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CANADA AND THE DEMANDS OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE 21ST CENTURY: IS SOFT POWER ENOUGH?

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the role that peacekeeping has and continues to play as an element of Canadian foreign policy. In particular, it describes how peacekeeping has evolved over the past fifty years from operations that dealt largely with interstate conflicts, to the more demanding missions of today that are far more dangerous and involve intrastate violence between racial, ethnic or religious factions.

These emerging peacekeeping demands are then compared to Canadian foreign policy that, for over a decade, has focused on soft power as a means of extending Canadian influence in world affairs and enhancing global peace and security. The paper will demonstrate that, while soft power has served Canada well in achieving certain humanitarian aims, the emphasis placed on it continues to undermine Canada's ability to fulfill her peacekeeping and human security commitments.

Finally, the paper concludes by emphasizing the need for a hard power balance in order for Canada to succeed as a peacekeeping nation by providing the type of humanitarian intervention likely to be called upon in the foreseeable future.

In 1956, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, masterminded a solution to the volatile Suez Crisis, a situation that came close to precipitating a major East/West confrontation. His solution, which put in place a large multinational peace operation under the auspices of the United Nations, allowed the Middle Eastern nations and superpowers involved to save face and facilitated a peaceful resolution to a difficult problem. In 1957, Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize along with a citation that acknowledged his personal contribution to the mission and the powerful instrument of peace he had conceived.

> What actually happened has shown that moral force can be a bulwark against aggression and that it is possible to make aggressive forces yield without resorting to power. Therefore, it may well be said that the Suez Crisis was a victory for the United Nations and for the man who contributed more than anyone else to save the world at that time.[1]

Since that time, Canada's involvement in peacekeeping operations has been significant and there have been few such missions over the past fifty years that have not included Canadian representation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Canada has thus gained a reputation as a "peacekeeping nation" and Canadians view themselves "as peaceful folk dedicated to doing good works in the world, untainted by power politics or considerations of narrow national self-interest."[2] This reputation is well founded and reflects Canadian Foreign Policy, which has traditionally sought to support peacekeeping and contribute to peace and security beyond Canada's borders.[3] Indeed, Canada's "forward security" or expeditionary policies embrace the principle that the security and economic prosperity of nations abroad can affect economic prosperity at home; peacekeeping has served as an appropriate means to that end. However, the demands of peacekeeping today have evolved since the Suez Crisis to a point where the complexities of future peacekeeping

missions might well be beyond the capability of the UN to undertake. Whereas "moral force" was sufficient to induce a settlement between Israel and Egypt in 1956 and allow the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to take up a position between their two armies, the likelihood of encountering and resolving a similar crisis today -Ethiopia and Eritrea notwithstanding - is small.

As the UN continues to come to terms with the emerging demands of peacekeeping, Canada has turned her focus to the concepts of soft power and human security. These concepts, although not new, were revitalized during the 1990s under the leadership of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Mr. Lloyd Axworthy, so as to bolster Canada's influence in world affairs and enhance global peace and security. During an interview in 1998, Mr. Axworthy described soft power as "affecting and influencing behavior by information, by values and by non-intrusive means of intervention."[4] Soft power has allowed Canada to achieve political aims, such as the success of the recent land mines treaty. But, arguably, it is too often viewed as a compromise to military capability and by itself is likely to impede the success of peacekeeping efforts of the type commonplace today. In particular, Canada's commitment to human security, placing an individual's freedom and rights, before the security of the state,[5] requires that a militarily robust peacekeeping capability be available when the call for humanitarian intervention is received.

Human atrocities of the type that have occurred in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, demand the world's attention. As peacekeeping has evolved, so too has the global security environment, which now demands a range of peacekeeping capabilities that are much more complex, uncertain and, in some cases, more militarily

demanding than in the past. Furthermore, although the contemporary view of peacekeeping operations appears to lie at the heart of Canada's foreign policy, the emphasis placed on soft power is undermining her ability to fulfill her peacekeeping and human security commitments.

