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WINNING THE NATIONS HEARTS AND MINDS – COMBATING
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

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Abstract

Asymmetric warfare has been around for centuries, and is the strategy by which a disadvantaged opponent can 'level the playing field' to achieve its political or military objectives. Asymmetric warfare is fought on many fronts, political, diplomatic, social and economic and is not merely a military campaign but a political one as well; as Clausewitz stated, war is merely a continuation of politics by other means. Due to the complexity of the different asymmetric approaches, the focus for this paper is on the insurgent movement, and the military role in combating the insurgents. In this regard, it is the contention of the writer that success in asymmetric warfare depends on effective civilian-military cooperation.

One of the foremost influences on counterinsurgency was the British Theorist, Sir Robert Thompson whose 'Five Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency' are based on effective civilian-military cooperation during a conflict and at all levels of war. Thompson's principles are used to compare the successes and failures of the three example campaigns of Vietnam, Oman and Malaya, and further whether the establishment of a 'hearts and minds' policy within these countries affected future governance and development of these nations. It will be shown that effective civilian-military cooperation was in fact a necessary requirement.

Though civilian-military cooperation is not the panacea of countering asymmetric approaches, it is a factor that must be considered during any conflict. Certainly, with the heightened awareness on terrorists' activities post September 11, 2001, asymmetric warfare is a major focus for many nations. Combating these forces is therefore in the forefront of planning, and as identified in this paper, effective civilian-military cooperation is one means to success.

WINNING THE NATIONS HEARTS AND MINDS – COMBATING
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

‘The three hundred Israelites commanded by Gideon, were facing battle with the mighty armies of the Midianites and the Amalekites and their allies. These vast armies, far outnumbering the Israelites, awaited the battle as they gathered together in the valley of Jezreel.

After dark, the Israelites, following the orders of Gideon, separated into several small groups and spread out over the sides of the hills surrounding the valley where the Midianites were encamped. Gideon told them all to do just as he did. Suddenly Gideon broke the clay pitcher that was hiding his lighted torch, and all around, the Israelites did the same and blew their rams' horns. The Midianites, aroused out of their sleep, seeing torches flickering all over the sides of the hills, and hearing the blowing of trumpets and the shouting from so many different directions, imagined that they were surrounded by a mighty army, much larger than their own. They were filled with fear, became excited, and instead of fighting that small army of three hundred Israelites, they started to fight each other! Many of them were killed in this way, and the remainder fled in terror.

Gideon, knowing now that the Midianites were on the run, pursued them until they were driven completely away and were no longer a menace to Israel's peace and happiness.’¹

INTRODUCTION

Ever since Biblical times, weaker forces have survived by using different means referred to as asymmetric warfare; and it is as prevalent today as it was thousands of years ago.

The definitions of asymmetry differ little in literature. Mor

Special Report to the Strategic Studies Institute, is universal in its application and will be used in this paper. According to Metz and Johnson, asymmetry can be defined as:

“In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological and physical dimensions.”²

Asymmetric warfare, therefore, is the strategy by which a disadvantaged opponent can level the playing field to achieve its political or military objectives.

Sun Tzu understood this significance when he stated, “A military operation involves deception. Draw them in with the prospect of gain; take them by confusion. When they are fulfilled, be prepared against him; when they are strong, avoid them”³ B.H. Liddell Hart advocated “the indirect approach” in strategy – the wisest strategy he contended, avoids the enemy’s strength and probes for weakness.⁴

Britain, with their experience during the communist insurgency in Malaya in the 1950s, and in fighting against the rebels in Oman during the 60s and 70s, has had more experience than most nations in combating these unconventional ‘wars’. The operations in Malaya and Oman did not only involve shooting the

² Steve Metz, Douglas Johnson, Asymmetry and US Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001) 5/6

³ Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Trans. Thomas Cleary (London: Shambhala, 1998) 68-69

⁴ B.H. Liddle Hart, Strategy, The Indirect Approach. (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1967) 24-26

enemy; part of the strategy was psychological - to turn their opponents in a battle for "hearts and minds"⁵ which is fought on many fronts - political, diplomatic, social and economic⁶. Asymmetric warfare involves therefore not merely a military campaign, but a political one as well. As Clausewitz states "War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce"⁷. Therefore if the threat is political, then the long-term solution must also be political.⁸

Which begs the question then as to what should be the role of the military in these types of confrontations. The British understood the military role as examined in the Malayan conflict, yet as will be explained, this was not necessarily the case with the Americans in the Vietnam War. The role of military forces in asymmetric warfare is to be the means by which an atmosphere of stability is to be created for the revitalization of the political system. As experienced by the British in Malaya and Oman, this can only be achieved through continuous civilian and military cooperation at all levels of war. This has not necessarily been the case in many other conflicts. In neither the American involvement in Vietnam, nor the intra-state insurgency within Uruguay, was there thought to the long-term key to responding to unconventional threats – the assurance that the political system would be effective once hostilities ceased.

