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We Fight As One?

The Future of the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group

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ABSTRACT

The Canadian Forces command and control structure has evolved over the last decade to meet the changing demands of domestic and international operations. This evolution has resulted in the creation of the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group to provide operational-level command and control capabilities for contingency operations. Since its formation in June 2000, it has been involved in numerous operations and exercises to develop and hone its capabilities, many which have been proven on real operations. Throughout this period there has been continual problems encountered with command and control for contingency operations. Now that the Joint Operations Group has reached its full operational capability it will be argued that it must be given the responsibility for the operational level command and control of contingency operations. An examination of Canadian Force concepts, doctrine and operations over the last few years supports the argument for change to the current distribution of responsibilities between National Defence Headquarters and the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group. Two options are presented for comparison against a set of enhanced Canadian Forces principles of command. It is shown that the proposed changes are the ideal method to benefit from the investment in the Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group and improve command and control on future contingency operations.

The side that has superiors and subordinates united in purpose will take the victory¹

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Forces (CF) command and control structure has evolved over the last decade to meet the demands of domestic and international operations, as well as, force reductions because of the 1994 Defence White Paper². During the 1990 Oka Crisis and the 1991 Persian Gulf War, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) developed a dedicated joint staff to command operations at the strategic level.³ At the operational level, the ad hoc creation of a Joint Headquarters in Bahrain prompted the CF to consider forming a permanent capability for future operations.⁴

In 1994, Armed Forces Council directed the development of a CF operational level command and control capability.⁵ In 1996, NDHQ posted a 35 person joint headquarters cadre staff to

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, trans. Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 113.

² The Defence White Paper directed a reduction of one third in resources devoted to headquarters functions. This was later increased to a cut of one half by NDHQ. Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1994), 41.

³ Vice-Admiral (ret'd) G.L. Garnett, "The Evolution of the Canadian Approach to Joint and Combined Operations at the Strategic and Operational Level," *Canadian Military Journal* Winter 2002-2003, 4.

⁴ Morin, Major Jean H. and Lieutenant-Commander Richard Gimblett, *Operation Friction, 1990-1991: The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf*, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 113-126. The challenges faced in forming a joint headquarters on operations were not lost on NDHQ staffs. There was a clear need for a deployable joint HQ.

⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, NDHQ Action Directive D/12/94 Development of Canadian Forces Joint Operational Level Command and Control Capability (NDHQ: 29 October 1994), 1.

the Army's 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, which was made responsible for providing a deployable Joint Headquarters.⁶ Several domestic operations tested the Joint Headquarters capability.⁷ During the same period, the CF created a project to evolve the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters into the CF Joint Operations Group (JOG), whose role would be to “. . . provide operational-level command and control capabilities for the CF . . .” Since its formation in June 2000, the JOG has progressively developed its capabilities, reaching full operational capability three years later. The motto it adopted “We Fight As One” was to signify its joint war-fighting role.⁸

Within NDHQ, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) is responsible to plan and control operations. Over the last decade, due to the lack of dedicated staff and the high tempo of operations, much of the strategic level functions were not done well or at all, in order to complete the essential operational level functions. Now that the JOG is formally operationally capability, it now the time for the CF to adjust the responsibilities, processes and structure of NDHQ and the JOG with respect to CF contingency operations.

⁶ Boyle, General J.E.J, NDHQ Action Directive D/3 /96 Joint Operational Level Command and Control Capability (NDHQ: May 1996), paragraph 8 page 7.

⁷ These operations included support to Manitoba due to floods in 1997, support to Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick due to the effects of an ice storm in 1998 and the potential support to the federal and all provincial governments in December 1999 to January 2000.

⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, *CF Obtains New Capability – a Deployable Joint Headquarters*; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/CFJOG/article_e.asp; Internet; accessed 16 September 2003.

The thesis of this paper is that the JOG must be given the full authority and responsibilities for the command and control of all CF contingency operations. The first part will explain some key terms and command and control principle, before examining the CF's concepts and doctrine for the command and control of contingency operations. The second part will then examine the reality experienced by JOG on three recent contingency operations. Based on this analysis, potential options to resolve the issue will be evaluated in the third part. It will be shown that the best option is to transition the JOG headquarters to become the sole CF operational level headquarters responsible for contingency operations.

PART ONE – THEORY

Theory exists so that one does not have to start afresh every time sorting out the raw material and ploughing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education; not accompany him to the battlefield.⁹

A review of the CF theory of command and control needs to first start with some understanding of its principles of command and control. The CF Doctrine manual lists six principles of command for the CF (Table 1). These principles are based on a CF philosophy of command where commanders must ensure that their subordinates understand their intentions and the assigned mission. In turn, the subordinates will be given as much freedom of action and sufficient resources to decide how to best achieve their mission.

⁹ Karl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 141.

A review of the Environmental doctrine shows only the Canadian Army has expanded on these command principles. Their Command manual articulates five fundamentals of command based on the need to develop trust and mutual understanding between commanders and subordinates at all levels. A comparison of the two is shown in the Table 1.

