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Conflict Resolution: Canadian Senior Officers Meeting the Challenge

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ABSTRACT

The environments within which our soldiers have operated over the past 10 years have been extremely complex. They have involved a large spectrum of actors each with their own cultures, priorities or hidden agendas. In all likelihood this complexity will not disappear in the future and if anything it may even get magnified. Canada considers global peace as the key for its prosperity and security and as such it is fair to assume that Canada will continue to deploy its military for operations in these complex environments. The present operational tempo is unlikely to slow down.

Acknowledging the complexity of today's international environment, do we believe Canadian senior military officers (LCol and up) receive adequate preparation and education prior to their deployment into these complex environments? Have we adapted our professional development and education curriculum to cater for the increased complexities of foreseeable U.N. or other such operations? This paper will examine these questions and conclude that most Senior Officers of the Canadian Forces do not, at present, possess sufficient knowledge that would permit the "optimum use of conflict resolution techniques" at the Operational Level.

"A successful U.N. operation or mission must increase the level of consultation and coordination among national governments, grass-roots organizations, U.N. agencies, and front-line NGO's. This will occur only through the competence of a new generation of political, military, and humanitarian officials who are well schooled in the multidisciplinary skills of all the elements of a mission structure and fully integrated planning. In the start-up phase, at a negotiating impasse, or certainly if a crisis erupts, only well-educated and trained political, military, and humanitarian officials, and ultimately troops and civilian police will be able to grasp the initiative and build a sustainable, integrated, and effective implementation of the complex mandates of this new generation of peacekeeping operations."[1]

Moore, 1998

Introduction

The Canadian Government has a number of policy statements that were put in place to guide the country's involvement throughout the world. Three of those policies are repeated in a publication called Canadian Forces Operations. In chapter 30 of this publication it is written that Canada wishes to promote prosperity and employment as well as global peace. The latter is considered to be the key for the protection of Canadian security.[2] It is therefore assumed that Canadians will continue to employ their military forces in a number of conflict areas in order to further the cause of global peace.

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[1] Jonathan Moore, ed., Hard Choices (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 86.

2 Canada. Department of National Defence. (B-GG-005-004/AF-000) "Canadian Forces Operations". (Chapter 30. Ottawa. 2000), 30-1.

Miall et al. (1999) wrote that the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has identified the need for the peacekeeping forces to "find new capabilities for what he refers to positive inducements to gain support for peacekeeping mandates amongst populations in conflict zone".[3] What Kofi Annan argues in Miall et al.'s book is that the coercion used by peacekeeping forces is efficient only for a time and by itself it is not sufficient for building long lasting peace. For Kofi Annan, "it is better to attempt to influence the behavior of people in conflict situations by the use of the carrot rather then the stick"[4]. The approach suggested requires that military commanders and the respective UN / NGO authorities use a number of rewards or incentives that would encourage the different factions and their populations to cooperate with each other. This cooperation could then be built on towards the achievement of enduring peace. According to Miall et al., Annan sees as essential that peacekeeping operations evolve to include conflict resolution. They conclude that as a result, working in the conflict areas becomes more complex. This complexity is increased with the added requirement for improved coordination between a large number of heterogeneous organizations like governmental, non-governmental organizations, civilian etc. As a group these

[3] Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse. Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Malden: Polity Press, 1999), 143

[4] Ibid., 143.

different organizations are described as the "conflict resolution capability in the war zone".[5]

The added dimension of conflict resolution integrated as an element of the overall mission suggests that the military will require an in-depth understanding of the issues at stake. As well, it suggests that a thorough understanding of the social and organizational cultures of all the players involved in their Area of Operations (AO) will be crucial. Finally, it would be reasonable to believe that one of the keys to success will be the military commander and his/her subordinates' ability to create and sustain an environment where the highest level of mutual trust and confidence exist. Acknowledging the complexity of today's international environment, do we believe Canadian senior military officers (LCol and up) receive adequate preparation and education prior to their deployment into a conflict area? Have we adapted our professional development and education curriculum to cater for the increased complexities of foreseeable U.N. or other such operations? The author is not convinced that we have, and this paper will examine this question and conclude that most Senior Officers of the Canadian Forces do not, at present, possess sufficient knowledge that would permit the "optimum use of conflict resolution techniques" at the Operational Level.

