COALITION AND ALLIANCE OPERATIONS

IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY;

A CONTINUING NEED FOR THE NATO ALLIANCE

Prepared by: Cdr G.D. Switzer

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ABSTRACT

The traditionally accepted spectrum of conflict has undergone notable expansion in the last decade. In particular, low intensity operations other than war have grown in frequency, scope and complexity. There will continue to be low intensity conflicts, such as East Timor, that can be undertaken by hastily assembled, ad hoc coalition or alliance forces. However, missions such as those in Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo represent a new breed of complex, yet low intensity operation. These missions, conducted in regions where the peacekeeping contingent is not welcome and where the rule of law has collapsed, require robust and highly capable forces if there is to be any degree of success. This paper will demonstrate the continuing need of the NATO Alliance, which is the only organization possessing the modern, mission ready forces and trained commanders necessary to conduct complex and mid intensity warfare missions.

Coalition and Alliance Operations
In the Twentieth First Century:
A Continuing Need for the NATO Alliance

Introduction

> "Coalitions have accordingly become a defining characteristic
> of the modern Western style of war, and an imperative for
> military action. However, this political imperative has not
> always been matched by commensurate military preparations
> to ensure that coalitions are formed smoothly, and managed
> effectively."[1]

> 'While the United States will retain the capability to act
> unilaterally, a strategy that emphasizes coalition operations
> is essential"[2]

Coalitions will remain the preferred, and generally the most militarily effective

means of ensuring future collective security. One must acknowledge, however, that the

range of coalition operation types has expanded rapidly in the last decade. Between the

extremes of Desert Storm, a medium intensity conflict, and low intensity Peacekeeping

operations, a new and complex level of warfare has arisen. These complex operations, at

times described as UN Chapter Six Point Five and Chapter Seven operations, require a

sophisticated and robust military response if an efficient and timely success is to be

assured. A low intensity Peace Keeping operation can be mounted with relative speed

using available forces. Complex operations, such as those underway in the Balkan States

today, demand a full range of military capabilities including complicated command

structures, ready, mission capable forces and the availability of modern and compatible

C4I technologies.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that only NATO, and nations trained to a NATO standard, possess the level of interoperability, training and experience necessary to command and execute complex coalition activities, particularly those involving the use of joint forces. Indeed, the bulk of forces for each complex mission will often be assigned from NATO and related nations.

In conducting this analysis, the types of coalition missions will be examined, comparing the increasing complexity of each to the resources required to effectively conduct the operation. Next, various alternative organizations will be examined so as to determine the military capability of each to lead and execute complex coalition operations. In undertaking such a review, this paper will prove the continuing necessity for the NATO Alliance as a force generator and employer for complex alliance and coalition operations.

In the interest of brevity, this paper will not discuss the political dimension of authorizing coalition and alliance missions.

Defining the Activity

The definitions of what constitutes a coalition and an alliance are contained in the US Basic National Defence Doctrine.[3] A coalition is considered to be an ad hoc, or informal agreement for short term, common action between two or more nations. An alliance represents a more formal arrangement to achieve broad, long-term objectives.

The level of conflict intensity will determine the quantity and quality of resources required in a coalition or alliance operation. Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 25[4] divides the conflict spectrum into peace, conflicts other than war, regional conflicts, war

and general war. A more clear definition is provided by Maurer[5] who separates the conflict spectrum into three parts: low intensity warfare, which includes sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla warfare; mid intensity warfare including limited conventional to general war, and high intensity warfare which comprises both limited and general nuclear war.

These traditional definitions do not reflect the reality of current, more complex operations. According to these descriptions, nearly all the coalition and alliance operations conducted in the past decade are low intensity missions. Commodore Lawrence coins the term "Complex Emergencies"[6] to describe those missions, such as Somalia and Rwanda, in which local conditions escalated beyond the mandated ability of the assigned peacekeeping force to manage. Complex Emergencies, often referred to as UN Chapter Six Point Five or Chapter Seven missions, may be:

> "characterized by continuing conflict, large scale displacement
> of people, famine, a serious breakdown of law and order, and
> usually failures of basic institutions of government."[7]

Complex missions will normally be conducted within an unwelcoming host nation where most, if not all government control agencies (such as the justice system, police, the military, schools) have collapsed. A characteristic of complex missions is the speed with which they need to be established, and the rapidity with which events in the host nation may change.

