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ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: NEW NETWORKS AGAINST NETWORK TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

With the recent attacks on American interests through out the world and the dramatic

and disastrous tragedy of 11 September 2001, the United States and her allies in the

western world are faced with a new paradigm of warfare. Although some might suggest

that it is being caused by a small organization of disgruntled foreign interests, this paper

argues that this is not the case. The thesis presented in this paper is that there exists a

highly organized network that has common interests and goals as well as international

connections. By offering an insight into the funding of international terrorism, the

recruitment of members, methods of operation, and the establishment of groups or cells

in numerous countries, an argument is presented that normal methods of warfare will not

be able to defeat these transnational terrorists. Also, a hypothesis is presented that a

network must be established both nationally in the US and internationally to defeat the

terrorists. The possible composition of this new network is discussed as well as some

Roadblocks that must be overcome before cooperation can be established within a new

organization. Some of the problems facing the Lead Agency are offered along with

proposed resolutions. Also, the role of the military in this new network warfare is

discussed, both in the area of Special Operations and the expertise the military has in

planning and organizing a successful coalition of disparate players.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: NEW NETWORKS AGAINST NETWORK

TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION

"Modern states emerged in part because of their proficiency at war. Because they

were able to protect their subjects from bandits and external enemies, they gained a

degree of pragmatic support which eventually matured into legitimacy-the moral

obligation to obey."[1] This assertion by Martin Van Creveld in *The Transformation of*

War leads us to the obvious question "What happens when the state cannot protect its

citizens from an external threat?" Popular sentiment might suggest that neither Canada

nor the United States are in a situation where they could not protect their respective

countries and citizens from an external, conventional military force. Initial reaction to a

hypothesis that North America is and will continue to be threatened by external forces

should obviously illicit looks and responses of incredulity. But with further analysis, a

reasonable amount of understanding of international politics, and a belief in the existence

of unbridled anger towards the West, one can reasonably come to the conclusion that our

way of life, our continued economic success and the enjoyment of freedom that exists

today could disappear quickly. There are those who believe "The political, economic, and

technological climate favors terrorism and asymmetric attack."[2]

This hypothesis was presented in 1998 during a conference entitled The Asymmetric

Threat: Listening to the Debate, almost three full years before September 11, 2001. Since

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[1] Martin Van Creveld. The Transformation of War. New York: The Free Press, 1991,
[2] Robert David Steele. The asymmetric threat: listening to the debate JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, Fall 99
Issue 23, p. 78

that horrific day, many questions have been asked. How could this happen? Who should have done something to stop it? Did anyone know beforehand? And finally, why did this happen? All are legitimate questions. Some believe that the military should have been able to do something. Perhaps the intelligence community should have known and should have been able to warn the government. Was there a breakdown in our intelligence agencies? Who was at fault? From the same conference came this question: "The most difficult issue which arose during the conference was not threat identification or even response development, but rather the more ambiguous political question of whose job is it?"[3]

Almost immediately following 9/11, President Bush ordered the formation of the Office of Homeland Defense; subsequently, the Department of Justice created the National Security Coordination Council; and, as of 1 October 2002, a new military command, Northern Command (NORTHCOM), was "stood up". These three major organizations were formed with the idea that they would all have a responsibility to counter terrorist threats and defend the continent. But with these new agencies came serious organizational challenges. Who was responsible for what? What was their executive direction? Were they to work together and if so, who was in charge?   It can be argued that immediate remedial action has been taken to counter future terrorist attacks and that the government truly understands that terrorism has become a very serious transnational problem. But without further direction and cooperation among diverse departments and non-governmental players, who is going to connect all the players into a cohesive organization that might have the capability to defeat the terrorists? It has been hypothesized that the "the challenge is of the same magnitude as developing a cold war

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[3] Ibid

strategy toward the former Soviet Union. It cuts across almost all policy domains and makes a mockery of the idea that national security and domestic policy are separate."[4]

Unfortunately, there are no immediate answers nor instant solutions, and the fact remains that North America is facing an asymmetric threat of terrorism so evil and, at the same time, so deadly that solutions to thwart its success must be attempted. "A new form of warfare is emerging and with it a new paradigm for national security."[5]

Though some might argue that asymmetric warfare is not new, this paper contends that North America is faced with a new paradigm of war that is transnational terrorism. It will take creative, innovative ideas, and organizations to defeat or to mitigate its consequences. This paper will argue that in order to attempt to end terrorism or to at least mitigate the consequences of terrorism, it is mandatory to develop a coalition network consisting of the military, law enforcement agencies, other government departments and selected civilian organizations to counter organized terrorism networks that have crossed international borders into North America.