The contemporary view of peacekeeping reflects today's global security environment and as such, is unique from the peacekeeping periods of the past. To better appreciate this view and the demands of peacekeeping now and in the future, it is necessary to consider how peacekeeping has evolved and how it fits into Canadian foreign policy. In his book "Why Peacekeeping Fails", Dennis Jett divides peacekeeping into seven different eras: (1) the Nascent Period, 1946-1956, (2) the Assertive Period, 1956-1967, (2) the Dormant Period, 1967-1973, (4) the Resurgent Period, 1973-1978, (5) the Maintenance Period, 1978-1985, (6) the Expansion Period, 1988-1993, and (7) the Contraction Period, 1993 - present.[6]

During the Nascent Period only a few observer missions were launched and relatively few people and resources were committed to the tasks. These missions entailed classical peacekeeping duties, where "blue berets" helped to maintain the peace agreed to by disputing parties such as in Israel and Kashmir, operations that are still in existence today.[7] The Assertive Period of 1956-1967 was one that witnessed significant expansion, largely because of conflict in the Middle East. Of the eight new peacekeeping operations (PKOs) that were launched during this period, five were familiar observer missions including missions in Lebanon, Yemen, the Dominican Republic, and India-Pakistan. Missions of a more complex nature, however, were established in Egypt (UNEF1), the Congo, West New Guinea and Cyprus. For the first time, the UN was faced with

assuming temporary authority over a territory in transition to independence, becoming involved in a civil war, employing civilian police in a PKO, establishing a large-scale operation, and allowing peacekeepers to carry arms."[8] UNEF1 not only proved hugely successful in resolving the Suez Crisis, but also served to establish key principles that would be used as a guide for future PKOs. These principles included the requirement to establish the consent of disputing parties, to use force only in self defence, to form the UN force from troops voluntarily furnished by neutral countries, to maintain impartiality, and to remain under the control of the UN Secretary General.[9] Notwithstanding the successes, this period also marked the first PKO failure. The operation in the Congo saw UN troops drawn into a civil war for the first time, when political pressure forced the UN bureaucracy to ignore most of the principles previously established. The mission, which in essence was established to prevent the superpowers from entering into a confrontation over the Congo, ended the UN's first attempt at an expanded multi-dimensional operation with an air of reluctance to take on similarly complicated missions in the future.[10] The consequences of this failure were lasting and contributed to the absence of new PKOs that might otherwise have occurred during the following seven years.[11]

The Resurgent Period, which commenced in 1973, was once again prompted by instability in the Middle East and led to three large scale missions: the Sinai, the Golan Heights, and the Lebanon. These operations were classical in nature and adopted the principles drafted in 1956. Typical of the Cold War era, superpowers influenced these missions considerably, with the US viewing them as a way to help assure the security of Israel while the Soviet Union saw them as a way to lessen the cost of defeat to its Arab allies.[12] During the period 1978-1988 no new missions were stood up. Rather, this

period was one of maintenance of the existing Middle East operations and those in Cyprus and Kashmir: these PKOs were classical in their approach and continue today.[13]

Canada's participation in the peacekeeping missions leading up to the end of the Cold War was clearly grounded in both her policies and in her international and security interests: peacekeeping was a means for Canada to contribute to global stability. Indeed, through participation in the UN and other collective security arrangements, such as NATO and NORAD, Canada demonstrated its internationalist approach and the view that peace and security has no borders. Although the primary threat to Canada during this period was the stability of Europe and North America, where NATO and NORAD figured prominently, her participation in peacekeeping operations recognized the threat of regional instabilities and their potential exacerbation by superpower influence. With the concern of the day focused on the survival of mankind rather than the security of individuals, Canada used peacekeeping largely as a tool to enhance and influence stability in the world. In 1964, Paul Martin, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs described the purpose of Canadian peacekeeping involvement thus: "In the thermonuclear world…in which conditions of instability and disorder are apt to arise, an international force to keep the peace or hold the ring while negotiations take place is vital if we are to avoid the dangers of escalation to nuclear war."[14]

The end of the Cold War was marked by an increase in global instability and conflict and brought about an unprecedented period of growth in peacekeeping. In fact, during the Expansion Period between 1988-1993, more PKOs were begun than during all of the previous forty years,[15] and the types of conflicts that surfaced were devastating. As Dennis Jett argues, three factors led to this expansion. First, peacekeeping became

more possible because the superpowers could turn their attention to the worlds problems and away from their individual agendas; second, peacekeeping became more necessary because of the changed nature and number of conflicts that had erupted; and third, public support for peacekeeping was high.[16]

Indeed, most of the missions between 1988-1993 were made possible because of cooperation between the superpowers. They consisted largely of traditional missions associated with withdrawal from longstanding regional conflicts or those resulting from the Soviet Union's progressive withdrawal from Third World regions.[17] As a result, Canada's participation in the missions to Iran/Iraq, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Namibia and Angola was not only consistent with her regional security interests but also of the mission type that she was familiar with and well prepared to engage in.

