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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

AMSC 8 - CSEM 8

Cultivating Operational Level Leadership in the Canadian Forces:

Argumentation for filling the doctrinal vacuum

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ABSTRACT

The Canadian Forces operations focus is gradually shifting towards greater appreciation of the operational level. Recent events, high profile commands in multinational operations, publication of operations doctrine, professional military education (PME) developments and CF transformation initiatives have all focused on the operational level. Further evidence regarding this trend is found in Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS) and its corresponding Defence Policy Statement (DPS) that direct that "the CF focus their expeditionary capabilities on operations in these states (failed and failing states), *including in a leadership role ...*"

Two keystone Canadian Forces leadership doctrine manuals were published in 2005: *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Doctrine* and *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Conceptual Foundations*. This new doctrine categorized leadership as either leading people or leading the institution; grouping both the tactical and operational levels to the - leading people category and aligning the strategic level with the - leading the institution category.

Through leadership theory review, foreign policy analysis and doctrine analysis, this paper presents an argument in favour of amending newly published CF Leadership doctrine in order to clearly distinguish operational level leadership.

**Cultivating Operational level Leadership in the Canadian Forces:
Argumentation for filling the doctrinal vacuum**

#5 Be careful what you choose. You may get it.¹

Colin Powell – His “Rules”

Introduction

Arguably, the combination of Canada’s geopolitical context, domestic agenda, and long-standing collaborative foreign policy approach have all contributed to what some have coined “a distinct Canadian ‘way of war’ – contribution warfare”. Protagonists of this theory, such as Vance², have even argued that operational art need not be studied in Canada as it does little to explain this ‘way of war’. In essence, this theory contends that small and medium power nations making tactical level contributions to post-WWII coalitions, such as Canada, have relied on lead nations to translate strategic direction through the development of campaigns into tactical missions – the essence of operational level art. This is not to say that the Canadian Forces (CF) is bereft of operational level thought or practice. Rather, if this theory explains our ‘way of war’, then our interest lies in understanding this level from the perspective of a tactical level contributor. Perhaps this explains why leadership at the operational level of war is not treated as distinct in recent CF Leadership doctrine.

¹ Lisa Shaw, *In his own words: Colin Powell* (New York: Perigee Books, 1995), 109.

² LCol John Vance, “Canada’s Departure from the Classic Doctrine of Operational Art”(Toronto: Canadian Forces College Advanced Military Studies Course Paper, 2004), 7.

Current practice however, runs counter to the contribution theory; senior Canadian officers have and will be deployed as operational level commanders and staff³, operations doctrine relating to the operational level of war has recently been published⁴, professional military education (PME) developments focusing on the operational level of war such as the Advanced Military Studies Course are mandated and recent CF transformation initiatives all focus on the operational level. This trend was cemented with the publication of Canada's International Policy Statement (IPS) and its corresponding Defence Policy Statement (DPS) that directed that "the CF focus their expeditionary capabilities on operations in these states (failed and failing states), *including in a leadership role when it is in Canada's interest and ability to so.*"⁵

In 2001, the CF created the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) whose purpose was to "... disseminate core concepts of leadership and the Profession of Arms to the CF."⁶ Pursuant to this mandate, CFLI published two keystone documents in 2005: *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Doctrine* and *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Conceptual Foundations*. Whereas CF Operations doctrine published five years earlier had clearly identified the three levels of command; tactical, operational and strategic⁷, the new Leadership Doctrine categorized leadership as either leading people or leading the

³ MGen Gauthier (Former Republic Yugoslavia, 1993 - Force Engineer UNPROFOR), BGen Gagnon (Haiti, 1997 – Comd UNTMIH), and LGen Hillier (Afghanistan, 2004 - Comd ISAF) are all examples of CF officers who have recently held appointments as commanders or senior staff in operational level HQ.

⁴ Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000).

⁵ Department of National Defence, NDID A-JS-005-000/AG-001 *Canada's International Defence Policy Statement - A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 2.

⁶ Canadian Defence Academy, "CDA-CFLI-Homepage" http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca/CFLI/engraph/home_e.asp; Internet; accessed 23 October 2005.

