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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

AMSC 8 - CSEM 8

A Reserve for the 21st Century

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La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

ABSTRACT

The Canadian Forces is comprised of the Regular and Reserve Forces, both have function and defined places in the plans that the government has for response to crisis or emergencies. The force structure that came out of World War II was that of a smaller standing force (full time) with a much larger reserve force (part time) that would be mobilized in the event of emergency. During the Cold War Canada revised its plans, based on the threat, to one that would have a larger standing force with a smaller reserve force, yet there is still the premise that the reserve force is trained and available to be mobilized to respond to crisis or disaster. There have been modifications, in terms of how the reserve are employed, to meet the needs of the CF. Yet over the years the primary definitions of what these two components of the CF are and how they are to be employed have never changed. It is time that doctrine and policy be reviewed to ensure that the reserve is able to support what is required of it when needed.

A RESERVE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

INTRODUCTION

War, the character of war and the way in which we conduct war, has evolved and changed over the decades. It has changed because of a number of factors or catalysts, including technology and terrorism. Reserve forces have traditionally been earmarked and trained to serve as a mobilization base, and to provide an ability to ‘surge’ in times of emergency. At the same time, many of today’s reservists are employed full-time within the military to support day-to-day operations and international deployments. To meet these challenges, the CF has revised its use of reserve forces over the years, yet the basic underlying tenets of why a reserve force exists has not changed. These tenets need to be reviewed to ensure that employment of, and the *raison d’être* for, a reserve force, are in sync with each other and that the forces are available when needed. Such a review will then enable the CF to effectively hire, train and employ reservists and ensure that they are available when needed and as planned for, to meet the needs of the 21st century.

To begin this paper will review doctrine to establish why a reserve force exists. Based on this a number of themes will be examined to define what is a reservist, and more importantly, what it is not, and how it is being utilized today to illustrate that there are a number of contradictions with these.

BACKGROUND

A White Paper is the statement of government policy on specific topic; “the term white paper is now more commonly applied to official documents presented by Ministers of the Crown which state and explain the government's policy on a certain issue.”¹ For the purposes of setting the evolution of the use of reserve forces in the CF, this essay will deal with those sections of White Papers (and their policies) that have focused on Reserve employment and utilization.

Immediately after the Second World War, the purpose of Canadian reserve or militia forces was to provide a pool of trained personnel that could be called upon to form a base for mobilization of personnel in times of emergencies.² This plan called for larger reserve force when compared to regular or standing forces. However, the White Paper on Defence in 1964 set the force structure priorities for Canada as follows:

1. “Forces for the direct protection of Canada which can be deployed as required.
2. Forces-in-being as part of the deterrent in the European theatre.
3. Maritime forces-in-being as a contribution to the deterrent.
4. Forces-in-being for UN peacekeeping operations which would be included also in (1) above.
5. Reserve forces and mobilization potential.”³

¹ Parliament of Canada, *White Papers, An Introduction* 2005-04-19. Available from <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/related/Federal/papers/index.asp?Language=E&hea=0>; Internet, accessed 15 October 2005

² Government of Canada, *White Paper on Defence*, March 1964, Queen’s Printer Ottawa, 1964

³ *Ibid*, 7

This was a change from the post World War II ideology where “the basic concept underlying the post-war re-organization was traditional: a mobilization base and a mobilization period.”⁴ The main threat during the Cold War was seen as nuclear war. There would be no time to mobilize large numbers of personnel; the focus therefore would be on “forces-in-being”⁵ vice a mobilization base. The primary role of the reserve forces would be to support the regular forces in times of emergency and this would be accomplished by ‘calling’ the reserve forces to active duty to replace regular force members; this would then free the latter for operational roles.⁶

The 1971 White Paper elaborated on its predecessor by setting the priorities for national defence as the protection of Canada; the defence of North America; the support of NATO; and a commitment to international peacekeeping. Parity of nuclear weapons now adeo ird{6(baers2

addition to these two roles, the Naval Reserve would provide control-of-shipping, the Militia would provide augmentation for civil emergencies and the Air Reserve would provide light and tactical transport.⁹

