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THE COMPLEXITY OF OPERATIONS DEMANDS A NEW OFFICER CORPS

By/par Lieutenant-Colonel Warren J. Spaan

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ABSTRACT

This paper contends that the changing dynamics of future battlefields and operations other than war (OOTW) will place increasingly complex demands on operational level commanders and their staff officers. These demands provide the impetus to the military training and professional military education (PME) system in the deliberate development of a cadre of competent officers who will become practitioners at the operational level. Since the Canadian government has continued to commit the Canadian Forces to ever-increased peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, the resulting increase in operational tempo has led to serious manpower shortages and equipment rust-out. The case is made for an increased Reserve Force participation in PME commensurate with their current and increased roles on operations. Every indication is that this operational tempo will continue, and the participation of the Reserve Force will do likewise. A strong case is made for a review of the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) as it is currently programmed and suggests several new approaches in the conduct of the AMSC to facilitate an increase in the number of adequately prepared senior officers. The paper concludes that the development of the Total Force Officer corps is necessary not only to ease the current manpower crunch but to be able to provide the necessary infrastructure for any future mobilization.

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INTRODUCTION

"The art of war is a simple art; everything is in the performance."[1]

Napoleon

The conduct of war through the ages has proven to be more difficult than Napoleon allowed. Since his time, war has undergone fundamental transitions in scale and scope associated with the fielding of mass national armies, the mass production of war matériel, and the advent of modern technology. Such advances allow for more lethal and long-ranged destruction than Napoleon could have ever imagined. Further complicating the modern battlefield are the complex military structures associated with the trend towards more coalition and multi-national task forces in operations spanning the spectrum from full-scale war, to peace enforcement, to peacekeeping, through to the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Bowdish proposes that "modern warfare and diplomacy offer numerous ways for nations to resolve their differences: military, diplomatic and economic alternatives that span the spectrum of conflict."[2] These comments hypothesize that the operational commander of the 21st century needs to consider many more factors that are well beyond the realm of qualities and attributes traditionally assigned to the military commander. Therefore, the leaders of the future, both operational level commanders and those operating at the tactical level will be subject to various new demands, and operate in conditions subject to many constraints and restraints that heretofore were not even imagined. War is no longer the simple art that Napoleon made reference to.

Increasingly, everything is in the performance of operational commanders, and the staff officers working in combined and joint task force headquarters.

A recent example of this growing complexity were the demands and challenges faced by Roméo Dallaire when he acted as Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993-94. He headed a coalition under a complex mandate with demanding milestones, complicated with multidisciplinary partners, and was under continuous media scrutiny.[3] When discussing the conventional wisdom that training for war is more difficult than training for operations other than war (OOTW) or for conflict resolution, Dallaire contends:

> I believe the opposite to be true. The skills required for peace support operations demand a much broader range and depth of knowledge---and a much richer set of experiences---than those acquired in conventional war fighting training programs. Militaries must ensure that their personnel also develop linguistic, cultural, and analytic skills that are unique to peace support operations---skills that are not currently taught in military education and training programs.[4]

Other writers share this view and elaborate further by asserting that the present post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding operations see military, and non-military personnel and organizations engaged in the process of post-conflict reconstruction and development,[5] operations well beyond those assigned to conventional warfare as Napoleon knew it. Operations in Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan bear witness to the wide scope of new demands faced by operational level commanders and headquarters staffs in the modern age. Dallaire reinforces this premise when he declares that conflict resolution, not war fighting, will be the main context for the employment of our forces. Of course, he agrees that Canada's forces will always need to maintain and

develop war-fighting skills in order to respond to national security problems that could include offshore allied and coalition operations:

> [if] the majority of military operations in the next couple of decades involve conflict resolution, then a serious disconnect exists between our current training and educational approaches, even as they are more and more based on the philosophy of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the human skills necessary for successfully executing conflict resolution operations. I believe that we need in the immediate instance to realign and broaden the education of the Canadian officer corps to more closely reflect a fundamental balance of competencies of the type and complexity that, realistically, we will end up facing. [6]

