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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE
CSC 27

EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS

United Nations peace support operations: developing a naval expeditionary capability to afford the government of Canada a wider range of options when deploying Canadian forces to future internal conflicts

LCdr BH Baxter

“The well-being of Canada and Canadians depends on global human security, prosperity and development. The Government of Canada is committed to working with its international partners to promote international peace and security... The Government will continue Canada’s proud record of peacekeeping. In Budget 2000, the Government provided funding increases for the Canadian Forces to help ensure that they are equipped and prepared to respond quickly to calls for help at home and abroad.”

*Speech from the Throne
January 30, 2001*

Introduction

Since Lester Pearson first proposed the concept of deploying an international contingent of troops under a United Nations (UN) flag in 1956, Canadians have become immensely proud of the contributions they have made to international peace and security¹ and the international reputation they have earned as peacekeepers.² Today, with over fifty years of experience, and as one of only a handful of countries regularly called upon to provide troops for UN missions, international peacekeeping “has become an important aspect of our national heritage and a reflection of our national beliefs.”³ International peace and security and peacekeeping are now so deeply embedded in the Canadian psyche that key government addresses such as the annual

¹ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada and Peacekeeping*, at <http://www.dfait-macci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/back-e.asp>, 2.

² *Canada and Peacekeeping*, 1.

Speech from the Throne routinely confirm our commitment to these fundamental Canadian principles and the recent adoption of human security as a central theme of Canadian foreign policy.⁴

First introduced in a 1994 UN Human Development Report, and then later expanded upon in a 1996 Canadian speech to the UN General Assembly, human security has redefined what it means today, within the international community, to be secure. No longer does security refer only to the traditional concepts of state sovereignty or of a state's rights. Today the language of international security refers primarily to the security of people⁵ and broadly defines human security as "freedom from pervasive threats to a person's rights, safety or life."⁶ Recently adopted as a cornerstone of UN policy, this fundamental shift in ideology has had a significant impact on international relations and recent world affairs. In the last decade alone, UN identified human security issues resulted in the formation of UN peacekeeping missions to such areas as Central America, Namibia, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Iraq/Kuwait, the Western Sahara, the Balkans, Mozambique, Somalia, Haiti, South Africa, Liberia, Rwanda, Chad, Zaire, Guatemala, East Timor, and Ethiopia-Eritrea. With the exceptions of only Liberia, South Africa and Chad, Canadian forces have been active in each of these missions.

With the recent adoption of human security as a central theme of Canada's foreign policy it should come as no surprise that Canada's defence policy has also been significantly impacted.

³ *Canada and Peacekeeping*, 1.

⁴ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Human Security Program*, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/HS_program-e.asp, 1.

⁵ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security*, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/HumanSecurity_Booklet-e.asp, 2.

⁶ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Human Security*, at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/menu-e.asp>, 1.

Since 1989, Canada has contributed to 53 UN sponsored peace support operations (PSOs).⁷ UN peace and security missions now form the majority of Canada's international military commitments.⁸ The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) document, *Global Trends 2015*, has analyzed the world of 2015 and predicts that internal conflicts stemming from religious, ethnic, economic or political disputes will remain at current levels or possibly even increase in number. It further predicts that the UN or other such regional alliances will be the organizations called upon to manage these conflicts.⁹ With this prediction of the future, a Canadian foreign policy now anchored in human security and recent military operations indicating that the Government of Canada is adopting a more interventionist role within the international community to support this policy – the Canadian Forces (CF) should expect this trend to continue. Support to UN peace and security missions will continue to dominate the CF's international military commitments.

Unfortunately, the Canadian Navy currently lacks certain capabilities ideally suited to support UN peace and security missions. According to some, its force structure is out of date and out of synchronization with current and future requirements.¹⁰ This paper will focus on future UN PSOs and suggest that the Canadian Navy must develop an expeditionary capability to afford the Government of Canada a much wider range of options when deploying Canadian forces to these future internal conflicts.

⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Past Canadian Commitments to Peace Support Operations (December 2000)*, at http://www.dnd.ca/admpol/org/dg_is/d_pk/pastops_e.htm.