Challenge and Commitment was the title of the next White Paper (1987) and it was quite different from its predecessors. It stated that past personnel and budget reductions had resulted in a serious “commitment-capability gap.”¹⁰ This was a gap between what Canadian military forces were capable of achieving and what the government had committed them to. It documented years of budget cuts that had resulted in “rust out”¹¹ and the degradation of the military to do its job. The White Paper thus insisted on increased spending on defence to address these problems, to include significant expenditures on new equipment. For the Reserve Forces the idea of Total Force was championed:

“It is now clear that it is both impractical and undesirable to try to meet all of our personnel requirements through the Regular Force. The costs attached to an all-volunteer, full-time military force have become too high.”¹²

The Reserve would thus maintain its role of augmentation but they were also to undertake additional specific tasks. As in the 1971 White Paper, the Naval Reserve would remain responsible for control of shipping, but now they would also undertake maritime coastal defence, to include mine counter-measures. The Militia would contribute to defence within North America and train replacements for overseas operations, to include logistical and medical support. The Air reserve would become more closely aligned

⁹ Ibid, 46

¹⁰ Government of Canada, *Challenge and Commitment, A Defence Policy for Canada* 1987, Supply and Services, Ottawa, 1987, 43

¹¹ Ibid, 45

¹² Ibid, 65

with the regular force through the integration of units. The modernization of the reserve forces was to be accelerated and its strength was to be increased “to about 90,000.”¹³ Of course, no one predicted the end of the Cold War and that this document would be overtaken by world events soon after it was published. Hence, the proposed equipment expenditures and the force structure changes did not take place.

The follow-on 1994 Defence White Paper assessed a change in threat in response to the new world situation, it started by proclaiming that “The Cold War is over”¹⁴ yet it also stated that “the persistence of conflict within and between states”¹⁵ would continue to threaten international peace and security. The challenge was to redefine the Canadian military to fit within a steadily decreasing defence budget. To address this the paper defined a new mobilization framework that consisted of four stages:

1. The first stage, “force generation”, would be required to respond to emergencies. No change in the existing force would be needed to respond at this stage and reservists would only be needed for augmentation.
2. The second stage, “force enhancement”, would see additional funding being allocated to improve existing capabilities. Again no change in the existing force is required and no defined commitment for the reserve forces beyond augmentation.
3. Stage Three would be “force expansion” and this stage would now require increased numbers of personnel and involve changes to the force structure, and was equated to Canada’s response to the Korea in the early 1950’s.

¹³ Ibid, 66

¹⁴ Government of Canada, *1994 Defence White Paper*, Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1994, 3

¹⁵ Ibid, 45

4. Stage Four equates to the “full mobilization” of the nation in response to a major war.¹⁶

The idea of total force defined a regular force that would provide troops “with a ready response capability”¹⁷ and provide an augmentation and sustainment-centered reserve force. The paper thus called for a reduction in the CF; a regular force of “approximately 60,000 and a Primary Reserve to approximately 23,000”¹⁸ personnel (this included all primary reserve elements). In order to meet these new challenges with less resources this White Paper stated that a “thorough examination of all elements of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves will be conducted with the aim of enhancing their ability to respond to new requirements and the new mobilization approach.”¹⁹

In 2005 the Canadian government issued its first integrated policy document, Canada’s International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. It consisted of four parts, an Overview and four policy documents – diplomacy, defence, development and commerce. The defence portion, the Defence Policy Statement (DSP), stated that it is “firmly grounded in the realities of the post-Cold War, post-September 11th world”²⁰ and it went on to list three roles for the Canadian military, “protecting Canadians; defending North America in cooperation with the United States; and contributing to international peace and security.”²¹ To accomplish their mission the CF

