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North American Homeland Defence Coalition

By /par

Colonel C.S. Sullivan

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Abstract

The post-9/11 North America security environment demands that Canada refocus its national defence mandate to include permanent high-readiness *homeland defence* military forces capable of responding in an immediate and rapid manner to threats emanating from inside North America and locations worldwide. Canada's vital national interests and existing Department of National Defence strategic guidance call for meaningful CF participation in the collective defence of North America. However, twelve months after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the readiness and responsiveness of Canada's military remain well below the levels required to allow effective participation in short-notice homeland defence operations. Operation Grizzly, the CF's security effort in support of the G8 Summit in Alberta, offered insight and clarity to the homeland defence mission and should form the basis of a new homeland defence "*Force Planning Scenario*". All of Canada's military war fighting communities would be called upon to provide multi-purpose capabilities. Canada's homeland defence mission would also require a permanent Joint Forces Headquarters, which would include a Joint Force Commander supported by permanent air, land, maritime and special forces Components Commanders. The CF's contribution to the "*North American Homeland Defence Coalition*" would be coordinated with Northern Command in the United States, and with several other government and civilian organizations.

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North American Homeland Defence Coalition

"Canada faces no greater foreign and defence policy challenge than finding an appropriate and credible way to reassure the United States that Canada can live up to the defining 1938 Roosevelt-Mackenzie King agreement under which the Prime Minister assured the President that no attack on the United States could come through Canadian territory."

Douglas Bland - 2002

Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact reduced the possibility of a significant attack on North America. However, on 11 September 2001 the world was given a terrifying glimpse of a non-conventional threat that would redefine the manner in which sovereign states would prepare to defend their homeland against terrorist attacks. The new threat would be capable of launching devastating attacks on North America from within continental borders, adjacent territories and waters, and distant locations abroad. Of grave concern, the new menace would be sophisticated, intelligent and determined, with techniques and methods limited only by its resourcefulness and imagination.¹ Once relegated to the list of *potential* threats to North America, terrorist groups and "rogue nations" with the desire and technological means would become a very real threat to North Americans.

The senseless brutality of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington galvanized the determination of the international community to rise up and defeat terrorism. Within hours of the attacks the United States declared war on terrorism and rallied their friends and allies in a most remarkable and inspiring manner. NATO invoked "Article Five" – an attack on one member is an attack on all, and Canadians found themselves embracing their closest and most

¹ NORAD Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, [NORAD Daily Intelligence Briefs - September 01 to June 02](#). Terrorist attacks assessed as sophisticated and well coordinated. NORAD NJ2 warned that follow-on attacks could include techniques and methods not previously imagined.

trusted friend and ally in a manner seldom demonstrated before.² Canada did not delay in demonstrating its willingness to support North America's new homeland defence mission: federal and provincial departments, law enforcement agencies, security organizations and the Canadian military forces were elevated to the highest levels of alert and then focused toward the North American homeland defence effort. Canada's contribution to aerospace surveillance and control was facilitated through NORAD and saw CF18 fighter aircraft patrolling the skies over Canada's major metropolitan centers and along the Canada-US border.

The efforts of Canada's military in the aftermath of 9/11 were extraordinary and unprecedented; however, the overall responsiveness of the CF's multi-role capabilities was, and continues to be, inadequate to counter the new asymmetric non-conventional threat.³ In addition to improved surveillance and detection capabilities in and around North America, a new homeland defence mission would require permanent high-readiness military capabilities, similar to those assembled to support the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, to counter terrorist and rogue-nation asymmetric threats. The post 9/11 North American security environment demands that Canada refocus its national defence mandate to include permanent high-readiness air, land, maritime, special forces, and a Joint Force Headquarters capable of responding in an immediate and rapid manner to threats emanating from inside North America and locations worldwide. Similar to the current NORAD mission, and complimentary to the mandate of the newly formed Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in the United States, Canada's new military partnership with the United States would be based on a "bi-national homeland defence coalition" focused on North American security, but also capable of short-notice expeditionary operations

² Public vigil held on Parliament Hill, Ottawa, on 14 September 2002, witnessed an outpouring of emotion and support from over 100,000 Canadians.

³ DND Defence Planning 2002 Online document directs three weeks notice-to-move for CF Vanguard forces, three months for Main Contingency Forces, and 180 days for the defence of North American.

abroad.

This paper discusses the threat to North America and the Canadian vital national interests and strategic guidance statements that enunciate the manner in which Canada's military should refocus its defence mission to include homeland defence. The paper also examines a homeland defence (HLD) force-planning scenario, HLD capabilities, and a command and control arrangement that would assist the CF in becoming more effective in supporting a HLD mission.

Threats to Homeland Security

“American military superiority on the conventional battlefield will push our adversaries towards unconventional alternatives. [W]e are entering a period of “catastrophic terrorism” with terrorist gaining access to weapons of mass destruction including nuclear devices, germ dispensers, poison gas and computer viruses. States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.”

New World Coming - Hart-Rudman Commission - 1999

The term “Asymmetric Threat” in the contemporary sense is used to describe the weapons and tactics used by relatively weak enemies to foil or circumvent the technological supremacy of western nations.⁴ The asymmetric threat to North America has not diminished in the months following 9/11. Terrorist organizations, whether they be religious fundamentalists or state-sponsored, have the ability to carry out sophisticated and coordinated attacks employing weapons of mass destruction against targets anywhere in the world.

In 1994, the White Paper on Defence (WP94) expressed concern over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and pointed out that a number of

states had acquired, or were seeking to acquire, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missile delivery capabilities. Of note, WP94 acknowledged that sophisticated delivery mechanisms were not required in the case of chemical and biological weapons. The increasing prevalence of technologies with both civilian and military applications, and the globalization of production and marketing of weapons systems makes proliferation difficult to prevent or control, and makes it more likely that the transfer of resources, skills and technology to “rogue” regimes will be irreversible.⁵

Asymmetric non-conventional threats with the ability to attack targets in North America span a broad spectrum of capability and lethality. Civilian intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) have the daunting challenge of identifying and then interdicting clandestine insurgent-type terrorist networks and operations that could employ “*chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced high explosive*” (CBRNE) weapons. Targets could include food sources and water supplies, heavily populated urban centres, and infrastructure critical to government and economic activity. The planning for such attacks is difficult to detect and offers little warning prior to execution.

Once attacks have been initiated, immediate and urgent response from all agencies, including military and civilian, would be essential to minimize the loss of life. Military forces could be called upon to assist in mass casualty, bio/chemical containment and decontamination operations.⁶ As discussed below, it is planned for U.S. Northern Command to play a leading role with the Office of Homeland Defence and Security to coordinate appropriate responses for

⁴ Paul Mann, Asymmetric Threats New Military Watchword, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 27 Apr 1998, p 54-55.

⁵ Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper, Minister Supply and Services Canada 1994, p 7.

