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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
AMSP 9 - PSEM 9

**CANADIAN FORCES SUPPORT UNIT (EUROPE)  
- A CAPABLE UNIT WITH OPERATIONAL REACH?**

By/par Commander Mike McGrath

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## **ABSTRACT**

The 1990s saw some of the most dramatic reductions to the Canadian Forces, in terms of financial and human resource capacity, since the aftermath of the second world war. Canadian Forces Europe (CFE) was closed, and the latest (1994) Defence White Paper foretold of more drastic restraint within the Department of National Defence and the CF. It was during this time-frame that Canadian Forces Support Unit (Europe) stood up with the responsibility to provide a minimum level of administrative and financial support to the remaining European based (after the closure of Canadian Forces Europe) CF personnel and their dependants. From the outset, it was clear that CFSU(E) would not have an operational role to play, nor would it be resourced in terms of personnel or money to carry out additional tasks. This paper will provide an overview of the initial support responsibilities assigned to CFSU(E) when it stood up in 1993, and it will look at the evolution of support provided by CFSU(E) during the 13 years of its existence. Most importantly, it will prove that CFSU(E) adapted to a changing Canadian Forces and NATO role, and found ways to provide operational level support to current CF operations. It will do so by using the examples of support to casualty administration/retatriation of human remains, kit/weapons/ammunition support, and pre-deployment training as operational level support activities critical to the support of CF personnel deploying on the NATO operational stage. This document will also illustrate that based upon its adaptable nature, its minimal cost and its many benefits to the CF, that CFSU(E) is a very capable unit - a unit which will have future operational level impact on CF operations in Afghanistan and any other location in which CF NATO personnel deploy.

## CANADIAN FORCES SUPPORT UNIT (EUROPE) - A CAPABLE UNIT WITH OPERATIONAL REACH?

### BACKGROUND

The Canadian Forces Support Unit (Europe) (CFSU(E)) is the only remaining extant Canadian Forces unit in Europe. Initially founded to provide basic administrative and financial support services to European CF personnel and their dependants, this paper will clearly demonstrate that CFSU(E)'s role has changed, in step with a transforming Canadian Forces and NATO, to include key levels of operational support.

The end of the Cold war, and the much celebrated fall of the Berlin Wall caused most militaries to review their raison d'être within a changing world construct. The Cold War was over, and the West could now look at the possibilities and ramifications of a future peace dividend. At this same time, the Canadian Federal Government was involved in a major battle of its own – a battle to reduce and eliminate a significant Canadian financial deficit. As the largest department within the Government of Canada, there was no doubt that spending within the Canadian Forces would have to be curtailed if the deficit war was to be won. Within the Canadian Forces, every aspect of CF support was under the proverbial microscope, and the pervading sense of the day was if it (the activity/item) was not directly connected and/or attributable to operations, it could be 'civilianized' or contracted out. A passage from the 1994 Defence White Paper appropriately sets the tone for this difficult period in CF history:

**NOTE:** For ease of review by non-CF personnel, only the most basic abbreviations are used. When there is any doubt as to the meaning/content, the abbreviation or acronym will be written out in full.

Canadian defence commitments have been revised, personnel levels cut back, operations and maintenance budgets shrunk, defence infrastructure reduced, and capital programs cancelled or delayed. As a consequence of the further decline in defence expenditure that forms the fiscal context of this paper, cuts will be deeper, and there will be more reductions, cancellations, and delays. In some areas, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will do less.<sup>1</sup>

CF personnel employed within a number of different military occupations were targeted for early release, and were being offered Early Retirement Incentives.<sup>2</sup> Support occupations took the brunt of these reductions as the CF attempted to decrease its support ‘tail’, commonly referred in the 1990s as , the ‘tooth to tail’ ratio. In addition, the 1990s saw our bases in Europe closed and as such, the CF’s influence in Europe, and elsewhere, decreased. It was during this time period, in which a small support unit in Neiderheid Germany stood up, in order to provide administrative/financial and a limited range of other support to the remaining CF personnel, and their dependants, in Europe.

The initial role of CFSU(E) was to provide:

- a. administrative support services...to all Canadian Forces personnel assigned to continental Europe except for services provided by NDHQ or Canadian embassies;
- b. selected administrative support services for personnel to the UK;
- c. custody, control and maintenance of assigned nationally owned equipment.<sup>3</sup>

The period between the stand-up of CFSU(E) in 1993 and the present has been equally challenging. The much hoped for peace dividend did not materialize, and was

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<sup>1</sup> Minister of Supply and Services Canada, *1994 Defence White Paper*, (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), 10.

<sup>2</sup> The Forces Reduction Plan (FRP) offered financial incentives to personnel (predominantly support occupations) to entice personnel to retire early.

<sup>3</sup> 1901-3132 (DGFD) 30 July 1993, *Canadian Forces Organization Order 1.82 Canadian Forces Support Unit (Europe)*, 2/5.

replaced by the international community's involvement in assisting failed and failing states. Even the 1994 White Paper recognized failed states as a new challenge for the CF.

The breakdown of authority in certain states is another source of instability. It is characterized by chaos, violence and the inability of political leaders to provide the population with the most basic of services...Examples as diverse as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Afghanistan illustrate the extent of the problem.<sup>4</sup>

With respect to NATO, the White Paper recognized that NATO "should make a greater contribution to UN operations,"<sup>5</sup> and that this could only be accomplished once NATO's role in relationship to the United Nation "is clearly and appropriately defined and widely understood."<sup>6</sup> In the following years both NATO and the CF set out on a course of transformation. NATO moved from its static, non-deployable nature to that of a more deployable and relevant force. NATO's current role in Afghanistan is a perfect example of its evolution, while the CF transformed by updating its approach to domestic operations with its establishment of Canada Command.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, the CF created a more operationally focused organization through the overhaul of its command and control structure. In addition to Canada Command, this transformation resulted in the creation of three new CF operational commands, Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM), Canadian Forces Special Operations Force Command (CANSOFCOM), and Canadian Forces Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM), all of which stood up in early 2006.

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<sup>4</sup> Minister of Supply and services Canada, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), 5.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>7</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. A Role of Pride and influence in the World OVERVIEW: Canada's International Policy Statement (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2005), 8.

## AIM

To prove, that even though CFSU(E) was established as an administrative/financial support unit in 1993, with no operational responsibility, it has evolved, due to the changing role of the CF and NATO, to become a small but important link in the operational activities of the Canadian Forces. Furthermore, this document will prove that CFSU(E) is ‘value for money’, an adaptable unit which will continue to assist in current and future operations in which the CF is involved. CFSU(E) – a capable unit with operational reach!

In order to prove this contention, this document will be broken into eleven sections. The background and aim have already been provided. An examination of the operational level will take place. CF doctrine pertaining to logistics support will be introduced, and a future concept in logistics support within the CF will be examined. From ‘Humble Beginnings’ will describe the early days of support provided by CFSU(E). The current ‘CFSU(E) Support Concept - The Evolution of Support’ will describe in general terms how support has evolved to the present. ‘CFSU(E) – Operational Reach’ will discuss casualty administration, pre-deployment training, and kit/weapons/ammunition support, as examples of operational level reach/support provided today. An assessment will then be made as to the overall capability of CFSU(E). ‘Alternative Visions’ will focus on the consequences of a CF without CFSU(E). The penultimate section will deal with how CFSU(E) can continue to evolve in its support of the CF and NATO. Lastly, concluding remarks will summarize the

arguments put forth in this paper, and will clearly illustrate the future operational importance of CFSU(E) in a transformed CF and NATO environment.

### THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

In order to clearly situate the level at which support is provided by CFSU(E), one must articulate the meaning of operational level. In referring to the operational level, the manual of Canadian Forces Operations, provides the following:

...Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives,... These activities imply a broader dimension of time and space than do tactics: they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.<sup>8</sup>

Although there is still much debate as to the "...meaning of the term 'operational' when it is used to describe a level of war...,"<sup>9</sup> Allan English concedes, "While the concept of the operational art as a means of linking strategy and tactics appears to have some utility in many cases, the debate over its applicability in all cases continues."<sup>10</sup> In the 2000 version of the manual of Canadian Forces Operations<sup>11</sup>, the levels of logistics support are described in the same terms as levels of war, i.e. the strategic, operational, and tactical.

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<sup>8</sup> B-GJ-005-300/FP-000 Canadian Forces Operations, 2005-08-15, 1-5.

<sup>9</sup> Allan English. "*The Operational Art: Theory, Practice and Implications for the Future.*" Chap. 1 in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts.* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press), 62.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

<sup>11</sup> In the updated 2004 version of the manual of Canadian Forces Operations, the Logistics Support section (Chap 31) is still under development.



Operational logistics... involves activities to support forces in campaigns and major operations within a theatre or area of operations, and that specific activities of operational logistics include identifying resource requirements sufficient to ensure continuity of operations through all phases of a campaign or throughout an operation....<sup>12</sup>

For the purposes of this paper, the operational level will be that level, which according to the current Commander of the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM), LGen Gauthier, ‘bridges’<sup>13</sup> the tactical and the strategic. In terms of operational support to a theatre, it is a national responsibility to ensure that Strategic Lines of Communication (SLOC) are clearly established in support of CF operations abroad. These lines of communication bridge the strategic to the theatre, and in the case of strategic logistics are the “bridge between a nation’s economy and its military.”<sup>14</sup> As such, strategic lines of communication project support from the nation to the theatre, and are sustained through the use of forward support elements and intermediate staging bases that provide the support link bridging the theatre commander to the strategic level. Now that operational level support has been put into context, it is important to examine current and future logistics support doctrine.

## CF LOGISTICS SUPPORT DOCTRINE AND A FUTURE CONCEPT OF CF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

It was previously noted that the Logistics Support chapter in the most recent version of the manual of Canadian Forces Operations is currently under development.

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<sup>12</sup> B-GG-005-004/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations*, 2000-12-18, 27-2.

<sup>13</sup> Briefing by Comd CEFCOM to Advanced Military Studies Program at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 3 October 2006.

<sup>14</sup> B-GG-005-004/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations*, 200-12-18, 27-2

Rather than spend considerable time examining dated logistics doctrine, the basic concepts associated with logistics support doctrine will be reviewed, and more importantly, the possible direction of future CF operational support will be examined.

Logistics is the science of planning out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with:

- a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposal of materiel;
- b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel;
- c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposal of facilities; and
- d. acquisition or furnishing of services.<sup>15</sup>

Logistic support can also be referred to in the broader term of administration (a principle of war), i.e. “the management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy, primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management.”<sup>16</sup> and Combat Service Support, i.e. “the support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of logistics and administration.”<sup>17</sup> Every Commander must fully understand the importance of effective logistics support in the success of a given campaign because it is the Task Force commander who is ultimately responsible for developing the logistics support concept for his respective operation.<sup>18</sup> Erwin Rommel, one of the greatest German generals to ever command troops in war stated:

...In fact, the battle is fought and decided by the quartermasters before the shootings begins. The bravest men can do nothing without guns, the guns nothing without plenty of ammunition; and neither the guns nor ammunition are of much

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<sup>15</sup>, Ibid, 27-1.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 27-1.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 27-1.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 27-4.

use in mobile warfare unless there are vehicles with sufficient petrol to haul them around.<sup>19</sup>

The commander is of course assisted by strategic NDHQ staff in the production of this plan, as well as, being supported by the staff of the Canadian Forces Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM). Currently, when planning for a CF operation commences, the overall concept is based upon the logistic support principles of foresight, simplicity, flexibility, economy, cooperation, self-sufficiency; and visibility.<sup>20</sup> The planning for each CF operation is task tailored and clearly geared toward the operation at hand. As previously stated, operational support in the Canadian context is the bridge between the strategic and the tactical using strategic lines of communication. As strategic lines of communication become extended, or more complex (i.e. multi missions), then intermediate staging bases or forward support elements must be established in order to ensure continued mission support. It is this aspect of CF support which is conducted in an ad hoc manner, based on the vagaries of each new CF operation, and it is this challenge that the newly created Canadian Forces Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) has endeavored to correct.

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<sup>19</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2004), 200.

<sup>20</sup> B-GG-005-004/AF-000, Canadian Forces Operations, 200-12-18, 27-3. Foresight is necessary to ensure the existence of suitable, personnel, equipment and materiel and the flexibility to make reserves when and where required...Simplicity leads to efficiency in both planning and execution of logistics operations...Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistics structures, functions and procedures to changing situations and concepts of operations...Economy is the provision of logistics support at the least cost in terms of resources available and necessary to accomplish the mission...Cooperation among staffs at all levels of command greatly enhances the effectiveness of logistics support...Self-Sufficiency implies that combat elements of a force initially have at their disposal the essential resources for combat for a pre-determined period...Visibility - Proper control or coordination of support cannot be exercised if the commander does not have sufficient visibility of in and out of theatre assets...

In his briefing to the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP), the Comd of CANOSCOM, MGen Benjamin introduced the possibility of the CF establishing operational support hubs at selected locations around the globe.<sup>21</sup> A document which amplifies the concepts introduced by MGen Benjamin was prepared by Col Mike Boomer, the CANOSCOM Chief of Operational Support Transformation.<sup>22</sup> Titled, “Operational Support Hubs *Global Reach* for the CF”, Col Boomer’s contention is that “the introduction of a global hub and spoke system for support will inexpensively permit the CF to project itself into the various regions of the world that the government is most likely to send it.”<sup>23</sup> As this statement implies, the CF will force project itself into areas where the Government of Canada wishes to have an effect. In its simplest form, and based on information gathered by the Foreign Policy Research Organization, the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management, and based upon a study of the provision of Canadian Foreign aid, a list of likely locations where the CF could find itself in the future was drawn up. Based on these likely locations, support hubs would be established at appropriate locations. These hubs would be tied together by both air and sea lines of communication, using a combination of commercial, CF and allied military resources, and would serve both the CF and other government departments. A small detachment would be created at each location close to the airport or seaport. Leased warehousing, materiel handling aids, and office space would be acquired. As part of the Canadian Materiel Support Group, each detachment would work closely with Heads of mission of the host country and the Military attaché for the region. The detachment

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<sup>21</sup> Briefing by Comd CANOSCOM to Advanced Military Studies Program at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 22 September 06.