BACKGROUND

Many countries of the world have experienced terrorism over the past century. For example, the United Kingdom continues to have Irish Republican Army (IRA) problems in Northern Ireland. This internal conflict goes on, blowing both hot and cold depending on the peace proposals on the table at any certain time. Spain continues to deal with the Basque Homeland and Freedom movement (ETA). We are all more than aware of the

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[4] James A.Thompson. We're Here for the Duration. Washington: Rand Review, Summer 2002; Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 17
[5] R.V.Gusentine. Asymmetric warfare-on our Terms United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis; Aug 2002; Vol 128 Issue 8

Israel-Palestinian situation that seems to have no end in sight and is a permanent fixture on daily news broadcasts. Indeed, even Canada experienced terrorism through the actions of the FLQ in the 60's and 70's. The murder of Mr. Laporte and the kidnapping of Mr. Cross were horrific incidents in Canadian history. There are numerous other groups throughout the world, but space precludes the listing of them all. Suffice to say, terrorism is not unique to any one part of the world nor does it have the same objectives all the time. As stated in a Rand Corporation study, *Countering the New Terrorism*, "Terrorism occupies an increasingly broad place on the conflict spectrum, from activity barely distinguishable from crime or vendetta, through conventional terrorism in support of political and transcendental objectives, to potential "super terrorism", perhaps as a proxy to war."[6] A short comparison between different groups will illustrate the change in magnitude and agendas when we discuss about terrorism and super terrorism.

Organizations already mentioned such the IRA and the ETA have national goals with relatively understood objectives. That is "terrorism was practiced by a collection of individuals belonging to an identifiable organization that had a clear command and control apparatus and a defined set of political, social, or economic objectives."[7] At any one time the IRA and ETA might each have 200-400 active participants and as Bruce Hoffman points out in his study, Terrorism, Trends and Prospects, these groups "reflected this stereotype of the traditional terrorist group. They generally issued communiqués taking credit for –and explaining in great detail-their actions."[8] These traditional terrorists groups, who are generally regional in activity, ie within their own national borders, have been joined by new organizations to the terrorist activity. "These

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[6] Ian O.Lesser et al. Countering The New Terrorism. Washington: RAND, 1999, 98
[7] Ibid. p. 8

new terrorist organizations embrace far more amorphous religious and millenarian aims and wrap themselves in less cohesive organizational entities, with a more diffuse structure and membership."[9] The new groups do not exhibit a significant amount of state support, appear to have highly decentralized command network structures and there seems to be a substantial amount of private money that sponsors their activity. And it is precisely this super terrorism, specifically, an organization called Al Qaeda that has invaded the shores of North America, specifically the United States. The details and more specific features of this organization will be analyzed in the following sections of this paper.

The attack on 11 September 2001 was beyond the realm of the "average" terrorist activity. The United States has experienced different forms of terrorists in the past, notably the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh or the problems of Ruby Ridge in the west. But these activities are pale in light of the attacks on New York City and Washington. Even the initial attempts to destroy the World Trade Center buildings in 1993 do not come close to the magnitude of the latest attack. This act was beyond the scope of regional terrorism or personal vendetta. This attack was orchestrated by Al Qaeda, the organization led by Osama bin Laden, who on 7 October 2001, less than a month after the attack, said in his videotape: "As to America, I say to it and its people a few words: I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine, and before all the army of the infidels depart the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him."[10] This was an open declaration that there would be

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[8] Ibid. p. 8
[9] Ibid. p. 9
[10] Peter L.Bergen. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. New York: The Free Press, 2001, 221

continued attacks upon the United States and its people. Up to this point, most attacks by Al Qaeda against America had been against American interests or troops in foreign countries such as the Khobar Towers, the USS Cole, and embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. But now the "war" has come to the homeland.

DISCUSSION

The United States is facing an enemy that it cannot defeat on the battlefield with its Army and Air Force nor can it attack this opponent on the open seas with its superpower Navy. Al Qaeda has no symmetrical opposing forces for the United States and her allies to overpower in conventional warfare. This is, in fact, a true asymmetric situation with the smaller side having struck the first blow. Peter L. Bergen in his new book, *Holy War, Inc.*, describes bin Laden's organization with the following analogy: "behind them are the many thousands of members and affiliates of Al Qaeda, not only in Afghanistan but in sixty countries around the world: a Hydra-headed monster."[11] It appears, then, that unlike stereotypical terrorist groups of a few hundred participants, Al Qaeda may have many thousands of dedicated well-trained members not only in the Middle East but also throughout the world. In order to understand its operation and argue a course of action for its containment and eventual defeat, it is necessary to offer some insight into what the West knows as offered by recent articles and books attempting to shed some light on the phenomenon called Al Qaeda. Specifically, what kind of organization does it have, how widespread is it, how does it operate, what type of people are part of this organization and how is it funded? The last question is: How will the United States counter this international problem?