The thesis of this paper is that the heavy demands placed by the Canadian government upon the Canadian Forces (CF) to meet operational commitments coupled with the changing complexity of armed conflict, demands that a fresh approach is required in the development of the Total Force officer corps at the operational level of war. For the purposes of this paper, the operational level of war includes the full spectrum of operations from full-scale war, to peace enforcement, to peacekeeping, through to the provision of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, these commitments are set out as a role that Canadians aspire to maintain since they are vital to our national interests.[7] The 1994 White Paper sums this up by stating, "as a reflection of the global nature of Canada's values and interests, the Canadian Forces must contribute to international security. We should continue to play an active military role."[8]

This paper takes that position that up until recent times, the training and Professional Military Education (PME) systems did not adequately prepare commanders and their staffs for the complexities of the evolving operations they were tasked to undertake. Therefore, the requirement to prepare the officer corps in line with the greater

competencies required of operational level commanders and their staffs, the practitioners who will serve on tomorrow's joint and combined coalition operations, is obvious.

We must ensure that OOTW are included in this realignment of our systems in order to gain an appreciation of the full spectrum of hostilities in a time of fast-paced technological developments and geo-political change. Clearly, the current military training and PME system recognizes the challenges facing the CF and is attempting to make-up for these shortcomings. However, more still needs to be done. If we are successful in this radical transformation of the total force officer corps, Canada will continue to be able to use military power in the shaping of the world of tomorrow. The results of failure in this realignment challenge are unacceptable.

The paper will begin with a brief historical overview to explore the nature and evolution of the operational level of war. This will set the scene for an understanding of how the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is impacting on current restructure initiatives in the non-traditional use of military forces in pursuit of limited political objectives.

The segment on modern day views of the operational art will set the stage to examine the vital requirement to prepare modern day Canadian commanders and staff officers, as operational artists. An overview of Canada's changing place on the world scene will provide the impetus for the development of a revitalized officer corps, one capable of filling key positions on joint and combined operations within national and international headquarters and organizations.

The paper will conclude with the position that a requirement exists to train and educate increasing numbers of reservists at the operational level of war so that they may

not only continue to effectively fill existing manpower gaps on current operations, but will be able to provide a vital operational level capability in the event of future mobilization.

EVOLUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL ART

The exact origin of the concept of the operational art is not clearly delineated in the literature. However, an examination of recorded history leads one to conclude that it is only after the Napoleonic period, a time that changed the nature of warfare, that operational art began to receive close attention from military theorists and practitioners.[9]

Military thinkers led by Henri Jomini described Napoleonic military art as the skillful manoeuvre of huge formations that would converge with the enemy at a single point leading to a climactic battle. Such a battle would determine the outcome of a season's campaign, or even the outcome of an entire war.[10] This practice of the operational art saw a combination of statesman and soldier in the form of the Emperor himself. Napoleon "insisted not only on one-man rule but also on one-man command."[11] This meant that communications in his day consisted of messages and intelligence being passed by mounted staff officers. Thus, the commander remained the single point of reference during the campaign. It was Napoleon's keen understanding of the ebbs and flows of battle that allowed him to seize windows of opportunity that gave him the upper hand. This meant that he did not require an elaborate staff, as he was able to view the battlefield most of the time and make decisions based on what he saw. Staff officers were therefore gatherers of information and passers of orders. The commander on the other hand, was the artist who would choreograph the entire campaign.

It was only after the Napoleonic Wars and the resultant changes in the nature of warfare, that military theorists then paid attention to the operational art. This early attention had a decidedly Prussian and German flavour until after the First World War. It was the development of the German General Staff that is seen by history to have been a huge force multiplier that led to the great successes of the German armies from the 1860s until 1942. Soviet theorists such as Svechin and Tukhachevskiy spent much of the 1920s and 1930s developing a more complete understanding of the term "operational art" and its implications. These ideas came together during the 1930s with the Soviet concept of deep operations. In their view, operational art required the practitioner to identify strategic objectives within a theater, visualize a theater in three dimensions, and determine what sequence of military actions would bring the attainment of those objectives.[12]

One would think that this view of war would lead to Soviet success from the very beginning of operations. However, thanks to a series of circumstances, including Stalin's officer corps' purges (1937-1938), the misinterpretation of lessons learned from the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the difficulties in assimilating huge quantities of untrained troops, coupled with the advent of new technologies, resulted in the poor performance of the Soviets in the opening stages of World War II. It took until 1943 for the effects of these circumstances to run their course. The Soviet Army had learned from its disastrous experiences and returned to an improved version of operational art. The tide had turned and from Stalingrad to Berlin during 1943–1945, Stalin's marshals had learned to command and control front and multi-front, sequential and simultaneous operations, with devastating consequences for the Wermacht.[13] Perhaps they were not

operational artists in the true sense of the word, but had learned to use their overwhelming mass of resources in an extremely effective operational way. In any case, the results were dramatic.

