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**“Gimmie My Timmies!”
New Considerations in Morale
for the
Canadian Operational Commander**

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“Gimmie My Timmies!”
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ABSTRACT

The members of today’s Canadian Forces (CF) are all volunteers who offer themselves for service based on an implied social and moral contract. They will pay the ultimate sacrifice when called upon to do so, but they expect to be supported by the society that they serve. This paper highlights that the operational level commander has responsibilities with regard to that moral contract, which he or she must exercise through the fostering and maintenance of morale. The failure to plan for the timely introduction of a Tim Horton’s outlet in Afghanistan and the failure to consider the financial repercussions for wounded soldiers are two recent incidents that demonstrate that improvements are required in planning for the maintenance of morale. This paper demonstrates that Canadian doctrine in this area is scant, and offers no models or tools to focus the commander’s thought processes on morale. A model is then introduced and, through looking at the changing nature of both operations and individuals, examples are given of how using the model can provide insights for the commander. The paper then suggests a tool that the commander can use in meeting the critical requirement to communicate with and update the deployed force with regards to morale, and calls for further research in the area. Finally, the paper hypothesizes that such a focused approach would significantly reduce the probability of failures such as those noted above.

“Gimmie My Timmies!”
New Considerations in Morale for the Canadian Operational Commander

*“Morale is the greatest single factor in successful war....
 In any long and bitter campaign morale will suffer unless all
 ranks thoroughly believe that their commanders are concerned
 first and always with the welfare of the troops who do the fighting”*

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Crusade in Europe, 1948

Introduction

The members of today’s Canadian Forces (CF) are all volunteers who offer themselves for service based on an implied social and moral contract. In return for their services, including paying the ultimate sacrifice when called upon to do so, CF members expect to be supported by the society that they serve.¹ As such, senior government and military leaders have responsibilities in maintaining this contract of mutual trust and support, all of which manifests itself into core values that form the link between the forces and society.²

Two recent incidents have highlighted the nature of the moral contract. First, a series of newspaper articles told the story of how the CF wanted to raise troop morale by establishing a ‘Tim Horton’s® Afghanistan.’³ The idea of setting up an outlet at the Kandahar airfield took shape only when the first Canadians were greeted by a row of American fast-food restaurants, including Burger King, Subway, and Pizza Hut.⁴ It was

¹Lieutenant Colonel T.M. Endicott, “The Social Evolution of the Canadian Forces – Post Somalia” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2002), 11.

² *Ibid.*, 6.

³ Tim Horton’s ® is a coffee, doughnut and sandwich food chain that is owned by Wendy’s International, U.S.A. This chain is highly popular in Canada, and is generally associated with Canadian culture.

⁴ Chris Wattie, “Canadian Forces Desperate for Tim Horton’s,” *The Vancouver Sun*, 28 January 2006, A4. Major Dailies Database, available from <http://proquest/umi.compdqweb?did=977928861>. Internet; accessed 11 September 2006.

reported that Tim Horton's "balked" at the idea, noting it was not in their business model,⁵ and that tight controls over their product and operations could not be maintained in Afghanistan,⁶ all the while a CF Personnel Support Agency representative was implying that a trailer could be set up in a couple of weeks, if not days if military cargo space were available.⁷ As might be expected, many Tim Horton's customers (also participants in the social and moral contact) were enraged, and "swore-off their Timmies in letters to the editor and e-mails and telephoned complaints to company headquarters..."⁸ The Company reiterated their support for the troops and noted they would try to do something, but they had not yet been asked.⁹ Discussions between the company and the military were announced shortly thereafter.¹⁰ All these events transpired in eight days (28 January – 4 February 2006) and the outlet was officially opened some five months later during Canada Day celebrations.¹¹

A second recent incident was the appearance of spectacular newspaper headlines, including "*Adding Insult to Injury? Wounded Soldiers Have Pay Cut*"¹² and "*Wounded*

⁵Chris Wattie, "Canadian Forces Seek Coffee Shop to Boost Morale," *National Post*, 28 January 2006, A3. Major Dailies Database, available from <http://proquest/umi.compdqweb?did=977928351>. Internet; accessed 11 September 2006.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Bill Mah, "Confusion Over Afghanistan lands Tim Hortons in Hot Water," *The Victoria Times Colonist*, 2 February 2006, A13. Major Dailies Database, available from <http://proquest/umi.compdqweb?did=979697651>. Internet; accessed 11 September 2006.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Chris Wattie, "Afghan Tims Still Possible," *National Post*, 4 February 2006, A2. Major Dailies Database, available from <http://proquest/umi.compdqweb?did=981645681>. Internet; accessed 11 September 2006.

¹¹Matthew Fisher, "Canadian Troops in Afghanistan Get Beer and a Break," *Edmonton Journal* 2 July 2006, A3. Major Dailies Database, available from <http://proquest/umi.compdqweb?did=1071025901>. Internet; accessed 11 September 2006.

¹²Gloria Galloway, "Adding Insult to Injury? Wounded Soldiers Have Pay Cut," *Globe and Mail Online*, 5 October 2006; available from <http://globeandmail.com//servlet/story/RTGAM.20061005.wxdanger05/BNStory>. Internet; accessed 5 October 2006.

*Soldiers Have No Claim to Danger Pay.*¹³ Such actions prompted one Liberal Party opposition Member of Parliament to state "...I think (it) is extraordinarily harsh and shows a broken faith with our troops."¹⁴ In a related story, the father of a recently injured soldier implied that the government was not supporting families in their time of need, adding that they were told they would have to pay their own expenses to meet their son upon arrival back in Canada.¹⁵ The Minister of National Defence and the Chief of Defence Staff responded that the troops would be taken care of, with the Minister commenting that when the policy was put in place, no one thought of the consequences of having wounded soldiers evacuated out of the area and the financial impact it would have on them.¹⁶

The above incidents demonstrate how such issues can quickly permeate the traditional strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations from a moral contract perspective, and that there was a degree of failure in the planning process. Such incidents directly affect the morale of those touched by them, in this case the soldiers on operations looking for a piece of Canadiana in the form of a good cup of coffee, and the soldiers wounded on operations and their families. From a morale perspective, this is considered the *tactical level*. The CF, with the approval of the government exercised through the Treasury Board, have implemented many policies and benefits that reflect the nature of the moral contract and contribute to soldiers' morale. The danger pay policy, support to

¹³Eric Beuchesne, "Wounded Soldiers Have No Claim to Danger Pay," *Can West News Service* 9 October 2006; available from <http://www.Canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id23281507-86a6-4aa8-b5bc-5>. Internet; accessed 9 October 2006.

