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**Canadian Coalition Contributions:
Proposing a Planning Paradigm**

By /par LCol B.N. Pennington

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Abstract

Coalition partnerships form the backbone of Canada's national security strategy. This paper asserts that presently there are insufficient analytical aids at the disposal of military planners in preparing recommendations for CF coalition contributions. Having proven a shortfall, the paper proposes a Multidisciplinary Expeditionary Response Paradigm for use in analysing the degree of CF involvement in future coalition operations. The paper commences with a review of Canadian Foreign and Defence policies for the purpose of identifying national trends that are highly relevant in developing military advice for the Government. The model is applied to two case studies (Operations ASSURANCE and ECLIPSE) in order to demonstrate its utility.

Canadian to lead NATO forces in Afghanistan.

- *National Post, 27 September 2003*

Introduction

Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary-General, announced on 26 September, that a Canadian three-star general will command the 31 nation coalition known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan as early as February 2004. This will be the most prestigious coalition appointment for Canada since the end of World War II. Earlier this summer, John Manley, the Deputy Prime Minister and a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, threw his hat into the ring as a candidate to replace Lord Robertson on the latter's departure from NATO later this year. In the period between these two events, Prime Minister Jean Chretien declared to the world "...when a government cannot or will not do so, the responsibility to protect [its citizens] becomes temporarily a collective international responsibility. We believe... the international community has a moral responsibility to protect the vulnerable."¹ Do these events signal a refinement of Canadian foreign and defence policy elevating our normative role of participant to one of greater leadership and visibility? If so, are the Canadian Forces (CF) prepared to scrutinize petitions for greater international involvement?

Canadian foreign and defence policy has historically placed great emphasis on coalition partnerships to address issues of national security.² Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to state that Canada's involvement in coalitions has significantly increased. Over the last 15 years, Canada has contributed to coalition operations in Rwanda, Eritrea, East Timour, and most recently Afghanistan. Elected officials decide and direct the involvement of the CF in international

¹ Prime Minister J. Chretien, *Speech Before 58th Assembly of the United Nations*, 1-5.

² Bland, D. "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?" *Policy Matters*. Vol. 3, No. 3. (February 2002), 3 and 8.

affairs based upon counsel they receive from advisors, to include the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). What though are the analytical tools of the military planner and how are these tools applied in deriving advice regarding CF employment? This paper asserts that currently there are insufficient analytical aids at the disposal of planners in preparing recommendations for CF coalition contributions, and goes on to propose a Multidisciplinary Expeditionary Response Paradigm for use in analysing and developing recommendations regarding the degree of CF involvement in future coalition operations.

In order to fully appreciate the underpinnings of this paper the following course shall be steered. First, a review of Canadian foreign and defence policy development will be visited to illustrate historical trends. An appreciation of these trends aids in understanding the why and what of current foreign and defence policies that must form the basis of any coalition deliberation. This will be followed by an examination of the CF staffing process in order to demonstrate an analytical shortfall within a CF planner's *toolbox*. Finally, a full examination of the proposed model will precede its application against two historical cases (Operations ASSURANCE and ECLIPSE) for the purpose of demonstrating the model's utility.

While alliances are formal, semi-permanent defence oriented agreements with established processes and directives for force employment, coalitions are just the opposite. Coalitions are, as CF Joint Doctrine defines them "... ad hoc, short term (relationships) established for specific objectives."³ It is precisely due to the temporary nature of coalitions, a lack of established processes and the high risk environment that accompanies such operations, that recommendations to lead, participate or abstain, must be carefully, logically and thoroughly analysed.

³ Canada, *CF Operational Planning Process*, B-GG-005-004/AF 000, GL-E-3.

Part I – The Evolution of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy (1900 – 2003)

The beginnings of modern Canadian foreign policy can be traced to the Borden government's demand for greater input into both war and post-war planning as a condition of continued Canadian support during the Great War.⁴ During the post-war period the importance of the United States (US) in contrast to an established mother-country relationship with Great Britain (GB) emerged as a cornerstone of Canadian foreign and defence policies. In a 1923 address, Prime Minister (PM) MacKenzie King skillfully managed the fine line between fidelity to GB and a new relationship with the US:

...as far, at least, as Canada is concerned we have found the United States of late years an increasingly friendly and dependable neighbour. It has been our aim... to maintain and develop this good feeling...[it] is our firm belief that there is no contribution that Canada can make to the fair and peaceful settlement of international affairs, no way in which she can so strengthen the Empire of which she is a part, as by so handling our relations with the United States as to build up an enduring fund of goodwill.... That is our primary task; the task assigned to us in the division of Imperial labour.... [and] I think it will long remain our primary task.⁵

As King steered Canada through the 1930s, his foreign and defence policies remained bent on supporting a united Empire buttressed by access to American markets and resources:

- The guiding principle in the formulation of Canada's foreign policy should be the maintenance of the unity of Canada as a nation;
- Canada's foreign policy is, in the main, not a matter of Canada's relations to the League, but of Canada's relations to the United Kingdom and the United States;
- Canada, should as a general rule, occupy a back seat at Geneva or elsewhere when European or Asiatic problems are being discussed;
- Canada is under no *obligation* to participate in the economic sanctions of the League;
- Before the Canadian government agrees in future to participate in military or economic sanctions or in war, the approval of the parliament or people of Canada will be secured; and

⁴ Granatstein, J.L. *Canadian Foreign Policy, Historical Readings*. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993, 1.

⁵ MacKenzie King in Granatstein, 9.

- Canada is willing to participate in international inquiries into international economic grievances.⁶

At Ogdensburg in 1940, King met with President Roosevelt where the two leaders forged a common defence bond that continues to this day.⁷ Three years later, King elevated Canada's place on the global stage declaring to the world: "Representation should be determined on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question."⁸ King's doctrine, known as the *functional principle*, demanded international acceptance of Canada as a middle-power.⁹ Louis St. Laurent, King's Secretary of State for External Affairs, laid out a series of foreign policy objectives in 1947, under the title *basic principles*, which are distilled below:

- National Unity – foreign policy must not fracture the country. No one group (based on language, economics or religion to name only three) may determine the course of foreign policy regardless of the reason;
- Political Liberty – democracy as we know it must be permitted to flourish. Citizens must freely express themselves through the democratic process;
- The Rule of Law – government and individuals are subject to the impartial administration of the law. An international code of law will continue to be welcomed;
- Christian Values – Moral principles govern the conduct of human relations and must be embraced; and
- Acceptance of international responsibility within our role in world affairs – Canada has a moral obligation and responsibility to participate in international organizations, in both peace and war, and must continue to fully participate as the nation's security demands it.¹⁰

Andrew Cohen, in *While Canada Slept*, notes that these *basic principles* launched a period of activist foreign policy known as the *golden age of Canadian diplomacy*.¹¹ Activist

⁶ Escott Reid in Granatstein, 151.