⁶ Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Op Grizzly Operations Order, Draft April 2002.

certain types of terrorist threats in the United States. It has not yet been determined the manner in which Canada might participate in this process although it was announced on 17 September 2002 by Lieutenant-General George Macdonald, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, that a Canadian planning team would interface with NORTHCOM.⁷

As demonstrated on several occasions since 9/11, American and Canadian military forces have a key role in operations designed to interdict the para-military group of threats represented by the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Because homeland defence extends beyond continental boundaries, American and Canadian HLD military forces could be expected to deploy expeditionary force packages in an immediate and rapid manner outside of continental boundaries in response to imminent terrorist or “rogue” nation attacks. Many aspects of these para-military terrorist threats and delivery methods are classified; however, a very brief unclassified summary has been included as follows:⁸

- General Aviation. The risk of commercial aircraft being hijacked and employed as weapons of mass destruction has decreased dramatically due to security measures implemented since 9/11. However, thousands of small aircraft including business and executive jets and private recreation aircraft are available and accessible across North America and still represent one of the most serious threats to homeland defence and security.
- Ultra-lights, Unmanned Air Vehicles. Ultra-lights, unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and radio-controlled sub-scale aircraft are widely available and easy to employ. UAVs, including drones and remotely piloted vehicles controlled by ground based operators offer tremendous capabilities with respect to pre-programmed flight paths and attack profiles.
- Maritime Threat. Maritime vessels employed as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), similar to the attack on the USS Cole, represent a serious threat to North American shipping, ports, waterways and canals, offshore oil operations, coastal cities and industrial complexes.
- Cruise Missiles. Modern cruise missiles are reliable, accurate, survivable, and lethal. Low-tech cruise missile technology continues to proliferate and may be in the inventory of terrorist groups and rogue nations. Cruise missiles have a range of several hundred

⁷ Robert Fife and Sheldon Alberts, Canada, U.S. Devise Joint Military Unit, National Post, 17 September 2002.

⁸ North American Air Surveillance Council, North American Air Surveillance Plan, Draft Version 5.1, 25 July 2002.

km and can be launched from maritime vessels within continental boundaries such as inland waterways, or from littoral approaches and open ocean areas.

- Indirect Fire Systems. Ground and sea-based indirect fire weapons systems such as mortars and rockets are available worldwide and can be easily concealed and transported. Larger caliber systems have ranges of several kilometers and can achieve relatively good accuracy when sited and operated properly.
- Man-Portable Weapons of Mass Destruction. Man-portable CBRNE devices are the most difficult threats to detect and interdict. Civilian LEAs and intelligence organizations have the greatest role to play in countering these types of attack. Military forces could be called upon to assist in NBC containment, denotation and clean up. Of note, military units would be able to operate more effectively in contaminated environments. Not all civilian agencies have the equipment or training to conduct operations in NBC contaminated environments.
- Ballistic Missiles. The main ballistic missile threat to North America comes from those states referred to by the Bush administration as the “Axis of Evil”. Interdiction prior to launch remains the most effective means of defense against these types of attacks.
- Note. It is important to note that any of the above threats and weapons systems could employ chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced high explosive (CBRNE) payloads and warheads to achieve the greatest amount of mass destruction, loss of life and terror.

Figure 1 – Threats to Homeland Defence

The weapons systems and terrorist threats summarized above would pose extreme challenges for HLD forces. The initial planning phase of terrorist activities would be difficult to detect and could take place anywhere and at anytime. The preparation phase, however, would be more difficult to conceal. While this might give the Canadian government some lead time to respond, aside from CF18 aircraft supporting NORAD in the surveillance and control role,⁹ and JTF2 on standby to respond to Solicitor General requests for assistance,¹⁰ the CF does not maintain multi-purpose air, land and maritime forces to counter or interdict these threats in a coordinated and timely manner. The CF’s highest readiness multi-purpose forces are the small

⁹ Canadian NORAD Region, Weekly Air Tasking Orders, September 2001 to September 2002.

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, Defence Planning On-line 2002, accessed in October 2002
http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/dplan/intro_e.asp

vanguard force packages,¹¹ which are resourced and postured to deploy within several weeks. Main Contingency Forces have several months to respond to a deployment tasking, and considerable doubt exists as to whether this can even be achieved.¹² The Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) maintains high readiness levels for aerospace surveillance and control; however, this capability represents only a small portion of the military contribution that would be required to counter short-notice terrorist attacks and their weapons of mass destruction. Homeland defence tasks have not been assigned¹³ to the CF's three main Environmental Chiefs¹⁴.

National Interests

The Canadian Government has no greater national interest or responsibility than to ensure the well-being and safety of its citizens. Indeed, Canada's defence policy, as articulated in WP94, places the defence of Canada and the protection of its citizens above all other interests, obligations and priorities.¹⁵ Collective Defence -- the defence of Canada through bi-national arrangements with the United States and multi-national alliances such as NATO -- underpins the manner in which Canada has chosen to address this most vital national interest. Successful collective defence depends on effective partnerships, which in turn, relies on meaningful contributions from committed partners. As one of the few partners that can operate relatively seamlessly with the US military, Canada has been well served over the years

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Joseph T. Jockel, The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999, p 3-4.

¹³ Defence Plan On-line 2002.

¹⁴ Three Main Environmental Chiefs: Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Chief of the Land Staff (CLS), and Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS).

¹⁵ 1994 Defence White Paper.

in supporting American-led alliances and coalitions,¹⁶ especially those associated with North American defence and security. Defence policy crafted to support foreign policy objectives has served to facilitate the pursuit of international goals and afforded Canada a privileged position with an “insider” view of the intentions of its larger neighbour and partner.¹⁷ However, the inability to keep up with the U.S. could cause Canada to be increasingly marginalized in international forums. Already, there is a sense amongst analysts that Canada’s reduced military expenditures and capabilities have resulted in declining international influence.¹⁸

Canada’s most important coalition -- the collective defence of Canada and North America -- may be headed for radical transformation, from one based since 1950 on a threat of over-the-pole attacks, and from 1989 on “no threat at all”, to an overwhelming, all encompassing concern for the security of the homeland.¹⁹ Colonel Joseph Nunez highlights the importance of collective defence and recommends a hemispheric security architecture to include not just Canada and United States, but all the states of the Americas. Noteworthy, Colonel Nunez calls for a security structure consisting of standing forces dedicated to security operations, able to deploy expeditiously – regionally and globally – to deal with natural disasters, border disputes, failed states and other challenges that rapidly emerge.²⁰ Colonel Nunez also draws notice to the adequacy of Ottawa’s military, the uneasiness of living next door to a superpower, and concern that Canada might be abandoned if it does not act to pull its share of the continental security

¹⁶ Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues, IRPP Policy Matters, Vol 3, no 7, June 2002. p 13.

¹⁷ Ibid,

¹⁸ Elinor C. Sloan, Canada and the RMA in the Revolution of military Affairs: Special Implications for Canada and NATO, Chapter 8, p123-142.