ORGANIZATION

According to a most recent Rand research paper published in 1999, there are distinctive differences among terrorist groups that are dependent upon the size and goals as well as the leadership styles of their founders. In their study they quote T. Burns and G.M Stalker who are of the opinion that a system of network organizations are in fact totally different from a hierarchical design-"a network structure of control, authority, and communication, with lateral rather than vertical direction of communication. "[12] The types of networks described in the research are the chain network, the star or hub network and the all channel network. It is believed that the Al Qaeda organization uses an all channel network that is highly internetted and decentralized. For the purposes of this paper and in order to not confuse the reader, the Al Qaeda name is used to represent the terrorists' alliance. In fact, Al Qaeda appears to be the inner circle for bin Laden in an alliance with other Islamic terrorist groups. These groups "are part of a complex network of relatively autonomous groups that are financed from private sources forming a kind of international terrorists' net. The most notorious element of the network is Osama bin Laden, who uses his wealth and organizational skills to support and direct a multinational alliance of Islamic extremists."[13]

The multi-channel or all-channel network can be visualized as "a geodesic Bucky ball, named for Buckminster Fuller."[14] In the opinion of the Rand study, this type of "network as a whole (but not necessarily each node) has little to no hierarchy and there

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[11] Ibid. p.
[12] Lesser, p. 48
[13] Ibid. p. 62
[14] Ibid. p. 51

may be multiple leaders. Decision-making and operations are decentralized, allowing for

local initiative and autonomy."[15] They also have common training and mindset to allow a

complete understanding of their "concept of operations." This may be, in fact, the

ultimate "auftragstactic" situation.   The Rand study authors summarized the design and

characteristics of this type of network using the acronym "SPIN: a segmented,

polycentric, ideologically integrated network."[16] A condensed explanation follows: " it is

cellular, composed of many different groups …polycentric means it has many different

leaders or centers of direction …networked means that the segments and the leaders are

integrated into reticulated systems or networks through various structural, personal, and

ideological ties."[17] For example, in the Al Qaeda alliance: "Even though bin Laden

finances Arab Afghan activities and directs some operations, he apparently does not play

a direct command and control role over all operatives."[18] In fact, by bin Laden

controlling the financing to selected groups and key leaders, there are members within the

alliance who do not know they are working for Al Qaeda.

The conclusion that Al Qaeda is a complicated network organization was further

strengthened through investigations and arrests made around the world by national law

enforcement agencies after the 11 September attack. A short list of countries where

suspected Al Qaeda operatives were arrested or detained follows: the Philippines, India,

Canada, Israel (in the West Bank), Pakistan, Great Britain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, the

United States (Chicago and Buffalo), Bosnia and Germany. This is a non-inclusive list

since there are many more ongoing investigations and additional arrests are expected to

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[15] Ibid. p. 51
[16] Ibid. p.52
[17] Ibid. p.52
[18] Ibid. p. 63

occur in other countries. Suffice to say, there is enough evidence to suggest that this organization exists in at least sixty countries with that number continuing to grow. There can be no doubt that this organization is not only international but has many more participants than originally alleged.

ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

To understand the operations of Al Qaeda, it is necessary to explain how it becomes established in particular states. Without a description of these procedures and initial operating methods, it would be impossible to build a counter terrorism plan. According to Ray Takeyh, a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and his coauthor, Nikolas Gvosdev, in their article "Do Terrorists Networks Need a Home?" they argue the position that "the multinational corporation and the transnational terrorist network both utilize the existing global economic, transportation, and communications systems to organize and manage far-flung subsidiaries and to move funds, men and material from one location to another."[19] It was revealed during the trial, in 2001, of a member of the Egyptian Al Wa'd organization, "the extent to which terror has operationally adopted the global business model."[20] As such, young recruits were sent for training in Kosovo or Pakistan and then dispatched to various countries to serve the organization as required. "Cell phones and e-mail kept the network in constant contact, while couriers provided cash advances, airplane tickets, and passports to facilitate operations."[21]

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[19] Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev. Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home? The Washington Quarterly Summ

To establish infrastructure "bases" from which to operate, Takeyh and Gvosdev found in their research that "failed states are the global terrorists' network's equivalent of an international business's corporate headquarters, providing concrete locations, or stable "nodes," in which to situate factories, training facilities, and storehouses."[22] The need to seek out the failed state is almost the reverse of what a global business organization requires. " While the multinational corporation seeks out states that offer political stability and a liberal business climate with low taxes and few regulations, failing or failed states draw terrorists, where the breakdown of authority gives them the ability to conduct their operations without risk of significant interference."[23] The states selected all invariably share the general perspective of radical Islam.