¹⁴Galloway, *Adding Insult to Injury*, 1.

¹⁵Unidentified Author, "Soldiers Story Prompts Ottawa Promise," *The Chronical Herald Online*, 10 October 2006; available from <http://thechronicalherald.ca/Canada/533064.html>. Internet; accessed 10 October 2006.

¹⁶Eric Beuchesne, "No Danger Pay for Wounded, O'Conner says: Bonus reserved for soldiers in war zones: Minister Say Government Won't Budge," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 9 October 2006, A4.

military families through the Military Family Resource Centres, Home Leave Travel Assistance, and other extensively public funded morale and welfare programmes are but four examples particular to deployments. From a morale perspective, this is considered the *strategic level*. Conceptually then, the operational level commander, exercising the operational art in the ‘middle ground’, has the responsibility for fostering and maintaining morale in the *operational level* sphere.

The above cited incidents imply that the current approaches to planning for morale or framing the commander’s thought processes in that regard are lacking in effectiveness, and that a greater emphasis on morale is therefore required if the probability of such incidents is to be minimized. Accepting this, the question becomes whether or not the commander has sufficient doctrinal backing, models or tools to execute his responsibilities with respect to morale.¹⁷ As will be shown, there is precious little at his disposal that could help him gain insights into any new considerations resulting from any potential changes to the nature of the operation at hand, or the changing nature of the individuals comprising the force. As such, it is argued that by approaching the fostering and maintenance of morale through a model that considers the mission-relevant, leadership, unit, and individual antecedents of morale, the commander can influence the optimism, confidence and purpose that lead to the motivation and enthusiasm that are critical to the accomplishment of mission objectives. It will be demonstrated that the commander must communicate and update his insights on morale, and a tool for doing so will be proposed. Finally, it will be suggested that focused human element research in the area of morale would be beneficial.

¹⁷‘His’ may be used within this paper exclusive of an accompanying ‘her’ in the interest of brevity, but in all instances should be taken to be inclusive of both.

Morale Defined

The CF Joint Doctrine Manual *CF Operational Planning Process* lists the ten Canadian Principles of War, noting that the commander may have to adhere to one principle at the expense of another at times, but disregarding any one principle involves risk and the possibility of failure. The description of the principle of ‘Maintenance of Morale’ states that “After leadership, morale is the most important element on the moral plane of conflict. It is essential to ensuring cohesion and the will to win. It is, however, sensitive to material conditions *and should never be taken for granted* (emphasis added). Morale is nurtured through good leadership, sound discipline, realistic training, confidence in equipment and a sense of purpose.”¹⁸ However, this does not provide a definition *per se*, and a scan of Canadian joint doctrine does not provide one.¹⁹ Interestingly, neither do the U.S. Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, nor the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. In the Oxford English Dictionary morale is given two definitions, first as “The morals or morality of a person or group of people; moral principles or conduct”, and second as “The mental or emotional state (with regard to confidence, hope, enthusiasm, etc.) of a person or group engaged in some activity; degree of contentment with one’s lot or situation.” This provides little insight into military specific morale, of which the cultivation, presence and maintenance thereof are often taken as a given.²⁰ This definition also sheds little light on the terms often used as synonyms, such as motivation, esprit de corps and cohesion.

¹⁸Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 *CF Operational Planning Process*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 1-6.

¹⁹Although not specifically listed here, a scan of the bibliography will provide the reader with a compilation of the doctrinal sources examined.

²⁰Major David W. Burwell, “Morale as a Principle of War” (Fort Leavenworth Kansas: A Monograph for the US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 29.

Morale can be defined as a function of the self-preservative adaptability of individuals and groups. When it is high, the individual or group is efficient in adapting to the problems or situations that arise, and when it is low, they are not. Self-preservation and self-betterment may be termed the life-instinct that an individual may forego, to the point of giving ones life, to further the interests of other persons or cherished principles.²¹ In other words, morale is the individual mental attitude based on self-confidence and confidence in his or her *primary* group.²² In context then, cohesion is the feeling of solidarity and belonging to a group based on trust, loyalty, and mutual affection, and esprit de corps is pride in a larger group (unit) where face-to-face encounters are rare.²³ Collectively these elements make up a climate for which commanders have responsibilities.

Morale exists on both positive and negative planes (as opposed to good and bad) as such terminology is representative of the ‘electric-emotional charge’ that can be derived from morale. For instance, positive morale is the “charged-up, excited camaraderie soldiers gain from satisfied needs, their positive sense of mission and unity, or a wide spectrum of other causes.”²⁴ Positive morale drives the individual, through mutual confidence, to strive for something more important than the individual.²⁵ Clausewitz suggests that the main factor for defeat in battle is the lack of morale or the

²¹Freedman Burill, “Morale and the Life Instinct: A Biological Orientation,” *American Sociological Review* 8, no. 6 (December 1943): 715-716; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet ; accessed 27 September 2006.

²²Lieutenant-Colonel Donald M. Bradshaw, “Combat Stress Casualties: A Commander’s Influence,” *Military Review* 67, no. 4 (July-August 1995): 20-24; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet ; accessed 27 September 2006.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴Lieutenant Colonel Eric Ash, “Terror Targeting: The Morale of the Story,” *Aerospace Power Journal*, (Winter 1999): 34; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet ; accessed 27 September 2006.N 17

²⁵*Ibid.*, 36

loss thereof.²⁶ Although many others could be cited, such as J.F.C. Fuller, S.L.A. Marshall, and George S. Patton, it is safe to say that morale is widely accepted as a critical element of a force, but few commanders can define it succinctly or understand how to measure it.²⁷ This supports the contention that some form of descriptive doctrine, model of morale, or other tool would be of use to the commander in keeping the importance of morale in mind, and to shape the appropriate conditions for the creation and maintenance of positive morale. But are doctrine, models, or tools available?