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid, 44

¹⁸ Ibid, 45

¹⁹ Ibid, 45

²⁰ Department of National Defence, *Canada’s International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence*, ADM PA, 2005, Message from the Minister

²¹ Ibid, 2

will expand by 5,000 regular and 3,000²² reserve personnel, acquire new technologies and equipment, and will be provided with new resources.²³ This appears to be a combination of previous White Papers, it calls for increased expenditures and new equipment (as did the 1987 White Paper) and like the 1971 White Paper sets the number one priority for the military as the defence of Canada (sovereignty). The DSP does not address either the concept of total force or the mobilization framework, where it addresses future tasks for the different environments by name, it includes that these tasks are Regular and Reserve, i.e. “The *Land Forces* (Regular and Reserve) will.”²⁴ So, although not stated by using the terminology of Total Force, it is clear that the concept is still a valid one.

This section has tried to summarize where the reserve is today, in terms of size, force structure and tasking through a review of the White Papers and the current DSP. The policy changes over the years have been somewhat akin to a roller coaster ride, with direction to increase in size (1987 White Paper directed the reserve to increase substantially) followed by another paper giving direction to decrease in size (1994 White Paper stated that the personnel cuts would continue). Total force was embraced as a means to try and maximize forces in a world of shrinking numbers, both in terms of personnel and defence dollars, and continues today to define the concept of how the CF is structured to meet the defence needs of Canada.

²² The extra 3,000 personnel that are slated for the land reserve states that this will increase “the authorized end-state to 18,500 personnel.” This is somewhat confusing, in that, the Government of Canada Policy Statement Land Force Reserve Restructure stated, in October 2000, that the army reserve was “increasing the number of part-time army reservists to at least 18,500 by the end of fiscal year 2005/06.

²³ Ibid, 4

²⁴ Ibid, 20

TOTAL FORCE and TRAINING

Although the Total Force concept was not a new one, it gained greater acceptance and attention after the 1994 Defence White Paper. Its supporters touted the concept's ability to integrate full and part-time military personnel together in order to provide multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces. Additionally, the concept also provides a workable framework to train and equip reserves.²⁵

Transforming this framework in reality, however, has been a work in progress. In the early 1990's, with the downsizing of the forces the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS) St-Jean, Quebec had excess capacity to train new recruits. The Air and Naval reserves took advantage of this and by augmenting CFLRS staff through the summer timeframe (which traditionally is the higher training time for reservists) they began training their new recruits at the same institution as the regular force. When the regular force began increasing its intake of recruits in the mid-1990s, the reserve found itself unable to get their recruits trained quickly enough and in sufficient numbers as they now found themselves in direct competition for training slots. As a result both the Air and the Naval Reserve set up recruit schools that taught the same curriculum as CFLRS St-Jean. A few years later, accepting the inefficiencies of running parallel programs, the two reserve schools amalgamated their efforts. This school, due to the seasonal training requirement of the reserve forces, has excess capacity and as the regular force continued its growth, beyond what CFLRS could accommodate, it turned to the reserve school. By

²⁵ Government of Canada, *1994 Defence White Paper*, Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1994, 44

increasing the instructing staff in this school the regular force now train a number of their recruits here. This is an excellent example of how the Total Force (regular and reserve) has been able to address the needs of the entire force. However, if the Total Force is to be more than just a concept, there should not be conflicting priority based upon the full or part-time status of the member. A truly Total Force needs to plan for, and manage, its training needs to satisfy all of its members as equal members of the force.