⁸ *Canada and Peacekeeping*, 2.

⁹ United States, Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts*, at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends2015/index.html>, 7.

¹⁰ Edward L. Tummers, ed., *Maritime Security in the Twenty-first Century - Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 11* (Halifax: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2000) 109.

Peace Support Operations

Peacekeeping is primarily an Army responsibility, supported by the Navy and the Air Force. The latter two are charged with getting the Army personnel and equipment to and from the theatre of operations in an efficient and timely manner, and providing the type of support the Army needs while it is carrying out its assigned tasks.

*Major-General Lewis Mackenzie
1993*

For those who still view Canadian peacekeeping missions from a more traditional “army-centric” perspective, it might be easy to agree with Major-General Mackenzie’s statement. However, traditional peacekeeping missions have evolved into far more complex operations than simply monitoring a cease-fire between two belligerents who have agreed to UN involvement. Today, peacekeeping has become “a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.”¹¹ In supporting the UN’s human security policy, today’s peacekeeping missions have become interventionist, joint¹² and often very dangerous operations. They are now characterized by a range of PSOs comprising of preventive action, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding missions.¹³ So that one might fully appreciate the spectrum of conflict inside which these peace support missions could occur, each must be understood.

¹¹ United Nations, Department of Peace and Security, Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, *Brahimi Report*, at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations.

¹² Canada, Department of National Defence, *The Canadian Forces Operations Manual* (B-GG-005-004/AF-000), GL-E-2 and GL-E-5. Defines joint operations as those operations in which elements of more than one service (army, navy or air force) of the same nation participate. Joint operations differ from combined operations. Combined operations are those operations in which two or more forces of two or more allies participate.

¹³ D.N. Griffiths, “The Maritime Face of Peacekeeping,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Sept 1995, 12.

In the past, UN peacekeeping missions were normally established after the conflict had already occurred.¹⁴ Recently, in keeping with its policy to intervene early in the defence of human security, the UN created the term preventive action and defined it as “any action taken that prevents human suffering, prevents disputes from arising, prevents existing disputes from escalating into conflicts or limits the spread of conflicts when they eventually erupt.”¹⁵

Preventive actions are generally proactive, non-military measures that could involve such initiatives as negotiated settlements, confidence-building measures or arms control measures. Preventive military actions, those involving the deployment of military forces to act as a deterrent to aggression,¹⁶ are not included in the term preventive action. To describe these military actions the term preventive deployment was created. The 1995 UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) to the Balkans was an example of such a deterrent mission.

The term peacemaking refers specifically to the use of diplomacy to persuade parties in a conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.¹⁷ The more traditional Chapter VI¹⁸ peacekeeping missions of the past 50 years would now be referred to as peacemaking missions. However, traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping missions usually only involved UN military forces. Today’s peacemaking missions can be quite different and can

¹⁴ United Nations, Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (17 June 1992), at <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.

¹⁵ *An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (17 June 1992).

¹⁶ *Canada and Peacekeeping*, 2.

¹⁷ United Nations, Department of Political Affairs, *Preventive Action and Peacemaking*, at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm>.

¹⁸ *The Canadian Forces Operations Manual*, 10-4, 10-5. The UN Charter was signed and came into force in 1945. Under Chapter VI of the Charter entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, the UN Security Council (UNSC) is able to establish peace support missions. Under Articles 33 to 38 of Chapter VI, traditional peacekeeping relied on the consent of opposing parties and normally involved the deployment of peacekeepers to implement an agreement approved by those opposing parties.

include envoys of governments, groups of states, regional organizations, unofficial or non-governmental groups, or even a prominent personality working independently towards the resolution of a conflict.¹⁹

Whereas peacemaking now encompasses what was previously understood as traditional Chapter VI UN peacekeeping missions, peace enforcement now encompasses what was previously understood as Chapter VII²⁰ UN peacekeeping missions. Peace enforcement involves the use of military force by the international community against a belligerent state in an attempt to restore the status quo. Peace enforcement operations are generally considered to be in the mid to high level intensity conflict range with the Korean War (1950-55) and the Gulf War (1990-91) being two large scale examples.²¹

The most recently introduced term in the peacekeeping spectrum, peacebuilding, encompasses all those activities which occur after the cessation of conflict and which work towards the rebuilding of peace. Peacebuilding initiatives could include such things as the reintegration of former combatants into civilian society; strengthening the rule of law through the training of local police, and judicial and penal reform; improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; and providing technical assistance for democratic development.²² Peacebuilding missions currently employ very few military personnel. The vast majority of personnel currently deployed on the UN's 14

¹⁹ *Brahimi Report*.

