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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES COURSE 7

**AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: IS IT TIME FOR A
SINGLE NATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS?**

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ABSTRACT

Since Unification, there has been an almost constant tension between individual Army, Navy and Air Force identities and the notion of a strong joint single-service Canadian Forces construct. Throughout the Cold War era, each individual commander retained responsibilities of individual service-based force employment and force generation activities. During the 1990s, a requirement for domestic joint task force capabilities became more prevalent, and a construct was developed whereby NDHQ would exert national command authority over complex domestic force employment missions. For routine domestic operations, the various formation-based headquarters retain regional responsibilities. Thus, with eight individual formation-based headquarters situated throughout the country, there is no centralized command and control structure. Moreover, for routine operations that require the participation of more than one service, special command and control structures have had to be created through service-level agreements. When a domestic operation is beyond the capability of the regional formation-based headquarters, NDHQ establishes an ad hoc centralized command and control structure under a Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander.

This ad hoc JTF concept has been implemented in several domestic operations such as OPERATION ASSISTANCE, QUADRILLE, RECUPERATION and GRIZZLY. It is also the planning basis for CDS CONPLAN PANORAMA. To date, the JTF Commander and the associated headquarters staffs are amassed from one of the eight formation-based headquarters. However, post operation reports show that the integration of the three services has not necessarily been seamless, and that there have been many voids in the joint processes. The day-to-day force generation working structures of the regional formation-based headquarters often conflict with joint force employment processes that are required for contingency operations. It has been made clear that formation-based headquarters must be proficiently trained and exercised in joint procedures to maximize the effect of integrated forces. In addition, the size and scope of contingency operations can easily overwhelm the capabilities of these headquarters. To solve these issues, the introduction of a single task force headquarters, responsible for force employment missions throughout Canada is recommended.

INTRODUCTION

Command and control structures within the Canadian Forces have slowly evolved under a barrage of never ending debates, retrenchments and modifications. From the onset of the concept of *Unification* of the three services into a single service entity, there has been an almost constant tension between individual service identities and a strong, joint single-service construct. Four decades after *Unification*, the notion of a *joint* single-service force under the command of the Chief of Defence Staff, is still being debated within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.¹ Consequently, only incremental steps have been made towards achieving a national joint-force capability. With command and control structures remaining essentially oriented to individual Army, Navy and Air Force activities, the concept of Canadian Forces international and domestic *joint* operations is still evolving. The topical question is: What should be the next step in this evolution?

There are many facets to the development of an ideal Canadian command and control structure. To help limit the scope of the overall discussion, this paper will focus on command and control of *domestic* operations, at the operational level. As such, both routine and complex (i.e. contingency) *joint force employment* activities will be analyzed. Furthermore, a review of the evolution of *joint* command and control structures within the Canadian Forces will be conducted to help provide a framework from which to situate the current dilemma. This review will show that although the concept of *Unification*

¹ The term joint should not be confused with the notion of a unified force. Joint constructs recognize the individuality of independent services, and focus to bring those individualities together to achieve one single concentrated effort. Unified forces such as the United States Marine Corps have no need for internal joint operations because its constructs do not recognize individual sub components.

suggests that the Army, Navy and Air Force would act as one Canadian Forces entity commanded by the Chief of Defence Staff, the realities of the Cold War era created an environment in which the three services remained as dominant entities. As such, each environmental commander retained responsibilities for individual *force employment* and *force generation* activities.

The requirement for domestic joint task force (JTF) capabilities became more prevalent during the 1990s. National control of these joint task forces was essential, and ad hoc mission-based (force employment) command and control structures were implemented to address the emergent requirements. Commanded centrally through NDHQ, the resultant JTFs utilized the inherent capabilities of the established formation-based headquarters that exist throughout Canada. Since these headquarters essentially use individual *force generation* processes in their day-to-day activities, they were not, and are still not ideally suited for JTF *force employment* requirements.

Through a review of recent domestic operations, this paper will demonstrate that the currently existing formation-based headquarters do not have the inherent and necessary capacity or expertise to coordinate sea, land and air activities in a single concentrated joint effort. Moreover, consistency in command and control processes throughout the various regions and the various formation-based headquarters in Canada is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Centralized planning and coordination is a critical component of contemporary domestic realities and this lack of consistency has unnecessarily complicated Canadian Forces responses to domestic requirements, both in terms of

routine and complex operations. As such, it is now necessary to take the next incremental step in the evolution of domestic command and control *force employment* structures, by introducing a single national JTF headquarters that is responsible for all domestic operations throughout Canada.

INCREMENTAL STEPS TO JOINT OPERATIONS

Strategy of Commitments

In his 1966 *Address on the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act*, Defence Minister Paul Hellyer argued that *Unification* was a natural extension of the reality of warfare, which by tactical necessity, was becoming significantly more integrated. Moreover, the cost of the Defence machine, which also weighed heavily on the government of the day, was unaffordable. As a result, Hellyer explained, “the rising cost of the extant armed forces were consuming capital investment leaving nothing for the future force.”² By consolidating the command and control chain under a single service Chief of Defence Staff, Canada would be able to mitigate the “deterioration of defence capability” that was being caused by the self-serving interests of each Service. In effect, he was arguing for *Unification* in terms of both operational and administrative imperatives.