⁵ Anthony Clutterbuck, The Long Long War. (Washington: Praeger, 1966) 3

⁶ Donald W. Hamilton. The Art of Insurgency: American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia. (London: Praeger, 1998) 138

⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, trans J.J. Graham, revised by F.N. Maude, On War (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997) 22

⁸ Ian FW Beckett. Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency. (London: Croom Helm, 1985) 20

The fundamental aim of asymmetric warfare is to render a superior army incapable of saving the state,⁹ and as will be discussed, cooperation between civilian and military agencies will assist in combating these threats. To date there is little doctrine, except for that of the United Kingdom, on combating asymmetric approaches through the use of civil-military cooperation. Lessons learned through the case studies to be discussed emphasize the need for more study on the impact of civilian and military cooperation throughout an asymmetric conflict and at all levels of war. The thesis of this paper is therefore that success in combating asymmetric warfare depends on effective civilian-military cooperation, based on a common understanding of doctrine.

HISTORY OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

History is full of examples of asymmetric warfare; from Gideon and David and Goliath in the Bible, to the use of overwhelming Allied power in the Gulf War. For centuries, weaker opponents have tried to beat their enemy's technological and numerical superiority by fighting in a manner that outmaneuvered their enemy's strengths. In 9 A.D., Arminius, a Roman citizen who was now in charge of a small German military force, had to devise a plan to defeat the advancing Roman Legions. Arminius knew the operational strengths and weaknesses of the advancing Roman army as well as the technologically superior weaponry at their disposal. His only option was to use this information to his advantage and to force the Roman military forces to split up and fight on boggy and heavily forested battlefields. Arminius knew he could not win by any

⁹ Ronald Haycock, ed. Regular Armies and Insurgency. (London: Croom Helm, 1979) 9

conventional means; he had to ensure victory based on being unconventional – and he succeeded.¹⁰

In more modern times, asymmetric warfare appeared within the European states during the nineteenth century.¹¹ The British involvement in the Boer War is a prime example. The British developed a new pacification strategy against the Boers in 1899-1902. By denying the Boers an ability to maneuver due to a liberal use of wire and blockhouses across the veldt, and by imprisoning their families in concentration camps, while destroying their farms¹², the British reduced the Boers' support and will to fight. More recently, in 1994, the Russian authorities chose to use military force against the Chechens during the Chechen civil war. Not unlike the Roman commander against Arminius, the Russian military underestimated the extent to which the Chechnya's citizens would fight to retain their right to independence. The Chechens chose as their battlefield their capital city, Grozny. Though the Chechens were inferior in terms of weaponry, tactics and training, they fought an urban battle, on their own territory, and on their own terms, something the Russians were not prepared to confront. The Russian army, as strong as it was, could not fight under these conditions, and there are tales of Russian conscripts being held in their armored vehicles afraid for their lives.¹³

¹⁰ Vincent Goulding, Jr, "Back to the future with Asymmetric Warfare," US Army War College Quarterly Winter 2000-01, 21-22

¹¹ Beckett 2

¹² Beckett Armed Forces 3

¹³ Goulding 5

INSURGENCIES

Though the term asymmetric warfare may include any or all of the following: unconventional warfare, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, or terrorism, asymmetric warfare is fundamentally a battle of the state. Due to the complexity of the different asymmetric approaches, this paper will only concentrate on the insurgent movements. An insurgency's key distinguishing feature is that it is rooted in revolution, counter-revolution and the terrorism often associated with each.¹⁴ In essence, it is a means by which a group tries to destroy a political system and then replace it with another. In the cases cited above, as in further examples below, the success in countering an insurgency or asymmetric threat is based on the government's desire to use a more holistic approach to combating the threat, in effect through cooperation between both military and civilian agencies.

HEARTS AND MINDS

Speaking of the American Revolution, John Adams of the United States coined the term 'hearts and minds' when he stated, "The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people."¹⁵ Two hundred years later, Sir General Templer in 1952, during the Insurgency of Malaya, used the same phrase in reference to the British's ability to

¹⁴ Sam C. Sarkesian. Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam. (London: Greenwood Press, 1993) 19

¹⁵ Clutterbuck 3

win the approval and support of the Malayan population and hence to win the war. “The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.”¹⁶ In contradiction to the attrition battles of conventional (symmetric) warfare, in countering asymmetric forces, it is first and foremost the ability to win the support of the population that will ensure long-standing victory.

