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**THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE 3-D POLICY**

By / par  
Commander Richard H. Jean

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## ABSTRACT

In 2005, the government of the day released the International Policy Statement which stated aim is to make a difference globally by building a more secure world. This is to be accomplished by implementing the concept of Defence, Diplomacy, Development (3-D) and Commerce which involves unprecedented levels of coordination among government department and agencies. This three pronged approach consists of rapidly deploying elements of the Canadian Forces along those of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade who will assist in re-establishing governance and by deploying elements of the Canadian International Development Agency so as to provide developmental assistance in rebuilding said state. In order to be successful, 3-D will need to be coherently delivered. Exactly how the concept of 3-D is expected to be delivered within highly unstable environment of failed or failing states is extremely problematic. By reviewing the concepts of the 'three block war,' 3-D policy and Canadian military doctrine, the reader is exposed to the extraordinary challenges facing the coherent implementation of this new policy which seeks to integrate all of its stake holders. The paper argues that in order to make the 3-D possible, the CF will need to adjust its doctrine so as to allow for the peculiarities of each key player, be they Other Government Departments or Non-Governmental Organisations; by using campaign planning principles as well as operational art, it will be possible to 'operationalise' the 3-D policy and thus make its coherent delivery possibly even during complex interventions. The operationalisation of the 3-D policy is key to its success; by doing so, the Canadian government will be able to set the conditions necessary in building a more secured world.

## **THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE 3-D POLICY**

### **PART I – INTRODUCTION**

Throughout modern times Canada's defence policy has always contained key elements that remained basically identical regardless of the government in power. From Defence in the 1970s to the most recent Defence Policy Statement (DPS) one can always identify two key imperatives and at least one policy choice. Over the course of the last 40 years the key imperatives focused on sovereignty of the country and the defence of the North American continent in collaboration with our closest ally, the United States of America. The government's defence policy choices focused primarily on maintaining our alliances or exporting Canadian values abroad. In 2005, this choice was identified in the International Policy Statement (IPS) when the government of the day opted to make a difference globally by "building a more secure world."<sup>1</sup>

In order to achieve this, the Government of Canada put forth the concept of Defence, Diplomacy, Development and Commerce<sup>2</sup> "involving unprecedented levels of coordination among government department and agencies."<sup>3</sup> This three pronged approach consists of rapidly deploying the Canadian Forces in order to stabilise a failed or failing state in combination with or followed by diplomats of the Department of

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, Overview: Canada's International Policy Statement* (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005), 11.

<sup>2</sup> This Whole of Government approach has been updated to 3D + C, C referring to commerce or trade. So far, the conservative government of Mr Harper seems intent on keeping the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade unified despite a push by the previous government to separate the two entities. For the purpose of this monograph, the concept will be referred to as 3-D.

<sup>3</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Beyond Peace: Canada in Afghanistan," in *Canada World View* (Ottawa: DFAIT, autumn 2003), 4.

Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) who will assist in re-establishing governance, and finally by deploying elements of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to provide developmental assistance in rebuilding said state.<sup>4</sup>

Current operations in Afghanistan have highlighted the challenges of post combat operations and especially with the unexpected rise of insurgencies within these countries. Exactly how the Canadian Forces are expected to apply the concept of 3-D within this highly unstable environment is extremely problematic. As such, this paper will demonstrate that in order for 3-D to be successfully exploited, Canadian military doctrine needs a course adjustment. In order to do so, the paper will give an explanation of the modern counterinsurgency environment by defining the concepts of the ‘three block war,’ as well as the 3-D policy. This will be followed by a discussion on Canadian Civil-Military doctrine so as to highlight some of the institutional challenges in integrating Other Government Departments (OGD), such as DFAIT and CIDA, and particularly the difficulties in working with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO). Finally the reader will be presented with some recommendations aimed at facilitating the integration of 3-D during complex interventions.

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<sup>4</sup> The deployment may be sequential or simultaneous depending on the security environment. It may also involve the deployment of elements of other organisations such as the RCMP.

## **PART II - DISCUSSION**

### The Three Block War

In the context of modern warfare, the Canadian Forces has formally adopted the doctrine of the ‘three block war.’ This concept was first published by the then Commanding General of the United States Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak. As he explained, the three block war is a concept where the military “will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribe apart – conducting peacekeeping operations – and finally they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day, all within three city blocks.”<sup>5</sup> The main tenet of this philosophy focuses on two important themes: space and time. Thus it is assumed that in the ‘tactical’ three block war, the military forces can and will, within the space of a few hours, even minutes, switch from handing out basic humanitarian relief such as bread and water to quickly become embroiled in close combat operations of mid to high intensity. What makes this even more complex in today’s environment of asymmetric warfare or what some people have labelled fourth generation warfare, is that the insurgent is not easily distinguishable from the population whom the soldiers are trying to help.<sup>6</sup> While the three block war model is meant to focus the attention of those engaged in tactical combat operations, reminding them that they must be mentally agile and ready to rapidly deal with uncertainty, its strict

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<sup>5</sup> General Charles C. Krulak’s National Press Club speech as quoted in Joseph J Collins. “Afghanistan: Winning a Three Block War.” *Journal of Conflict Studies*, winter 2004, 61.

interpretation can cause serious difficulty when attempting to apply Gen Krulak's thesis to the operational level of war. As will be demonstrated later in this paper, when viewed from the theatre commander's perspective, the three block war model can be extremely useful in conceptualising a viable operational campaign plan that will assist operational commanders in the implementation of the 3-D policy.