According to Bower, the Anglo-Saxon appreciation of the operational level of war did not emerge until a quarter century after the Second World War.[14] The huge and remarkable American renaissance of doctrinal creativity in the 1970s and 1980s was spearheaded by the creation of the army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973.[15] Its creation was stimulated by the disastrous results of the war in Vietnam, influenced by the Soviet doctrinal example, and was largely adopted by British allies. Modern military thinkers in the aftermath of the Cold War and victory in the Gulf are musing about the implications for operational art based on what some see as a "Revolution in Military Affairs."[16] These implications are not only as a result of the ongoing technological revolution, but the evolving nature and complexity of warfare in modern times, where nations are willing to pursue limited wars that serve political or humanitarian interests while overriding the concept of the sovereignty of nations. From this, one must conclude that there has been a significant shift in global thinking.

MODERN DAY OPERATIONAL ART

What are some currently accepted views on the nature of the operational level of war and the operational art? Peter Davies proposes that "it is at the operational level where generalship, in its broadest sense is practiced."[17] He goes on to suggest that the modern commander will practice the operational art by exploiting the numerous modern tools of war by combining and coordinating them to achieve the strategic aim. His views are in line with the established Canadian doctrine that states:

> Operational art is the skill of translating…strategic direction into operational and tactical action. It is not dependant on the size of the committed forces, but is that vital link between the setting of military strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield through the skilful execution of command at the operational level. Operational art involves the design, planning, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It requires a clear understanding of the consequences of operational level decisions, their tactical results, and their impact on strategic aims. Operational art requires commanders with broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends. Using operational art, the commander applies intellect to the situation to establish and transmit a vision for the accomplishment of the strategic objective.[18]

A comparison of Canadian doctrine with that of the United States is warranted as it is most likely that future combined operations will be lead by the world's only remaining superpower. In the view of the United States Department of Defense:

> Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.[19]

Both these doctrines share a common thread, that operational art applies the commander's intellect in the skillful link between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces to achieve those objectives.

THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL STAFF

Modern operations run the entire gamut from conventional warfare to OOTW. Regardless of the type of operation, it is the operational commander who is responsible for the planning of his campaign including the major operations necessary to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.[20] The modern operational leader is greatly assisted in this process by his staff officers.[21] It is they who must help the Commander fight his fight. Thus, the dynamic process of continuous interaction

between the Commander and his planning staff should lead to the successful development of a winning plan.[22] This is in line with Haché who contends "…it would be naïve to believe that this level of leadership stops with them, [commanders] and that the principal staff officers at this level are also practitioners of the operational art."[23] If one follows this thinking to its logical end, one should conclude that training and education should not be limited to operational level commanders, but must include a large number of operationally prepared staff officers. This is of paramount importance to the Canadian Forces if we are to be prepared to deploy on future operations. Fortunately, this deployment capability is a mandated component of the Canadian defence strategy outlined by the former Chief of the Defence Staff, General J.M.G. Baril. He outlined five strategic imperatives, of which one is highly relevant in this paper.

> Maintain a ***relevant force structure*** that is inter-operable at the component and contingent headquarters level with Canada's allies, globally deployable and affordable over time.[24]

At the core of this imperative are the long-term strategic objectives and shorter-term, 5- year targets that underpin the department's agenda for change. Those items considered relevant in the context of this paper include the following:

- **Objective 4: Globally Deployable** – complete the conversion of the Joint Force Headquarters to a deployable C^4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) organization capable of national command and logistic support at the operational level of war; and

- **Objective 5**: **Interoperable** – manage our interoperability relationships with the US and other allies to permit seamless operational integration at short notice.[25]

The mandated direction for the Canadian Forces is clear. We must be inter-operable at the component and contingent headquarters level with Canada's allies. To achieve this

goal requires the preparation of future commanders and staff officers for appointments at the operational level within national and international headquarters and organizations.[26]