The British are and continue to be a leading nation in successfully countering insurgencies, and they acknowledge that cooperation between civilian and military agencies has been instrumental in their success. One of the foremost influences on British doctrine on counterinsurgency was the British theorist, Sir Robert Thompson¹⁷. Based on British experience in the last one hundred years Sir Robert Thompson has developed what he termed the ‘Five Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency’¹⁸. As Head of the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam and as an unofficial advisor to the United States President, Richard Nixon, during the Vietnam War¹⁹, Thompson developed his ideas on counterinsurgency from his personal experiences in Malaya in the 1950s and 60s. In effect, a literature research on insurgencies has tended to rely on Robert Thompson’s work. The fundamental basis for his research centered on the need for a government to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the general population and in so doing to reduce support for the insurgents. This he believed could only be accomplished through a fully integrated civilian-military structure where the

¹⁶ Clutterbuck.3

¹⁷ John Mackinlay. “War Lords”. RUSI Journal. Vol 13 Apr 1998:3

¹⁸ Robert Thompson. Defeating Communism Insurgency. (London: Chutto & Windus, 1974) Chapter 4

¹⁹ Ian F.W. Beckett. Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc, 1999) 235

civilian population was convinced that the government could provide for them and nurture their needs.

Thompson's principles were very influential within the British army²⁰ and are incorporated into their doctrine. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of his work with the American forces in Vietnam. Though the US President John F. Kennedy and members of his staff, supported Thompson's views, the American officials in Vietnam did not believe his experiences in Malaya were anywhere nearly the same as those in Vietnam and they resented his intrusion²¹. However, and as discussed below, Thompson's principles could have been highly effective in the Vietnam War.

The basis of Thompson's principles concerns the requirement for civil-military cooperation in an asymmetric environment. Thompson's principles are summarized below, and will be used in comparing the successes and failures of the three example campaigns to be discussed.

THOMPSON'S FIVE PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY²²

First, it is essential that there be an understandable political aim to which you can clearly declare a political end state. Military operations and civilian activities must contribute to the same end state; yet the military end state must be subordinate to the political one. Just as importantly, the indigenous population must be involved, and have buy-in, throughout the process. In the final analysis,

²⁰ Beckett, Encyclopedia.235

²¹ Beckett, Encyclopedia 236

²² Thompson 10-12

the political system must survive and be stronger at the end of the campaign.

Secondly, the government, military forces, police forces and civilian administration must function in accordance with the law of the land and in accordance with the highest civilized standards. Forces working together to counter the insurgencies must act within the law; normal procedures for justice must continue, and discipline and good order must prevail. Any counter-insurgency force must portray what the government stands for, emphasizing trust and competency. Third, there must be an overall plan and an overall strategy. The key to this is organization, and includes strong civilian and military coordination and intelligence. Without a robust intelligence system, including extensive Human Intelligence (HUMINT), the government cannot understand the enemy, adapt to its methods and hence overwhelm him. Psychological and Information operations are important tools to use in consideration of this principle.

The last two principles describe the requirement to secure government's assets and to deny the same to the enemy. The fourth principle is to secure your own bases. This includes cities, ports, airfields, roads and the developed population centers. Without a sense of security, the people will not feel safe from the insurgents and will likely sway to the enemy's side. Though the military is capable of providing this function, it is essentially a civilian police task. Finally, the fifth principle states that the priority of attack should be against the insurgents' infrastructure, and not against its units. Breaking down the enemy's

organization will make it difficult for them to fight, and will reduce their ability to rise again.

Thompson's principles require a diverse, organized and holistic approach to combating asymmetric warfare – emphasizing the underlying need for strong relationships between the civilian and military components.

RECENT CASE STUDIES

The following three historical case studies will illustrate the need to follow Thompson's principles, and the requirement to have civilian and military cooperation at all levels of war. Starting with Vietnam, it is argued that without any regard for the principles, and with a reluctance to coordinate civil-military affairs, victories on the battlefields do not necessarily constitute an overall military victory nor do they a political one. In the last two cases, Oman and Malaya, are 'text book' examples of how establishing civilian-military cooperation was instrumental in securing victories both politically and militarily against insurgents.

VIETNAM WAR 1965-73

*April 1975 – Colonel Harry G Summers, Chief of the Negotiation Division, US Delegation, speaking with Col Tu, Chief of the North Vietnamese Delegation: Col Summers “You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield”. To which Col Tu responded, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant”.*²³

²³ Sarkesian 118

The American campaign in the Vietnam War was based on the conventional strategies of the First and Second World Wars and the Korean War. The communist North Vietnamese and Viet Cong however, fought unconventionally. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacks were against the American will and included political aims and psychological warfare. The US' means of attrition warfare, their belief in their military superiority, coupled with their disregard for the South Vietnamese military forces²⁴ and lack of civilian administrative involvement on behalf of the South Vietnamese, were key to the American failure and subsequently opened South Vietnam to the North just months after the American withdrawal.