On one hand, a low intensity peacekeeping mission within a benign, or welcoming host nation may be successfully accomplished with ad hoc forces, highly restricted Rules of Engagement and a low-tech headquarters. On the other hand, complex missions will require greater levels of coordination, physical security, use of force,

interoperability and more robust Rules of Engagement. When dealing with Non

Government (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs), the military

commander of a complex operation will need to achieve the difficult balance between the

humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. As they are conducted in hostile, or near

hostile regions, these complex missions demand higher levels of force protection and

specialist skills such as de-mining. Indeed, in balancing the requirements of military

presence, conflict resolution, humanitarian aid and force protection, the use joint forces is

frequently necessary. Therefore, complex missions require much higher standards of

leadership and military resources than are needed to accomplish traditional, Chapter Six

operations. These standards of leadership and military resources are only available from

nations, alliances and coalitions that maintain ready forces that train routinely in joint and

combined operations.

The Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations publication[8] provides a very

useful summary of likely coalition and alliance operations, including:

    a. War,
    b. Protection of Shipping,
    c. Support to Counter Drug Operations,
    d. Enforcement of Sanctions and Maritime Interception Operations,
    e. Enforcement of Exclusion Zones,
    f. Enforcing of Freedom of Navigation and Over Flight,
    g. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations,
    h. Combat Terrorism,
    i. Peace Operations,
    k. Show of Force Operations, and
    l. Arms Control.

War, by definition, represents a mid to high intensity operation. The Enforcement

of Sanctions and Maritime Interception Operations, Protection of Shipping, the

Enforcement of Exclusion Zones and the Enforcement of Freedom of Navigation and

Over Flight operations are low to mid intensity operations. To be successful, each of these activities require a high degree of coordination and joint interoperability which will only be possible with well trained, experienced maritime and air forces. These operations cannot be undertaken to complete success by a single environmental service. As only the United States possesses sufficient forces to conduct these missions on its own, the use of combined forces will be the norm. The current Embargo and Over-Flight operations in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, conducted by joint, multi-national forces, are examples of this type of mission.

Similarly, Support to Drug Operations necessitates a close link between joint military forces, Other Government Departments (OGDs) and Non Government Organizations (NGOs). One of the most successful Counter Drug operations is the Caribbean Patrols conducted by the US, Britain, France and the Netherlands (all NATO nations). The use of joint and combined forces, and civilian agencies, all integrated within a high speed command and control link and sharing the highest quality intelligence has proven to be a superb weapon in tracking and countering the Caribbean drug trade, from its source to its market.

Counter terrorism may be considered to be a low intensity, often low-tech operation. However, while individual terrorists may use weapons of low technology, they are frequently supported by organizations using sophisticated communications systems and modern military hardware. The bin Laden - Al Qaeda network is a useful example where the use of jet aircraft represents a new standard of high-technology terrorism. As recent events have shown, terrorist organizations are searching for even more technically sophisticated weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction. The

current United States led coalition to counter terrorism demonstrates the requirement for sophisticated, mission ready, joint and combined forces to seize the initiative from, and to counter the threat of terrorism.

The last four operations noted in the table are traditional, UN missions that represent the bulk of coalition or alliance operations. These missions have been historically undertaken, successfully, by ad hoc coalition forces. However, in the 1990s several missions, including Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, grew beyond their initial mandate to become complex missions. Kent[9] underscores the growing complexity of UN operations and has developed a table to equate mission objectives to the level of military involvement required:

Objective	Principles	Military Tasks
Conflict Prevention through Peace Making and tradition-Peacekeeping	Consistent impartiality Non-use of force Preventative deployment	Observation Truce supervision
Conflict Mitigation Through Multi-Functional Peace-Peacekeeping	Limited consent Impartiality Use of appropriate Force	Interposition Protect humanitarian intervention Protect safe areas
Conflict Resolution Through Peace Enforcement	No consent Partiality Use of Overwhelming Force	Suppress aggression Re-establish secure environment
Conflict Rehabilitation through Peacebuilding	Consent Impartiality Non-use of force	Disarming De-mining

Conflict Prevention and Conflict Rehabilitation missions represent traditional Chapter Six missions to support the peaceful settlement of disputes. The others are examples of Chapter Seven[10] operations: actions in respect to breaches of the peace or acts of aggression.