Although the requirement for administrative efficiencies was based on reasoned organizational management theories and practices, Minister Hellyer’s operational

² Douglas L. Bland, ed. *Canada’s National Defence, Volume 2: Defence Organization*, (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 1998), 94.

imperatives required a new military strategy that transitioned the traditional Canadian *strategy of commitments*³ to a *strategy of national security*. However, after Unification, the government's *strategy of commitments* did not change, and therefore, the overseas elements of the Canadian Forces remained focused on individual service-based commitments. The committed forces were under operational control of Allied forces, and centralized Canadian command and control was not necessary.⁴ The three services continued to have significant influence on the decision-making process and the ideology of *Unification* was somewhat thwarted. Thus, a 30-year "tug of war" commenced between the concept of *Unification* and the *Strong-Service* idea.⁵

Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Canadian Forces remained focused on the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union. As espoused by historian James Eayrs, without national security at stake, the Canadian military establishment was essentially an organization by which to enhance Canada's "diplomatic and negotiating position vis-à-vis international organizations and other countries."⁶ With this construct in mind, there seemed to be little need for, or interest in, a national command capability, as conceived by Minister Hellyer.

³ Douglas L. Bland discussed the *strategy of commitments* in his *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*. He notes that this strategy resulted in a military focused on the deterrence of Soviet aggression in the context of Alliance commitments. Thus, each service developed independent capabilities to support NATO objectives.

⁴ Within the NATO Allied Force construct, Air Command, Maritime Command and Force Mobile Command continued to rationalize requirements based on their independent service commitments.

⁵ see Colonel JPYD Gosselin's, *Unification and the Strong-Service idea: A 50-year Tug of War of Concepts at Crossroads* for a detailed discussion on the relationship between NDHQ and the Service Commanders after Unification.

⁶ James Eayrs, "Military Policy and Middle Power: the Canadian Experience," in Gordon, *Canada's Role as a Middle Power* (Toronto: Institute of International Affairs, 1966): 70, quoted in Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 215.

Despite of the overwhelming overseas focus, it is not fair to say that domestic issues were not of concern. During the 1970s, the Canadian military had been given more national duties such as sovereignty patrols and national development tasks. But as Admiral Robert Falls (CDS 1977-1980) admitted: “We conducted superficial acts. We flew aircraft in the north on monthly patrols...they never made contact...we flew in complete darkness, figuratively and literally, most of the time. We sent ships up to the north and damaged their hulls.... It was a complete waste of time, but it satisfied the politicians.”⁷ The domestic efforts were essentially an ad hoc arrangement at best. The lack of a national command capability, which *Unification* was designed to provide, was of no great concern. The result of decades of Alliance commitments relegated domestic security to the back burner. As Douglas Bland put it, the result was “the retardation of the evolution in Canada of an instinct for truly national defence strategy and the development of a national defence structure to guard and maintain it.”⁸

Strategy of National Security

The lack of a national planning capability finally became problematic in 1988 when the Chief of Defense Staff, General Paul Manson, ordered NDHQ to develop contingency plans for the “hostile evacuation” of Canadians from the island of Haiti. The operational planning process that ensued was dramatically inadequate and General Manson issued an immediate directive to “examine the role and responsibilities of NDHQ in emergencies and war.” The resultant report, authored by Major-General WD Little, explored the role of NDHQ, but more importantly it “dealt with the relationship of the DCDS vis-à-vis the

⁷ Douglas L. Bland, *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces*. (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 232.

⁸ *Ibid*, 260.

environmental commanders.”⁹ Although the report was deficient in many ways, it did initiate considerable introspective analysis. After several committee meetings of senior department officials, the notion emerged that NDHQ would be a “force generator” and the environmental commanders would be the “force employers”. In other words, NDHQ would be the centralized planner and the environmental Commanders would be the decentralized executors – thus, representing a “significant departure” from the Hellyer *Unification* initiative.¹⁰ The concept, however, did not survive the first contact with an actual crisis.

That crisis was the Oka confrontation in 1990. Due to the highly sensitive nature of the Oka situation, political influence on military operations was significant and NDHQ had to exercise a direct *force employment* role. While the CDS of the day, General de Chastelain, established a task force headquarters, the commander of the task force did not receive the authority to make operational decisions commensurate with his responsibilities. Even the most “trivial” of decisions had to be coordinated through NDHQ. In effect, NDHQ became a de facto operational-level headquarters.

The ad hoc command and control arrangements of the Oka incident were later refined during the Gulf War, but they were not immediately institutionalized in doctrine. That institutionalization came four years later when, as a result of the Management Command and Control Reengineering (MCCR) effort, an entire level of headquarters was removed

⁹ Ibid, 192.

¹⁰ Ibid, 197.

from the Canadian Forces.¹¹ Moreover, MCCR codified the notion that *force generation* and *force employment* command and control concepts could be viewed as entirely separate constructs. MCCR reorganized the national command and control structure so that the CDS was responsible for *force employment* and the environment chiefs were responsible for *force generation* – a complete reversal of the concepts from four years earlier. Within this construct, the environmental commanders moved to Ottawa to provide *force generation* planning advice to the CDS. The DCDS was designated the Chief Operations Officer (COO), and was assigned responsibility for Canadian Forces *force employment* activities.¹² This basic command and control structure remains with us today.

THE TYRANNY OF TERMINOLOGY

Operational

Along with the United States and NATO military forces, the Canadian Forces has adopted the concept that military operations are conducted at three distinct levels: tactical; operational; and strategic (see Figure 1). Intuitively there are three concomitant levels of command. For the purposes of this paper's discussion of command and control

¹¹ Brigadier-General (retired) G.E. (Joe) Sharpe and Allan D. English PhD, *Principles for Changes in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces*, (Winnipeg: Published for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute and the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Group by the Canadian Forces Training Material Publication Centre, 2002) pp14-19.