CF Principles of Command	Army Command Fundamentals
<p>Unity of Command. A single, clearly identified commander will be appointed for each operation. He or she has the authority to direct and control the committed resources and is responsible and accountable for success or failure.</p>	<p>Unity of Effort. Commanders must impart a clear sense of purpose to his subordinates. Subordinates must understand the intent of their immediate superiors and those two levels up. This unity of purposes at three levels of command promotes mutual understanding and allows subordinates to act purposefully in an unexpected situation</p>
<p>Delegation of Authority. Commanders may delegate all or part of their authority if the scope and complexity of an operation requires it. How much authority is delegated, and to whom, must be clear.</p>	<p>Decentralized Authority. Decentralizing decision-making includes setting decision thresholds as low as possible to allow for rapid decision-making and reduced flow of information up the chain of command. This requires delegation of specific authorities. A commander who delegates authority for action to a subordinate is required to furnish that subordinate with sufficient resources.</p>
<p>Freedom of Action. Once the mission is established and orders given, maximum freedom of action is given to subordinate commanders.</p>	<p>Timely and Effective Decision-Making. Commanders must be capable of operating efficiently in an environment of great uncertainty. Commanders must be able to make, sound and timely decisions, faster than an adversary.</p>
<p>Chain of Command. The command structure is hierarchical and must be clear and unequivocal. Bypassing levels of command in either direction is only justified in exceptional circumstances.</p>	<p>Trust. A superior needs to have earned not only the trust of his subordinates, but also to place his trust in them. The basis of this two-way trust is shared implicit intent, which enhances mutual understanding.</p>
<p>Continuity of Command. A clear succession of command, well understood at all levels, is required.</p>	<p>Mutual Understanding. Commanders understand the issues and concerns facing their subordinates based on shared perception of military doctrine</p>
<p>Span of Control. The assigned resources and activities must be such that one person can exercise effective command and control.</p>	

Table 1 - Comparison of CF Principles of Command¹⁰ and Army Command Fundamentals¹¹

¹⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/AF-000, *Canadian Forces Doctrine (Third Draft)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, March 2003), 56.

¹¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-003/FP-000, *Command* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 21 July 1996), 30.

For the purposes of this paper, these principles and fundamentals have been amalgamated into one list at Table 2. This new list, though not officially part of CF doctrine, will be used later to evaluate command and control aspects during contingency operations.

Amalgamated CF Command Principles and Functions
<p>Unity of Command. A single, clearly identified commander will be appointed for each mission. The commander has the authority to direct and control the committed resources. The commander is responsible and accountable for their success or failure of the mission.</p>
<p>Chain of Command. The chain of command and the related authorities must be clear and tailored for the mission. A clear succession of command, well understood at all levels, will be implemented to ensure proper command authority throughout the conduct of the mission.</p>
<p>Decentralized Authority. Decentralizing decision-making includes setting decision thresholds as low as possible to allow for rapid decision-making and reduced flow of information up the chain of command. This requires delegation of specific authorities. A commander who delegates authority for action to a subordinate is required to furnish that subordinate with sufficient resources. Once the mission is established and orders given, maximum freedom of action is given to subordinate commanders.</p>
<p>Span of Control The assigned resources and activities must be such that a single commander can exercise effective command and control, even in crisis and war.</p>
<p>Unity of Purpose. Commanders must impart a clear sense of purpose to their subordinates. Subordinates must understand the intent of their immediate commander and the superior commanders two levels up the chain of command. This unity of purposes at three levels of command promotes mutual understanding and allows subordinates to act purposefully in an unexpected situation without reference to the commander.</p>
<p>Mutual Understanding and Trust. Commanders understand the issues and concerns facing their subordinates based on shared perception of military doctrine, which enhances mutual understanding. A superior needs to have earned not only the trust of his subordinates, but also to place his trust in them. The basis of this two-way trust is shared implicit intent.</p>

Table 2 – Revised CF Command and Control Principles

In addition to the above principles, it is also important to distinguish between the two types of CF operations. Routine operations are those for which one of the CF Environments¹² has been specifically tasked, organized and equipped. These operations are normally commanded

¹² In Canada there is officially only one service, the CF. Environmental refers to the three environments within the CF: maritime, land, and air.

from one of eight operational level headquarters¹³ across Canada under command of one of the Environments. Contingency operations are the remaining CF operations. They can be conducted either domestically or internationally.¹⁴ The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) commands these operations, with assistance from the DCDS. These operations are normally joint and combined in nature and therefore require detailed planning and close control to ensure mission success. The JOG has been designated as the deployable operational level headquarters for contingency operations. With those principles and definitions in mind, let us turn to the current CF concepts and doctrine related to the strategic and operational levels of command and control.

The source for CF concepts is the 1994 Defence White Paper.¹⁵ Strategy 2020, published in 1999, builds on the White Paper and provides the overall strategic direction for the CF. It describes certain objectives to meet this strategy. The one related to command and control is *Globally Deployable*. The five year target for this objective is to: “Complete the conversion of the Joint Force Headquarters to a deployable C⁴I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) organization capable of national command and logistic support

¹³ The eight headquarters are the two naval headquarters on the West and East Coasts (MARPAAC and MARLANT respectively), the four Land Force Area Headquarters in Edmonton, Toronto, Quebec City, and Halifax, the 1st Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg and CF Northern Area Headquarters in Yellowknife.

¹⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, *Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 06 Nov 2002), 1-3.

¹⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1994).

at the operational level of war.”¹⁶ This target was achieved with the JOG in June 2003.

However, the development of the support command and control concepts has not progressed at the same rate.

The Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS), who is responsible for CF strategic concepts, is currently developing a new taxonomy for concept development as shown at Figure 1.




Figure 1: Taxonomy of Concepts from a presentation by LCol Wayne Eyre, DDA 3 to the SOC Development retreat 24-26 September 2003.