CANADA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

> *Involvement in overseas contingencies is a cornerstone of the "middle power" conception of Canadian internationalism.*[27]
>
> *Allen Sens*

At the end of World War II, Canada was seen as a major player on the world stage. In part this was due to the immense size of its military forces proportionate to its population. "In the first decade after the war Canadians had little difficulty in giving meaning to the achievements and sacrifices of the men and women of the armed forces. The horrors of the Third Reich were fresh in everyone's minds and no one doubted that Canadians had made a major contribution to the defeat of the "monstrous tyranny" which had threatened the survival of Western civilization."[28] Added to this was the importance of Canada's industrial efforts to the overall Allied victory and one could easily conclude that Canada in 1945 had earned its status as a world power. Since that time however, the shrinking size and capability of our Armed Forces coupled with the rising economic might of a rebuilt Europe and Asia have relegated Canada to the status of a "middle power" who by "contributing contingents to ventures such as peacekeeping and interventions…gains a seat at the table, a voice, and therefore some input into decision-making forums."[29]

Post-war strategy saw Canada as a central partner in the NATO alliance and the United Nations. Canada was one of the founding members of both organizations. NATO was established out of a concern for European security and posted a credible force in Europe that was highly valued by our allies.[30] However, our reliability as an ally and

Canada's reputation as a committed partner is at risk. While Canada's ability to deploy and sustain expeditionary capabilities continues to erode, its weakening ability to contribute to the conflict management efforts of the UN and NATO and coalitions of willing and capable states, means that Canadian ideas (even good ideas) will be compromised. It is important for Canada to retain its seat at the table by ensuring the Canadian Forces retain a significant combat-capable expeditionary capacity.[31] This leads one to conclude that if Canadian diplomatic initiatives are to have any credibility, Canada must retain the means to contribute effectively. Fortunately, this requirement has been outlined in a strategic policy statement that serves to provide a focus for defence decision-making. The strategic direction is:

> To position the force structure of the CF to provide Canada with modern, task-tailored, and globally deployable combat-capable forces that can respond quickly to crises at home and abroad, in joint or combined operations.[32]

This strategic vision for the Canadian Forces is basically sound and clearly points the way towards increased Canadian interoperability with the Americans and NATO allies in combined operations. Latham believes "there are signs that, despite a very slow start, the institution is now taking the RMA seriously and is beginning to think through the myriad and far-reaching implications of the revolution for business of Defence."[33] Moens' conclusion reinforces the importance of alliances to Canada's overall place in the world when he states "to be sharp in the 'battlespace of the 21st century' means to be a central and not a supplementary actor in NATO. If a country can make a net contribution in the Atlantic Alliance, it can make a contribution to world security anywhere."[34] Therefore, a reorganization and change in strategic direction for the CF is required. A major component of this reorganization is the development of the officer corps.

DEVELOPING THE OFFICER CORPS

> *"The problems we face are increasingly complex. More is demanded of us as officers than ever before."*[35]
>
> *Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN*

It has been argued by Latham that within the context of the nature of the RMA and the future security environment, Canada will only be able to make a meaningful and relevant military contribution to peace and security if the Forces develop a capacity for expeditionary operations in conjunction with the US and/or other NATO allies. Such operations will span the full continuum of conflict from high-intensity conflict down to OOTW.[36] He elaborates further by stating:

> Given that "international peace and security" is now often understood to entail the promotion and protection of "human security", the mission of the CF can also be said to include providing "hard power" in support of a range of peace support, humanitarian assistance/intervention, nation-building and post-conflict stability operations.[37]

How Canada will develop the capability to project "hard power" and develop an expeditionary capability is beyond the scope of this paper and is best left for further debate. However, the preparation of commanders and staff officers for these operational level challenges will now receive further attention. Vice Admiral Turner's words contend that more is required of officers than ever before. Given the increasing complexity and broad scope of current and future operations one could not but agree with his sage remarks. What kind of officers are we talking about, and how will they be prepared for operations?