¹² Department of National Defence. B-GG-005-004/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2000), 2-5.

at the operational level, the three command levels, as defined in the Canadian Forces Operations manual, are provided hereunder.¹³

Strategic Command. That level of Command through which control of a conflict is exercised at the strategic level and overall direction is provided to military forces, advice is given to political authorities, and coordination is provided at the national level.

Operational Command. That level of Command which employs forces to attain strategic objectives in a theatre or area or operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations. At the operational level, sea, land and air activity must be conceived and conducted as one single concentrated effort. Activities at this level link strategy and tactics.

Tactical Command. That level which directs the use of military forces in battles and engagements designed to contribute to the operational level plan.

¹³ *Canadian Forces Operations* is the keystone manual within the CF doctrine system.




Figure 1 – Activities at Each Level of Command

Source: English, *The Operational Level of War*, Presentation to AMSC 7.

The term “operational” can be misleading, particularly in the Canadian context. While Canadian Forces doctrine recognizes that operational-level command is exercised at the theatre commander, or joint force commander level, it contradicts itself by designating formation-based commanders as operational-level commanders. In the domestic context, the Chief of Defence has identified eight separate operational-level headquarters in Canada: Maritime Pacific (MARPAC), Maritime Atlantic (MARLANT), Land Forces Western Area (LFWA), Land Forces Central Area (LFCA), Secteur Québec de la Force Terrestre (SQFT), Land Forces Atlantic Area (LFAA), Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA), and 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD). As Brigadier General (retired) Sharpe and Dr. English noted in their analysis of post cold war C2 in the Canadian Forces, it is

necessary “to recognize that [operational] means different things to different people and different organizations depending on the context.”¹⁴

To minimize any inherent confusion, this paper utilizes the strict definition of the term; thus, the operational level is where a commander conceives and combines sea, land and air activity into one single concentrated effort. It is important to distinguish this level of command from the others, because it is at this level, that commanders combine the total capacity of multiple environments to achieve *unity of effort*. It is at the operational level that the benefits of joint operations are created, so that these benefits can be realized at the tactical level. Within Canadian doctrine, an operational-level commander would be the commander of a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ). Thus, within a JTFHQ, an Air Component Commander, a Land Component Commander and a Maritime Component Commander would represent the three functional environments.¹⁵

Joint – A Brief Clarification

The concept of *joint* operations can also be confusing in Canadian terms. For example, with 1 CAD Maritime Helicopter detachments deploying as integral units in Canadian warships, there is a notion that once the detachment is embarked, the recipient warship operates as a *joint* battle team. Similarly, it has been argued that Land Force Battle Groups employing integral 1 CAD Tactical Helicopter elements, also operate as a joint

¹⁴ Sharpe and English, *Principles for Changes in the Post-Cold War Command and Control of the Canadian Forces*, 33.

¹⁵ Other functional Component Commanders such as the Special Operations Component Commander (SOCC) may be integral to the JTFHQ. See *Canadian Forces Combined and Joint Staff Officer's Handbook*, I-3-1/6.

force.¹⁶ If this assumption were taken to its logical conclusion, Land Forces Area Commanders and Commanders of Canadian Fleets, with helicopter units attached, would be designated as a Commander Joint Task Forces (Commander JTFs). This however, cannot be the case.

In a joint force construct, operational control authority is vested in the Component Commanders. As such, an Air Component Commander is responsible for “making recommendations to the JFC on the employment of air forces and assets, planning and coordinating air operations and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned to him.”¹⁷ Likewise, the Maritime and Land Component Commanders are responsible for their Maritime and Land areas, respectively. The Maritime and Land Component Commanders are responsible for the employment of organic 1 CAD aviation units, and not the Air Component Commander. For this reason, when the Commander of a Canadian Fleet sails with organic aviation embarked, they are designated as a Commander of Task Group (CTG) or Task Force (CTF), and not a Commander JTF. This day-to-day structure is not *joint*.

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: AN ANALYSIS

National Security Tasks

Under the umbrella of “Protection of Canada”, the 1994 Defence White Paper tasked the Canadian Forces to provide for the Defence of Canada and Canadian Sovereignty, and to

¹⁶ Lieutenant-Colonel F.M. Boomer, “Joint or Combined Doctrine?: the Right Choice for Canada”, (Toronto: Canadian Forces College Advanced Military Studies Course Paper, 1998), 7.

¹⁷ Department of National Defence. CFC CJ SOH *Canadian Forces Combined and Joint Staff Officer’s Handbook*, VI-2-7/14.

provide for the Protection of Canadians. Specifically, within the realm of Domestic Operations, the Canadian Forces were tasked to:¹⁸

- ◁ Be able to monitor and control activity within Canada's territory, airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction
- ◁ Assists other government departments in achieving other national goals such as fisheries protection, drug interdiction, and environmental protection
- ◁ Be prepared to provide humanitarian protection and disaster relief
- ◁ Maintain a national search and rescue capability
- ◁ Maintain a capability to immediately respond to terrorist activities
- ◁ Respond to Aid of the Civil Power requests

To prepare for these tasks, the Canadian Forces characterized Domestic Operations as either Limited Operations or Complex Operations. Generally speaking, Limited Operations are *routine* in nature, while complex Operations normally require mission-specific *contingency* plans. Routine operations are designed to use normal "functionally-based" headquarters command and control arrangements, whereas, contingency operational will use national joint command and control structures. When a routine operation expands and demands more capability than a formation-based headquarters is able to provide, national-level resources will be applied, and the operation will be commanded by the CDS and controlled by the DCDS.

¹⁸ Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*, (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994), 18.