Thompson's Principles. In assessing Thompson's principles in the Vietnam War, there were minor attempts at employing his last two principles, securing South Vietnamese bases and attacking the insurgents' infrastructure. However, little was accomplished in providing an understandable political aim, functioning within the rule of law and the issuing of an overall plan.

Right from the start, there was no national strategy, political aim att8jECr40.0019941Tj00.0025 0 0 0

establishment of Joint Commands, the effectiveness of the joint headquarters was limited. The US forces, strangers in a foreign country, did not engage the indigenous population, the South Vietnamese, and lost the overall perspective of the combined forces. The South Vietnamese were considered ‘poor cousins’ in their own country.²⁷

Throughout the campaign, and especially towards the time of the American withdrawal, the morale of the American troops was poor and resulted in unprofessional conduct. Drugs, fraggings²⁸, and questionable military operations were increasing in occurrence and scope²⁹. The My Lai massacre was not necessarily a surprise³⁰; yet this further instilled into the local people distrust for American troops and American lack of respect for local laws and customs.

Without a clear strategy from which to plan, the war in Vietnam lacked the organization and cooperation essential to combating the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Intelligence on enemy forces was difficult to acquire, as there was little interaction between US and South Vietnamese forces. HUMINT, psychological and information operations were haphazard at best and were generally the product of small Special Operations Forces (SOF) working outside the confines of the army command and control structure.³¹

Interestingly, there was some progress made in offering protection and security to the local population by the SOF. Which, had it been able to continue

²⁷ Sarkesian.105

²⁸ Fraggings – murder and injury of US military officers and NCMs by subordinates

²⁹ Sarkesian 115

³⁰ Haycock 10

³¹ Sarkesian 109

and evolve, could have set off a 'hearts and minds' program with the South Vietnamese. However, since these efforts were seen as outside the accepted conventional war campaign,³² they were discontinued before they could be assessed. The CIA also tried to instill a pacification plan called the Phoenix Program. The Phoenix Program established counter-insurgency teams, and provided additional security forces for the civilian population.³³ Though there was some improvement in intelligence gathering, especially on enemy infrastructure during the Phoenix Program, it too was discontinued.³⁴

In the end, the war in Vietnam was a failure for the US forces, both militarily and politically. The decision not to integrate the indigenous civilian administration or security forces or to establish a hearts and minds program deprived the Americans from obtaining a victory over the smaller North Vietnamese force.

OMAN 1962-76

In 1932, Sultan Said bin Taimur became the leader of Oman. In the early years of this century, Oman was a country that had not developed socio-economically, had a weak political system, and where the survival of the Sultan depended wholly on the British. Sultan Said was reluctant to bring change to his country and ruled with a policy of parsimony, backed by draconian laws.³⁵ By

³² Sarkesian 109

³³ Sarkesian 110

³⁴ The CIA intended to use the Phoenix Program as a means of eliminating the Viet Cong threat. This was termed not to be in the best interest of the United States government.

³⁵ Beckett, Armed Forces 26

the 1960s, the support of the British had secured his leadership, yet he lived in a relative vacuum from his people, showing them little regard and resisting any notion of providing social, educational, or medical services to his approximately one million inhabitants. The Omani people were ripe for a revolution.

In the early 60s, small insurgencies were organized and by the 1970s, the insurgents had amassed support from their countrymen and continued with attacks on the government, further contributing to the diminishing support for the Sultan. Throughout, the only counter-insurgency movement came from the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) made up entirely of British troops, while the Sultan himself remained complacent in his palace.³⁶ Concessions to the insurgents were denied outright without due consideration, and Sultan Said, who rarely left his palace, established new laws inhibiting freedom of movement, imposing harsh curfews and even harsher penalties³⁷.