Kent completes his Table[11] with a description of the types of forces required for each mission. As they are conducted within a welcoming, or benign host nation, where no use of force is required, any military coalition with appropriate training is sufficient to conduct Conflict Prevention operations. Conflict Mitigation missions are undertaken within a less-welcoming host nation where the ability to use force must be supported with the immediate capability to do so. Force and area protection is a requirement of these missions. Well-trained and generally interoperable forces are needed for Conflict Mitigation operations. The use of force is an inherent requirement of Conflict Resolution missions. To be successful, the peacekeeping force must immediately possess a clearly more powerful warfighting capability than the often well-equipped local armies or militias. Professional, ready, highly interoperable, and heavily armed joint forces are needed for Conflict Resolution missions. Both Conflict Mitigation and Conflict Resolution missions require modern and sophisticated command and control systems with instant communications facilities in order to cope with situations that may develop rapidly.

As stated, Conflict Rehabilitation missions, conducted in a now benign host nation where the use of force is no longer necessary, represent traditional Chapter Six operations. However the requirement for specialized and tailored military forces may

shift such missions beyond the capabilities of ad hoc coalitions, or non-NATO forces, to perform.

To this table must be added the Chapter Six Point Five, or complex missions, where, for whatever reason, the host country environment has deteriorated to a point beyond the capacity of ad hoc coalition forces to manage. Given the environment in which they are conducted, and the rapidity with which the local situation may deteriorate, these missions require all the resources of Conflict Mitigation or Resolution operations. As seen in Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans, complex missions necessitate the use of joint forces and are always combined in nature.

Ad hoc forces, with minimum military resources, training and experience, will continue to meet the needs of traditional Chapter Six Peacekeeping missions. Given the need for specialized military skills and immediate force, all other missions require a degree of training and specialization to be found in more advanced armed forces.

A further factor affecting the selection of forces for UN missions is the phenomenon of "mission creep". This occurs when the objectives of a mission change, and usually escalate, after the force is formed and deployed. Examples of this are Somalia (UNISOM 1) and Rwanda (UNOMIR), where events quickly escalated from a basic peacekeeping and humanitarian aid mission to one of conflict mitigation and resolution. In both instances the initial forces were too small, and lacked the integrated training and professional experience needed to manage the situation of increasing tension. As stated by Jerzy Ciechanski:

> "The inability of the Security Council to resist the pressure to expand the
> mandate of ongoing peace operations, causing so-called "mission creep"
> and the failure to promote sustained leadership as well as the necessary
> resources was already marked in Somalia, but became glaringly evident in

Yugoslavia. On several occasions the Security Council imposed new tasks upon its forceable peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII, without ever intending to provide adequate Resources to carry them out." [12]

Characteristics Required of Coalition Forces

LCol Wayne Silket[13], Robert Ricassi[14], Joint Publication 3-16[15] and others have sought to define the many characteristics of coalition forces. Some of these include:

    a. Language,
    b. Culture,
    c. Capability,
    d. Common Goals,
    e. Doctrine,
    f. Intelligence,
    g. Equipment,
    h. Logistics,
    I. Communications,
    j. Command and Control,
    k. Training, and
    l. Leadership.

Whilst some of these characteristics may appear self evident, and are well documented elsewhere, others are less clear and deserve comment.

Language: This refers to the ability to communicate not just with citizens of a host nation, but also to the need for understanding within the coalition force itself. Even amongst English speaking nations and long serving allies, some terms will have differing meanings to different services. The word "secure", with its quite different Army, Navy and Air Force connotations, is a very basic example. For a sailor, a building is secured when it is locked. A soldier will secure a building with an armed guard. The airman might consider a building secured through its purchase. For military operations, command and direction must be fully understood if objectives are to be achieved

efficiently and successfully. While basic Peacekeeping Missions may permit time for translation, explanation and clarification, the fast pace of complex and joint operations will not. Only training and the experience that comes from working together, in operations, will resolve this issue.

Culture: Culture presents many of the same inhibitors to cooperative understanding and effort as language. Further, a nation's culture may render it unsuitable for operations within a specific theatre, or with other national contingents. For example, ex-colonial powers such as Britain and France can be unwelcome as peacekeepers in their former colonies. Japan is an unacceptable peacekeeper in any Southeast Asian country. Religion must also be considered when selecting forces appropriate for a peacekeeping operation. Western peacekeeping forces are accepted only reluctantly in Islamic nations. Culture will also shape a nation's doctrine and method of conducting military operations, a factor that must be considered by the coalition commander when organizing his force.