⁷ Stacey, C.P. *Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 2: 1921-48*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981, 179.

⁸ House of Commons Debate, 9 July 1943, 4555-58 in Granatstien, 26.

⁹ Granatstien, 6.

¹⁰ Louis St. Laurent in Granatstien, 28-31. St. Laurent's fourth principle (Christian Values) may be outdated; however, the underpinning remains recognisable in present day Canadian foreign policy.

¹¹ Cohen, A. *While Canada Slept: How we lost our place in the world*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003, 127.

foreign policy is oft times replaced with the sardonic label *joiner*, regardless, Canada fully engaged in international affairs in the post Second World War period. She was a member of the drafting team of the United Nations Charter, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and a founding member of NATO. Canada doubled her diplomatic missions from 38 in 1945 to over 60 within twelve years.¹² Simultaneously, King implemented the lessons learned following the Great War in his defence policies. He directed his Minister of National Defence (MND), Brooke Claxton, to plan and conduct an orderly demobilization and make significant budgetary reductions. International prestige for Canada continued to grow through participation in a UN sanctioned coalition to Korea and miraculous mediation during the Suez Crisis, for which L.B. Pearson received the Nobel Peace prize.¹³

In 1963, Pearson snatched electoral victory from Diefenbaker's Conservative party, in large part due to Diefenbaker's mishandling of defence issues.¹⁴ Pearson extended King's theme of enlightened internationalism and strengthened involvement in international affairs based on Canadian interests. This resulted in a shift in defence policy from one of co-operation to one of reliance, Canada now relied on collective security agreements within a UN, NATO and US framework. In 1967, *The Economist* pronounced the world's respect for an internationally active Canada:

The community of nations has learned that it needs an active Canada: as an intermediary in Commonwealth disputes, and in wider ones that range ex-imperial powers against former dependencies; as a factor that moderates the disproportion between American and European strengths in the Atlantic world; as a dispassionate but not apathetic participant in projects that are based on a tenuous international consensus.¹⁵

¹² Cohen, 131.

¹³ Bland, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?" 3.

¹⁴ Cohen, 45.

¹⁵ Cohen, 133.

The election of Pierre Elliot Trudeau marked a watershed in Canadian foreign policy and heralded a diplomatic shift as Cohen describes “from the golden to bronze age.”¹⁶ Andrew Cooper’s insightful analysis of Canadian foreign policy concludes that it was the general failure of diplomacy in Vietnam that led to his loss of faith in the diplomatic corps, coupled with a domestic oriented agenda and a self-witnessed perception that the Canadian Foreign Service was bureaucratic, exclusive and out of touch that caused Trudeau to force radical change upon the Department.¹⁷ In a *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, Trudeau signalled his intention to move away from enlightened internationalism toward a Canada-first foreign policy:

At times in the past, public disenchantment with Canada’s foreign policy was produced in part by an over-emphasis on role and influence obscuring policy objectives and actual interests. It is a risky business to postulate or predict any specific role for Canada in a rapidly evolving world situation. It is even riskier – certainly misleading – to base foreign policy on an assumption that Canada can be cast as the “helpful fixer” in international affairs.¹⁸

Trudeau’s MND, Donald Macdonald, implemented the move from a cold-war/NATO dominated defence policy, as Doug Bland infers, based on Trudeau’s fear that Canada’s sovereignty was being assimilated by the US and other international organizations.¹⁹

In 1984, Brian Mulroney succeeded Trudeau on a platform of business-oriented conservatism, improvements to defence and a promise to re-estab-

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have no choice but to build it with others, co-operatively.”²¹ In 1991, the Mulroney government released a *Foreign Policy Framework*, which opened with “Canada’s foreign policy is driven by the need to protect and promote Canadian interests and values abroad.”²² Under a theme entitled *making choices*, Canada adopted the following major policies:

- Strengthening Co-operative Security;
- Creating Prosperity on a Sustainable Basis; and
- Securing Democracy and Respect for Human Values.²³

On the defence side, the Mulroney government devoted effort and resources to address what it termed a CF commitment-capability gap spawned during the Liberal administration.²⁴ In the 1987 *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, MND Perrin Beatty noted that “...the realities of the present... call for a more sober approach to international relations and the needs of security policy.”²⁵ Consequently defence policy turned squarely toward operating within a collective security framework provided by NATO and the US. *Challenge and Commitment* outlined five defence objectives: Strategic Deterrence (through NORAD); Conventional Defence (through NATO); Sovereignty; Peacekeeping (through the UN); and Arms Control.²⁶ This period saw a return to coalition-based operations absent since Korea.

The election of Jean Chretien in 1993, provided the last foreign and defence policy reviews to date. In 1994, the government promulgated *Canada in the World* and declared the following objectives which remain the cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy today:

- The promotion of prosperity and employment;
- The protection of our security, within a stable global framework; and

²¹ Cooper, 79.

²² Canada, *Foreign Policy Framework: 1991*, Ottawa: 1991, 1.

²³ Canada, *Foreign Policy Framework: 1991*, 5-13.

²⁴ Bland, *Canada’s National Defence, Volume 1 Defence Policy*, 183,

²⁵ Canada, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, Ottawa: 1987, 2.

²⁶ Canada, *Challenge and Commitment*, 17-27.

- The projection of Canadian values and culture.²⁷

Lloyd Axworthy, possibly Chretien's most able MFA, declared that Canadians could not "ignore the problems of the world even if we wanted to."²⁸ The physical face of his statement was an extensive *human security agenda*, which Jockel and Sokolsky attribute as having brought foreign and defence policy closer together today than at any other time since World War II.²⁹ They infer that current collective security arrangements (NATO/NORAD/US) provide so much protection that Canadian national security is no longer at threat, which in turn frees the CF to conduct other international tasks including human security operations as was the case in Kosovo and Africa.

The problem is that unforeseen crisis such as the attack on the World Trade Centre and subsequent combat operations in the likes of Afghanistan and the Gulf demand that Canada maintain combat ready forces. And even though the *1994 Defence White Paper* touts the maintenance of "multi-purpose, combat-capable forces," the fact is that resources have simply not been provided to meet the demand.³⁰ The challenge that the CF face under the current defence paper, as Bland notes, is that unlike every other previous defence paper and unlike the current foreign policy paper, it provides no priorities nor defence objectives.³¹ Perhaps this assertion is too harsh for some objectives can be distilled. However, clearly what is needed is a melding of the nation's foreign and defence objectives, particularly if the CF is going to continue to face increased demand as recent statements of the PM and his latest MFA, Bill Graham indicate. In addressing the 57th General Assembly of the UN, Graham stated,

We believe that our ultimate response to the challenge of September 11 is thus to rededicate ourselves to our beliefs and to the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. [He went on]... these are serious, complex issues

²⁷ Canada, *Canada in the World*, Ottawa: 1994, i.