In 1970, LCol John Watts, Commanding Officer of the British 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (22 SAS) conducted a reconnaissance of Oman on behalf of the British government in reply to a request by the Sultan for Allied aid. His report stated in part:

“The road was cut and the only resupply was by air or sometimes by sea... There were no [Omanis] in the SAF, which was virtually an army of occupation. Everybody on the jebel³⁸ was with the enemy, some convinced, come out of boredom, some intimidated: SAF had only a few jebali guides. It was crazy – we were on a hiding (sic) to nothing...”³⁹

³⁶ Beckett, Armed Forces 29

³⁷ Beckett, Armed Forces 30

³⁸ Jebel – province of Oman

³⁹ Beckett, Armed Forces 30

Finally, on 23 July 1970, the Sultan's son, Qaboos bin Said, out of desperation to ensure his own inheritance, led a bloodless coup and ousted his father. He immediately set up an Interim Advisory Council, chaired by the Defense Secretary and a number of British advisors. His actions included setting up a modern central administration with four new ministries – education, health, interior and justice. He invited all exiled Omanis back into government positions and lifted the archaic restrictions upon his people, released political prisoners and developed programs to build schools, clinics, houses and roads.⁴⁰ In 1971, Oman was welcomed as a member state of the United Nations.

Based on LCol Watts recommendations, Qaboos attacked the insurgents. The SAS five-front campaign (intelligence gathering and collation, information operations to describe the governments policies, medical aid, veterinary facilities and a policy of directly involving Omanis) was directed to meet the British's proven formula for countering insurgencies; most notably, acquiring local knowledge, 'hearts and minds' and native participation. The goal was to bring immediate relief to the people while training local citizens to provide for their own in the future. The long-term goal of course was for the Omani government to regain control and establish the necessary infrastructure to support it's own people. The military were simply a means to that end.⁴¹

Thompson's Principles. Sultan Said did not incorporate any of Thompson's principles when the insurgency movement started in Oman. However, this was quickly resolved once his son took over the government and

⁴⁰ Beckett, Armed Forces 31

⁴¹ Beckett, Armed Forces 33

established his own hearts and minds policy and structured the counter-insurgency efforts based on Thompson's principles.

During Sultan Said's reign, there were no attempts to plan a campaign to counter the insurgencies. The Sultan remained aloof to the needs of his people and believed that by imposing unreasonable restrictions on them, he could sway their loyalties. Though there were no identified end states, his actions spoke of maintaining the status quo in a country where the citizens had no civil liberties and no government help. Said never attempted to understand the rebel's grievances and refused to counter their offers of reforms. Furthermore, with the lack of intelligence and information operations, the government could not reach the citizens.

Nor did Sultan Said engage in any 'hearts and minds' policy. Security of the people and trust in the government were non-existent. As late as April 1970, Said had no overall plan to counter the insurgencies – his only direction to the SAF commander was that the rebels were 'evil and dangerous men' and he wanted him 'to destroy them'.⁴² The military did not have an achievable aim nor did they understand the political aim.⁴³

The situation evolved quickly once Qaboos gained control of the government. His trust in the experience of the British forces allowed him to concentrate on establishing a long-term solution for governance of his country. At the political level, Qaboos coordinated and controlled the SAF, police and other government agencies. He ensured all members of the counter-insurgency

⁴² Beckett, Armed Forces 30

⁴³ Beckett, Armed Forces 31

team were made aware of his strategic aim and that the operational tasks were coordinated to achieve it.⁴⁴ Qaboos' quick reaction in establishing a 'hearts and minds' policy won the support of the people and aided in intelligence gathering, trust and in security measures meant to make his citizens feel safe.

Qaboos achieved what his father could not. He coordinated military and political policies – using the military to stop the violence and the politicians to ensure it does not rise again.⁴⁵ More importantly, his efforts left his government stronger than ever.

MALAYA 1947-55

Malaya in the 1940s was a pluralist society made up of Malaysians, Chinese and Indians. Though equality appeared to exist between these communities, this was not necessarily the case, and helped to form the insurgency movement within the country. This was further exacerbated in government where the British, who were in the process of establishing an independent Malaya, had established the Malayan constitutional framework ensuring the Malaysians dominated the government.⁴⁶

By 1947, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had commenced its revolutionary strategy following the principles of Mao Tse-tung; offensive tactics associated with a guerrilla war of attrition.⁴⁷ The British troops who had previous experience in counter-revolutionary warfare, had from the outset explained that

⁴⁴ Beckett, Armed Forces 33

⁴⁵ Beckett, Armed Forces 42

⁴⁶ Sarkesian 64

⁴⁷ Sarkesian 65

the key to countering the revolutionaries was to maintain law and order and an effective government administration.⁴⁸ Strong initial reaction by the British to squash the revolt slowed the MCP in the early years. A state of emergency was declared, the MCP banned and British, Malayan and Gurkha troops were put in place to counter what amounted to a Communist army.⁴⁹