### Defence, Diplomacy and Development (3-D) and Commerce

The government's 3-D policy announced by the 2005 Liberals is Canada's main instrument or means by which it plans on promoting global security. As Andrew Cooper observed: "This model encompasses a clear recognition that security must be defined and delivered in a comprehensive fashion."<sup>7</sup> The concept is meant to serve as an integrator between the key departments and, although released under the Liberal government, the newly elected Conservative government appears to support this 'whole of government' approach. While the three main actors or key departments, namely the Department of National Defence (DND), Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), come to the table with their own sets of protocols and doctrine as well as strengths and inherent weaknesses, this integrated approach is meant to provide long term solutions that address the underlying causes of conflict. The intent is that this joint approach will be more likely to resolve conflicts, restore peace and rebuild governance in failed or failing states thus promoting

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<sup>6</sup> Thomas X. Hammes., "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation." *Strategic Forum*, January 2005, pp 1-17. According to Hammes, "fourth generation warfare, which is now playing out in Iraq and Afghanistan is a modern form of insurgency. Its practitioners seek to convince enemy political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit."

<sup>7</sup> Andrew Cooper, "Adding 3Ns to the 3Ds: Lessons from the 1996 Zaire Mission for Humanitarian Interventions." *CIGI Working Paper no 4 on Fragile and Weak States*, December 2005, 1.

global security. While still a relatively new concept, its implementation is facing some serious challenges. For example Mr Wright of the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) reported at a 2005 conference on Afghanistan that while DFAIT “has the broadest interest in the country, it has the fewest resources. There is only one political officer in Kabul, a symptom of a wider lack of resources. For 3-D to be more than tactical, Canada must create integrated units with real decision-making power.”<sup>8</sup> He goes on to say that: “the 3-D has not developed into a truly integrated and *results driven* approach. It is plagued by miscommunication, stereotypes and the rotation of staff.”<sup>9</sup> [Emphasis added.]

The aim of 3-D is clear: to deliver a more coherent approach to global security which integrates all key players including the NGOs as well as the government it is trying to rebuild. As Hayes pointed out in the course of his analysis of the 1999 Kosovo intervention:

There were innumerable calls, within the humanitarian community for a more coordinated approach and comprehensive strategy; integrating all the problem areas, utilizing all the agencies, covering all the countries of the sub-region, and envisioning a smooth transition to post-conflict rehabilitations and development programming.<sup>10</sup>

The real challenge therefore is how to appropriately synchronise, coordinate and integrate those actors. For the military, Civil Military or CIMIC doctrine offers a possible solution.

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<sup>8</sup> Julian Wright, “Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the 3-D Approach.” in *Conference Report*, 12-14 May 2006. 6.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Lukas Haynes, “The Emergency Responses of NATO and Humanitarian Agencies,” in Spillmann, Kurt R., and Joachim Krause, *Kosovo: Lessons Learned for International Cooperative Security*, (Zurich: Peter Lang. 2000.) 74.



## Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

There are two Canadian Forces (CF) publications which address CIMIC doctrine. The capstone document is called the *CF Operations Manual* which devotes an entire chapter to the broad doctrinal concept of CIMIC. The second publication is aptly named the *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War* and provides a more detailed explanation of CIMIC doctrine expanding from broad concepts to detailed standard operating procedures aimed at the tactical and operational commanders. In the original version of the *CF Operations Manual* published in 2000, CIMIC was defined as “all actions and measures undertaken by a military commander which concern the relationship between a military force and the government, civil agencies or civilian population in the areas where the military force is stationed or employed.”<sup>11</sup> While this document has since been revised and the updated documentation will be discussed later in this section, it is useful to review the original document in order to demonstrate a trend in the evolution of CIMIC doctrine in Canada.

There are two types of CIMIC: Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in support of the Task Force and CIMIC Support to Civil Administration (SCA). The primary role of CMO is identified as CIMIC Operations whose main focus is to “support a civilian authority, population, IO<sup>12</sup> or NGO, the effect of which is

is a subset of this role under the heading of Support to Civil Authorities. In this role, the manual states that during a crisis or armed conflict the United Nation High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR) will normally have the role of lead humanitarian agency.<sup>14</sup> Another key subset of CMO is Military Civic Action (MCA) which is defined as small scale humanitarian activities intended to secure the support of the local population. Accordingly, CIMIC is seen as a force multiplier, a tool that an operational commander has at their disposal during the main phases of the operations which are described as the Military and the Civilian Phase. These phases are deemed to be sequential where CIMIC tasks can often be carried out simultaneously in each phase.<sup>15</sup> This previous attempt at CF doctrine did go to some length at describing the roles of each actor within the ‘humanitarian space’<sup>16</sup> and recognised that the CF will most likely have no legal authority over the civilian agencies. Nevertheless, unity of command was seen as a critical factor to mission success and it was suggested that the proper integration and coordination of all activities are key to achieving mission objectives.

