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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES  
AMSC 8 / CSEM 8

## **JOINT PROCESSES IN THE CONDUCT OF A CAMPAIGN**

By/par

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*“A prince or a general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and resources doing neither too much nor too little.*

*But the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms of action as in the ultimate success of the whole. What we should admire is the accurate fulfillment of the unspoken assumptions, the smooth harmony of the whole activity, which only becomes evident in final success”*

**Carl von Clausewitz  
On War, 1832**

*“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week”*

**George S. Patton, Jr.: War As I Knew It, (1947)**

## INTRODUCTION

The campaign plan provides the connection between strategic military objectives, operational theater, and tactical actions to achieve the national objectives. The outline of the concepts in the campaign planning links together different military operations through the entire battlespace to obtain strategic military objectives. The joint campaign planning process produces a series of different operational level contingency plans. Each plan of these is designed for a specific contingency in the battlespace. Campaign planning must be clear in its objectives and easy to implement. It is designed to bridge the gap between national objectives and strategic military objectives.

Over one hundred years ago Clausewitz indirectly highlights the campaign planning when he stated *“The political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it”* he realized there should be a link between the national objectives and the military operations. The planners of the current joint planning process recognize the requirement to ensure this link in the form of campaign planning.

“The campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of the combatant commander's theater of operations and defines the framework in which an operation plan fits”.<sup>1</sup> The planners of the joint planning process realize that the campaign planning provides an analytical

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/TJJ.htm>

framework for applying forces and resources in time and space within the operation theatre of war in order to achieve national objectives. The campaign plan is designed to provide the connection between national objectives, military strategy, and operational plans. The best description of the campaign planning occurred during World War II when U.S. campaign planning reached its peak. At the beginning of the World War II, the U.S. military had a proper strategic planning process, but little interest had been given to the development of joint campaign plans.

The current planning process is an excellent way to produce detailed operational-level plans. The guidance provided in the national strategic level is translated into military strategy. Then, the campaign planning connects the national objectives and the operational-level strategy. To have a proper campaign planning, all elements must do a joint planning in order to achieve the national objectives.

This essay paper will argue about some of the joint processes in the conduct of a campaign (Joint Planning, joint Targeting, Joint intelligence, Joint Information operations), the Joint Force Commander (JFCs) at the operational level must understand how to conduct the joint campaign processes. The campaign planning has a technique used by different JFCs to integrate and synchronize all efforts and to sequence several related operations in the battlespace. A campaign plan's a "series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space".<sup>2</sup> So the campaign planning processes had a lot of changes after DESERT STORM OPERATION. General Norman Schwarzkopf used a campaign plan to direct, integrate and synchronize his forces during operation DESERT STORM. A campaign plan must focus on the enemy center of gravities (COGs), while the same time it protect the own center of gravity.

"Campaign plan is the extension of a commander's operational combat. The commanders translate the operations concepts into joint plans for military action by how operations, logistics, and time will be used to reach the operational objectives. Through theater campaign plans, combatant commanders define objectives, describe concepts of operations, sequence operations, organize forces, establish command relationships, assign tasks, and synchronize air, land, sea, and space operations and their sustainment.

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<sup>2</sup> JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Campaign planning is a primary means by which combatant commanders arrange for strategic unity of effort and through which they guide the planning of joint operations within their theater of operations. A campaign plan communicates the commander's intent, requirements, objectives, and concept to subordinate components and joint forces, as well as to parent Services so that they may make necessary preparations".<sup>3</sup>

## JOINT CAMPAIGN PLAN

*"Nothing succeeds in war excepts in consequence of a well prepared plan"*  
**Napoleon Bonaparte**


The campaign planning is a guide for the JFC how to achieve the strategic military objectives, its converts the strategic military guidance into specific military objectives at the joint command level. The joint campaign planning arranges the tasks of all services and forces in the joint campaign, the planning will direct the use of all resources to the military objectives and phases of the joint campaign. The planning begins when the commander receives the mission of the campaign by analyzing the mission and to determine the specified and implied tasks and continues through operation action planning. To success in the joint campaign, the JFC should make use of operational art and recognizes the characteristics of all available resources. The art of operation is very important at the operational level when the JFC translates the strategic guidance into an operational plan which is designed to active defined objectives.