²⁰ *The Canadian Forces Operations Manual*, 10-4, 10-5. The UN Charter was signed and came into force in 1945. Under Chapter VII of the Charter entitled "Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression", the UNSC is able to establish peace enforcement missions. Under Article 42 of Chapter VII, the UNSC may take all necessary action (including military action) to maintain or restore international peace and security.

²¹ *Canada and Peacekeeping*, 2.

peacebuilding missions are civilians but with such a range of initiatives that could fall under this broad heading there are obviously roles which could be undertaken by military personnel.

Future Naval Peace Support Operations and Roles

The Canadian Navy must be prepared to undertake operations in future UN sponsored preventive diplomacy, peacemaking (Chapter VI) and peace enforcement (Chapter VII) missions. With this broad spectrum of PSOs inside which the future navy must be prepared to operate, how should it expect to be tasked? A recent copy of the navy's draft document, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020*, provides some insight to this question. *Leadmark* states that "in order to support the foreign policy of the Canadian government, the navy of 2020 must be ready to contribute to Canadian and international, particularly UN, peace support operations anywhere in the world, including preventive deployments, enforcement of embargoes and sanctions and combatant or non-combatant support of land and air forces ashore."²³

Leadmark breaks these contributions down further into specific functions and indicates that in order to support future PSOs the navy must be able to undertake the following roles: presence, sea control, sea denial, maritime interdiction (MIO), maritime force projection, humanitarian assistance, preventive deployment, symbolic use, non-combat evacuation (NEO) and confidence building.²⁴

In addition to these specific roles, *Leadmark* also indicates that future naval forces must be "rapidly deployable, versatile, tactically self-sufficient, and sustainable in mid level

²² *Brahimi Report*.

²³ Canada, Canadian Navy, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020 (Draft 23 Nov 00)*, 71-72.

²⁴ *Leadmark*, 70.

operations”²⁵ and that they “must enhance our capability to deploy Vanguard elements for crisis response anywhere in the world.”²⁶ It is strongly suggested that this latter requirement will form the basis of the most critical roles the navy must be prepared to undertake in the future. The navy must develop the ability to rapidly transport Canadian forces to UN PSOs worldwide, move these forces into theatre, support and sustain them while they’re on the ground and then pull them out when the mission is over.

In his 2000 paper, *Thoughts from the Outside: Rethinking Maritime Strategy and Force Requirements for 2020*, Dr. James Fergusson, the Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba, suggests that the whole of the Canadian Navy should realign itself to a United States Marine Corp like structure and perform no other roles than those in direct support of land forces. He believes that future military operations will require the CF to intervene in worldwide internal conflicts and that the Canadian government will continue to place the CF in harm’s way. He further suggests that for the future navy to be relevant it must provide only those capabilities that will enable Canadian land forces to meet Canadian political and strategic interests.²⁷

Unfortunately, a complete shift in naval force structure to perform no tasks other than those in direct support of land forces makes little sense in the Canadian context. Any move in a niche direction would contravene the government’s 1994 *White Paper*, the navy’s *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada* and the CF’s *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: Strategy 2020*. All of these documents call upon the CF and the Canadian Navy to maintain

²⁵ *Leadmark*, 61.