Canadian Doctrine on Morale

One constant that contributes to victory is the quality soldier, so developing and maintaining morale must always be in the forefront of the commander's actions. Commanders must understand that morale is in a constant state of flux, is critical to assuring operational readiness,²⁸ and must be at the highest possible level at all times as there is often little warning before operations.²⁹ Canadian Army doctrine on command notes that "whether in peacetime or operations, a commander, by force of his personality, leadership, command style and general behaviour, has a considerable *influence on morale* (emphasis added), sense of direction and performance of his staff and subordinate commanders. Thus it is the commander's responsibility to create and sustain an effective 'climate' within his command."³⁰ This leadership driven climate will directly or

²⁶Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. By Micheal Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 231.

²⁷Major David W. Burwell, *Morale as a Principle of War*, 4.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 4,39.

²⁹Major Kevin Wm. Smith, "Maintenance of Morale: A Cornerstone of Unit Operational Effectiveness in Today's Canadian Forces." (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 1995), 27.

³⁰Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), 13.

indirectly affect soldier well-being.³¹ But with the pressing demands of operations at a level unprecedented in many years (read casualties), are commanders truly ‘tuned-in’ to the fundamental precepts of morale that history has clearly demonstrated, or do they need some assistance in terms of models or tools that could assist in focusing thought in that domain?

Notwithstanding the doctrinal references to the importance of the commander’s influence on morale, Canadian operational and joint doctrine offer no outlines or models that commanders might use to focus his or her influence on morale and command climate. The *Canadian Forces Operations* manual simply lists the ‘Maintenance of Well-Being and Morale’ as one of the seven principles of personnel support, that personnel services are provided to help sustain members and assist commanders in the maintenance of morale, and that such services “can alleviate hardships encountered by members of an expeditionary force and enkindle greater attention to duty and skill-at-arms.”³² A list of personnel services is provided, from chaplaincy to graves registration (the latter being far from morale inspiring and a clear hang-over from days past, but nonetheless an important consideration for the commander in the terms of ‘ramp ceremonies’ and public opinion), but it is interesting to note the absence of family support services, individual communication capacities, decompression, and post operation support. It is also interesting to note that the chapter in *CF Operations* on ‘Force Protection’ is still under

³¹Paul D. Bliese, “Social Climates: Drivers of Soldier Well-Being and Resilience,” in *Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat, Volume 1 - Operational Stress*, ed. Amy B Alder, Carl Andrew Castro, and Thomas B. Britt, 213-234. (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 214.

³²Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 *Canadian Forces Operations*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 33-3.

development, and one can only hope that it will address the protection of one's own morale given that war is all about destroying an adversary's will.

The CF *Direction for International Operations* and *Morale and Welfare Program in the Canadian Forces* are other publications where one might expect to find insight into the issue of morale. The former has an extensive chapter on personnel support, but it can best be characterized as a procedures and authorities manual.³³ The latter includes a section on support and services available to deployed operations, but the overall focus rests on authorities and levels of public support.³⁴ As such, it can be argued that there is a marked shortcoming in Canadian doctrine, as morale is a commander's constant concern.³⁵ This shortcoming must be overcome, but the focus herein will remain confined to the operational level commander.

Given the absence of any meaningful Canadian doctrinal guidance, models or tools from which to work, it is argued that the operational level commander will need some sort of construct or model if morale is to be examined more holistically or systematically. It must first be acknowledged that there has been a great deal of meaningful work done by the Canadian Directorate of Human Resources Research and Evaluation (DHRRE) to measure and establish norms concerning the human dimensions of operations (HDO) over the four stages of an operation.³⁶ A series of questionnaires

³³Department of National Defence, *DRAFT: Direction for International Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, undated), Chapter 12.

³⁴Department of National Defence, A-PS-110-001/AG-002 *Draft submitted for approval: Morale and Welfare Programs in the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2006), Ch 3, 8.

³⁵Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Ash, *Terror Targeting: The Morale of the Story*, 34.

³⁶The four stages are: the preparation and deployment for the operation; the arrival in location to 2 months; a maintenance period between two months to five months; and the preparation for the return home.

measure concerns about medical/health issues, discipline, attitudes, cohesion and morale, professional morale, leadership, and stress in military service.³⁷

One tool used is the Unit Climate Profile that provides battalion commanders with insights into the unit's morale, cohesion, and confidence in leaders. However, this information is often confirmatory or after the fact, and the nature of the results implies that although the activities of a battalion, brigade, or division (and by extension an operational level task force) may affect a soldier's morale, the fundamental attitudes and behaviours are generally determined at the company level and below.³⁸ Further, as results are treated as confidential to the unit commander,³⁹ there is limited utility to the operational level commander in his exercise of the operational art and exploitation of the operational planning process for effect when it comes to morale (either through intent or through planning guidance). Finally, the norms used in the Unit Climate Profile were developed over a two year period in Bosnia, which had a significantly different mission framework than the current operations in Afghanistan. This means that further time may be required for the norms to adjust or for new norms to be developed before they are of use to a commander in the focus of current operations or in a like field.

The Britt and Dickinson 'Model of Morale During Operations'

³⁷Captain K.J. Brown, *Human Dimensions of Operation Surve : Revision and TwoYear Validation*, Report Prepared for the Chief of Land Staff. (Ottawa: Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation, 2005, 3-7.

³⁸David H. Marlowe, Ph D., *Cohesion, Anticipated Breakdown, and Endurance in Battle: Considerations for Severe and High Intensity Combat*, Report prepared for the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Washington, D.C.: Division of Neuropsychiatry, undated, 51.

³⁹Major K.J. Brown, *Human Dimensions of Operation Survey; The Way Forward*, Report Prepared for the Chief of Land Staff (Ottawa: Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation, 2005, iv.