¹⁹ Douglas Bland, Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How and with Whom? Policy Matters, Vol 3 February 2002, p 26-27

mission.²¹

Ranking just below the protection of its citizens is Canada's second most vital national interest -- the strength and vitality of its economic relationship with the United States. WP94 characterizes the United States as Canada's most important ally and partner in the world's largest bilateral trading relationship.²² The undefended border between the two countries is evidence of the common political, economic, social and cultural values Canada and the US share as advanced industrial democracies. Geography, history, trust and shared beliefs have also made the two countries partners in the defence of North America.²³ The WP94 attributes Canada's ongoing membership in alliances and coalitions and its involvement in championing democracy and global security to Canada's economic future and ability to trade freely with other nations.²⁴

Canada's dependence on the United States economy is unequivocal. If not patently clear prior to 9/11, Canadians have come to appreciate that failure to protect America's Northern flank would see a barrier between Canada and the US that would ostensibly seal the border. The result would be hindered travel, reduced trade and a weakened Canadian economy. The economic impact would be substantial. According to the National Association of Manufactures and Canadian Manufactures and Exporters, delays caused by heightened security since the 9/11 terrorist attacks have slowed cross border traffic, disrupted commerce and strained supply chains. At stake is over \$1.1 billion in trade each day (\$400 billion per

²⁰ Colonel Joseph R. Nunez, A 21st Century Security Architecture for the Americas, U.S. Army War College, August 2002, p 30.

²¹ Ibid, p12.

²² 1994 Defence White Paper.

²³ Ibid.

year), more than 80% of its manufactured goods.²⁵

The manner in which the U.S. regards Canada should matter to Canadians. The Secretary of Defense Report to the U.S. Congress, "*Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*" places Canada at the bottom of a list of 26 allied countries that contribute to common defence. Specifically, the report ranks Canada 24 of 26 allies for defence spending as a percentage of GDP, and 25 of 26 for active-duty military personnel as a percentage of the total labour force.²⁶ Before 9/11, the Bush administration made its concerns known with regards to Canadian defence spending when the American Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, remarked that it has now reached the point where, without significant increases, the Canadian Forces could lose much of their effectiveness.²⁷ More recently, the US Ambassador chided the Canadian government on its defence spending, citing the situation in the Ivory Coast where it was French and U.S. military forces that helped rescue Canadian children and citizens. Ambassador Cellucci commented that the U.S. has helped Canada in the past and will continue in the future, however, he stated "a modern military needs to get its troops to where they're needed quickly".²⁸ His comments were directed towards the CF's lack of strategic airlift. These official statements from the U.S. should warn that Canada's incapacities are sidelining Canadian

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ William B. Cassidy, Business Logistics – United States September 11 Terrorist Attacks 2001, *Traffic World*, 28 January 2002, Vol 266, Issue 4, p14.

²⁶ United States Congressional Report, *Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense*, June 2002, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2002/allied2002.pdf

²⁷ Douglas Bland, *Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How, and with Whom?*, Institute for Research and Public Policy, Vol 3, No 3, February 2002.

²⁸ Canadian Press, *US Ambassador Again Chides Canada Over Military Spending*, Globe and Mail Online Edition 26 September 2002, available from <http://www.the.globeandmail=20020926&archive=rtgam&site=front>.

influence not only in Washington, but also in the international community generally.²⁹

The U.S. government is proceeding quickly in establishing robust and effective capabilities for homeland defence and security. As a close and trusted partner in so many other ventures, it seems logical that Canada would want to participate in such an important and fundamental activity, one that is unfolding on its very doorstep. “Should Canada hesitate or seek to avoid these new obligations, it seems likely that the United States [would] blockade its northern border, and undertake covert intelligence operations in Canada whenever the President deem[ed] it necessary.”³⁰

There is little doubt that as a friend and neighbour, the U.S. appreciates the contribution Canada has made over the years toward common defence. Although a larger defence budget would improve Canada’s ability to contribute military capabilities over the long term, what is important in the near term is that Canada recognize, and then act upon vital defence imperatives as they emerge. Homeland Defence is a new defence policy imperative for the United States. The U.S. military has established North America security as its number one defence priority.³¹ It is now time for Canada to translate its strategic intentions into tangible operational realities. “Share defence or be tossed aside”³² is a prospect that could confront Canada. Canada’s homeland defence mission should be viewed as the next logical step into an era characterized by readiness postures and capabilities tailored to deter and counter threats to homeland security. If indeed it is true that partnerships remain viable only so long as the reason

²⁹ Bland, Vol 3, No 3, February 2002, p 3.

³⁰ Ibid, p 27.

³¹ Peter Verga, Statement by Special Assistant for Homeland Security, before the 107th Congress House Committee on Government Reform, Sub-committee on National Security, Veteran Affairs, and Internal relations, March 21, 2002.

³² Jim Travers, Share Defence or be Tossed Aside, Toronto Star, 26 February 2002, A23.

for their founding endures,³³ Canada could have a viable partnership with the U.S. in a common homeland defence mission for several years to come.

Strategic Direction

In the months following 9/11, the Government of Canada announced wide-ranging support to HLD and security and the war on terrorism. Sweeping new anti-terrorism laws were passed,³⁴ the CF was directed to commit maritime, land and air forces to the war effort in Afghanistan,³⁵ and the federal budget earmarked \$7.7 billion over five years to improve specific aspects of Canadian security.³⁶ The Canadian Element of NORAD provided the main effort to the Canadian aerospace surveillance and control mission. However, With no formal national or continental mission in place, security and defence operations were planned and executed, ad hoc, with task-specific direction issued by NDHQ on a case-by-case basis to support individual security events. Still, as new methods and procedures were added to the CF's homeland defence "*playbook*"³⁷, the HLD mission began to crystallize.³⁸ NORAD continued to provide air surveillance and control over both countries, and unlike in the U.S. where the use of military forces for domestic law enforcement activities is restricted by a law known as "*posse comitatus*,"³⁹ the CF was called upon to make unprecedented contributions to homeland

³³ Robert H. Scales Jr., Trust not Technology Sustains Coalitions, Parameters: US Army War College, Winter 98/99, Vol 28, Issue 4, p 4 & 7.

³⁴ Bill C-55, the Public Safety Act, replaced Bill C-42, which w

defence and security operations.

Throughout the 12-month period following 9/11, and in the midst of ongoing intelligence assessments that warned of terrorist groups and rogue nations with weapons of mass destruction,⁴⁰ the CF maintained force postures and readiness levels unchanged from pre 9/11 levels, save a modest increase in fighter aircraft assigned to NORAD in the surveillance and control role.⁴¹ On review of key strategic-level documents,⁴² it was not surprising to find that strategic direction and guidance for the defence of Canada and North America, which should have encouraged the CF to transition to more responsive homeland defence postures, was already in existence, but had not been embraced by DND or the CF as a course of action to be pursued.

This important information was, and continues to be available, in four executive and strategic-level documents, namely: WP94, Defence Plan 2002 (DP02), Report on Plans and Priorities 2002 (RPP02), and Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 (Strategy 2020). Although two of the four documents listed above, WP94 and Strategy 2020, were published prior to 11 September 2001, collectively they provide insightful guidance with respect to the manner in which Canada should prepare to meet North America's homeland defence mission.

³⁹ General E. Eberhart, CINC Brief to NORAD Commanders Conference, February 2002.

⁴⁰ Canadian NORAD Region, CANR Director Operations Weekly Situation Reports, Period of September 2001 to September 2002.

⁴¹ Canadian NORAD Region, Weekly Air Tasking Orders for the period of September 01 to September 2002.