There are many theories of management, leadership, and command put forth by writers such as Slim, Northouse, and Pigeau and McCann that could have relevance to

this discussion. However, there is no clear consensus on any checklist of the characteristics of ideal officers though topics such as transactional and transformational leadership provide some insight to this conundrum. Of particular interest is the work by Northouse in the new area he calls, "The Skills Model."[38] Suffice it to say that much work remains to be done in this field before accurate conclusions may be made. Therefore, this paper will not consider these ideas in any great sense but will focus instead on the need for a fresh approach to the development of the officer corps at the operational level of war.

General Baril, put forth the position that the critical concepts of Canadian officership are: Professionalism, Leadership, and Strategic Thinking. His strong belief in ongoing officer education and professional development are the keystones of the Canadian system. He posits that we cannot train or educate our personnel with specific skills to meet the requirement of 2020 with any degree of precision. Nevertheless, "we can prepare them intellectually to be able to cope and deal with ambiguity and complexity. While training furnishes predictable responses to predictable situations, education enables a reasoned response to an unpredictable situation---in other words, disciplined and critical thinking in the face of the unknown and the unknowable."[39]

The requirement for a change in senior level military education was outlined in two separate reviews, the first by Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire in 1988, the second by Lieutenant-General Robert Morton in 1995. Both reviews pointed to two different education vehicles, in varying formats, one to meet war-fighting needs at the operational level and the other to provide a framework for strategic leadership and management. From these recommendations was borne the current Advanced Military Studies Course

(AMSC) and the National Securities Studies Course (NSSC). It is critically important to understand the differentiation between training and education. Training tends to focus on standardized conduct of physical or mental tasks. Education on the other hand, concentrates on expanding intellectual horizons while offering the opportunity to pursue ideas in depth. Due to the increasing complexity of operations, it became clear that the program would have to employ an educational approach to learning with the emphasis on scholarship and critical thinking, rather than training.[40]

Alexander Moens offers a further suggestion in the development and training of the officer corps. His ideas incorporate attendance on the AMSC and/or NSSC, followed by the posting of more high and mid-level officers to serve in major NATO commands in order to expose and train our officer cadre at the strategic and theatre level. One would assume that these postings would include both command and staff positions in various headquarters. He reasons that this is necessary as there are relatively few such jobs available within our national CF structure where such experience can be gained. Though maintenance of such officers and their families in Europe is costly, "the investment for the CF and the multiplier effect in terms of our influence in the integrated military structures vastly offset the cost."[41] Some of Moens' ideas are already in practice, but one could argue that increased emphasis in this area would only serve to improve the Forces' capabilities while having a simultaneous benefit of emphasizing the renewed importance and continued support of the New NATO alliance by Canada.

Holder believes that the services need to provide a large number of operationally competent staff officers to joint force commanders and theatre commanders to remain effective on the operations of the future.[42] Further, he suggests that future operational-

level staff and commanders should be selected early on in their careers with specific future theatre-level assignments in mind.[43] In his view, "senior officers must be taught…the means of establishing practical, meaningful theater objectives [and] the ways of pursuing them effectively…These officers will be the "artists" at the operational level for the next decade."[44] An obvious conclusion is that the CF needs to expand attendance on the AMSC and NSSC if we are to meet the anticipated needs of the Forces. In an earlier paper by Wakelam[45], this issue was addressed and it was determined that there was the need for up to 24 student billets on the AMSC for those promoted to colonel/captain(N), and 12 student billets on the NSSC for those going on to higher ranks. However, this study is flawed in light of the current situation as it did not include the reserve force in any calculation of requirements and must therefore, be amended to reflect this deficiency. Nevertheless, a strong case can be made for the requirement to conduct ongoing systematic and timely reviews. This would ensure sufficient numbers of Total Force officers are being fed into the PME system to keep up with the ongoing requirements for operationally trained commanders and staff officers.

A NEW AMSC

A complicating issue, especially for the reserve force, is the length of the AMSC as it is currently programmed. The target student audience is the senior reservist. In most cases these reservists are also most likely in positions of senior responsibility in their civilian career. Many reservists find it difficult to obtain a 15-week leave of absence from their civilian employment. Therefore, the pool of potential participants in Development Period 4 (DP4) professional development, is significantly reduced leading to a manpower shortage of critical dimension. Perhaps, alternative delivery means for the

AMSC should be investigated. The wide spectrum of delivery tools such as computer based training (CBT), video conferencing, and computer conferencing could help ameliorate the problem.