[5] Ibid., 144.

Method

The approach that will be used for this paper is as follows. First, the author will define what it is meant by conflict resolution, what are some of the different techniques that apply and what are some of the skills, attributes and/or knowledge that are required to create winning conditions. Then, the curriculum of our senior courses and those of courses given prior to deployment will be examine in order to determine if the content of these courses meets the requirement. Combined to this review, we will look at the result of *The Debrief the Leaders Project (Officers)* that surveyed over 800 Canadian Forces officers "regarding their leadership challenges encountered on operations over the past ten years".[6] As well, we will review the result of interviews between the author and half a dozen senior officers on their own operational experiences. Following this review, the gap between what is needed and what is given will be identified. The final part of the paper will be used to offer a way ahead for the improvement of the present Officer Professional Development Curriculum.

Conflict Resolution (Define)

A number of definitions exist to explain the term conflict resolution. Saaty et al. (1989) define conflict resolution as " the search for an outcome that, at a minimum, represents for some participants an improvement from, and for no

[6] Canada, National Defence, The debrief the Leaders Project (Officers) (Ottawa: 2001), i.

participants a worsening of, their present situation."[7] Schellenberg (1996) writes that the approaches to conflict resolution are endless but that most practitioners will use one or a combination of the following five practices: coercion, negotiation and bargaining, adjudication, mediation and arbitration.[8] Let's briefly review each of those practices.

Coercion is a form of conflict resolution that may or may not resort to the direct or indirect use of force. The Falkland Islands Crisis and the Gulf War are good examples of coercive conflict resolution using direct force. An example of coercion without the use of force would be the state versus its citizens when the latter is obligated to pay taxes. Schellenberg (1996) writes that four factors need to be assembled if the proper conditions are to result in coercive conflict resolution. They are capability, credibility, relevance and legitimacy. For the first two, it means the force involved must have the resources to do the job and it must be believed that they will use it if they want to. Relevancy is explained, as the actions intended must be relevant in that they can influence the desired end-state. Finally,

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[7] Thomas L. Saaty, Joyce M. Alexander, Conflict Resolution : The analytic Hierarchy Approach (New York: Praeger, 1989), 3.

[8] James A. Schellenberg, Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 13.

legitimacy means that the parties involved must believe that one side is totally in his right to take the actions intended.[9]

Negotiation and bargaining are employed more readily at the political level then between militaries. Quite often though a combination of coercion and negotiation will be employed. Schellenberg (1996) writes that negotiation and bargaining are the most common method used to resolve a conflict. They normally involved critical issues surrounding the relative power of the parties present. This method is most effective when the parties are looking at a resolution that will be mutually acceptable versus taking an approach of winners versus losers. Schellenberg (1996) identifies three "subprocesses" to negotiation and bargaining. First the parties involved will identify what the other wants. Second each party will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the position of the other party. Finally, the parties reach a conclusion that will be mutually satisfying.[10]

Adjudication is defined as the process that uses the rational application of the law for conflict resolution. It is done through the judiciary system. According to Schellenberg (1996) though, adjudication "does not work independently of coercion or negotiation as an approach to resolving conflicts".[11]

Mediation is a process by which a neutral third party is asked by the disputing parties to help negotiate a settlement. The mediator is a guide during the

[9] Ibid., 134.

whole process. The disputing parties are solely responsible for the decisions taken as a result of the mediation. The process is described as informal and the end-state of mediation is normally in the form of a signed agreement. Schellenberg (1996) uses the agreement of 1978 at Camp David between Sadat and Begin as his example of mediation conducted by a third party (President Carter).[12] One wonders with this example how neutral the third party was and how coercion if any was at play!