²⁶ *Leadmark*, 61.

multi-purpose, combat capable armed forces capable of meeting future challenges to Canada's security both at home and abroad. Canada's navy must continue to enhance its multi-purpose, combat capability. Developing capabilities to better support future joint operations will position the navy that much closer to being a highly adaptable and flexible maritime force capable of undertaking a wider range of UN PSOs and providing the government with a wider range of policy options.²⁸

Past and Present Naval Peace Support Operations

This is not to suggest that Canada's navy has been unable or is currently unable to undertake peace support missions. Preventive deployments, MIO, presence, sea control, sea denial, humanitarian assistance, and limited NEO are all roles that have been or could be undertaken by Canadian warships. The Korean War (1950-55), *Terra Nova* and *Kootenay* off Vietnam (1973), operations off Haiti (1987, 1993-94), the Gulf War (1990-91), and recent operations in the Adriatic (1993-96, 1999) are good examples of such missions and demonstrate the flexibility of naval forces in PSOs. Other PSOs such as *Magnificent* deploying to the Suez (1956), *Bonaventure* deploying to Cyprus (1964), *Preserver* deploying to Somalia (1992-93) and *Protecteur* deploying to East Timor (1999) involved transporting ground troops and/or equipment to these areas of conflict and then sustaining or supporting land operations once in theatre.²⁹ These missions were easily accomplished in 1956 and 1964 with small aircraft carriers but were not so easily accomplished in 1992-93 or in 1999 with Canadian auxiliary oiler replenishment vessels (AORs). Canadian AORs were simply never designed to undertake those

²⁷ *Maritime Security in the Twenty-first Century - Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 11*, 112.

²⁸ *Leadmark*, 61.

²⁹ *Leadmark*, 93.

types of roles³⁰ and success during these latter missions can be attributed to the quality and resourcefulness of the ships' companies,³¹ not to the ships.

Neither Major-General Mackenzie's view of peacekeeping nor Dr. Fergusson's concept of the navy existing only to support the army should be lone factors in determining a force structure for the future Canadian Navy. It must be acknowledged, however, that both highlight a very important issue. Both highlight that success for the vast majority of peacekeeping operations does eventually require land forces operating on the ground. Where they both fail is in their suggestions that a hierarchy exists where naval and air forces are subordinate to land forces in PSOs as opposed to recognizing the current joint nature of UN missions. In the joint environment each service has its own distinct role to play - be it on the ground enforcing the peace, flying troops in to or around the theatre of operation or enforcing an embargo off the coast. This service interaction creates the cumulative or synergistic effects which are so desired and which no single Canadian service can generate on its own. To borrow from an old phrase in describing the fundamental concept behind today's joint operations – “there's no I in team”.

Towards a Naval Expeditionary Capability

Canada is considering a new model for its peacekeeping missions: getting in early then getting out fast, thus avoiding open-ended commitments. It's not hard policy yet, but the idea has attractions for Defence Minister Art Eggleton, who outlined it in a luncheon speech to diplomats on Wednesday (21 March 2001).

*Canadian Press
21 March 2001*

³⁰ Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon and Richard H. Gimblett, eds., *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy* (Halifax: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1998) 218.

³¹ *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*, 218.

For many reasons, some directly attributable to recent UN PSOs, many nations throughout the world are currently reviewing, re-emphasizing, or looking to develop their rapid response capabilities. The ability to react quickly and bring military forces to influence early upon a potential conflict is becoming more central within UN policy and could prove to be the decisive factor in preventing widespread human suffering in any future internal conflict. Middle power nations such as The Netherlands and Australia are two very good examples of countries whose most recent White Paper strongly supports the concept of rapid reaction, and in particular, the concept of rapid sealift. Following closely along this same line of thought, current CF doctrine also clearly outlines the need for “global deployability, rapid response to crisis at home and abroad, and an enhanced strategic sealift.”

The introduction of this new capability is likely to result in the emergence of a number of new and innovative opportunities to support the force employment and sustainment of Canadian forces anywhere in the world in support of national policy.