In conducting research for this paper, the author came across but two models of military morale that were not mired with specific sociological research (and the somewhat hypothetical and statistical bend associated with them). It has been argued that this is not surprising, as it is contended that there is little research on the determinants of morale and too much focus on the outcomes that may (arguably) result from poor morale, such as post-traumatic stress disorder.⁴⁰ The first is a consideration of ‘Layers of Morale’ as ‘A Generic Army Unit Model.’⁴¹ It defines the responsibilities from individual to the battalion level with regard to intent, mission, norms and targets, using descriptors such as enthusiasm, endurance and loyalty. However, this model lacks sufficient depth to be of practical use at the operational level. The second model is provided in the very current writings of Thomas W. Britt and James M. Dickinson, and is of use here as it provides a theoretical model of morale during operations (figure 1).⁴²

⁴⁰Thomas W. Britt and James M. Dickinson, “Morale During Military Operations: A Positive Psychology Approach,” in *Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat, Volume 1 - Operational Stress*, eds. Amy B Alder, Carl Andrew Castro, and Thomas B. Britt, 157-183. (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 157.

⁴¹Major Kevin Wm Smith, *Maintenance of Morale: A Cornerstone of Unit Operational Effectiveness in Today's Canadian Forces*, 7.

⁴² Thomas W. Britt and James M. Dickinson, *Morale During Military Operations: A Positive Psychology Approach*, 160.




Figure 1 - A Model for Morale During Military Operations

Source: Brit and Dickinson, *Morale During Military Operations: A Positive Psychology Approach*, 4.

In the model, the hypothesized antecedents of morale are tied to morale as motivation and enthusiasm for achieving mission success. This motivation and enthusiasm is determined by a member's sense of purpose, confidence, hope and optimism for the operation. The mission-relevant antecedents focus on the *beliefs* of the soldier that the mission has a clear purpose and achievable objectives, that incremental success is being made, and that there is public support for the operation.⁴³ The leadership antecedent sees the critical attributes of leaders as clarifying the mission objectives, instilling high efficacy through training and leading by example, creating trust between leaders and subordinates, and emphasizing and recognizing the positive outcomes that

⁴³*Ibid.*, 165-169.

result from dedicated skill. The unit antecedent assumes that unit cohesion contributes to the unit's power or capacity to produce the desired effects. Finally, many individual factors come into play, including a member's natural disposition to believe that there are positive opportunities with positive outcomes, hardiness in the sense that they are committed to life goals and enjoy challenges, confidence that they can do their jobs under difficult conditions, and to what degree one considers being a soldier as central to their identity.⁴⁴

High motivation and enthusiasm for accomplishing mission objectives have psychological and performance related consequences as well. The psychological consequences include continued good mental health, the perceived benefit of doing meaningful work or having a greater appreciation for life, and organizational benefits such as enhanced commitment to the organization. Performance related consequences include the ongoing approaches to one's own work and assisting in the work of others, or potentially counter-productive activities such as drug abuse or breaches of discipline.⁴⁵

Having identified morale as a critical element in operations and a construct in which the operational level commander can view morale, the question becomes how he or she can effectively execute their responsibility to foster and maintain morale as an element of the forces' climate between the strategic and tactical levels. Using the model as a framework to seek insights in that regard, the main focus should be on issues that affect the antecedents, as positive morale will lead to favourable consequential psychological and performance outcomes. Within the scope of this paper it is not

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 170-172.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 174-175.

possible to introduce multiple issues that may affect morale and examine them in the perspective of the model, but two broad-based issues should be sufficiently demonstrative. Given that the first three antecedents to be considered (mission relevance, leadership, and the unit) are clearly linked to operations, the changing nature of operations would be a suitable broad-based issue. Given that it is the individual at the root of the fourth antecedent to be considered, it follows that the changing nature of the individual would be an appropriate second broad-based issue.

The Changing Nature of Operations

The international security environment of the future will (continue to) be characterized by failed or failing states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and increasing asymmetric threats.⁴⁶ Today, there are many ways to describe the character of war and its changing nature, but this paper will limit discussion to two contexts as being representative and sufficient for the purposes of exploring the benefits of using the model. The two contexts selected are the Three Block War and advances in technology.

The Three Block War

One way of describing the character of war is through the Three Block War concept, which espouses that "...our enemies will not allow us to fight the Son of Desert Storm, but will try to draw us into the stepchild of Chechnya. In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart –

⁴⁶Major David W. Burwell, *Morale as a Principle of War*, 1.

conducting peacekeeping operations – and finally they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day, all within three city blocks.”⁴⁷ Inherent in this construct are six conditions that will complicate and shape operations:⁴⁸

- there is a duty to try and protect the innocent civilian population. Technologically advanced sensors and weapons allow modern forces to do so better than at any time in the past. However, opponents do not share this value and target civilians or use hospitals or schools for operational advantage;
- operations must be planned through a blending of political, military and humanitarian factors. Planners must speak joint, inter-agency and non-government organization (NGO), and understand the concepts of development that will result in a crowded, multi-faceted area of operations;
- there is no decisive victory over the enemy that leads to a distinct post-conflict phase. This makes the simultaneous delivery of humanitarian aid and reconstruction critical to the longer-term strategic victory;
- insurgents will attack aid workers and those that aid the coalition rather than face a force directly, undermining the resolve of aid workers and reconstruction teams that are critical for success;
- the media is omni-present and admit that “if it bleeds, it leads.” The focus on combat detracts from the work on the other two blocks, leaving impressions that those efforts are not effective; and
- the military must conduct the battles, but NGOs, diplomats, and local government and aid workers must control blocks two and three.

Superimposed on these conditions is the concept of ‘fourth generation warfare (4GW),’ an “evolved form of insurgency [that] uses all available networks – political, economic, social, military – to convince the enemy’s decision makers (through the public and the moral contract) that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for

⁴⁷General Charles C. Krulak, quoted by Joseph J. Collins, in “Afghanistan: Winning a Three Block War.” *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol XXIV, no 2 (Winter 2004), 62.

