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AMSC 4
Jointness – It's A Matter of Attitude
Colonel J.G.G. Simard

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview of some of the conceptual thought that has had, and will continue to have, an impact on attitudes regarding jointness. Specifically, the paper examines two contradictory approaches to jointness: the perspective of jointness as the integration of separate service capabilities into an effective joint capability; and the unification perspective of jointness, wherein certain service components and/or capabilities are either blended with, or subordinated to, one or more dominant capabilities from another service. The paper goes on to discuss issues surrounding the joint doctrine development process. It then provides an overview of the potential impacts military culture might have on attitudes towards both jointness and the joint doctrine development process. Finally, the paper provides a perspective on the reality of jointness within the CF.

Given the fact that the CF approach to jointness, as well as its overall doctrinal development process, is very similar to that of the U.S., a great deal of the discussion in this paper is based upon existing U.S. thoughts on the issues. While not specifically choosing any side of the various arguments within the paper, the author leads the reader to the logical conclusion that much of the debate surrounding the issue of jointness is indeed a simple matter of attitude.

Jointness – It’s A Matter of Attitude

By Colonel J.G. Guy Simard

Joint Warfare is Team Warfare

When a team takes to the field, individual specialists come together to achieve a team win. All players try to do their very best because every other player, the team, and the home town are counting on them to win....[T]hey all must also believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, that fights together to win....[T]his is our future.

*Colin L. Powell
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff¹*

*If, as Services, we get too critical among ourselves, hunting for exact limiting lines in the shadow land of responsibility as between...[the services], hunting for and spending our time arguing about it, we will deserve the very fate we will get in war, which is defeat. **We have got to be of one family, and it is more important today than it ever has been.** (emphasis in original text)*

Dwight D. Eisenhower²

Jointness is not new, nor is joint warfare the wave of the future. The reality of modern warfare is that the execution of operational art is optimized with an emphasis on joint warfare. Modern warfare demands that we plan and fight as a joint team across the conflict spectrum.³ “Jointness properly understood is absolutely essential for success in modern war.”⁴

U.S. Joint Pub 3-0 states that “[t]o achieve assigned objectives, **joint forces conduct campaigns and major operations**. Functional and [s]ervice components of the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Joint force commanders (JFCs) synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. The goal is to **increase the total effectiveness of the joint force**, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally. (emphasis in original text)”⁵

“Joint operations demonstrate the careful understanding of the relationship of ends to means. They enable the transfer of strategic objectives into an effective and efficient operational design that links and integrates tactical battles and engagements to the strategic aims. Simultaneity, synchronization and synergy form the key principles of joint operations.”⁶ The desired effect is simply combat power at the time and place of the commander’s choosing. Key to achieving this unity of effort and efficiency in action, especially as conditions change or the unexpected occurs, is a shared understanding of the language of battle, and the effective integration of components through commonality in procedures, equipment, capabilities, and employment concepts. Coordination between services must be exacting, thorough, and carefully synchronized at all levels to achieve maximum shock and surprise.⁷

Although the definitive history of this subject has yet to be written, it is evident that “jointness” has become a dominant force and driving institutional concept within the West. The concept has been embraced and pursued with great vigour, with the best of intentions and hopes, by both civilian and military leaders often with widely different

perspectives. Within the U.S. this has been especially true of the last fifteen years since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.⁸ Within Canada it has been particularly evident since the end of the Persian Gulf War.

From the military perspective, such fundamental warfighting concepts as increased cooperation and improved synergistic effects, have highlighted the drive towards jointness. At the same time, active analysis and open debate have become even more prevalent in response to the economic realities and budget cutbacks facing all nations. Rather than having several services competing for scarce resources across the spectrum of defense requirements, jointness is being viewed as a way to reduce duplication, and as an alternate method to address declining capabilities.⁹ It has, and is, having a major impact on military decision-making, structure, functioning, resource allocation, and capabilities. Jointness has become not only desirable - it has become necessary.¹⁰

This paper provides an overview of some of the conceptual thought that has had, and will continue to have, an impact on attitudes regarding jointness. Specifically, the paper examines two contradictory approaches to jointness: the perspective of jointness as the integration of separate service capabilities into an effective joint capability; and the unification perspective of jointness, wherein certain service components and/or capabilities are either blended with, or subordinated to, one or more dominant capabilities from another service. The paper goes on to discuss issues surrounding the joint doctrine development process. It then provides an overview of the potential impacts military culture might have on attitudes towards both jointness and the joint doctrine development process. Finally, the paper provides a perspective on the reality of jointness within the

CF. Given the fact that the CF approach to jointness, as well as its overall doctrinal development process, is very similar to that of the U.S., a great deal of the discussion in this paper will be based upon existing U.S. thoughts on the issues.