Under the updated capstone *CF Operations Manual* published in 2005, CIMIC doctrine as detailed in the most recent version of the CF OPS manual, differs slightly from the previous iteration. There are still two main types of CIMIC activities which remain essentially the same: Civil Military activities in Support of the Military Force (SMF) – previously known as CMO - and civil military activities in support to civil environment (SCE) – previously known as SCA. The main difference is that

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 30-7.

<sup>15</sup> Department of National Defense. B-GJ-005-900/FP-000 *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War* (Ottawa, ON: DND, 15 Jan 99.) pi.

humanitarian assistance is no longer seen as a military imperative but rather as a tool the military may use in support to the civilian environment. Indeed humanitarian assistance operations, in the context of conflicts, are now captured under SCE, which while it may be a small nuance it does shift the emphasis from a pure military line of operation to one of support in the provision of aid and assistance “with no particular military objective.”<sup>17</sup>

As a result this new doctrine attempts to distance itself from the realm of Information Operations (IO) which has been a particular point of contention among the NGOs and other civil actors where they perceive IO as another military intrusion into the humanitarian space. The new document is clear in this regard: “although there is a great tendency to view CIMIC as an active collector and driver of IO. This is not the case.”<sup>18</sup>

Military Civic Action (MCA) continues to be a key component of current CIMIC doctrine and can be “most characterised by ‘hearts and minds’ activities in non-permissive or less-than-permissive environments.”<sup>19</sup> MCA, a subset of SMF, is described primarily as a force protection measure involving small scale humanitarian assistance actions which still requires coordination with the other stakeholders within the humanitarian space.

A yet to be released 2005 draft CIMIC directive, also supports this shift in CF doctrine where humanitarian assistance during conflict becomes much less of a military task to one which is conducted in extremis in order to relieve extreme suffering. In this

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<sup>16</sup> Humanitarian Space is deemed to exist when there is a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors and that of the military and where humanitarian actions are not subordinate to political aims: i.e. there is room for neutral and impartial humanitarian action in the midst of a conflict.

<sup>17</sup> DND. B-GG-005-300/FP-000 *Canadian Forces Operations...*(15 August 2005) 19-6.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 19-5.

draft document, CIMIC is described as a capability that undertakes activities and tasks to *support* military operations but does not conduct specific *direct action* CIMIC Operations. While CIMIC still seeks effective coordination of information and activities between the military and the civil actors as a key element to success, the role of the military tends to be more focused on the liaison functions between the actors. In the case of humanitarian actions, the military plays more of a coordinating role particularly “where civil authorities and agencies are unwilling or unable to undertake the task.”<sup>20</sup>

While the more detailed publication on *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*, which addresses CIMIC at the operational and tactical levels of war, has yet to reflect the positive changes described in this section, the new CF Ops doctrine governing CIMIC attempts to get the military out of the humanitarian space. It also provides basic guidance on how to coordinate the efforts of all stakeholders be they military, governmental, civilian agencies or NGOs. This evolution in doctrine is positive and demonstrates that the CF is heading in the right direction in regards to CIMIC, but as we will explore below, more remains to be done particularly in regards to the successful ‘operationalisation’ of the 3-D policy.

### CIMIC and the NGOs

The coordination of all these resources within a theatre of operation has always been challenging particularly when dealing with complex emergencies such as wars or conflicts where security is not guaranteed. The organisational structures, values, ethos

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 19-6.

and, perhaps most importantly, the differing cultures of those involved pose significant challenge when attempting to work together. For example the military is hierarchical in nature, extremely adept at planning and leading operations and is often results driven focusing on such things as an exit strategy and end-states. For government organisations such as DFAIT and CIDA the goal can often be different and in the case of NGOs these goals can sometime appear to be incompatible. CIDA and the NGOs for example will have a much longer term view and interest in the failed or failing state. While the military would like to think in terms of years if not months, OGDs and NGOs think in much longer terms particularly in regards to peace building, humanitarian aid and reconstruction.

From a resource perspective those agencies are often thin on the ground and operate mainly at the tactical or strategic level often working in silos independent of one another.<sup>21</sup> This is what 3-D means to fix. The new policy seeks a more integrated approach which is intended to provide us a more coherent and ordered or holistic response. However, while there will always be agencies that accept an integrated approach, some co-ordination mechanism may simply ostracise the array of actors which raises the whole issue of who shall lead? A more parallel or complimentary approach may indeed be more suitable to the task especially in the case of NGOs. From the NGOs perspective this desire to fully coordinate and integrate the efforts of all key actors is problematic and this is perhaps because they have achieved a certain degree of success

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<sup>20</sup> Department of National Defence. *Civil Military Cooperation*, Chapter 11 from DDIO (Ottawa, ON: DND Fall 2005.) 11-4.