The authors continue to depict the method by which the terrorists groups infiltrate their organizations into the failed state. They allege that these groups "gain control over territory in a failed state through a Faustian bargain with authorities, usually by offering its services to the failed state during times of conflict."[24] For the pseudo authorities in these states, this can be a win-win situation. In effect, they are receiving "surrogate warriors" to wage their wars and at the same time "future aggressors may prefer to accomplish their objectives clandestinely with a handful of surrogate terrorists. Not only could such small bands facilitate the destabilization of neighboring or rival states, but if done covertly, the state sponsor might escape identification, retaliation, and sanctions."[25] They offer the examples of Islamic fighters arriving in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Sudan and Afghanistan to participate in local conflicts and wars. "Once on the ground, they

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[22] Ibid. p.98
[23] Ibid. p.98
[24] Ibid. p. 99
[25] Lesser, p.15

could exploit the chaos caused by fighting to set up their operations. The near collapse of the Albanian government during the 1990s; the chaos unleashed in Columbia, Sierra Leone, and Bosnia because of civil wars; the protection of warlords in a Chechnya that is de facto independent of Russia; and the continuing absence of an effective judicial system in Kosovo have enabled terrorists of all stripes to continue their work without significant interference"[26]

Takeyh and Gvosdev offer three more significant factors for the selection of failed states. These include "weak or nonexistent law- enforcement, permitting terrorist groups to engage in smuggling and drug trafficking in order to raise funds for operations";[27] "failed states create pools of recruits and supporters who can use their resources and organizations to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of official state power and civil society"[28]; and lastly, "failed states retain the outward signs of sovereignty. The presumption against interference in the internal affairs of another state, enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter, remains a major impediment to cross-border action designed to eliminate terrorist networks."[29]

"By playing on the widespread dissatisfaction with the corruption, economic stagnation, and political repression of the Central Asia republics, the Islamists have tapped into new pools of recruits and used the rural and mountainous areas of the region to create safe havens for training terrorists."[30] Offers of legitimate work are used as inducements for potential recruits. Examples are presented that this tactic has been used in Columbia and the Balkans. According to the authors: "Poor economic conditions in

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[26] Takeyh and Gvosdev, p. 99
[27] Ibid. p. 99
[28] Ibid. p.100
[29] Ibid. p.100

failed states also means that terrorist groups take advantage of their financial resources to hire recruits and bribe officials."[31]

Takeyh and Gvosdev write in their paper that these failed states portray the outward signs of sovereignty that is attractive to the terrorists. As such, although failed states have little or no ability to enforce that sovereignty or to police internal affairs, the sovereignty of any state, "remains a major impediment to cross border action designed to eliminate terrorist networks…Failed states may be notoriously unable to control their own territory, but they remain loath to allow access to any other state to do the same."[32] Further, failed states, because of their sovereignty have the right to issue passports, which have been found in terrorists' possession. As an example of the power of this sovereignty and the right of these states to take on the trappings of statehood, Interpol is investigating the 'loss' of over 100,000 passports from Albania. These sovereign states also have the right to buy arms on the international market for their militaries. Unfortunately, as in the case of Albania: "Interpol estimates that, during January to March 1997, terrorists and organized crime gangs seized hundreds of thousands of assault rifles, machine guns, and rocket launchers from state depots."[33]

FUNDING AND FINANCES

As to the source of terrorists' groups' funding, Mr. Mathew A. Levitt recently presented congressional testimony to the committee of Senate Banking, Housing and Urban affairs detailing the intricacies of the flow of money to the Al Qaeda network. His

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[30] Ibid. p.100
[31] Ibid. p.100
[32] Ibid. p.100
[33] Ibid. p.101

paper, titled "Role of Charities And NGOS in Terrorist Financing" gives a detailed view of how the terrorist money flows around the world and how well meaning people often donate money without knowing exactly where it goes or who they are supporting. For example, to use Mr. Levitt's own words "Long before September 11, officials were aware that financial networks of charitable and humanitarian organizations were financing terror."[34] In fact, as detailed in his paper, funding for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center was traced to a company importing Holy Water from Mecca to Pakistan. Even in Canada, an organization partially funded by the government, Human Concern International, a Canada based charity was found to have terrorist connections. "As Ambassador Francis Taylor, the State Department's Coordinator for Counter Terrorism recently noted that 'any money can be diverted if you don't pay attention to it'."[35] At the same time, from Mr. Levitt's research, it appears that more and more charitable and humanitarian groups are knowingly and proactively raising funds from individuals who know nothing of the groups' links to terrorists.