In the concluding paragraph of a paper entitled “Joint Doctrine for the Canadian Forces: Vital Concern or Hindrance?” Colonel Desjardins states “Jointness is very much an attitude”.¹¹ While not specifically choosing any side of the various arguments within this paper, it is intended that by the end of this paper the reader will have been led to the logical conclusion that much of the debate surrounding the issue of jointness is indeed a simple matter of attitude.

Integration versus Unification

While a considerable amount of thought and effort has been expended in an effort to gain a greater understanding of the concept of jointness, the reality is that the precise meaning and implications of this extensively used term are still not understood clearly.¹² Much of the controversy and confusion surrounding the issue of jointness can be boiled down to the use (and possible misuse/abuse) of this single term to describe two basic and contradictory concepts – specifically the concept of “jointness as integration” versus that of “jointness as unification”.¹³

What many believe to be the common sense and traditionally understood idea of jointness as integration refers to the concept of enhancing overall combat effectiveness of a force, by improving procedures, so as to seamlessly combine the unique and specialized capabilities of each of the different services. This would appear to have been the intent of the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, as highlighted in his quote at the beginning of this paper. It was likely also the goal sought by many of those

who supported Goldwater-Nichols, specifically with the desire of ending what they believed to be wasteful inter-service rivalry and competition that was unnecessarily precluding the integration of separate joint service capabilities into effective joint warfighting capabilities.¹⁴

Jointness as integration is intended to build upon the existing capabilities of the services to create a flexible and adaptable force structure. It works from the premise that each service has strengths that should be exploited to the fullest. Concurrently, it also recognizes that there are weaknesses in each service that must be minimized. Supporters of this concept believe that by planning for and employing forces in this method, efficiency is enhanced, synergy achieved and overall military effectiveness increased across the entire spectrum of conflict. They also believe that this method spurs healthy competition that in turn stimulates adaptation and innovation.¹⁵

Critics of the integration perspective contend that it has significant weaknesses and that far from spurring innovation, the separate services will actually resist change because of bureaucratic inertia and institutional rigidity. Specifically, they point to organizational theory which suggests that, in an effort to satisfy systemic needs, bureaucracies will often settle for the first (ie, the least painful/easy) solution rather than finding the optimal solution to a problem. These critics also consider the approach to be wasteful and inefficient because of their belief that the services will either develop unique, or unnecessarily maintain duplicate, capabilities in pursuit of their own agendas.¹⁶

Those in support of the integration perspective, however, are convinced that there is a strategic requirement for some redundancy in what the services bring to the

battlefield and that there will always be a place for unique capabilities.¹⁷ They look at the above noted criticism as the ‘accountant’ approach to the issue and believe that in the accountant’s quest for efficiency there is in fact a resultant decrease in military effectiveness.¹⁸

The essence of jointness as integration is summarized in the following quote:

Remember that effective jointness means blending the distinctive colors of the services into a rainbow of synergistic military effectiveness. It does not suggest pouring them into a single jar and mixing them until they lose their individual properties.... Balanced military judgment and combat effectiveness depend upon service individuality, culture, training, and interpretation of the battlefield. The essence of jointness is the flexible blending of service individualities.¹⁹

The polar opposite of integration, the concept of jointness as unification emphasizes a process whereby certain service components and/or capabilities are either blended with, or subordinated to, one or more dominant capabilities from another service. The aim of this effort is to centralize control. This approach has become more prevalent of late as a result of the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA), and the perception that the best way to stay ahead of the enemy is to create a technologically formidable military force. Those in support of this concept of jointness believe that to fully exploit the RMA and achieve the ultimate end requires the military to develop new organizations and joint doctrine that institutionalize jointness as unification. This approach to defense planning has the potential for tremendous impacts on operations, doctrinal development and organizational/force structures.²⁰