<sup>21</sup> International Development and Trade Policy Lectures presented to AMSP 9 at CFC Toronto, On: 2 Oct 2006.

thanks to their impartiality.<sup>22</sup> Indeed their operational effectiveness depends upon the actual and perceived adherence to the principles of neutrality and impartiality and their sustained access to the people in need will most likely be conditional on this perception of independence from military and political objectives.

For example in the summer of 2004 Médecin Sans Frontière (MSF), one of the most recognised NGO, opted to pull out of Afghanistan and issued the following statement: “MSF denounces the coalitions’ attempts to co-opt humanitarian aid and use it to ‘win hearts and minds.’ By doing so, humanitarian actions are no longer seen as an impartial and neutral act, endangering the lives of humanitarian volunteers and jeopardizing the aid of people in need.”<sup>23</sup> Indeed for most NGOs, CIMIC goals runs counter to their understanding of humanitarian assistance where the objective is one which ought to lead to longer-term development and the unbiased relief of human suffering. According to MSF, the military’s work within the humanitarian space has blurred the lines to a point where the insurgents no longer see the NGOs as impartial but as part of the occupying force.<sup>24</sup>

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the other hand has often welcomed the help of the military and has a proven track record of having worked well

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<sup>22</sup> Another factor that raises tension among the actors is the competition for dollars not only between government departments but also with the NGOs as reported in Francis Kofi Abiew, “From Civil Strife to Civic Society: NGO-Military Cooperation in Peace Operation,” Occasional Paper no. 39, 2003. 14.

<sup>23</sup> Statement by Médecin Sans Frontière (MSF), 28 July 04 as quoted in Raj Rana, “Contemporary Challenges in the Civil-military relationship: Complementarity or incompatibility?” *International Review of the Red Cross*, No 855, p. 565-592. September 2004. 565.

with them. In its doctrine, ICRC is explicit that it wants to “avoid the current blurring of lines produced by the characterization of military ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns or reconstruction efforts as humanitarian.”<sup>25</sup> For the ICRC, CIMIC operations are part “of a commander’s range of tools for waging war – globally referred to as ‘information operations’...As such there can be no complete separation between military humanitarian activities and intelligence gathering.”<sup>26</sup> From a military perspective winning the ‘hearts and mind’ of the population it is trying to help is imperative. Without the support of the local population, the military will fail to legitimize its intervention and thus will likely be seen as an occupying force rather than one of liberation. The key is to do this without sacrificing the impartiality of the NGOs.

On the whole, most NGOs agree that they need to be seen as impartial as possible, anything else would erode the trust they have established with the local population and thus render their effort much less effective. Of course, they also want to operate in a relatively safe environment. For some NGO’s the support provided by the military is a welcomed means of protection: “without resorting as a rule to armed protection for its own operation, including relief convoys, [the ICRC] welcomes any efforts by international military missions to create a safe environment for humanitarian activities.”<sup>27</sup> Similarly, other international organisations claim that those same actions caused a

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid, Despite solid arguments by Colonel Giguère where he opined during a recent conference on the subject that the threat to the NGO’s were not caused by a blurring of the lines but rather because the NGO’s proved to be a easy target and possibly the most vulnerable aspect of the military-diplomatic-humanitarian triad, particularly when attempting to discredit the intervening international bodies as described in: Colonel Richard G Giguère, “Who leads, who follows», *Weak States and Sudden Disasters and Conflicts. The Challenge for Military-NGO Relations*,” in *Institute for Research on Public Policy*. Ottawa, 7 June 2005, 4.

<sup>25</sup> Statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 31 March 2004 as quoted in Raj Rana, “Contemporary Challenges...”, 566.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 592.

perceived association with one of the belligerent factions which in effect makes them a prime target thus compromising their safety.<sup>28</sup> While those NGOs try hard to separate themselves from the military, the military itself is trying to operationalise and integrate the actors within this humanitarian space. As Raj Rana writes regarding what is probably the most receptive NGO to military assistance: the “ICRC and its strict adherence to neutrality and independence are something of an anachronism to armed forces audiences being trained to better understand and integrate all political, military and humanitarian action, whatever their assignments”<sup>29</sup> The current Canadian Forces CIMIC Doctrine reflects this philosophy however, it falls short of providing tangible direction on how to integrate the military, OGDs and NGOs in a coherent and effective manner so as to deliver on the 3-D promise. NGOs can be force multiplier by the effect they achieve and the toolset they bring to the table; however, the military must be cognisant that in order to be effective, NGOs must be seen as impartial. The competing requirement between military imperatives and the NGOs desire to remain impartial, capable of operating freely within the humanitarian space, needs to be reconciled if 3-D is to be successful. How to do so will be discussed in further detail below.