⁴² 1994 White Paper on Defence (WP94), Defence Plan 2002 (DP02), Report on Plans and Priorities 2002 (RPP02), and Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020 (Strategy 2020).

WP94 emphasizes the manner in which collective defence remains fundamental to Canadian security, and the importance of maintaining collective defence arrangements should a serious threat emerge. Of special relevance, WP94 specifically discusses sovereignty and the defence of Canada emphasizing that “Canada will continue to modify its defence relationship with the U.S. consistent with new priorities”. The White Paper reminds Canadians that although there had been a much-reduced threat of global war, the world is neither more peaceful nor more stable. WP94 further advocates prudent planning for a world characterized in the long term by instability. The most appropriate response would come from a flexible, realistic and affordable defence policy, one that provides the means to apply military force when necessary to uphold essential Canadian values and vital security interests, at home and abroad.⁴³

Strategy 2020, published in June 1999, provides further insightful, relevant and visionary guidance for Canada’s HLD mission. The document has no formal government approval; it is however, updated periodically by DND and the CF and used to guide planning, force structure and procurement, as well as investments in personnel, education and training.⁴⁴ The critical attributes of Strategy 2020 are striking. They include rapid-response and global deployability; strengthened relationship with the U.S. to ensure Canadian and U.S. forces are inter-operable and capable of combined operations in key selected areas; joint capability and counter-threat partnerships with domestic and international partners to deal with weapons of mass destruction and asymmetric threats; and, deployable command and control and a joint headquarters.⁴⁵

⁴³ Ibid, p 8.

⁴⁴ Middlemiss, Vol 3, no 7.

⁴⁵ DND Deputy Minister of National Defence / Chief of the Defence Staff, Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020, Published June 1999.

Most applicable to the defence of North America, Strategy 2020 directs the completion of force-planning scenarios, their continued use in providing coherent and focused advice to government, and the development of new task-tailored capabilities to deal with asymmetric threats and weapons of mass destruction. With respect to out-of-area operations, Strategy 2020 specifically sets combat preparedness, global deployability and sustainability of the CF's maritime, land and air forces. Other critical areas addressed, which will also be important to the HLD mission, include enhancements to CF strategic airlift, training, burden-sharing and collaborative ways to respond to emerging asymmetric threats to continental security.⁴⁶

Two other important documents, “*DP02*” and “*RPP02*”, play key roles in translating strategic direction into operational reality. Together, these two documents allocate resources and assign readiness postures to specific mandated tasks and commitments, which then allows the CF's three main Environmental Chiefs to task operational-level headquarters and units to generate capabilities for specific mandated tasks and commitments. A year after the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, the overall responsiveness and readiness of the CF with respect to the homeland defence mission has not changed. As directed by *DP02*, the CF's multi-purpose combat-capable Vanguard and Main Contingency Forces, which include air, land and maritime elements, continue to maintain a “readiness-to-move” of several weeks and months for real-world force employment operations. Based on the threats and vital national interests discussed above, CF readiness levels have remained woefully inadequate to meet Canada's homeland security and defence needs.

For the CF to take on new incremental activities and missions, an increase in the defence budget or an internal reallocation of resources from other missions to the HLD mission

⁴⁶ Ibid.

would be required. With respect to the federal budget, incremental government funding to DND over the past year for homeland defence and security has been unremarkable. Non-forecast incremental defence funding in the wake of 9/11 has been mainly related to the war against terrorism in Afghanistan -- \$210 million for in-year deployed military operations, \$300 million over five years for equipment, and \$119 million over five years for JTF2 counter-terrorism unit to double the size of the unit.⁴⁷ Other government departments and civilian agencies have been allocated \$7.1 billion over five years to be divided amongst five broad areas, which include commercial air travel security; RCMP, CSIS and other federal security agencies; information sharing among security agencies; civil maritime surveillance and security; and, Canadian border crossings and Customs and Immigration.⁴⁸ Within DND and the CF, DP02 resource allocations and readiness levels have remained unchanged from pre-9/11 levels.

From the above it is clear that the requirement for a homeland defence mission is supported by potential threats to North America, vital national interests and existing strategic guidance; however, DND and the CF have taken very little action to address the requirement in the 12 months following 9/11. A possible explanation for inaction could be the lack of government funding for the CF to undertake a new mission of this magnitude. A more realistic conclusion points to DND and the CF not taking the initiative to reprioritize Canada's three defence missions against new terrorist threats and current funding realities, and then establishing homeland defence as a vital joint mission ahead of other activities. The pre-9/11 mentality persists; namely, the defence of Canada remains secondary to Defence Mission Three -- international peace and security. Decreasing the emphasis on low-readiness Main Contingency Forces and other operations abroad, and placing greater importance on high-

⁴⁷ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "New Anti-terror Bill Limits Power to Declare Military Zones", 30 April 2002.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

readiness HLD forces and operations at home could be seen as a prudent course of action that would allow Canada to make a significant contribution to its two highest vital national interests.

Force Planning Scenario

The eleven Force Planning Scenarios span the spectrum of conflict and describe operations anticipated by the CF.⁴⁹ The scenarios are meant to evolve as required to ensure they continue to reflect the strategic environment and Canada's defence perspectives.⁵⁰ Of concern, although several HLD and security operations have been conducted during the twelve months following 9/11, force-planning scenarios have not been modified to reflect the new terrorist threat to North America or the requirement for a HLD mission. Amendments to existing scenarios or the addition of an entirely new scenario would be a critical and important step in providing the guidance and clarity needed to establish a formal homeland defence mission. The following section discusses aspects of a HLD force-planning scenario based on known threats and previous ad hoc homeland defence operations.

Para-military terrorist organizations capable of employing CBRNE weapons of mass destruction against North America pose significant challenges to conventional military forces. Many of these challenges have become familiar to American and Canadian forces over the past year as a result of several security operations, discussed below, that have been planned and executed. Many of these operations have assisted in identifying the manner in which civilian and military organizations should prepare to meet the homeland defence mission. The defence of large public sporting and political events and the protection of critical infrastructure such as nuclear and hydro-electric power stations, government buildings and critical economic infrastructure have served as useful planning models. Setting the tone for larger more challenging NORAD-supported scenarios were the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, the 2002 Super Bowl in New Orleans and a number of Space Shuttle Launches.

⁴⁹ Department of National Defence, Director of Defence Analysis, Force Planning Scenarios, 20 Dec 1999, available from http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/dda/scen/intro_e.asp.

⁵⁰ DND, "Defence Plan Online", 2002.