The new capstone Strategic Operating Concept document is currently being written. It will guide the development of other operational concepts, including subordinate (environmental and joint), integrating¹⁷ and functional.¹⁸ In terms of joint command and control, the draft

¹⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of the CF: A Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1999), 6-10.

¹⁷ Integrating concepts include network-enabled operations (NETOPS), Joint, Interagency, Multi-national and Public (JIMP) and effects based operations (EBO).

document states, “the CF must adopt, at the strategic and operational levels, a more agile Joint Command and Control . . . To implement [it] the CF must review roles and responsibilities currently carried out by the various headquarters at the strategic and operational levels.”¹⁹ In addition, the draft subordinate CF Joint Operating Concept 2012, being written by the NDHQ J7 staff, states that by 2012 the Joint Operations Group will be solely responsible for the conduct of operations, whether routine or contingency, in the future.²⁰ There is a clear indication that the CF intends to eventually make the JOG more responsible for the conduct of CF operations. What is not clear is what changes will be required and how they will be implemented. To assist in answering those questions, it is important to examine the CF’s command and control doctrine.

The CF Doctrine Board approved in April 2003 a new CF doctrine hierarchy, based on the continental staff system,²¹ with the *CF Doctrine* manual as the capstone document, which is currently not approved. However, the third draft is being staffed for comments. The draft manual contains the current CF practices in the areas of command and control at both the

¹⁸ Functional concepts includes Human Resources, Information Management and Sustainment, etc.

¹⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strategic Operating Concept (Draft)*; available from http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/cfsoc/chp4_e.asp; Internet; accessed 7 October 2003; Supporting Concepts – C2.

²⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, *CF Joint Operating Concept 2012, Draft 24 July 2003*, 1-3.

²¹ The continental staff system is used throughout the world to organize staffs. The Canadian system has nine branches: J-1, personnel; J-2, intelligence; J-3, operations; J-4, logistics; J-5, plans; J-6, communications and electronics; J-7, training and doctrine, J-8, finance, and J-9 civil military co-operation.

strategic and operational levels. An examination of it, in the areas of command and control responsibilities, planning and execution will help formulate options for the future of the JOG.

The first area to examine is the split of responsibilities for command and control at the strategic and operational levels. First, it is important to understand the definitions of these two levels and their fundamental differences. NATO defines the strategic level of war as “The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them.”²² The operational level is defined as “The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.”²³ The NATO capstone manual, AJP-1, further clarifies the levels of war by stating,

The key to delineation is that normally strategic authority allocates objectives and resources, setting necessary limitations; while, at the operational level, the commander orders the activities of his assigned formations in pursuit of his own plan of campaign. At the tactical level, commanders employ units for combat in order to achieve the military objectives of the campaign.²⁴

The CF Doctrine manual states:

The military strategic level is concerned with determining the military strategic goals and the desired end-state, by crafting strategy, allocating

²² NATO, AAP-6 (2003), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French) (Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, Dec 2002), 2-S-10.

²³ Ibid, 2-O-2.

²⁴ NATO, *AJP-01 (A) Change 1 Allied Joint Doctrine* (Brussels: Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), April 1999), 20.

resources and applying constraints as directed by the political leadership. The operational level links the strategic and tactical levels. The focus at this level is on operational art; it is at operational level that major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic goals.²⁵

Thus in accordance with NATO and CF doctrine, NDHQ, at the strategic level, is responsible for crafting the strategy, while the JOG, at the operational level, is responsible for developing and implementing the campaign plan of an operation. But, as we will see next, that clear distinction for planning is not used in the CF Doctrine manual.

The CF Doctrine manual, in fact, introduces a new concept of strategic campaign planning. It states, “Campaign planning is concerned with defining the strategic conditions which determine success, translating policy goals into military strategic objectives, assigning operational level command, imposing limitations and allocating resources. Campaign planning at NDHQ is confined, as far as is practicable, to the strategic level, leaving operational level activities to the designated [Task Force Commander].²⁶ This statement appears in the CF Operations manual but it refers to the development of strategic directives and not campaign plans.²⁷ It also contains an annex on strategic campaign planning, which is almost verbatim from NATO documents for the operational art and campaigning, except for the inclusion “strategic” in the title. It would appear that this is an attempt to amalgamation operational level campaign planning with strategic mission analysis and direction within

²⁵ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/AF-000, *CF Doctrine (Third Draft)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, March 2003), 14.

²⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/AF-000, *CF Doctrine (Third Draft)* (Ottawa: DND, March 2003), 42-43.

²⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations* (Ottawa: DND, 3-1.

NDHQ. Since there is no explanation of operational campaign planning, it appears to suggest that this would not be one of the above activities performed by the operational headquarters, like the JOG. Clearly this variance from NATO doctrine needs to be reviewed and explained in the next draft of the manual.

A third area to examine is with respect to the command and control of a Task Force during contingency operations. When a contingency operation is authorized, the Environmental Chiefs of Staff will be tasked to provide forces. Once they declare the forces operationally ready, the forces will be transferred under operational command of the CDS. The CDS will then, at an appropriate time, transfer the forces under operational command or control of the Task Force Commander.

At the operational level, a Task Force Headquarters, normally provided by the JOG, is deployed to support the Task Force Commander. If forces are provided by more than one Environment, the Task Force will be designated a Joint Task Force (JTF), and the commander called a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC). The manual makes passing reference to the fact that the JOG also provides a logistic support capability through the CF Joint Support Group, and communications support to all deployed missions through the CF Joint Signal Regiment. There is no information on the role of the JOG in areas such as strategic reconnaissance, liaison, mission activation and mission closeout.²⁸

²⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/AF-000, *CF Doctrine (Third Draft)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, March 2003), 66.