The MCP responded with a shift in their tactics – they mounted a campaign of terror and coercion against the civilian population. “In spite of the efforts of the Army and the Police, as then existing, the situation towards the end of 1949 was becoming increasingly serious, causing a serious drop in civilian morale.”⁵⁰ By 1950, the British, under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, instituted the ‘Briggs Plan’, which confirmed that the civilian government was responsible for responding to the revolutionaries. It further placed an emphasis on resettlement programs where citizens could live without fear and in a secure environment – all the while integrating the civilian and military systems of planning and operations.⁵¹

In 1952, Briggs left and was replaced by General Sir Gerald Templer. This was the turning point in the campaign. Templer was appointed High Commissioner and Director of Operations – for the first time, the political and military organizations reported to one man. Templer executed the Briggs plan in earnest. He integrated the police and military systems, brought together the traditional Malayan rulers, the civil authorities, the British military and the special

⁴⁸ Sarkesian 66

⁴⁹ Sarkesian 67

⁵⁰ Sarkesian 68

⁵¹ Sarkesian 71

police to develop and implement plans and to institute control of the provinces and districts.⁵² Templer established the War Council to coordinate and plan the work of the three arms of government – civil, military and police, from top to bottom.⁵³ The concept of a central office to coordinate the counter-insurgency movement was highly effective and led to coordinated plans and operations. Most importantly, Templer was convinced that the only way to influence the population was through their ‘hearts and minds’.

By 1954, the number of terrorists’ activities had dwindled. Federal elections in 1955 provided an opportunity for political participation by all communities and Malaya was on its way to full independence.

Thompson’s Principles. The Malaya government was very successful in countering the insurgent movement through use of all of Thompson’s principles.

The key to the success in the Malayan campaign was the centralization and integration of the civilian and military organizations. The strategic aim – to stop the insurgency and gain Malayan independence as a fully self-governing nation⁵⁴ - was understood by all and coordinated at the highest levels. The maintenance of law and order was essential to retain the moral high ground and served to sway support for government policies and efforts.

The direct link between the Briggs Plan and winning over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people was fundamental to the overall success. Templer aimed to resettle 423,000 squatters⁵⁵ with a higher standard of living and local governance

⁵² Sarkesian 72

⁵³ Clutterbuck 57

⁵⁴ Clutterbuck.80

⁵⁵ Clutterbuck 57

in secure areas. In these settlements, civil agencies were tasked with local administration while enforcing the decisions of the central government; police and auxiliary forces were tasked with internal security and the military with relieving the pressures on the villages by forcing the guerrilla units to split up.⁵⁶

Information and psychological warfare was used to gain support for government forces and as they progressed, exchanges in intelligence were prominent throughout the country. In the end, governance won out. At the strategic level, there existed an effective government meeting the needs of the people, while at the grass roots level there was an effective local government backed by a professional police force that enabled it to function without coercion or corruption.⁵⁷

KEYS TO SUCCESS

In the successful campaign examples above, leadership was paramount in countering insurgency. Motivated officials, working within a centralized command and control structure, one in which the strategic aim remained at the forefront of planning and operations, felt reassured and could conduct their work in relative security and confidence. As illustrated early on in Malaya and later on in the Oman conflicts, the government officials were determined not to be controlled by the insurgents yet were convinced that it was crucial not to force the civilian population to the government side, but to convince them that that was the ideal solution.

⁵⁶ Clutterbuck 4

⁵⁷ Clutterbuck 5

In convincing the citizens, the first reaction to any revolt as described has to be to protect the civilians and control the population.⁵⁸ This is key. A government cannot hope to win the hearts and minds of the people if they are afraid and do not feel as though they can trust the government forces. A secure living and working environment coupled with established law and order is essential to convince the population that the government has the best interests of the country at heart. An integrated civilian – military structure is an effective means of accomplishing this.

Also key is that a counter-insurgency strategy based only on a military victory rarely wins the broader war. The ultimate victory rests with political, economic, and socio-psychological success.⁵⁹ Combined with a close integration of the military, police, and information branches, success is assured. Succinctly stated by General Harold K Johnson, United States Army Chief of Staff, in his foreword to Brigadier Richard L. Clutterbuck's book, The Long Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam, "The arms of the government must be long enough to reach out to all the people, firm enough to give them support, and strong enough to protect them from coercion and outside influence."⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Clutterbuck 176

⁵⁹ Clutterbuck ix

⁶⁰ Clutterbuck ix

CANADIAN FORCES DOCTRINE

In a recently published threat definition for Canada and the Canadian Forces⁶¹, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff's Future Operations Study, concluded that 'emerging threats to Canadian security and interests, labeled "asymmetric" are present now', and that these threats 'have significant potential to affect Canadian security and may move in to the foreground in the next 5 – 10 years'.⁶² This study further emphasizes that a potential for asymmetric attack on Canadian citizens or CF personnel while deployed highlights the need for additional security and preventative capabilities and flexibility in missions abroad.⁶³ Furthermore, in a review of Defense Planning Guidance 2000, seven of the eleven planning scenarios offer possibilities for asymmetric threats in Canada or against CF personnel deployed⁶⁴. This accentuates the need to have CF doctrine for countering asymmetric threats, doctrine which the CF does not currently have.