²⁸ Axworthy as quoted in Bland, D. "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?", 24.

²⁹ Jockel, J. & Sokolsky, J. "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy," *International Journal*. (Winter 2000-2001), 7.

³⁰ Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 1 Defence Policy*, 284.

³¹ Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 1 Defence Policy*, 284.

that no one nation can confront alone. [Then switching his attention to various regions of the world he stated]...the situation in Africa cries out for action. ...the Israeli-Palestinian crisis remains at an all too familiar impasse, despite the fact that everyone knows what is needed to restore peace. [He concluded] ...when states are unable or unwilling to afford protection to their own people, the international community has a responsibility to step in temporarily and provide that protection.³²

On 23 September 2003, PM Chretien addressed the 58th General Assembly. In his speech he renewed Canada's commitment to international participation, what he left unclear however, was just how much participation Canada might extend.

Multilateral cooperation is indispensable to ensuring the well-being of citizens and protecting them effectively from harm. [On states in crisis] ...when a government cannot or will not do so, the responsibility to protect [its citizens] becomes temporarily a collective international responsibility. We believe, as does the commission [on Intervention and State Sovereignty] that in the face of large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, the international community has a moral responsibility to protect the vulnerable.

No entity is more appropriate than the UN Security Council to authorize military action to protect the innocent. But the member states of the Council have sometimes failed the innocent. Past failures must motivate us to prepare better for future crises. [On Israeli-Palestine]...when the time is right, the international community must be able to offer a robust international presence that will guarantee the safety and security of Israel and of a Palestinian state.³³

Despite the fact that the last three Defence White Papers pronounced no direct or immediate conventional military threat to Canada, the events of 9/11 combined with over a decade of severe turmoil in far away places such as Africa, Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East, as alluded to by the MFA and PM above, serve to warn that we continue to live in a very precarious world.³⁴ The world will not stand for a Canadian attitude that we live in the comfort and safety of a Rosedale neighbourhood of the New World, immune from danger and/or participation in risky international affairs. Current Canadian foreign and defence policies agree

³² Graham, *Speech to 57th UN Assembly*, 12 September 2002, 1-4.

³³ Chretien, *Speech to 58th UN Assembly*, 23 September 2003, 1-5.

³⁴ Morton, D. *Understanding Canadian Defence*. Toronto: Penguin Books, 2003, 212.


on at least one fact, that coalitions are the only pragmatic method in which Canada can achieve her stated objectives.³⁵

Table 1 (over) provides a summary of Canadian foreign and defence policies and as we look back over a century three clear trends emerge. First and foremost, Canada's existence relies upon an effective security posture; to wit, she has engaged in a series of collective security *agreements* (NATO/NORAD), primarily with the US. Secondly, Canada has been and desires to remain a player in the global community; she has obtained this status through a series of initially co-operative and later collective *arrangements* (UN, Commonwealth, La Francophonie, and the Organization of American States (OAS) to name just four). Finally, Canadians embrace a number of intrinsic values which include the rule of law, social justice, democracy and peace. These values are protected and promoted by a number of international institutions (UN/International Court) in which Canada is both active player and whole hearted supporter. We can conclude that Canada's principal means of projecting foreign policy has been through a combination of collective agreements, sometimes through alliances and sometimes through coalitions, and there is nothing to suggest that this is not a road map for the future.

³⁵ Bland, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?", 8.

Table 1 – A Summary of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy (1947 – 2003)

| | 1947 King (1921-30//35-48) | 1964 Pearson (1963-68) | 1971 Trudeau (1968-79-84) | 1985-87 Mulroney (1984-93) | 1994 Chretien (1993-2004) |
|---------------------------|--|--|---|--|---|
| Foreign Policy Theme | Enlightened Internationalism. | | Canadian Sovereignty Retrenched isolation. | Re-invoking internationalism. | Global Citizen |
| Foreign Policy Objectives | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Unity Political Liberty Rule of Law Christian Values International Responsibility | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Military security Expanding economic strength Influence over others Capable and willing to play role in International Affairs Maintain basic unity at home | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foster economic growth Safeguard sovereignty and independence Work for peace and security Promote social justice Enhance quality of life Ensure a harmonious natural environment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unity Sovereignty and independence Justice and democracy Peace and security Economic prosperity Integrity of natural environment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prosperity and employment Security, within a stable global framework Project Canadian values and culture |
| Defence Policy Theme | Orderly demobilization and budgetary retrenchment. | Strategic reasoning from a national interests perspective. | Sovereignty first, retrenchment of collective participation. | Return to collective (Cold War) security. | Effective, realistic and affordable. |
| Military Strategy | Co-operation with others. | Collective agreements. | Collective, but movement away from US. | Collective security within a NATO/North American framework. | Collective security, based on an expeditionary modus. |
| Defence Policy Objectives | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defend CA against aggression Assist civil power Undertakings in co-operation with friendly nations or collective action under UN | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collective measures IAW the UN Charter Collective defence within NATO Partnership with US for defence of North America National measures for security of CA | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protection of CA sovereignty Defence of North America in cooperation with US Fulfillment of NATO commitments International peacekeeping | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintenance of strategic deterrence CA sovereignty Peaceful settlement of international disputes Effective arms control Conventional defence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defence of CA Collective security framework, priority to US International peace/security, peacekeeping, arms control, humanitarian relief |
| Major Military Missions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No forward deployed forces Korea, Suez, Balkans, West New Guinea | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NATO/NORAD Bases in Europe Congo, Cyprus, Middle East, Indo China, Egypt | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NATO/NORAD Bases in Germany Cyprus, Middle East, Vietnam, Syria | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NATO/NORAD Bases in Germany close Cyprus, Middle East, Syria, Gulf War I, Somalia, Iran/Iraq, Sinai, Namibia, Cambodia, Croatia. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NATO/NORAD Cyprus, Middle East, Syria, Iran/Iraq, Sinai, Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Haiti, Eritrea, East Timor, Afghanistan. |



...based on the experience of the last decades, it is clear that the government of Canada will want to retain the ability to play an important roles [sic] in contributing to international peace and security. Although, historically, Canada has led international operations at the strategic and operational level only on rare occasions, the Canadian Forces must be prepared, as part of a national effort, to lead small but critical operations.³⁶

This passage taken from the *Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept*, links Canadian foreign policy outlined earlier in this paper to the timeless CF mission: "...to defend Canada and Canadian interests, while contributing to international peace and security."³⁷ In so doing it reinforces the truism that coalitions form the backbone of our national security strategy and that Canada must be prepared to play a lead or supporting role in future coalition operations.