Opponents of the unification perspective argue that the concept seeks to impose a single vision on the defence establishment, and that by so doing it ignores historical

reality and the common sense view that, due to the dynamic and uncertain nature of the world, it is impossible to predict or fully control the actions of a potential adversary. They also argue that as long as war involves humans there will always be ambiguity and uncertainty, that technology is no substitute for a highly trained, highly competent military force, and that it is a fallacy to believe that technology can eliminate all or even most future security problems.²¹

Joint Doctrine

There is no doubt that joint doctrine development has made significant progress over the last fifteen years and that the current development process in the U.S. is regarded as the most advanced in the world.²²

Numerous perspectives/definitions on the exact meaning of doctrine exist. A sampling of excerpts/thoughts is provided below:

- "... philosophical justification for an armed force's existence and method of operating..."²³
- "... fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions..."²⁴
- ... considered opinion as to the best way to do things
- ... shorthand for accepted military thinking

Key within each of these excerpts are the underlying principles that doctrine 'justifies', that it is 'fundamental', and that it is 'commonly accepted or understood'. These principles are evident in the following definition of joint doctrine "... [J]oint doctrine - the fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces from two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective."²⁵

The issue of joint doctrine and its associated development process is an interesting one as discussion of this subject quickly becomes embroiled in proverbial ‘chicken and egg’ debates. As noted earlier, a substantial amount of analysis of the whole issue of joint doctrine has been completed in recent years, especially since the Gulf War. Part of this analysis has included independent service reviews both of joint doctrine, and of their own service doctrines. All services are in agreement that joint operations, in and of themselves, represent significantly greater complexity than single-service operations. The services appear to agree that the charter of joint doctrine is to help the joint commander meld the different capabilities and perspectives provided by the services into the most efficient and effective joint force possible, and that joint doctrine should offer a common perspective from which to plan, operate, and fundamentally shape the way all think about and train for war. Most also seem to agree that existing joint theory, and the associated doctrine, is predicated on single service thinking, not vice versa. In general, they all conclude that existing joint doctrine appears valid and that service doctrines continue to work despite what the services consider to be minor flaws. However, they also acknowledge that significant doctrinal differences still remain between some elements of the various service doctrines and joint doctrine. They also note that in some cases these differences between the service and joint doctrines are ‘papered over’ for the sake of harmony, and that this compromise approach often results in neither the joint doctrine, nor the service doctrines, being fully successful.²⁶

Within the assessments however, can also be found a number of diverging views that appear to align with the previously discussed differences between those who espouse to the integration perspective of jointness, as opposed to those who support the

unification perspective. Those in support of the integration perspective contend that success in war is contingent upon the common sense idea of jointness as a seamless integration, and that joint doctrine is only intended to knit together service components and concepts by prescribing guidelines for areas of operation, command relationships, and support and coordination of the joint force. The over-riding premise is that each service's doctrine has its own merits, each of which can be traced to a service's culture and history. Their belief is that joint doctrine should flow from service doctrine while taking on the obvious added responsibilities that come with the joint reality. They believe that joint doctrine should take the best of the various services' paradigms, from which should be developed a best mix of organization, capabilities, and warfighting approaches for the task at hand. This ability to integrate is what they consider to be in keeping with the most fundamental principle of war – unity of command.²⁷ The integration approach is exemplified by the following quote from General Shalikashvili in his description of the intent of the U.S. forces Joint Vision 2010:

[Joint Vision 2010 will focus] the strengths of each individual service or component to exploit the full array of available capabilities ...[and] ... guide the evolution of joint doctrine, education, and training to [ensure that] we will be able to achieve more seamless joint operations in the future.²⁸

On the other hand, advocates of the unification perspective believe that “jointness is incomplete because it has not been holistically designed.”²⁹ Their perspective is that because joint warfare is larger than the sum of its parts then the end state must be envisioned as a concept unto itself.³⁰ They believe that to achieve the full synergistic effects of joint combat power, the warfighting doctrine must be common to all arms, and that in the absence of a commonly understood doctrine, it becomes extraordinarily

difficult to plan or execute military operations.³¹ While they agree that service capabilities should be considered within the doctrine development process, they profess that in order to ensure synergy the doctrine should be designed from the top down, not the existing reality of bottom up. They consider it unrealistic to believe that effective concepts of jointness will somehow rise naturally from the bottom. They emphasize that this holistic approach towards the process of joint doctrine development and application would lessen the doctrinal differences among the services, allow the services to refocus their core strengths, and ensure a solid joint doctrinal basis.³²