### The Three Block War – Operating in a Dangerous Environment

From a tactical perspective, just how reasonable is it then to expect the concept of 3-D to work within the context of the three block war? In the case of state building for example, Coombs explains that economic investment “will happen when the situation is

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 598.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 565.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 582.



reasonably safe and there is a prevailing sense of stability for the populace, entrepreneurs, and the International and Non-Governmental Organisations.”<sup>30</sup> This is a clear indication that non-military actors will not willingly enter into an unstable area of operation. For example: shortly after the assassination of Canadian diplomat Mr. Glynn Berry, the political director for the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), all developmental work carried out by that PRT ceased as the DFAIT and CIDA representatives opted to seek safety within the walls of the Canadian military compound.<sup>31</sup> A senior military official went so far as to state that “the diplomat’s death set the 3-D clock back by six months”.<sup>32</sup> The same results were experienced in 1991 in Somalia where humanitarian agencies were largely locked within their own compound until the US lead coalition under UNITAF intervened and re-stabilised the area, albeit for a brief period.<sup>33</sup> This in itself points to the need for close military-civilian cooperation at least when dealing with OGDs. Other western countries engaged in peace building are also facing similar integration challenges. For example in the United States, “the Department of State and the USAID must become more operational and assign its personnel to areas where being in harm’s way is the norm and not the exception.”<sup>34</sup>

While it may be self-evident that the non-military players may not be willing to enter high risk areas, another factor is once again the competition for the humanitarian space which is deemed to occur when conducting a tactical three block war. To wit, MSF reported that an extreme case of “line blurring” occurred in Somalia in 1993 when

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<sup>30</sup> Howard G. Coombs, “Perspectives on Operational Thought,” (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, June 4, 2004,) 17.

<sup>31</sup> LCol Pierre St-Cyr Interview 29 Sep 06.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Jean-Marc Biquet, “Militaires-Humanitaires: une relation difficile,” in *Morale Laïque.*, avril 2003, 4.

American soldiers shifted from one day to the next from distributing bread to firing lead, hence causing total chaos amongst those they were seemingly trying to protect.<sup>35</sup> These highlight the extreme challenges of trying to apply the 3-D policy within a three block war construct at a tactical level. However, when one elevates the concept to the operational level, many of these inhibitors are effectively neutralised as it will be suggested below.

### Bringing it all Together

There are two real challenges in achieving the coherent application of the 3-D policy at play here: whether or not the three block war remains a valid doctrine in which the 3-D construct can be applied and secondly, is the current CF CIMIC doctrine compatible with the 3-D concept?

In so far as the three block war is concerned, the evidence reviewed so far indicates that in order for development to start and humanitarian assistance to be useful, the working environment must be made sufficiently safe. Without this security the OGDs and NGOs will not be able to effectively carry out their primary tasks. From a tactical perspective what is proposed is a 1+2 Block War: Combat Ops, followed by Peace and Security Operations and Humanitarian Assistance *Support*. Thus by conducting full scale combat operations until such a time where the area is sufficiently secured, Development and Humanitarian efforts can commence in earnest in a relatively safe environment. During this second phase the military can focus on maintaining peace as well as

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<sup>34</sup> Joseph J .Collins “Afghanistan: Winning a Three Block War.” in *Journal of Conflict Studies*, winter 2004, 76.

providing *support* to humanitarian assistance and development activities. Because we are often focused on sequencing our action, it is during this second phase of operation that the 3-D concept can truly be put into action at all levels. As Stuart Gordon puts it: “in ‘unconflictual’ situations a more ‘integrated’ approach may pose fewer difficulties particularly when military action directly supports humanitarian efforts rather than replaces civil capacity or decision making authority.”<sup>36</sup>

From the theatre or operational level, if we look at the three block war in term of kilometres and weeks or months instead of city blocks and hours, the operational commander can now deliver 3-D simultaneously by focusing on separate, yet integrated, lines of operations. How this can be done will be explained further in this section, however one can already realise that when interpreted from the theatre level, the three block war encompasses areas where security has already been established. This security will permit the NGOs, diplomats, development agencies and the militaries (i.e. the 3-D actors) to conduct operations alongside each other. However, a proper division of labour as well as appropriate operating principles will need to be established. For the military, CIMIC doctrine constitutes one of those operating principles.

While CF CIMIC doctrine has improved a great deal in the last decade, it still needs to be re-visited and modernised in order to effectively and coherently deliver coherent 3-D. A possible solution may be derived from what has been adopted by the United Kingdom where its military forces focus primarily on security operations while

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<sup>35</sup> Jean-Marc Biquet, “Militaires-Humanitaires...”, 2.