Doctrine: This is not so important in low intensity missions where there is ample time for discussion, coordination and training. However, a common doctrine is vital in complex low intensity, and mid intensity operations where each unit must understand and be prepared for the reactions of their coalition or alliance partners.

Common Goals: This point actually refers to two aspects. First, there must be an agreement upon the goals of the mission if it is to be accomplished in a timely and efficient manner. What must be equally clear, however, are the longer-term national or

regional goals of coalition participants. Have members joined the coalition or alliance in hopes of achieving other, more parochial aims?

Equipment: It is important that forces arrive with equipment appropriate to the mission. This may include the provision of light armoured vehicles, helicopters, and even basic personal, military equipment. There have been instances of Third World contingents arriving with a very poor standard of equipment issue, with the expectation that the UN would provide upgraded military hardware. While this may be tolerated and overcome during low intensity operations, it becomes a threat to the success of more complex missions. Further, compatibility of equipment between national contingents is important in easing the problem of force logistics. Greatly dissimilar equipment, such as the NATO and Soviet tracked vehicles used by the Desert Storm allies, will normally require the use of separate operating areas. The Middle Eastern Coalition nations utilized ex-Soviet equipment, as did Iraq. There was a danger of fratricide had these forces been mixed with those of the Western Coalition. In keeping them within a separate area of operations, the danger that Middle Eastern tanks and vehicles would be mistaken as the enemy was avoided. Further, in keeping similar forces together, General Schwartzkopf was able to build-upon upon, rather than dilute, the strengths of each group.

Logistics: This requirement is frequently overstated. Under existing, and all likely future command relationships, it remains the responsibility of the donor country to ensure a continuing system of replenishment is available for their national contingent. Nevertheless, the Mission Commander must remain entirely aware of the logistical state

Further, more complex operations may require types and levels of sensitive information that simply will not be available to, or shared with, Third World Nations. Again, Third World Nations may well be of limited usefulness in a complex coalition or alliance mission:

> " in fact, when the need is there, (countries not equipped or familiar with the coordinated use of force) may be more of a hindrance than a help." [16]

Command and Control: A primary requirement of command and control is to conduct effective operations planning. The shorter the period available for planning, and the greater the mission complexity, the greater will be the demand for experienced planners and a sophisticated command and control capability. Once again, low intensity operations can succeed with a small command and control centre, few personnel and low technology. Haiti, for example, proved to be a low complexity mission, in a relatively benign environment, where the time existed to resolve differences through discussion:

> "In Haiti, two of the three major troop contributors were third
> World nations… There were three distinct ways in which
> any situation will be handled, and the Force Commander is
> required to balance these daily"[17]

In situations where the mission may escalate quickly, even low complexity operations require a robust command and control network. In Rwanda, the peacekeeping force lacked the resources to cope with both the complexity and the speed in which the mission was unravelling. Kent notes that the Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) was unable to balance the requirements of Peacekeeping with the Humanitarian mission.[18] His final verdict was that:

> "The UN system did not have what is subsequently described
> as effective 'command and control' that would have enabled

senior officers to bring the IOC into action quickly and
effectively. [19]

A modern, sophisticated command and control system is therefore required for
most missions. It is vital to the conduct of complex and medium intensity operations.
Beyond the equipment, complex and medium intensity operations also require staff
officers who possess a high level of joint and combined experience for all phases of the
operation. Some missions will have sufficient time for some training, but this is not the
norm. Major General Lewis MacKenzie has concluded:

> " a muscular peacekeeping mission must possess adequate command and
> control, which the UN cannot do and should not be ashamed to admit"[20]

Interoperability: Intelligence, communications, equipment and command and control are
linked within the realm of interoperability. The possession of modern, national systems
is of little use if they are not able to operate together within a coalition or alliance. Even
amongst the western alliance there are numerous examples of systems that are
incompatible including joint communications and automatic data link equipment.
However, interoperability includes a much greater spectrum of activities:

> "Because the United States participates in coalition activities
> when undertaking both combat and non-combat operations,
> interoperability needs be addressed across the entire spectrum
> of operations … and is needed to ensure a national level of
> 'plug-and-play'. [21]

In other words, the resources promised to coalition operations, especially complex
operations, must be compatible. The use of non-interoperable communications or
Identification-Friend-or-Foe (IFF) equipment risks fratricide. To be useful, all national
contingents providing aircraft must be able to process the Air Tasking Order (ATO).