Fortunately, based on their experience in countering insurgency movements, the United Kingdom has developed their own doctrine on Counter-Insurgency Operations.⁶⁵ Many of the principles and key attributes discussed in this paper have been incorporated in the UK doctrine. There is a general awareness by the UK military that an effective civilian-military cooperative, at all

⁶¹ Col WJ Fulton, Threat Definition: Asymmetric Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction. (Ottawa: NDHQ, 2000) 1

⁶² Fulton 10

⁶³ Fulton 3

⁶⁴ These include: 5 – Protection and Evacuation of Canadians Overseas; 6 – Peace Support Operations (Chapter 6); 7 – Aid of the Civil Power; 8 – National Sovereignty/Interest Enforcement; 9 – Peace Support Operations (Chapter 7); 10 – Defence of Canada/US Territory; and 11 – Collective Defence. Fulton 8-9

⁶⁵ UK Army Field Manual Volume V – Operations Other Than War: Counter-Insurgency Operations Part 1 & 2

levels of war and under the leadership of civilian authority, is essential to combat insurgencies.

The only US or CF doctrine remotely related to insurgency or asymmetric warfare as highlighted in this paper, is that written on civilian-military operations. In the US documents, Joint Publication 3-57 (Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations) and Joint Publication 3-08 (Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations), the focus is on military leadership and cooperation with Non-Government Agencies (NGOs), limited in scope to medical and humanitarian needs. In the Canadian CIMIC Manual however, there is awareness that civilian-military cooperation is more than coordinating the efforts of NGOs, it is also about helping institute legal governance to the regions of conflict.

In reviewing the CF CIMIC manual⁶⁶, CIMIC refers to those ‘activities and operations, involving political, military, civil and humanitarian elements’ to be ‘focused on preventing further bloodshed, resolving an (armed) conflict and ensuring lasting peace’⁶⁷. In this regard, there is great commonality with that of the UK manual. Unlike the UK however, in the Canadian Forces, CIMIC is recommended to be subordinate to the military system, which is in essence the final authority. Task Force Commanders are guided to include CIMIC in their operations as a primary means of assisting the local population through the coordinated efforts of various civilian organizations (UNHCR, ICRC, etc). Moreover, there is acknowledgement that no legal authority rests on the command staff over civilian agencies; therefore it is the responsibility of the commander to

⁶⁶ B-GG-005-004/AF-023 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War.

⁶⁷ B-GG-005-004/AF-023 1-1

seek their cooperation. Unfortunately, there are no established positions at the Joint Operations Group dedicated to CIMIC operations – the responsibility rests within the J-staff system, on an ad-hoc arrangement⁶⁸. Though the CF CIMIC Manual speaks of unity of effort and unity of purpose⁶⁹ as suggested in Thompson’s principles – the impression given in the manual is that it is really a measure of unity of the military purpose and military effort that is desired.

The CF CIMIC document was not written to delve into the complexities of insurgencies or asymmetric warfare – it was meant to be a starting point in establishing civil-military ‘cooperation’ on current CF peace-support missions. However, the underling principles as described by Thompson, are evident as described in several of the stated objectives of CF CIMIC:

- a. Assist in support to civil administration, in achieving developmental goals by assisting or reinforcing the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government, as well as political and socio-economic infrastructure to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public institutions and civil services;
- b. Facilitate the mission by minimizing interference by the local population in the military phase of an operation while obtaining civil support for the civil phase and associated tasks;
- c. Assist in meeting the legal and moral obligations to the local population; and,

⁶⁸ B-GG-005-004/AF-023 1-3

⁶⁹ B-GG-005-004/AF-0231-29

- d. Assist Canadian and foreign civil authorities in creating, restoring and maintaining public law and order.⁷⁰

With the greater emphasis on countering asymmetric warfare, the present CF CIMIC manual can be modified, similar to the UK doctrine manual, in order to further expand on how civilian-military cooperation can be used to counter asymmetric warfare and insurgencies. This can be assisted through war-gaming techniques where robust countermeasures are employed which will lead to the development of improved tactics and doctrine.⁷¹ This war-gaming should include participation of civilian agencies, which will lead to better interagency cooperation and the establishment of procedures and protocols, improving the initial situational awareness at the beginning of a conflict. Finally, improved cooperation with Canada's Allies, particularly the US and the UK, will open intelligence and information sharing essential for countering such attacks.