Arbitration is the process by which a neutral third party listens to the representation of the parties involved and then renders a decision that ends the conflict. Arbitration can take many forms. It possesses the advantages of privacy and flexibility as found in mediation. The major difference being that as with arbitration, an authoritative decision is rendered.[13]

Conflict Resolution- What is needed?

"…conflicts have their roots in complex behavioral relationships, not fully understood, within and between nations,…"

Burton (1987)

Byman et al., wrote that "military missions in complex contingency operations typically fall into five general categories: providing humanitarian assistance, protecting humanitarian assistance, assisting refugees and displaced

[10] Ibid., 153,154.
[11] Ibid., 155-173.
[12] Ibid., 173-193.

persons, enforcing a peace agreement and restoring order."[14] They added that the military that worked in these operations will not only face the complexity of their operations but as well the complexities of the multitude of organizations engaged in the operation. These organizations will vary in size and power. They could include, as mentioned earlier, governments (local, regional, international), donor countries, and host countries, NGOs, PVOs etc… The priorities of these heterogeneous actors will be different and their desires may interfere with the military commander's intent. Micro-management from "up top", conflicting goals and confusion as to who is in charge does occur. Coordination of effort becomes a daunting challenge. The end result could often be a mission that is not all that clear or that there may be conflicting objectives within the overall mission. Flexibility, patience and the ability to improvise would be the norm for the military.[15]

Both the recently published *Canadian Forces Operations* manual and the manual titled *Civil-military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*, explain the responsibilities of the military commander. In particular these manuals put emphasis on the necessity for the military commander to "harness the energy" of the different actors and "canalize" that energy towards a unity of effort. The documents define the requirement for the establishment of common goals through

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[13] Ibid., 193-204.
[14] Daniel Byman, et al., Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations (Arlington: RAND, 2000), xiv.
[15] Ibid., xv.

a joint vision and joint campaign planning. Both documents repeat the importance of gaining the trust and confidence of all the players. They identify some of the education and training that should occur before deployment into the AO. The common themes are: understanding of the organizational cultures of the players involved and their cultural differences, understanding of the local culture, seeking to build and sustain an overall team spirit through cooperation and the establishment of common goals.[16] Through those publications and the earlier definition of the complexities of the environment within which the military will operate, one can extrapolate the type of education and the types of skills the military would need in addition to their combat skills. Last (1997) defines these other skills as contact skills.[17]

As a result of the complex environment defined above it would be reasonable to state that in addition to his/her combat skills the military commander requires education and training in the following fields. First and foremost the TFC needs to understand culture. In this context we will use the culture definition of Daft (1999): "the set of key values, assumptions, understandings, and ways of thinking that is shared by members of an organization and taught to new members

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[16] Canada. Department of National Defense, (B-GG-005-004/AF-000) Canadian Forces Operations Chapter 30. Ottawa. 2000. ---'Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War Chapter 1,2,5 and 8. Ottawa 1999.

[17] David M. Last, Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations (Cornwallis: The Canadian Peacekeeping

as correct".[18] Not only does the military commander needs to understand the local culture, which is a given, but he/she must also understand the organizational culture of the coalition forces under his/her command as well as the organizational culture of the other actors in the mission. Once the leader understands the type of culture he/she is facing only then can the appropriate leadership and motivational theories be applied. The result should be minimizing misunderstanding. The conditions should then be present for the building of trust and confidence. As well, an understanding of all the cultures involved will facilitate the creation of a common vision and the building of the campaign plan. In addition to the above, it is believed that the military commander needs to understand his/her own national culture and where it fits among the others. This understanding will avoid inappropriate overreaction when the behavior of those with different culture runs counter to the military commander's own value system. Finally, to ensure maximum effectiveness the military commander needs to have developed sound self-awareness. Without sound self-awareness the military commander may not be aware of the different "signals" being sent as he/she is going about their day-to-day business. Without sound self-awareness the military commander may not be in a position to anticipate his/her reaction to the behavior or the expression of the values of the different actors. Poor self-awareness could quickly undermine mutual

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Press, 1997), chap-3.

trust and poison an otherwise healthy working environment. The result could be a jeopardized cooperation and a weaken coordination.[19]

As well as understanding the different cultures, the military commander should be informed of who will be operating in his/her AO and what are their missions and objectives. This information should be known before deployment. When possible, those organizations that are considered partners should be involved in the planning process and the pre-deployment preparation.

