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
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# **JOINT PROCESSES IN THE CONDUCT OF A CAMPAIGN PLANNING**

**BY COL: SALEM ALKAABI**



# Introduction

## General.      **The Challenge of Joint Force Integration**

The role of Joint Force Integration has been defined by USJFCOM as a "collection of activities whose purpose is the synergistic blending of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) from the different Military Services to improve interoperability and enhance joint capabilities." The supporting principles are: Future Oriented, Fully Interoperable, Functional Across the Entire Spectrum of Conflict, and Enhanced Competitive Advantage. One of the key factors in achieving the goal of a fully integrated joint force that supports various levels of conflict is the development of a successful Joint Experimentation Program<sup>1</sup>. The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB), Joint Targeting and Information Operations (IO) are activities triggered by and interacting with the Campaign Decision Making Process mainly constituting of a Joint Estimate and a Campaign Plan (see also graphic at Annex A). This decision making process is usually triggered by a Campaign Directive issued by the superior military level.

**Aim.** "To evaluate the integration and synchronization of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space, Joint Targeting, information Operations in the Campaign Decision Cycle".

**Definitions.** It is necessary to look at the definitions of the 3 terms in order to understand completely the subject and to be precise. They are defined as follows:

1. **Joint IPB.** "The analytical process used by joint intelligence organisations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the total battlespace environment; describing the battlespace's effects; evaluating the adversary; determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. The process is used to analyse the air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic, cyberspace, and human dimensions of the environment and to determine an opponent's capabilities to operate in each. Joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace products are used by the joint force and component command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and election of friendly courses of action." (US Joint Pub 1-02).
2. **Joint Targeting** The targeting process is a conceptual construct used to explain how targeting is performed. The process is performed at various levels of command and execution. Though driven by intelligence, it is not the

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<sup>1</sup> Joint forces integration-A challenge for war fighter by **Joseph Jackson** 757-548-2010

Purview of any one community.<sup>2</sup> Community boundaries are beginning to blur between operations and intelligence. This should help consolidate targeting functions. The targeting process includes actions that produce target intelligence and target materials (through analysis and fusion of multi-source intelligence) and applied in support of operational decision-making and force employment. This process includes the steps by which targets are recommended and is comprised of six phases:

- Objectives and guidance derivation
- Target development
- Weaponeering
- Force application
- Execution planning

Process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (NATO AAP-6). Usually takes place at the “operational level of war”. The process starts with the arrival of a “Campaign Directive” (or strategic directive), the nomination of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and the creation of a Joint Task Force (JTF). The JTFC, his joint staff and his Component Commanders (CC) then perform a joint estimate, which ends with a decision by the JTFC, upon which usually a “Campaign Plan” or an “Operation Plan” (OPLAN) is drafted and sent to the CC. Once the CC have drafted their orders to their forces and the campaign starts, feedback from the CC (in form of SITREP or request) is used by the JTFC and his staff to check and if possible rectify the initial plan to adapt it to the changing situation and the process more or less starts again (at least partially) and becomes a cycle...and. IO are directed against the adversary’s decision makers (offensive) and should protect own decision making (defensive). They are a part of the outcome of the commander’s decision. They are the realms of J3, who usually has a special cell for IO (or they are planned in the C2W Cell. First thoughts and preliminary guidance stem from “own possible COA” in the estimate process. Inputs on the enemy come from the Intel Estimate, Guidance to plan and conduct IO are usually formulated in the paragraphs “Commander’s Intent”, “Conduct of Operations”, “Tasks” and “Forces” of the Campaign Plan. IO must be thoroughly coordinated with C2W (categories Operations Security, Psychological Warfare, Deception, Electronic Warfare and Destruction) and Joint Targeting and continuously updated by intelligence. Special Issue. IO are not restricted to “military targets”. They are also directed against adversary “political targets”. They require a particular attention by the JTFC,

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<sup>2</sup> **USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE**  
AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 14- 210 Intelligence  
1 FEBRUARY 1998

who at the operational level of war deals also with political issues of the campaign. Joint Targeting is also an outcome of the JTFC decision. It is a