Routine Domestic Operations

From a Canadian Forces operational-level perspective, a fundamental flaw exists in the command and control construct for routine operations. This can be best articulated through the analysis of the routine maritime operations. To monitor and control activity within Canada's territory and maritime areas of jurisdiction both CAS and CMS share responsibilities in achieving the objectives. This sharing arrangement also applies to the fisheries protection, drug interdiction, and environmental protection missions throughout the coastal areas of Canada. Conceptually, CAS and CMS operate in what the Canadian Forces Operations manual would characterize as a *joint* environment. On the west coast of Canada, 1 CAD and MARPAC consolidate their efforts to achieve the national objectives, and on the east coast of Canada, 1 CAD and MARLANT cooperate in attaining their individual responsibilities.¹⁹ These sharing arrangements are important in that they represent an interesting case study in the adaptation of a formation-based command and control structure in a *joint* context. While there are other domestic routine operations ongoing within Canada, none are as frequent or as *joint* as the maritime surveillance missions.

MARPAC and MARLANT plan and control their domestic maritime surveillance missions through respective formation-based headquarters in Esquimalt and Halifax. 1 CAD plans and controls domestic maritime surveillance mission requirements through

¹⁹ Arctic coastal areas are divided into two regions; one under MARPAC jurisdiction; and one east under MARLANT jurisdiction. Due to the movement and structure of the ice flows, there is some contestation between Commander Northern Region and the two coastal commanders over their respective areas of responsibility.

Maritime Air Components in the maritime headquarters in both Esquimalt and Halifax.²⁰ Maritime Air Component (Pacific) (MAC(P)) and Atlantic (MAC(A)) are responsible to 1 CAD, which in turn reports to CAS. On the other hand, MARLANT and MARPAC are responsible for mission performance directly to CMS.

Both coasts use similar but different command and control structures to coordinate the air and maritime elements. To maintain clarity and to avoid excessive description of the command and control methodologies that each coast has adopted, this paper will focus only on the command and control arrangements established between MARPAC and MAC(P), in terms of the maritime surveillance mission. This MARPAC surveillance mission is conducted under the auspices of OPERATION SEALION, a routine, yet continuous, formation-based operation.

The maritime missions conducted by either environmental commander are complementary yet distinct. Thus, while the missions can be conducted independently, changes to the 1 CAD “campaign” plan directly affect CMS plans, and vice versa. Both Commander MARPAC and Commander 1 CAD are responsible and accountable for accomplishment of OPERATION SEALION missions. MARPAC N3 controls OPERATION SEALION missions on behalf of Commander MARPAC, while Commander MAC(P) controls OPERATION SEALION missions on behalf of Commander 1 CAD. With two operational-level commanders involved in the planning and execution of operations, the arrangement violates the principle of *Unity of*

²⁰ Maritime Air Component (Pacific is co-located with MARPAC and Maritime Component Atlantic is co-located with MARLANT

*Command.*²¹ It should therefore, be of no surprise that tensions arise between both entities when either CMS or CAS restricts or reassigns its resources to other priorities. When resources become scarce, each side accuses the other of not providing the necessary support to achieve the required objectives. To reconcile differences of opinion, and to ensure that each environmental commander understands the intended contributions of the other environmental commander, CAS and CMS created a service-level arrangement (SLA) whereby the provision of services could be negotiated through a formal and structured process.²²

Recognizing a dysfunctional command and control structure, the CAS/CMS SLA identified a system that “is intended to describe the normal Command and Control relationship that will govern the provision and employment of aerospace power in the maritime environment. The C2 relationship is designed to be consistent with the principles of a single HQ planning, tasking and executing aerospace operations.”²³ Under this arrangement, the commander MAC(P) is delegated OPCON of specifically assigned 1 CAD resources, with the MAC operating as an Air Component Commander (ACC) on behalf of the Commander 1 CAD.²⁴ When aviation units are required to achieve CMS tasks, 1 CAD has agreed to transfer OPCON of the resources to the Commander MARPAC, with the caveat that that OPCON would be delegated to the ACC (Commander MAC(P)). As the ACC, the Commander MAC(P) is also designated the

²¹ Canadian Forces Operations manual describes Unity of Command principle in the following: “ In a military unit or formation, a single commander will be authorized to plan and direct operations. The commander will be held responsible for an operation’s success or failure, and has the authority to direct and control the personnel and material committed to the task.”

²² See *Service Level Arrangement between the Chief of the Maritime Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff concerning the Provision of Services to Support Force Generation, Operations and Sustainment.*

²³ Ibid, 3.

²⁴ 1 CAD Order 3-308.

Aerospace Control Authority (ACA).²⁵ This places the additional responsibility of coordinating military air movements in the airspace over the MARPAC area of responsibility (AOR). This assignment of ACA duties to the ACC is consistent with Air Component doctrine, and is necessary to balance the MAC(P) Commander's authorities with his responsibilities as a *force employer*.

Essentially, the SLA command and control arrangement was developed to mirror a joint force structure by bureaucratically, and arguably artificially, assigning OPCON of air resources to Commander MARPAC. While the delegation of OPCON was designed to mitigate the lack of *Unity of Command* at the operational-level, 1 CAD only transfers OPCON of flight hours, and not the physical aircraft and crews. Within the MARPAC headquarters, there was considerable debate about the actual point at which OPCON was transferred from 1 CAD to MARPAC. Was it during the pre-flight briefing, was it during the take-off role, or was it when the aircraft reported on station? Complicating the matter further, was the reality that many sorties had components of both 1 CAD *force generation* and OPERATION SEALION *force employment* activities in the same flight. While it was documented that that the MARPAC Commander was delegated OPCON, in reality he only exercised TACON. OPCON remained with the ACC, who continued to be responsible to Commander 1 CAD and Commander MARPAC. Despite this contradiction, it is well established through the CAS and CMS staffs that MAC(P) and MARPAC operate as a pseudo-joint headquarters, at a tactical level. It is not designed to organize and conduct *joint* campaigns and major operations, and as such, it would be a considerable stretch to suggest that it operates as a *joint* operational-level headquarters.