Thus, it appears that the understanding of the cultures involved in the operation, sound self-awareness and a solid grasp of different leadership and motivational theories would serve the military commander well in his/her quest to accomplish the mission. While the above knowledge and skills would be critical, I also believe that the military commander would need proper education in the latest conflict resolution techniques as well as training in negotiation techniques. The fundamental principles of these different techniques as well as a clear understanding of their effectiveness would enhance the overall capability of the military commander. Practices in mock-up negotiations prior deployment would certainly enhance the self-confidence and the effectiveness of the military commander. Now that we have a better understanding of the complexity of the environment within which the military commander will operate as well as the

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[18] Richard L. Daft, Leadership Theory and Practice (Orlando, Florida: The Dryden Press. 1999), 183.

education and the professional development believed to be required, let us review the education and professional development provided prior to deployment. This review will be done in two parts. First, we will look at the curriculum of different courses given to our officers during the course of their career. This will be followed by the review of the results of a survey called *The Debrief the Leaders Project (Officers)* and a review of the results of interviews conducted by the author with a small group of senior officers who deployed on operations at the operational level.

Education and Training Provided

We have deduced earlier that the military commander needs additional skills and education to his combat skills if he/she is to have the necessary tools to built an environment conducive to conflict resolution. This added education and these skills have been identified as: understanding cultures in the AO (local culture, organizational cultures of all actors, own national culture), self-awareness (how do I come across, what is my style, what are my strengths and weaknesses), a mastery of the leadership and motivational theories, an understanding of the conflict resolution techniques and training in negotiation techniques. We will review next if the above needs are covered in the present curriculum of the general officer development program and the pre-deployment training courses.

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[19] Diana C. Pheysey, Organizational Cultures – Types and Transformations (New York: Routledge,1993),

"…one of the most decisive functions of leadership is the creation, the management, and sometimes even the destruction of culture…. Cultural understanding is desirable for all of us, but it is essential to leaders if they are to lead."

Edgar H. Schein (1992)[20]

The complex subject of culture is first introduced to officer cadets as part of the core curriculum given to all cadets at the Royal Military College of Canada.[21] At present, culture (its definition, principles, general type of cultures etc.) is addressed as a sub-set of other courses called either organizational behavior or advance leadership and motivational theories. There are optional courses available in the Arts Programs that examine particular cultures. It is planned that the Professional Military Education (PME) program being presently developed for all other officer cadet training programs will have sub-set of courses where cultural awareness is covered.[22] Chapter 2 to the CDS Guidance to Commanding Officers 00/01 has a section (three pages) that introduces the complex subject of culture with a definition and some tips on how to analyze and shape the culture of one's own unit.[23]

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chap1.

[20] Edgar. H Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers,1992), 5,15.

[21] Royal Military College of Canada, Undergraduate Programmes of Study 2000 to 2001 (Kingston, 2000), 87.

[22] E-mail from LCdr Robert Charest, Breakdown of PME Ed Os into modules.doc (Kingston, 05 Oct 2001), 17, 31.

[23] Canada, Department of National Defence, Chief of Defence staff (CDS) Guidance to Commanding officers 99/00 (Chapter 2. Ottawa. 2000), 28-31.

A number of excellent pre-deployment courses have been developed and are intended for all individuals before their deployment. These courses (seven and eighteen days) are under the responsibility of the Peace Support Training Center in Kingston and are intended for all ranks either deployed as individuals to a theater or for all contingent members before they deploy. Two of these courses contain a one 40-min lecture on culture general and about seven hours on specific culture to the mission.[24] Training methods consist of some theory and some role playing scenarios where the knowledge taught is exercised. Overall, the Enabling Objective (EO) on cultural awareness seems to provide a very good introduction to the culture specific to the mission.