These advocates of the unification perspective are also of the firm belief that while the services may be trying hard to demonstrate ‘purple think’, the reality is that each service’s doctrine retains much the same colour it had in the past. They emphasize that each of the services still has a long way to go toward melding their conflicting visions of warfare into a single concept.³³ They also believe that recent trends in joint thinking appear to be reinforcing the seams between the services, that the services are not integrating their capabilities, and that the result may actually be fewer options for future commanders. They are of the firm opinion that individual service fears of losing funding within the defense budget, combined with an inflexible adherence to service paradigms, has unfortunately (but inevitably) added fuel to the issue of inter-service rivalry, and the problems of competing service doctrines. They also contend that many of the current difficulties with the joint doctrine development process result from the fact that joint doctrine is decided by ‘committee’, and that the greatest influence on the process is often exercised by those services with the largest staffs devoted to the joint effort. Their concern is that this often results in the compromise and temporizing of many key issues.

They further emphasize that some of the realities of this particular issue manifest themselves when planning staffs are unable to appreciate fully the capabilities of the various services, and in the fact that there is often little coordination between the services. While they appear in agreement that the requirement for joint doctrine does not in and of itself preclude the need for individual service doctrines, they are of the firm belief that to correct the current negative reality, service doctrines must 'bend' to support the common joint philosophy.³⁴

Those in support of the integration approach consider the idea of joint doctrine supplanting service doctrine to be a serious mistake. They view this to be the equivalent of dogma being imposed on an organization from the top down. Specifically they contend that it is one thing to standardize inter-service procedures with the intent of improving effectiveness, but that it is quite another to attempt to standardize the fundamental understandings of the various services as concerns 'how to fight'.³⁵ They believe that to balance each service's core capabilities, joint doctrine must be able to draw on the fully developed operational doctrine of each service, and that if there are gaps in this operational level doctrine this could impact on the reality of joint operations. They are also very quick to point out their belief that many of the problems associated with the ongoing debate over joint doctrine can be directly attributed to the unification attitude.³⁶

What is clear upon review of the literature is that significant headway has been made with respect to joint doctrinal development. Although some issues are still festering, many have been worked out, worked through, or worked around. While there is still a need for further clarification on such key joint issues as targeting and intelligence

collection, to name just a couple, there is no doubt that marked improvements have been realized within these areas and many others. Within the U.S. the creation of unified commands has undoubtedly been one of the most successful results of the joint development process.³⁷

Military Culture

In his paper “Doctrine is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies”, Paul Johnston notes that “those who study business have developed the concept of a ‘corporate culture’ to describe the organizational culture or character of a business.” This character, they point out, may begin with individuals but with time it permeates the entire organization. He goes on to say that, whatever the specific corporate culture, it will inevitably become self-replicating since typically the type of person hired or promoted within the organization will be one who reflects the corporate characteristics and values.³⁸

It goes without saying that military organizations in and of themselves have specific organizational cultures, and that in the same sense as the corporate culture, an army’s character or culture can spring from many sources and be reflected in many ways.³⁹ Military culture has also been described by some authors as the “bedrock of military effectiveness.”⁴⁰ New members to a military organization are quickly socialized to the realities of military life. Those who stay and prosper within the organization are typically those who adopt the existing value system.⁴¹

To change an organization’s culture is difficult because the culture is often so deeply ingrained, the behavioural norms so well learned, that they often become unconsciously “non-confrontable” and “non-debatable.” Members of a culture must

often 'unlearn' the old norms before they can learn new ones.⁴² B.H. Liddell Hart notes that "[t]he only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is getting the old one out."⁴³ An understanding of military culture is therefore key to understanding the process of change, or possible lack thereof, within military organizations.⁴⁴