²⁵ Maritime Air Component (Pacific) Concept of Operations (CONOPS), 17 March 2004.

Effective military command and control can only be exercised if the right resources are given to the right person with the right training. Dr. Ross Pigeau and Ms. Carol McCann, from DRDC Toronto, suggest that there are three dimensions of command capability: Competency, Authority, and Responsibility.²⁶ In their model, effective command can only be achieved when there is a suitable balance between the three command dimensions. In terms of the 1 CAD/MARPAC command structure, it becomes evident that the necessary authority to accomplish the mission is neither vested in a single commander, nor at an appropriate level, despite SLA attempts to define a suitable balanced system. In essence, an ineffectual operational-level command and control system ensues. Tactical level commanders are only able to compensate for this dysfunctional structure because of the simplistic non-threat environment in which the missions are actually being conducted. A more complex environment would demand a more balanced command and control structure, particularly one that embraces the principle of *Unity of Command* by providing commander with the necessary levels of authority to conduct the mission.

Institutionally, this command structure inhibits organizational learning. While the staffs at the tactical level work feverishly at attempting to improve the surveillance process, the effects-based focus is lost at the operational-level and strategic level. Currently, it seems that measures of success tend to be defined in terms of the number of sea days and flight hours that have been and need to be consumed. Process improvement initiatives are

²⁶ Pigeau and McCann, *Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control*, in *Canadian Military Journal* Spring 2002, 57.

difficult to implement because they are frequently “bottom up” concepts. With no single commander having overall responsibility for the mission, the “bottom up” initiatives that require support from both environmental commanders are frequently lost in the multiple staff processes. Without an appropriate command and control structure that fosters a Canadian Forces wide learning construct, initiatives that enhance our routine *joint* interoperability will be difficult to implement. A centralized command and control structure, such as those implemented for contingency operations, could provide the necessary resolution to the *Unity of Command* concerns and the concomitant learning issues.

Contingency Domestic Operations

By the early 1990s, senior political and departmental officials had identified a need for NDHQ to be able to organize and command a unified force. There was a subtle but identifiable shift from the strategy of commitments, as Bland characterizes it, to a strategy of national security. Through various national and international events, it became abundantly clear that a centralized national command and control structure was not just desirable - it was essential. While international alliance commitments remained important, emerging national objectives demanded greater cooperation between the three services. It was no longer acceptable for individual service requirements to dominate national perspectives and strategies.

As mentioned previously in this paper, the Oka crisis (OPERATION SALON) was the principal domestic event that stimulated a period of *joint* enlightenment within the

Canadian Forces. To respond to the unpredicted Mohawk standoff, the CDS quickly established an ad hoc command and control structure that created a joint task force commanded by Lieutenant-General Kent Foster. From a tactical point-of-view, OPERATION SALON was very similar to international UN peacekeeping operations, with which the army had a great deal of expertise. The authority to conduct the operation was delegated to Brigadier-General Roy who, in accordance with aid to the civil power directions detailed in the National Defence Act, was to coordinate directly with provincial authorities. However, the federal political sensitivities of that era and a general distrust of the military's national command capabilities, caused bureaucrats in senior federal positions to bypass the chain of command and to attempt to micromanage the affair by influencing Lieutenant-General Foster and Brigadier-General Roy directly. As sensitivities peaked, General Foster was directed to clear operational matters through the Deputy Minister's office.²⁷ From a strictly war-fighting sense, Lieutenant-General Foster's legal authority to exercise OPCON of his forces was severely restricted by direct political influence, thus establishing a questionable command structure.

It should not necessarily be a surprise that operations such as OPERATION SALON have a tendency to be controlled at senior bureaucratic levels. As Howard Coombs points out in *Perspectives on Operational Thought*, peacekeeping-type operations require "centralized control and resolution at the highest level."²⁸ These operations do not encourage operational thought and there is often a blurring of the traditional strategic and operational levels of command. Figure 2 shows conceptually the impact of modern

²⁷ Bland, *Chiefs of Defence*, 198-200.

²⁸ Howard G. Coombs, *Perspectives on Operational Thought*, (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2004), 6.

communications on strategic influence over operational and tactical levels of command. Equally important is the realization that real-time information will have similar effects on political influence. The separation of political control from an operational-level headquarters is not a principle of an effective command and control structure. It is not a criterion on which to establish organizational effectiveness, but rather a criterion to establish command and control flexibility and coherency throughout the spectrum of political influence.



Figure 2 - Levels of Command – Then and Now

Source: Holder, *Joint Operational Concepts and Operational Art*, Presentation to AMSC 7

Instead of invalidating the operational-level of command in domestic operations, the experiences of the Oka Crisis demonstrated that the notions of NDHQ as a *force generator* and the environmental commander as a *force employer*, as defined in “Little Report” were unsupportable. A centralized *force employment* command and control arrangement under the CDS was essential.

The separation of *force employment* from *force generation* is an important concept within the Canadian context of joint operations. *Force employment* is by definition mission-based, whereas *force generation* is process-based. Joint operations are inherently mission-based, and therefore, an organizational separation from *force generation* activities provides a focused single-service approach to mission accomplishment.