<sup>22</sup> Col Mike Boomer, CANOSCOM, Essay - Operational Support Hubs *Global Reach* For The CF, 28 August 2006.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 1.

would create lists of suppliers to be used if CF elements operated in the region. Some materiel could also be pre-positioned at these locations. If major operations were to take place, the small detachment staff could be augmented by trained personnel from the Canadian Materiel Support Group or the Joint Support Group, both units of CANOSCOM. Importantly, “the selection of hubs should involve not just CF personnel but also Foreign Affairs advisors so that they are established with a whole of government flavour from the outset.”<sup>24</sup> Other important aspects of establishing these support hubs falls into the category of ‘intangibles’ from a measurement perspective. For example:

Not included in the Operations Research model were the improvements in support that can be expected when there are pre-facilitated contracts in place, SOFAs, customs and immigration arrangements, as well as local knowledge of both the political and commercial workings of the country and city in which a hub was located.<sup>25</sup>

For all intents and purposes, CFSU(E) has acted as a defacto permanent operational support hub in support of CF operations for many years. The following pages will provide detail into the many activities carried out by CFSU(E) in its provision of support.

### FROM HUMBLE BEGINNINGS

It is not the intent of this section to give a full historical recounting of the last 13 years of operations of CFSU(E). The purpose is to provide some key background information which will permit the reader to understand changes that have taken place within CFSU(E), especially as they pertain to operational level support. When CFSU(E)

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 18.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 10.

formally stood up on 30 June 1993<sup>26</sup>, it was expected to provide (in addition to the general support listed earlier) a full range of administrative and logistics support to CF personnel (and their dependants) serving in Europe.<sup>27</sup> Given the geographic, transportation and technological difficulties associated with providing support to approximately 1700 personnel in 12 different countries in over 80 locations<sup>28</sup>, the initial support provided by CFSU(E) was essentially limited to the CF personnel serving within close proximity to the support unit. Essentially the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) stationed in Geilenkirchen, Germany and NATO personnel serving with Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum, the Netherlands were the main benefactors of CFSU(E) provided support in the early years. It is interesting to note that the initial concept of support...

...was to provide a minimum acceptable level of service with a clear understanding that each CF member in Europe was to assume a larger degree of responsibilities for his/her personal administration, and that the turn-around time required to provide these services would be greater than that of a normal support base in Canada.<sup>29</sup>

For practical reasons, the initial support provided by CFSU(E) focused on CF personnel in the local area. As time, and expertise within CFSU(E) personnel grew, greater support to outlying areas began to materialize. This natural evolution of support took place

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<sup>26</sup> CFSU (E) 1904-1 (CO) 28 September 2005, *Concept of Operations Provision of Support to CF Personnel in Europe*, 1. Support included Personnel Services, Military Personnel Administration, Records Support Unit (URS), Civilian Personnel Administration, Public Accounting Services, Internal Audit, Security, Supply, Transportation, Maintenance, Construction Engineering, Dental Support, Medical Support and Postal Support.

<sup>27</sup> Annex B to 1901-3132 (DGFD) 30 July 1993, *Canadian Forces Organization Order 1.82 Canadian Forces Support Unit (Europe)*, B-1/7 – B-7/7.

<sup>28</sup> 1904-1(CO) 28 September 2005, *Concept of Operations Provision of Support Services to CF Personnel in Europe*, 1.

<sup>29</sup> Canadian Forces Europe HQ 1904-1 (Comd) 25 January 1993, as quoted in 1904-1(CO) 28 September 2005, *Concept of Operations Provision of Support Services to CF personnel in Europe*, 1.

because CF personnel in more remote locations started to approach CFSU(E) for support, while the staff at the CFSU(E) became more comfortable with their respective duties. Based on the number of CF personnel in Europe requiring support, the initial CFSU(E) establishment (at stand-up) was comprised of 50 military positions and 27 civilian positions.<sup>30</sup> CFSU(E) was primarily staffed through personnel transfers from the former Canadian Forces Europe (CFE), as a result of its closure, and through the down-sizing of the former support cell belonging to the Canadian Component (CC) NATO Airborne Early Warning Force in Geilenkirchen.<sup>31</sup> In its first year of operation in 1993/94, CFSU(E)'s annual operating budget was forecast as DM10,983,602 (or \$8,923,957 Cdn).<sup>32</sup> In 2006/07, the annual National Military Representative (NMR) funding allocation is \$9,687,948, of which CFSU(E) comprises approximately 67%<sup>33</sup>. Currently, CFSU(E)'s total military establishment (including Detachment Daws Hill U.K.) is 45 personnel, and the total number of civilian personnel is 42.5.<sup>34</sup>

### CFSU(E) SUPPORT CONCEPT – THE EVOLUTION OF SUPPORT

At the time of stand-up in 1993, CFSU(E) provided administrative and financial support to CF personnel in Europe through its main location at Neiderheid GE (Selfkant

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<sup>30</sup> Appendix 2 to Annex B to Part 1 to 1920-3132 (DMP) 14 December 1994, *Report-Manpower Review Canadian Forces Support Unit (Europe)*, B2-1/1. These numbers only include CFSU(E) proper (i.e. Neiderheid) and Detachment Daws Hill personnel. They do not include any specialist support such as Medical, Dental, Legal and Communications.

<sup>31</sup> 1904-1(CO CFSUE) 15 April 1993, *Implementation Directive – Transition Plan-CFSU(E)*.

<sup>32</sup> Appendix 2 to Annex W to 1940-1(Comd) 10 Decemeber 1992, *Concept of Operations and Support - Support to CF Personnel in Continental Europe after 30 June 1993*, W2-2/2. The average exchange rate for DM to Cdn \$ was .81248.

<sup>33</sup> E-mail CPO2 Morley (CFSU(E) Resource Manager to Cdr McGrath 25 September 2006

<sup>34</sup> Annex A to CFSU(E) 1901-1(CO) 29 September 2005, *Concept of Operations – Provision of Support Services to CF Personnel in Europe*, A-1/2. Civilian positions can also be expressed in terms of money, thus it is possible to employ personnel in less than full-time capacity.

Kaserne) and through seven separate CFSU(E) detachments located at Casteau BE (SHAPE), London U.K. (later moved to Daws Hill U.K.), Brunssum NL, Heidelberg GE, Ramstein GE, Naples IT, and Brussels BE<sup>35</sup>. These detachments were established on a very small scale (1-2 personnel) and were responsible for providing national level support to the small population of CF personnel (and their dependants) serving at each location. For assistance with items requiring higher headquarters intervention, requests were forwarded through the main CFSU(E) unit in Neiderheid. For example, requests for special consideration concerning financial entitlements would be forwarded to CFSU(E) for their review and concurrence prior to the document's onward transmittal to NDHQ.<sup>36</sup> Over time these support detachments gradually evolved to fall under the authority of the Senior Canadian Officer (SCO) at their respective location. Today, the only detachment that remains under the direction of the CO CFSU(E) is that of the Detachment Daws Hill in the U.K.