⁷ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Operations ...*, art 204.2.

institution⁸; grouping both the tactical and operational levels to the 'leading people' category and aligning the strategic level with the 'leading the institution' category. Howard Coombs explained some of the difficulties in articulating leadership at the operational level in his doctrinal summary. He quotes Haycock and Bernier who identify the absence of historical research as a hindering factor in their efforts to "create a Canadian approach to leadership and command as they apply to operational art in the CF with a view to translating it into a framework for professional development".⁹

This paper will argue that by failing to recognize operational level leadership as an intermediate layer between leading people or the institution (tactical and strategic) in accordance with CF Operations doctrine, newly published CF Leadership doctrine will be of little use in preparing future commanders and staff assigned to leadership functions at the operational level. To paraphrase Colin Powell's words, by *choosing* to doctrinally neglect this important level of leadership, we risk *getting* failure or weakness at a time when our transformation efforts are clearly bringing this level of command to the forefront of CF operational activities.

Approach. To elicit the case for clearly distinguishing operational level leadership within keystone leadership doctrine, this paper will first examine the CF leadership doctrine from a leadership theory perspective. Analysis will then seek linkages between operational level leadership and national and foreign operations

⁸ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-003 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Doctrine*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 6.

⁹ Howard G. Coombs, "Perspectives on Operational Thought" (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Paper, 2004), 24.

doctrine. Canada's IPS and the supporting DPS will then be reviewed and interpreted to validate the requirement from a policy perspective. Having identified gaps from a theoretical perspective, established linkages with operations doctrine and enunciated the policy perspective, the final portion of the paper will compare CF leadership doctrine with U.S. Army leadership doctrine to highlight the relevance of recognizing leadership at the Operational level and imbedding it as a distinct major leadership function within CF Leadership Doctrine.

Premise. For the purpose of this paper, the following definitions apply as description of the operational level environment.

Operational level of conflict. The operational level of conflict is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, and initiating actions and applying resources to bring about and sustain those events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time and space than do tactics: they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.

... Regardless of its size, a military force tasked to achieve a strategic objective, is being employed at the operational level.¹⁰

Operational Level of Command. That level of command which employs forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre or area of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. At the operational level, sea, land and air activity must be conceived and conducted as one single concentrated effort. Activities at this level link strategy and tactics.¹¹

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Operations ...*, art 112.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, art 204.2.b.

CF Leadership Doctrine – the problem

Describing leadership in the first chapter of Canada's new Leadership doctrine, major leadership functions are categorized into two groups as follows:

At lower to middle rank levels in the CF, Officers and NCMs appointed to positions involving leadership responsibilities are typically engaged in directing, motivating and enabling others... Because of the requirement for a lot of face-to-face interaction and direct influence, this leadership function is described as *leading people*, and generally corresponds to the *tactical and operational levels of command and activity*.

At higher rank levels, senior leaders and their staffs are uniquely responsible for sustaining current military capabilities and systems while planning and developing professional capabilities needed...into the future. This leadership function is described as *leading the institution*, and generally corresponds to the *military strategic and national-strategic levels of command and activity*.¹²

Missing in the preceding descriptions is any parallel or linkage to the abilities, skills, traits or unique considerations of command at the operational level. Rather, the operational level is grouped with the tactical implying that direct leadership is best suited to this level of command and authority. Why is this so? And why have leadership doctrine writers seemingly ignored operations doctrine that clearly explains, as we shall see later, the unique challenges of leadership at the operational level?

Peter Northouse, author and Professor of Communication at Western Michigan University, has taught leadership for more than 20 years. He has suggested that from a leadership theory perspective, the CF view of leadership is similar to the skills

¹² Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Doctrine ...*, p.6.

approach.¹³ In the third edition of his compendium of leadership theory, which bridges the gap between simplified texts on leadership and abstract theoretical approaches, he describes this approach as follows:

“...in the skills approach we shift our thinking from a focus on personality characteristics, which are usually viewed as innate and relatively fixed, to an emphasis on skills and abilities that can be learned and developed.”¹⁴

Northouse goes on to explain that initial work into the skills approach conducted in the mid-1950's identified three skills categories¹⁵:

- Technical
- Human
- Conceptual

The skills approach suggests that as successful leaders progress to superior levels of management (supervisory, middle and top) their human skills vary little however, technical skills diminish in relative importance whereas more emphasis is placed on conceptual skills. The term ‘management’ in the preceding sentence is used as it pertains to studies in leadership theory. CF definitions of command, management and their linkages to leadership are found in the *Conceptual Foundations* manual of CF leadership doctrine.¹⁶

¹³ Author's interpretation of comments made by Dr Peter G. Northouse to AMSC 8 students during the Leadership lecture – discussion held at CFC Toronto, 22 Sept 05.