As well as humanitarian funds being diverted, wealthy individuals also do their part to support terrorist activity for personal gain in some cases but often because of religious or ideological sympathy with terrorist's causes. In the Rand paper, Implications for Strategy, the proposition is made that "private sponsors of terrorist movements, not necessarily limited to Islamic radicalism and with access to information technologies and techniques, may find it convenient to operate against regimes, rival movements or the United States."[36] As such, wealthy contributors often use terrorist groups to do their

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[34] Mathew A.Levitt. Role of Charities and NGOs in Terrorist Financing. FDCH Congressional Testimony August 2002, p. 3
[35] Ibid. p. 3
[36] Lesser, p.105

personal bidding for business or revenge motives. According to Levitt in his committee report "Individuals who support terrorism play a critical role in financing terror, highly disproportionate to their numbers. Unfortunately, a few wealthy individuals are able to sponsor much terror."[37] One example of such a wealthy individual "Yasin al-Quadi, a prominent Jedda businessman and the head the Muwafaq Foundation, has supported a variety of terrorist groups from Al Qaeda to Hamas. Further investigation of this foundation led to the conviction that "the Muwafaq Foundation is a front organization through which wealthy Saudis forward millions of dollars to Al Qaeda."[38] Levitt detailed the arrest of another individual, Osama Karika as he was leaving Gaza. Under interrogation, he admitted, "He was on his way to Saudi Arabia to brief unidentified persons on the development of the rockets and to obtain their funding for the project."[39]

Two other known methods of funding are the trafficking in drugs and arms as well as legitimate businesses that are operated by Al Qaeda members. According to Takeyh and Gvosdev in their writings, "Using the southern Fergana Valley as a transit point, Afghans have transferred weapons and personnel into central Asia. They also use the valley as a transshipment point for drugs produced in Afghanistan en route for sale in Europe, the proceeds of which Al Qaeda can then use to finance further operations."[40] Levitt documented several examples of Al Qaeda using legitimate businesses for funding. Plumbing and construction companies supported sleeper cell activities in European cities. Funds were deposited in accounts directly linked to Al Qaeda. Further testimony revealed that "Cell members ran another business buying, fixing and reselling used

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[37] Levitt, p. 2
[38] Ibid. p. 2
[39] Ibid. p. 2
[40] Takeyh and Gvosdev, p. 99

cars."[41] Many of the workers at these companies, as documented by Levitt, were

"mujahidin (holy warriors) arriving from places like Bosnia where they had fought a

Jihad (holy war)."[42] Space precludes a detailed description of all of this activity but

suffice to say, millions of dollars are involved internationally in the financing of terrorist

groups. Since 9/11, some sources of this funding have been discovered and "frozen" but

more can be accomplished through national and international cooperation.

SOLUTION: MILITARY FORCE?

    Having presented an overview into some of the characteristics of terrorist

organizations, the stage is set to discuss the solution to this ever growing and

strengthening problem. First, here is some historical background. As described in

Philppe Bonditti's paper, "L'organisation de la lutte anti-terroriste aux Etats-Unis", one

of the initial responses/solutions was military reprisal against the state to which the attack

was attributed. In response to the Libyan terrorist activity in 1986, namely the bombing

of a discotheque in Berlin where some American servicemen were killed, the United

States launched a raid on Libya, Operation El Dorado Canyon, ostensibly as punishment

while others debate whether it was an actual attempt to assassinate Khadafi. Seven years

later, an attack was made against Iraq after the Secret Service alleged that Saddam

Hussein had ordered an attempted assassination of President Bush during a visit to

Kuwait. Since then, other military action has occurred, notably the operation in

Afghanistan over the past year (2001-2002).   Although these actions can be classified as

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[41] Levitt, p. 2
[42] Ibid. p. 2

successful military operations, did they really do anything to stop terrorism or were they 'feel good' attacks for political purposes?

Takeyh and Gvosdev imply that military action is not the solution for two main reasons: "that long term occupation and reconstruction in Afghanistan will not follow short term military action and that the United States has no real stomach for pursuing terrorist enclaves in other, more inaccessible locations."[43] In fact, the terrorists have proclaimed their belief in the survival of their networks in Kashmir, Kosovo, Chechnya and Palestine because of the difficulty in attacking these sovereign states without international agreement. The authors go on to say: "Solving the problem of global terrorism by conducting military operations in failed states will be difficult to repeat elsewhere."[44] (Afghanistan may be the exception, depending upon the long-term success of rebuilding that society and political apparatus.) Furthermore, the Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov said: "Any actions, including the use of force, by states and international organizations must be based on the norms and principals of international law and be appropriate to the threats."[45] It appears then that military responses cannot be the sole means to counter terrorism due to the inability to find all the headquarters and cells, which is the very nature of this asymmetric threat.