⁴⁸Joseph J. Collins, “Afghanistan: Winning a Three Block War.” *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol XXIV, no 2 (Winter 2004), 61-77.

the perceived benefit.⁴⁹ To complicate matters, Three Block operations are often conducted within coalitions that will be of different size, capabilities, composition and character, depending on the strategic objectives.⁵⁰ In theory, common doctrine is used to bridge the intellectual gap between principles of war and the execution of the coalition mission,⁵¹ but the incidence of friction is likely to be high and inefficiencies can occur due to different languages, technology and training.⁵²

Returning to the antecedents of the model, the nature of the Three Block War and characteristics of 4GW will have implications for the commander in instilling the optimism, confidence and trust required for positive morale. In terms of mission-relevant antecedents, the troops will need an expanded band of information about activities on the political, economic, social, block two, and block three fronts in order to see the clear purpose behind the mission. Mission objectives are often difficult to understand in such operations as simple terms such as ‘conquer the objective and destroy the enemy’ are less common, and hostilities can continue during diplomatic efforts or even interim agreements. The commander must be that information provider between the strategic and the tactical. He must ensure relevant issues are effectively communicated down to the soldiers in order to gain their trust, as knowledge of the real state of affairs (not captured by their common information sources) will lessen the fear caused by the unknown.⁵³ The information must be framed so the troops know they are making incremental steps

⁴⁹Robert Riscassi, “Principles for Coalition Warfare.” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 1 (Summer 1993), 60.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 59.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 60.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 62.

⁵³Sergio Catignani, “Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli Defense Forces,” *Parameters* (Autumn 2004): 108-21; available from <http://carlisle-army.mil/usawc/parameters/04autumn/catignan.htm>; Internet ; accessed 6 October 2006.

towards a clearly defined operational objective, implying that a method of providing frequent updates will be required.

Today, operations occur ‘outside the wire’ and under the constant eye of the media, which has two implications. First, as the military naturally views the media as subversive rather than positive⁵⁴ (and soldiers can be self-conscious with media present⁵⁵), units will have to understand the nature of the media and that all is not just what they report (the sensational issues that tend to undermine morale). For the commander, he must find ways, often through the media and by influencing the strategists, to convince the public that the goals can be achieved at an acceptable cost.⁵⁶ Second, while many factors affect morale, including public opinion, the most important factor is the immediate conditions at and how comfortable the troops feel ‘inside the wire’. The American experience has shown that soldiers are not frail creatures that are quick to be dejected, but are rather “active participants in their own well-being.”⁵⁷ “The forward operating base has emerged as a critical factor in shaping the ability for soldiers to maintain the requisite psychological readiness for combat operations....what helps morale...is mostly the mundane stuff – hot showers, video games, email, and communications with family back home; ...once the bullets stop flying, they want stuff.”⁵⁸ For the Canadian commander, such ‘stuff’ would include the uninterrupted offerings of a Tim Horton’s outlet, and it is suggested that the commander could leverage

⁵⁴Douglas Porch, “No Bad Stories: The American Media-Military Relationship,” *Parameters* (Winter 2002): Vol. LV, No. 1. 108-21; available from <http://carlisle-army.mil/usawc/parameters/04autumn/catignan.htm>; Internet ; accessed 6 October 2006.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

⁵⁷Avi Klien, “The Morale Myth,” *Washington Monthly* 38, no. 5 (May 2006): 12-14; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet ; accessed 3 October 2006.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

his effect on morale by reminding the soldiers (for reasons that will be more evident later) of the ‘value’ of all that has been made available to them and why (the moral contract). This suggests that some form of tool to do so would be useful.

Advances in Technology

There is an ongoing need to focus on the human element of soldiering in spite of significant advances in technology brought about by the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs.⁵⁹ Concepts such as Network-Centric Warfare purport to focus combat power by effectively linking all aspects of the war fighting enterprise. “It is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces (consisting of entities) to create a high level of shared battle space awareness that can be exploited via self-synchronization and other network-centric operations to achieve the commander’s intent.”⁶⁰ Some would argue that perfect battlefield visibility is closer at hand than ever,⁶¹ and that “the battle commander no longer needs to overlook the battlefield; he no longer needs to be in the vicinity of the battle; he no longer needs to be adjacent to the battle; he no longer needs to be in even the same global hemisphere of the battle... (with the) 21st century General viewing a cluster of video screens and digital maps that portray battle changes in real time.”⁶² However, wars are still fought by men and women and their will, regardless of technology, meaning that “individual actions, human imperfections, performance thresholds, and varying

⁵⁹ Sergio Catignani, *Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli Defense Forces*, 109.

⁶⁰ Arthur K Cebroski and John J. Garstka, *Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future*, Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute 124, No. 1, (January 1998), quoted in Matthias Alfons Altmeier, *The Perils of Network-Centric Warfare: Micromanagement, Morale and Combat Power in the Age of Information Technology*. (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2004), 6.

⁶¹ Colonel Christian Rousseau, “Commanders, Complexity and the Limits of Modern Battlespace Visualization.” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Advanced Military Studies Course Paper, 2002), 1.

⁶² Robert K Ackerman, *Operation Enduring Freedom Redefine Warfare*, Signal Magazine, 57, No.1, (September 2002), 3, quoted in Colonel Christian Rousseau *Commanders, Complexity and the Limits of Modern Battlespace Visualization* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Advanced Military Studies Course Paper, 2002), 1.

personalities will still influence and determine a conflict's outcome.”⁶³ The commander is the key personality at play in those human elements and he must remain engaged on that plane. It can also be argued that a renewed focus on the human element of morale is needed due to the increasing need to fight in urban areas, where the terrain significantly reduces the technological edge of conventional forces.⁶⁴

It is clear that superior technology can be a major force multiplier, but it can also have its drawbacks. It has been argued that “Having a common operating picture will lead operational commanders to be increasingly involved in purely tactical decisions, instead of focusing on the operational and strategic aspects of the situation.”⁶⁵ This blurring of the levels of war and tendency to exploit vertical command, or micromanage, is counter to the concept of mission command, and can have a profound impact on morale. Studies have shown that micromanagement severely degraded morale as it implied a lack of trust in subordinates,⁶⁶ and led to inaction or even fear to act resulting in problems getting escalated to the top.⁶⁷ In other words, “micromanagement leads to high turnover, low morale, poor quality and low productivity.”⁶⁸

The implications for the commander lie primarily in the leadership antecedent of instilling high efficacy and trust. The operational planning process will lead the

⁶³Brian R. Rienwald, *Retaining the Moral Element of War*, Military Review 58, No.1, (January-February 1988), 69. quoted in Catignani,, *Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli Defense Forces*, 108.