A critical review of the AMSC curriculum might lead to a reduced residential component with more work being completed at a number of regionally based satellite sites using existing military facilities at little or no extra cost. Students would attend at the Canadian Forces College for the tutorial and exercise phase only. The foundations series, modules, and seminars could be conducted at the aforementioned sites. A Senior Directing Staff (SDS) would need to be appointed for each of these regional sites in order to maintain linkage with the College and to assist in program delivery.

In this new way of operating, two streams are indicated: a 15 week residential stream identical to the existing AMSC, and a non-residential stream that would incorporate a four week residential requirement. Further study is needed to determine if the course objectives could still be accomplished and to determine if any cost savings could be realized by shortening the residential portion by 11 weeks.

A variant to the proposed model outlined above, would entail the posting of Total Force officers to a regional site for a number of weeks rather than posting them to the College. This would mitigate the strain on current College facilities while reducing family stress caused by a long absence from home. However, those officers attending at the AMSC satellite sites would be posted to the College establishment so as to prevent them from being held to their previous responsibilities. In this way their sole focus would still be the AMSC.

A final option would involve the programming of selected topics for weekend and evening seminars thereby increasing the number of reservists in the AMSC program. This would be no different in concept than the approach currently in place for the Militia Command and Staff Course (MCSC) and the Joint Reserve Command and Staff Course (JRCSC). The options outlined above could provide the foundation for further investigation into a restructuring of the AMSC.

PME alone is not the cure for our current manpower dilemma. One is cautioned, however, to remember the importance of experience as one of the four development pillars of the Officer Professional Development System (OPDS). Stuart Beare warns us "that the OPDS and its 2020 strategies deal almost exclusively with training and education and provide no formal policy nor regulation to the management of experience as a key component to OPD. [Officer Professional Development]."[46] Therefore, we must remember that education, training, and self-development are only three of the four pillars in the OPDS. Experience is the fourth pillar and is necessary to provide the operational practitioner with the insight and background to be able to make reasonable decisions. Thus, a blend of command and staff experiences throughout an officer's career, balanced with training, operational deployments, and professional military education would seem to be the solution.

THE MANPOWER DILEMMA

> *"The Canadian regular army has long passed the point of even being able to fulfill its current commitments quantitatively. With insufficient critical mass to engage in operations other than war, it is increasingly experiencing severe strains and will more and more have to be supported by reserves."*[47]
>
> *Jack English*

In order to maintain a seat at the table, a voice, and therefore some input into decision-making forums "Canadian governments have committed the CF overseas for a combination of interest-based reasons, and given the continued relevance of these interests there is every expectation that the future governments will continue to do so."[48] Presently, the CF is capable of providing meaningful contributions to Peace Support Operations (PSO). Recent equipment purchases have provided sophisticated frigates for the navy, precision-guided munitions for the air force, and new armoured vehicles for the army. When combined with the high levels of training in the CF, the Canadian contribution as a partner in collective action is meaningful.[49]

To put this in perspective, the reader need only consider the historical record. In 1999 Canada had 4,500 personnel deployed abroad in 20 different operations. Currently, the number has fallen to 2,762 military personnel deployed on 11 different operations. Our two main deployments include 1,270 soldiers in the Balkans on OP PALLADIUM, while 1,231 are on OP APOLLO. The current deployment on OP PALLADIUM includes 250 reservists, or 20% of the total. [50] This represents a 39% decline in deployment levels in three years and points to a military that is stretched to the limit, burdened by a high operational tempo, and afflicted with numerous morale and retention problems.[51] To further complicate the issue is the problem of the "rust out" in some

important equipment categories. Jones adds, "Afghanistan is also not the first time that the small number and heavy rotational schedule of Canada's army battalions has affected Ottawa's ability to contribute over the long-term to multilateral military operations."[52] This view is supported in DND documents that declare, "there are simply not enough of them [soldiers] to go around. In short, the 'peacekeeping burden' is much heavier in the new form of peacekeeping operations."[53] How then will Canada continue to meet its operational commitments?