Nor will it be easy to convince the international community that the need to use the military is justified. In fact, author Jonathan B. Tucker, in his paper, "Asymmetric Warfare", concludes that "it is not clear that in the post Cold War era, military intervention is always desirable or in the national interest…not all security treats are best addressed by military means…by disengaging from secondary military commitments

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[43] Takeyh and Gvosdev, p.102
[44] Ibid. p. 102

around the globe, the United States could reduce the incentive for terrorist attacks against Americans at home and abroad."[46] Takeyh and Gvosdev also echoed this sentiment: "Military operations against failed states designed to destroy bases and infrastructure and neutralize terrorist operatives can only be one aspect of the war on terrorism. Carrier launched fighter bombers are useless for uncovering Al Qaeda sleeper cells in Hamburg or shutting down web sites that provide instructions to terrorist recruits."[47] In summary, at times concentrated military force can be an option; however, it will not be a panacea against the decentralized network that supports the terrorists.

NETWORK PROBLEMS

Since it has been established how the organizations operate as individual cells within a network, it would only make sense to put together a network which operates faster and more efficiently in order to, as an analogy, "get inside their OODA loop". It has been documented how the organizations move their people with false passports, illegal funding, and shadow employment to cover their activities. The Rand research theorizes that in order to defeat these networks: "It takes networks to fight networks…and whoever masters the network form first and best will gain major advantages."[48] The problem for the counter terrorism organization then is to form a network that is more informed and capable of reacting quicker than that of the terrorist. Information would appear to be the key to countering their network. The immediate problem for the organization given the "Lead Agency" role would be to first establish the network or coalition, and to gain the

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[45] Ibid. p. 102
[46] Jonathan B.Tucker. Asymmetric Warfare   Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy Summer 1999, p. 7
[47] Takeyh and Gvosdev, p.104

cooperation from all agencies involved to share information and to work together. How this network should be constructed is a major problem. Given the historical lack of cooperation among departments, the involvement of NGOs, the role of the military, the function of law enforcement, and the use of civilian organizations, the coordination of this counter terrorism effort will be monumental for any "Lead Agency". How will the new counter network be organized? What tasks will be assumed by each cell or node? Will each node have the initiative and authority to act on its own or must it wait for direction from the top? Finally, how will each department know what each other is accomplishing to preclude duplication of effort?

Bonditti discusses the establishment of a "Lead Agency" in his paper. Over the years, different agencies in the United States have been designated to have the responsibility for counter terrorism. The FBI, CIA, Department of State and the Department of Defense all had a role to play in the terrorist game. And at the same time, they all appeared to have a distinct definition of terrorism. For example, the FBI was concerned with "l'usage illegal, ou la menace de faire usage de la force ou de la violence, par un groupe ou un individu base et operant entierement a l'interieur des Etats Unis."[49] That is, they were mandated to act against only those people or groups within the United States. On the other hand, the CIA was concerned about transnational terrorist. The Department of State, as well as Defense, had differing interpretations of terrorism. Each believed they had a role to play, but not with one another. In fact, certain laws of the United States do not allow the FBI and CIA to share their information. The reaction of Defense was to re-role some of their Special Operations Forces as counter terrorism units.

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[48] Lesser, p. 55

Obviously, these differing definitions, laws and the specific interests of these agencies

produced tension and, therefore, a lack of cooperation. Levitt echoes this saga of non-

cooperation in his paper on funding: "within the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement

community the financial war on terrorism has been hamstrung by bitter turf wars between

the Departments of Treasury and Justice. The Departments have reportedly launched

parallel task forces that do not communicate or share information."[50] The history of this

uncooperative attitude, excellently documented by Bionditti, is beyond the scope of this

paper, but suffice to say, they were not getting very far, very fast.

LEAD AGENCY ISSUE

After 9/11, President Bush appointed Governor Ridge as the head of the Office of

Homeland Security (OHS). This is the new "Lead Agency." With a budget of about

forty billion dollars it would appear that this new organization should be off to a solid

start. Its mandate is to "developer et coordonner une strategie globale de defense du

territoire contre des menaces ou des attaques terroriste."[51] But again, the bureaucracy is

hampering Ridge from success. Although he has the budget, he does not have the power

of a Cabinet position to demand the cooperation required to form the network to fight Al

Qaeda. Nor does he have the operational authority to give orders to other departments-

State, Defense, FBI, CIA, Immigration, Transportation, or the Coast Guard- to name

some of the key players. And as before, another department stood up its own group. In

March 2002, the "Department of Justice announced the establishment of a National

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[49] Philippe Bionditti. L'organisation de la lutte anti-terroriste aux Etats Unis Cultures Conflits Hiver
2001: No 44 34
[50] Levitt, p. 7
[51] Bionditti, p. 35