Selection process of targets and the force (forces) attributed to attack such targets. In this context force is meant in a generic sense, it may include soft kill techniques (e.g. EW), special forces and hard kill techniques such as bombing, missiles or artillery. Targeting is the realm of J3, who normally forms a Joint Targeting Board, which sits regularly and includes members from various staff elements and representatives of the component commanders, and. As in IO first thoughts and preliminary guidance stem from "own possible COA" in the estimate process. Inputs on the enemy come from the Intel Estimate. Guidance to plan and conduct Joint Targeting are usually formulated in the paragraphs "Commander's Intent", "Conduct of Operations", "Tasks" and "Forces" of the Campaign Plan. Joint Targeting must be thoroughly coordinated with C2W and IO. Joint Targeting is regularly updated by intelligence and requires special means Joint targeting fundamentals are the functions, steps, and actions accomplished when conducting joint targeting operations. Joint targeting fundamentals include the definition of a target, the explanation of what joint targeting is as a whole, and the description of the joint targeting process. Joint Publication 1-02 succinctly describes a target as a geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. However, targets also include the wide array of mobile and stationary forces, equipment, capabilities, and functions that an enemy commander can use to conduct operations. Joint targeting is selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them to meet a specified objective. The joint targeting process has six basic phases / functions: COMMANDER'S OBJECTIVES AND GUIDANCE, TARGET DEVELOPMENT, WEAPONERING ASSESSMENT, FORCE APPLICATION PLANNING, EXECUTION PLANNING/FORCE EXECUTION, and COMBAT ASSESSMENT. Although commonly referred to as a "cycle," the joint targeting process is really a continuous process of overlapping functions independent of a particular sequence. Joint targeting significantly affects the theatre campaign, as the JFC must synchronize targeting efforts throughout the joint force to ensure the effective accomplishment of theatre campaign objectives. Further complicating this is the fact that targeting occurs at all levels within a joint force by all Forces capable of attacking targets. It must therefore be deconflicted, coordinated, And prioritized among components to ensure success. Organizing for the joint targeting process is extremely dependent on the situation. JFCs may establish and task an organization within there staffs to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate this responsibility to a subordinate commander. The JFC may assign certain responsibilities associated with targeting to agencies on the staff. In addition, the JFC may appoint a JTCB. The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. JTCB responsibilities and authority are defined by JFC directives and should ensure fulfillment of JFC objectives and intent with respect to targeting. Most importantly, the JFC should direct measures to coordinate joint targeting efforts among

components. Regardless of how the JFC establishes procedures for joint targeting operations, the procedures must follow the basic principles of the

Joint targeting process and be flexible enough to respond to rapidly changing situations in the fast tempo of modern warfare.

**3. IO.** “Actions taken to influence decision makers in support of political and military objectives by affecting others’ information and/or information systems. The division's IO cell is comprised of the Division's IO officer and a three-man Field Support Team (FST) from the LIWA. The FST provides expertise in deception, OPSEC, and tools for IO modeling, targeting, and synchronization. One can see that the IO cell is not large enough, nor does it possess the skills in all the C<sup>2</sup>W elements to plan and execute all the necessary IO. For the division to have an IO capability that is robust and fully integrated and synchronized, the IO officer uses the Information Operations Working Group (IOWG). The composition of the IOWG is mission contingent. In my topic, it is comprised of representatives from the IO cell, G3 Plans, G2 Plans, Public Affairs, Civil Affairs (CA), G6, PSYOP, Electronic Warfare, Staff Judge Advocate, Political Advisor (POLAD), Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), Provost Marshal Office (PMO), and Counterintelligence. In his role as facilitator, the IO officer ensures that the talents and creativity of the individual members of the IOWG are fully exploited in achieving the IO objectives. The following IO process provides the IO officer with a template for conducting Information Operations. The IO process is a 12-step method that forms a template for planning, implementing, and evaluating IO. It is not doctrine, and it differs, albeit slightly, from the one being used by the LIWA in Bosnia, but it is offered here as a point of reference. Hopefully, this article will lead to further discussion and improvements in IO modeling and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), which, in my opinion, are the two Major shortfalls in the execution of IO. The reader should keep in mind that what Joint Pub says of deception Planning is true of the IO Process: **“Although diagrams of planning processes are useful in aiding the understanding of the individual elements of the process, it must be remembered that processes are seldom as linear as diagrams or flow charts may imply. Planners must be prepared to respond to the dynamics of the situation and of their own headquarters.”** What follows are the 12 steps that the IO cell and the IOWG must follow to achieve effective Information Operations There are two major categories of INFO OPS: offensive and defensive, depending on the nature of the actions involved. **Analyze the Mission** The IO officer and his cell analyzes the mission to determine the military and political objectives and the commander's intent. The IO cell collects all available Relevant Information and Intelligence (RII) and begins to formulate the questions that he will need answered. If not already created, the G2 develops an IO Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. The IO officer presents the work the IO cell completed to the IOWG. The other members of the IOWG are analyzing the mission to determine how they can best contribute to achieve the commander's objectives. Here in the IOWG, the IO officer serves as a