The NDHQ Joint Staff provides strategic level oversight and administrative control of CF operations. The strategic intelligence (J2), operations (J3), plans (J5), training and doctrine (J7) and civil-military affairs (J9) staffs are found within the DCDS Group. The remaining support staff functions, such as personnel (J1), logistics (J4), communication and information systems (J6), finance (J8), and specialists are provided by other organizations within NDHQ. The Joint Staff Action Team, headed by the Chief of Staff J3, coordinates the solution of problems associated with CF operations. It is important to note that since there is no equivalent Chief of Staff J4 to integrate the support functions the Chief of Staff J3 is solely responsible for integrating all of the staff functions.

In terms of actual control of operations, the CF Doctrine manual states, “Canada’s command and control structure for operations differs from those of our major allies in one important respect: most CF operations are controlled directly from the national headquarters rather than from a subordinate, single-service or joint headquarters established for that purpose.”²⁹ No explanation is provided for this major variance between the CF and its allies.

In summary, the new CF doctrine, which is based on actual practice, varies from NATO doctrine in that it merges the strategic and operational level planning and control functions at NDHQ. Though regular coordination occurs, the NDHQ Joint Staff lacks unity of command since the majority of the Joint Staff are not in the formal chain of command of the DCDS. The absence of a Chief of Staff for support functions puts unnecessary burden on the Chief of Staff J3 to integrate both operations and support aspects in planning and controlling

²⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/AF-000 *CF Doctrine (Third Draft)* (Ottawa: DND Canada, March 2003), 62.

operations. The CF command and control doctrine is inconsistent with the emerging concept of transferring to the JOG the responsibility for command and control of both routine and contingency operations by no later than 2012. An examination of recent operations will demonstrate the need to conduct this transfer of responsibilities from NDHQ to the JOG is urgently required.

PART TWO – PRACTICE

“By analysing historical command [and control] systems at work we may hope to gain a better idea of how it was done, successfully or otherwise.”³⁰

The JOG has played an important role in the command and control during recent CF contingency operations. Though it was formed in 2000, its capabilities were built on the practical experiences of the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, stretching as far back as December 1991 when it mounted and deployed as the Canadian Joint Force Somalia Headquarters. However, there have been many improvements since that time and thus the focus of this investigation will focus on three recent operations. Before identifying these operations it would be useful to first describe the actual role and capabilities of the JOG.

The JOG was created by the Defence Services Program project number 2001, *CF Joint Headquarters/ Joint Task Force Headquarters*. The JOG is a formation that comprised of two units – the Joint Headquarters and the Joint Signal Regiment. The Joint Headquarters is a permanent, operational-level joint staff with representation from all the staff branches. The

³⁰ Martin Van Creveld, *Command In War*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 15.

Joint Signal Regiment provides dedicated intelligence, communication and information systems, and combat service support capabilities to the Joint Headquarters.³¹

The JOG is a deployable operational-level command and control capability, which is capable of performing various roles during CF contingency operations from crisis up to and including war fighting. The JOG will form a JTF Headquarters that will operate in one of two possible roles depending on whether operational command is retained or passed to the coalition commander.

Role 1A. The JTFC retains operational command of the assigned force;

Role 1B. The JTFC retains operational command but transfer operational control of the assigned forces to another headquarters; and

Role 2. The JTFC transfers operational command of the assigned forces but he remains as the Canadian National Commander.³²

The project team developed three progressive operational capability levels in line with the roles of the JOG. Operational capability level one was the development of some key capabilities in support of contingency operations, such as the command and control of humanitarian operations, the provision of operational reconnaissance teams, and activation and closeout of a theatre of operations. This Initial Operational Capability was reached in October 2000. Operational capability level 2 builds on this and included the training and development of operational level staff to allow the Joint Force Commander to effectively

³¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, Project Charter DSP 2001 CF Joint Headquarters/Joint Task Force Headquarters Version AL-1(Ottawa: DCDS, 15 November 2000), 3-4.

³² Canada, Department of National Defence, Project Charter DSP 2001, CF Joint Headquarters/Joint Task Force Headquarters (Ottawa: DCDS, March 1999), 2-3.

command and control CF elements as part of a coalition led by another nation. This Final Operational Capability was reached on 20 June 2003.³³ A further operational capability was to be the development of additional staff and operational level capabilities so that Canada could be the lead nation in a coalition. The decision to develop this capability has not been determined at this time. The relationship of the operational capabilities, the types of operations, and the assigned roles is shown at Table 3.³⁴

The three operations that will be examined are in bold in Table 3. The first, Operation ABACUS, was a good example of a Role 1A operation. Operation APOLLO and Operation ECLIPSE were good examples of Role 1B and Role 2 respectively. This review is based on primary sources documents, after action reports and lessons learned staff action directives.

³³ Canada, Department of National Defence, *CANFORGEN 082/03 CDS 074 201945Z Jun 03 CF Joint Operations Group (CF JOG) Full Operational Capability (FOC) Declaration*; available from http://vcds.dwan.ca/vcds_exec/pubs/canforgen/2003/082-03_e.asp; DWAN; accessed 1 October 2003.

³⁴ Adapted from Gosselin, Colonel J.P.Y.D. *CF JOG Full Operational Capability* (CF JOG: 1901-2 (J5 Mar) 22 April 2003), 12/14.