In Canada, an especially useful HLD model emerged during the planning and execution of the security operation in support of the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta. The detailed analysis and planning that went into determining the military capabilities needed to support the G8 Summit provided considerable definition to the evolving homeland defence mission. Truly unprecedented, Operation Grizzly epitomized the manner in which Canadian and U.S. government departments, including American and Canadian militaries, could come together and combine capabilities and resources to produce one of the largest military and civilian security operations in Canadian history. Of special interest was the broad range of *Defensive Counter Terrorist* military capabilities assembled for the two-day event:

- CF Land Forces for area defence and security and counter-terrorist operations
- Joint Task Force 2 for counter-terrorism and hostage-resolution operations
- Canadian Forces NBCW Response Teams for decontamination, containment and cleanup operations
- NORAD Aerospace Surveillance and Control
- American AWACS and Strategic Air-to-Air Refueling aircraft
- Defensive Counter Air capability supported by armed CF18 Fighters, CH146 helicopters with armed snipers and emergency response teams, Ground Based Air Defence missile systems, and Transportable Control Radar (TCR) systems
- CH146 helicopters in support of Utility and Tactical Air Lift in support of JTF2, Land Forces and VIP transport
- Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) for Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance
- Dedicated C4I systems, capabilities, infrastructure and procedures specifically designed for operation Grizzly

Figure 3 – Operation Grizzly - Defensive Counter Terrorist Capabilities

As successful as Operation Grizzly was, it is important to note that the entire operation was assembled ad hoc, and disbanded immediately after the event. Noteworthy, the planning and preparation period began eight months before the event, required an intensive four-month exercise and training period, and had a deployment phase that took several days. An important lesson learned from Operation Grizzly⁵¹ was that future short-notice HLD missions would require dedicated high-readiness military forces on a continuous basis, trained and ready to respond in a matter of hours or days to terrorist threats anywhere in North America. From a force planning scenario perspective, Operation Grizzly provided valuable insight in identifying the full range of military capabilities and inter-agency coordination needed to detect and counter the broad spectrum of terrorist capabilities. Most importantly, Operation Grizzly could now serve as a realistic base-line starting point for the development of a standing HLD force-planning scenario.

To ensure the new HLD force-planning scenario would be all encompassing from a Canadian demographic / geographic perspective, the scenario would need to be set in a populated coastal-metropolitan center, close to the Canada-United States border.⁵² The operation would be “joint” within Canada, “combined” between U.S. and Canadian military forces, and would rely upon NORAD surveillance0.98 0 0 10.98 311.05679 0 0 1 279.72025 Tm(f nd counro) fap

The ability to respond to a “*short-notice*” HLD tasking would also be an important aspect of the HLD scenario. A “*short-notice*”, HLD scenario would be the result of human and signal intelligence (HUMINT & SIGINT) intercepted from clandestine communications indicating that attacks would occur within a matter of hours or days against North American coastal urban centres.⁵⁴ As part of the HLD force-planning scenario, it would not be unusual to have uncertainty surrounding the exact method of attack. Therefore, all the threats summarized above (General Aviation, Indirect Fire Weapons, Maritime Threats, Cruise Missiles, Man-portable WMDs) would need to be anticipated. A final important aspect of a HLD force-planning scenario could include information with respect to the possibility of terrorist strongholds and staging bases outside of North America. This type of input would justify the initiation of rapid-response pre-emptive HLD expeditionary operations beyond the boundaries of North America.

The short-notice aspect of the HLD Force Planning Scenario as described above may appear to be quite daunting, however, as experienced in the months following 9/11, it is not unrealistic. Two weeks after 9/11, Canadian military and law enforcement agencies were required to respond to reliable intelligence reports that indicated two major Canadian urban centers were about to be attacked. The types of attacks were not known, and only a few hours warning had been provided.⁵⁵ Similarly, a few days before the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, intelligence and security concerns began to shift to other areas of the country. Queries were made to 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters as to the options available to provide additional homeland defence capabilities to other areas of concern. The specific details surrounding these two events are classified and cannot be discussed further in this paper.

⁵⁴ An Op Noble Eagle exercise in April 2002 attempted to include CF maritime assets in a supporting role to the CANR surveillance and control mission. The mission not successful due to command & control, ROE, and data transfer problems.

The ability of military forces to respond rapidly and effectively to short-notice homeland defence tasks would require high-readiness and well trained units, as well as tried and tested command and control structures and inter-agency agreements. Of special note, the short-notice scenario may not initially demand large numbers of HLD assets, however, it would require the deployment of light and mobile, highly responsive force packages able to react within hours or days of task to locations anywhere in Canada and North America. The critical imperative for HLD missions would be to scramble the appropriate air, land and maritime *Defensive Counter Terrorist* capabilities as quickly as possible, and then, if necessary, develop sustainment for protracted operations. Because North America HLD operations could extend beyond continental boundaries to include operations abroad, HLD force packages could be deployed globally within hours or days of task in response to imminent terrorist threats against North American vital interests. Scenarios that call for expeditionary options include terrorist groups preparing to carryout attacks against diplomatic missions, embassies, groups of foreign nationals, or direct attacks on North America from abroad.

Drawing from yet another valuable force employment model to assist in the development of a short-notice HLD force planning scenario, the Canadian NORAD Region currently maintains operational contingency plans to support urgent deployments in support of the NORAD surveillance and control mission. The plan involves small packages of fighter aircraft scrambling to American operating bases in response to short-notice air events in and around North American air space.⁵⁵ This plan is part of NORAD's flexible response concept and was developed only a few months prior to 11 September 2001. Of relevance, this concept could be adapted to include HLD operations anywhere in North America or worldwide. Canadian HLD

⁵⁵ Canadian NORAD Region, [Air Operations Centre Duty Officer Logbook](#), entry for 29 Sep 02.

⁵⁶ 1 Canadian Air Division, [Contingency Operations Plan Polar Banner](#), Draft August 2001.

force packages (air, land and maritime) at high readiness at home could deploy forward with American forces as part of the HLD coalition to foreign operating bases, American or other host-nations, to counter imminent hostile terrorist threats to North American vital interests.

A short-notice HLD force planning scenario would demand high readiness operational capabilities from the air, land, maritime and special forces components, as well as other government departments, civilian law enforcement agencies and intelligence and security organizations. As discussed above, these high readiness HLD capabilities have not been directed or tasked by NDHQ, save NORAD surveillance and control assets and a small contingent of JTF2.

Homeland Defence Capabilities

Canada has many of the multi-purpose combat capabilities needed to make a real and significant contribution to a North American HLD coalition. However, very few of these capabilities are maintain at readiness levels sufficient to provide timely responses to unpredictable and sophisticated terrorist threats. Canada's vanguard forces maintain a readiness-to-move of several weeks, Main Contingency Forces are allowed several months to deploy, and the CF is permitted several months to prepare for North American defence operations.

WP94 highlights that through the Canada-U.S. Basic Security Plan, Canada has traditionally assigned forces⁵⁷ to defend the continent, however, these forces are also tasked for

⁵⁷ Canadian forces include a joint task force headquarters, a maritime task group on each coast, a brigade with associated support, two squadrons of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of transport aircraft.

a variety of other missions.⁵⁸ The current operations tempo with deployed operations abroad does not allow the CF to cover all three national defence missions with the forces available.⁵⁹ In the event Canada's Vanguard or Main Contingency Forces are deployed, there would most likely be insufficient numbers of air, land and maritime assets at home to support continental defence or the HLD mission.⁶⁰ To ensure the HLD mission is assigned the requisite air, maritime, land and special forces, Canada's three main defence missions⁶¹ would need to be reprioritized to place greater operational importance on the protection of Canada and Defence of North America. The CF's Vanguard forces offer a partial solution to Canada's HLD mission challenge. Vanguard forces assigned readiness levels appropriate for immediate and rapid response to short-notice non-conventional terrorist threats would allow the CF to support the HLD mission in a manner consistent with a fully committed member of the homeland defence coalition.