Obviously more emphasis must be placed in the area of retention, especially of those soldiers with specialist skills. Every trained soldier who leaves the service is a huge loss in manpower investment that is not easily recouped. At the same time the new emphasis on recruiting not only unskilled personnel but those with specialized skillsets such as technicians, engineers, and medical staff, has received additional emphasis. The DND has even gone as far as offering signing bonuses in an attempt to attract such highly skilled individuals. Elinor Sloan notes, "it is significant that the DND has placed front and center in its most recent planning documents the priority of strengthening the Canadian Forces' ability to recruit, train, and retain highly skilled personnel."[54] The dilemma faced by DND is part of a trend brought about by demographic forces beyond anyone's immediate control whereby many organizations are competing for the best and brightest young people to fill more and more positions in a variety of industries, government departments, and the armed services. This problem is not faced by Canada alone, but is a common issue facing the western world. In fact, some allied armed services suggest that there might be a case for a blend of regular force and reserve personnel to mitigate these trends.[55] If these trends are going to continue, and there is no

reason to believe they will not, then the CF will have to look to other sources of manpower that before now were largely ignored. The current budget situation and unlikely shift in government priorities to increase defence spending in a meaningful way, leads one to conclude that the Reserve Force offers a potential source of new cost effective manpower.

THE VITAL ROLE OF THE ARMY RESERVE

English contends that the current trend towards an expanded use of reserves will "continue as the costs associated with the maintenance of regular force personnel become increasingly prohibitive."[56] The Commander of Mobile Command in 1969 declared that reserve soldiers would not be permitted to serve on classic peacekeeping operations as they were incapable of meeting performance requirements. Contrast this with the reality of the late 1990s, where Canadian militiamen commonly constituted at least 20% of Canadian contingents,[57] and one can clearly see that the reliance upon the reserves has increased dramatically and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future.

As a case in point, the author's own unit, The Calgary Highlanders, has provided over 200 soldiers in support of operations since 1992. Today, the Highlanders are currently providing a formed rifle platoon as part of the current deployment on OP PALLADIUM ROTATION 11 (ROTO 11). This force contains a Composite Reserve Infantry Company (CRIC) manned by 119 army reservists. They are an integral part of the 1 Princess Patricias Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) Battle Group. Add to this many more reservists augmenting the remainder of the Battle Group in a variety of positions ranging from drivers to reconnaissance patrolmen, and one must conclude that the contributions of the reserves are vital.

Army plans indicate that the reliance on reservists will continue into ROTO 12. That mission will deploy in March/April 2003 with yet another reserve company. Added to this trend is the landmark decision to appoint a reservist as the Task Force Commander (TFC), the first of such senior operational command positions given to a member of the Primary Reserve since World War II. In addition, the Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) role has been assigned to the reserves.

Given Canada's continued participation on these missions, current army plans to increase the size of the reserve component on ROTO 18 are even more significant. Therefore, it can be concluded that army reservists are providing vital manpower to the overstretched regular force and that the number of soldiers and level of reserve participation on operations is expected to increase.

THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE RESERVES

A similar situation to that outlined above exists in the other two environments. However, due to space constraints they will not be examined in any detail in this paper. Nevertheless, a short overview will be sufficient to support the thesis.

The reserve navy is a force of approximately 3500 men and women who have been tasked to provide harbour defence, naval control of shipping, and maintaining port inspection teams. Furthermore, they have the task of providing the necessary crews to operate 10 of the 12 Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV).[58] Though the naval reserve does not currently provide sailors to the regular navy in any substantial number as is the case in the army, the fact that approximately 10% of the naval reserve's strength is employed at any one time, leads one to conclude that the navy reserve is helping to mitigate the manpower deficiency of the regular navy.

A similar situation exists in the air reserve. It has the role to augment, sustain, and support deployed forces by providing personnel who will support the air force in ongoing peacetime tasks as well as deployed operations. With a current strength of approximately 2200 personnel the air reserve provides a cost-effective entity of the Total Air Force structure by minimizing training costs and maintaining capability and readiness.[59] The rate of participation of air force reserve members on operations has continued to increase. An examination of the structure of air reserve units indicates that three flying squadrons are "reserve heavy" with reserve force commanding officers. The air reserve is also fully integrated into the Contingency Capability Component (CCC) Headquarters that provides the air force support elements for worldwide operations. Finally, there is one Airfield Engineering Squadron that rounds out the list of vital capabilities provided to the CF by the reserve.[60] This short overview validates the conclusion that the navy and air force reserves are filling vital roles as part of the Total Force team and thus making a contribution to Canadian sovereignty and security, even before the issue of mobilization comes into play.