The difficulty experienced in getting recruits through basic training only multiplies when factored into the next area of training - a member's occupational training. The CF has a finite number of institutions in which they train their personnel for the skills they will need to become operationally effective. There are, however, many skill sets that are common between the civilian and military worlds. The CF needs to be better able to identify and make use of individuals with these types of training, this is not an easy task as current prior learning assessment tools tend to be individually oriented and not suited to large institutional needs. Perhaps the identification of schools that have equivalent curricula could assist in this area, and it might also aid in the CF's recruiting from such institutions if the system were able to later grant advance trade training for their graduates. The use of Community Colleges is not a new one for the CF, some programs have been very successful and other areas have proven challenging. One success is that of Dental Technician, the CF hires only skilled applicants that have "Dental Assistant Level II certification,"²⁶ the dental education and training are delivered by recognized Community Colleges and the CF delivers military specific training. This works because

²⁶ Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Recruiting Website, 15 October 2005. Available from http://www.recruiting.forces.ca/engraph/career/tradeinfo_e.aspx?id=738#requ; Internet; accessed 15 October 2005

the requirements for the CF were matched directly to those of the civilian occupation. Unfortunately there are many areas that although there is a direct correlation between the civilian skill and the military one, there are no easy match between the two specifications. The recruiting centers list related civilian occupations to military career fields, a comprehensive review of specific civilian educational areas could identify occupations, like Dental Technician, where the CF could save training time by granting an equivalency to skilled or semi-skilled applicants. There will always be a requirement for military specific training, however, where there is a direct correlation in skills the CF could make use of these graduates and save on training time and resources.

EMPLOYMENT

The Canadian Forces is defined in the National Defence Act (NDA) as consisting of regular and reserve forces; the regular force is defined as “a component of the Canadian Forces, called the regular force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for continuing, full-time military service”²⁷ and the reserve is defined as “a component of the Canadian Forces, called the reserve force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service.”²⁸ These definitions worked under the construct that the reserve forces were mainly for augmentation of the regular forces and to provide a base for massive mobilization during an emergency. Even under the four stage mobilization framework stated in the 1994 Defence White Paper, these definitions still work, as the reserve was seen as only augmenting in Stages 1 and 2, and not being


²⁷ Government of Canada, National Defence Act, Subsection 15(1)

²⁸ Ibid, Subsection 15(3)

needed in large numbers until stages 3 and 4.²⁹ The CF Joint Doctrine for Mobilization, dated 2002-07-11, states “With the end of the Cold War and the shift to capability-based operations planning, DND and the CF need a more flexible approach to mobilization planning. Furthermore, cuts in the Regular Force mean that if CF operational capability is to have the necessary breadth and depth the Reserve Force must be fully incorporated in all stages of mobilization.” The chart below gives a graphic picture of the increased pace of operational commitments on the downsized CF:

Rethinking the Total Force

PARTICIPATION BY CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS: 1990-1999³⁰



²⁹ Government of Canada, *1994 Defence White Paper*, Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1994, 44

³⁰ Department of National Defence, VCDS website, 2003-04-24. Available from (http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcds-exec/pubs/rethink/annxc_e.asp); Internet; accessed 10 October 2005

Very clearly the chart illustrates that after the end of the Cold War the CF experienced significant personnel cuts while also experiencing significantly increased operational commitments. The way of addressing this growing demand for deployment by an increasingly shrinking full-time force was to become more reliant upon the reserve force to fill in the gaps, both at home and on deployed operations. This resulted in greater opportunities for reservists to be employed, on a full-time basis, to support the needs of the CF. On the surface it would seem that this is what the reserve force was structured for, this will be true if there is an end point where the reservist will not be needed on a full time basis. However, if a reservist has a full-time career that is primarily full-time, they do not fit the definition of a reservist under the NDA.

There also appears to be a disconnect between the CF Joint Doctrine for Mobilization and the 1994 Defence White Paper, in terms of where the reserve forces fit in the stages of mobilization and also with the employment model of the reserve force when compared to the definitions within the NDA. The following statistics are from the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Office and documents the number of reservists on part and full-time service in the CF. The following is a summary of reserve pay activity averaged over three months (June, August and September 2005):

TOTAL RESERVE RECORDS (Primary Reserve only)

Class A (part-time)	Total members with earnings	13,291
Class B (full-time)	Total members with earnings	8,994
Class C (full-time)	Total members with earnings	428