The North American HLD mission can be divided into two distinct operational areas: "*Surveillance and Control*", and "*Defensive Counter Terrorism*". The first operational area involves surveillance and control in and around North American territory, airspace, inland waterways, littoral areas, maritime approaches and open ocean areas out to approximately 500 nautical miles. Civilian government departments such as Customs and Immigration, Coast Guard, federal and provincial LEAs, and intelligence and security organizations would provide the main level of effort in this operational area. NORAD would continue to make a significant contribution, and consideration has also been given to a bi-national Canada-U.S. maritime surveillance and control organization, modeled after the NORAD example to address existing

⁵⁸ 1994 Defence White Paper.

⁵⁹ Defence Plan On-line 2002.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

and future maritime security concerns.⁶² Although vitally important to the overall HLD mission, it is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be discussed in any great detail.

Worthy of special mention has been the American initiative to create the North American Air Surveillance Council (NAASC). The NAASC has produced a surveillance plan designed to satisfy the mutual surveillance requirements of 15 independent and distinct U.S. and Canadian civil, law enforcement and military organizations.⁶³ The Common Operating Picture (COP) produced by the surveillance stakeholders of the NAASC would be critical to the HLD Surveillance and Control mission.

The CF's multi-purpose Vanguard forces would be called upon to champion the HLD "*Defensive Counter Terrorism*" mission and HLD expeditionary operations abroad. As discussed above, large numbers of military assets would *not* normally be required to provide the initial response to a terrorist threat, however, assets tasked would need to be at high readiness so as to allow immediate and rapid responses to locations in North America and, if required, destinations abroad. Similar to the NORAD construct, the North American continent could be divided into HLD regions and sectors.⁶⁴ The Canadian HLD Region would be further divided into Canada-East and Canada-West sectors. CF units garrisoned in their respective sectors would respond to HLD operations in those areas.⁶⁵

⁶¹ 1) Protection of Canada, 2) Defence of North America, and 3) Support to International Peace and Security.

⁶² Robert Fife and Sheldon Alberts, Canada, US Devise Joint Military Unit, National Post, 17 September 2002.

⁶³ Lt Col James K. Smith, North American Air Defence Plan, (DoD [NORAD] Representative to the Air Surveillance Working Group, North American Air Surveillance Council, 25 July 2002.

⁶⁴ NORAD Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, NORAD Contingency Operations Plan 3310-96, 1997.

⁶⁵ 1 Canadian Air Division / Canadian NORAD Region, Operation Noble Eagle - Concept of Operations, Dated 27

The inherent advantages of air power -- speed, range, precision, responsiveness, ubiquity, and concentration -- plus Canada's ability to operate nearly seamlessly with American units, makes Canada's air force well suited for a bi-national HLD coalition. Current and ongoing modernization programs are addressing CF18 capability and interoperability deficiencies.⁶⁶ The fighter-force will continue to be fully interoperable with U.S. military units with improvements being achieved over the next three years in the areas of weapons, avionics and secure communications.⁶⁷ As demonstrated during Allied Force, CF18 fighters will maintain the ability to integrate into American military operations in both the air defence and ground attack roles.⁶⁸ In addition to NORAD assigned aircraft, HLD fighters would be placed at high readiness in both Eastern and Western Canada ready to employ their multi-role air-to-air and precision ground attack capabilities to interdict maritime, air or land targets within North America or in support of HLD expeditionary operations abroad. The CF's current CF18 Vanguard forces⁶⁹ equally divided between Canada-East and Canada-West and placed at high readiness, would offer an impressive level of support to both HLD *Defensive Counter Terrorist* and short-notice expeditionary missions.

Several systems would need to contribute to the HLD surveillance and control of North American air space: NORAD AWACS, deployable Canadian Transportable Control Radars (TCRs), NAV Canada Radars and the Canadian Coastal Radars. Of note, TCRs would be at high readiness, ready to deploy on short notice via strategic airlift to locations anywhere in North

November 2001.

⁶⁶ Middlemiss, Vol 3, no 7.

⁶⁷ 1 Canadian Air Division, Canada's CF18 Fighter Force – The Way Ahead, 31 July 2002.

⁶⁸ Sloan, Chapter 8, p 123-142.

⁶⁹ 12 aircraft and 24 pilots.

America.

The CF's Maritime Patrol capabilities are being modernized and will enjoy the same level of interoperability as the fighter force. There is a concern, however, of the number of airframes and crews available to support HLD operations during ongoing modernization activities and the community's continued support to the war against terrorism in Afghanistan.⁷⁰ The CP140's Vanguard commitment, equally divided between both coasts and re-assigned to the HLD mission would respond rapidly to requests from civil organization in support of the HLD *Surveillance and Control missions*, and provide short notice continuous support to the *Defensive Counter Terrorism* missions anywhere in North America and short-notice HLD expeditionary missions abroad.

Critical to the HLD mission will be the immediate availability of strategic airlift and air-to-air refueling (AAR) aircraft. Canada has been criticized in the past for not being able to deploy forces quickly to Afghanistan in support of the War on Terrorism.⁷¹ If Canada expects to play a credible role in the HDL mission, strategic airlift will be vital for the rapid movement of forces within North America and in support of HLD expeditionary operations. Of note, Canada has relied exclusively on American strategic air refueling tankers for CANR's Operation Noble Eagle mission and throughout the G8 Summit. Canada is planning to convert two CC150 Air Buses into strategic tankers;⁷² however, this will result in two less airframes for CC150 airlift.

⁷⁰ 1 Canadian Air Division, CP140 Aurora – Critical Mass Paper, 11500-1 (A3 Mar), 27 July 2002.

⁷¹ Canadian Press, Globe and Mail Online Addition, US Ambassador Again Chides Canada Over Military Spending, 26 September 2002.

⁷² Middlemiss, IRPP Policy Matters, Vol 3, no 7, June 2002.

In addition to VIP and utility transport, the employment of CH146 helicopters in the Defensive Counter Air (DCA) role during the G8 Summit was a tremendous and unprecedented success. The HLD mission would require high readiness CH146 helicopters in both eastern and western Canada in support of Land Forces, JTF2 air transport, and reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting operations. CH146 aircraft would also be tasked to provide Forward Air Controlling to CF18s in the *Defensive Counter Terrorist* mission, and to deploy with military and civilian armed snipers and Emergency Response Teams.⁷³

The ability of Canada's navy to integrate relatively seamlessly into the United States Navy will allow CF frigates to excel in the HLD mission. Dedicated HLD Canadian frigates would be required on both coasts on a continuous and permanent basis to respond to requests for assistance from civilian organization supporting the HLD Surveillance and Control mission. In his 1999 study "*The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power*", Joseph Jockel summarizes the role of the Canadian navy: "to know exactly who is using [Canadian] waters, maintain an unequivocal expression of government authority in those waters, and be able to respond quickly and effectively to violations of law or threats to national security."⁷⁴ When terrorist attacks are anticipated from surface vessels operating in or around continental waters and approaches, combat-capable Canadian frigates would lead rapid-reaction and short-notice "*Defensive Counter Terrorist*" operations. HLD maritime activities would also include forward-presence missions as members of USN carrier battle groups supporting HLD expeditionary operations abroad. Of critical importance would be the need for the CF's HLD Maritime Forces to train and exercise with other members of the HLD team on a continuous basis, and to be

⁷³ 1CAD / CANR, Op Grizzly Force Employment Guide, Draft May 2002.