However, the latter part of this period also witnessed the beginning of an era in which conventional armies, states, and frontiers diminished in importance and in which wars were increasingly waged by non-state actors such as terrorists, guerrillas and bandits.[18] Whereas peacekeepers could, in the past, rely on the safety that their symbolic blue berets gave them, this was no longer the case. Civil wars and intrastate conflicts, where peacekeepers were faced with increasingly dangerous environments well outside the scope of classical peacekeeping, dominated the demand for new PKOs. A cautions approach, however, was not to be - public desire to deal with the human tragedies so graphically portrayed on the evening news and referred to as the "CNN effect," accelerated the pace of PKOs across the globe. From 1988-1993 the number of peacekeepers deployed worldwide increased from 9000 to 80,000. However, an inability

to realize objectives led to the greatly diminished enthusiasm amongst the international community to engage in subsequent PKOs.[19] The result is the current Contraction Period. The "humanitarian missions" to Somalia and Rwanda, which were likely key in this regard, failed because peacekeepers were simply ill-prepared to deal with the situation in which they found themselves or lacked both the necessary resources and UN support to succeed. The 1993-1995 mission to Rwanda, for example, was initially established as a classical peacekeeping mission where a modest number of troops were to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border. However, it was progressively expanded to one where peacekeepers were tasked to help the Rwandan government "re-establish a secure environment in the country."[20] Then, in April 1994, a smoldering civil conflict erupted into ethnic violence as the Hutu-led government engaged in genocide of the Tutsi minority.[21] Prepared only for self-defence and pitifully under manned, it was impossible for the UN peacekeepers to succeed in their mission and stop the killing that ensued. General Romeo Daillaire's pleas for additional troops to augment the 450 that he commanded consistently fell on deaf ears amongst the international community. With roughly half a million people slaughtered within a month, Dallaire painfully submitted: "With the 450 men under my command…we saved and indirectly protected 25,000 people. What could a force of 5,000 personnel have prevented?"[22]

While the Contraction Period has seen the continuation of older missions and those in the former Yugoslavia and Angola, very few new missions have been initiated. With the exception of the larger mission in Albania, where internal anarchy was leading to mass migration to Italy, others have been observer missions of short duration involving few people. This period did, however, lead to recognition of the need to reform the UN

structure and in 1992 Secretary General Boutros-Ghali introduced An Agenda for Peace. This provided the UN with new ideas for managing the settlement of conflicts and carrying out other UN tasks. Notably, while the document focused on diplomatic and peaceful instruments, it did not dismiss the use of force as a means of resolving the types of modern conflict in which UN peacekeepers were increasingly becoming involved.[23]

Probably as a result of this change in UN philosophy, the Security Council approved a Chapter VII operation [24] in Albania to ensure that the peacekeepers had the security and freedom of movement necessary to complete their mission effectively. Furthermore, the UN also approved the establishment of a temporary multinational protective force to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance and to help create a secure environment for the other international missions in Albania, including those providing humanitarian assistance.[25] As both the UN and the world at large came to terms with this new conflict regime, the number of PKOs continued to decline. By the end of 1996, only 16 PKOs, employing 26,000 peacekeepers were underway and their mandates were largely limited to classical peacekeeping functions.[26]

Ironically, the intense human violence and conflict that led to this decline lies at the heart of Canada's Human Security Agenda and what it is striving to resolve. This is enshrined in Canada's two guiding documents on National strategy, Canada in the World and the 1994 Defence White Paper. From these it can be seen that Canada remains firmly internationalist and promotes global peace as key to the protection of her security.[27] Canada in the World provides that global security and stability are prerequisites for Canada's own economic growth and prosperity, principles that are actively pursued by the Government. Prime Minister Chretien recently brought these