CONTEMPORARY NOTES

Though this paper concentrated on the insurgency movement as a means to understand how to combat asymmetric warfare, it must be emphasized that the use of civilian-military cooperation is but one of the means to accomplish it. Today, nations are faced with increasing emphasis on combating terrorists because of the events of September 11, 2001. There is no easy answer to the terrorists' question. Certainly as proposed by Colin S. Gray in a recent spring

⁷⁰ B-GG-005-004/AF-023 1-5

⁷¹ Aston B. Carter, John P. White ed. Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001) 123

edition of Parameters,⁷² there are a number of guidelines that need to be established within the military communities – not the least of which is a better general awareness of the threats. Gray postulates that we cannot give into terrorism, nor can we plan for every possible threat. We must be able to re-think what would be a morally acceptable response, perform aggressive war-gaming techniques where ‘thinking outside the box’ is encouraged and plan to the worse case scenario. Most importantly, nations must continue to try and understand the ‘enemy’. This is by no means an easy task – but one that is imperative to combating an unpredictable foe.

CONCLUSION

“To summarize....the first requirement for the successful conduct of a counter-insurgency campaign is for the government to set up a sound framework within which it can take place. This should consist of coordinating machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign, arrangements for ensuring that the insurgents do not win the war for the minds of the people, an intelligence organization suited to the circumstances, and a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment.”

General Sir Frank Kitson⁷³

Beginning in the 1990’s, the United States began to shift its focus within the Department of Defense with the growing recognition of the potential for asymmetric threats against the US. This was in part due to its realization that the security environments post the Cold War had itself become more asymmetric in terms of global

⁷² Colin S. Gray, “Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror,” *Parameters*, Spring 2002: pages 5-14 (journal online), accessed 23 October 2002; available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02spring/gray.htm>

⁷³ UK Army Field Manual 5-1

distribution of power.⁷⁴ Though there is more focus on asymmetry today after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, asymmetric warfare has been around for centuries. What is important to consider however, is how to combat these inequitable distributions of military power. As discussed in this paper, the establishment of an effective civil-military program is crucial to the overall success.

First, let's consider the examples used in this paper. In the Vietnam War there was virtually no civilian-military cooperation, and that which was there was poorly coordinated and later discontinued. Vietnam still bears the burden of the effects of the war, particularly in its ruined infrastructure. Two years after the American withdrawal from South Vietnam, North Vietnamese forces took them over. Vietnam is a communist country, run by an aging Communist Party reluctant to make the reforms necessary for Vietnam to develop economically.⁷⁵ Relations between the US and Vietnam have taken years to be established – and only in the hope of aid. The battle is not only remembered in Vietnam; the American side of the experience is still felt. American soldiers and the American public will not soon forget the one war that defined the United States in the latter half of the 20th century.

Though the US government and its military operate under different concepts today, the principles described in this paper are still valid and have been used in the current campaign against terrorism. The United States' attempts at instituting a 'hearts and minds' campaign in Afghanistan through civil infrastructure projects, maintaining

⁷⁴ Metz and Johnson 2

⁷⁵ CIA Fact book - Vietnam

law and order and protecting the governing powers, may not be in their 'doctrine', but it is understood at all levels to be a means to the end of asymmetric warfare.

In the last two classic examples of effective civilian and military cooperation activities during counter-insurgency operations, Oman and Malaya each had a better opportunity to grow economically and politically given the positive state of the population after their respective counter-insurgency movements. Though Oman is termed a monarchy with Sultan Qaboos bin Said at the head, the extensive modernization program instituted soon after his successful coup against his father has opened the country to the outside world. Strong political and military ties with the United Kingdom continue, as does a moderate foreign policy that maintains good relations with Middle East countries. As of late, Qaboos has opened the debate on free elections and guaranteed civil liberties for all Omani citizens.⁷⁶

Malaya, renamed Malaysia in 1963, stood strong as a nation while it was subjected to growing tensions with its neighboring Indonesia. Singapore separated in 1965 and since then, Malaysia has enjoyed a stable constitutional monarchy, free of insurgencies.

In asymmetric warfare, if we use Clausewitz's center of gravity principle, it is not the armed forces that are the center of gravity in the conflict, but rather the hearts and minds of the population. Though civilian-military cooperation is not the panacea of countering asymmetric approaches, it is a factor that must be considered during any

⁷⁶ CIA Fact Book - Oman

conflict; without it government agencies cannot win the battle for the hearts and minds of the nation – and without the hearts and minds of the nation, there can be no long-term support for the government.

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