¹⁴ Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2004), 35.

¹⁵ Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice...*, 37.

¹⁶ Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-00 *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Conceptual Foundations*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 8.

CF leadership doctrine is based on a systems approach to leadership where linkages between a number of factors including leader characteristics, leader influence and situational factors all affect the outcomes and effectiveness of particular leadership situations.¹⁷ CF doctrine integrates these relationships through the *Integrative CF leadership model*.¹⁸ Underlying the doctrine is the basic premise that leadership is not trait driven, rather, that it is based on skills which can be taught and learned throughout a career. Clearly, adopting the skills approach lends itself very well to large and complex organizations such as the CF who must develop their leaders from within given the importance of experience and knowledge of task, group, institutional and environmental characteristics.

Similar in concept to the skills approach, CF leadership doctrine proposes five leadership competencies that can be developed and improved to increase leader effectiveness¹⁹:

- Knowledge and skill
- Cognitive ability
- Social capacities
- Personality traits
- Professional motivation and values

The doctrine explains that knowledge and skill, cognitive ability and social capacities must all grow throughout a leader's development and his/her progression to


¹⁷ Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice...*, 16.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁹ Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Doctrine ...*, 19.

positions of greater responsibility. For these competencies, as the leader progresses from the direct leadership role to the institutional leadership role, he requires more breadth and the ability to apply abstract thought.

Viewed in parallel, CF doctrinal leader competencies and leadership skills enunciated in the skills approach are quite similar (see Figure 1).



If we accept the parallel proposed in Figure 1, then why are CF leader competencies not weighted according to the three levels of war similar to the three levels of management used in the skills approach?

This argument can be taken one step farther. Northouse explains that the skills approach was refined in the early-1990's following work sponsored by the U.S. Army and Department of Defense who sought to explain the underlying elements of effective

performance.²⁰ The result of this research was a skills-based model of leadership which resembles the CF leadership model in many ways; both seek to explain leadership outcomes, both are concerned with linkages between similar attributes, competencies or characteristics and both suggest that outcomes are influenced by environmental or situational factors. This is further evidence that the CF leadership model finds its origins in the skills approach – an approach based on three levels of management. Consequently, from a leadership theory perspective, one would expect the CF leadership model to also prescribe to three levels of leadership including an equivalent middle management leadership level - the operational level.

Operational level leadership – an operations doctrine perspective

In the CF, doctrine is defined as the "fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives."²¹ CF leadership doctrine professes to be "... essential guidance for CF leadership practice at *all levels*."²² Logic would then suggest that this doctrine provide fundamental principles as they pertain to the three levels of command enshrined in CF operations doctrine. The following analysis will explore Canadian, U.S. and U.K. operations doctrine to demonstrate that all three refer to and describe in varying degree operational level leadership. U.S. and U.K. doctrines have been chosen as these countries are our principal allies and have similar operations doctrines.

²⁰ Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 39.

²¹ J7 Doctrine Website, "Joint Doctrine from a CF Perspective", http://www.cdcs.forces.gc.ca/jointDoc/pages/j7doc_doctrine_e.asp; Internet; accessed 23 October 2005.

²² Department of National Defence, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces – Doctrine ...*, iv.

Canadian Doctrine. Through *Duty with Honor: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, the theoretical and philosophical *raison d'être* of the CF is explained to its members and the greater Canadian population²³. In chapter 3, section 4, leadership is defined and linked as an essential element of professionalism.