**Initial
Operational
Capability**

15 Oct 00

**Final Operational
Capability**

20 Jun 03

**To Be
Determined**

Cap ility	Operational Capability Level 1	Operational Capability Level 2			Operational Capability Level 3
Type of Operation	Domestic & International <u>Operations</u>	Domestic Operation Functioning as Op Commander (JTFHQ)	International Operation Not Functioning as Op Commander (JTFHQ/NCE)		International Operation Functioning as Op Commander (CJTFHQ)
And	Functioning as Op Commander (DART HQ)	Retain Operational Command	Retain Operational Command	Pass Operational Command	Retain Operational Command
Command Relationships	Assistance to Op Commander (Ln & Recce, Theatre Activation and Mission Closeout)	Retain Operational Control	Pass Operational Control	Retain Administrative Control	Retain Operational Control
Role	Partial Capability All Roles	Role 1A	Role 1B	Role 2	Canada as the lead nation (Role 1A)
Exercises		OP ASSISTANCE (97)	Ex UNIFIED SPIRIT (00)		OP ASSURANCE (95)
And		OP RECUPERATION (98)	OP ECLIPSE (00)		
Operations		OP ABACUS (98-00)	Ex JOINT JAVELIN THRUST (01)	OP APOLLO (01-03)	
		Ex JOINT WOLF (02)		Ex COOPERATIVE JAGUAR (03)	

OPERATION ABACUS

OPERATION ABACUS was an example of a contingency operation where the employment of operational level headquarters proven to be highly successful. At the time, NDHQ was being stretched in maintaining control of operations around the world. The CDS recognized that the scope of the Year 2000 problem was well beyond the CF. NDHQ staffs, led by the DCDS, would need to be engaged with other government departments and other national militaries in preparing for potential problems prior to, during and after midnight on December 31, 1999. Therefore, it was agreed that an operational level commander would be required to command and control the CF in Canada, while the DCDS would command and control the CF deployed overseas. As a result, the Commander of the 1st Canadian Division was appointed the JTFC for the operation. The operation formally commenced in March 1998 and ceased in February 2000.

Due to the operational tempo of the CF at the time³⁵, the DCDS tasked the JTFC with drafting the strategic level guidance and plan. The approved Strategic Planning Guidance clearly stated the split of responsibilities between the staffs. The DCDS was responsible for strategic C2, intelligence, co-ordination of resources, and direction. The JTFC was given the

³⁵ During the period March 1998 to January 2000, the CF was also involved in conflict and later peacekeeping in Kosovo, and UN peacekeeping in East Timor, in addition to Bosnia.

responsibility for operational level planning and execution of the operation.³⁶ The JTF Headquarters used the operational planning process extensively.³⁷

The command and control structure was based on four subordinate JTFs and a Joint Force Air Component Headquarters co-located with the JTF headquarters. The command and control structure was successful because it was based on a clear chain of command with clearly identified commanders at all levels of command. The command relationships between the various elements of the CF were practiced through several major exercises, until they were well understood.

The various exercises in preparation for the operation also brought to light a number of areas that needed improvement. There was misunderstanding of basic C2 terminology among the ECS and NDHQ staff. Familiarity with joint doctrine varied throughout the levels of command and concerted effort was made to bring staffs to the same level.³⁸ The DCDS Instruction for Domestic Operations was unsuitable due to the complexity of the operation that it had to be rewritten.³⁹

Overall, both the preparations and the actual operations were highly successful. The fact that there were dedicated staffs at the operational level to address these issues meant they could

³⁶ Crabbe, Lieutenant -General R.R, *Strategic Direction Operation Abacus (Y2K)* (NDHQ: file 3000-15 (DCDS), 31 August 1998), Annex B.

³⁷ Burden, Major D, NDHQ Joint Staff J3 Lessons Learned Questionnaire OP ABACUS (NDHQ: 6 December 1999 (sic)), 18.

³⁸ Ibid, serial 10, 5.

³⁹ Ibid, serial 8, 4

be resolved over time without great impact on the strategic level staff, which continued to control contingency operations overseas. With the formation of the JOG six months later, it was anticipated that future operations would follow the same approach. Unfortunately, that was not the case.

OP ECLIPSE

In the summer of 2000, the JOG was involved in training new staff and preparing to achieve its initial operational capability. At NDHQ the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia was climaxing and the UN was trying to deploy a peacekeeping force. Canada, along with the Netherlands, had previously agreed to contribute forces to the United Nations Standby High Readiness Brigade. This was an opportunity to debut the organization on operations. It was also an opportunity to practice the JOG's newly developed Theatre Activation Team and Mission Closeout capabilities. The operation formally commenced on 6 December 2000 with the arrival of the Theatre Activation Team and ended with the departure of the Mission Closeout Team in July 2001.⁴⁰

The CF commenced strategic planning in conjunction with the Netherlands. It was agreed that Canada would provide an Infantry Company Group, from 2nd Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, as part of a Dutch Infantry Battalion. NDHQ decided not to involve staffs outside of Ottawa, including the JOG, due to concerns over the release of information that the Netherlands was considering to join Canada in the operation before its government approved that decision. The DCDS staffs, which were already overworked, were now required to conduct both strategic and operational planning for another contingency operation.