With the exception of the Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention training (SHARP) the core curriculum and the above pre-deployment lectures and document there seems to be no other time in an officer's career where the complex subject of culture is addressed. It appears the military commander learns on the job, when deployed, what is the organizational culture of the actors in his AO. This same military commander has not had the benefit of today's cultural education given to our junior officers. This education has only been recently added to the core curriculum and it is not fully implemented yet. [25]This means that our present

[24] http:/www.army.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp 27 Sept 2001

[25] Royal Military College of Canada, Undergraduate Programmes of Study 2000 to 2001 (Kingston, 2000)…. E-mail from LCdr Robert Charest, Breakdown of PME Ed Os into modules.doc (Kingston, 05 Oct 2001).

Senior Officers have received little if any formal education for example on what defines culture, what are the major different culture, how culture affects behavior, what approaches work best with a specific type of culture or what values define their own culture etc… Unless the military commander studied the subject on his own his/her behavior will be based on experience and instinct but not knowledge.

Insofar as the studies of the organizational culture of the "peace partners" in peace support operations (PSO), one 40 minutes lecture is given to all ranks, on pre-deployment. The aim of the lecture is mainly to define the partners that will be operating in the AO.[26] More extensive (two week) courses are available at The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center in Cornwallis NS on the subject of Interdisciplinary Cooperation and Understanding the Peacekeeping Partners.[27]

We have seen earlier how self-awareness is critical for the leader. Yet it appears that self-awareness development is only briefly touched upon early in the career of the officer and this only recently, and towards the end of one's career (National Security Studies Course (NSSC)).[28] Self-awareness is developed through some of the leadership courses given in the core curriculum and PME. In one particular course called Advanced Leadership and Motivation our officer cadets

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[26] Ibid.
[27] http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/Programmes/On Site.ht, 24 Sept 01
[28] http://www.cfc.dnd.ca/DP4/NSSC/NSSC3/Syllabus/sylch4.en.html, 16 0ct 01

get acquainted with tools that permit the evaluation of their strengths and weaknesses as leaders. Unfortunately this course is not included as part of the core curriculum.[29] The subject of self-awareness was covered at the rank of Colonels on the Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) until the fall of 2000. It appears now that the subject is only revisited on NSSC.[30]

We have said earlier that a military commander should master the different leadership and motivational theories. These tools would provide more flexibility for the military commander in his/her selection of the appropriate approach to a particular culture. It appears that leadership and motivational theories are taught thoroughly at the early stage of an officer's career (DP1) and that officers are briefly exposed to the subjects again on CSC and AMSC. From DP1 onwards, it appears that only NSSC addresses the subject in detail. There is a gap between the knowledge taught in DP1 and DP4. It is believed that the acquisition of experience alone is not enough to cover this gap. If we want our Senior Officers to have mastered knowledge once they reached their rank, they have to have been exposed to and have experienced this knowledge throughout their career.

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[29] Royal Military College of Canada. Undergraduate Programmes of Study 2000 to 2001 (Kingston, 2000), 87-91….E-mail from LCdr Robert Charest, Breakdown of PME Ed Os into modules.doc (Kingston, 05 Oct 2001).

[30] http://www.cfc.dnd.ca/DP4/NSSC/NSSC3/Syllabus/sylch4.en.html 16 0ct 01
http://bbs.cfc.dnd.ca/Admin/AMSC/AMSC4/curricoverv.en.html 16 Oct 01
http://barker.cfc.dnd.ca/Admin/LTD/Whites/ltd_index.en.html 16 Oct 01