When elected decision-makers consider a coalition action, a danger as Bland notes is that "...the aspirations of politicians in crisis situations may tempt political leaders to demand the deployment of the Canadian Forces in circumstances for which they are ill-equipped or otherwise unprepared."³⁸ There is significant risk to the nation if the CF is committed without adequate analysis. Military staffs, in conducting such analysis, must understand how foreign policy is developed, how foreign and defence policies interface, and how their historical trends apply. An understanding of these factors enables recognition and appreciation of the political imperatives behind coalition petitions. Failure to address these imperatives is likely to result in the assignment of unattainable military objectives or worse, the outright rejection of a military recommendation. Rwanda and Somalia are two documented examples of Canada entering into coalition ventures without adequate military analysis.³⁹

³⁶ Canada, *Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept 2020*, 4-4.

³⁷ Canada, *Defence Planning Guidance 2003*. Ottawa: 2003, 2-2.

³⁸ Bland, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?" 17.

³⁹ Bland, "Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?", 42.

Given, as the CDS recently reinforced, that the CF is a process and learning based institution which functions on common operating principles or frameworks, it is reasonable to expect that a staffing process complemented with analytical tools exist to aid military planners in formulating and delivering on coalition petitions.⁴⁰ Dr. Jane Boulden, an expert in Canadian defence management, maintains that the Canadian civil-military decision-making process is effective.⁴¹ Within the CF, a Joint Staff (J-Staff) under the guidance of the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) and supported by other Level 1 staffs, develops for the CDS (the sole official military advisor to Government) all recommendations for coalition contributions. That recommendations flow from the CF, through the CDS, to the Government is not at question here; nor is the internal CF staffing process worked principally by Directors and Director Generals, rather what is at issue is the lack of an institutionalised analytical tool used by these officers and their staffs for deriving recommendations for force contributions.

Military planners have little in the way of formal guidance upon which to base their analysis regarding a coalition contribution.⁴² This appears to fly in the face of the J-Staff described above and a well resourced CF senior officer professional education system. With respect to the latter, the Command and Staff Course (CSC) at the Canadian Forces College (CFC) devotes less than 10% of its available time to Strategic Studies and yet this course produces the first tier of the joint Canadian staff team. The Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) focuses on operational level processes and although coalition operations are briefly examined, it is from a process and not a coalition building perspective. The AMSC devotes no appreciable time to strategic studies and yet is looked upon as a pre-requirement for attainment

⁴⁰ Canada, Annual Report of the Chief of Defence Staff 2002-2003 Ottawa: 2003, i-iv.

⁴¹ Boulden, J. *A National Security Council for Canada?* Kingston, Ont: The Claxton Papers, 2000, 8-9.

⁴² The terms coalition contribution and coalition building are used interchangeably in this paper and refer to the Canadian contribution in generic terms.

of senior rank and produces the second tier of trained staff officer. The National Strategic Studies Course (NSSC), which produces but a handful of senior officers annually, provides an in-depth examination of Canadian foreign and defence policy for the express purpose of “... preparing flag rank officers and selected colonels/naval captains for strategic-level command and staff appointments.”⁴³ Consequently, it is only as these officers complete their last formal professional development course, which it must be noted does not preclude prior employment as a Director, that they receive strategic level indoctrination in foreign and defence policy studies.

A review of current Canadian doctrine and planning publications reveals little written guidance on coalition deliberations. The first publication a planner may reach for is the *Strategic Framework for the Canadian Forces (SFCE)*, this is a process-based manual with emphasis on command and control. The *SFCE* presents the highlights of Canadian foreign and defence policies in less than two pages. It provides a list of factors for a politico-military strategic-level estimate, but aside from headings there is no explanation. A planner may next turn to the *1994 Defence White Paper* which strangely enough details the essential components of mission design but provides no guidance on coalition building. The *CF Strategic Operating Concept 2020 (CFSOC)* repeatedly states that alliances and coalitions are the way of the future, but also provides no discussion or direction on coalition building.

The recently released *Canadian Forces Operations Force Employment Concept 2012* paper focuses on operational employment but makes no reference to coalition building. Two other documents *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020* and *Defence Planning Guidance 2003* also ignore coalition building. Finally a planner may consult the *CF Operational Planning Process (CFOPP)*, a manual which as the title implies provides very little

⁴³ Canada, *National Strategic Studies Course 5 – Syllabus*, Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2002, 2-1/2.

in the way of strategic guidance and not surprisingly nothing on coalition building. Chapter 5 of the *CFOPP* details the entire gamut of strategic planning in the CF without once using the word coalition.

Which leads us back to the J-Staff and internal standard operating procedures (SOP). Annually the J-Staff conducts an orientation briefing aimed at newly arrived staff officers and other DND personnel whom interact with the J-Staff.⁴⁴ A review of the most recent briefing package and J-Staff SOPs provides insight into their staffing process, but more importantly confirms the lack of an analytical tool in developing a military recommendation to a coalition petition.⁴⁵ Even in the best of worlds, formal guidance will rarely be sufficiently detailed as to compensate for the fluid nature of international affairs at the moment of a coalition petition; however any guidance is better than none.

As coalitions are a central part of Canadian foreign policy and national defence planning, there is little room for naïve and incomplete policies that may ultimately commit significant amounts of national treasure and prestige in coalition politics. Similarly, there is no room at all for strategic and institutional disorder when such commitments place Canadians at risk.⁴⁶

Coalitions will remain the backbone of our national security strategy; therefore, the CF must analyse coalition petitions in a comprehensive and coherent manner. Such an approach must take into account the political realities that confront elected officials, or face the consequences of the assignment of inappropriate missions or the outright rejection of military advice. As a process and learning-based institution that functions on a common operating framework, it is only logical that as our senior officers learn the estimate and operational planning processes, they also learn and receive tools spec

Part III – Proposing a Paradigm

What would be of aid to those officers that have not attended the CSC or the NSSC; for whom it has been a period of time since attendance; and/or for those without exposure to studies in Canadian foreign and defence policy, and yet find themselves members of staffs preparing recommendations on coalition petitions? The Multidisciplinary Expeditionary Response Paradigm (MERP) is proposed as a table-top model for military planners when considering a coalition petition. As a table-top model, MERP provides macro considerations from which to launch detailed analysis. MERP is a subjective assessment tool designed to aid planners in making informed recommendations and articulating risk in terms that senior political and military leaders can understand.

MERP consists of two imperatives (diplomatic and military) that are sub-divided into 12 considerations or factors discussed below. Each consideration must answer one of two critical questions. First, of the three diplomatic considerations, what is the degree of impact on Canadian interests and the resultant level of political support; and second, of the nine military considerations, what is the demand and the capacity-capability available to action the degree of response envisioned on the diplomatic plane?

From a process perspective, it is critical that planners reflect on all of the considerations in the order presented. It is not intended that military planners supplant foreign affairs planners, but rather that military planners have a global understanding of the political aspects of the coalition petition. The intention in using MERP is to ensure an understanding of why and what degree of political support is anticipated on the diplomatic plane, while articulating what and how much capacity-capability is required on the military plane. MERP does not advocate

⁴⁶ Bland, “Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom?” 19.

misrepresenting capacity-capability in order to satisfy the diplomatic imperative, rather the duty of the military planner remains to ensure that the military demand is recognised, analysed and presented.