Training: Bowman[22] and others emphasize the importance of training, including coalition training. Continued training will allow coalitions and alliances learn common doctrine and how to overcome differences in operations practice. Western military forces undertake constant warfare practice. The more sophisticated the equipment is, the sooner operators will forget key aspects of drill such as how to tune radars, or the correct launch sequence of weapons. The result will be lost reaction time when it can be least afforded.

Leadership: The selection of a leader will depend upon national, religious and cultural acceptability. More importantly, the selected leader must possess the training and experience to effectively manage the variety of forces and equipments, including command and control systems, assigned to him. Low complexity missions may be well commanded by experienced third world commanders. Complex and medium intensity operations, particularly those requiring the use of joint forces, will need a commander well versed in modern and sophisticated doctrine and technology. He must possess experience in working, at the operational level, with international joint and combined staffs. Today's coalition leader must also be capable of working with NGOs and PVOs. Few organizations provide this level of training and experience.

Each of these characteristics is required, in varying degrees, of any armed force. However, to meet the dynamic needs of complex missions and higher conflict spectrum operations, assigned forces must arrive combat ready and possessing a high degree of interoperability. There will be little to no time to establish operating procedures, to practice common doctrine or to train staff officers. A robust and sophisticated command

and control system is required from the beginning of a mission; it cannot be imported at a

later date. The leader and his headquarters staff must be immediately functional, trained

and experienced in managing complex joint and combined operations.

<u>Sources of Coalition and Alliance Forces</u>

> "There are many organizations under whose aegis operations
> can be conducted. Only two – the UN (but only with peace –
> keeping) – and NATO have well developed procedures for
> bringing together multi-national forces and a command
> structure."[23]

Having discussed the characteristics required of modern coalition or alliance

forces, I will now examine some alliances and their ability to generate forces to the

standard required to conduct complex and mid intensity operations. Any nation can

provide forces to a coalition. Forces are often donated to missions on a regional basis,

relying upon existing pacts or alliances. These have the advantage of having common

regional interests, and of having developed military resources in a similar manner, to a

similar standard. Organizations that can, and could provide forces to coalition operations

include:

a   Organization of American States, OAS,
b   Organization of African Unity, OAU,
c   The Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS,
d   The Commonwealth,
e   Australia, Britain, Canada, America, ABCA,
f   The European Union, EU,
g   North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO,
h   The Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS, and
i   The United Nations. UN

A reflection of post-colonial sensitivities, the Organization of African Unity

(OAU) was founded on the principle of solving African problems with African resources.

While the OAU possesses no formal military council, the Mechanism for Conflict

Prevention, Management and Resolution was established in 1993 to promote prevention,

peacemaking and peacebuilding. However, this mechanism has become only a forum for

political discussion. The OAU has no force generation or military headquarters

capability. According to Peck:

> "The OAU Conflict Management Mechanism established it-
> self as an operative actor in African crises, although its record
> of success is mixed at best." [24]

Another African Organization, the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), was established to promote economic stability throughout that region. Its

1981 Protocol required military support for member states subject to aggression, and the

Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) was established to manage the military affairs of

ECOWAS. The first, and only mission conducted under ECOWAS direction was the

ECOMOG (Monitoring Group) in Liberia from 1991 to 1992. This mission was

compromised by the partisan activities of Nigeria, and was rejected by the Liberian

government. Clearly, ECOMOG inherited a complex mission that it was unsuited to

manage. In the words of Robert Mortimer:

> "…ECOMOG was not adequately equipped for operation,
> and the force unable to achieve its objectives at first attempt.
> … From its inception, the ECOMOG mandate was compromised because of its
> de-facto alliance with one of the warring factions." [25]

Although ECOWAS does possess a force generating ability, it does not have the

capability to undertake complex to mid-intensity conflict operations. ECOWAS reflects

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all five risks identified by Dull as characteristic of regional military alliances:[26]

      a.   scarcity of resources (especially financial),
      b.   inadequate organizational facilities,
      c.   remaining impartial,
      d.   ability to remain impartial, and
      e.   dealing with regional hegemonial power (Nigeria)

The Organization of American States (OAS) was founded in 1947 to promote economic prosperity and security within the Western Hemisphere. It was originally intended as a mutual defence pact to counter the threat of communist expansionism during the Cold War. Not surprisingly, there has been a continued concern of American domination of the organization's functions. Nevertheless, there remains the pragmatic realization that only the US has the resources to truly ensure hemispheric security. For an alliance based upon collective security, the OAS possesses only a small military bureau. The Inter-American Defence Board provides a forum for discussion while the Inter-American Defence College promotes military and academic commonality. Armed forces from nations throughout the hemisphere will periodically train together within the UNITAS (UNITY) series of exercises.[27] However, these are combined, not joint exercises conducted at a Task Group, or tactical level. No operational level headquarters are involved. While individual OAS members may contribute to an international operation, the Organization itself is not equipped to lead or provide a headquarters to any mission.