⁷⁴ Jockel, p 79.

readily available to support short-notice HLD missions off Canada's coasts.⁷⁵

As demonstrated during the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada's Land Forces would have a critical role to play in HLD operations. In coordination with civilian law enforcement and other crisis action teams, Land Force units on high readiness in both eastern and western Canada would respond with little warning to imminent terrorist attacks against large metropolitan areas, critical infrastructure and other priority one vital points.⁷⁶ Post-attack consequent management, NBC containment and decontamination operations, and direct action against terrorist insurgent operations are all areas that would rely on the CF's Land Forces. Rapid mobilization and deployment of HLD Land Forces across Canada or within North America would remain problematic until DND procures strategic airlift. The "Army of Tomorrow" is currently restructuring to become lighter, more mobile with the acquisition of 651 General Motors LAV III Armoured Personnel Carriers. The transition will lead to expeditionary-type forces for maximum strategic value to JFCs and coalition operations.⁷⁷

Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) played a vital role in Operation Grizzly in providing the final layer of defence around strategic vital points.⁷⁸ Canadian "*Air Defence Anti Tank Systems*" (ADATS) units would be required at high readiness levels to respond rapidly to short notice tasks anywhere in North America. Again, strategic airlift would be vital to deploy GBAD

⁷⁵ Canadian NORAD Region Op Noble Eagle exercises conducted during the period of November 2001 to May 2002 over Canadian coastal areas experienced difficulty in integrating CF Maritime Forces into air defence and security operations. Main reference: Op Noble Eagle Exercises – 1 Canadian Air Division Lessons Learned.

⁷⁶ As outlined in NORAD Op Noble Eagle Concept of Operations dated November 2001, priority one vital points include industrial complexes, nuclear facilities, critical lines of communications and critical government and economic infrastructure.

⁷⁷ Middlemiss, IRPP Policy Matters, Vol 3, no 7.

⁷⁸ Canadian NORAD Region, Op Grizzly Op Order, 23 May 2002.

units within hours of task. Road moves would take several days.

Canada's strategically controlled special forces, which also include deployable NBCW Response Teams, would continue to play a central role in the CF's Counter Terrorism mandate. Although these units are currently maintained at high readiness on a continuous basis,⁷⁹ they would experience difficulty in deploying rapidly due to the lack of strategic airlift. Tactical CC130 Hercules aircraft, when not tasked for other operations such as humanitarian, search and rescue, and other deployed operations abroad, are the main means for rapid deployment. Special Forces would be tasked to support both the *HLD Defensive Counter Terrorism* mission and short-notice expeditionary operations abroad.

Experiences and lessons from past security operations have taught that the command and control of a HLD mission would be a full-time and continuous responsibility requiring robust and effective C4I and headquarters structures.⁸⁰ The CF does not currently have the C4I and headquarters structures in place, manned and operational, to support a continuous HLD mission in Canada and North America. There are, however, command and control concepts articulated in CF operations and doctrine manuals that would allow Canada to participate in bi-national HLD operations. Domestic contingency operations within Canada are normally conducted by one of the eight operational-level headquarters⁸¹ with operational commanders filling the role of

⁷⁹ DP2002 Online.

⁸⁰ The command and control structure for Operation Grizzly evolved into a permanent adjunct to the 1CAD/CAR Air Operations Centre in Winnipeg. One central C3I organization was established in Winnipeg for Canada's HLD mission, which also included Operation Grizzly.

⁸¹ HQ Maritime Atlantic, HQ Maritime Pacific, HQ Land Forces Atlantic Area, HQ Land Forces Quebec Area, HQ Land Forces Central Area, HQ Land Forces Western Area, HQ 1 Canadian Air Division, and HQ Canadian Forces Northern Area.

Task Force Commander (TFC).⁸² Larger more complex operations, which extend beyond the resources and capabilities of operational-level Commanders and HQs, are normally commanded by the CDS. These missions are controlled by the DCDS, on behalf of the CDS, through the National Defence Command Centre (NDCC). Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) normally report directly to the CDS through DCDS and, depending on the nature of the mission, are supported by Air, Land, Maritime and Special Forces Component Commanders.⁸³

A robust and effective command and control structure for the CF's HLD mission would be based on the C2 and HQ structures described above; however, with a few minor but significant changes. Instead of having eight operational-level HQs across the country involved in coordinating and conducting their own regional HLD mission with other HQs and civilian organizations, a single permanent Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) would be designated along with a Joint Force Commander (JFC), and supported by permanent Air, Land, Maritime and Special Forces Component Commanders co-located at the JFHQ. With this single C2 and HQ structure, the JFC would assume responsibility for the command and control of all surveillance, control, deterrence and interdiction operations associated with Canada's overall HLD mission at home, in North America and worldwide. The Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) mission could be transferred from 1 Canadian Air Division HQ to the JFHQ. Similar to the command construct at 1 CAD/CANR HQ in Winnipeg,⁸⁴ the JFC would function as the Commander CANR. The JFHQ permanent Air Component Commander would serve as the Director of Operations for all HLD air operations, which would include "Surveillance and Control", "Defensive Counter Terrorism", and when required, HLD expeditionary operations abroad. As described for the Air

⁸² Department of National Defence, Domestic Contingency Operations, Canadian Forces Operations Manual, B-GG-005-004/AF-00. Para 117.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ The Commander of 1 Canadian Air Division is double-hatted as the Commander of the Canadian NORAD Region.

Component Commander, the Maritime, Land and Special Forces Component Commanders at the JFHQ would have similar and parallel responsibilities to the JFC. Noteworthy, the maritime surveillance and control mission would also transfer from MARLANT and MARPAC to the JFC.

Under the construct described above, the JFHQ would be the Canadian counter-part to the new United States NORTHCOM. The JFC would be responsible for the Canadian HLD mission including coordination with NORTHCOM and all Canadian and American government departments and civilian law enforcement agencies. The establishment of a Canadian HLD JFHQ would alleviate concerns that, with the establishment of NORTHCOM, the Canadian forces would be integrated into the US military thus jeopardizing certain Canadian rights.⁸⁵ Canada's House of Parliament also expressed concern with Canada's ability to maintain an independent foreign policy. Similar to the U.S. Element of NORAD⁸⁶, which was established in the early days immediately following 9/11, the Canadian JFC and the JFHQ would serve as the Canadian Element of the North American HLD Coalition with a national chain of command directly to Canada's "*National Command Authority*"⁸⁷ in Ottawa.