elements together during a Team Canada Trade visit to China; in his carefully worded speech to the Chinese National Judges College, he advised that Chinese openness to trade will lead to greater respect for human rights.[28] Canadian commitment to human security is also evident through participation in humanitarian assistance and peace support operations which, although part of the wider peacekeeping umbrella, are often conducted independently and are wrought with risk to the peacekeeper. Notwithstanding the risk and daunting challenges that its agenda entails, Canadian foreign policy remains committed to the pursuit of human security, embracing the Special Joint Committee statement that "We [Canada] will have shared security, shared prosperity and a healthy environment for all or none will have any in the long-term."[29] To this end, Canada has identified five foreign policy priorities for advancing human security: the protection of civilians; peace support operations; conflict prevention; governance and accountability; and public safety. While all relate to the promotion of human rights, safety and life itself, Canadian foreign policy emphasizes the need to build UN capacities to address the demanding and increasingly complex requirements for peacekeeping in today's modern conflict environment.[30] However, Canada's Human Security Agenda is also influenced by soft power.

The concept of soft power can be traced back to the works of the American academic, Joseph Nye Jr., who in the 1980s saw the decline of the US as a superpower because of the diminishing utility of the US military and, subsequently, the importance of alternate power sources.[31] His concept of soft power is based on behavioral power, or the possession of resources needed to achieve the outcome desired through the "attractiveness of one's culture and the mastery of institutions and information

technologies to disseminate persuasive information."[32] Indeed, Canada's reputation has been enhanced as a result of soft power and arguably, her Government is able to demonstrate greater influence in global affairs than that which would be anticipated of a middle power. For example, Lloyd Axworthy very successfully used soft power to influence Canada's position on human security issues, and at the same time, strengthened Canada's status as a global leader in this area. As Joseph Nye Jr. conceded in 1999, "Canada is a country that adds value internationally by focusing on issues related to basic human security. Canada's recent approach to such issues as land mines, small arms and the International Court of Justice – even though it may have irritated the US – is a good example [of human security successes]."[33]

A potential consequence of soft power advocacy, however, is that in the extreme it can lead to the degradation of essential military capability. For example, Mr. Axworthy's description of soft power as it appeared in the Ottawa citizen on 28 May 1998 provided that: "It is affection and influencing behavior by information, by values and by *non-intrusive means of intervention*."[34] As the recent missions to the former Republic of Yugoslavia have proven, however, intervention in certain circumstances is anything but non-intrusive. Dr Dean Oliver of Carleton University, in his reply to Mr. Axworthy's statement, argues that "while full of rhetorical promise, [Mr. Axworthy's comment on non-intrusive intervention] might best be regarded as a contradiction in terms.[35] Has Canada, then, diverted too much attention to soft power at the expense of hard power? Is she prepared to live up to her human security goals and succeed in the types of humanitarian intervention missions that may be demanded of her?

The answer to these questions is sadly obvious. Although many "tools" are required to govern a nation, an appropriate variety and balance is necessary to ensure that the right one for the right circumstance is available. Unfortunately for Canada, the emphasis that has been placed on soft power in recent years has taken its toll in terms of her military capability. Indeed, Canada's National strategy documents reflect the declining importance that has been placed on her military in recent years. While affirming the need to maintain a military capability and build upon the military preparedness foundation, Canada in the World, arguably, also downplays the role of the military. It provides that "protecting our security must go beyond military preparedness" with a view to developing new approaches, instruments and political responsibilities to maintain international security.[36] It goes on to state that approaches beyond military options that focus on promoting international cooperation, building stability and on preventing conflict will be pursued.[37] Further, notwithstanding Canada's stated commitment to the UN and its role in achieving global peace and security described earlier, the document later falls short on its emphasis towards peace enforcement[38] and protective engagement,[39] both necessary for the types of humanitarian operations that can be expected in the world today. Rather, Canada in the World places greater emphasis on preventive diplomacy,[40] regional security organizations[41]and peacebuilding[42] and to improving the UN's decision making process. While the pursuit of efficiencies and balance to Canada's approach to global peace and security and human security is prudent, understating the requirement for a hard power capability, considered an essential element of national power, is not.