As tactical and operational support evolved in Europe, there became a need for a document that clearly enunciated how support services were/are provided to the CF population (and their dependants). As such, the CO CFSU(E) was tasked, by the National Military Representative to SHAPE, in the spring of 2005 to produce this record. The resultant report "Concept of Operations for the Provision of Support to CF Personnel in Europe" was approved and signed by NMR on 29 September 2005<sup>37</sup>. The basic premise revolves around the locations where CF personnel serve, as well as the location's

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<sup>35</sup> Appendix 1 to Annex B to 1920-3132 (DMP) 14 December 1994, *Report – Manpower Review Canadian Forces Support Unit (Europe)*, B1-1/13.

<sup>36</sup> CFSU(E) has authority to deal directly with Subject Matter Experts in NDHQ with respect to most financial/administrative matters.

<sup>37</sup> CFSU(E) 1904-1 (CO) 29 September 2005, *Concept of Operations for the Provision of Support to CF Personnel in Europe*, 1.



size in terms of overall CF population. CF personnel (and their dependants) at each location are responsible to the Senior Canadian Officer (SCO) for all 'national' related activity. To summarize the concept of support espoused by CFSU(E), the following is provided;

Locations with eight or more CF members (i.e. SHAPE, Brussels, Naples, Heidelberg, Ramstein and Brunssum) have full-time National Support staff. Locations with four or more CF members have a part-time Locally Engaged Employee (LEE),...<sup>38</sup> In those areas that do not have sufficient mass, Remote Personnel service support is provided by CFSU(E), by Detachment Daws Hill, or through arrangements with the closest NSE (National Support Element).<sup>39</sup>

Based on the above personnel support framework, support is categorized into six Support Arrangements. Support Arrangements One provides for the full range of services one would expect at a small base in Canada, while Support Arrangement Six provides support via electronic means. All of the other support arrangements provide levels of support somewhere between these two extremes<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Locally Engaged Employees. German Law and the SOFA place restrictions on who CFSU(E) can employ. Personnel must 'accompany' the Force, and therefore the labour pool is almost entirely restricted to CF dependants. Foreign Nationals can be hired, but their salary and benefit package is almost double the cost of a LEE. Likewise, posting Public Servants to Europe is a far more expensive alternative.

<sup>39</sup> CFSU(E) 1904-1 (CO) 29 September 2005, *Concept of Operations for the Provision of Support to CF Personnel in Europe*, 4..

<sup>40</sup> Support Arrangement One includes the full range of support found on a small base in Canada, and supported units include CFSU(E) and CC NAEWF. Support Arrangement Two includes onsite administrative and clerical support plus the services listed at paragraph seven, less national Security, Supply, Construction Engineering, Release, and Social Work Services, and supported units include SHAPE and CFSU(E) Detachment Daws Hill. Support Arrangement Three includes support to those families who are not in the immediate vicinity of CFSU(E) or a National Support Element, but who can commute within two hours. Normal service is provided by the CFSU(E) Remote Personnel Cell and/or CFSU(E) Detachment Daws Hill with periodic access from the above two units. Medical and Dental services are provided on the economy or from the nation in which they serve; the supported units include Rheindahlen, Kalkar and Northwood. Support Arrangement Four includes onsite administrative and clerical support, plus those services listed at paragraph seven, less national Security, Supply, Construction Engineering, Release, Social Work Services, and Civilian Personnel Administration. Medical and Dental services are provided by US Forces or on the economy; supported units include Brunssum, Naples, Brussels, Heidelberg, and Ramstein. Support Arrangement Five provides for basic administrative services including national mail distribution and claims administration. The services are provided by a Locally Engaged Employee (LEE) with assistance/training provided by CFSU(E). Supported units include Ismir, Lisbon,

## CFSU(E) – OPERATIONAL REACH

Now that a clear understanding of the origins of CFSU(E), its evolution and support concept have been articulated, the following paragraphs will provide some detail with respect to the operational level of support provided by this small, but important CF entity.

Casualty Administration/Repatriation of Remains – ever since the CFs' involvement in Afghanistan commenced in 2002, CFSU(E) has provided support to casualty administration and repatriation of human remains. In fact, this remains the unit's number one priority; a responsibility which CFSU(E) personnel respond to with a tremendous amount of pride. Between 2002 and 2005, CFSU(E) responded to numerous casualty evacuations and repatriation of remains events, but its procedures were very ad hoc in nature, and very much relied upon the typical CF 'can-do' attitude in order to ensure their success. As CF involvement in Afghanistan increased in size and tempo in 2006, it became apparent that a more formalized response to these unfortunate results of war was required.

Since 2002 in Afghanistan, the CF have been involved in 44 incidents ranging from enemy contact, to rocket attacks, to mine/Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) attacks, to suicide bombers, to vehicle accidents. These incidents resulted in approximately 210 CF personnel being injured/wounded<sup>41</sup>, including the deaths of 43 CF members.<sup>42</sup>

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Istanbul, Stavanger and Madrid. Lastly, Support Arrangement Six provides support to those personnel not assisted through an NSE. The support is provided via electronic means from either CFSU(E) RP Cell or Detachment Daws Hill, and includes ground mail service and periodic visits. Supported units include Strasbourg, Oberammergau, Rome, and other Remote Personnel.

<sup>41</sup> E-mail A. Bronson (ADM/PA) to Capt K.C. Farrier (VCDS/GMS) 13 October 2006.

<sup>42</sup>“List of Critical Canadian Incidents in Afghanistan” Updated Saturday October 7,2006. Available online from, [http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060416/afghanistan\\_incidents\\_060423/200](http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060416/afghanistan_incidents_060423/200)

As such, the National Military Representative to SHAPE, in concert with key Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) personnel, and CFSU(E) staff, created an interim concept of operations (CONOP) for the support of seriously injured CF personnel. This CONOP also provides general instructions pertaining to the repatriation of human remains. The “Interim Concept of Operations-Aeromedical Evacuation of Personnel From Landstuhl Regional Medical Centre To Canada”<sup>43</sup> was signed by Comd CEFCOM on 17 March 2006, and is currently the document used by CFSU(E) in support of this crucial task. In the words of then MGen (now LGen) Gauthier, Comd CEFCOM:

Canada has and will continue to suffer casualties in deployed operations. In most instances, because of geography, those casualties, both killed and injured, will be repatriated through the US casualty evacuation system in Ramstein (airhead) and Landstuhl (hospital)... The requirement to develop a permanent capability and universal CONOPS to cater for wounded personnel on international duties is becoming even more important as the Canadian presence in Afghanistan will increase significantly over the coming months and unfortunately, so too will the risk of major incident.<sup>44</sup>

This Interim Concept of operations document outlines CFSU(E)’s role in responding to a casualty scenario. Upon notification from CEFCOM (or from other sources, i.e. Medical network, and/or theatre) the National Military Representative normally tasks the CO CFSU(E) to appoint an On-Scene-Commander who will lead the evolution. It is the On-Scene-Commander’s

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[60710](#): Internet:accessed 26 October 2006. On this Webpage, CTV News provided a short recap of all incidents involving CF troops since the CF’s arrival in 2002. The above statistics only include those incidents where CF members were killed and/or injured.