Formal doctrine is an important source of this character, as are the experience and values of the leadership. Reflections of this character could include the organization an entity adopts for itself or the types of training it chooses to indulge in. Since armies choose doctrines, and not the other way around, it could even impact on the formal doctrine it chooses to adopt for itself.⁴⁵

Much of the mindset, and differences in opinion, on the relative success of implementation of jointness and joint doctrine can be directly attributed to the realities of specific service cultures. At the heart of the debate are the differing perspectives between the various services. These differences are not necessarily service parochialism but rather the result of intellectually honest, yet competing, paradigms. At the intellectual level these perspectives do not in and of themselves cause problems. Typically difficulties only surface when it comes time to implement potential changes. As such, the resulting tension, if approached creatively, can yield a rich variety of military options. Taken in the negative it can very quickly destroy the effectiveness of an organization.⁴⁶

Johnston goes on to say that ultimately an army's behaviour in battle will almost certainly be more a reflection of its character or culture than of the contents of its doctrine manuals, and that it is wartime experience rather than peacetime innovation that will form this culture. As such, if the purpose of jointness is to change the way an army will fight, then it is not enough to just write new doctrine.⁴⁷

True organizational change is impacted by both internal and external factors, and requires a complete cultural transformation including changes in structures, behaviours, and professional incentives.⁴⁸ To actually change an individual's mind, or for that matter an organizational culture, also requires a significant event, quite often a vivid or emotional experience. Therefore, if the "mindset" of an army influences the way it fights, more so than the contents of its formal doctrine manuals, then so too will there be a need for a significant event, not just a rewrite of the doctrine manuals, to change the mindset of the organization. Johnson concludes that for an organizational change to be successful it will require, at the very least, changes to its training, personnel, promotion and perhaps even its recruitment policies, and that a great deal of deep thinking must be undertaken prior to and throughout this change process.⁴⁹

The Canadian Forces Reality

B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Canadian Forces Operations is the keystone manual within the CF doctrine series of publications. The publication concentrates on the operational level of force employment. It places particular emphasis on the synergistic integration of CF commands and agencies so that their total effort can be concentrated decisively to achieve the commander's mission. As stated in the preface of the manual, it "is intended to guide the employment of the CF, [to] provide a basis for collective training, and [to] provide the military education system with instruction material."⁵⁰

The foreword of the manual also provides a good overview of the changes to the National Defence Act (NDA) and the resultant integration and unification of the three separate services of Canada into a single unified defence force in the mid to late 1960s. As alluded to later, in many respects this may have been the significant event that started

the CF down the path of jointness. This was subsequently followed in the mid-1990s by a management command and control re-engineering team (MCCRT) review of the DND and CF, driven by the 1994 Defence Policy White Paper, in which one of the key findings was that the CF would continue to have to “deliver operationally effective sea, land and air forces capable of operating in a joint context”.⁵¹

A CF operation is defined within the publication as “the employment of an element or elements of the CF to perform a specific mission.” The manual goes on to state that the CF, as a unified force, conducts operations involving elements of at least two environments as a matter of routine and that “[n]otwithstanding the legal aspects of the NDA, which describes the CF as a single service, when elements of two or more environments of the CF are required to operate in the same theatre or area of operations in support of the same national strategic objective, they will operate under a joint structure using internationally recognized joint terminology.”⁵² As further noted in the keystone manual, two of the five strategic objectives that support the mission of the department and the CF, and further define our systemic inclination towards jointness are as follows:

- “... to generate and employ effective, multi-purpose, combat capable forces ...; and
- ... to optimize the use of resources available and to promote efficiency and cost effectiveness.”⁵³

Within the CF there is a fairly positive mindset and attitude towards jointness. This likely results from the reality of the integration/unification process the CF underwent years ago, the fact that the CF tends to follow the U.S. lead in its approach to

doctrinal development, and the fact that the Gulf War, and subsequent national/international events over the last ten years, have had significant joint aspects to them. Finally, the reality of recent budget cuts, and the resultant force reductions, have put a tremendous amount of importance on the CF remaining relevant in the rapidly changing world environment. This has left the organization with no alternative but to optimize forces, while at the same time minimizing duplication.

The CF has done a good job of inculcating jointness training within its officer professional development programmes over the last ten years. This has had an impact on the joint culture within the organization to the point that it appears to have become accepted as the logical thought process and way ahead for the organization.