The military commander and the Senior Staff Officer working at the operational level or even at the higher tactical levels also need to understand what are the conflict resolution techniques, how they apply to his/her operation and how their principles can be used for setting winning conditions with the support of an adequate campaign plan. Negotiation techniques are necessary not only for the day- to- day dealings with the factions in the AO but they are also very necessary as a working tool to achieve the level of coordination and cooperation between the different "partners for peace". It is believed that conflict resolution techniques are not formally taught on any of our DP level courses. Negotiation techniques on the other hand, are introduced and practiced by all those who deploy during the pre-deployment training. These three × 40 minute periods are aimed at low level negotiations and are addressed to all ranks. Those who deploy as military Observers are given five × 40 minute periods pre-deployment training as part of their 18 day course. The outline of those training periods above seems insufficient for the level at which the military commander and some Senior Officers will be operating.[31]

Having reviewed the content of the curriculum of the major courses given to our officers as well as the pre-deployment training courses, let's now review the results of a survey conducted by the office of the Special Advisor to the Chief of

[31] http:/www.army.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp 27 Sept 2001

Defence Staff for Professional Development and the result of interviews completed by the author.

The Survey

The Office of the Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff for Professional Development surveyed 800 officers using a combination of focus groups, interviews and questionnaires. This survey was completed as part of the requirement to research the type of experiences officers of all rank had acquired over the past ten years. The data accumulated was needed for the development of our Canadian Officer Corps vision for the next twenty years. The spectrum of conflicts within which these officers participated include the major international and national operations the CF were involved with over the past ten years (Oka, Gulf, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, our Floods, the Ice Storm etc..).[32] In the survey report titled *The Debrief the Leaders Project (Officers)*, tabled in may 2001, the top two areas "…where respondents rated themselves as possessing inadequate knowledge and lacking ability were:

- Knowledge of the culture of people in theatre;
- Knowledge of mediation/negotiation skills."[33]

Two of the conclusions of the report were: " The officers of the future will need to develop a military ethos that retains the concept of the soldier as warrior while

[32] Canada, National Defence, The debrief the Leaders Project (Officers) (Ottawa; 2001), I

complementing it with the concepts of the soldier as diplomat and scholar…….new competencies are needed to supplement traditional leadership competencies, as defined by another era of war and fighting. Cultural sensitivity, interpersonal and emotional competencies are required within the context of a revised military ethos, doctrine and leader development programs."[34]

Interviews were conducted with a small group of Senior Officers who operated at the operational level over the past few years. The overall intent of the author was three fold. First, it was to get an appreciation, through personal contact, of the perception these Senior Officers had of their operational experiences. Second, the author was wondering if there was also a perceived gap, at the operational level, between the education and training received before deployment and what these officers felt they needed when deployed? Lastly, the author wanted to see how the results of these interviews "fitted" with the results of the survey.

The method used for the interviews was through a telephone interview. All respondents had served at the operational level either as the Canadian Contingent Commander or as a Senior Canadian Staff Officer in a multicultural headquarters or both. Their AO were split between Africa and the Balkans. The lowest rank was LCol and the highest rank was MGen. All of them had completed the CFCSC and half of them are AMSC graduates or the equivalent. The questionnaire starts with a

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[33] Ibid., I, 16.

few generic questions to identify the time in as a commissioned officer, position held at the operational level for their tour, and the time the tour was done. Following these generic questions four questions were asked. They were:

- Upon returning from Operational Tour, I have heard Senior Officers mention that they were ill prepared for some of their challenges. This was due in part because they knew little about the different cultures involved in the conflict. Others have said that the training and education received on cultures throughout their careers and in particular just before deployment prepared them sufficiently for the challenges they faced. What was your own experience?

- At the Operational Level there is a requirement to work hand in hand with numerous NGOs, PVOs and Government Agencies. It is my understanding that, quite often, the military will play a key role in leading everyone towards a unity of effort. Do you agree with this statement? What education and/or training did you receive prior your deployment in this regards?

- When you look back at the deployments you had at the Operational Level, are there any types of training or additional education you wish you had had before you left?

- Would education in the area of self-awareness development, leadership and motivational theories have helped?