<sup>43</sup> 5090-1 (CEFCOM) 17 March 2006, *Interim Concept Of Operations – Aeromedical Evacuation Of Personnel From Landstuhl Regional Medical Center To Canada*, 1.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, 1.

responsibility to gather all known information, liaise with appropriate staff, and determine the size and nature of the team that will deploy to Ramstein (3 hr road move) in order to assist with the casualties. For multi-casualties, especially if next-of-kin are expected to arrive, a standard team will consist of an On Scene Commander at the LCol/Maj rank, and a support team including a General Duty Medical Officer, an Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) Nurse Officer and 5-6 additional support personnel.<sup>45</sup> Other specialists can be added, such as a Social Worker, based on the On-Scene-Commander's assessment, and the availability of personnel resources. Notably, the General Duty Medical Officer and Aeromedical Evacuation Nurse positions have been provided by Comd CEFCOM as dedicated personnel resources in support of casualty administration. CFSU(E)'s role in these situations is to provide support to next-of-kin, and to those personnel assigned to assist the next-of-kin (i.e. Escorts, Assisting Officer, and Padre). Support includes airport and hospital transportation, accommodation assistance, coordinating VIP visits, paying invoices, providing advances and ensuring that CEFCOM has full situational awareness (SA) of the status of casualties/deceased personnel. In essence, CFSU(E) does whatever needs to be done in order to minimize the burden to the next-of-kin.

Other than the Doctor and Nurse positions described above, CFSU(E) carries out the majority of administrative/casualty support operations through the

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<sup>45</sup> 5090-1(CEFCOM) 17 March 2006, *Interim Concept of Operations-Aeromedical Evacuation of Personnel from Lanstuhl Regional Medical Centre to Canada*, 2-3. Support personnel would usually include 1 X Public Affairs Officer, 1 X MWO – Logistics Coord and OSC 2i/c, 1 X WO/Sgt – Finance/Administrative Coord, 2 X General Duty Driver, and 1 X Padre.

use of its own personnel, with augmentation from other Senior Canadian Officer organizations in Europe. When the CONOP was developed, two significant assumptions/limitations were enunciated; they are that CFSU(E) could accommodate a maximum of six seriously wounded CF personnel at any one time (with concomitant number of Next-of-Kin etc), and that incidents would not exceed one incident per month with an endurance ranging between three and ten days.<sup>46</sup> To date, the assumptions have proven to be quite accurate, however CFSU(E)'s ability to sustain this continual requirement may prove to be overstated.

Certainly the number of incidents and duration of casualty evacuation operations carried out by CFSU(E) in the last six months have truly tested that unit's ability to continue as per this CONOPS, while still maintaining appropriate levels of support to all other CF personnel (and their dependants) in Europe. On a number of occasions, CFSU(E) has contributed over 25% of its military strength, for extended periods of time, in order to provide casualty support. Since January 2006, CFSU(E) assisted with the care of over 90 CF patients transiting through the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, and has expended 375 person-days (not including medical personnel) in providing that support.<sup>47</sup> When one adds to this total, personnel on Temporary Duty, and personnel on posting/leave (during the summer period), especially considering CFSU(E)'s limited Military personnel strength, the overall support capabilities of CFSU(E) have been greatly

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>47</sup> E-mail Deputy Commanding Officer CFSU(E) to Cdr McGrath 29 September 2006.

diminished. If CF operations continue at the current pace and casualties remain at levels witnessed in the past few months, CFSU(E) will be extremely hard pressed to continue casualty support operations while still maintaining an appropriate level of support to other CF personnel, and their families – something will have to give! Given the government’s recent endorsement of continued assistance to Afghanistan until at least 2009, a more permanent solution to the current CONOPS must be found in order to ensure that CF casualties are always provided with the best possible care and support. As stated above, it is now time “...to develop a permanent capability and universal CONOPS to cater for wounded personnel on international duties...”<sup>48</sup> Should a more permanent solution be found, CFSU(E) will undoubtedly continue to play a valuable (albeit smaller) role in support of casualty administration.

With respect to repatriation of human remains,<sup>49</sup> CFSU(E) normally provides (with the assistance of other Senior Canadian Officers in Europe) the pall-bearer party. This party is required when human remains have to be moved to/from the aircraft (for whatever reason) while the aircraft is located in Germany. The most significant challenge to CFSU(E) is finding the right personnel to carry out this physically demanding duty, usually on very short notice. Given the small and dispersed CF population in Europe, and the need for immediate action, this can prove to be a very challenging task. From a training perspective, the activities

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<sup>48</sup> 5090-1(CEFCOM) 17 March 2006, *Interim Concept Of Operations-Aeromedical Evacuation Of Personnel From Landstuhl Regional Medical Centre To Canada*, 1.

<sup>49</sup> When possible, human remains are transported directly from theatre to Canada. If there becomes a requirement for an aircraft containing human remains to have to stop in Germany, then there may be a requirement for a pall-bearer party if the remains have to be moved from the aircraft.

associated with pall-bearer party duties are not difficult to learn, especially for experienced soldiers. It is, however, extremely important that this task be completed with due respect and in accordance with appropriate military protocol. One only has to turn on a television to know that the ‘eyes of Canada’ are upon the pall-bearer team when they carry out this function – to do so improperly could have immediate operational and strategic effects.

Weapons/Ammunition/Kit Support – normally one would contend that the issuance of weapons, ammunition and operational kit is a tactical level support function. Certainly, if all that is required is for a deploying member to walk to Base Supply in order to receive his/her required items, this activity would clearly be at the tactical level. Regrettably, this example is not the case in CFSU(E). As was stated earlier, CFSU(E) was originally established to provide basic administrative services to a NATO CF population that was mostly (if not entirely) static. Based on this initial construct, CFSU(E) was never authorized to hold or distribute operational stock/kit, other than a few weapons and small amounts of ammunition used to conduct annual refresher weapons training. Thus when NATO commenced its transformation to a more deployable force, CFSU(E) was forced to work with the operational level (and often strategic level) of the organization in order to have an effect. For example, in March of 2006, the National Military Representative to SHAPE requested of the VCDS that a number of NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) units be designated as High

Tempo Units.<sup>50</sup> The reasons were two-fold; 1) to ensure that screenings for individuals posted to High Tempo Units were completed at both tier one and tier two screening levels, and 2) to ensure that such members arrived at their new NATO unit with the appropriate operational kit. To do otherwise meant that CFSU(E) would have to engage the Supply system (often at the Asset Manager level) in order to acquire the required operational kit needed to deploy; kit that CFSU(E) had no authority to issue or handle. In response, the VCDS acknowledged:

CF personnel assigned to NATO positions in Europe are deploying on operations at a demanding rate, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. In order to provide an additional means to ensure personnel posted to NATO units are prepared to deploy, I have approved the designation, of various CF establishments that provide personnel to NATO units, as HIGH Tempo Units (HTUs) in accordance with reference A.<sup>51</sup>

CFSU(E) has since been authorized to hold 10% operational stock and increase its weapons holdings based on the new reality within NATO.<sup>52</sup> The difficulty from a CFSU(E) perspective is ensuring that operational kit and weapons are delivered to the deploying member in a timely manner. When one considers the geography in which CFSU(E) works, the minimal number of personnel available to complete the task, and the complexities of sending kit (especially weapons) to personnel deploying from 12 different countries, which employ 12 different sets

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<sup>50</sup> NMR SHAPE 1900-1 (SAN) 15 March 2006, *High Tempo Unit Designation – CF Personnel Assigned to NATO Allied Command Operation Units*, 1. The designation of High Tempo Unit (HTU) recognizes the demanding pace at which CF personnel in NATO posts are being deployed. This designation requires a more thorough screening be conducted before arriving to post, and on an annual basis while at post.