A joint task force under a single-serve command and control structure was implemented during OPERATION ASSISTANCE (Manitoba Floods) in 1997. The value of integrating individual CLS, CAS and CMS capabilities under the force employment of the CDS was clearly demonstrated. Captain (N) Forcier, the Maritime Component Commander, noted in his Post Operation Report “one of the most appealing aspects of this operation was jointness...”²⁹ Colonel Sharpe, the Air Component Commander reported, “Overall, OP ASSISTANCE was an outstanding success due to the manner in which each of the Components worked together toward one goal. I was particularly pleased in the manner in which jointness was practiced throughout.”³⁰

However, the integration of the three services was not seamless, and there were many voids in the *joint* processes. Without a doubt, joint operations don’t just happen. They must be practiced so that the staffs understand the joint concepts and procedures. One of the primary complaints in OPERATION ASSISTANCE was that the JTF commander (JTFC), Major-General Jeffries, imposed Army/Div headquarters *force generation* staff

²⁹ Captain (N) Forcier, *MARITIME COMPONENT COMM 010 212.288 932* RIT RITRITRIT

system upon the components.³¹ The day-to-day working structures for routine operations were being mixed with those for contingency operations. In doing so the JTF HQ staffs tended to ignore the Components' doctrine and operating procedures. Major-General Jeffries acknowledged this problem and noted that very few officers had any sort of joint training, and they had not planned or exercised an operation from a joint perspective. He concluded:

Although the CF's ability to deploy a joint force at the operational level still needs some improvement, great strides have been made. Further, if the spirit of cooperation between the three environments so evident throughout OP ASSISTANCE persists, the future for joint operations bodes very well. The key is to draw appropriate lessons from this [Post Operations Report] as well as other command observations and incorporate/ promulgate them in doctrine, procedures and training.³²

The combination of routine *force generation* and contingency *force employment* structures was also problematic during OPERATION QUADRILLE (Québec City Summit of America). In this 2001 operation, Major-General Maisonneuve noted that the command and control structure was a melding of “different processes and responsibilities in to a single stream vice a distinct division of responsibility.”³³ With SQFT being dual

³¹ Captain (N) Forcier, *MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER'S POST OPERATION REPORT – OP ASSISTANCE*, n.p.

³² Major-General Jeffries, *OPERATION (OP) ASSISTANCE POST OPERATION REPORT (POR)*, 16 July 1997

³³ OPERATION QUADRILLE Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive (LLSAD), 30 October 2001, A-12/21

hatted as the JTFC, there was confusion over the JTFC being assigned OPCON of forces for which SQFT already exercised OPCOM. Moreover, there was a general confusion of *force generation* and *force employment* command responsibilities and authorities. The transfer of command authority (TOCA) was not clear, and the associated inconsistencies were, as the Major-General-Maisonneuve reported, "...symptomatic of a larger C2 issue associated with the TOCA process and the dual hatting of an [operational-level headquarters] Commander as a JTFC." With additional concerns such as the authority and responsibility for Rules of Engagement and provision of services, a review of the command and control structures was necessary, with specific emphasis on the concept of routine operations and contingency operations, and the transition between the two.

Size and scope of contingency operations can easily overwhelm the capabilities of formation-based headquarters. These headquarters are normally very lean organizations, and while they may have a core capability to execute certain joint functions, by definition, all require augmentation during contingency operations. In the Post Operations Report for OPERATION ASSISTANCE, Major-General Jeffries assessed that while LFA headquarters are suitable for "domestic operations of limited scope", they "lack the depth breadth, communications assets and mobility needed to command large and lengthy operations." To gap the identified deficiencies, 1 Canadian Division Headquarters mobilized rapidly to provide the necessary headquarters resource augmentation. Lieutenant-General Henault identified similar observations during OPERATION RECUPERATION (Ice Storms). Noting that LFAs are "non-deployable entities", concerns were raised that the headquarters are inappropriately staffed to execute

complex domestic operations. “Clearly, LFA HQs are infrastructure HQ, not organized to be field deployable and lack mobility, intelligence, logistics and communication resources.”³⁴ As during OPERATION ASSISTANCE, 1 Canadian Division Headquarters was crucial in providing the necessary augmentation.

Virtually every recent domestic contingency operation has been centered on a regional LFA headquarters. Each LFA has different day-to-day working arrangements, and every post operation report has mentioned some form of difficulty with respect to integration of staff augmentation, communication information systems, and procedures, to name a few. With eight separate “Operational” headquarters throughout Canada, this is to be expected. Clearly, the addition of staff from 1 Canadian Division has been extremely important in the execution of complex domestic operations, yet even the 1 Div HQ staff procedures were Army-based and thus, not *joint* in nature. As experienced in OPERATION ASSISTANCE, this was problematic for the component staffs. It was clear that an operational-level headquarters must be proficiently trained and exercised in joint procedures, to maximize the effect of integrated forces. In OPERATION ASSISTANCE, Captain (N) Forcier surmised that perhaps a “...radical model would be to restructure the staff as primarily a joint staff reporting to DCDS, not the Land Force Commander. The JFHQ could be augmented for Army Div operations, not the other way around.” This novel concept is of interest, as it provides the notion that a national deployable JFHQ

³⁴ OPERATION RECUPERATION Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive LLSAD), 15 March 1999, A-15/27

might be the ideal command and control methodology for dealing with domestic operations at the operational-level.³⁵

One lasting observation of domestic operations is that they invariably have a significant civilian component. Trust, respect and cooperation between participating military, civilian and other government department (OGD) agencies are important to maximize efficiencies and to mitigate the usual problems associated with the interaction of multiple agencies. In OPERATION RECUPERATION, Lieutenant General Henault remarked that it was "...the local knowledge, and the personal contacts that allowed the deployed formations and units to operate effectively."³⁶ During OPERATION GRIZZLY, the interpersonal relationships that were developed between the Summit Management Office, Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Forces were instrumental in overcoming organizational differences. But as Colonel Barr (Chief of Staff OPERATION GRIZZLY) reported, "cooperation is one thing [but] joint planning is another."³⁷ Like joint military operations, if joint military/civilian/OGD operations are important, joint planning is essential. Canada's National Security Policy demands interagency cooperation, and that seems to suggest that Canadian Forces *joint* operations in the domestic context must evolve into *joint interagency* operations.³⁸

³⁵ The CF JHQ was established to address this issue. It is, however, predominantly oriented to international operations. Support to domestic operations is executed on an ad hoc basis.