Building upon *Duty with Honor*, *Canadian Forces Operations – B-GG-005-004/AF-000*, the CF keystone operations doctrine manual clearly acknowledges the three levels of war.²⁴ Later, in the same manual, an entire chapter is devoted to campaign planning, including an overview of operational art and a thorough description of the distinguishing features of command at this level germane to leadership: perspective, freedom of action and operational level intelligence.²⁵

These same themes are echoed and developed in more detail in Canadian Army doctrine manuals. Useful in terms of defining operational level leadership, *Canada's Army – B-GL 300-000/FP-000*, the Army's foundation manual, describes components of operational art and makes an important reference to leadership and command as they pertain to the skillful operational level commander:

²³ Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honor: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, (Kingston, ON: CF Leadership Institute), 2003.

²⁴ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Operations ...*, art 111-113.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, art 312.

Skill in operational art requires commanders to master not only the complexities of planning and conducting large scale combat operations but, equally, *to manifest a style of leadership and command* which brings forth and exploits the full human and materiel potential of their force.²⁶

In *Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army – B-GL 300-001/FP-000*, Canadian Army doctrine further expands its keystone manual’s description of operational art and the commander.²⁷ Here, the reader is left with a list of personal abilities or skills, including leadership, on which the degree of success of operational level commanders is dependent. Mention is also made of the environment, experience level and professional knowledge of practitioners of operational art. These elements all form part of the leadership model proposed in the new CF Leadership Doctrine. However, in this new document they are presented differently and leadership skills are grouped into only two categories versus the three levels of war.

US Doctrine. Some could argue that following the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. Army turned to operational art and the operational level of war as a means of rectifying the frustrations of ‘never losing a battle and yet losing the War’. Although tenets of this intermediary level of command had been recognized by other countries in the preceding 80 years²⁸, it was only during the 1980’s that the U.S. Army imbedded the concept in its own doctrine which has now permeated throughout the U.S. military establishment. The operational level is now germane to doctrine, professional development, training and the conduct of US military operations.

²⁶ Department of National Defence, B-GL 300-000/FP-000 *Canada’s Army* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998), 105.

²⁷ Department of National Defence, B-GL 300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998), 45.

²⁸ Bruce W. Menning, “Operational Art’s Origins”, *Military Review*, September – October, 1997, 32-47.

Doctrinally, the American approach to the operational level of war has evolved over the past 25 years and now finds its roots emanating from *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*²⁹, a publication that clearly articulates the three levels of war. Again, the same tenets of this definition are echoed through U.S. Army doctrine in *FM 100-5, Operations*³⁰. Through these two publications, one clearly identifies what Americans consider the discriminating factor regarding the conduct of war at the operational level - the requirement to practice operational art.

However, American Joint and Army operations doctrine are bereft of any mention of leadership in the enunciation of concepts regarding the levels of war. This appears to be an intentional omission as leadership doctrine has continually been published in parallel with operations manuals. As an example, *FM 22-100, Leadership* and *FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, were both published in the mid-80's as complements to *FM 100-1, AirLand Battle*, the Army's keystone operations doctrine of the period. Interestingly, through the publication of two separate manuals, the U.S. Army sought to distinguish attributes, perspectives and skills germane to higher levels of war. These two leadership manuals were later combined and superceded by a 1999 version of *FM 22-100, Army Leadership*. This most recent publication will be discussed later in comparison with CF Leadership doctrine. However, of note is the effort by U.S. Army

²⁹ U.S. Joint Electronic Library, "(JP 3-0) Doctrine for Joint Operations", http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/primer.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 October 2005

³⁰ U.S. Joint Electronic Library, "FM100-5 Operations", http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm100_5.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 October 2005.

authorities to articulate three distinct types of leadership: direct, organizational and strategic.

British Doctrine. British keystone doctrine is certainly the most explicit in defining leadership at the operational level when compared with similar Canadian and U.S. publications. Although *Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01*, the keystone British Defence doctrine manual, differs from Canadian and U.S. doctrine in that it identifies a fourth level of war, grand strategic, it nevertheless clearly identifies leadership as a subset of the Moral Component of Fighting Power.³¹ Here, the leadership theme is well developed and provides a detailed description of attributes of command and leadership without linking them directly to a specific level of war.