In order to save time, the formal operational planning process was not followed causing many problems later on. Though the information was available, the CDS did not produce an initiating directive. While some staff planning guidance was provided for the mission

⁴⁰ Maisonneuve, Major General, J.O.M, *Operation ECLIPSE Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive (LLSAD)* (NDHQ: file 3350-165/E9 (J7 Lessons Learned)), A1.

analysis phase, in subsequent planning phases only verbal guidance was offered.⁴¹ No written guidance was ever produced for the company group option. There was never a statement of the Commander's Intent from the strategic level. The Land Staff actually wrote the strategic mission statement for subsequent approval by the J Staff. Insufficient information was available to allow the staff to develop any formal Course of Action analysis or recommendations. Throughout the planning period various members of the J Staff made different assumptions, occasionally worked at cross purposes. This lack of a common understanding and unity of purpose resulted in staff time and effort being wasted.⁴²

The JOG was tasked with providing the Theatre Activation Team for the operation. The JOG developed a campaign plan, but attempts to coordinate the JOG campaign plan with the strategic plan were unsuccessful.⁴³ As a result the Theatre Activation Team deployed into theatre without clear strategic and operational objectives. Due to the late appointment of the Canadian National Commander, the Commanding Officer of the Theatre Activation Team became the de facto national commander during the early part of the mission. The Theatre Activation Team passed control of the operation to the National Command Element staff after seven weeks. Six months later at the end of the operation the JOG provided a Mission Closeout Team to allow the CF elements to depart quickly out of the theatre back to Canada.

⁴¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *DCDS Joint Staff Planning Guidance: Options for UNMEE* (NDHQ: file 3350-1 (J3 Intl 2-1), 16 June 2000.)

⁴² Maisonneuve, Major General, J.O.M. *Operation ECLIPSE Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive (LLSAD)* (NDHQ: file 3350-165/E9 (J7 Lessons Learned)), A3/15.

In summary, the operation raised many issues related to the role of the JOG in contingency operations. The late appointment of the Task Force Commander affected unity of command. The lack of unity of purpose in the NDHQ Joint Staff resulted in uncoordinated staff action. The fact that the JOG was not included in the earlier planning and later the unwillingness by NDHQ to review their campaign plan made it difficult to establish trust and mutual understanding between the staffs. Though the deployments of the Theatre Activation Team and Mission Closeout Team were very successful, the JOG had yet to prove itself in the command of a mission. That opportunity was to follow a short three months later.

OP APOLLO

Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the CF started discussing with the United States options of forces that Canada could contribute to the fight against terrorism. On 9 October a reconnaissance team traveled from Ottawa to the US Central Command in Tampa, Florida. Over approximately the next two weeks, the team conducted strategic planning to determine Canada's contribution. On 26 October, an operational level formation was established known as the Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia. The staffs of the JOG were used to form the JTF Headquarters. At its peak included a Canadian naval task group of four warships, an infantry battle group from 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry, strategic and tactical airlift, long-range patrol aircraft, and a National Support Unit.

The split of responsibilities between the JTF and NDHQ established a clear chain of command. JTFC was made responsible to the DCDS for all matters related to national

command, including the operational readiness, administration and discipline of the Task Force. He was also responsible for monitoring the operational employment of the JTF; taking necessary action to ensure Canadian policies were respected; conducting liaison with Commander Central Command; and ensuring that the DCDS was informed of significant issues.⁴⁴

The command and control structure at the operational level was complicated because the operational HQ was in Tampa while the JTF units consisted of differing operational types in a variety of geographic locations throughout South West Asia. The JTFC made several requests to NDHQ to permit him deploy his headquarters into the theatre to ensure effective command, but they were all refused because of the need by NDHQ to have access to information from the Central Command Headquarters. The result was the commander spending much of his time travel to and from the theatre. The JTFC for Rotation 1 considered that the separation of the deployed elements from the operational level commander was a risky command structure.⁴⁵

There were a number of planning and control issues that arose during the operation. The strategic planning team in Tampa focused their efforts on providing whatever forces were available based on their readiness levels and without fully considering the implications with

⁴⁴ Gosselin, Colonel J.P.Y.D. Joint Force Command and Control. Briefing to CFC Course 29, 21 November 2002, slide 20, 22, 24, and 26.

⁴⁵ Lucas, Major General J.S, *Operation Apollo Lessons Learned Staff Action Directive (SAD)* (NDHQ: file 3350-165/A27 (J7 Lessons Learned, 30 April 2003), B-14 to B-15.

respect to sustainment in the operational planning process.⁴⁶ As a result, all the support elements were task tailored for a specific capability resulting in six different support elements in the theatre at different locations.⁴⁷

It was also difficult to conduct medium term planning for the ongoing operation⁴⁸. While the operational level planners in Tampa worked with CENTCOM staff, NDHQ had no strategic level mid-term planners. They had to reassign J3 staff to assist the J5 staff in strategic planning tasks. The J4 staff, on the other hand, did all the strategic and operational planning within NDHQ. This created an imbalance of J3, J4, J5 planning responsibilities in NDHQ and between NDHQ and the JTF.

There was constant pressure by NDHQ to get information from the theatre on the activities of the JTF. The JTF headquarters could seldom filter requests or provide the information necessary to NDHQ. As a result, NDHQ bypassed the chain of command and contacted the units directly. These requests required considerable effort for the units, especially the infantry battalion and created a separate flow of information outside of the chain of command.

In summary, OP APOLLO demonstrated again the need to have an operational level headquarters, like the JOG, available to conduct planning and control of the assigned forces. The inability of the JTFC to deploy into the theatre resulted in command and control

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, B-6 and B-38-39

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, B-38. There was one for the navy, four for the air force and one army.