With the establishment of a single JFHQ for the HLD mission, the CF's operational-level HQs would continue to oversee force generation and routine domestic operations,⁸⁸ however, they would also play a key-supporting role in the HLD mission. Their HLD focus would include force generation and training activities, and the sustainment of HLD force packages at the

⁸⁵ Chris Champion, NORAD in the Balance, Report News Magazine, 27 May 2002, Vol 29, Issue 11, p 15.

⁸⁶ U.S. Element of NORAD is a distinct American-only chain of command, which allows the U.S. to deal with issues related to the security of continental United States without involving Canada.

⁸⁷ 1Canadian Air Division / Canadian NORAD Region, Op Grizzly Force Employment Guide, 19 June 2002.

⁸⁸ Regional operational-level headquarters oversee routine domestic missions such as Search and Rescue, support to Department of Fisheries and Oceans, local humanitarian assistance, assistance to Canadian law enforcement agencies, and Aid to the Civil Power.

tactical level. They would also assist JFHQ in establishing forward deployed HQ operations and providing augmentation during extraordinary HLD events such as Op Grizzly and protracted short-notice HLD missions. With the JFC accepting national responsibility for surveillance, control, deterrence, and interdiction operations as part of the overall HLD mission, there would be an opportunity to reduce the number of operational-level HQs across the country. Although an important and long-standing issue, the re-organization of the CF operational-level HQ structure is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be discussed.

A permanent JFC and JHQ could liaise directly with U.S. NORTHCOM to coordinate the overall military response to HLD tasks, and with a host of government departments, LEAs, and intelligence and security agencies for coordinated military/civilian participation. Key Canadian civilian stakeholders could include the RCMP and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canadian Coast Guard, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OC�PEP), Transport Canada and NAV Canada.⁸⁹ These agencies would have dedicated and full-time liaison officers in the JFHQ. Of critical importance would be the requirement for all members of the HLD team, including senior commanders, government officials, and civilian and military participants to be highly trained and proficient in the execution of the mission on a continuous basis.⁹⁰

Canada's pledge of *support* to the War on Terrorism has been expressed and demonstrated in a number of different ways since 9/11;⁹¹ however, Canada's *commitment* to homeland defence and security, once made, will be measured by the capabilities it will be willing

⁸⁹ 1 Canadian Air Division / Canadian NORAD Region, Op Grizzly Force Employment Guide, Draft May 2002

⁹⁰ Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, Generalship and the Art of the Admiral – Canadian Perspectives on Canadian Senior Leadership, Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001. p 299.

to contribute.⁹² The CF's Vanguard Forces, re-tasked and then dedicated to the HLD mission, would provide an impressive first step toward meeting Canada's HLD requirement. Command and control of Canada's HLD mission would be a full-time responsibility that would require a permanent and dedicated C4I and headquarters structure, and permanently assigned multi-purpose standing military forces including JTF2. A Canadian JFHQ led by a JFC and supported by permanent Component Commanders would fulfill a critical role in providing a rapid and immediate response to imminent terrorist threats originating within North America and locations abroad.

Conclusion

The new asymmetric non-conventional terrorist threat to North America is resourceful, sophisticated and unpredictable, and capable of initiating attacks from within continental boundaries and locations worldwide. To effectively support a North American HLD coalition, Canada needs high-readiness military capabilities able to respond in an immediate and rapid manner to counter terrorist threats anywhere in the world.

The new terrorist threat covers a broad spectrum of capability and lethality. Government departments and civilian organizations have the challenge of interdicting clandestine insurgent-type terrorist activities, whereas military forces play a leading role in responding to para-military terrorist attacks. Canada's greatest national vital interest -- the well-being and safety of its citizens -- rests upon a collective defence partnership with the United States, which in turn is based on meaningful contributions from the partners. Canada's second most vital national

⁹¹ CANR offered personnel and CF18 aircraft to augment the American HLD mission. Canada's support to the War on Terrorism committed several ships, an army battle group, air transport aircraft, and CP140 maritime patrol aircraft.

interest is the economic relationship it nurtures with the United States. At stake is over \$400 billion per year in cross border trade. Of concern, the U.S. continues to admonish Canada citing that it has now reached the point where, without significant increases, the Canadian Forces would lose much of their effectiveness, and that incapacities would sideline Canada internationally and in Washington.

Strategic-level guidance documents have encouraged DND and the CF to pursue a HLD mission, yet little action has been taken. The critical attributes of Strategy 2020 include rapid-response, global deployability and counter-threat partnerships to deal with weapons of mass destruction and asymmetric threats. Strategy 2020 also calls for the completion of force-planning scenarios and their use in providing advice to government, and the development of new task-tailored capabilities to deal with asymmetric threats and weapons of mass destruction. Defence Plan 2002, which translates strategic direction into operational reality, has not tasked CF elements to prepare for a homeland defence mission. Readiness levels have remained unchanged from pre-9/11 levels and continue to be inadequate to meet Canada's homeland security and defence needs.

Operation Grizzly identified the military capabilities needed to counter terrorist threats, and should now form the base-line starting point for the development of a HLD force-planning scenario. The HLD mission would require standing capabilities at high readiness, ready to respond in a matter of hours or days to terrorist threats anywhere in North America or beyond continental boundaries. The HLD mission would be "joint" within Canada, "combined" between U.S. and Canadian military forces, and would draw upon the high-readiness capabilities of the CF as well as other government departments, LEAs, and intelligence and security

⁹² As outlined in DP02, the CF has not designated combat forces to the HLD mission in North America.

organizations.

The capabilities required to support the homeland defence mission would be drawn from the CF's war fighting communities. Civilian government departments, intelligence and LEAs, assisted by NORAD, would champion surveillance and control, whereas the CF would lead the "*Defensive Counter Terrorism*" mission at home and HLD expeditionary operations abroad. The CF's interoperability with American forces makes Canada's air force well suited for a bi-national HLD coalition; however, the inability of Canada to provide strategic airlift and AAR would be seen as a significant deficiency.

Canada's maritime forces would continue to operate seamlessly with the American Navy in surveillance, control and interdiction operations. Canada's Land Forces, in coordination with civilian law enforcement and other crisis action teams, would be called with little warning to respond to imminent terrorist attacks against metropolitan areas and other priority one vital points. Deployment of Land Force formations would remain problematic without strategic airlift. Ground Based Air Defence, JTF2 and the CFs NBCW Response Teams would offer essential capabilities for the HLD Joint Force Commander. Canada's HLD mission would be a full-time responsibility that would require a permanent and dedicated joint force headquarters structure. The HLD mission would be based on a permanent JFHQ and a JFC supported by air, land, maritime and special forces Component Commanders co-located at the JFHQ. The JFHQ would liaise directly with U.S. NORTHCOM to coordinate military and civilian responses.

In closing, it may not be possible to eliminate international terrorism completely. A more realistic approach would be to mitigate terrorist attacks against North America. The outcome of a bi-national homeland defence expeditionary coalition would have terrorist organizations and rogue nations believe that it is not worth their efforts to attempt terrorist attacks against North

American targets. With this as the goal, Canada would be well served to commit multi-purpose combat capabilities to a bi-national Canada-U.S. North American Homeland Defence Coalition that would have the ability to respond to short-notice terrorist threats originating from within continental boundaries and from locations worldwide.

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