It is important to note that none of these alliances possess the military resources or political and regional power necessary to effectively command complex or medium intensity missions. Further, although alliances of like-minded nations, their armed forces exercise together only occasionally. Forces from these organizations often lack the

combined and joint training, and experience, needed to participate in complicated low or mid intensity operations.

Historically, the Commonwealth has been a frequent source of forces for coalition and alliance operations. The Commonwealth offers a wide range of like-minded people, usually from democratic backgrounds, and normally sharing the same language. East Timor has proven a successful low intensity Peacekeeping mission led and manned with largely Commonwealth resources. However, the advantages stop there. Many Commonwealth nations are now members of the third world, often having regressed from forward looking democracies to poor dictatorships in the years since independence. These countries have few resources, poorly trained armed forces and have been known to arrive for missions lacking essential equipment that they hope will be provided at UN expense. Nevertheless, these national contingents are frequently used successfully in low complexity peacekeeping operations within their own regions. More advanced Commonwealth nations, such as Canada and Australia, have provided capable leadership of Commonwealth missions, but are at times viewed with suspicion by their less successful Commonwealth sisters.[28] New Zealand, another Commonwealth nation of moderate capacity, simply lacks the resources to meaningfully partake in coalition or alliance operations.

The ABCA member states possess the forces necessary to fulfil any of these missions. However, ABCA is an organization for force development and standardization rather than one for force generation and employment. It provides a platform for ongoing military thought and development, and possesses a small staff that is unsuited for

planning and executing operations. According to the ABCA Coalitions Handbook:

> "The American, British, Canadian, Australian (ABCA) Program
> is not an alliance nor has an ABCA Force under the Program been employed. ….
> While the ABCA program has achieved some levels of standardization in certain
> areas, there is not a common doctrine between the armies." [29]

NATO survived the Cold War intact, but is looking for new reasons for its existence. Today, only NATO possesses large international military forces that are ready, well trained in joint and combined operations, strong in interoperability and supported with the sophisticated equipment necessary to mount complex low and medium intensity operations with rapidity. Designed as an organization for regional collective defence, NATO required considerable administrative adjustment in order to accept peacekeeping and missions other than war, particularly those conducted out-of-area (outside of western Europe). The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was not in favour of NATO approving or accepting these missions. It was considered that this would give the Alliance a political initiative. [30] However, both the US and UK feared the OSCE would be too Euro centric an organization to control military activities, and that this would weaken the North Atlantic nature of the Alliance. The Oslo Declaration of June 1992 formalized NATO's responsibility for crisis management and the peaceful resolution of disputes.[31]

In accepting this new responsibility, nearly every NATO nation has developed the force structures required to meet peacekeeping, and other missions, more quickly and effectively. In the United Kingdom, a Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) was established in 1997, with provision for two deployable battalions.[32] France was quick to follow with a Joint Force Planning Staff (EMIA) and Joint Theatre Expeditionary Force

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(PCIAT). Since enacting a law to allow armed forces to be deployed outside of the country, Germany has provided Crisis Reaction Forces (KrK) to 33 missions since 1990. Germany has also created a deployable Joint Operational Command Centre (FuZBu).[33]

In 1992, peacekeeping became NATO's number two task. The NATO term for this mission is Peace Support Operations. Although not yet given political approval, NATO Military Planning Guide for Peace Support Operations, MC 327, provides the Alliance's direction for Peacekeeping operations.[34] In the words of the (then) German Defence Minister:

> "We export security and stability. …Common security and our contribution to this remain the central task …."[35]

The decisions reached within the Oslo Declaration were enhanced at the British-French Summit at St. Malo in December 1998[36] and, more significantly, during the Washington Summit of the North Atlantic Council in April 1999.[37] At St. Malo, Britain agreed with France to investigate a new, EU based European Security Structure. The Washington Summit, conducted as the difficulties with the Kosovo mission were becoming clear, built upon the Anglo-French agreement, and added Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the NATO Alliance. Recognizing the "appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic security"[38], the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was established which:

> "Highlights the enhanced role of the partnership and dialogue,
> underlines the need to develop defence capabilities to their full potential to meet the spectrum of Alliance missions, including
> forces that are more deployable, sustainable, survivable and
> able to engage more effectively; …"[39]

ESDI was coupled with a Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) that includes a

Multinational Logistics Centre, completed in 1999, and an Integrated Command

Structure, to be completed by 2002. European nations have pledged 60,000 troops to the

ESDI to be at 60 days notice for deployment by 2003. However, a review of the national

pledges will show that the ESDI will continue to be a NATO resourced organization:[40]

a. Germany:	13,500
b. United Kingdom:	12,500
c. France:	12,500
d. Italy:	6,000
e. Spain:	6,000
f. Netherlands:	5,000
g. Greece:	3,500
h. Finland:	2,000
i. Austria:	2,000
j. Belgium:	1,000
k. Ireland:	1,000
l. Portugal:	1,000

The Warsaw Pact did not survive the Cold War, but Russia has attempted to

regain a measure of control over her former republics within the Confederation of

Independent States (CIS). While recognizing the UN as the lead agent for low intensity

peacekeeping operations, the Tashkent Protocol of 1992[41] organized the armed forces of

the CIS into an ad hoc coalition to provide peacekeeping forces for domestic, or "near-at-

hand" missions. In reality, this ad hoc force has been used for operations in Georgia,

Tajikistan and Chechnya only.

Recognizing the increasing complexity of peacekeeping operations, Secretary

General Boutros Boutros Ghali outlined a new UN structure for peacekeeping in his

Agenda for Peace.[42] Within this document, the Secretary General described a bold future

for peacekeeping with a permanent international planning staff and dedicated reserves of

forces pledged by nations in anticipation of future missions. As part of this process, a

Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)[43] was created in 1997. This

Brigade possesses a small pre-operations planning cell, and has been promised forces

from 10 nations. However, SHIRBRIG operations are restricted to Chapter Six Missions,

and for periods of six months only. In other words, the SHIRBRIG will not meet the

needs of Chapter Seven and complex missions. Further, the forces assigned to the

SHIRBRIG are nearly all from NATO nations.

The lessons of Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo have clearly shown that, for more

complex operations, the UN is too slow in providing sufficient forces to effectively

manage anything but low complexity missions. Despite the creation of the SHIRBRIG:

> "The UN is without a military culture, it has no forward look staff
> capability to develop strategy, operational plans and standardized
> procedures and equipment" [44]

In his Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, Boutros Ghali recognized that, rather

than achieving his desired force structure, future missions will be undertaken by a

"coalition of the willing.[45] The current reality of UN missions has been well expressed by

David Livermore:

> "The Secretary General has become reluctant to accept the command and
> control problems inherent in these operations … the Secretary General
> has made it clear in his Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, the
> preferable course of action is for the Security Council to authorize
> 'coalition of the willing', to undertake leadership roles. … Logic thus
> dictated that NATO be the lead actor"[46]

Nevertheless, the UN continues to improve its peacekeeping structure. The

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report)[47] of August

2000 outlined several key recommendations aimed at improving the UN's ability to react

quickly and positively to peacekeeping requirements. The establishment of a Strategic

Analysis Section (EISAS) within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),

the assignment of forces capable of deployment within 30 days for non-complex and 90

days for complex missions, greater emphasis on police and civilian peacekeeping

activities and the importance of Information Operations (IO) are all recommended within

the Brahimi Report. Further, the Report highlights the requirement for a clear chain of

command in peacekeeping operations. While it remains to be seen if these

recommendations will have any effect on future peacekeeping missions, it is clear that the

forces necessary for complex or mid intensity operations will still be required from

NATO nations.

The Reality

Three other factors prove the continuing requirement for NATO presence and

leadership in coalition and alliance operations: historic, fiscal and political realities.