⁴⁸ See Commander CJTFSWA OP APOLLO ROTO 1 Tour End Report, 3350-134-1 (Comd) 21 Oct 02, Annex A para 47

problems. The demand by NDHQ for information from theatre resulted in their violation of the chain of command. The NDHQ staffs were inadequately structured and resourced to conduct their strategic planning functions.

PART THREE – OPTIONS AND A SOLUTION

There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.⁴⁹

The ability of the JOG to contribute to the success of CF operations over such a short period demonstrated the value of having a well-trained, operational level headquarters. Success was achieved when there was a clear split in responsibilities between the strategic and operational levels, the chain of command was respected and authority was decentralized to allow for freedom of action. Problems occurred when there was a lack of unity of purpose, due to unclear strategic direction, incomplete campaign planning, and lack of coordination between operation and support staffs at the strategic level.

A comparison of the actions of both NDHQ and the JOG on the above operations against the proposed CF principles of command was conducted (Table 4). The results suggest that when the principles of command were followed the operation was more successful in terms of command and control. The current merging at NDHQ of strategic and operational functions needs to be re-examined with the arrival of the JOG on the scene. There continues to be a need to also structure the staffs in NDHQ so they can achieve both unity of command and

⁴⁹ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 21.

purpose. In terms of planning, the strategic level should focus on developing military strategy, while the operational level carries on with campaign planning. In both cases, the formal operational planning process must be followed. During the conduct of operations, NDHQ must use the operational level headquarters to provide them information instead of contacting the tactical units directly. Clearly, there is a need to change as there continues to be constant problems with command and control on CF operations. The question is what are the options available to resolve the situation.

PRINCIPLES	OPERATION ABACUS	OPERATION ECLIPSE	OPERATION APOLLO
Unity of Command.	Yes	No. The JTF Commander was appointed too late to deploy on the strategic reconnaissance or arrive in theatre with the Theatre Activation Team.	Yes.
Chain of Command.	Yes	Yes	No. NDHQ violated the chain of command to get information on the Task Force elements directly
Decentralized Authority.	Yes	Yes	No. The Task Force Commander was not allowed to deploy his headquarters into the theatre of operations to effectively command the Task Force
Span of Control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unity of Purpose.	Yes.	No. The incomplete use of the OPP caused a lack of unity of purpose for many of the NDHQ staffs, which resulted in problems in coordination.	No. The lack of agreement on producing a coordinated sustainment plan resulted in overlaps in sustainment efforts until the NSU was created.
Trust and Mutual Understanding	No. Understanding of joint doctrine varied greatly.	No. Trust between the JOG and DCDS staffs were strained due to their exclusion from the early planning.	Yes.

Table 4 – Comparison of Command Principles and Operations

The options for resolving these issues are related to how best assign between NDHQ and the JOG the responsibility for strategic and operational level command and control functions. Currently, NDHQ is performing many of the operational functions related to contingency operations. On the other hand, the JOG is performing only some of the operational functions in peace, such as non-combatant evacuation⁵⁰ while negotiating the transfer of others, like the CF Contractor Augmentation Program.⁵¹ Any solution must clarify what and where these functions will be performed. The solution has to address its ability to provide effective command and control during peace and war. The principles of command also need to be considered.

Two options are envisioned. The first option, known as NDHQ Plus, is to give the DCDS the responsibility for both strategic and operational functions, while retaining the JOG for large domestic and international operations. The second option, known as JOG Plus, is to define and allocate responsibilities so that NDHQ is responsible for strategic level functions and the JOG for operational level functions.

The NDHQ Plus option has been considered before. In 2000, the VCDS contracted Vice Admiral (retired) Mason and Lieutenant General (retired) Crabbe to complete a study of to create a single centralized operational level HQ for the CF. The conclusion of their study was

⁵⁰ Gauvin, Commodore J.J., *Non-Combat Evacuation Operation (NEO) – Joint Operation(sic) Group (JOG) Way Ahead* (NDHQ Ottawa: file 3450-7 (J3 Intl Plans 2), 19 March 2003), paragraph 1.

⁵¹ Turner, Colonel J.M., *CF JOG Reservations First Edition of CANCAP Program Governance Document Devolution of Oversight Responsibilities at the Operational Level* (Canadian Forces Joint Operations Group, Kingston: file 1901-1-10 (Comd), 11 July 2003), 1-2.

that model not be adopted but that a new “third” option be considered in its place. This option would transfer all force employment responsibilities to a single operational level CF Joint Headquarters under command of the DCDS. The NDHQ Plus option is similar, but it will only retain the JOG for certain contingency operations that require the deployment of a headquarters.

The advantages of the NDHQ Plus option are that the ability to provide information to the CDS and government will be enhanced for most contingency operations. Command and control would be centralized in the DCDS, except when there was a need for a deployable headquarters. The disadvantages are that the distinction between the strategic and operational planning functions will be difficult to maintain, the structure will not be the same for crisis and war. The investment made in forming the JOG and JSG would not be fully realized.

In terms of principles of command this option provides some concerns. Unity of command and chain of command will be difficult, as both staffs will be reporting to the same commander. If the JOG were tasked to deploy a headquarters, a new chain of command would have to be established. Unity of purpose, trust and mutual understanding between the strategic and operational staffs will be enhanced due to their centralization in a single organization but not during operations between the staff in NDHQ and the tactical units deployed on operations. This will not allow for decentralized decision-making or allow for freedom of action at the tactical level.