Assessing the model's outputs is a subjective process, however staff officers of similar experience, professional knowledge and training will derive similar outputs, which reinforces the importance of a common operating framework within the CF. MERP definitely evaluates whether or not military assets can be contributed; while it effectively discriminates which of the following three roles (as defined by the author) could be recommended:

Lead – A national willingness to take overall responsibility for the coalition operation. It does not demand that the lead nation physically possess the military capacity-capabilities necessary to ensure mission success, but implies that the lead nation will take responsibility to negotiate, contract and/or co-ordinate all assets identified as necessary to the mission that are not provided by the participating partners. This is a Governmental responsibility which may be handed off to a federal department for action;

Participatory – A national willingness to make a contribution without accepting overall responsibility. It implies that the nation physically possesses a capacity-capability to participate, or that the nation can negotiate, contract and/or co-ordinate the delivery of the agreed upon asset. Once the degree of participation is identified it can be handed to the responsible federal department for action; and

Abstain – A lack of national willingness to make a contribution and/or an inability to produce or negotiate the delivery of any asset identified as required in the coalition petition.

The degree of discrimination between these three roles is the least developed element of MERP. Until future research is conducted discrimination should be based upon the reason/crisis for which a coalition petition has been made. Due to the subtleties and abstract nature of international affairs a holistic approach is recommended in making the final assessment of the coalition petition under MERP. While it is possible that a single consideration will take on such import as to alone determine which of the three options to recommend; it is more probable that a

combination of considerations will determine which should form the basis of the military recommendation. What follows is a detailed explanation of the model's twelve considerations.

Canadian National Security.

This is the most important of the diplomatic considerations and refers to threats and/or actions aimed at Canadian sovereignty and vital interests (which may not be defined until the moment of the coalition petition). From where the action or threat originates is irrelevant in establishing its ongoing or potential impact on Canada. An examination of this consideration typically includes weapons of mass destruction and conventional forces, but may also include economic and/or political activities. In assessing this consideration, any action or threat to Canadian sovereignty/vital interests will result in a desire to contribute CF assets. If Canada's sovereignty/vital interest has not been attacked/threatened to the degree of invoking a security agreement, but the threat is perceived as real, one must assume that political willpower to engage Canada's entire military capacity-capability, in any role, will be overwhelming.

The Global Community.

This consideration consists of a number of sub-components. The most important relates to regional security and stability. If a region's stability is endangered by physical attack or threat of attack and Canada has postulated a high degree of interest (such as the human security agenda discussed earlier) or concern for the region based on special links with Canada (i.e. Commonwealth/La Francophonie) the political desire to respond will be high. Factors to consider here include:

- Where is the region for which the coalition petition is produced?
- Is the region in Canada's immediate area of concern wherein failure to address could result in undesirable impacts upon Canadian territory?
- Is there a geographic or cultural link between the region and Canada?

- Is the cultural link (La Francophonie, Commonwealth or a major Canadian ethnic group) of sufficient strength to demand Canada take a lead role, are there domestic political levers involved?
- Are Canada's foreign policies and/or recent international actions such that Canada has incurred a moral obligation to assume a lead role?
- Has Canada developed a special relationship with the region/nation in turmoil that demands a high degree of participation?
- Has a recognised authority (RA), such as the UN, asked Canada to play a specific role?
- Does the affected region/nation specifically want Canada's involvement; is there a demand by the nations of the affected region that Canada take a lead role?
- Have the coalition partners demonstrated a desire for a Canadian lead, will they?

From the political perspective the discriminator between a lead and participatory role will be based on the degree of Canadian interest in the region. Regions with strong cultural or geographic links to Canada, or regions where the crisis will create a security vacuum or instability will garner strong political support.

Values.

Canadians hold dear a number of intrinsic humanist values which include the rule of law, democracy, social justice, quality of life and maintaining the natural environment. Canadian foreign policy promotes these values through a series of international institutes. Consideration must be made regarding how the crisis relates to any one of these values. In most cases an attack, which is not restricted to the physical plane, on one or all of these values will likely involve some degree of international security violation, but the attack may be so sudden as to be over before international attention is gained. A violent change of government, provided it is based on the desire of the populace (i.e. a popular revolution) will generate less political support than a seemingly peaceful change of government based on a disregard of law or the violation of

human rights. The discriminator between a political desire to lead or participate will be based on the degree to which these values are threatened or attacked.

Mandate.

Mandate is the first of nine military considerations. The *mandate* consideration focuses on identifying the coalition aim as measured against the appropriate application of military force in order to resolve the issue. As stated earlier, it is highly probable that in the early stages of coalition building an actual mission statement may not be articulated. The planner must discern from the information available what is the likely mission. The two-part question that must be answered under this consideration is: What is the likely mission, and is it an appropriate task for a military force? A decision to contribute a military asset measured against this consideration is clear, if the mission can be articulated as an appropriate use of military force and based on the diplomatic plane there is a desire to support then a positive recommendation of force contribution is appropriate. The discriminator between a lead or participatory role as measured against mandate is narrow. A lead role may be recommended if the objectives of the mandate and the capability level resident within the CF, to include whatever assets can be harnessed by the Canadian Government from other coalition partners, will assure mission success. A clear endstate must be articulated as a condition of a lead role. If the mandate will not be achieved through the application of military force then a recommendation to abstain is appropriate.

Force Capacity-Capability.

This is a highly complex consideration for the military planner which must be based on the question: what is the coalition demand as compared to the available coalition capacity-capability? Whereas the *mandate* consideration focused on the appropriateness of the application of military force, this consideration is pure military force capacity-capability.

Capacity is defined as personnel, aircraft, naval vessels, vehicles and material that is or will be combat ready in the time available. Capability is defined as the quality – the skills, faculties, talents or special proficiencies that are required to ensure mission success. Capacity-capability includes all assets that must be harnessed for mission success.⁴⁷ The decision to make a military contribution as measured against this consideration is clear, if the CF has available capacity-capability and based on the diplomatic plane there is a desire to contribute then a positive recommendation may be made. The discriminator between a lead or participatory role as measured against capacity-capability is significant. A lead role may only be recommended if there is an available CF capacity or an assurance that the Government can harness sufficient coalition resources to achieve success.

Before departing this consideration a logical question to ask is, if Canada seeks a lead role, does this mean that Canada must provide a high percentage of the force? The answer is no. It is not necessary in order to lead a coalition, that the lead-nation contribute the preponderance of combat forces. However, unless Canada has been asked to provide **only** the Coalition HQ, it is suggested that a significant portion of the force be Canadian to enable a Canadian Coalition Commander a degree of credibility and increased flexibility. On the issue of abstaining from participation, if Canadian capacity-capability is insufficient to accomplish the mission or assigned tasks, then a recommendation to abstain must be made.