In *Joint Defence Publication (JDP) 0-1, Joint Operations* however, an entire chapter is devoted to explaining the nature of command at the operational level.³² British doctrine writers describe, at length, command as a “function of decision-making and leadership”.³³ This subject is then explored in further detail through descriptions of the personal dimension of command, key qualities of the commanders and joint considerations. To add further emphasis to the British doctrinal approach, curriculum at both the Joint Services Command and Staff College and The Royal College of Defence Studies include dedicated terms to the study of leadership adapted to various levels of war.

³¹U.K. Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, “(JDP) 0-1, Joint Operations”, http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/jdcc/publications/jwp0_01.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 October 2005.

³² U.K. Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, “(JDP) 0-1, Joint Operations”, ..., Ch. 4.

³³ Ibid., 4-2.

It is evident that Canadian, U.S. & U.K. operational doctrine all distinguish the operational level of war from both the strategic and tactical levels. In Canadian and U.K. keystone Defence doctrine manuals, leadership is a theme which is developed generically as it pertains to the profession of arms. Each country addresses operational level leadership through their Army or joint operations doctrinal manuals in varying detail. Both our joint operations and Army doctrine speaks to leadership at this level without elaborating on key principles, theories or traits. The UK addresses the issue directly in its joint operations doctrine including definitions, traits and key qualities of commanders and staff at this level. The U.S. approach is distinct as they address command versus leadership at the operational level and have published leadership doctrine as a complement to their operations manuals. Suffice to say that, from an operations doctrine perspective, the operational level is distinct, it relates to command, and it has been doctrinally described by our allies who have made efforts to provide some description of leadership at this level.

Interpreting Canada's International Policy Statement

One of the most compelling arguments regarding the need for clear doctrinal definition of operational level leadership doctrine can be found in Canada's most recent IPS and corresponding DPS.

Prime Minister (PM) Paul Martin uses the verb *to lead* no less than four times in his forward to the IPS when referring to the role Canada must play in the geopolitical context of the 21st century.³⁴ The insistent nature of this assertion clearly indicates a shift in policy; less focus on contributing at large, more focus on concentrating elements of national power to significantly impact targeted nations or international situations. Arguably, strategic staff in NDHQ will use portions of this new policy as key elements of strategic direction when ordering CF elements either independently or as members of a greater ‘Team Canada’ or coalition, to partake in operations overseas.

Later in his forward, PM Martin states, “...*we must ultimately be committed to playing a lead role in specific initiatives and, on occasion, to resolving to go it alone.*”³⁵ From a military operations perspective, this statement certainly implies that there may be situations where the Canadian government will call on the CF for unilateral actions in prosecuting the nation’s foreign policy. This request will then be translated into strategic direction by the strategic level staff at NDHQ and passed to a Canadian commander or senior officer who will be responsible to craft a campaign plan and eventually *lead* a force to end-state – an operational level function.

The DSP is even more explicit regarding our potential leadership role at the operational level. Building on the leadership theme proposed in the IPS, the DPS provides clear direction to the CF:

³⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, ISBN 0-662-68608-X *Canada’s International Defence Policy Statement - A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Overview* (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2005), Foreword from the Prime Minister.

³⁵ Ibid.

With respect to national assets, the Canadian Forces will be able to:

- Sustain for up to six months the command element of the Standing Contingency Task Force, either land or sea-based, *capable of multinational lead-nation status* in peace support operations³⁶

By including the command element within the aforementioned task, the DSP is directing that a significant number of officers and non-commissioned members (NCM) will be required to understand and, in certain cases, assume leadership roles within a deployed, possibly multi-national, joint operational level HQ. Some of these officers will be senior in rank and experience and can be expected to navigate the nuances of current Leadership doctrine. However, others will be more junior and they would certainly be assisted by doctrine that is clear and explicit to this level of war.

CF Transformation resulting from the DPS generates a similar argument from a domestic perspective. CF Transformation has created a number of operational level HQs that will be commanded and staffed by Canadian officers who should apply leadership commensurate with this intermediary level HQ.