³⁶ OPERATION RECUPERATION Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive LLSAD), A-15/27.

³⁷ Colonel Barr, *The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Interagency Cooperation*, Canadian Military Journal, (Winter 2003-2004): 43.

³⁸ This interagency requirement encompasses continuous interaction with both federal and provincial agencies.

COP PANORAMA (Catastrophic British Columbia Earthquake) is perhaps at the leading edge of the *joint interagency* reality. In fact, it takes the notion of *joint interagency* operations to *joint interagency bi-national* operations. The assigned PANORAMA Task Force will not only operate with Federal and British Columbia authorities, but may also be operating with United States agencies.³⁹ Planning has been ongoing for several years, and MARPAC, LFWA, and MAC(P) have conducted interagency exercises with British Columbia authorities. COP PANORAMA has incorporated many of the lessons from recent domestic operations. From an operational-level command and control perspective, CF JOG has been tasked to provide the JTFHQ, which will be under command of Commander LFWA, who in turn is under the command of the CDS. The task force has an integral air component and maritime component commanders, and is deployable and ready to operate from within the earthquake catastrophe area. This construct has embodied the essential attributes of a centrally planned and executed JTF.

THE NEXT STEP - A NATIONAL JTF HEADQUARTERS?

Force Employment and Joint Concepts - Validated

This review of recent domestic operations has shown that the separation of a mission-based, *force employment* chain of command from a process-based, *force generation* chain of command has been repeatedly validated. With the CDS having direct command over the designated JTFCs, the single chain of command has provided the necessary focus to achieve mission success for contingency operations. To achieve similar degrees of

³⁹ Department of National Defence. CDS CONPLAN 0290/03 PANORAMA – *Canadian Forces Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake in British Columbia – Advance Version*, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, 9 May 2003.

effectiveness in routine operations, we have seen that 1 CAD has also institutionalized the *force employment* construct in support of accomplishing maritime surveillance tasks. By assigning the Commanders of MAC(P) and MAC(A) as line commanders with OPCON authority, 1 CAD provides MAC(P) and MAC(A) with essential force employment authority to execute their responsibilities in the joint environments.⁴⁰ Thus the daily command and control structure is similar to contingency operations. These separate *force employment* structures are helping to eliminate the inherent difficulties in conducting joint operations in what are usually *force generation* command and control systems.

Clearly, for *joint* missions, a JTFC with suitable responsibilities and authorities must be assigned to maintain a maximal balanced command structure. As the analysis demonstrates, *joint* domestic contingency operations under the command of a JTF are now normal practice throughout Canada. To date, the JTFC and the associated headquarters staffs are amassed from one of the eight operational headquarters. The command and control structures for their routine domestic operations normally mirror their more prevalent *force generation* requirements. Consequently, the eight operational level commanders had their staffs have limited experience in conducting joint operations. Canadian *joint* doctrine is still evolving and is not yet firmly established in day-to-day operations at these *force generation* headquarters. No system across the various headquarters is exactly alike and difficulties naturally arise when these headquarters structures transition from *routine* to *contingency* missions, where other services are involved. Commanders and their staffs still have a certain degree of difficulty integrating

⁴⁰ 1 CAD Order 3-308

with other component command staffs, and the application of joint processes remains problematic, particularly during the initial stages of an operation. To solve this dilemma, the introduction of a single task force headquarters, responsible for *force employment* missions throughout Canada, is attractive.

Mason-Crabbe Recommendation

Lynn Mason and Raymond Crabbe analyzed the concept of centralizing all “force employment and force generation functions currently conducted at nine⁴¹ operational headquarters and National Defence Headquarters.”⁴² While their detailed analysis did not support a fully centralized system, their recommendation supported centralized *force employment* and decentralized *force generation* constructs. In their recommended model, two Canadian Forces chains of command would be established: one for all operational-level force employment functions; and one for residual force generation under the existing Environmental Commanders. Through their extensive analysis, they concluded that “[this] would have the distinct advantages of a very effective operational command and control system, and a system of headquarters outside Ottawa to provide the local leadership for force generation, regional representation, mobilization and a number of lesser functions.”⁴³

A centralized *force employment* structure would provide the necessary framework from which to focus the development of national joint processes. With routine *force*

⁴¹ The Joint Operations Group was included in their analysis of the eight domestic operational headquarters.

⁴² Lynn Mason and Raymond Crabbe, *A Centralized Operational Level Headquarters*, Report for the Department of National Defence, December 2000.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 53.

employment operations being subsumed within a single, national joint force chain of command, one command and control system could be applied to both routine and contingency domestic operations. The issues surrounding the transitioning of *force generation* headquarter processes to meet joint contingency operation requirements could be eliminated. Thus, in the context of routine national security tasks, air and maritime and army commanders would report to a single individual. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to define where that single commander would reside or whether there would a geographic focus, it is clear that the reporting chain would not be through the environmental commanders.