Civil-Military Relationships.

The relationship between the authoritative body, that being the organization petitioning for the coalition (hereafter referred to as the recognised authority (RA)), and the appointed military commander is of quintessential import. There are two methods in which a coalition can

⁴⁷ Harness is defined as the ability to provide, contract and/or co-ordinate for identified demands. It is a Governmental responsibility until assigned to a department.

function in regard to civil-political control. The RA may retain control and provide strategic direction to the force commander direct, or the RA may pass control of the operation to another legal body, such as a Government, who will issue strategic direction to the coalition commander. If Canada is contemplating a lead role it is critical that the military planner understand which of these two methods is preferred by the RA and more importantly which is acceptable to the Canadian Government. For the military advisor, a difficulty is providing an initial recommendation on the feasibility of each method, before Canada's desire to contribute and available capacity-capability is confirmed – a case of putting the cart before the horse.

Simultaneously, the planner must determine if the CF can interface with the RA. The decision to make a military contribution as measured against this consideration is clear; if the CF can interface with the RA and there is support based on the diplomatic plane a positive recommendation may be made. The discriminator between a lead or participatory role as measured against civil-military relations is narrow. A participatory role could be recommended when interface is not possible and the political desire to contribute low, conversely a lead role could be recommended when interface capability and desire levels are high.

Command.

This consideration is an examination of the command function, it does not include the control function. Planners must consider whether the CF is capable of providing a skilled and experienced operational level commander, who will be accepted by the contributing nations. The discriminator in this consideration is significant, a lead role should not be considered if the CF cannot produce either an operational level commander, or the mission is downsized to a level at which a Canadian commander is suitable. The provision of tactically competent commanders can only result in participatory roles.

Control.

This consideration is second only to *force capacity-capability* in import and complexity. The planner must examine how the coalition will interact from a control perspective. Whereas the *force capacity-capability* consideration focused on the demand and availability of forces, this consideration examines the demand and availability of control systems and must include all assets that may be harnessed for the mission. The decision to make a military contribution as measured against this consideration is clear, if the CF is capable of interoperating based on training, doctrine and equipment then a positive recommendation may be made. The discriminator between a lead or participatory role as measured against the *control* consideration is narrow. A lead role may be recommended when interoperability is high or can be provided by a trusted nation (although given the national management of control systems the latter is highly unlikely), while a participatory role may be recommended when interoperability is assessed as low. An inability to interoperate at all is a cause to recommend absention.

Intelligence.

The planner must examine how the coalition will interface from an intelligence perspective and ask the fundamental question: who are the coalition partners and can intelligence be exchanged without compromising formal intelligence sharing agreements? Whereas the *force capacity-capability* consideration focused on the demand and availability of forces, this consideration examines the demand and **ability**, including legal agreements, to share intelligence. The decision to make a military contribution as measured against this consideration is clear. The CF may participate without sharing intelligence with those coalition members that are not signatories of a formal intelligence sharing agreement, but Canada should not take a lead role if intelligence that is essential to the success of the mission cannot be shared.

Logistics.

This consideration is of critical import and potentially the most complex of all factors given the nature of coalition operations. The military planner must examine the probable logistics demand of the mission as measured against that which each nation will contribute in movement, material and infrastructure disciplines. In contemplating a lead role, consideration must be made from the operational-level perspective and answers sought to the following two critical questions. Can Canada harness sufficient movement and material support as to ensure the success of the mission? Does the CF possess the expertise to manage logistical issues on the scale envisioned?⁴⁸ Provided the answers to these two questions is yes, and desire exists on the diplomatic plane, then a recommendation for a lead role is possible. The entire resource bill should be accounted for under this heading and must form part of the final recommendation to government – in essence presenting the bill. Given the complexities of logistics a lack of confidence to achieve the level of support required is a clear indicator to recommend capping any contribution at the participatory level.

Other and Non-Government Agencies (OGD/NGO).

Questions to consider under this heading include: who are the agencies involved, what are their tasks and what will be their functional and administrative relationships to the coalition? The planner must examine how each agency will interface with the coalition, how command and control will function, how administration and security will be provided, and a myriad of legal issues. Provided there is a high degree of confidence that the OGDs and NGOs can be adequately managed, to include both the control systems and infrastructure aspects, a recommendation to adopt a lead role may be made. As with logistics, any lack of confidence

⁴⁸ Managed is defined here as overall management, not necessarily management of each dependency or logistical discipline, which may be delegated/assigned to coalition partners.

regarding management of these agencies is an indicator of capping a contribution at the participatory level.

Given the post 9/11 war on terrorism and a growing involvement in international affairs, specifically within the security arena, there is little doubt that Canada will continue to base her national security strategy on collective agreements, principally coalition partnerships. What is absolutely critical when implementing such a strategy is comprehensive and coherent analysis leading to a judiciously articulated risk assessment and a recommendation for CF commitment. Table 2 (over) provides a summary of the crucial diplomatic and military considerations that a military planner must analyse in deriving a military recommendation. The planner's perception of political support based on the first three considerations affords insight into what direction the Government will likely take, while ultimately the military recommendation is based on an assessment of the nine military considerations.

Part IV – Applying MERP to Two Historical Cases

In the following paragraphs MERP will be demonstrated using two historical cases of Canadian coalition involvement. In 1996, Canada assumed the lead role in a coalition venture to Zaire/Rwanda, while in 2000 Canada accepted a participatory role in a coalition venture to Ethiopia/Eritrea. These two cases were selected based on the following factors:

- Both missions were authorized by the same Canadian government, consequently national leadership and foreign and defence policies are common to both;
- Both operations were conducted in the same region;
- The mandates were relatively similar, both being sanctioned by the UN; and
- Their selection affords an example of lead and participatory roles.