ALSC Concept of Employment

The development of a naval expeditionary capability would resolve Canada's national sealift shortfall, expand upon the overall multi-purpose combat capability of the Canadian Navy and most importantly provide the Government of Canada with additional options when considering the provision of forces to future PSOs. Rapid sealift, as a fundamental component of an expeditionary capability, is required to allow the CF to respond rapidly to crises abroad, be globally deployable, quickly transport a significant portion of the land Vanguard forces into theatre and then remove them once the mission is up and running. However, as just one component of an overall expeditionary capability, rapid sealift alone is not enough and ALSC expects to be far more than just a general-purpose cargo ship or a heavy roll on/roll off ferry. ALSC is envisioned as providing an adaptable, general-purpose capability capable of carrying out a number of joint strategic roles.³⁵ According to the ALSC Concept of Employment (CoE), not only will the ALSC fleet be capable of providing rapid worldwide strategic sealift for 85% of Canada's land Vanguard forces,³⁶ it will also address such critical issues as in theatre force sustainment, support to forces ashore, sea-based command and control (C2) and support to an embarked joint or national force headquarters.³⁷ ALSC would provide the Government of Canada with an expeditionary capability and additional warships capable of being tasked in a multitude of peace support roles.

³⁵ *ALSC Concept of Employment*, 6.

³⁶ *ALSC Concept of Employment*, 8.

³⁷ *ALSC Concept of Employment*, 4, 6.

Rapid Military Sealift

In the emerging security environment, some defence capabilities are becoming more relevant - such as rapid reaction and global deployability...

*General Maurice Baril
Chief of the Defence Staff
February, 2001*

ALSC would provide Canada with organic, purpose-built military sealift ships. No longer would the government be dependent on contracted, civilian manned, general-purpose cargo vessels that may be unable or unwilling to deploy to potential areas of conflict. These ships would be capable of commencing operations within 48 hours of mission orders³⁸ and possess the ability to operate in first year ice. This enhanced ice capability would ensure that potential Vanguard embarkation ports such as Quebec City and Montreal, which are often iced in for several months during the winter, would be accessible year round.³⁹ As already indicated, the ALSC fleet will be capable of providing rapid worldwide sealift for 85% of the land Vanguard forces (the remaining 15% being transported by strategic airlift).⁴⁰ Numerically this equates to rapid sealift for 7500 lane metres of equipment, helicopters, vehicles, stores and ammunition.

Rapid military sealift would provide the Canadian government with a host of political and military options. First, it would allow the government to demonstrate an early national commitment to a future UN operation by quickly mobilizing forces and rapidly moving them to any area of conflict. The government would also be able to poise or pre-position its forces in any theatre of operation and demonstrate early presence without necessarily having to breach a

³⁸ *ALSC Concept of Employment*, 7, 8.

³⁹ *ALSC Concept of Employment*, 12.

nation's territorial sovereignty – an inherent advantage of all warships. With Canadian forces poised at sea the government could continue to observe the situation develop, reconfirm national support for the operation and then commit Canadian forces at their time of choosing.⁴¹

Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS)

Integral within an expeditionary capability is the ability to deliver the equipment that has been rapidly moved towards an area of concern, in to the area of concern. Although it is considered unlikely that Canadian forces will ever conduct an opposed shore landing during any future UN mission, the navy must be prepared to disembark (and later re-embark) equipment into areas of the world where port facilities or wharfage are not available or insufficient to permit disembarkation. To support both its strategic lift role and its support to forces ashore role, ALSC will possess an over the beach self-load and self-unload capability for personnel, equipment, stores and supplies. The navy is currently unable to specify exactly how this will be accomplished but the obvious methods of transport are via some form of marine landing craft or some variant of heavy lift helicopter. Ideally, and primarily to permit the greatest range of military flexibility in the performance of this task, a combination of these two assets should be acquired. The conduct of beach landings in any sea state higher than 3 is commonly known to be problematic. In conditions of higher than sea state 3, marine landing craft can begin to experience difficulties at the beachhead as they interface with the heightened surf. Simply put, beach conditions that might be ideal for local surfers could severely hamper mission timings.

⁴⁰ *ALSC Concept of Employment*, 8.

⁴¹ *ALSC Concept of Employment*, 8.

Therefore, complementary assets consisting of both marine landing craft and heavy lift helicopters would provide the greatest degree of flexibility.