<sup>51</sup> VCDS 1900-1 (OUTCAN Sp Coord) 31 August 2006, *High Tempo Unit Designation – CF Personnel Assigned to NATO Units*, 1.

<sup>52</sup> E-mail CFSU(E) Corporate Services Officer to Cdr McGrath 28 September 2006.



of customs regulations, the challenge becomes significant. In addition, CF regulations require two personnel to accompany the load when transporting weapons, which translates into significant personnel drain on a very small military organization. Interestingly, CFSU(E) has recently made arrangements for deploying NATO CF personnel, who will be transiting through Camp Mirage or Kandahar, to draw their weapons at those locations. Although workable, this solution is not ideal, given that personnel arriving in theatre should have their weapon/s with them upon aircraft touch-down. Furthermore, this solution does not address those NATO CF personnel deploying to other locations, such as the Sudan, and Iraq for example. Regardless of the circumstances, CFSU(E) will take the necessary action to ensure that deploying members obtain all of the operational and protective kit required to safely operate in theatre.

Pre-Deployment Training – Current CF regulations require that all CF members attend the Peace Support Operations (PSO) course at Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC),<sup>53</sup> Kingston prior to their deployment. The course is of seven training days in duration and its intent is to prepare the deploying member, in general terms, for the mission on which they are about to deploy.<sup>54</sup>

Personnel not completing this course will not be permitted to deploy unless the Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) provides a waiver. As NATO began its

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<sup>53</sup> Peace Support Training Center, Kingston. Available online from [http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/asu\\_Kingston/military/lfdts\\_e.asp?Nocache+10%2F6%2F2006+1%AO1+PM#pstc](http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/asu_Kingston/military/lfdts_e.asp?Nocache+10%2F6%2F2006+1%AO1+PM#pstc); Internet; accessed 9 October 2006.

<sup>54</sup> PSTC delivered training consists of non-traditional, mission-specific military subjects ranging from low-level negotiation techniques, stress management, mine awareness, deployment legal considerations, handling of foreign weapons, equipment recognition and cross-cultural awareness. Mission specific training is conducted at unit and theatre levels.

transformation early in the new millennium, with its increased emphasis on deployability, the requirement for deploying NATO CF members to attend the Peace Support Operations Course in Canada, just prior to deployment, meant more time away from family. Based on this major dissatisfier, CFSU(E) devised its own pre-deployment course in 2002.<sup>55</sup> The course is five training days in duration, is held at CFSU(E) Neiderheid, and covers a range of topics similar to those provided in Kingston. The course content<sup>56</sup> has been reviewed by staff of the former Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) Group, and by staff of the Peace Support Training Center Kingston, and in every case, operational waivers for personnel who have completed the course were granted by higher headquarters. The first course was completed in the fall of 2003 and in 2006/2007 the number of courses conducted annually has increased to six. This course has been greeted with great enthusiasm by most European participants due to the fact that it is operations focused (i.e. live fire on the ranges, NBCD training, Mine Awareness, etc), it is shorter in duration than the Peace Support Training Centre course, it does not require travel back to Canada, and it permits the deploying CF member to spend more time with his/her family just prior to departure.

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<sup>55</sup> CFSU(E) pre-deployment training includes: First Aid, Preventative Medicine, Medical Countermeasures, Stress Management, the Law of Armed Conflict, Use of Force, Rules of Engagement, CFMRC Support, Foreign Service Premium Operations/Pay, 9 mm/C7 Tests Of Elemental Training (TOETs), live fire on the ranges, Mine Awareness, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical drills (including masking, drinking, and Immediate Decontamination (ID) drills), Negotiating Techniques, Protection (Hostage Awareness and Detainee Training), and Pre and Post Deployment Administrative Procedures.

<sup>56</sup> *CFSU(E) Pre-Deployment Training Course Syllabus* for Pre-Deployment Training Course 21-24 August 2006.

The previous three sections of this document have attempted to prove that an administrative unit such as CFSU(E) can have an operational level impact. It is appropriate to close out this theme by referring to relevant doctrine. In the NATO publication, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine’, in Chapter three – Employment of Allied Joint Forces, it is stated:

“An Allied joint operation normally consists of a number of stages of which occur at the military strategic level (e.g. force generation). Typically stages at the operational level, which may overlap depending on the situation and mission, are: . . . Force preparation, including build-up, assembly and pre-mission training.”<sup>57</sup>

Clearly the provision of pre-deployment training, kit and weapons support and casualty administration/evacuation are relevant examples of how an administrative/tactical level unit such as CFSU(E) can have operational level effect. Without this critical support to deploying CF NATO personnel, the achievement of objectives of any operation would be put in jeopardy. In its simplest form, in order for a soldier to effectively fight, he needs adequate training, appropriate equipment, and the knowledge that in the event of serious injury or death, he and his family will be cared for.

### CFSU(E) – CAPABLE?

Before an analysis of the capability of CFSU(E) can be completed, the word ‘capable’ must be clearly defined. The Oxford dictionary defines ‘capable’ as “having

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<sup>57</sup> NATO AJP-01(B) *Allied Joint Doctrine*, December 2002, 3-1.

the necessary quality to do, (2) able to achieve whatever one has to.”<sup>58</sup> Admittedly, capability can come in many forms, and can be measured in many ways. For the purpose of this paper, ‘capable’ will be defined in terms of a unit’s ability to effectively complete its primary tasks, and its ability to satisfactorily carry out additional tasks (self-generated or command driven) without additional resources. Also, an overall appreciation of the financial and human resource environment in which an organization operates should provide a link to its capability. Given this construct, when one considers CFSU(E), it has reduced its annual operating budget from the 1993 level of \$8,923,957 to its current level of 67% of the NMR budget or \$6,522,127, while reducing its military strength from 50 to 45 personnel, while concurrently increasing its operational support to the CF population in Europe. In fact, the 1994 Manpower Review of CFSU(E), after studying the unit’s work-load for a full year, determined that its military strength should actually be increased by three personnel.<sup>59</sup> Regrettably these three positions were not filled due to the fiscal reality facing the CF in the 1990s. Significantly enough, the number of civilian Locally Engaged Employees (LEEs) did increase by 15.5 Person Years over the past 13 years, however there are limitations with respect to the capabilities that this workforce brings to the table. The report from the Manpower Review team states;

The LEEs, who are dependants of Department employees, provide a fluctuating capability that varies as the rotation of personnel takes place. With a dwindling pool of potential worker because of cutbacks, it will become increasingly unlikely

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<sup>58</sup> Soanes, Catharine. *Pocket Oxford English Dictionary*, 9<sup>th</sup> Edition. New York: Oxford University Press 2002, 124.