Whilst the impact of soft power influence is reflected in Canada's Foreign policy, this is not the case for Defence. The 1994 White Paper provides clear direction concerning the military role and capability necessary to achieve Canada's peacekeeping and human security objectives. It confirms Canada's strong advocacy of multinational security institutions, including our participation with the UN and the acknowledgement that modern conflict today poses immense challenges to the international community.[43] It recognizes that the range of military activity likely to be conducted by the UN could cover anything from preventive deployments to enforcement operations and that Canada is prepared to deploy trained, combat capable maritime, land and air forces as required.[44] The military assets that Canada has committed itself to deploy include a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft, forces that could total as many as 10,000 troops if deployed simultaneously.[45] Provision is also made to deploy an additional 4,000 troops, stand-by forces consisting of two ships, one battle group, one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element, and a headquarters element.[46] These commitments represent a formidable range of military capabilities aimed at fulfilling Canada's potential obligations to missions related to peace and security that might range in size from that experienced in Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991 to the more modest missions recently conducted in Central Africa. Can these commitments continue to be met in light of the increasing gap between Canada's stated foreign policy and the military capabilities necessary to meet these peacekeeping and human security obligations?

A review of Canada's National policy on defence sheds some light on this question. The 1994 White Paper mandates the requirement for a general-purpose combat capable force that adequately addresses Canada's security needs and her commitments to international peace and security abroad. However, global military downsizing in pursuit of the "peace dividend", combined with Canada's soft power approach to foreign policy have had a dramatic affect on the CF's ability to live up to the demands of the 1994 White Paper. As LGen Belzile (Ret'd), the current Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations, noted in his recent address to the Political Studies Students' Conference at the University of Manitoba, the "massive reductions of defence spending in the years following its [1994 White Paper] publication have severely limited its implementation."[47] Even after the modest increases in Budgets 1999 and 2000, he noted, "Canadian Forces capabilities continue to fall".[48] The likelihood of Canada being able to meet the commitments laid out in the 1994 White Paper will continue to fall until the dichotomy between resourcing and capability is resolved. In the interim, the ability of Canada to meet all of her peacekeeping and human security obligations, in addition to her other defence roles, remains uncertain, a situation perhaps best demonstrated by the proposed mission to Zaire in 1996.

Allegedly instigated by Prime Minister Chretien himself,[49] the Canadian Government took the decision to play a lead role in what was to become a multinational humanitarian intervention into Zaire. The UN task was to assist several hundred thousand Rwandan refugees trapped in Eastern Zaire as a result of the ensuing civil war in that country.[50] The mission, which required enforcement action in order to end the plight of the Rwandan refugees trapped by the Hutu guerillas and the genocide that was

ravaging the area, demanded the presence of a robust, combat capable force. For several reasons, however, the mission never went beyond the initial planning stages, not least because of the reluctance of the African governments and rebel groups involved to agree to external intervention. However, the planning stages led Canada to the realization that she did not have the military capabilities necessary to mount and sustain the operation that she had proposed. In fact, it became clear that the success of the operation would be completely dependent on the military and logistical capabilities of the United States and that the US would call the shots on what was to be done.[51] In the end, Canada was simply unable to mount and command the mission, a reality that led Louis Delvoie, a former DND ADM(Pol), to conclude that it was lucky for both Canada and our troops that they weren't put to the test in combat.[52]

Canada's failed attempt to mount this mission provides a clear example of her inability to undertake a peacekeeping operation of the type demanded by her foreign policy and national leaders. Further, it is a reflection of how large the gap between foreign policy on the one hand and military capability on the other, has grown, a result which stems from the emphasis that soft power has had on Canada's foreign policy. Soft power, although important to Canada's national power base, must be balanced with a hard power capability, essential to today's peacekeeping environment. As Paul Heinbecker, ADM(Global and Security Pol) in DFAIT points out in discussing the crisis in Kosovo, "a commitment to the protection of people also requires a commitment to back diplomacy with the threat of military force and, when necessary, with the use of force."[53]

In summary, Canada continues to enjoy a long and proud history as a peacekeeping nation. From the early days of the UN's existence, Canada participated in PKOs as a means of extending her forward security policy. Indeed, during the Cold War period, peacekeeping provided Canada with a means of influencing the stability of the world, which in turn helped to deter aggression from North America and indirectly, protected Canadian trade, values and standards of living. The end of the Cold War, however, marked a new era in peacekeeping, an era in which PKOs were mounted not solely for traditional reasons of global peace and security, but for others as well. Many of the missions during this era were brought on by the moral obligation to ease human suffering in less fortunate areas around the globe, essentially marking the end of traditional Pearsonian peacekeeping of the past.