facilitator. His task is to exploit the creativity, talent, and experience of all the members. It is a team effort. And, although following the IOWG meetings the members will go back to their individual work sites to

Plan and manage their activities, it is through the IOWG that the IO officer gains synergy by ensuring that IO is fully radiated and synchronized. For the rest of the IO process, the reader can assume that the steps are carried out by the IOWG functioning as a team. **Seek Irrelevant Information and Intelligence (RII)** is the key to effective IO. It is needed to plan, implement, monitor, and evaluate. The G2 representative is the IO officer's link to RII. The IOWG develops Request for Intelligence (RFI), which the G2 representative works. He ensures RFIs are properly submitted, monitored, and answered, providing feedback to the IOWG. This does not mean the other members can sit back and wait for the "answers." They will be using their sources to collect RII. PSYOP, Civil Affairs (CA), CI, and SOCCE teams in the field will be collecting RII. The IO cell is aggressively exploiting the unclassified Internet and the various military nets. The POLAD also has sources. The PAO will provide the IOWG with information on the media environment in which friendly forces are operating. Maintenance contact teams, logistic teams, engineers, reconnaissance elements, and Infantry and Military Police Patrols are exploited for RII. The point is that the myriad of sources are fully exploited, and RII is shared within the IOWG. **Determine IO Objectives** An IO objective is a Specific and operational statement regarding the desired accomplishments of the IO program. For each IO objective, the planner strives to use strong verbs, states only one purpose or aim, specifies a single end-product or result, and specifies the expected time for achievement.<sup>2</sup> It is important to remember that the closer the objectives are to outcomes that can be directly measured, the more likely it is that a competent evaluation will result. Using this scenario, the IO cell determines as an IO objective the following: *"Within 90 days, dissuade the populace of Tajmil from rioting."* Dissuade is the strong verb. The IOWG has the one aim of dissuading the populace from rioting, and the specified outcome is the lack of rioting. The outcome that can be easily measured. The populace either riots or they do not. This IO objective becomes the overarching objective for each of the IOWG members. They will develop objectives for their individual elements of C<sup>2</sup>W and Public Affairs (PA) and Civil Affairs (CA). **Codetermine Objectives for Each Element** The IO Staff Officer needs to know what the objectives of the elements of C<sup>2</sup>W and PA and CA are and how they will aid in achieving the overarching IO objectives. Although members will come to the IOWG with objectives already in mind, it is important to go through a brainstorming process. Brainstorming takes up valuable time, but is time well spent. It fosters team ownership of the objectives; it provides a sanity check; and it allows the members to know each other's intent, creating opportunities for synergy. Brainstorming will ensure that the IO and the elements' objectives are clear, distinct, and focused, and, more importantly, will assist the members in understanding the connectivity between the elements' objectives and the overarching IO objective. Keeping with this scenario, one PSYOP objective might be: Inform the target audience of the ramifications of any rioting. If ramifications include

military response, it is imperative that the military and diplomatic agencies are capable and has the resolve to follow through on the military actions. This example illustrates why PSYOP themes must be approved by higher.