Coincidentally a good understanding of jointness at the operational and strategic levels of the organization has also developed especially as concerns command and control of forces. It is worthy of note that recent developments in support of the command and control of CF operations have resulted in the establishment within the CF of a deployable Joint Force Headquarters in Kingston.

This is not to say that inter-service rivalries have not been evident. Nor is this intended to state that the transition has occurred without serious reservations by some at various points along the way. However, from the overall perspective, the transition has actually gone reasonably well, and the future looks bright for jointness within the CF.

From the joint doctrine development perspective, while there is a very small cadre of individuals responsible for this process within the CF, they have produced the keystone manuals so important to ongoing and future CF operations. Of particular note, however, is the fact that it has been recognized within the CF process that “[w]hile CF

and [e]nvironment specific doctrine are separate bodies of doctrine, the two must be compatible.”⁵⁴

Conclusion

In conclusion, as stated in the CF Operations Manual, “operational art requires commanders with broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends.”⁵⁵ A commonly understood doctrine is essential to mutual understanding in battle.⁵⁶

Jointness, in and of itself, is not a new concept. Inter-service cooperation has existed in one form or another for centuries. However, the nature and reality of modern warfare puts a premium on cooperation to compete with the enemy. Many factors contribute to the effectiveness of forces. Unquestionably, jointness has the ability to make the whole greater than the sum of its parts.⁵⁷ Jointness gives the commander the latitude to employ his different capabilities in the most efficient and effective manner possible. Therefore, to be successful in the modern warfare era, a common understanding of the fundamental concepts of jointness and of how to fight joint forces is absolutely essential to achieve harmony, unity of effort and operational success on the battlefield.⁵⁸

As stated in Joint Pub 3-0 “the central philosophy necessary for successful operations [is] unity of effort – common action throughout the joint force in pursuit of common objectives.”⁵⁹ Teamwork is the essence of jointness. The fundamentals of cooperation, consensus and unified execution are imperative.⁶⁰

While there are still visible differences in opinion with respect to how to realize the ultimate goal of jointness, there is no disagreement as to the fundamental importance of this concept. Although certain economic realities and obvious inter-service tensions

may have occasionally slowed the process, overall cooperation among the services definitely appears to have improved. Debate with respect to the various ‘pros and cons’ appears to be less controversial and focused on details, not on the basic concept of the importance of jointness.⁶¹

Several positive steps have been taken to integrate military operations within the U.S. since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, and within Canada since the end of the Persian Gulf War. As stated by Col Owens, “The goal of jointness must continue in the path it has followed for many years, specifically to enhance cooperation among the services.”⁶²

Jointness is not an end, but a means. Jointness per se is neither good nor bad. It is good to the extent that it enhances the proper end of military effectiveness.⁶³ Continued success comes if a focus is maintained on building the most effective and efficient joint force. The essence is that joint forces can do more than any single service alone.⁶⁴ “True integrated jointness requires an open mind and an acknowledgment that, for a given situation, perhaps the other guy has a valid solution.”⁶⁵

Jointness – It really is a matter of attitude!!!

Endnotes

¹ Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, “Joint Warfare is Team Warfare”, 11 November 1991, i.

² Ibid, Inside Cover.

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⁴ Mackubin T. Owens, (Col, USMCR (ret)) “The Use and Abuse of ‘Jointness’”, Marine Corps Gazette, November 1997, 50.

⁵ Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer, 15 July 1997, 31.

⁶ CFC 106(3), Canadian Forces College Combined and Joint Staff Officer’s Handbook, 2001-6-6, I-1-1/4.

⁷ Robert W. RisCassi, (Gen, US Army), “Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment: A Necessity”, Military Review, NO 1, January – February 1997, 106.

⁸ John E. Greenwood, (Col, USMCR (ret)), “Editorial: The Evolution of Jointness”, Marine Corps Gazette, November 1997, 2.

⁹ Ankersen, 117.

¹⁰ Greenwood, 2.

¹¹ Berthier Desjardins, (Col, CF). “Joint Doctrine for the Canadian Forces: Vital Concern or Hindrance?” Advanced Military Studies Course 2 Paper, 22.