Table 2 – Multidisciplinary Expeditionary Response Paradigm

| | Considerations | Lead Role | Participatory Role |
|--|---|---|---|
| D I P L O M A T I C | Canadian National Security | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CA sovereignty/security or a designated vital interest is under attack or high threat of attack. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Alliance terms invoked resulting in partnership or subordinate role. No direct action, low threat to CA sovereignty. |
| | Canada's place in the Global Community | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional conflict ongoing. Regional crisis ongoing or just complete. Regional instability due to high security threat. CA is obliged to offer leadership based on stated foreign policy objectives. Overwhelming cultural/geographic links demand CA leadership role. Lack of faith that CA aims will be achieved without CA leadership. A recognised authority has requested CA leadership. There is strong domestic support for CA leadership. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional stability is not threatened, sufficient disruption exists to warrant CA involvement. High faith that coalition partners will achieve CA objectives. Regional conflict/crisis has culminated, resultant need is moderate to low. Limited geographic/cultural links resulting in low CA interest. Involved nations will not accept CA leadership, but will accept participation. CA is asked to contribute a specific non-military capability (civpol). Domestic support is low. |
| | Institutions and Values | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CA values are threatened or under attack. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CA values are under duress. |
| M I L I T A R Y | Mandate/Intent | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mandate/Intent will only be achieved through the application of military force. Endstate is clearly articulated. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some aspects of mandate require military force, but majority is non military mission. |
| | Force Capacity-Capability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> High assurance that sufficient international capacity-capability will augment CA to ensure mission success. CF can meet all mission requirements. CA contribution sufficiently robust as to garner the respect/compliance of other nations. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low capacity-capability, but some assets available to participate. Can provide a niche capability. |
| | Civil-Military Relationship | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CF capable of interfacing with the RA as the coalition lead. Satisfied that inter-coalition legal issues can be resolved without impact on mission. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participation is limited due to an inability to interface with the RA. |
| | Command | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commander capable of operational command. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commander capable of tactical command. |
| | Control (Joint and Combined Interoperability) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deployable C4IS available to control the operation, including transition from combat to peace support. Experienced/practised staff. High level of interoperability. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Staff and/or individuals skilled at the operational and tactical level available to augment lead nation. CF unable to control other than that required for a specific contribution. Low interoperability. |
| | Intelligence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possess authority to provide appropriate intelligence to all participants. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can share limited amounts of intelligence. |
| | Logistics | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Possess or have high assurance that sufficient material support, infrastructure and expertise in use will result in mission success. CA can manage the entire resource bill. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can provide limited management and support assets, generally sufficient for own contribution only. CA can manage a participatory resource bill. |
| | Other Government Agencies | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can harness and manage significant OGA/NGO to achieve mandate (criminal activity, mass migration, post conflict reconstruction). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can provide limited management and support assets. |
| Non-Governmental Agencies | | | |

By utilising two examples with similar characteristics there is greater potential to demonstrate how the discriminators could be applied to the three possible roles (lead, participate or abstain). Every effort was made to avoid applying hindsight, but given that the principal documents available for analysis are CF Lessons Learned, and articles based on similar material, a degree of hindsight is unavoidable. What is not available is the actual military recommendation made for each mission, but this is an advantage as this information cannot then influence the model. The reader should note the possibility that the CDS recommendation made in either or both cases may not have been what was ultimately directed by the government.

OPERATION ASSURANCE

The humanitarian catastrophe that leapt from the evening television news at 24 Sussex Drive, over the Remembrance Day weekend in November 1996 was anything but a surprise to its viewer. Over the two previous years government accounts such as a scathing DFAIT report: *The Rwandan Crisis of April 1994 Lessons Learned*, and first hand accounts from Generals Baril and Dallaire warned of a crisis.⁴⁹ By October 1996, hundreds of thousands of refugees occupied camps on both sides of the Zaire-Rwandan border without the presence or support of any international aid-agencies – a humanitarian crisis loomed.⁵⁰ In the space of a week, the Canadian government coordinated the necessary international support, gained critical American military support (a promise of 1,000 troops) and secured a UN Resolution (SCR 1080) appointing Canada as the lead of a multi-nation coalition.⁵¹ However, over the next four weeks the refugee camps were emptied and the occupants repatriated to Rwanda under suspicious circumstances.⁵² The

⁴⁹ Baril was the Military Advisor to the Director Peacekeeping Operations at the UN in New York and Dallaire the 1994 UN Force Commander in Rwanda.

⁵⁰ Hennessy, M. "Operation 'ASSURANCE' planning a Multinational Force for Rwanda/Zaire." *Canadian Military Journal*. (Spring 2001), 11.

⁵¹ Axworthy, L. *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future*. Canada: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003, 164-5.

⁵² Hennessy, 17.

Rwandan government withdrew permission for UN forces to operate within its borders. The Coalition Commander, Lieutenant-General Baril, finding empty refugee camps one week after SCR 1080 was passed, recommended mission termination. Although some of the coalition partners had deployed assets prior to the mission termination, these assets were never placed under the Coalition Commander and consequently the coalition never came into being.

Applying MERP to Op ASSURANCE.

While Canadian sovereignty and vital interests were not under attack or threat of attack, the influence of the other two diplomatic considerations was very high. The key diplomatic influences in the Rwanda case were:

- a heightened sensitivity in Canada toward the humanitarian crisis based on earlier failures (the April 6th 1994 disaster) coupled with a moral compulsion and strong domestic support for action;
- a strong cultural link between Canada and central Africa based on the Commonwealth and La Francophonie, supported by active *grassroot* communities in major Canadian urban centres;
- the active promotion of Canada as coalition lead by the nations of the affected region, and preference of coalition partners to a Canadian lead; and
- Canadian values of social justice and rule of law under open attack in the affected region.

An analysis of the military considerations under MERP reveals the following highlights:

- the mission was not an entirely appropriate use of military force, based on a lack of CF training for intervention between para-military threats, refugees and humanitarian aid-agencies. Although the Government provided a statement of intent that formed the basis of SCR 1080 (the mandate), a clear endstate was not articulated until days before the mission was terminated (low assessment of appropriate use of military force);
- CF optempo at the time of Rwanda was extraordinarily high with contingents in Bosnia, Croatia and Haiti, and numerous domestic tasks, leaving very little capacity-capability to support another mission. In essence it became clear that Canada's capacity was limited to an HQ and staff (low capacity-capability);⁵³

⁵³ Legault, A. *Canada and Peacekeeping: Three Major Debates*. Clementsport, N.S: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press: 1999, 92.

- control capacity-capability was highly questionable from the outset. Regarding the latter, the Canadian HQ was inexperienced, untested and used to performing as a tactical level HQ rather than an operational one. CF doctrine at the time denoted that Canada would not lead a coalition resulting in significant confusion and a steep learning curve. The Canadian HQ had an insurmountable shortfall of secure and non-secure communications equipment and was not prepared for an international deployment (very low control capacity-capability);⁵⁴
- there was a lack of intelligence sharing capability based on the fact that not all coalition partners were privy to essential intelligence material (low intelligence capability); and
- given the optempo of the CF, there was little residual logistics capacity and a very low capability to manage logistics as the lead nation. Regarding strategic lift, Axworthy noted “we were...limited by our inability to deploy rapidly. We and other smaller states simply didn’t have the necessary transport to get people to the conflict zones.”⁵⁵ In fact the logistics plan devolved into each coalition partner sustaining themselves (very low logistic capacity-capability).

While in hindsight we can find many errors in the decision to deploy CF assets to Rwanda, utilising MERP a recommendation would reflect that while a very strong diplomatic imperative drove Canadian involvement, the preponderance of military capacity-capability to lead was low and at most Canada’s role should have been capped at participation only.