Security Coordination Council (NSCC) designed to create a united front to "identify, disrupt and dismantle terrorist networks."[52] Even though Governor Ridge already has a mandate for homeland defense, the creation of this agency appears to be another "look good, feel good" operation. The mandate of the NSCC allows coordination and cooperation among the FBI, CIA, the Department of Defense (DOD), federal, state, and local law enforcement. Again, the bureaucracy has created two agencies, both with apparently different roles, one mandated for domestic security (OHS) and the other (NSCC) with an overarching mandate for "anti and counter terrorism roles." As articulated by Gusentine, the problem occurs again: "Synthesizing law enforcement and military capabilities is exactly what is needed, but doing it through unilateral or threat specific organizations will be limited and inefficient."[53]

COUNTER NETWORK

The existence of the terrorists' network system is a proven fact. Their ability to make and move money, people and resources has been clearly seen by international law enforcement agencies. And their ability to strike throughout the world has been evident for some time. Obviously, Al Qaeda's pervasiveness and strength are dependent on their network organization and the flow of information that it facilitates. Thus, to defeat this organization, its network must be shut down and eradicated. According to Rand research: "Terrorism cannot be eliminated, only contained and managed…Effective counter terrorism strategies must address the problem of networks and individuals, not just state sponsors…There is as an imperative of close coordination among intelligence,

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[52] Gusentine, p. 3
[53] Ibid. p. 4

civilian, and military agencies."[54] Despite the efforts and money of the present American

authorities, the absence of power and operational authority prevents the Lead Agency

from organizing a credible counter network. Mathew Levitt writes: "To bear any fruit,

counter terrorism techniques must be as comprehensive, ongoing, and cooperative as

possible."[55] Although inefficiency and territorialism is rampant among agencies, and the

lack of cooperation of some governments departments continues, he believes that since

9/11, this spirit of cooperation is certainly improving. Levitt believes that if you can

trace the money and stop its flow, it may be possible to "succeed in dismantling

terrorists' groups logistical and financial support network."[56] The importance of

networking among agencies with an atmosphere of cooperation cannot be overstated.

Cutting the money flow and interrupting their network of information and intelligence are

the keys.

 RECOMMENDATION

    Up to this time, there has been the appearance of the American political system

attempting to create a semblance of anti and counterterroism organizations. The OHS

and NSCC are certainly laudable efforts, but they are hollow shells. Without the

authority, proper direction and cooperation, the "system" will not achieve any credible

success over the short or long term. Neither OHS nor NSCC has been given the

Department level recognition and power in order to make it a viable entity within the

hierarchy of American power politics. Not only do these organizations need that power,

they also require the cooperation from all Departments from which they request

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[54] Lesser, p. 126
[55] Levitt, p. 8

information, people or resources. OHS, under Governor Ridge, must put together a network in order to fight the "netwar" that he going to have to wage in the future. There is no doubt that this will be a massive undertaking and will not be a "quick and easy fix." This will involve not only national, but also international assets. It will be a coalition of civil-military cooperation with every country willing to cooperate in this war against terror and the composition of this network must take account of every area that is affected by terrorism. The flow of information must be monitored and cut off at every opportunity. The movement of money, resources, and people as well as international crime must be attacked by every nation interested in eradicating terror. This will be no mean feat.

When one considers who should be involved as active partners in this network, the list becomes inexhaustible. The military, immigration, law enforcement at all levels, the banking and financial institutions, the FBI, the CIA, the Coast Guard, the Justice Department, the FAA, Customs, Transportation, and myriad other Departments as well as Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) will all be required to work together in this effort. And this is only the beginning. International operational plans will need to be developed, agreements for sharing information and intelligence will be required, and operational protocols will have to be developed. There may even be requirements for binational treaties or agreements to be negotiated. And a prerequisite for all the participants, both national and international, will be the obligation to trust and cooperate with each other at all levels of operations. This may be the toughest part of building the international network.

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[56] Ibid. p. 8

The "Lead Agency" will be required to build its internal national network but will also be required to negotiate international integration within that network. There will be intelligence concerns, security problems, operational agreements, and financial considerations at the extreme levels. This is not a task that will be accomplished in the immediate future, but someone has to start. Overriding this total effort must be the international will to attempt to destroy this transnational trade in terror and fear. After 9/11, the desire for action was strong and the cost was not a factor. But this will be a growing concern as the netwar goes forward. People like to see immediate results; regrettably, this netwar will not be over in a year, or five years but, rather, it may be a permanent fixture on the horizon with no end in sight. And that might be the price the international community will have to pay if it intends to protect and conserve the freedoms that are enjoyed by their citizens. For when a state cannot protect it citizens, what will be the outcome? This then is the overriding problem for Governor Ridge. How will he form a coalition of disparate organizations who see no requirement to neither abide by his bidding nor cooperate with all the parties in the coalition (read network)? Analogous to a military commander dealing with a multi-nation and multi-cultured coalition, Gov. Ridge is faced with a similar situation.