<sup>36</sup> Stuart Gordon. “Understanding the Priorities for Civil-Military Co-operation,” in *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 2001, 9.

the development and diplomatic organisations work on their own area of expertise thus avoiding potential encroachment into the humanitarian space.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, NGOs have a particular advantage over the military in conducting this type of work and as expected, so do OGDs such as CIDA, USAID, and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID). NGOs, and to a lesser extent OGDs, are often in country for many years, they have the language skills and personal links to the community, know the environment, culture, customs, the local security and the political situation and are often skilled at finding available transportation networks.<sup>38</sup> Much of this reality has translated into current doctrine, most notably in the most recent CF OPS manual. Unfortunately the CF CIMIC manual, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*, has yet to follow suit and reflects a construct where CIMIC is mostly an Information Operations tool where the military is expected to lead humanitarian and reconstruction efforts be it during combat operations, in peace support / keeping or humanitarian assistance tasks. In this updated approach the military forces can now focus on an end-state defined as the 'transition to stability' where soldiers are the gap-filler in achieving and initiating a hand-off to local security forces,<sup>39</sup> or as was recently stated by the Canadian Government, the setting of conditions for irreversible peace for which the military is only one part, albeit a critical one. At the tactical level this implies phasing the operations using the 1+2 block war concept while at the operational level it means adequately synchronising the efforts of OGDs and NGOs so as to coherently deliver 3-D across the theatre of operations. That is to say that the military,

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<sup>37</sup> Julian Wright, "Canada in Afghanistan...", 9.

<sup>38</sup> Daniel L Byman., "Uncertain Partners...", 100.

OGDs and NGOs should not work in stovepipes. Quite the contrary, they must fully coordinate their efforts and do so as early as possible in order to be successful. For all participants this means looking beyond their own line of operations and truly adopting a holistic approach to peace and state building. As BGen Gagnon pointed out in a recent article regarding peace keeping, “saturating the theatre of operations with irrepressible military forces is no longer a guarantee for success. Success is now dependant in the way actors, military and civilians synchronise their efforts. This will require seamless compatibility between the political directives and the military imperatives, hence the requirement for a new military-civilian partnership.”<sup>40</sup>

How then can efforts be coordinated between all the stakeholders given the aforementioned inhibitors? Turning to the military may offer a practical solution particularly when exploring the plethora of what has been written in regard to operational art and campaign planning where “current Canadian version of operational art seemingly attempts to coordinate the actions of participating agencies throughout a specific campaign and links these measures across the conceptual levels of war.”<sup>41</sup>

Thomas Xammes suggests that the actors need to operate as “interagency elements down to the tactical level,”<sup>42</sup> where typical stovepipes are abandoned.

Experience to date has shown that the linkages at the tactical level are achieving a certain degree of success thanks to the hard work of key individuals on the ground however in

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<sup>39</sup> Bruce Bingham, Daniel Rubini, and Michael J Cleary., “U.S. Army Civil Affairs – The Army’s ‘Ounce of Prevention,” in *Land Warfare Papers*, March 2003, 18.

<sup>40</sup> Translated from: Robin Gagnon, « Une Perspective Canadienne des Operations de paix : Directives Politiques versus impératifs militaires. » In *Guide du Maintien de la paix 2006-07*, edited by Jocelyn Coulon. (Outremont : Aténa Editions, 2006,) 112.

<sup>41</sup> Howard G. Coombs, “Perspectives...” 11.

order to be truly effective and responsive to what is often a very volatile and unpredictable environment, it is also essential that those links be also firmly established at the operational level early in the planning phase of the operation. This requirement has been expressed within British academia in relation to their Ministry of Defence (MoD) and DfID, when Stuart Gordon wrote that: “given the increasingly flexible development of mission objectives during the course of a mission there is obviously an incentive to develop more effective co-ordination at lower levels in both departments.”<sup>43</sup>

One promising means by which these efforts can be integrated is through people. Indeed it has been suggested that “embedded civilians will take on further importance, with State civilian advisors for humanitarian, reconstruction or political matters, private contractors in traditional combat-support functions, and as in-house State donor representatives.”<sup>44</sup> As previously explained when examining the problems of the three block war doctrine, before those representatives are to be embedded at the tactical level, they will be expecting a certain degree of security and as witnessed in the course of the last eight months in the Afghan theatre, this may not always be possible. However once the environment is stable enough, the integration of the civilian elements into the military structure and vice versa at the tactical level becomes possible. Notwithstanding the degree of safety present in theatre, this should not prevent the integration of personnel at the operational and strategic level. This exchange of personnel would permit an ongoing education of one another regarding our respective operational methods, sensitivities, ethos and expectations.

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<sup>42</sup> Thomas X. Hammes., “Insurgency: Modern Warfare...” 17.

Another possible solution is to integrate via plans. Operational campaign planning offers us an ideal tool in this regard and given the military's experience in campaign planning it may be reasonable to assume that the military would be best suited to take the lead in the early phase of the operation. However as pointed out by Coombs: "...during the post-conflict phase of the operation, planning staffs have come to realise that in the construction of the campaign plan military efforts must be subordinate to the imperatives of multiple non-military agencies."<sup>45</sup> Any campaign plan must therefore be crafted to reflect this reality. One of the most promising tools available to the operational commander in building integrated, yet flexible, plan that will permit a measure of independence from hierarchical control is the concept of Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO).<sup>46</sup> EBAO is also highly compatible with Collins' suggestion that 3-D needs to develop into a *results driven* approach.<sup>47</sup> Because it focuses on the effects rather than the means, it provides us with the ability to look at the problem from a unity of effort rather than one where unity of command is paramount.<sup>48</sup> As witnessed in the recent campaign in Afghanistan, operational planners have identified three separate yet intricately linked lines of operations namely: Governance, Development and Security. As operations shifted to peace support, security became a supporting element to Governance and Development under the leadership of DFAIT. This approach is not without its own challenges however, especially when attempting to coordinate the efforts

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<sup>43</sup> Stuart Gordon. "Understanding the Priorities...", 11.