<sup>59</sup> 1920-3132 (DMP) 14 December 1994, *Report – Manpower Review Canadian Forces Support Unit (Europe)*, 2.

that the unit will be able to find the needed skills within the relatively inexpensive LEE workforce, and will have to turn to more costly CTA.<sup>60</sup>

As military positions were expensive, difficult to establish and fill, and Canadian Public Service and foreign national hiring was not cost effective, CFSU(E) took the only viable economic option available to it (i.e. hire dependants) in order to get the job done. In all fairness, there are many instances where dependants bring unique skill sets to various positions, and (with appropriate training) become excellent employees, however, it would be erroneous to state that they can completely replace experienced military personnel.

For simple comparative purposes, Canadian Forces Station (CFS) St. John's (NF) employs 65 military, 40 full-time civilian and 19 part-time civilian personnel. It's annual operating budget is \$6.1 million and it supports 15 Lodger units representing 1550 regular and reserve personnel located across the island of Newfoundland.<sup>61</sup> Without comparing the complexities associated with providing support in Europe verses Newfoundland, and using straight comparative analysis, CFSU(E) has an annual operating budget approximately 6.5% greater than that of CFS St. John's, it has 58% of the personnel of CFS St. John's, while it supports approx 10% more personnel, situated in 12 different countries. This data is not to be used in any way to downplay the excellent work done at CFS St. John's, it is simply shown to illustrate that CFSU(E) accomplishes allot with very little.

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<sup>60</sup> Annex A To Part 1 To 1920-3132 (DMP) 14 December 1994, *Report – Manpower Review Canadian Forces Support Unit (Europe)*, A-1/1. CTA or Collective Tariff Agreement personnel are German nationals who fall under a different and more generous set of entitlements/salaries.

<sup>61</sup> E-mail CFS St. John's Admin O (Capt Fewer) to Cdr McGrath 23 October 2006. CFS St. John's also supports the Cadet movement across the island of Newfoundland – this represents 4000 Cadets. The level of support to Cadets is concentrated during the summer period.

Without accounting for the value of 1993 dollars today, during the past 13 years, CFSU(E) reduced its overall budget by over \$2.4 million (nearly 27%), it decreased its military workforce from 50 (arguable 53) personnel to 46<sup>62</sup>, while concurrently increasing its operational support to the CF. Clearly, even considering the offsetting increase of untrained Locally Engaged Employees, CFSU(E) has proven itself to be more than capable.

### CFSU(E) – ALTERNATIVE VISIONS

In any paper of this nature, the alternative argument must be examined. Could the CF survive without CFSU(E)? Would CF casualties still be cared for by other CF personnel if CFSU(E) did not exist? Would procedures be developed to ensure that CF personnel deploying on NATO missions would receive all of their respective kit, weapon/s and ammunition? Would CF personnel deploying on NATO missions be returned to Canada to conduct pre-deployment training at the Peace Support Training Center, or elsewhere, if CFSU(E) were no longer in the game? The answer to all of the above questions is a qualified 'yes'. A qualified yes, from an administrative/financial perspective, because support to many remote personnel serving in Europe is already being conducted via electronic means.<sup>63</sup> This service could be provided via the Web/DWAN, particularly if the bandwidth to some supported units was increased. The service will not be the personalized service that CF personnel in Europe have come to

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<sup>62</sup> In 05/06, CFSU(E) received approval to increase its military establishment by one Supply Technician, and that position was filled in the summer of 2006.

<sup>63</sup> Remote personnel are those CF individuals, and their families, who are not located in the vicinity of a support entity, and who receive the majority of their support via electronic means. Support Arrangement Six, detailed on page 14 footnote provides additional information.

expect, and fully deserve.<sup>64</sup> The level of service will revert below the ‘minimalist’ approach that was originally envisioned for CFSU(E), but it could be done. At first glance, it appears that the operational level support detailed above could also be addressed by the CF in other ways. For example, Comd CEFCOM could establish a small detachment of personnel in Ramstein to assist with casualty administration. Likewise, Comd CANOSCOM could assemble a small cadre of personnel at one of the European detachments and it could be responsible for the distribution of kit, equipment and weapons. Furthermore, pre-deployment training could be conducted back in Kingston, or with a small increment in personnel and space, pre-deployment training could also be conducted at one of the European detachments. However, a review of the consequences of closing CFSU(E) will make these options mute.

The consequences of the close-out of CFSU(E) are quite significant. Due to its origins from the closure of Canadian Forces Europe, certain legal characteristics were ‘tagged on’ to CFSU(E). For example, the NATEX consumer outlets that operate from the NATO Base in Geilenkirchen, and the Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) offices which operate out of Koblenz, are legally permitted to operate in Germany based on their “accompanying the force” status provided to them under NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). If the force (i.e. CFSU(E)) did not exist, then arguably NATEX<sup>65</sup> and PWGSC Koblenz would have no basis on which to remain

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<sup>64</sup> For example, CFSU(E) has established a 4 person section whose sole responsibility is to ensure that those remote personnel (who have no other avenues of assistance) are provided personalized support.

<sup>65</sup> NATEX is the European arm of CANEX, and, through its revenue generation, is a major contributor to the CF Central Fund.

in country. Legal opinion was provided in 1994 regarding the consequences of closing CFSU(E);

...if CFSU(E) were to be closed or moved outside of Germany the implications could be very significant. The argument elaborates that if the unit were not located in Germany it would virtually remove Canada and all Canadian service personnel and their dependants from the status of Sending State under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In simple terms, the withdrawal of CFSU(E) or the change from a support unit status with legal and financial authority to a sub-unit status would cause the Supplementary Agreement with Germany to lapse.<sup>66</sup>

Put simply, if CFSU(E) were to close, the CF would lose its ability to move goods (including Household Goods and Effects, and Personal Owned Motor Vehicles) at no cost, its tax exempt status would be forfeited, and it would lose its legal jurisdiction over CF personnel (and their dependants). Furthermore, it would no longer be able to conduct vehicle registration and license drivers, and it would commence to pay rent for any future infrastructure that it required.<sup>67</sup> Given the benefits of SOFA status in Germany, the minimal cost (in the big picture) to operate CFSU(E), and the unit's proven ability to adapt to changing operational requirements, CFSU(E) should continue to play an important role in the future operational support construct of the CF.

#### POSSIBLE AREAS OF FUTURE CFSU(E) OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

CFSU(E) has many advantages. It is centrally located, only a two hour drive from Amsterdam, and Brussels, an hour drive to Cologne (Koln), the closest German military

<sup>66</sup> NDHQ 2452-1-2 (D LAW/1) 11 April 1995 as quoted in 1904-1 (CO) 28 September 2005, *Concept of Operations for the Provision of Support to CF Personnel in Europe*, 3-4.