This represents a large percentage of personnel being paid for full time service when compared to part-time service. The chart below is taken from a presentation to the Joint Reserve Command and Staff course in July of 2005 and is used with permission the Chief of Reserves and Cadets office.³¹

Operation Name	Location	CF Pers	Res Pers	%
OP ATHENA	Kabul, Afghanistan	949	105	11%
OP DANACA	Middle East	191	36	19%
Op BOREAS	Bosnia Herzegovina	73	45	62%
OP CALUMET	El Gorah, Egypt	28	1	4%
OP ARCHER	Kabul, Afghanistan	20	2	10%
Op BRONZE	Bosnia Herzegovina	10	8	80%
OP CROCODILE	Democratic Republic of Congo	8	6	75%
OP JADE	Middle East	8		
OP SCULPTURE	Sierra Leone	8	3	38%
OP FOUNDATION	Tampa, FL USA	7		
OP SAFARI	Sudan	6	1	17%
OP REPTILE	Sierra Leone	3		
OP AUGURAL	Sudan/Ethiopia	2		
OP HAMLET	Port au Prince, Haiti	2	1	50%
OP ACCIUS	Afghanistan	1		
OP IOLAUS	Iraq	1		
OP SNOWGOOSE	Cyprus	1		
	Total	1318	208	16%

³¹ Chief of Reserves and Cadets Powerpoint presentation to the Joint Reserve Command and Staff Course, 09 July 2005

In addition to this the following numbers document the commitment that reservists have made to international operations between 2000-2004:³²

Year	#Reservists deployed Overseas
2000	558
2001	675
2002	768
2003	661
2004	653

The case could be made that the reserve force is contributing, full-time, to daily operation of the CF and to CF deployed operations. The contradiction between the practice and policy appears evident. As defined in the NDA the Reserve is that component of the CF that is “enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service;”³³ yet currently a large portion of the Reserve force are being paid for full-time service. It appears that this ratio will increase with future commitments as the militia has received a warning order to identify 204 personnel to deploy to Afghanistan in the summer of 2006.³⁴ This is being staffed now in order to identify and ensure that those who go will be properly trained and ready next year. In addition there are plans for ‘high readiness’ reserve organizations; the readiness aspect will be managed by having the reservists in these companies on three-year contracts, while providing a ‘high readiness’ response.³⁵ In addition to this the Defence Plan and Canada’s International Policy Statement both document the Reserve as being required to fulfill up

³² Ibid

³³ Government of Canada, National Defence Act, Subsection 15(3)

³⁴ National Defence, LFCAHq Warning Order 3350-1 (G3 Ops) dated August 2005

³⁵ Telecon DLRM 3 dated 10 October 2005

to twenty percent of international deployed commitments. The question then is whether these personnel are truly reservists under the current definition of the NDA if they are required (due to insufficient regular force personnel) to meet the commitments the government has set for the CF. If we currently have (and are projecting as required) significant numbers of Reservists on full time service, then where is the ability to ‘surge’ in times of crisis or emergency?

DIFFERENT WAYS OF DOING BUSINESS

In a paper written recently by Dr. J. Paul de B. Taillon, he writes that the Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) was assigned a “task of doubling its operational capability.”³⁶ This is a daunting task for many reasons that he documents in his paper. He goes on to make a case for the creation of a CANSOF Reserve that would provide other options for employment of personnel with specifically needed skill sets that are not resident inside the CF, i.e. language specialists. His proposals are valid but would require some new flexibility in how the CF recruits, trains and utilizes reservists. The CF personnel system is organized to process personnel in a very methodical and systemic way. However, innovative programs will require innovative methods to be successful and the difficulty with these is that they tend to be targeted at a small group that does not benefit from the larger systemic approach. In cases like this it would be more effective to allow those units or organizations that are going to require these individuals some flexibility in identifying them and then provide them an ability to ‘speed up’ the process