(The approval process should not be that cumbersome. The objectives and themes for PSYOP, deception, and the other pillars of C<sup>2</sup>W will be rolled into the IO program, which can easily be shown to Support the Conc.'s IO campaign plan.) One might argue that "inform" is not a strong verb, and, admittedly, "inform" is a long way from "dissuade," but to simply inform is a necessary step toward achieving the IO objective. It can also be easily measured. The military deception objective might be: Convince the target audience that certain areas will be heavily patrolled and monitored by Ground and air assets. **When in reality, the friendly assets are not available to conduct such operations as described.** Electronic Warfare (EW) might have the objective to *"Degrade and disrupt the capability of faction leaders to communicate electronically during a certain period of time."* **The time might be triggered by some event that indicates rioting is imminent.** It must be remembered that the purpose of these objectives is to achieve the IO objective. Achieving an individual element's objective and not achieving the IO objective is a failure for the IOWG. **Identify IO Targets** The IO cell identifies IO targets and presents this list to the IOWG for additions and deletions; other IOWG members will have targets that the IO cell did not have. Targets will, of course, be quite diversified. They could be key communicators, a certain segment of the population, or a set of radio towers that are being used to encourage people to riot. The probability of success is increased if a target can be attacked by more than one pillar of C<sup>2</sup>W **Obtain detailed information about the target audience** As a minimum, RII about the target audience should consist of the following :Political agendas Biographic information Decision making processes Demographic information: age, sex, race, religion, economic income, cultural likes and dislikes. The target's perceptions of friendly capabilities and possible courses of action The target's IO capabilities and processes Estimates of target's actions under differing scenarios PSYOP personnel are trained in target audience analysis--the process by which potential One area where work is needed is in the field of modeling and simulation for IO. The difficulty of quantifying results produced by IO activities has caused modeling for IO to lag behind the more conventional force-on-force modeling. However, work is being done with such modeling tools as the Advanced Regional Exploratory System (ARES), the Deployable Exercise Support System (DEXES), and SPECTRUM show promise. As these and other tools are developed, modeling will aid the IO staff officer in evaluating various courses of action and objectives and in estimating the targets Actions under different scenarios. Target audiences are identified and analyzed for effectiveness, accessibility, and susceptibility. This type of analysis prepares the IOWG for the next step--developing themes. **Develop Friendly Information Themes** **33-1, Psychological Operations**, defines a theme as a subject, topic, or line of persuasion used to achieve a psychological objective. Themes to use and avoid will often be passed down from higher. However, that is not to say themes could not be developed at the Land Component level. PSYOP



personnel have the skills, expertise, and experience to develop themes. But again, as with objectives, themes should be discussed within the IOWG for possible improvement and to ensure that all members are thoroughly familiar

With them. In our Scenario, possible themes are: *"Peaceful protests is the appropriate way to communicate your desire for political change."* *"Violence will be met with force in order to protect lives and property."* *"Rioting will delay and possibly stop the rebuilding of roads and homes and the inflow of economic aid."* It is important to remember that the themes are not necessarily PSYOP themes. Providing the right piece of information to the right audience with the purpose of reinforcing or creating perceptions or to cause ambiguity is the goal. However, thinking in terms of themes, allows the IOWG to develop, identify and create that "right piece" of information.

**Identify Pressure Points** pressure point is an important, essential, or primary factor that can be influenced to control behaviour. As with objectives and themes, the IO officer should facilitate an IOWG discussion with the purpose of identifying pressure points and ways that they can best be exploited. In our scenario, the people of Tamil desperately need economic aid. This aid is a pressure point. It will be made clear to the citizens of Tamil that the delivery of aid will depend on whether or not the political leaders support democracy. **Develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)**

Developing MOE for IO is, in my opinion, the most difficult step in the IO process. Without MOE, the IOWG will not be able to evaluate the effectiveness of the IO program. A commander has the right and the responsibility to ask his IO staff officer this simple question: *"How do we know this IO stuff is helping me achieve my overall objectives?"* Thus, the IOWG needs to build MOE into the IO plan so that the following three critical metrics can be measured: **Effectiveness.** Describes the relationship between outputs and objectives. Were the IO objectives achieved? If not, why not? **Efficiency.** Describes the relationship of inputs and outputs. Although the IO program may have been effective, could there have been ways to accomplish it quicker and cheaper? **Adaptability.** Describes the ability of the IOWG to respond to changing demands. Was there sufficient flexibility to adjust a PSYOP program or deception plan to react to an unexpected event? MOE can be classified as either quantitative or qualitative. Michael Patton in his book, **Utilization-Focused Evaluation**, states, *"Quantitative methodology assumes the necessity, desirability, and even the possibility of applying some underlying empirical standard to social phenomena. By way of contrast, qualitative methodology assumes that some phenomena are not amenable numerical mediation."* **Quantitative**