⁶⁴Catignani,, *Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli Defense Forces*, 109.

⁶⁵Matthias Alfons Altmeier, “The Perils of Network-Centric Warfare: Micromanagement, Morale and Combat Power in the Age of Information Technology.” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Command and Staff Course New Horizons Paper, 2004), 8.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 18.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 19

commander to a force structure and capabilities list, but the soldiers will need to be confident that the collective of the personnel, equipment and support provided are sufficient to do the job, and that they are adjusted when required. The commander must do this through his communications and his actions, as “regardless of how logical and well-meaning the explanation may be for the unit’s shortages, soldiers will evaluate their own role and their unit’s mission on the basis of their own perceptions, and no one else’s.”⁶⁹ What fosters negative morale is a lack of equipment, not having sufficient resources on the ground to not just get the job done, but to keep it that way, and watching a soldier die.⁷⁰ Thus it is a commander’s responsibility to foresee and demand additional resources when required, or otherwise demand that the mission be changed. But having the right equipment is one thing, and being allowed to use it is another. Faster communications and greater battlefield visibility may tend to restrict ROEs, but the commander must ensure the Rules of Engagement are flexible enough to allow for improvisation and freedom of action.⁷¹ ROE restriction can affect the individual efficacy antecedent by giving soldiers a sense of loss of personal psychological control, resulting in disengagement from the mission and a loss of pride in their work.⁷²

Soldiers can have the best equipment, but as noted earlier, its effects may be limited by terrain or the scenarios they face. To foster the antecedents of collective and individual efficacy, commanders must ensure units are well trained. Given that operational commanders rely on separate force generators, they must assure themselves

⁶⁹Clark Brown, *Cohesion*, Infantry, (March-April 1982), 10: quoted in Catignani, *Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli Defense Forces*, 113.

⁷⁰Avi Klien, *The Morale Myth*, 13.

⁷¹Catignani, *Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli Defense Forces*, 118.

⁷²Thomas W. Britt, *Responsibility, Commitment and Morale*, Military Review 78, No.1, (January-February 1988), 79. quoted in Catignani, *Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli Defense Forces*, 108.

that the troops were properly trained by the force generators for the mission at hand. This can be difficult as a joint task force can often be put together quickly due to some unforeseen event. It is argued that the scenario-based training (SBT) approach to impart the knowledge, skills and attitudes for the accomplishment of military tasks is the best approach.⁷³ If the task force commander has the time to conduct training, he must ensure that the SBT is well designed and relevant, or otherwise ensure that was the case with the force generators. He must ensure that performance history and skills inventories are used to determine the appropriate tasks and competencies. Once training objectives are developed, carefully crafted scenarios must be embedded and performance measures established. Key to the process is providing constructive and timely feedback (for reasons that will be more evident later). The commander also has a professional responsibility to see that lessons learned from the training and subsequent operations are ‘fed back’ so that future training can be modified.⁷⁴ The commander should also communicate his confidence in the training provided, as this will give the soldiers the confidence they need in their self and unit efficacy.

The increasing battlefield visibility garnered from technology generates a particular challenge for the commander. When battle intensity rises, the soldiers need to see the commander or know he is near, as this instills belief that direction and order exist.⁷⁵ In the words of General Patton, “commanders should routinely visit units two echelons below their command. The more senior the officer the greater the value to the

⁷³Eduardo Salas, *et al*, “Scenario Based Training: Improving Military Mission Performance and Adaptability,” in *Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat, Volume 2 - Operational Stress*, eds. Amy B Alder, Carl Andrew Castro, and Thomas B. Britt, 32-53. (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 36.

⁷⁴Eduardo Salas, *et al*, *Scenario Based Training: Improving Military Mission Performance and Adaptability*, 45.

⁷⁵Major David W. Burwell, *Morale as a Principle of War*, 31.

morale of troops. If there is danger eminent the greater the value of the visit.”⁷⁶ But presence in the form of micromanagement must be resisted. This creates a dilemma because technology and the nature of operations can result in greater dispersion, making it more and more difficult for the commander to be seen. In Vietnam, senior officers were accused of using advancing communications equipment to avoid combat risk, thus not dying in sufficient numbers in front of the troops to create a shared risk or martyrdom that all sociological units require to maintain cohesion.⁷⁷ It may be that a commander cannot use personal presence to the same degree as in the past, meaning that he must find new ways to heighten and maintain morale through the increased attention to other antecedents and alternate means of communication. As will be seen, the changing nature of the individual will demand it.

The Changing Nature of the Individual

All human beings concern themselves with the basic tenants of life such as food, safety, and health, but morale transcends these basic concerns when it comes to the mission.⁷⁸ Individuals will have natural tendencies as to their dispositional optimism and hardiness, two of the individual antecedents leading to morale, and these vary from generation to generation, with different generations being found in a single organization. In Canada, there are four generations, namely Matures (born prior to World War II), Baby Boomers (born post WWII to 1964), Generation X (born 1965 to 1980) and

⁷⁶George S. Patton Jr., *War as I Knew It*, (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton University Press, 1985), 336.

⁷⁷Anthony Kellett, *Combat Motivation*, Report Prepared for the Department of National Defence (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1980, 161.

⁷⁸Lieutenant Colonel Eric Ash, *Terror Targeting: The Morale of the Story*, 35.