"War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war or rather, no one ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it".<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> U.S. Army War college, Campaign Planning Primary 04

<sup>4</sup> Carl von Clausewitz On War, 1832



**Figure 1 Campaign Plan Purpose<sup>5</sup>**

### **Campaign plan framework**

“Operational-level Army planners use major operations as tools to synchronize ends, ways, and mean to support the joint operations of a subordinate joint campaign. These major operations sequence tactical battles or activities to attain theater strategic and supporting operational-level objectives and guidance from the unified theater campaign. Theater strategic planners use unified operations to synchronize the ends, ways, and means of the theater combatant commander's theater strategic purposes”.<sup>6</sup>

Campaign planning takes a comprehensive view of the combatant commander's theater and defines the framework in which an Operational Plan (OPLAN) fits.<sup>7</sup> Through JFC campaign plans, strategic and operational planners synchronize national and military theater ends, ways, and means to achieve national objectives. The JFC should understand the national and military strategic guidance to determine the required end state and military objectives, identifying the critical factors (enemy strengths, strategic COGs and weaknesses), and develop an operational concept or scheme will achieve the military strategic objectives.

<sup>5</sup> Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, 5-00.1, 25 January 2002, Page I-2

<sup>6</sup> US FM 100-7 Chapter 4

<sup>7</sup> Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, 5-00.1, 25 January 2002, Page I-5

## Military strategic guidance

JFC initiates his plans based on the specific military strategic guidance. In general the military strategic guidance will provides long and intermediate terms or other important objectives. It must define what make the victory or success by describing the way of using forces.

“The strategic guidance normally contains the following”:

- Strategic end state (definition of victory or success).
- Resources (forces, to include multinational, time, space).
- Restraints (prohibitions and restrictions, e.g., geographical, weapons, methods, rules of engagement (ROE)).
- Constraints (obligatory or must do, logistic, ROE).
- Strategic assumptions.<sup>8</sup>

## Identifying critical factors

*“The first task... in planning for war is to identify the enemy’s center of gravity, and if possible, trace them back to a single one”.*

*Carl von Clausewitz On War, 1832*

“There are some restrictions on the commander’s freedom of action. Limiting factors are generally categorized as constraints or restraints. Constraints are “must do” and restraints are “must not do”.

- Constraints: Constraints are tasks that the higher commander requires subordinates to perform (for example, defending a specific decisive point, maintaining an alliance, meeting a time suspense, or eliminating a specific enemy force etc.)
- Restraints: Restraints are things the higher commander prohibits subordinate commander(s) or force(s) from doing (for example, not conducting preemptive or cross-border operations before declared hostilities, not approaching the enemy coast closer than 30 nautical miles, not decisively committing forces etc.)”.<sup>9</sup>

From my point of view the most important task of the JFC in the campaign plans is to identify the center of gravity (COGs), i.e., power, sources, resistance, forces, and C2 of the enemy. To achieve the maximum effectiveness should focus on resources so the enemy will not have a long term of fighting. The success of the JFC is will depend on how he describes the enemy COGs and destroy or neutralize them. But in other hand it’s very important the JFC to protect the friendly COGs, sources and forces. The JFC and his planners must study, analyze, evaluate, and make decision how to conduct the operations in order to lead to the strategic

<sup>8</sup> Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, 5-00.1, 25 January 2002, Page II-1

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Army War college, Campaign Planning Primary 04



military guidance. Before attempting to identify the COGs, must understand the relationship between COGs and other critical factors. It's most important to understand the relationship among the critical factors and COGs to have a good decision. To overcome the factors in decision, the plans should be logical, realistic, and positively.

### **Concept of operations**

According to the strategic military concepts, the JFC describes how he wants to conduct the joint campaign using all available tools. Normally the campaign planning includes an overall operational scheme for the entire joint campaign. This scheme must be achieved by sequence of events and phases, including the anticipation of enemy reaction against friendly forces. Mainly the concept must focus on the enemy centers of gravity (COGs). And how to protect the friendly center of gravities (COGs).