It is argued that his first task is to resolve his mandate. Is he responsible for Homeland Security or counter terrorism? Or does the NSSC have responsibilities that overlap those of OHS? What is the commander's guidance and further, what is the desired end state? What operational authority has he been granted and have their been executive orders written concerning the roles of the many Departments who could be tasked to fall under his direction? It can be argued that without Cabinet level position

and authority, most Departments will be less than willing to cooperate. Each believes

they have their own niche to have and to hold without interference or direction from an

outside agency. As a note, while this paper was being written, it was announced October

3, 2002, that the Office of Homeland Security has been proposed for Cabinet level status.

This should be a positive step in enabling HOS to get on with their mandate. Or it could

be the start of intense in fighting among the inner circle (the Cabinet) of the United States

government. Only time will sort this problem. But time may not be on Governor Ridge's

side. If there is another terrorist attack on North America with the success of the World

Trade Center event, it could be argued that OHS may not be able to survive the "slings

and arrows" which would definitely be thrown its way.

If OHS is successful in gaining the authority to organize a coalition network, how will

the tasks be divided? Arguably, each Department is competent at its particular expertise.

Similar to a military operation, each Department brings a certain expertise and capability

to the fight. Perhaps cells or nodes within this new network could be tasked with a

counter- financing role. This might include the Department of Treasury, Customs and

Immigration, civilian banking organizations, and Transportation. This hypothetical cell

would network together specifically focusing on finances and the movement of those

funds. Levitt concludes in his report to Congress: "To bear any fruit, counter-terrorism

techniques must be as comprehensive, ongoing, and cooperative as possible. Cracking

down on terrorist financing will only succeed in dismantling terrorists' groups logistical

and support networks, and by extension preventing terrorist attacks, if the governments

and agencies involved in the effort act in concert and, at a minimum, mirror the resolve, commitment and dedication displayed by the terrorists."[57]

Another node or cell could be formed to attack the information network itself. The intelligence expertise of the FBI, CIA, DOD and NSA could work together to affect the ability of the terrorist cells to pass information. Possibly a psyop plan could affect the credibility of information passed or even misinformation could be injected into the enemies network. As detailed in the Rand paper: "The key task for counter terrorism, then, is the identification of organizational and technological terrorists networks. Once such structures are identified, it may be possible to insert and disseminate false information, overload systems, misdirect message traffic, preclude access, and engage in other destructive and disruptive activities to hamper and prevent terrorist operations."[58]

Finally, on the military side, Special Forces should be available to strike at infrastructure and transportation routes when agreed to by national and international authorities. Military forces may be available and capable of shutting down some drug trafficking operations or the movement of weapons and personnel. Inter-service rivalry must, by necessity, be forgotten in this new war. Sharing of information, intelligence and planning operations must be the status quo, not the exception. However, military campaigns will not win this war on their own. Certainly the military must be part of the network, but they must be obliged to cooperate with those other agencies within the counterterroism net.

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[57] Ibid. p. 8
[58] Lesser, p. 81

Additionally, military planning and organizational capabilities could contribute to the creation of a counter terrorism coalition infrastructure. If this is, in fact, a new paradigm of war and is truly a problem of national security, perhaps a military planning and organizational approach using the military's experiences and expertise in joint and combined warfare should be offered to the OHS, the Lead Agency. By resorting to the military methods of planning and conducting coalition operations, arrangements could be put in place that would facilitate the marshaling of a coalition of agencies and departments for a full spectrum assault on this new and very difficult enemy to national security. The model of a Joint Force Commander's organization could possibly lend itself to the resolution of the coalition effort that is obviously a serious challenge for the Lead Agency.

CONCLUSION

The overview of the Al Qaeda terrorist movement has been presented in order to establish the detail and complexity of its operation and organization. This organization did not happen over night, but rather, it has been growing and developing over many years. This paper has argued that it is an asymmetric threat that must be taken seriously. Also, with reference to numerous knowledgeable sources of research, the proposal to attack this threat on its own level, that is, by forming a coalition network among many different agencies, levels of government and law enforcement has been argued as a plausible solution. The problems inherent in forming this coalition are not unlike problems faced by senior military operational commanders. There is no question that the defeat of terrorism will be a daunting task; however, this task must be accepted in order

to protect all citizens and prevent the evil of terror to pervade our lives. As presented in the argument, it is a demanding task, it will not be easy and it will not be over in the foreseeable future. The cooperation of many disparate players is mandatory in a network to do combat in a new netwar against this asymmetric threat- that is, Al Qaeda. With the cooperation of all departments and agencies, with international participation and a Lead Agency with the executive power and authority to coordinate coalition operations, transnational terrorism can and will be defeated.

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