employ paratroops: the suppression of enemy air defences is of prime concern, weather conditions must be right and they must bring sufficient resources with them to accomplish their mission. Airborne Forces are conventional forces designed for employment at the operational or tactical level of conflict. While their utility in conventional warfare remains extant, they must be of sufficient size to gain advantage – perhaps this is why they are under question today.

Special Forces, on the other hand, provide substantial flexibility. Small in nature, they attack or engage strategic or operational targets. U.S. doctrine for Joint Special Operations states that “success by a small force against a strategic or operational objective usually requires units with combinations of special equipment, training, people, or tactics that go beyond those found in conventional units.”³¹ Special Forces can complement conventional forces before, during or after conflict, thereby providing economy of effort. They can “locate, seize, or destroy strategic targets; obtain critical intelligence; test an enemy’s defenses; diminish his prestige; disorganize, disrupt, and demoralize his troops; and divert important resources.”³² Special Forces can be employed in operations that fall between diplomatic initiatives and the use of conventional forces.

³¹ JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, (Washington, DC, 1998) A-7/31.

³² Holmes, 1.

WHY SPECIAL FORCES?

The Canadian Army is a small, yet highly effective institution. Furthermore, the Canadian Forces are highly regarded and are considered amongst the best trained in the world. Unfortunately, reality dictates that the Army is over-stretched and under-funded. Over-stretched to the point where contractors are employed on the battlefield to replace support personnel, to the point where we have soldiers now deployed on their sixth Bosnian mission. Under-funded to the point where the Commander Land Staff, Lieutenant General Mike Jeffery, recently told the Canadian Press “The institution requires more dollars to keep it running than there are dollars available...from three to two brigades and clearly that is an option...if you want some idea of magnitude.”³³ A cut of this magnitude would equate to approximately 10,000 personnel.

There must be a better solution than simply cutting people. For example, creating a strong and viable Special Forces Battalion to act as a force multiplier to any coalition effort may be more cost effective than mere personnel cuts. Some of the critical attributes of the Canadian Forces’ Strategy 2020 document include deployability, inter-operability, domestic capability and jointness: Special Forces fill the billets of all these attributes. As seen from Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) 2001, Canada must remain alert and ready to counter any threat. This entails the ability to “exploit information and intelligence at the military strategic level.”³⁴, an ideal task for a Special Forces unit. DPG goes further and talks about operational level capabilities, including the formation of tactically self-sufficient units (TSSUs), citing examples such as the Immediate Reaction Force Battalion; stating that the TSSUs must be capable of integrating into a Combined Force package as a "task-tailored" component. TSSUs could be substantially reduced

³³ John Ward, Army commander can’t make ends meet under current budget, The Halifax Herald (20 March 2001) 1.

³⁴ DND, Defence Planning Guidance 2001, CFC War, Peace & Security Web Server, 1.

at the tactical level and Special Forces could become the Canadian Forces' contribution to a Combined Force package.

Special Forces could be tailored to combat View 2 conflict, whether at home or abroad, as an independent, joint or combined force. Such a battalion should be responsive to the highest level of authority. Rigorous physical, weapons, demolition, paramedic and intelligence training should be the norm. Specialist training could incorporate not only extreme climate environments but also close integration with Canada's Allies. Aside from a headquarters company to command all Special Forces, the battalion could specialize in anti-terrorism, NBCD and or counter-CNA, to name but a few possible tasks. It is likely that such a structure would be able to capitalize on economies of scale, resulting from surplus resources within existing units. Bottom line, the Canadian Forces can do more with less. Special Forces units are small in nature, they are employed at the strategic and operational level, they can be task tailored, they are highly mobile, they can counter View 2 threats and they can support conventional forces. They can be interoperable and could form part of Canada's contribution to combined operations. Economies would be realized with the elimination of the three extant para-companies. In brief, the possibilities are endless.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this paper has argued that the creation of a Special Forces Battalion is but one avenue toward combining many specialist skills and units into a cohesive package. A Special Forces Battalion will realize economies of effort and scale. It will provide the Canadian government and its military with a highly trained, highly specialized unit capable of countering most, if not all, threats to Canadian society; today, tomorrow and into the future. It will give the

Canadian Forces a top-notch organization that can be employed independently or in a combined environment.

This paper has provided the reader a brief background on Airborne and Special Forces, focussing on the Canadian experience. The future nature of conflict was considered critical so a brief synopsis was presented. A comparison of paratroops versus Special Forces was included to ensure the reader understood the unique capabilities each brings to the battlefield. The paper addressed the question as to why the Canadian Forces should entertain the thought of creating a Special Forces Battalion. Shrinking budgets, doing more with less, countering asymmetric threats, retaining a viable force projection package and being interoperable with Allies all support the creation of a Special Forces Battalion. The paper proposed a skeletal organization, which could be based on the three existing para-companies, and the JTF2. It would retain the anti-terrorist role and could take on the national roles of NBCD and counter-CNA. Finally, it proposed that a sub-unit could be formed to perform traditional Special Forces missions. In the end, Canada must retain the edge.

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