**Research is desirable when** A picture of the environment at a given point in time is needed. Data that can be projected to a larger universe is needed. The target audience is difficult to reach. Large amount of specific information from the target audience is sought. The data must be statistically representative of a very large geographic area. **Qualitative Research is desirable when:** Modifications need to be made in an idea before it is finalized. Very fast feedback from the targeted audience is needed. The research budget is limited. There is a need to probe deeply into the cause of

some observed behaviour. <sup>4</sup>The point here is that different kinds of assessments require different types of MOE. The IOWG should not get locked into thinking that if MOE are not quantifiable they are of no use

**Write the IO Plan** With the worksheets, matrices, and gnat charts to record and display objectives, pressure points, tasks, milestones, and timeline  
**Implement and Monitor the IO Campaign Plan** during this step, the plan is executed. The plan is monitored, and feedback begins to be collected. The collection of RII continues. A Synchronization Matrix is used to deconflict and synchronize IO activity. The members of the IOWG are constantly using RII, MOE, and feedback to evaluate the effectiveness of their individual activities, allowing them to fine-tune the plan and adjust to unexpected events. The focus is on coordinating, adapting, and achieving synergy. (See Annex B) is a portion of a matrix that depicts how the components of IO are mutually supporting. Let me state emphatically that PA and CA do not conduct PSYOP or deception, nor are these Components of IO manipulated by the PSYOP and deception planners. However, they and the elements of C<sup>2</sup>W, by staying in their own lanes and providing information that create the desired perceptions, can achieve synergy, and, thus, increase the probability of achieving the IO objectives. (See Annex B)  
**Evaluate the IO Program** As stated earlier, MOE are built into the plan. The purpose of some of these is to provide the IOWG with an azimuth check, enabling the IO planners to adapt their plans as necessary. MOE are also used to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the IO program. Knowing the effectiveness, the IOWG can decide whether to modify the existing IO program and continue, to continue without change, or to end it. One more comment on MOE. Developing and implementing IO MOE must be a team effort by the IOWG. The PSYOP element's protesting and post-testing of a product or evaluation of a PSYOP program needs to be shared with the IOWG. Other members could possibly use the feedback to evaluate their own efforts. This information is needed by the IO staff officer to evaluate the overall IO program. Also, resources can be saved if one evaluation could answer the questions needed by other members of the IOWG information obtained thus far, the IO cell is now ready to write the IO plan. The written document might be in the format of an IO Annex to a CONPLAN or OPLAN. In addition, the IO cell uses a series of. (See: Annex: A it is d definition of 10 action **Organization**) 1.

## **Information Operation in the Campaign Decision Making Process.**

Decision Making Process is part of intelligence and it is one of the major contributions to formulate the decision of the JTFC. Its relationship with the Intelligence Estimate is illustrated by the picture below (see also US Joint Pub 2 – 01.3, Fig. 1 – 5). It shows that JIPB more or less are activities related to the Joint Intelligence Estimate, There are standing and current intelligent e ncrequirements. Standing Intelligence Requirements are

normally determined by (national) strategy and do not depend on any specified campaign or operation. They are not discussed in this context. The current Intelligence Requirements related to a campaign are usually

Defined during the JTFC Mission Analysis and are addressed to S2 (together with the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements – CCIR). This normally starts the JIPB and the Intel Estimate, the outcome of which are fed into the Joint Estimate (into factor “Enemy”, “Enemy COA”) and influence directly “own possible GOA” and the JTFC “Decision”. They are also needed to formulate (during the drafting of the Campaign Plan) IO and Joint Targeting (see Annex A). And below list explain RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JIPB AND JOINT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE:

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JIPB AND JOINT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE	
JIPB Process	Intelligence Estimate
1. Define the Battlespace Environment	1. Mission
2. Describe the Battlespace’s Effects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Analyze the Battlespace</li> <li>b. Describe the Effects on adversary and friendly Capabilities and Courses of Action</li> </ul>	2. Adversary Situation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Characteristics of the Operations Area</li> <li>b. Adversary military Situation</li> <li>c. Adversary conventional and psychological Warfare Situation</li> </ul>
3. Evaluate the Adversary <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Update or create adversary Models</li> <li>b. Determine current adversary Situation</li> <li>c. Identify adversary Capabilities</li> </ul>	3. Adversary Capabilities
4. Determine adversary COAs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Identify Adversary’s Objectives</li> <li>b. Identify the COAs available to the Adversary</li> <li>c. Evaluate and prioritise each COA</li> <li>d. Develop each COA</li> <li>e. Identify initial Collection Requirements</li> </ul>	4. Analysis of adversary Capabilities
	5. Conclusion <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Adversary Capabilities in Relative</li> <li>b. Probability of Adoption</li> <li>c. Vulnerabilities</li> </ul>