<sup>44</sup> Raj Rana, "Contemporary Challenges...", 577.

<sup>45</sup> H.G. Coombs. *Perspectives...*, 18.

<sup>46</sup> EBAO is defined as Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behaviour or capabilities using the integrated application of select instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.

<sup>47</sup> Collins. "Afghanistan: Winning...", 76.

<sup>48</sup> LCol Gibbons, Introduction to EBAO presentation to AMSP 9, CFC Toronto, ON: 03 Oct 06.

of the NGOs as “it was also acknowledged that this strategy could only work if there were consensus amongst all the stakeholders created by leadership from the principal ambassadors. This needed support from the heads of donors’ organisations in assisting the ATA to choose regions for concentrated development, in selecting priority institution-building programmes, and in distinguishing work requirements.”<sup>49</sup>

Perhaps the most difficult challenge for the military will be in adopting the primacy of unity of effort or purpose over that of unity of command, particularly when there is no pre-established framework of governance in the coherent delivery of 3-D. As explained by BGen (ret’d) Gagnon, “the aim of the game is unity of purpose and synergy (among the Three-D), which can be achieved somewhat satisfactorily without unity of command. In fact I am convinced that unity of command at that level [operational] will never exist.”<sup>50</sup> He suggests that in order to achieve unity of purpose, the operational commander will be required to be personally engaged in the process. What makes this concept particularly well suited is its flexibility. When high intensity combat operations resumed in southern Afghanistan, security operations took centre stage at the tactical and operational level with the military commanders in the lead for that area of operations. At the operational and strategic level commanders could continue supporting DFAIT in the overall campaign plan designed at re-building the country. By building a campaign plan that takes this concept as well as others from modern CF operational level doctrine into

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<sup>49</sup> Howard G. Coombs and General Richard J. Hillier. “Planning for Success: The Challenge of Applying Operational Art in Post-Conflict Afghanistan,” in *Canadian Military Journal* 6, autumn 2005, 11. ATA refers to the Afghanistan Transitional Authority which was then led by President Karzai who is today’s leader of the duly elected Afghanistan Government.

<sup>50</sup> BGen Robin Gagnon notes in support of AMSP 9 Syndicate C discussions CFC Toronto, ON. 17 Sep 06. BGen Gagnon was the Force Commander of the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMH). The mission took place from August to November 1997.



account, the commander can give himself better flexibility. Integration at the operational level is also possible using doctrinal concepts such as supported and supporting commanders where depending on the phase of the operation, a lead agency can be identified.<sup>51</sup> Using the current example of Afghanistan, as the situation regains stability, DFAIT can lead the overall effort while military forces and CIDA become supporting commanders while NGOs can be coordinate via DFAIT's Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force or START whose role is "to plan and coordinate rapid and integrated civilian responses to international crises."<sup>52</sup>

In order to achieve success and a common understanding of doctrinal concepts such as unity of purpose, command and control terminology, etc, the training and education of all key actors from the tactician to the strategist will become paramount. The embedding of civilian OGD personnel at all command levels and vice versa is a good practical example of education and on-job-training. This would create a climate of understanding and customisation necessary for the successful operationalisation of the 3-D approach but this is only one small step. We must also pursue formal training and education in "a genuine interagency environment. From the classroom to daily operations to interagency training exercises, personnel must think and act as part of a network rather than a hierarchy."<sup>53</sup> When dealing with NGOs, both the military and OGDs must ensure that "key personnel are familiar with those relief organizations that

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<sup>51</sup> DND. B-GG-005-004/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations*, 2-7.

<sup>52</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada's International Policy Statement. (Ottawa, On: DFAIT, 2005,) 14.

<sup>53</sup> Thomas Xammes., "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation," in *Strategic Forum*, January 2005, 17.

are essential to humanitarian operations.”<sup>54</sup> One way for the military to achieve this would be, as suggested by Daniel Byman, by “hosting conferences, conducting exercises, providing briefings and offering courses at military educational institutes.”<sup>55</sup> As such, the military would improve its overall awareness of relief agency capabilities. By extending this offer to other departments and agencies such as DFAIT and CIDA, we could achieve an unprecedented degree of understanding.<sup>56</sup> NGOs such as the ICRC also advocate international exercise and participation on conferences dealing with state building, as well as military-civilian cooperation. For example the ICRC “maintains organization-to-organization relations with military academies and other facilities that train military and civilian personnel for [military] missions.”<sup>57</sup> The Canadian Forces College has embraced this concept such that NGOs, DFAIT and CIDA representatives are often called upon to lecture students attending the various programmes and this practice should continue.<sup>58</sup> Large scale military exercises must also include active representation from the 3-D and NGO communities.<sup>59</sup>

Other than the cultural barriers which have come to hamper close coordination amongst the actors involved in peace building and reconstruction, it has been suggested that current period for a tour of duty in theatre severely restricts the impact of the 3-D approach both in terms of effect on the local population but also in regard to how well we

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Daniel L Byman, “Uncertain Partners...,” 108.