OPERATION ECLIPSE

Eritrea peacefully gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993. In 1998 fighting broke out between the two countries and deteriorated rapidly into trench warfare. It is estimated that tens of thousands of individuals were killed and over one million displaced.⁵⁶ Following a cessation of hostilities in 1999, the UN passed SCR 1320 which authorised the deployment of peacekeepers into a Temporary Security Zone between the two belligerents.⁵⁷ Canada successfully deployed and recovered a contingent of approximately 450 Army personnel as part of the UN Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in this Chapter VI coalition operation.

⁵⁴ Hennessy, 18.

⁵⁵ Axworthy, 167.

⁵⁶ *UN to prepare Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Force*, Reuters, as at <http://dgapa-dgap.mil.ca/Transcr/2000Jul/00073103.htm>, July 2000, 1.

Applying MERP to Op ECLIPSE.

The security crisis in Eritrea, like Rwanda, held no direct action or threat thereof to Canadian sovereignty or vital interests. The fact that the UN planned to utilise its SHIRBRIG and that Canada was a contributor has bearing only in so far as a SHIRBRIG contributor may opt-out if the mission is unacceptable. The key diplomatic influences in the Eritrea case were:

- the warring parties had agreed to a cease-fire and were engaged in diplomatic reconciliation with UN assistance;
- the m

Table 3 (over), provides a side by side comparison of a MERP application to the two case studies made above. Due to space available the application of MERP to the cases studies has been somewhat constrained; however, MERP provides a clear overall assessment of force contribution and discrimination between possible roles. The decision to accept a lead or participatory role in Rwanda and Eritrea was not at issue here. An examination of two deployments under similar circumstances to the same region, differentiated only by time, is important for it confirms that MERP asks the correct questions enabling an effective start point for detailed staff analysis.

Conclusion

Military advice has been provided to the Canadian Government on every occasion that it has been demanded. It remains the privilege of elected officials to accept, reject or alter that advice and issue instructions to the CDS for the employment of the CF. In order to remain relevant in a complex world, the CF must ensure all military advice is logical, comprehensive and in the best interests of the country. Those developing recommendations on behalf of the CDS must understand the political imperatives that elected officials face and thus why the application of military force is politically desirable in order that these same planners articulate, based on an in-depth analysis of military capacity-capability, what CF assets can or cannot be contributed to coalition operations.

This paper takes no issue with the manner in which military advice flows from the CDS to elected decision-makers, nor with how that advice is staffed within DND; rather, based on a review of current CF doctrine and publications what is readily apparent is the lack of an analytical tool from which advice on coalition contributions is determined. Furthermore, lacking an analytical tool one must conclude that advice on whether the CF should lead, participate or

abstain from coalition operations is not derived from a common and institutionalised vantage point. This paper has demonstrated that a shortfall exists within the CF planner's *toolbox*, and proposes that the Multidisciplinary Expeditionary Response Paradigm be adopted. MERP will enable planners to analyse, from an informed perspective, why Canada is likely to become engaged and what the CF contribution could be based on an assessment of military capacity-capability. Specifically MERP answers what degree of military contribution could be offered.

As a Canadian Lieutenant-General prepares to assume command of ISAF and the Canadian contingent in Kabul undertakes an expansion of its mandate, it is clear that coalition operations will remain the backbone of Canada's security strategy. The provision of military advice to the government must be based on logical, comprehensive and institutionalised analytical tools, and we must ensure that our planners have the correct tools upon which to base that advice, thereby ensuring the best possible recommendations for CF contributions to future coalition operations.

Table 3 – MERP Application to Case Studies

| | Rwanda (Op ASSURANCE) | Eritrea (Op ECLIPSE) |
|---------------------------|---|--|
| National Security | No direct/indirect action or threat to CA sovereignty or vital interests. | |
| Global Community | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Region – Great Lakes, Central Africa. • '94 crisis indicates proven threat. International community aware of pending crisis. • Cultural link based on La Francophonie, Commonwealth. • African nations prefer CA lead, Euro/US indicate support for CA lead. FR/US explicitly will not lead. • PM personally involved. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Region – Red Sea, East Africa. • '94 Rwandan crisis has bearing from domestic support perspective. • Cultural link low, less so in Toronto/Montreal areas where political pressure may be brought to bear. • International community supports cessation of hostilities and UNSCR 1320. |
| Institutions and Values | CA public opinion firmly in support of some form of action based on threats to democracy, rule of law, social justice and danger to refugees. Involvement of PM significant. | CA foreign policy supports peacekeeping that allows a return to normalcy for displaced persons and resumption of relations between the two nations. High degree of faith that SHIRBRIG will achieve CA objectives/aims. |
| Mandate Intent | CA concept of operations accepted as SCR 1080, a Chap VII operation of four month duration, with option to renew. CA Government provides statement of intent to CF. End-state not articulated and evolves up to mission termination. | Standard Chap VI Peacekeeping operation, demilitarised zone with inter-positioning of forces for a six month period that is renewable. |
| Force Capacity-Capability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coalition contributors: S. Africa; Malawi; Senegal; Denmark; Belgium; France and US. • CF optempo very high with contingents in Bosnia, Croatia and Haiti and significant domestic tasks to include immediate reaction forces and force generation. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First operational deployment of UN SHIRBRIG. • Actual deploying force Netherlands Bn. • CA commitment to SHIRBRIG is a Mech Infantry unit and aviation elements. SHIRBRIG is an assigned GDP task. • CF optempo very high with contingents deployed or returning from Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and the Gulf. Domestic demand very high with G8 Summit (5,000 troops), standing immediate reaction forces and force generation. |
| Civil-Mil Relationship | UN – Steering Group – CA Government – Coalition Comd. | UN to SHIRBRIG HQ. |
| Command | LGen Baril, former operational level planner at UN HQ New York and an experienced tactical level commander. | Tactical element requested. |
| Control | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JHQ available but very limited experience. • First operational deployment for the HQ. • Limited doctrine and experience. CF doctrine assumes that CA will not lead, resulting in a staff structure unable to issue timely operational level direction. • Lack of secure and non-secure control systems. • Significant difficulties in interfacing with Air component. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interop established and practised as part of SHIRBRIG. • Significant experience gained in recent years for international level liaison and control of/with joint and combined forces. |
| Intelligence | Cannot share all intelligence with all partners. | SHIRBRIG provides for intelligence sharing under NATO type umbrella. |
| Logistics | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to optempo and lack of strategic lift must rely upon nations to move and support themselves. • Coalition HQ will perform a monitoring role only. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Given high optempo ability to generate sustainment to support operation is questionable, but due to the SHIRBRIG task and structure can “plug and play” at tactical level. |
| OGA/NGO | Significant challenge given the lack of doctrine, training and experience in CF. | SHIRBRIG lead, requirement is for liaison and co-ordination only. |

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