A compelling advantage with a single chain of command is that *force employment* processes could be standardized throughout the Canadian Forces, regardless of location. For example, the force employment of air resources would be the same on the West Coast, as it would be on the East Coast, as it would be in central or arctic regions of the country. Should one headquarters staff require augmentation, individuals from other headquarters staffs could easily integrate. Standardized processes result in standardized reporting methodologies. This would, in turn, enhance the “learning” capabilities of the organization by being more readily able to compare lessons learned from one activity to another. The increased mission focus would further enhance the Canadian Forces ability to streamline processes and to be better prepared for future contingencies.

Recently, the United States has established a Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to design, organize and conduct operations throughout North America. It is a centralized

operational-level headquarters that coordinates sea, land and air activity through a single concentrated effort. With the majority of Canadian population near the United States border, it is likely that a major domestic crisis in Canada, whether natural or man-made, will have implications on USNORTHCOM. It is in Canada's interest to ensure that the Canadian Forces can demonstrate autonomous ability to rapidly respond to national crises. However, reality suggests that a bi-national agreement will be pursued to clarify the protocols whereby United States forces can support the Canadian Forces in the provision of military assistance to civilian authorities. Canada must have the mechanisms in place to effectively coordinate emerging bi-national requests with USNORTHCOM.

In a major Canadian disaster relief effort, for which Canadian Forces assistance is requested, a rapid national response will undoubtedly be essential. Contingency plans must be available and ready to be exercised throughout any region in Canada. Since the existing eight operational-level regional headquarters are *force generation* entities and are not structured to plan for, or execute, major relief efforts, a centralized *force employment* headquarters will be necessary to coordinate the interaction of the various geographically dispersed Canadian Forces resources. By definition, this headquarters must be a national entity, able to rapidly coordinate joint operations in any region of Canada. Moreover, it must be deployable, and must maintain continuous liaison with provincial authorities.

Since the tabling of the Mason-Crabbe report in 2000, the Canadian Forces have successfully participated in, and conducted contingency planning for, joint operations

under the JTF model. With these recent successes, and the reinvigorated national security realities, it seems that it is now time to step forward and streamline the domestic *force employment* processes further. Our domestic experiences show that Mason-Crabbe recommendation is valid, and that a centralized operational-level headquarters is required to coordinate contingency operations. To ensure maximum responsiveness throughout any region in Canada, and to provide a single operational-level headquarters interface with USNORTHCOM, a single national joint task force headquarters is required. All that it needed is the strategic will to take that next incremental step to improving Canada's national *joint* operations capability.

CONCLUSION

Since *Unification*, there has been a perpetual tug of war between the interests of each Service and the interests of unification. The national *strategy of commitments* did little to promote the single-service construct and, as a result, the three services remained dominant as force employers until the late 1980s. The Oka crisis changed the Canadian Forces perspectives on command and control. The strong individual service idea was no longer acceptable, and NDHQ had to develop a centralized *force employment* capability.

The 1995 Management, Command and Control Reengineering Team, institutionalized the notion that *force employment* could be separated from *force generation*. Moreover, *force employment* became an NDHQ responsibility, while *force generation* rested with the environmental commanders. The traditional environmental headquarters throughout the country were rationalized and an entire layer of bureaucracy was removed from the

command and control structure. With the environmental commanders moving to Ottawa, eight operational-level headquarters were situated across the country. This structure continues to exist today.

While the eight functional headquarters have been deemed to be operational headquarters within CF terminology, the definition of the operational-level of command suggests otherwise. The eight headquarters are essentially formation-based headquarters that use individual *force generation* processes in their day-to-day functions. They are not, by definition, structured to design, organize and conduct campaigns and major operations. They generally do not have the inherent capacity or expertise to orchestrate sea, land and air activities as one single concentrated *joint effort*.

Routine operations are, to some extent, conducted by each of the eight operational headquarters. Most operations are not *joint*, with the exception of the maritime tasks conducted in the coastal areas of Canadian territories. For these tasks, CAS and CMS have devised a command and control structure that mimics the construct of a joint task force. By designating OPCON authority to the Commanders of MAC(P) and MAC(A), these line commanders now represent virtual air components, responsible to Commander MARPAC and MARLANT, respectively, for force employment missions. However, Commander MAC(P) and MAC(A) are also responsible to Commander 1 CAD for *force employment* missions. This creates an anomaly that prevents either MAC from being recognized as operating within in a true joint task force concept. MAC(P), however, has taken the initiative to established the *force employment* functionally of an air component

command. Their day-to-day processes are consistent with those found in joint task forces.

An analysis of recent domestic operations demonstrates that contingency operations have firmly adopted the JTF constructs. Under the command of the CDS, the JTFC conducts air, land and sea activities in a single concentrated effort. However, the JTFs have used the existing operational headquarters as the fundamental building blocks. Since the processes in each of the operational headquarters are different, each joint operation has its own unique integration issues. Recognizing the need for the JTFs to be deployable, it is unreasonable for the eight operational headquarters to develop individual deployable capabilities.

The next step in the evolution of the Canadian Forces joint capabilities is to establish a centralized deployable joint force headquarters. The 2000 Mason-Crabbe report recommends a structure under which a single operational-level commander could conduct all force employment missions. Within this construct, the existing environmental commanders would retain the responsibility for residual *force generation* activities. The domestic JTF experiences that we have attained over the past several years have demonstrated that the Mason-Crabbe recommendations have merit. With the advent of Northern Command in the United States, a strong centralized joint task force construct, capable to managing crises throughout the country, seems to be even more appropriate at this juncture. We have demonstrated the value of JTF concepts, and now is the time to

consolidate the lessons learned and introduce a single national joint task force headquarters responsible for all domestic force employment missions.

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