³⁶ Dr. J. Paul de B. Taillon, *The Evolving Requirements of the Canadian Special Operations Forces: A Future Concept Paper*, pg. 3

of recruiting and enrolling them, while still ensuring that all of the security and verification checks are completed. The creation of a CANSOF reserve, besides adding capabilities (i.e. language skills) would allow some options to members of the CANSOF who are looking at retirement. This would give the CANSOF organization a method of retaining valuable skills and experience for use as required on a part-time basis.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

The reserve and regular force have been a good source of personnel for each other. Many Reservists who enjoy what they experience choose to enroll in the regular force. The corollary of this is also true as many regular force members who will retire, but wish to remain in the CF, can choose to become members of the reserve force. Currently this is referred to as a component transfer; logic would suggest that if a member of the reserve force is a member in good standing, with a current security clearance, medical category and recognized trade qualifications, that the process should be a relatively easy one. However, the system is so mired in bureaucracy that the opposite is usually the case. For example:

“A staff check of completed component transfer records for fiscal year 2004-2005 produced the following information.

- ◁ 6 % of transfers from the Reserves to the Regular Force were completed in less than 120 days;
- ◁ 60 % of transfers from the Reserves to the Regular Force were completed between 121 days and 1 year; and,
- ◁ 34 % of transfers from the Reserves to the Regular Force took more than one year.”³⁷

³⁷ Government of Canada, *Wounded: Canada's Military and the Legacy of Neglect*, September 2005. Available from http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/repintsep05-e.htm#_Toc115156296; Internet; accessed 15 October 2005

It is difficult as well to transfer from the regular force to the reserve force. Although called a 'transfer' it is in reality a re-enrollment due to the fact that the member must be released from the CF to gain pension and retirement benefits. It can be easier if the member transfers directly upon release from the regular force. In this case the member's releasing unit can deal directly with the gaining reserve unit. However, even this is no guarantee of a smooth process.³⁸ Policies that hamper the seamless transfer between Regular and Reserve forces need to be revised and common sense needs to be applied to ensure that skilled personnel are managed in a more logical efficient and timely manner.

In 1999 The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) recommended a pension plan for reservists be created.³⁹ This was approved and enacted and is currently forecasted to be implemented in January 2006. The part-time members of the CF will get a pension and the full-time reservists will become members in the same pension program as their regular force counterparts. This could provide a useful tool to the CF in terms of retaining or attracting back members

³⁸ As the flight commander of an Air Reserve flight I was involved in the transfer of many personnel. One example was that of a member who requested a transfer from the Supplementary Reserve List to the Primary Reserve. The member had been a pilot in the Regular force and had been retired less than two years. The member had a medical restriction while in the Regular force; the restriction stated that there were no career implications. However once released from the regular force it was as if the medical board that had reviewed his file had never taken place. We were informed that had the member remained in the Regular force there would be no issue; however, as he was now trying to join the reserve force, the medical file would have to go through the entire medical review process and there was little likelihood that we would get the very same waiver that the member had while in the Regular force. Another case was of a member who had taken her release and applied to join the Reserve force less than 1 year after leaving the regular force, with the same rank and trade in which she had served as a regular force member. She had to be processed through the Recruiting Center and was required to re-write the selection tests to join the CF. She did not attain the required marks for the trade in which she had just been released (she had been a Sergeant Supply Tech) and was told that she could not join the Reserve as the tests indicated that she would be unsuccessful in completing her basic trade qualification training.

³⁹ Department of National Defence, *SCONDVA Interim Report, December 1, 1999*, 2004-10-12; Available from http://www.forces.ca/hr/scondva/engraph/10chap2_e.asp?cat=1&Chapter=2#2.4; Internet; accessed 10 October 2005