¹² Owens, 50.

¹³ John A. Clauer, (Col, USMC), “In Defense of the Joint Vision”, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol 82, No 3, March 1998, 50 and Owens, 51.

¹⁴ Owens, 51.

¹⁵ Ibid, 53 – 54.

¹⁶ Ibid, 54.

¹⁷ Clauer, 52.

¹⁸ Owens, 54 – 55.

¹⁹ Greenwood, 2. (Quote from Gen Carl E. Mundy, Jr in Autumn 1996 Joint Force Quarterly forms part of this article)

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²¹ Ibid, 51 – 56.

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- ²³ David W. Szelowski, (LCol, USMCR) “Disjointed Just How Joint Are We?”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 126/9/1,171, September 2000, 58.
- ²⁴ Peter W. Gray, (Gp Capt, RAF), “Air Power and Joint Doctrine: An RAF Perspective”, The RAF Air Power Review, Vol 3, No 4, Winter 2000, 3. (Quoted from AAP 6).
- ²⁵ Sawyer, 37.
- ²⁶ RisCassi, 104, and Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer, 2, and Szelowski, 59 (info in article derived from Michael R. Gordon and LGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret), The Generals’ War, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995, 142).
- ²⁷ Ibid, 110.
- ²⁸ Rebecca Grant, “Closing the Doctrine Gap”, Air Force Magazine, Vol 80, No. 1, January 1997, 52. (Quote by General Shalikashvili forms part of this article)
- ²⁹ Ankersen, 117. (Quote by Michael C. Vitale, “Joint by Design, Not Accident”, Joint Force Quarterly, No 9, Autumn 1995, 28 forms part of this article)
- ³⁰ Ibid, 117.
- ³¹ RisCassi, 104.
- ³² Szelowski, 61.
- ³³ Ibid, 58.
- ³⁴ D. Robert Poynor, (Lt Col, USAF), “Organic versus Joint: Thoughts on How the Air Force Fights”, Strategic Review, Vol XXIX, No 1, Winter 2001, 58, and Szelowski, 61, and Clauer, 50 – 51, and Ankersen, 117.
- ³⁵ Owens, 57.
- ³⁶ Grant, 51, and Owens, 57.
- ³⁷ Ankersen, 116 – 121, and Szelowski, 59 – 60.
- ³⁸ Paul Johnston, (Capt, CF), “Doctrine is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behavior of Armies”, Parameters, Vol 30, No 3, Autumn 2000, 35 – 36.
- ³⁹ Ibid, 36.
- ⁴⁰ Dr Allan D. English, “A Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective”, Defence and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, Contract Report DCIEM No. CR 2001-047, 2001-05-10, 7 (quotation within Dr English’s paper was taken from Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. et al., “American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century”, Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2000, xv).
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- ⁴² Ibid, 16.

⁴³ Daniel W. Temple, (Capt, USMC), “Maneuvering Jointly from the Sea”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Volume 125/2/1, 152, February 1999, 41. (Quote by B.H. Liddell Hart forms part of this article)

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⁴⁵ Johnston, 36.

⁴⁶ Poynor, 58.

⁴⁷ Johnston, 37 – 38.

⁴⁸ English, 83.

⁴⁹ Johnston, 37 – 38.

⁵⁰ B-GG-005-004/AF-000, Canadian Forces Operations, 2000-10-02, iv.

⁵¹ Ibid, ii.

⁵² Ibid, ii.

⁵³ Ibid, 1-1.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 1-2.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 3-1.

⁵⁶ RisCassi, 104.

⁵⁷ Sawyer, 39.

⁵⁸ Owens, 50, and Clauer, 52.

⁵⁹ Ankersen, 117. (Quote from Joint Pub 3-0 forms part of this article)

⁶⁰ Alan L. Brown, (Cdr, USCGR), “Jointness Begins at Home – Responding to Domestic Incidents”, Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999, 111, and Christopher M. Bourne, (Maj, USMC), “Old Joint Team Needs a New Approach”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Volume 124/4/1,142, April 1998, 47.

⁶¹ Brown, 108.

⁶² Owens, 58.

⁶³ Ibid, 52.

⁶⁴ Ankersen, 117.

⁶⁵ Poynor, 62.

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