The JOG Plus option is related to passing to the JOG the responsibility for operational level command and control for all contingency operations. The JOG will also maintain a

deployable headquarters capability for contingency operations. NDHQ will retain the responsibility for strategic level functions. This option is based on the United Kingdom Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) model.

In 1996, the United Kingdom create a single permanent joint headquarters to permit a clear connection between government policy and strategic functions and the conduct of operations at the operational level.⁵² It is headed by a three-star commander, Chief of Joint Operations, who is responsible to direct, deploy, sustain and recover all United Kingdom forces deployed on operations. Permanent staffs of 438 personnel organized along the continental staff system supports him. The staffs are divided into operations and support staffs, each commanded by a two star general. Under his command is a deployable Joint Headquarters, similar to the JOG, commanded by an Army or Royal Marine Brigadier, and consisting of a staff of 60 personnel. A dedicated communications squadron, intelligence battalion and pioneer platoon support the Joint Headquarters. It is capable of forming a JTF headquarters or national command element.

In terms of split of responsibilities the British Minister of Defence provides strategic guidance and direction and the PJHQ focuses on campaign planning and operational command of deployed forces. The PJHQ is Joint Headquarters commander is often appointed as the operational commander for contingency operations, which allows for an effective command driven approach. There is a highly mid and long term planning process

⁵² Connaughton, Colonel Richard M, "Organizing British Joint Rapid Reaction Forces," *Joint Force Quarterly* Autumn 2000: 88.

that allows for easy transfer of responsibilities to operations staffs. The equal representation of operations and support issues ensures that the operations are effective and sustainable.

The JOG Plus option would follow this model. The JOG will continue to be in the DCDS chain of command for force generation and force employment issues. The JOG would be given the authority to establish coordination with the other eight operational level headquarters to facilitate domestic operations and standardize operational level doctrine and procedures. The organizational changes will be done by first determining strategic and operational functions, and then adjusting resources between DCDS and the JOG. The aim will be to eliminate any duplication between the JOG and NDHQ Joint Staffs. A new staff appointment of Chief of Staff J4 will be created at NDHQ and the JOG to coordinate all support functions, including personnel, logistics, finance, and legal. Communications and information systems (J6) staffs will be moved under the Chief of Staff J3 at both headquarters. The Commander of the JOG will be filled by a General officer. The current JOG commander will be designated his Chief of Staff. The control of contingency operations will move the National Defence Command Centre to the JOG and the Centre will focus on coordination of military capabilities with other governments and militaries. The current communication and information capabilities at the JOG headquarters in Kingston will need to be examined and improved, as required. This will also permit the JOG headquarters to become the alternate command post for National Defence in the case of a crisis or war.

The advantages of this option are that there is a clear split in responsibilities between the strategic and operational levels, that the structure is the same in peace, crisis and war, and it can easily effect control contingency operations. In addition, it allows for the deployment of

the Joint Headquarters while maintaining the permanent staff in Kingston to continue to command other contingency operations. The disadvantages are that it will require close cooperation between the strategic and operational staff in preparing for operations.

In terms of the principles of command, this option provides unity of command throughout peace, crisis and war. It will allow for the early appointment of a Joint Task Force Commander. It reduces the violations of the chain of command, as there is hierarchical and clear command structure that is consistent with NATO doctrine. It supports decentralized authority and eliminates information flows from tactical directly to strategic levels. There will also be a clear continuity of command, especially when higher-level C2 systems are disrupted. It would enhance unity of purpose at and between the strategic and operational levels with the reestablishment of equal consideration of operations and support functions. It will improve trust and mutual understanding at all levels within the CF. It will also enhance mutual understanding with allies and partners as it is based on approved and common used command and control doctrine.

In comparing the two options, it is clear that the JOG Plus option is far superior to the NDHQ Plus option in terms of how it addresses the concerns raised on recent operations and meets the principles of command. It is recommended that this option be seriously considered for approval. The changes that need to be implemented are not great but the rewards are potentially large and attractive. Much time and effort has been spent on creating the JOG and its subordinate formations and units. The current allocation of responsibilities and resource allocation doesn't meet the current and future requirements for CF contingency operations. With the formal achievement of full operational capability for the JOG in June

2003, now is the time to reap the benefits from our investment. With the selection of this approach, the future of the CF JOG will be clear and bright. To paraphrase Sun Tzu, the military that has its commanders and staffs united in purpose, will fight as one, and take the victory!

CONCLUSIONS

The thesis of this paper is that now that the JOG has reached its full operational capability it must be given the full authority and responsibilities for the command and control of all CF contingency operations, which is currently conducted at the strategic level by NDHQ. A detailed examination of CF concepts and doctrine in the areas of command and control responsibilities, planning and execution expose the discontinuities between NATO and CF doctrine in these areas. Through the use of after action reports and lessons learned directives, three CF operations were explored in terms of command and control at the strategic and operational levels. The results were then compared against enhanced CF principles of command. From this analysis a number of criteria were presented along with two potential options to resolve these command and control concerns with contingency operations. The first option, NDHQ Plus, move the operational level command and control functions to NDHQ in order to meet demands for centralized command and control of contingency operations. It was shown that this option was unworkable as it did not support many of the command principles and was not consistent for peace, crisis and war. The second option was based on the United Kingdom's Permanent Joint Headquarters model. It proposed to make the JOG responsible for the operational level command and control of all contingency operations. It was found to be clearly the best option as it clearly split strategic and operational responsibilities, and allowed for easy, flexible command and control of contingency operations whether in peace, crisis and war.

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