<sup>67</sup> Presently, under the SOFA, the CF does not pay rent for the infrastructure it uses on German bases.



airhead, and less than an hour drive to Dusseldorf. The closest NATO airhead (Geilenkirchen) is located ten kilometers from CFSU(E). With respect to the CF population that CFSU(E) supports, “33 percent ... are located in the local vicinity, and an additional 30 percent are within two hours drive.”<sup>68</sup> The location is in a rural northern area of Germany, unemployment is higher than in central/southern Germany, so costs (from a European perspective) are relatively low. On a comparative scale, CFSU(E) is deemed to be a location that is less expensive to live than Ottawa.<sup>69</sup> Although the actual base in which CFSU(E) is located (Selfkant Kaserne in the village of Neiderheid) is small, there is room for some expansion. In numerous discussions with the former Kaserne (Base) Commander, it was made abundantly clear that the presence of more Canadians at Selfkant was welcome, and was indeed, encouraged.<sup>70</sup> Interestingly enough, the CF Strategic Joint Staff Arms Verification Centre recently moved there staging location from the Netherlands to CFSU(E). There commander (Col Higgins) notes:

CFSU(E) provides essential support to SJS AVC as the principal forward staging and support base from which arms control verification, observation and other proliferation security operations and activities are conducted. Co-located with the Bundeswehr Verification Centre, CFSU(E) possesses the key mission support capabilities required to enable SJS ACV to plan, coordinate and execute operations remotely.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> CFSU(E) 1904-1 (CO) 28 September 2005, *Concept of Operations for the Provision of Support to CF Personnel in Europe*, 2.

<sup>69</sup> CF personnel serving in the Geilenkirchen area do not receive an additional allowance (Post Index) because the cost to live in that location is less than the cost to live in Ottawa. Post Index (PI) is a comparative analysis of the relative cost of a ‘basket’ of goods (approximately 100 items) in one location compared to the cost of the same basket of goods in Ottawa. In its simplest form, if the costs of goods at post is greater than Ottawa, then an allowance is paid. If the basket of goods at post cost less than in Ottawa, then no allowance is paid.

<sup>70</sup> Numerous discussions between the CO CFSU(E)/Base Commander Selfkant Kaserne during the period Sep 05 to Jul 06. As an aside, and due to the availability of facilities, CFSU(E) will soon move its Medical, Dental and Postal sections from the nearby NATO base at Geilenkirchen to the Selfkant Kaserne in Neiderheid.

<sup>71</sup> E-mail Col Higgins to Cdr McGrath 19 October 2006.

Given its many advantages, and based upon the future operational support construct outlined by the Comd CANOSCOM, and detailed in Col Boomer's research, CFSU(E) could be an ideal location as a permanent operational support hub. During an interview with Col Boomer (CANOSCOM Chief of Operations Support Transformation),<sup>72</sup> it was learned that CANOSCOM's initial focus is on four lines of operation. They are theatre activation and closure, national and international warehousing and distribution, international movement of personnel, and inter-theatre (and limited intra-theatre) communications. He acknowledged that the CFSUs (Europe, Colorado, Washington and Ottawa) are critical pieces in the operational support of the CF, but that CANOSCOM did not intend (at least at this time) on ownership of these entities.

Notwithstanding the above decision within CANOSCOM, CFSU(E) will continue to operate as a defacto operational support hub, providing key support to CF NATO personnel in Europe. It will also continue to provide the 'intangible' support (i.e. knowledge of the local area and its personnel, customs, immigration, SOFA, contract administration, political and commercial) that can only be accomplished by being 'on the ground.' For example, while working in Italy in 1999, as the Detachment Comd on the Canadian Search and Rescue helicopter project, LCol Michel Lalumiere received a phone call, and was requested to immediately start looking at basing options on the east coast of Italy, so that Canada could participate in the upcoming Kosovo campaign.<sup>73</sup> Within

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<sup>72</sup> Cdr McGrath interview of Col Mike Boomer, Ottawa, 22 October 2006,

<sup>73</sup> Interview of LCol Lalumiere by Cdr McGrath 26 October 2006.

hours, LCol Lalumiere was in his vehicle heading to the Italian air base at Aviano to make contact with senior Italian air force personnel whom he had met through the course of his duties. LCol Lalumiere was able to establish the link between key Italian and Canadian air-force personnel, so that within days basing options could be considered. Clearly, more time would have been required, at this critical juncture, to establish these important linkages if Canada had not had personnel on the ground during this event. CFSU(E) is the linkage to all CF personnel in Europe that permits these ‘intangible’ activities to take place.

CFSU(E) could have an even more significant role within the European context, centering around its unique status within Europe. As previously stated, CFSU(E) is the only extant CF unit remaining on the European continent. As such, and as previously discussed, certain legal obligations and advantages are conferred upon it. It is the only truly Canadian ‘national’ organization operating within Europe. For all intents and purposes, it is the ‘glue’ which binds support to all Canadians serving in Europe. Given the National Military Representative’s primary responsibility is to NATO, (not to mention his considerable work-load), perhaps it is time to resurrect Canadian Forces Europe. If a Flag level officer, in a national capacity, with a small staff, were interposed upon CFSU(E), that officer would become the voice of Canada in Europe.<sup>74</sup> Because this officer would not be associated with NATO, he would be viewed as unbiased (from a European Union perspective), and he could leverage this profile within the European Union. Establishing this position at the flag rank would provide instant credibility from a European/NATO perspective, and it would provide parity with the local Arms

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<sup>74</sup> Idea proposed by Col Boomer.

Verification commander. Based on the CF plans to establish a network of global reach, it is perhaps time to solidify its European Base, by elevating the role of CFSU(E).

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper has described the stand-up and evolution of the last remaining CF unit in continental Europe – CFSU(E). A small logistics unit that provides daily administrative and financial support across 12 borders, to CF members and their dependants in over 80 locations. Most importantly this paper details how CFSU(E), a unit originally established with no responsibility to provide operational support, a unit which underwent significant budgetary and military human resource reductions over its 13 year history, evolved, to have operational level impact. It is perhaps best described in the following quote from the Canadian National Military Representative (NMR) to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) when he wrote:

Since CFSU(E)'s creation on 30 Jun 1993, NATO has transformed from a static HQ to a dispersed, deployable force, with a reach well beyond its traditional European borders. Not surprisingly, the nature and structure of support by CFSU(E) to the CF members has evolved in step with these changes.<sup>75</sup>

The provision of support in Europe is integrally tied to CFSU(E), and should CFSU(E)'s closure ever be considered, the consequences of that action will be significant. Clearly the budgetary benefits associated with CFSU(E)'s closure, would be dwarfed by the

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<sup>75</sup> CFSU(E) 1904-1 (CO) 29 September 2005, *Concept of Operations For The Provision Of Support To CF Personnel In Europe (Covering Letter)*.

negative consequences of such an act. Ultimately, this paper has proven that CFSU(E) is a very capable unit that will continue to have operational impact, now and in the future.

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