In discussing the issue of maritime helicopters in his paper, Dr. Fergusson suggests that in selecting the navy's future helicopter (MHP) greater emphasis should be geared towards its ability to perform in such roles as supporting, sustaining, deploying and extracting land forces⁴² in expeditionary type missions. Unfortunately, the current MHP Statement of Requirements (SOR) addresses no issues pertaining to a potential expeditionary capability. Whether it is feasible to acquire a helicopter possessing all the capabilities listed in the MHP SOR plus any capabilities that might support a future expeditionary capability is unknown. The helicopters procured through MHP, however, will most likely be the last helicopters the Canadian Navy acquires for many years and they must be able to contribute to all future missions the navy might be expected to undertake. It could be suggested that a further delay to the acquisition of the new MHP might be prudent until the CF has a firm commitment from the government for the expeditionary concept of ALSC and a more defined appreciation of the roles it wants to develop within this new capability.

In addition to the options the government would gain from a rapid sealift capability, a LOTS capability would add several more. First, with its inherent capability to project forces ashore, an expeditionary platform lying off a coast demonstrates a significant national presence and firm national resolve. Second, with 70 percent of the world's population and centres of

⁴² *Maritime Security in the Twenty-first Century - Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 11*, 109-110.

government lying within 100 kilometres of a coastline,⁴³ it is reasonable to assume that 70 percent of future UN missions will occur within these littoral regions. Depending on the region of the world and the conflict scenario, access to a specific country or region may not be possible via any other method than from the sea. Normally, damaged or heavily defended airfields, closed border crossings or insufficient seaport facilities would pose problems for the government in contributing forces to a mission. With a LOTS capability, these problems are eliminated. The final option is speed. LOTS would allow the government to commit significant forces in as short a time as possible without having to wait for a favourable situation in theatre to accommodate the deployment of Canadian forces. In any future UN mission this may be a critical factor to deter, reduce or end human suffering or to support the MND's new concept of fast in, fast out.

Support to Forces Ashore

Supporting and sustaining forces ashore are crucial elements within an expeditionary framework. To specifically address these issues, each ALSC ship will be able to provide the following:

- a capability to embark, transport, stage and operate army tactical helicopters;
- a capability to land on and recover large cargo/transport helicopters and non conventional vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft;
- limited command, control and communications (C3) facilities to support forces ashore;

⁴³ S.P. Lee, "How Can Naval and Amphibious Forces Best Contribute to Peace Support and Peacekeeping Operations?," *The Naval Review* October 2000, 305.

- embarkation and disembarkation of support personnel, equipment, stores and supplies;
- medical, surgical and dental facilities;
- safe rest and recreation and hotel facilities for off duty ashore personnel; and
- an ability to conduct NEO and sufficient C3 to support such activities.⁴⁴

Militarily, by possessing an organic asset capable of performing these roles, the CF would gain a host of tactical options and advantages. Politically, forces capable of autonomously supporting and sustaining operations ashore could allow the government the option of undertaking military operations independent of the UN or any of Canada's other alliances. An organic NEO capability would preclude Canadian reliance on foreign forces to extract endangered Canadian citizens abroad and humanitarian assistance missions, such as those in support of disaster relief, would be ideally served by an organic asset possessing this range of capabilities.

Support to a Joint or National Force Headquarters

Unlike several navies that operate specialized command and control ships, no platform in Canada's naval inventory can fulfill all the requirements of an embarked Joint Force Commander (CJTF) or a National Command Element (NCE).⁴⁵ The extensive accommodations and C3 facilities required by an embarked, high level staff preclude any Canadian warship from effectively operating in this role. As a result, Canada currently lacks the ability to fully support a higher level commander anywhere but ashore.

⁴⁴ *ALSC Concept of Employment*, 9.

⁴⁵ *ALSC Concept of Employment*, 8.

To facilitate the embarkation of a CJTF or a national commander, ALSC will provide the accommodations and working spaces for 75 additional staff members and the necessary C3 facilities to support the various facets of the joint or national operation. This would allow ALSC to operate in direct support of a potential CJTF, a potential NCE, the Theatre Activation Team (TAT) or to operate as a supplementary component of the Canadian Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART).⁴⁶ By having this organic capability immediately available, the government would possess options similar to those already mentioned: undertaking military operations independent of the UN or other allies and providing rapid, extensive support to any worldwide humanitarian assistance mission.