Generation Y (born 1980 and beyond).⁷⁹ Simple math tells us that the first Generation Y's are now 26 years old, and they represent our predominant recruit pool, soldiers up to corporal, and officers up to junior captain. Operational level commanders in the near future are likely to be from early Generation X or very late Boomers, while more senior leaders are Baby Boomers. Generations are labelled because each has a similar set of values, attitudes, aspirations, expectations and motivations,⁸⁰ all of which contribute to one's optimism, confidence and purpose. Baby-boomers by their nature accept authority, recognizing there is a boss who issues the orders and that it is their job to carry them out.⁸¹ Although Generation X (Gen X) shares this characteristic to a degree, Generation Y (Gen Y) is fundamentally different. It is safe to say that those of Gen X who remain in the CF have been sufficiently inculcated in the military ethos, so it is Gen Y that is of increasing importance to the commander in examining morale issues. As such, Gen Y will be examined from an individual characteristics perspective, and from an organizational perspective.

There are many terms used to describe the individual characteristics of Gen Y. They have all the latest technological gadgets, they multi-task, they thirst for knowledge, demand respect, hate tokenistic rhetoric, and expect to control what, when, where and how they learn. They are smart, creative, confident and self-sufficient, but also impatient and focus on "me."⁸² Having been raised with all the latest electronic gadgets and

⁷⁹Cynthia G. Wagner, "Demography: Generational Shifts in Value," *Futurist* 40, no. 6, (March 1999): 16; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 27 September 2006.

⁸⁰Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Schwab, "Setting the Stage for Success: Developing Junior Officers of Character," (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Exercise New Horizons Paper, 2005), 8.

⁸¹Bernart Salt, "A word to the Ys about boomers," *The Australian*, 20 July 2006, 26; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2006.

⁸²Scott Carlson, *The Next Generation in the Classroom*, A35. See also Bernard Salt, "Words from the Y's: We Want Global Roaming," *The Australian*, 27 May 2006, 101; available from

gizmos, they are able to converse on an instant messenger, surf the web, and change tunes on the iPod, all the while doing their homework.⁸³ They have little brand loyalty, and believe it is their right to make choices and customize the things they choose.⁸⁴ They are always on phones and computers because of the value they place on networking with friends.⁸⁵ Gen Y will give you their dedication, but ask what they will get for it – *today!*⁸⁶ A Gen Y craves to be engaged, wanting to be active 24/7,⁸⁷ and can be given more responsibility sooner because of their computer skills – otherwise they can be bored and look for a better experience.⁸⁸ Whereas Gen Xers were raised in larger families with hierarchical order, Gen Yers are mostly from a single child or two children families. The resultant extra attention led to an ability to be unfazed by power and an ability to negotiate for what they wanted.⁸⁹ Gen X tend to be independent, whereas Gen Y had much closer parental coaching and counselling that emphasized self-esteem.⁹⁰ Interestingly, ten percent of Gen Y in the U.S. are critically compulsive spenders, a rate three times higher than previous generations.⁹¹

<http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2006; and Lynette Hoffman, “Gen Y Here and Now,” *The Australian*, 20 August 2006, 9; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2006.; and Bernard Salt, *Words from the Y’s: We Want Global Roaming*, 101; and Scott Carlson, “The Next Generation in the Classroom,” *Chronicle of Higher Education* 52, no. 7, 7 October 2005:A34; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2006; and and Scott Carlson, *The Next Generation in the Classroom*, A36; and Cynthia Yeldell, “Generation Y’s Knowledge of Technology Could Redefine the Workplace,” *The Knoxville News-Sentinel*; 26 May 2006; Not Numbered; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2006.

⁸³Scott Carlson, *The Next Generation in the Classroom*, A34.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, A35.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, A37.

⁸⁶Jennifer Robinson, “Work Force: X+Y > Type A,” *Las Vegas Review-Journal*, 14 August 2006; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2006.

⁸⁷Bernart Salt, *A word to the Ys about boomers*, 26.

⁸⁸Cynthia Yeldell, *Generation Y’s Knowledge of Technology Could Redefine the Workplace*. Not Numbered.

⁸⁹Bernart Salt, *A Wword to the Ys about Boomers*, 26.

⁹⁰Jennifer Robinson, *Work Force: X+Y > Type A*, Not Numbered.

⁹¹Editorial Summary, “Debt Woes Forecast for Young Americans,” *The Futurist* 39, no. 6; (November-December 2005); 3; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2006.

Given the foregoing traits, the implications for the commander within the individual antecedents of dispositional optimism, hardiness, self-efficacy and military identity are many. The most obvious is to ensure that the 'inside the wire' climate he develops is conducive to the use of all the gadgetry they rely upon for their networking activities. Recognizing there will be security issues to deal with, the climate should mimic to the extent possible that which is available in Canada. The commander should look for ways that he can exploit that network, given the condition of battlefield dispersity discussed earlier, and the need for the commander to be 'visible'. Similarly, distant learning opportunities increase in importance, and the commander must engage the strategic levels to ensure they are readily available at the tactical level. The noted traits re-emphasize the need to demonstrate incremental success to a generation that thrives on it, and the requirement to have organized activities inside the wire 24/7, lest they get bored. Noting that they will give you their dedication, what a commander can do for them *today* is ensure they can charge their batteries, stay connected, and not only have, but do not run out of doughnuts when 'behind the wire!' Noting the compulsive spending habits of some and the propensity for debt, the commander may need to emphasize the need for careful pre-deployment screening to ensure soldiers are not solely motivated by the monetary. This list is far from all-inclusive, but is demonstrative of the insights that could be gained by using the model at hand. But insights gained are of little use if not captured and communicated to the troops as a concrete indication that their morale is in the forefront of the commander's mind, and used in a manner that provides timely feedback that a growing proportion of the troops crave.