Since 1990, NATO nations have provided the bulk of all peacekeeping forces for

complex low and medium intensity operations. In Desert Storm, NATO provided over

85% of all forces. Similar percentages, or higher, are true for the Somalia and Bosnia

Operations. According to Major General MacKenzie:

> "There are 14 non-NATO nations (13 Partnership for Peace and
> one other) represented in IFOR. However, the vast majority of
> troop contributing nations belong to NATO."[48]

Second is the fiscal reality: the UN is virtually bankrupt. Some, such as Anthony

Parsons[49], suggest the organization is sound, but suffers from receiving payment in

arrears. Nigel Rodley gives a more precise view of the UN financial situation:

> 'The plain fact was that, at the end of August 1991, nearly half the
> assessed regular budget of $1Billion was outstanding, as well as
> $5Billion from previous years. Nearly half the assessed contributions
> ($435Million) for six peacekeeping missions had not been paid. A further
> $215Million was owing for assessed contributions from previous years."
> [50]

While the United States recently paid a portion of its outstanding bill, and donor

nations such as Japan, Switzerland and Germany have funded some operations, the fiscal

reality is that each mission costs the UN money it simply does not have.[51] NATO

represents a peacekeeping line of credit: NATO forces can conduct missions, now, for

UN payment at a later date.

The third reality is political. The UN Secretary General was not the only leader to

recognize the lessons of Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. Missions that should have been

resolved quickly by UN coalitions had instead escalated in intensity and threat to regional

stability. Following the escalation of the Somalia Mission in 1993, US Senator R. Logan

warned:

> "NATO will either develop the strategy and structure to
> go out-of-area, or it will go out-of-business"[52]

This became US national policy when President Clinton stated:

> "The fortunes of the global organization will depend upon a
> NATO prepared to envisage autonomous action."[53]

There are drawbacks, perceived and otherwise, with this high degree of current

reliance upon NATO resources to conduct complex low and medium intensity operations.

Foremost, Western nations are not always seen as friendly to the interests of less

developed nations. Some members of the EU are concerned that NATO will be

dominated with American interests.[54] The ESDI will remedy this concern. There are

those who feel that the humanitarian and military missions should not be mixed.

However, the escalation of the Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia missions all prove the

necessity of combining both peacekeeping and muscle in more complex operations. In

each of these operations, peacekeeping simply did not work without the provision of joint

and combined military muscle. Further, each of these operations demonstrated that only

NATO possesses the quantity and quality of ready forces needed to bring the missions to

a successful conclusion. A final difficulty is that NATO does not possess the mechanism

to lead missions outside of Europe. Nevertheless, as seen in Africa (Somalia) and the

Middle East (Desert Storm), the majority of forces required for these complex and mid-

intensity operations came from NATO nations.

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War has not spawned a new era of universal world peace.

Instead, the relative stability resultant from superpower confrontation has given way to an

age of escalating regional tensions. While nearly all of these crises represent low

intensity conflicts, the conflict spectrum itself must be now amended to include low

intensity complex operations. There continue to be minor conflicts, such as those in the

Sahara (MINURSO, 1991), Mozambique (ONUMOZ, 1992), the Aouzou Strip

(UNASOG, 1994) and most recently in East Timor. These represent low intensity,

minimum complexity, and traditional UN Chapter VI operations within a mostly benign

host nation where the government continues to maintain a degree of control. Ad hoc,

regional forces, or the SHIRBRIG are well suited to successfully manage these operations.

Today, for reasons of political indecision and escalating regional difficulties, it is no longer unusual for missions to experience "mission creep" into the realm complex operations. These operations are usually conducted within host nations where the coalition or alliance is not welcome, and in areas where the government and rule of law has ceased to exist. Given such conditions, these operations represent a level of mission complexity beyond the ability of the SHIRBRIG or ad hoc forces to manage. Somalia (UNSOM I and II, 1992–94), Rwanda (UNOMIR, 1993) and Bosnia (UNMIBH, 1994) are recent examples.

These complex missions require the use of integrated, joint forces, technologically advanced command and control systems and experienced, well-trained leadership to succeed. Further, these missions have demonstrated the ongoing need for a refined balance between humanitarian needs and military requirements, a balance which only experienced and well-supported commanders have proven capable of providing. As proven within this paper, while third world nations and some regional alliances can provide manpower, only NATO possesses the ready forces necessary to meet the leadership and military demands of these complex missions. While the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI) may appear to be an alternative, ESDI remains a NATO/EU initiative, staffed with NATO manpower and resources.

Finally, a review of the UN budget and political decision papers has shown that, today, only NATO is financially capable and politically acceptable as agent for Western nation involvement in complex coalition and alliance missions.[55]

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