The responses from all are surprisingly similar and vary only as a result of the different level of experience. To the first question all said that from the point of view of their military skills they were very well prepared for the operational challenges they were given. Half said that the pre-deployment education or training given on the subject of culture was very little while they other half said they had received none. What was useful for most of them is the fact that they had previous

[34] Ibid., (p. 25)

experience serving in a multicultural environment and/or with foreign armies. This experience facilitated their transition.

To the second question, they all agreed based on their experience, that the military is a key player in leading everyone towards unity of effort. None of them had ever being briefed or educated prior their deployment, on the numerous organizations that would be operating in their AO.

To the third question, most of them would have liked to receive more negotiation training before deployment. Half of them wished they had a better understanding of the different cultures at play that is to say the local culture and the culture of the different coalition forces deployed with them. As well, half expressed the opinion that it would have been very useful to know about the different non-governmental organizations in their AO before deployment.

To the fourth question, half were quite comfortable with their level of experience and knowledge of leadership and motivational theories. This half was also quite comfortable with their level of self-awareness. One of the individuals had done the self-analysis exercise on AMSC 1. He felt that the exercise was “nice to have” but he did not find it that useful. Another respondent who graduated from AMSC 2 felt that the self-analysis exercise he completed on his course was one of the most important parts of the course. Two other individuals felt that a broader knowledge of the leadership and motivational theories would have provided them

with a wider "variety of tools" to apply to the many leadership challenges they encountered. They wished they had more of it prior taking command at the Operational Level.[35]

How does the education and training given prior deployment compare with the perceptions of the officers who completed the survey and how does it compares to the perceptions of some Senior Officers who deployed at the operational level? What is the gap?

The Gap

Earlier in this paper we deduct from a number of sources that the TFC or a senior staff officer, needed more then his combat skills if he/she was to be efficient in the very complex environment of today's operations. We looked at what is taught on the major courses and we reviewed the pertinent training curriculum administered prior deployment. We examined the major conclusions of a survey conducted with over 800 officers and we reviewed the result of a small number of interviews done with Senior Officers who served in operations at the operational art level. The "gap" can be defined as what the officers surveyed and what the Senior Officers interviewed felt they needed before they deployed. It appears that they needed more education and training in the following five areas:

- Understanding of culture (definition, fundamental differences, culture of

[35] The interviews were conducted between Sept 26 and Oct 22 2001. The author does not have the authorisation to

people in theatre)

- Organizational culture of the partners in peace
- Self-awareness development
- Leadership and motivational theories
- Knowledge of mediation and negotiation techniques

The survey suggested that the soldier as a warrior must be complemented by the soldier as a diplomat and a scholar. Based on his experience, the author doubts that experienced soldiers would be comfortable with the concept of the soldier as a diplomat and a scholar. Both have connotations and baggage that are far from the basic values they perceive they need as soldiers. On the other hand, it is believed that most experienced soldiers would recognize that the environment within which they have to perform today is significantly more complex than before. As such, it is believed most of them would probably agree that we need better education in the areas mentioned above. As well, it is believed most experienced soldiers would probably agree that achieving the mission in this most complex environment will require a tremendous amount of effort towards the coordination and "the harnessing" of the energy of all the parties involved. It is logical to deduce that success would be impossible without the knowledge and use of some diplomacy skills. We owe it to our military leaders to better prepare them for their extremely

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name the participants.

demanding challenges. The Debrief the Leaders Project (Officers) suggest that the CF were caught unaware of the scope, intensity, tempo and ambiguity inherent to the operations conducted in the 1990s.[36] Does this mean the CF could have avoided some of the very difficult time it went through in the early 1990s (Somalia, Bacovici)? Does this mean that if we could have anticipated the complexity of the environment earlier and as a result have adjusted the education and training curriculum given prior deployment, our Senior Officers would have been better prepared? It is common knowledge that in the end those missions were very successful. However, how can we better prepare our Senior Officers for the future? How can we add to an already very demanding training and education program? Over the past five years the senior leadership has been fully engaged in redressing the situation. New education and training programs have been put in place or will be put in place in the very near future. Most of these new courses are been validated now and most of them need only minor adjustment. However, despite all these great improvements it is clearly sensed that it is not enough.