In today's global environment, the UN typically finds itself involved in conflicts that do not lend themselves to traditional peacekeeping. As described earlier, peacekeeping has evolved from largely interstate conflicts, where opposing sides were easily identified by geography and hence easily separated to peacekeeping today, which is largely intrastate, and where violence between racial, ethnic or religious factions is commonplace and the role of the peacekeeper far more dangerous. Further, the significant number of missions mounted during the last decade and failure to resolve the conflicts involved has led to significant decline in the numbers of missions underway today.

Notwithstanding, peacekeeping continues to be the focus of Canadian foreign policy as enshrined in both Canada's foreign and defence policy documents. Canada's Human Security Agenda in particular commits Canada to pursue the rights and freedoms

of individuals over and above those of the state and Canada has and continues to demonstrate this policy endeavor through various initiatives similar to those described earlier. However, the concurrent emphasis that is being placed on soft power, which essentially promotes other sources of national influence over that of the military, has contributed to Canada's declining military capability and ability to fully meet her human security aims. Clearly, soft power has served Canada well and is a valuable policy tool. However, if Canada is to succeed as a peacekeeping nation by providing the type of humanitarian intervention that has been called upon in the past and is likely to be called upon in the foreseeable future, a hard power balance is necessary.

END NOTES

[1] "The Peacemaker: Lester Pearson," Maclean's 4 September: 34.

[2] "The Peacemaker" 35.

[3] Canada in the World: Government Statement (Canada Communication Group – Publishing, PWGSC, 1995) 10.

[4] Dr. Dean Oliver, "Soft Power and Canadian Defence," The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Strategic Datalink#76, February 1999: 1.

[5] "Human Security," DFAIT Web-site available at http://dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/menu-e.asp: 1.

[6] Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) 21.

[7] Jett 23.

[8] Jett 24.

[9] Jett 24.

[10] Jett 25.

[11] Jett 25.

[12] Jett 26.

[13] Jett 27.

[14] DEA, Statements and Speeches, No. 64/20 (Ottawa 1964) 6.

[15] Jett 27.

[16] Jett 28.

[17] Louis A. Delvoie, "Canada and International Security Operations: The Search for Policy Rationales," Canadian Military Journal Vol. 1 No. 2 Summer 2000: 14.

[18] Jett 27.

[19] Jett 28.

[20] DFAIT, News Release No. 127/94 (Ottawa, 1994) 1.

[21] Thomas R. Mockaitis, Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch? (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999) 72.

[22] Mockaitis 73.

[23] Jocelyn Coulon, Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 7.

[24] Chapter VII of the UN Charter entitled "Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression", provides for the means to achieve compliance, establish enforcement actions, or action up to and including armed conflict, to ensure a return to peace and stability is achieved.

[25] S/RES/1101 (1997) of March 28, 1997.

[26] Jett 32.

[27] Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Public Works Government Services Canada, 1994); and Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World (Ottawa: Public Works Government Services Canada, 1995).

[28] Graham Fraser, "PM's message to China: Respect human rights," The Toronto Star 13 February 2001: A9.

[29] Canada in the World 11.

[30] "Human Security" DFAIT Web-site 1.

[31] Dr. Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, "Hard Power, Soft Power Reconsidered," Canadian Military Journal Vol. 1 No. 3 Autumn 2000: 2.

[32] "Hard Power, Soft Power Reconsidered" 3.

[33] Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The challenge of soft power," Time 22 February1999: 30.

[34] "Soft Power and Canadian Defence" 1.

[35] "Soft Power and Canadian Defence" 1.

[36] Canada in the World 24.

[37] Canada in the World 25.

[38] Peace enforcement – using military force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to terminate acts of aggression by a member state. Enforcement of "No Fly Zones" in Iraq and Bosnia, and actions in Somalia are cases in point. Why Peacekeeping Fails 15.

[39] Protective engagement – employing military means to provide safe havens or a security environment for humanitarian operations. Why Peacekeeping Fails 15.

[40] Preventive diplomacy – is most frequently conducted by multilateral institutions such as the UN, but can also be undertaken regionally or bilaterally. Canada, in co-operation with key partners at the UN and elsewhere, will focus on practical measures that hold prospects of success. Canada in the World 26.

[41] Regional security organizations – can lead in this field, not least through confidence-building measures. We will be working to expand the capacity of regional organizations, such

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