Conclusion

The Cold War is over. It is impossible to predict what will emerge from the current period of transition, but it is clear that we can expect pockets of chaos and instability that will threaten international peace and security. Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security...

1994 White Paper

The *1994 White Paper on Defence* recognized the dramatic shift in Canadian military affairs and articulated Canada's defence policy as it entered into the post Cold War era. Calling upon the CF to maintain multi-purpose, combat capable armed forces capable of meeting future challenges to Canada's security both at home and abroad, the document remains as relevant today as it was in 1994. The *White Paper* further identified the changing nature of international

⁴⁶ *ALSC Concept of Employment*, 9.

peacekeeping, that Canadian forces were being called upon more frequently in the defence of human security and that Canada would remain firmly committed to playing an active role in military operations, anywhere in the world, under the auspices of the UN.⁴⁷ Building upon the *White Paper, Strategy 2020* re-emphasized an unpredictable, changing global environment where peacekeeping operations would constitute the bulk of Canada's international contribution - cementing these as critical elements for future force planning and development.

Having participated in 53 different UN PSOs since 1989, the Government of Canada has certainly confirmed its commitment to human security. Violent internal conflicts in such areas as Africa, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Macedonia or the Middle East will continue to cause Canadian politicians to look to the CF to deploy military forces in support of this foreign policy. Making available and presenting to government the most effective options for the employment of Canadian forces in these future theatres will remain the role of Canada's military leadership. With the navy currently lacking an expeditionary capability, rapidly moving a significant contribution of Canadian forces into theatre is not an option they can present today. Tomorrow, this option must be available.

In his briefing to the Maritime Component of Command and Staff Course 27, the Netherlands Defence Attaché to Canada indicated that "today's Dutch Navy is concentrating more on expeditionary operations than actually conducting traditional warfare exercises at sea."⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, at <http://131.137.96.10/eng/min/reports/94wpaper/highlights.html>, 6.

⁴⁸ LCol L. Van den Heuvel, "The Royal Netherlands Navy Status and Plans," Lecture to the Maritime Component of Command and Staff Course 27, Toronto, Canadian Forces College, 26 March 2001.

He also stated that supporting land forces in an expeditionary role was the Dutch Navy's main focus and that this joint expeditionary concept was firmly establishing itself within the whole of the Dutch Armed Forces.⁴⁹ Human security is now more than just the UN's policy. Many nations throughout the world, including Canada, are embracing it. In doing so these nations are also restructuring their militaries towards joint rapid reaction forces – Canada should be no exception.

The CIA predicts that internal conflicts will remain at current levels to 2015 or possibly even increase. UN and Canadian foreign policies are now centered on human security. Recent military operations indicate that both are assuming more interventionist roles to support this policy. The MND is suggesting a fast in, fast out approach to future PSOs and *Leadmark* is openly discussing rapid sealift as a critical capability deficiency. With these as contributing factors, an expeditionary capability is precisely what the Canadian Navy must develop to provide the Government of Canada with increased political and military options when considering the deployment of Canadian forces to future internal conflicts.

Leadmark's vision for the Canadian Navy of 2020 is sound. It recognizes the future of joint military operations and the importance of the navy being able to support future UN PSOs. It clearly outlines that in order to contribute to these future missions, support Canadian foreign policy and enhance the navy's overall multi-purpose, combat capability a complementary, not exclusive, expeditionary capability must be developed. No other single capability being considered by the CF could provide a future government

⁴⁹ The Royal Netherlands Navy Status and Plans.

with a wider range of options. Rapidly deployable, heavy lift warships with the capabilities of transporting military or humanitarian supplies over the beach, remaining in theatre for a significant length of time to sustain operations ashore, and supporting an embarked national or joint command element would afford the Government of Canada a great deal more strategic, political and military flexibility than it enjoys today. The guiding words in *Leadmark* and the concept of ALSC must now be taken from the pages of naval documents, transformed into naval capabilities, and put to sea...

Ready Aye Ready.

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