“Considerations for the Concept include”:

- Applies the concepts of operational art.
- Describes the theater concept, objectives, and tasks and supporting operational direction, objectives, tasks, and concepts for subordinates to carry out their campaigns or major operations.
- Organizes joint, single-service, supporting, and special operations forces - in conjunction with multinational, interagency, non-governmental, or international organizations - into a cohesive force designed to plan and execute subordinate campaigns and operations.
- Retains strategic reserves.
  - Establishes command relationships.
- Integrates the nation's mobilization, deployment, and sustainment efforts into the combatant commanders' employment and logistics concepts.
- Concentrates forces and materiel resources strategically so that the right force is available at the designated times and places to conduct decisive operations.
- Seeks to gain the strategic advantage over the enemy that affords an opportunity to take the strategic initiative through offensive operations.
- Defeats or destroys the enemy's strategic centers of gravity to achieve the strategic end state.<sup>10</sup>

### **Joint Force Commander's Guidance**

The JFC after receiving the mission gives his staff the initial guidance to start the planning process. The initial guidance is very important for time effective development and analysis. The JFC guidance must focus on the main tasks and objectives that support the strategic objectives.

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. Army War College, Campaign Planning Primary 04

The guidance can be given in a written form or orally. The guidance must be clear in details to avoid unnecessary action by the staff or subordinate commanders. The content of guidance varies from commander to another and according to situations and time available. The focus of the staff must remain within the framework of the commander guidance. (There no limitations how many times the commander may issue his guidance). To achieve the mission successfully must defined, analyze and destroy or neutralize the centers of gravity targets (COGs).

## **JOINT TARGETING**

A main supporting element to the JFC campaign plan is the joint target process. Targeting is defined as: “the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.”<sup>11</sup> The joint target is to provide the commander the way how to connect objectives with desired effects in order to how to plan his battle space. This process is very flexible giving the commander the ability to affect full spectrum operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

The joint targeting process aims to minimize the possibility of conflicting or duplicative procedures in military operation, and to provide other commanders to understand the joint targeting process in order to achieve the required effects to accomplish the mission. Joint targeting is characterized by the integration and coordination of land, sea, air to help in the target detection and engagement phases. Target process occurs at all levels of commanding within joint operations and is performed at all levels of war by capable forces to attack targets and to destroy them. Targeting is a team work by operations, information operation and intelligence. It is very important to synchronize the attack of designated targets with other joint forces.

### **Joint Targeting Cycle**

Targeting cycle begins with the commander’s guidance. The purpose is to provide the joint commander with a target list which supports the joint campaign objectives. All level of commanding must understand the joint targeting cycle to in order to achieve the necessary effects to accomplish the joint commander’s objectives. The joint targeting cycle is organized

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<sup>11</sup> Commander’s Handbook for joint time-sensitive targeting

approach supporting operational plan to achieve the requirements as stated by the joint commander. Targets are divided into two general categories:

- **Planned targets:** are known targets exist in the battlespace and the plan for attack those targets have been scheduled in advance in the Air tasking Order (ATO) or in fire support plans.
- **Immediate targets:** Is which fire or attacks have not been scheduled. Normally those targets are detected too late and to be included in the normal targeting cycle. Immediate targets have two categories:
  - (a) **Unplanned immediate targets:** are the targets which are known to exist in the battlespace but not have been detected or located in a sufficient time.
  - (b) **Unanticipated immediate targets:** the targets that is unknown or unexpected to exist in the battlespace.

The joint targeting cycle has six phases:

\* **Phase 1: JFC Objectives, Guidance, and Intent.** The JFC objectives set the conditions for targeting in each phase of the targeting cycle. They derived from as high up as the politician at the national strategic level and through the chain of command. The objectives must be understandable and achievable in order to achieve the mission. The challenge is to have right weapon on the right target at the right time to achieve the required effect. Without clear objectives, targeting will fail in achieving the required effects. “Guidance may consist of Rules of engagement (ROE) that will govern how objectives are pursued”.<sup>12</sup>

\* **Phase 2: Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization.** Target development is will efficient evaluation of the potential target. It is a method by which the JFC decides which targets mostly likely will meet the objectives. The reason of target development is to generate a list of prioritized targets.

\* **Phase 3: Capabilities Analysis.** This phase is to analyze and estimate the selection of the appropriate weapons to create the desired effects on the targets in order to achieve the JFC objectives. Once the analysis is completed, the results can be merged with the component targets to create the target recommendations for the JFC.


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<sup>12</sup> Integration of special operations forces into the joint targeting process, 2003, page # 24

\* **Phase 4: Commander's Decision and Force Assignment.** This phase matches the targets with the objectives, guidance, and intent of the JFC, in order to select the right tools to complete the mission.

\* **Phase 5: Mission Planning and Force Execution.** This phase is the preparation of the task order, which gives the details to executors. The task order provides the required information to the assigned units, such as (attacking time, coordinates...).