## **Summary/Conclusion:**


Joint IPB, Joint Targeting and the planning of Information Operations are an integral part of the Joint Decision Making Process. Whereas Joint IPB is a major contribution to the preparation of the commander's decision, Joint Targeting and IO are direct "products" of this decision and are established during the drafting of the Campaign Plan.

The challenges facing the IO staff officer are formidable. Getting the IO Working Group to function as a team, obtaining RII, and measuring IO effectiveness are just a few of the hurdles he must overcome. He needs additional tools to monitor and evaluate IO at the sophistication equal to his civilian counterparts in marketing and political campaigning. Thus, much work remains, but the IO process does provide the IO staff officer with a needed methodology to plan and implement Information Operations.

[Annex A](#): Campaign Planning Timeline and Events related to JIPB, Joint Targeting IO process. And.

**Annex B** a portion of a matrix that depicts how the components of IO are mutually supporting

**Annex A:** Campaign Planning Timeline and Events related to JIPB, Joint Targeting IO process. And



**Annex B** a portion of a matrix that depicts how the components of IO are mutually supporting

	<b>PSYOP</b>	<b>Deception</b>	<b>CA</b>	<b>PA</b>
<b>PSYOP can support by:</b>		Creating perceptions that will enhance believability of deception plan Providing RII to IOWG	Informing the populace on the benefits being provided by CA Loud speaker teams helping control the populace during aid distribution Explaining to populace why certain groups are not receiving their perceived "fair share" of aid	Conducting counter-propaganda and protection from misinformation and disinformation Produce articles by key communicators that encourage respect for democracy and rule of law
<b>Deception can support by:</b>	Disseminating information that reinforces PSYOP themes Creating perceptions that enhance susceptibility to PSYOP themes		Reinforcing CA themes in the content of deception information	Creating perceptions that support PA-desired perceptions
<b>CA can support by:</b>	Providing aid to Host Nation, which gives substance to PSYOP themes Providing RII	Providing RII to IOWG Disseminating truthful information that reinforces believability of deception plan		Providing events that PA can exploit that will show the command in a positive light
<b>PA can support by:</b>	Providing information that counters adversary's propaganda Providing interviews with commanders who articulate JTF's reaction to rioting	Providing stories that show the unit is combat-ready and prepared to respond to riots	Publicizing financial and humanitarian aid given to Host Nation Providing information on how the populace is to receive aid, i.e., times and locations	

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5. LTC Garry Beavers and LTC Stephan Shanahan, U.S. Army, Ret, "**Operational zing IO in Bosnia-Herzegovina,**" Land Information Warfare Activity, Ft. Belvoir, VA.
6. Peter H. Rossi and Howard E. Freeman, **Evaluation** (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1982), pg. 59.
7. Michael Quinn Patton, **Utilization-Focused Evaluation** (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1978), pg. 212.
8. Thomas L. Green Baum, *The Handbook for Focus Group Research* (New York: Lexington Books, 1993), pg. 30.
9. Beavers and Shanahan used the following worksheets and matrices in their work in Bosnia:  
**Pressure Point Identification Worksheet (PPIW)**. The PPIW provides the IO planner with a systematic way to identify ways to influence target audiences.  
**IO Planning Worksheet (PW)**. The IO planner uses the PW to determine how and when to influence each pressure point.  
**Synchronization Matrix (SM)**. The SM is used to deconflict and synchronize IO activity.  
**IO Implementation Worksheet (IW)**. The IW is used to record additional information about each IO event found on the SM. In addition to identifying the attack "subsystem," the worksheet identifies the specific information themes that will be used for each IO audience.  
**IO Implementation Matrix (IM)**. The IM chronologically lists all IO executions for each IO function. Information from activity during a specific time period. The Information Operations **Process**: News From the Front (Mar-Apr by LTC (Ret) **Craig Jones**(previously assigned to the IO Division, HQDA)....
10. Joint forces integration-A challenge for war fighter by **Joseph Jackson** 757-548-2010.
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