Through the IPS, Canada's PM has promulgated foreign policy that seeks to concentrate our elements of national power when addressing international issues requiring intervention. In these cases, his intent is that, if necessary, we lead or even act unilaterally. This strategic vision has been interpreted through the DPS into clear operational level tasks for the CF. To fulfill the requirement, the CF is transforming and

³⁶ Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Defence Policy Statement - A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence...*,29.

generating operational level HQs both for expeditionary and domestic service. Many officers and NCM filling billets within these HQ will not have the benefit of education or experience to help them understand this new environment and their commander's leadership role or their role within it. Moreover, referring to CF Leadership doctrine as it pertains to the operational level will provide little insight. Hence, this situation provides another argument to fill the doctrinal vacuum.

Comparing CF and U.S. Army Leadership doctrine (FM 22-100)

CF leadership doctrine was published in 2005 whereas, the most recent version of FM 22-100 is already six years old. When seeking references to assist in developing our own doctrine it is evident that recent U.S. Army leadership doctrine related to the three levels of war was available. Nonetheless, in many ways both documents are quite similar. Both documents are intended as a reference for all members of their respective organizations, both view doctrine as a guide to support leadership training and self-improvement and both have similar structure and themes. They initially explore the definition of leadership followed by an overview of their respective models or approaches and conclude with descriptions of, or adaptations of, these models or approaches to specific levels of leadership. The most significant difference between both documents relates to levels of leadership; CF doctrine espouses two levels of leadership (direct and institutional as discussed earlier in this paper), whereas the U.S. Army doctrine speaks to three levels: direct, organizational and strategic (see Figure 2).



Figure 2 – U.S. Army Leadership Levels

Source: Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, FM 22-100 *Army Leadership*, art. 1-36.

FM 22-100 identifies organizational leaders as those who “...lead large organizations, usually brigade-sized and larger.”³⁷ Germane to the operational level, the description of organizational leadership states that, “..., leaders in units and organizations translate strategy into policy and practice.”³⁸ The latter statement is quite similar to the Canadian definition of the operational level. The two CF leadership levels in our doctrine are distinguished by assigned focus: accomplishing the mission (direct) and creating the conditions for mission success (institutional). Both models use a set of fixed criteria to describe their respective levels of leadership; CF doctrine lists five dimensions of military and professional effectiveness and U.S. doctrine employs four skills and three actions. Herein lies the second important distinction between both doctrines. CF dimensions of military and professional effectiveness are generic in nature and tend to

³⁷ Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, FM 22-100 *Army Leadership* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1999), ix.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 6-1.

use leadership theory terminology, whereas FM 22-100 adapts leadership theory terminology to the military reader and complements the theory with hypothetical and historical examples making it much easier to comprehend.

This brief comparison has revealed that U.S. Army doctrine writers have described and embedded in FM 22-100 their interpretation of leadership at the organizational (operational) level of war. Using a structure similar to CF doctrine, FM 22-100 was found to be useful both in defining the leadership levels and providing descriptions and examples adapted to the targeted military audience.

Conclusion

In seeking to explain why the operational level of leadership must be clearly distinguished within keystone Canadian leadership doctrine, this paper has not advocated the creation of rigid guidelines or stovepipes to explain the operational level of leadership. Nor has this paper sought to define operational level leadership. Rather, the impetus of this paper has been to present arguments that recently published leadership doctrine must be amended or complemented.

If doctrine is produced to enunciate *fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives*, then our leadership doctrine must be modified to include a thorough description of leadership at the operational level. This paper has argued that CF leadership doctrine is based on the skills approach. It has identified incongruence between the fundamental principles of the doctrine and the skills approach regarding levels of leadership. Analysis then highlighted a number of references to operational level leadership within national and foreign operations doctrine. Foreign policy analysis demonstrated the Government's desire to lead and the consequent requirement for the CF to establish and maintain a capability to lead or command at the operational level, either in coalition or unilaterally, if necessary. Finally, the paper compared Canadian leadership doctrine with U.S. Army leadership doctrine. Of note was the U.S. recognition of an organizational level of leadership, akin to the operational level, and the use of vocabulary and style germane to the military audience; a very useful tool to guide U.S. Army forces prosecuting actions at the operational level.

These arguments, along with recent CF operational experience, should rekindle CF research efforts to develop a Canadian approach to leadership at the operational level. Resulting findings should eventually lead to the embedding of *fundamental principles* of leadership at the operational level of command within our keystone leadership doctrine to *educate, guide and support* CF members employed as commanders or staffs in HQs at this level.

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