From an organizational perspective, Gen Y are more likely to ask what the organization can do for them rather than what they can do for it. They like to control their environment and are more concerned about career breaks, training and study time, the working environment, and appraisals.⁹² Gen Y college graduates correlate an interesting and challenging job with happiness as opposed to a high-paying job and financial security,⁹³ yet tend to have unrealistic expectations about how fast they will be making the same salary as the top 1% of the current population.⁹⁴ Gen Y does not fear the future or the prospect of losing their job,⁹⁵ and do not expect or even want a long tenure with a single organization.⁹⁶ A Gen Y will see bumping into the CEO as an opportunity for introduction and to express an opinion, whereas Gen X would avoid any such encounter, let alone say anything if it did occur.⁹⁷ Late Gen X and Gen Y will work very hard for supervisors that establish very specific and regular goals that are based on their need for regular, short-term achievements.⁹⁸ Gen Y like to have their jobs given to them in small, measurable pieces and want immediate feedback to satiate their need for a sense of accomplishment.⁹⁹ Interestingly, there is a trend in Gen Y towards joining the military for occupational reasons rather than the intrinsic value of military service and

⁹²Bernard Salt, *Older Generations Have to Ask Y*, 48

⁹³Deborah A. Abowitz, "Does Money Buy Happiness? A Look at Gen Y College Student Beliefs," *Free Inquiry into Creative Sociology* 33, No. 2, November 2005, 119-129; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2006.

⁹⁴James Dunn, "H-tech Focus for Generation Y," *The Australian*, 26 July 2006, 4: available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2006.

⁹⁵Bernart Salt, *A word to the Ys about boomers*, 26

⁹⁶Charles J. Brody and Beth A. Rubin, "Commitment, Cohorts and the Changing Social Contract," (Paper prepared for possible presentation to the 100th meeting of the American Sociological Association, University of North Carolina-Charlotte, 20 January 2005); 2; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 3 October 2006Bernart Salt, *A word to the Ys about boomers*, 26.N 46

⁹⁷Bernart Salt, *A word to the Ys about boomers*, 26.

⁹⁸Jennifer Robinson, *Work Force: X+Y > Type A*, Not Numbered.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*

ethos that Matures, Boomers, and Gen X joined for,¹⁰⁰ and DHRRE has noted that Privates traditionally report lower levels of military ethos than higher ranks.¹⁰¹

For the commander, the implications for morale in this context lie primarily in fostering the individual antecedent of military identity and allowing for the exercise of hardiness. Beyond communicating the positive outcomes and recognizing superior performance, the commander must rely on the greater strategic personnel framework to address the organizational attitudes noted above. Soldiers will have to be shown the broader benefits of military identity, i.e., the value that military service brings to them. Businesses accomplish similar aims through a ‘value proposition’, where their basis for competitive advantage (customer chooses your products over others) is to create a competitively superior value (compared to available alternatives) for a customer.¹⁰² In a military context, this equates to the soldier identifying and remaining with the military, rather than seeking alternatives, by seeing and understanding the value that service brings to them. The commander could make use of a similar tool to influence the antecedents of morale, and once that advantage is communicated and understood, he must be careful not to stray from the core message.¹⁰³ Such a soldier-centric approach will demonstrate that the commander and the CF truly care for them, and seek to meet their specific needs over the entire range of operations, thus fostering morale.

¹⁰⁰Major Brad Coates, “Postmodernism in the CF,” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Masters in Defence Studies, 2004), 58-60.

¹⁰¹Major K.J. Brown, *Human Dimensions of Operation Surge : The Way Forward*, 13-14.

¹⁰²Lary Seldon and Yoko S. Seldon, “Profitable Customer: The Key to Great Brands,” *Advertising Age* 77, No.28; S7- S12; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 6 October 2006.

¹⁰³Barry Van der Westhuizen, “Does Your Value Proposition Deliver,” *Finweek*, 23 March 2006; 35; available from <http://web.ebscohost.com>; Internet; accessed 6 October 2006.

Using the model as a method to look at the antecedents of morale identified many general factors for consideration by the commander, and the need to communicate with soldiers emerged as a common theme. To this end, the commander could issue some form of document, composed in the first person, to every participating soldier that details his value proposition to them. The document would highlight the higher level reasons for the mission and the government's support, the strategic benefits available to them (and why) such as home leave travel, family support programs, danger pay (and benefits after leaving the danger area or in the event of death), the quality of health care that will be available, distance learning opportunities, and post-deployment follow-up and support. It would include his commitment to ensure the best possible equipment is available and that it will be properly maintained. It would identify his intent with regard to unit climate and all the support and activities that will be available inside the wire, and how he intends to communicate with and update them on incremental mission success. These are but a few examples of issues that could be addressed in such a 'value proposition' document. It is further suggested that human dimensions research in the CF be focused to develop a Canadian model for morale during operations that highlights Canadian values. Focused research in this area could help identify the tenets of a value proposition applicable to all generations that can be personalized by future commanders.

Conclusion

The commander at the operational level has a responsibility to ensure that the moral contract between Canadian society and the soldier is maintained. It is through the maintenance of positive morale that this can be accomplished, and commanders must always have this in the forefront of mind. However, Canadian doctrine offers little

insight into this phenomenon, let alone provide a construct or model that the commander can use to assist in the planning process or during operations. This paper has shown that a model of morale would be useful for the operational level commander and, through looking at the changing nature of operations and the changing nature of the individual, has provided some examples as to how. It is clear that the commander must find ways to communicate the results of his analysis and demonstrate that morale remains uppermost in his or her mind. A personalized ‘value proposition’ to the soldiers is a tool that could be used as a means of instilling the optimism, confidence, and purpose required to ensure motivation and enthusiasm for accomplishing mission objectives. The strategic level must assist by co-ordinating the efforts of applied research in the development of a Canadian based model for morale during operations, and identifying the base tenets of the commander’s value proposition. It is argued that such an approach would markedly reduce the likelihood of overlooking issues that the troops and the public see as a breach to the moral contract, such as the need to have a Tim Horton’s in Afghanistan until seeing a Burger King already on-site, or un-thoughtfully demoralizing wounded soldiers and their families. After all,

*“In war, everything depends on morale;
and morale and public opinion comprise the better part of reality”*

Napoleon Bonaparte

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