\* **Phase 6: Combat Assessment.** After execution the mission it's very important to collect target results, it's helping the JFC to formulate battle plans. The results provide the JFC a fully picture of the battle space and targets. Combat assessment is performed at all levels and it has three functions: battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effect assessment (MEA), and reattack recommendations (RR).



**Figure 2 Joint Targeting Cycle Phase**

### **Center Of Gravity (COG)**

The center of gravity (COGs) of the enemy exists at all levels of war. Center of gravity (COGs) as what von Clausewitz called "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends...the point at which all our energies should be directed". The centre of gravity (COGs) is the majority of the operational level of war. So from my point of view in the commander

guidance it's very important to define and identify the (COGs) targets. In the targeting process must plan to identify targets, which have to be destroyed or neutralized in order to meet the specific objectives and to expedite campaign success. It is the most important task for the campaign planners to identify friendly and adversary centers of gravity. It should also identify the critical targets that directly or indirectly will lead to the neutralization of enemy (COGs) targets.

How do we identify a center of gravity (COG)? To select the right centre of gravity requires a lot of work. The JFC needs to know how the enemy operates and what are his strengths and weaknesses. To understand the enemy and to identify the (COGs) is the most difficult part.

"There are four steps in analyzing an enemy's centre of gravity":

1. Determine the enemy's critical capabilities, the absolutely essential functions the enemy's system requires. The system might have several capabilities, but not all are critical in every situation.
2. Identify the enemy's critical capability's source of power, which is the enemy's center of gravity.
3. Identify the center of gravity's critical requirements.
4. Identify the critical requirements or components that are vulnerable to attack or disruption. These critical vulnerabilities (CV) become targets to attack and are most likely protected by the enemy.<sup>13</sup>

What do we do after identifying the center of gravity? Must remember, the main thing of the campaign plan is focused against an enemy's center of gravities while protecting our (COGs).

### **Attacking a Center of Gravity**

There are two ways to attack a centre of gravity: directly or indirectly. Both are correct, and it depends on the available information which one to chose. If an enemy's centre of gravity is vulnerable it can be attacked directly, but direct attack is difficult and costly. An indirect approach might therefore be more appropriate. An indirect attack against an enemy COGs will cause the COG to lose its critical capability or ability to generate force. In this case, some of a

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<sup>13</sup> [http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m0PBZ/is\\_4\\_84/ai\\_n7068971](http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_4_84/ai_n7068971)

COGs might be vulnerable to attack or disruption. A direct attack on COG requirements is an indirect attack on the COG proper.

Defining and identifying the centre of gravity requires careful analysis. To define and identify the center of gravity requires a reliable military intelligence. That information will lead to the desired center of gravity COGs.

## **JOINT INTELLIGENCE**

*“If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and foreseen what may occur.”*

***Napoleon Bonaparte***

*“By ‘intelligence’ we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country--the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.”*

***Clausewitz, On War, 1832***

### **Joint Intelligence preparation of the Bttlespace (JIPB)**

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the bttlespace is continuous processing which enables the JFC and his staff to visualize the full spectrum of the enemy capabilities and bttlespace environment. This will facilitate the campaign planning and JFC’s decision making process. The JFC defines the operational objectives for the bttlespace of operations, and the J-2 defines the intelligence requirements to support the JFC objectives. The intelligence job is critical to the task. Its job depends on the JFC decision and the importance of intelligence to complete the mission. “JFC with the J-2 should ensure that intelligence objectives are correct, adequately stated, understood, synchronized, prioritized, and translated into actions that will provide the intelligence needed to accomplish the mission”.<sup>14</sup> The actions of the Intelligence should be synchronized with other battle space forces to ensure integrated and responsive support during all phases of the operation. The J-2 should participate in decision and planning process from the

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<sup>14</sup> I:\JP 2-0 Chapter IV Joint Intelligence Principles.htm

initial point when the operation is contemplated or directed. The JFC requirements should be the driver of the intelligence system. The JFC should get from intelligence the necessary information about the enemy capabilities, and centre of gravity, the intelligence will also advise the JFC about the best way how to attack enemy centers of gravity.