This is so for two reasons. First, between the time we introduce this new knowledge at the DP1 level (through core curriculum and the PME) and NSSC, too little has been done in the middle where it is likely that the officers selected for command of Canadian contingents will need it most. If the Senior Leaders of our

[36] Ibid., i.

profession are to master this new knowledge it must be formally and thoroughly studied throughout one's career. This means that Senior Officers must be exposed to this new knowledge regularly. It is common knowledge that it takes years of studies and experience to develop Senior Officers to meet the challenges they will encounter at their level.

The second reason why it is clearly sensed that it is not enough, it is that we have a serious gap at the moment that must be filled until our education system has caught up with all that are serving. The junior officers coming in (DP1) are getting a lot of this new knowledge we need and the very senior ones (DP4) are exposed to it. What about those who are in the middle? What about those that did not get the new DP1 curriculum? How do we ensure the Senior Officer is ready for this environment? A way ahead is proposed further below.

Conclusion

"If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of hundred battles"

Sun Tzu (500 BC)[37]

The environments within which our soldiers have operated over the past 10 years have been extremely complex. They have involved a large spectrum of actors each with their own cultures, priorities or hidden agendas. In all likelihood this complexity will not disappear in the future and if anything it may even get

magnified. Canada considers global peace as the key for its prosperity and security and as such it is fair to assume that Canada will continue to deploy its military for operations in these complex environments. The present operational tempo is unlikely to slow down.

The survey done with over 800 Officers as part of The Debrief the Leaders Project indicates that a number of respondents did not feel they were adequately prepared for their mission. Their top two areas of concern were the knowledge of the people in the AO and their knowledge of mediation and negotiation techniques.

We may have "let down" some of our Senior Officers in the early 1990's because we did not foresee the evolution of complexity that these operations had developed. We can ill-afford to operate in the old ways ever again. A tremendous amount of work and drive has been put into the reform of our Officer Professional Development Program and our pre-deployment training programs. However, as it was pointed out earlier in this paper there is a gap that must be addressed. At present our Canadian Senior Officers are missing critical knowledge that inhibits them from applying the optimum use of conflict resolution techniques. They need more knowledge in understanding culture (definition, fundamental differences), in understanding organizational culture of the partners in peace, in the area of self-awareness, leadership and motivational theories and finally in the field of

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[37] James Clavel, The Art of War by Sun Tzu (New york: Delacorte Press, 1983), 2.

mediation and negotiation techniques. We need to build on the long-term plan we have put in place already, but we also need to come up with an interim plan now, for all those officers that are missing the entry points where this new knowledge is taught.

Sun Tsu's axiom above may not be applicable verbatim in today's complex environment but it is argued that any leader who does not know himself or herself, as well as those who will be operating in his/her environment will fail. Let us adapt our curriculum soonest. Let us better prepare our leaders for success! Perhaps the following way ahead would be helpful!

Way Ahead

Maybe it would be appropriate to have our Leadership Institute analyze the data collected in the survey done for The Debrief the Leaders Project as well as the premises and findings of this paper. The purpose of this analysis would be to pinpoint exactly what is the knowledge and training it is believe are missing. Once this is done, they would review with all the stakeholders the curriculums of DP1 through DP 4 as well as the different courses that exist out there to confirm if the gap is real or only perceived. They would then provide recommendations on how to fix it. As they conduct their review the researchers would keep in mind how this new knowledge applies to the Senior NCOs Corps and make the appropriate recommendations.

For the next step, perhaps the Canadian Defence University could be directed to implement the recommendations provided by the Leadership institute. They could also be tasked to come up with a plan that would cater for the generation of officers and Senior NCOs if applicable, that are “in-between” the time period where we teach this new knowledge.

Finally, and this is a very important step, a well articulated communication plan could be created for the purpose of educating the senior leadership of the CF (Officers and Senior NCOs) in order to fully engaged them in the process of acquiring this new critical knowledge. We need to fill the gap. This way ahead may be a start!

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