NOT JUST MOBILIZATION PLANS!

Any discussion of CF capabilities cannot be complete without an insight into the issue of mobilization. Even though the investigation in this paper will be from the army perspective, the conclusions are valid in the case of the navy and air force reserves as well.

A mobilization plan is currently under development by the army and will be released in due course. Early indications are that it will contain strong statements on the role of the reserve force. The reserves will be seen as an integral source of manpower,

spanning the spectrum from individual augmentees to formed units. The need for trained reservists exists from the very beginning of any mobilization, rising in numbers as higher states of mobilization come into play. This is in line with comments by Jack English who believes it is prudent to have a workable long-range mobilization plan to expand the army in case it is called upon in the future. He posits that the tiny size of the CF is enough to suggest this is wise.[61] His belief that having the infrastructure most likely to be used in war, functioning in peacetime, simply makes good sense,[62] underlines the position taken in this paper. Given the pressing manpower constraints within the CF, one must conclude that the PME system must engage the entire officer corps in the deliberate development of a cadre of competent officers who will become practitioners of the operational art. We simply do not have the luxury of time to begin the process of developing the officer corps when mobilization is imminent. We must develop this capability in peacetime and must ensure that the officers of the reserve force have the same opportunities as their regular force peers. This is fundamental to the view that reservists will continue to fill command and staff positions on current operations, and must be able to provide an expanded operational level capability to the CF in the event of future conflict. Thus, it becomes clear that we must build the capability of the officer corps of the Total Force by ensuring increased access by reserve officers to training, self-development, experience, and PME opportunities. A move in this strategic direction will lead to the development of the professional army envisaged by English[63] and reflects the position taken in the 1994 White Paper:

> The Canadian Forces are a unified force of maritime, land and air elements. Their structure is based on a Total Force concept that integrates full- and part-time military personnel to provide multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces.[64]

In summary, it has been clearly shown that the changing complexity of armed conflict does demand a fresh approach in the development of the Total Force officer corps at the operational level of war. The current AMSC and NSSC are components of this new approach and must continue to evolve in order to maintain their position as the key components of DP4 level professional military education.

CONCLUSION

This paper has shown by way of a brief historical overview that the changing nature and evolution of warfare is undergoing a critical restructuring brought about by the RMA, and the changing political realities of the modern world since the end of the Cold War.

Many writers support the position that we must prepare not only commanders, but large numbers of staff officers, who will function as capable practitioners of the operational art. This view is supported by the DND and is contained in our strategic imperatives for the reorganization of the CF. A cornerstone of this new imperative is the recognition that the CF must be interoperable with its allies in order to be prepared for emerging risks and future challenges. This imperative has been made more pressing as the Canadian government has continued to commit the CF to ever increasing peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, leading to an increased operational tempo. Combine this with overall reductions in defence spending during the 1990s, and the resulting manpower and equipment dilemma take on increased importance.

An integral part of the ongoing restructure of the CF is the development of the professional officer corps. This is demanded by the changing nature of our operational commitments. Canada is clearly on the right path in the area of professional military

education as evidenced by the introduction of two key courses in 1998, the AMSC and NSSC. This paper contends that attendance levels on both courses should be increased and should include greater numbers of officers from the reserve force. A review of the conduct of the AMSC should be conducted to determine if a residential and non-residential stream is possible in order to facilitate the education of greater numbers of total force officers.

This paper supports the suggestion that graduates of the AMSC and/or NSSC, including reservists, should be posted to serve in major NATO commands in order to expose them to strategic and theatre level operations and capitalize on the investments in their PME. This investment in people is seen as a military force multiplier and will only improve the Forces' capabilities.

Lastly, this paper examined the vital roles currently performed by the army, navy and air force reserves during this time of high operational tempo, shrinking manpower, and strained budgets. The current paradigm of waiting until mobilization, to begin the education process, is clearly flawed. Thus, the argument for increasing use of the reserves is supported. This direction demands increased access to training, self-development opportunities, operational experience, and PME for members of the reserve force at the operational level of war. In this way, Canada will make effective contributions to international security initiatives, thus ensuring Canada's sovereignty and national security.

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