JIPB is a continues process of four steps. It:

- Defines the battlespace environment to determine the full multi-dimensional, geographic and non-geographic spectrum of the joint battlespace.
- Describe the battlespace effects, including the evaluation of all aspects of the environment with which both sides must contend, to include terrain, weather and any infrastructure and demographics in the Joint Operation Area (JOA).
- Evaluate the enemy, by analyzing the enemy and its COG, Strengths, weaknesses, critical vulnerabilities, capabilities and limitations, training and doctrines that reveal how the enemy operates when unconstrained by the effects of the environment.
- Determines the adversary's potential Course of Actions (COAs), by going beyond the first three steps, which provide the JFC and his staff with battlespace awareness, to achieve battlespace knowledge by anticipating the adversary's intent and actions.<sup>15</sup>




Figure 3 JIPB steps

### Levels of Intelligence


As usual there are three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. The levels are explains the connection between strategic objectives and tactical actions. The levels of war help

<sup>15</sup> Canadian forces college, combined and joint staff officer's handbook,2003,page # II-3-1-1/5

JFC to visualize a logical flow of operations. The levels of intelligence are the mirror of the levels of war. But the Joint Intelligence Process basically, remains the same during the military operation regardless of the level of war. The planning of the joint intelligence may vary between strategic, operational, and tactical level due to differences in mission, size of operational area, resources.

- **Strategic intelligence:** Strategic intelligence is produced for the senior military leaders, and combat commanders. It is providing required intelligence for the creation of national strategy and policy, monitoring the international situation, preparing military plans, and giving advices for major weapon systems and forces requirements.
- **Operational intelligence:** Operational intelligence is used by joint force commanders and their component commanders. Operational intelligence is focusing on the military capabilities and intentions of enemy. It keeps JFCs informed about the events within their areas of responsibility and determines when, where, and in what strength the enemy will conduct the attacks and major operations.
- **Tactical intelligence:** Tactical intelligence is used by tactical level commanders for planning and conducting battles and engagements. Tactical intelligence provides the locations of the enemy forces and kind of weapon systems, supporting the tactical commander's ability to shape the battle space with maneuvers, fires, and obstacles.





**Figure 4 levels of Intelligence<sup>16</sup>**

Within the designation area of interest, there must be a sufficient team of intelligence effort to ensure complete, current, and accurate, intelligence in order to develop the best possible understanding of the enemy and the situation, and to reduce unnecessary duplication and redundancy.

The JFC has the authority and the responsibility to determine, direct, and coordinate all tasks for the collection and analysis of data through centralized collection and production management efforts. The JFC has to ensure access to all necessary theater intelligence capabilities. The JFC must ensure that the subordinate commanders assist each other in collecting and evaluating intelligence sources required to the maximum extent compatible with the requirements of their respective commands and the joint force. This includes sharing intelligence collection assets and operations, sources, collection management, intelligence analysis, data bases, production, and communications.

*“Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total.”*

<sup>16</sup> Intelligence Support to Operations, US, page # 8

## *Sun Tzu, the Art of War*

### *C. 500 B.C.*

“Joint intelligence supports campaign planning by identifying significant facts and assumptions about the total battlespace environment and the adversary”.<sup>17</sup> This information will include the details about the enemy capabilities, COGs, limitations and potential COAs. Destroying or neutralize the enemy COGs it’s the most direct path to victory.

## **INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO)**

At the beginning I talked about joint planning, joint targeting and joint intelligence. Now I’ll talk about Information Operation (IO) and how it helps the planning. First let’s define the information operations. In the US FM 3-13 information operation doctrine IO defined as:

“Information operations are the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision-making”.<sup>18</sup>

By this definition the IO will affect the enemy decision making process and defending friendly decision making process.

“All actions taken to affect enemy information and information systems while defending friendly information and information systems”.<sup>19</sup> Friendly forces must have information superiority to keep providing information to the JFC and to deprivation the enemy information superiority. Information Operations IO are conducted at all phases and level of war. Information Operations are very effective when they start ahead of the decision making process. Information Operations planning should be an integral part of operations planning, which runs simultaneously. Each phase of the operation must include a review of IO to provide the most current information to the planers. All information operation from deferent sources must be coordinated and synchronized in order to have wise decision.

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<sup>17</sup> Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

<sup>18</sup> FM 3-13 (FM 100-6)Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures NOV 2003

<sup>19</sup> MCWP 3-36 information Operations

Advanced technology allows the commanders to monitor the action in the battlefield closer to the real-time than ever before, and to quickly pass information to their areas of operations. IO, advanced technology and communications will continue to decrease the time required for the planning processes. This will compress the decision cycles and increases operational movement, and the military action during the execution of the campaign. JFCs now have opportunity to achieve the required results earlier than ever before.