<sup>56</sup> It should be noted that there is a small core of liaison personnel between the departments at the strategic level. The level of cross-pollination needs to be expanded to include the Operational level commands.

<sup>57</sup> Raj Rana, “Contemporary Challenges...,” 590.

<sup>58</sup> Interview with LCol Angelo Caravaggio, a military planner at the CFC Toronto, ON. 18 Sep 06.

<sup>59</sup> Other than the obvious 3-D actors, the military should also focus its education and training effort on the main international NGOs particularly the WFP, ICRC, as well as those who traditionally play a leading role

can integrate at the tactical and operational level. Extending the tour of duties for interagency personnel such as DFAIT and CIDA has been recommended as a means to remedy this situation where the current “3- to 12-month overseas tours in a crisis cannot work in fights lasting decades.”<sup>60</sup> For example while CIDA’s approach appears to be in favour of longer tour of duties (12 months), some diplomats have stayed on for as little as six weeks which may be counterproductive when trying to attain an appropriate level of familiarity with their environment and other key tactical stakeholders. The military’s current overseas rotation of 6 months has also some limits but given the hardship and danger, one can certainly understand the rationale behind this limit. However since not all deployed soldiers are assigned to high intensity combat operations, those that are assigned to CIMIC tasks in the more secured areas can certainly stay in theatre for longer period. By doing so, they would be able to gain a better understanding of their environment and would be able to provide their superiors with a better appreciation of the overall situation, thus filling the potential gaps created by fast rotations of military personnel. Potentially, the creation of a professional CIMIC corps of officers and NCOs would provide a tangible solution to this challenge.

Since CIMIC has become such an enduring feature in today’s complex military operations, developing a broader body of professionals with a recognised career path may prove beneficial. Indeed this “specialisation” may serve as a means of ensuring consistency across multinational missions and provide a degree of institutional support that would ensure that CIMIC doctrine is relevant to today’s complex environment. The

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in humanitarian relief such as CARE, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children, and MSF

US Army has such a body of professionals. Composed mainly of reservist, CIMIC Affairs (CA) professionals focus almost exclusively in this warfare area providing advice to the tactical, operational and strategic commanders. For the CF, CIMIC tasks are also given primarily to reservists.<sup>61</sup> This needs to continue and perhaps be spread to the officers and men of the regular forces. Armed with a superior understanding of the roles of non-military actors, this new professional can thus help bridge the cultural gap between the military and the supported agencies, be they OGDs or NGOs. Furthermore they may even contribute to an improved search for alternatives to military intervention before and during the intervention itself where the coordination of the 3-D lines of operations will be essential. Arguably there is a need to develop a stable of officers and non commissioned officers that have experience working with OGDs and NGOs and that are comfortable doing so.

### **PART III – CONCLUSION**

The operationalisation of the 3-D policy is key to its success. By doing so, the Canadian government, in concert with the international community, will be more likely to set the conditions for ‘irreversible peace.’ In order to do so all the stakeholders need to be able to focus and appropriately coordinate and sequence their efforts. Thus the successful operationalisation of the 3-D policy will require an adjustment to Canadian Forces doctrine which integrates the OGDs and takes into account the important role played by the NGOs. This course adjustment will require among other thing, a broader interpretation of the three block war philosophy where the blocks are measured in

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<sup>60</sup> Thomas X. Hammes., “Insurgency: Modern Warfare...,” 17.

thousands of kilometres, and time is expressed in weeks, even months rather than hours. Doctrinally the CF will need to further adjust CIMIC procedures taking full account of the particularities of all key actors and more specifically NGOs and while it has been recognised that the full integration, within a rigid command and control structure, of all key actors may not be possible or even desired, it is clear that 3-D must be delivered coherently. This can be done by via flexible operational campaign plans that allows for independence of action while at the same time eliminates duplication of effort and a ‘blurring of the lines’ of responsibilities. ‘Operational Art’ and an ‘Effects Based Approach to Operations’ provides the commander with the requisite tools to operationalise 3-D. By using the campaign planning principles where initially the preponderance of the effort will be focused on the military establishing a sufficient degree of security and safety for all actors, other lines of operations can then be synchronised and delivered simultaneously at the theatre level. Under the concepts of supported / supporting commander, the lead agent can thus synchronise the efforts of all actors thus ensuring that the lines of responsibilities are not blurred and actions not duplicated, thus alleviating competition within the humanitarian space. This will require a common understanding of doctrines, roles, operating procedures, aims, goals, structures, etc, which can be achieved via integrated training, education and the embedding of trained professionals within each other’s command structures at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

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<sup>61</sup> Bruce Bingham, “U.S. Army Civil Affairs...,” 34.

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