who leave the CF prior to having served enough time to gain a pension. Hopefully, the impending enactment of a pension plan for reservists will make the ability to transfer between the two components more permeable and more attractive. It is recommended that members will be vested in the pension program after two years of service, members who wish to change between full and part-time service would now have an added incentive to do so. Once vested in a pension plan there would be added incentive to return to service and to increase pensionable service. Policy and definitions of full and part-time will have to be revised to support this permeability and target them to the benefit of both the CF and the member. This appears to be moving towards a force that will be able to define their members as either part- or full-time employees, this is in my opinion, the right direction in which to move. This would then clarify what a reservist is, under the NDA, the answer is that those personnel on part-time service are, by definition, reservists. The definition of regular force (or in this new case full-time) personnel would be those persons who are vested in the full-time pension and the ability to move from full-time to part-time could become a huge retention tool. The issue is far more complex than simple definitions based upon status in a pension program. The personnel management process, terms of service, rank and occupational qualifications are all currently totally separate functions, not just between regular and reserve, but between each reserve environment as well. These processes will have to be reviewed and revised to support a force that defines itself as either full-time or part-time.

Reservists have a duality to their existence. As mentioned many have both civilian and military careers and skill sets and in this regard it they are seen as a 'natural' choice for

employment in certain roles (i.e. CIMIC). There are many other areas where civilian experience and qualifications could have a direct transferability into the military world. However, these skills and qualifications are not documented, or when documented are virtually ‘unknown’ or invisible to the CF Personnel system. The CF needs a database that captures in one area a reservist’s civilian skills and experiences, one example being language skills. There have been a number of recent occasions where messages have been sent out requesting that anyone who has a proficiency in specific languages identify themselves to the Department. The CF utilizes the Human Resource Management System (HRMS) Peoplesoft, but this program was not designed with the reserve in mind and it is limited in what information is available. The reserve environments each maintained their own personnel databases, but were been mandated to use CF software and the individual databases were shut down and their data transferred to HRMS. This was not an easy issue as there was no compatibility between the differing programs and everything had to be manually reentered into HRMS for each member of the reserve force. The Director of Reserves recommended in the mid 1990’s that a module be added to HRMS that would allow information particular to a reservist to be entered and searched.⁴⁰ The ability to track civilian career status is of value to a number of organizations within the DND, for example, it has definite use within the Medical reserve world where the tracking of civilian qualifications that are directly related to the medical reserve is of value. In fact the medical branch has set up their own separate database to document and track such qualifications. HRMS does not meet their need so they have created their own database to address this issue. Having a searchable database that is more user friendly and contains this and other information would give the CF a quick

⁴⁰ Telecon, past Director of Reserves 14 October 2005

method of searching for specific skills or qualifications that are outside of a member's military profile.

CONCLUSION

Following the two world wars the rationale for maintaining a Reserve force was that of having a large cadre of trained personnel that could be called upon, in the event of an emergency to augment existing standing forces or forces-in-being. This has been the basis of the existence of a Reserve force. Although there has been some modification over the years to meet the needs of the CF, the basic underlying definitions of what the force structure is, has not changed. What force structure is needed, in terms of regular and reserve personnel numbers, to meet the needs of the CF? This must be defined in order to ensure that if a disaster occurs that there is the right mix of personnel trained, ready to be called upon, and available to meet the challenge. Total Force accounts for the reserve forces in the force structure of the CF but it has also aided in blurring the line between what is a reservist and what is a regular force member. The regular forces were downsized at the same timeframe that their deployment and international commitments were increasing. This resulted in the need to employ more and more numbers of reserve personnel on full-time service, for this and other reasons many reservists have full time careers within the CF. This would seem to contradict the very definition of what a reserve force member is under the NDA.

The CF has an opportunity, with new programs coming into force (in particular the proposed new pension plan) to ensure that the definitions and the planning criteria are in support of one another. This is not an easy task and would require significant review during a time of transformation of the CF to its new force structure. However, with all the changes ongoing with transformation, this would seem to be the right time to ensure that the doctrine and policies are in place to move the CF into the future and leave the Cold War behind. This will then support the force structure that is needed to meet Canada's needs today and those of unpredictable future emergencies. A Total Force will plan and conduct business as a Total Force; we are not there yet.

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