JFCs using both offensive IO and defensive IO at the same time to accomplish the task, increase forces effectiveness, and protect the organizations and systems. JFCs conduct a combination of these two types of Information Operations to achieve the required mission.

### **Information Environment**

The information environment is a total of organizations, or systems that collect, process, and disseminate information, it includes:

- \* Networks of the worldwide interconnection of communications.
- \* The Command and control (C2) systems of adversary and friendly forces.
- \* Adversary, Friendly, and other personnel who make decisions and handle information.

Elements such as terrain, climate, and weapons effects (electromagnetic pulse) affect the information environment but are not part of it. The forces in the battlefield rely on the unrestricted use of the information environment to perform (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) full operations. The information environment is one component of the battlefield. The JFC's area of interest includes parts of the information environment. These parts of the information environment within a JFC battlefield have information activities that affect the operation. The JFC will visualize and consider the dimensions of the entire information environment. He seeks to understand how activity in the information environment may affect the mission. The JFC then determines the information activities that affect the operations and C2 systems. Many things in the information environment can affect the strategic, operational, and tactical actions of the battlefield operations. Examples of these things are:

- \* Foreign governments.
- \* Nongovernmental organizations.
- \* Agencies that coordinate international efforts.

- \* Social and cultural elements and their leaders.
- \* Leaders of other Services, multinational partners, and adversaries.
- \* Individuals able to communicate with a worldwide audience.
- \* The news media.

The JCF considers the political and social implications that isolated small unit actions might produce. Within this context, the JFC face many challenges and opportunities. The complex relationship between political, strategic, technological, and military factors requires a clear understanding how operations and the information environment affect each other.

### **Offensive IO operation**

The US Army defines offensive information operations as:

“The integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect enemy decision-makers or to influence others to achieve or promote specific objectives”.<sup>20</sup>

### **Defensive IO operations**

The US Army defines defensive information operations as the:

“Integration and coordination of policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend friendly information and information systems. Defensive information operations ensure timely, accurate, and relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes”.<sup>21</sup>

The JFC integrates offensive and defensive IO at all phases of operational level. He synchronizes IO to do specific effects at decisive points in order to support the operation. Synchronizing offensive and defensive IO is more effective than conducting them independently. Synchronizing offensive and defensive IO, result in complementary and reinforcing effects.

## **CONCLUSION**

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<sup>20</sup> FM 3-13 (FM 100-6)Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures NOV 2003

<sup>21</sup> FM 3-13 (FM 100-6)Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures NOV 2003

The joint campaign planning is implement national strategic objectives and the campaign plans ensure the integration of all elements of services and forces in the battlespace. The JFC must provide all elements with national goals and directions focusing to achieve military end state in support strategic end state. Joint campaign planning converts the national guidance into military objectives, the campaign plan arranges all operations and forces in the battlespace. The planning starts when the JFC receives the mission; he analyzes the mission and determines specified and implied tasks. The JFC must use the art of operations and characteristics of all resources to conduct a successful military campaign.

In the planning process the JFC must overcome some critical factors in order to win the fight. The most critical factors are to identify the enemy center of gravities (COGs) and to destroy or neutralize them, at the same time protecting friendly center of gravities (COGs).

The initial guidance is very important for the staff to start initial planning, and the guidance must focus on the main mission and strategic objectives. The JFC guidance can be given orally or written.

The main goal of joint targeting process is to provide the JFC and the forces all assets and information about the targets. The JFC require joint targeting cycle to prevent duplication of efforts, Joint targeting process is one of the important things of the JFC campaign planning. The targeting cycle begins with JFC guidance. There are two target categories:

- Planned target.
- Immediate targets.

The JFC and his staff should identify the enemy center of gravity targets and the critical targets that directly or indirectly will lead to neutralize or destroy the enemy center of gravity targets.

Joint intelligence is continuous processing which enable the JFC to visualize the spectrum of the enemy capabilities and battlefield environment. In the area of interest must be a group of intelligence working to make complete, current, and accurate intelligence to develop the best possible understanding of the enemy situations.

The JFC has the responsibility to determine, direct, and coordinate all tasks for the collection and analysis of data through centralized collection and production management effort.

Information operations (IO) are also very important for the joint campaign planning. The IO aims to affect the enemy's decision making process. Information operation is conducted at all phases and level of war. The JFC will use both the offensive and defensive IO at the same time to accomplish the mission.

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