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WAS NATO AN EFFECTIVE THIRD PARTY INTERVENING IN THE BOSNIAN CONFLICT?

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ABSTRACT

This paper develops a model for effective third party intervention and applies this model to NATO's intervention in Bosnia. The model is based on an approach to conflict resolution involving four stages. The first stage is peacekeeping, which entails stopping the fighting and usually involves separation of the parties. Next, is peacemaking where the parties are pushed towards settling their dispute non-violently and trust is developed. The third stage is peacemaking when problem solving and reconciliation efforts are undertaken. Lastly, there is peacebuilding where the conditions that gave rise to the conflict are altered to prevent reversion to violence.

The application of this hypothesis to NATO's intervention in Bosnia proves that NATO was not an effective third party in this instance. It possessed a respected and credible force that successfully separated the parties and provided a secure environment, and it facilitated resolution discussions. It did not however, effectively use third party influence nor did it eliminate the causes of conflict by coordinating the entire peacebuilding effort. Bosnia was an important challenge for NATO. NATO's performance during the years of conflict management improved considerably and other refinements in its role for the post-Cold War security environment are inevitable.

INTRODUCTION

The Commander of NATO's Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) has gathered his key staff in a small conference room in Mons, Belgium. There is concern painted on the faces of all the officers, who interestingly represented each service and 14 different nations. The Commander took a deep breath, "I believe that we are ready. The CJTF was a concept in 1993, and since then, we have participated in countless exercises as well as studied several operations including the valuable lessons learned from NATO led operations in the former Yugoslavia. Our task is to intervene in this difficult conflict and resolve the situation. Challenging? Yes, but we have the knowledge, we have the resources, and we have the will ..."

The situation depicted above, although fictional, is representative of scenarios in which the international community will find themselves in the years ahead. With the dawn of the 21st century, people around the world are wondering what the future will hold for them. Most recognize that continued globalization based on further economic development, induced by trade liberalization and capital mobility, constant scientific and technological progress, and growing social and environmental concerns will shorten time and space; nations will be more interdependent. The Tofflers, noted futurists, believe that this is only the beginning. The breakthroughs in energy, medicine, biotechnology and more, will soon converge, and when they do, it will be with considerable tension and astonishing effects.¹ Globalization is a two edged sword, opening tremendous opportunities while creating new risks and challenges. The world of this new millennium remains volatile and unpredictable. Instead of peace and stability from a 'new world order,' there are more wars, more refugees, more confusion and less order.² As stated by Michael Margolian in the Canadian Forces' (CF) Strategic Overview 2000, "[i]n the area of security, the hopes that accompanied the end of the Cold War have faded after a decade of extremism and conflict."³

The view of the future is uncertain, although there are several characteristics of the global security environment that the CF leadership believe can be predicted with reasonable certainty. The United States is expected to maintain its status as the world's only superpower, its primacy rooted in overwhelming military and economic strength. Also, key states in Europe and Asia are likely to retain the ability to shape events in their respective regions, though whether they can influence outcomes on a global scale remains to be seen. Further, adversarial regimes bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction or sponsoring terrorism will pose a threat to their neighbours and to the stability of the international system. Humanitarian crises will continue to stimulate debate about the merits of intervention, the future of peacekeeping and the appropriate balance between state sovereignty and individual security. The prevalence of intrastate conflict, the application of advanced technologies to military operations and the pursuit of asymmetric strategies to confront U.S. dominance will change the nature of warfare. Demographic and resource pressures will likely aggravate existing conflicts and produce new cleavages within and between states.⁴

This paper examines intervention as a means of resolving conflict. The analysis first considers the spectrum of conflict before turning to conflict management and conflict resolution techniques. Interestingly, almost all techniques involve a third party and thus third party intervention is examined in more detail. The paper then assembles the ideas presented to determine four requirements of an effective third party. Lastly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its intervention in Bosnia are studied. The analysis proves that NATO was not an effective third party for conflict intervention

in Bosnia as it failed to effectively employ third party influence and coordinate peacebuilding efforts.

The examination is subjective as the definitions oc0017e4ct,c0017e4ct resolutio,e

War is an escalation and evolution of conflict. It is a strategic level political and military condition involving the application of a nation's military and other resources against an enemy to achieve a political end.⁹ The opposite of war is peace. It is defined as the absence of violence, direct or indirect, manifested or threatened.¹⁰ Peace is often a temporary and fleeting condition. For it to be enduring and genuine, it must be based on mutual respect, shared interest and common values. The environment within which nations and people interact can be depicted as a spectrum of conflict, which ranges from peace at one end to total war at the other.

Conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. It is an expression of the varied interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited constraints. The way we deal with conflict is a matter of habit and choice; however, it is possible to change habitual response and exercise intelligent choices.¹¹

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

One of the key questions regarding conflict is how to manage and resolve it. As modern societies have become more complex, problems of managing conflict have become fundamental, with broad implications for human well-being and social change.¹²

Conflict management is the process of directing a dispute or a conflict in which the disputing parties, with or without the assistance of mediators, negotiate or, otherwise, strive toward a mutually acceptable agreement or understanding, taking into account each other's concerns.¹³ The task of conflict management has been seen as helping parties,

who see their situation as zero sum, to perceive it as a non zero sum conflict, and then to assist the parties to move in the positive sum direction.¹⁴ Put another way, parties to conflict are usually inclined to see their interests as diametrically opposed where the only possible outcomes are seen to be: 'I win-you lose' or 'you win-I lose.' But there is a much more common outcome to conflict: all lose. The parties may impose such massive costs on each other that all of the parties end up worse off than they would have been had another strategy been adopted. Thus, there should be a strong motive based on self-interest for moving towards other outcomes such as compromise or problem solving.¹⁵ This is the art of conflict management.

Various types of conflict resolution techniques have been developed to deal with conflict. A special committee of the United Nations prepared a report that dealt with the methods of settling disputes. The methods included everything from negotiation, mediation and arbitration to regional arrangements. Ten techniques were examined and they represented a range of conflict management techniques that appear to be capable of dealing with everything from minor to major disputes.¹⁶ Interestingly, all techniques but negotiation included third party intervention.

THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION

Often, parties have difficulty negotiating directly. The presence of a third party is needed to help produce a "mutually acceptable solution."¹⁷ It represents a person or organization that acts as a catalyst within the conflict, normally without imposing a solution on the parties, making a decision for, or giving any legal advice to the parties.

The combination of authority inherent in the third party position as well as the means that the third party brings to the table generates third party influence. There are three elements.¹⁸ There is persuasion power based on the ability to find common ground and social cohesion. There is bargaining power based on mediation, good offices and problem solving skills. Lastly, at the extreme, there is threat power based on powerful resources that can be brought to bear on the conflict. These include political, economic, social and military means. Third parties may and often use all these forms of power as the conflict is managed.¹⁹ This is seen especially in attempts to intervene in violent conflicts.

Third parties are sometimes invited by the belligerents, but often, they invite themselves. They believe that they have a responsibility for responding to conflict. Four factors dictate that third parties are inevitably involved and often play a vital role in conflict management.²⁰ First, the international community, in its various guises, is often somewhat responsible for the conflict in the first place. Second, increasing interdependence means that conflict affects the interests of regional neighbours and beyond. Third, the combination of human suffering and media transparency makes it difficult for outside governments to persist in doing nothing. Finally, protracted conflicts can often only be resolved when outside resources are brought to bear.

Patrick Regan completed an interesting study of intervention in intrastate conflict.²¹ Approximately 30% of unilateral interventions were successful, which he defined as stopping the fighting. Intervention was more likely during the Cold War than after, when conflicts were less intense, and when there was a humanitarian crisis. More success was achieved when interventions were undertaken by major powers, involved a

mixture of economic and military techniques, supported the ruling group, and were directed at wars with relatively few casualties. He also considered multinational interventions and concluded that they were more successful when intervention was neutral, the parties to the conflict gave their consent and there was a clear strategy.

The Chairman of the August 2000 Panel on UN Peace Operations, Lakhdar Brahimi, made some compelling recommendations regarding intervention. There is a fundamental requirement to project credible forces into peacekeeping and peacemaking scenarios. Peacekeepers must work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining.²²

Conflict management is a multidisciplinary field – a mix of psychology, philosophy, political science, sociology and law. It represents a convergence of means or arrangements for the future that are not necessarily in the parties' interests or perspectives, and with an understanding that parties commonly come to support the same arrangement or agreement for very different reasons. Third parties do not necessarily resolve tensions between parties. They may help to sufficiently align matters to permit each party to make enough progress on their desired ends, preferring a state of agreement rather than an uncertain and stressful state of disagreement.²³

AN EFFECTIVE THIRD PARTY

The aim of third party intervention is not the elimination of conflict, which would be very difficult to achieve. Rather, the aim is to transform actual or potential violent

conflict into peaceful processes of social and political change. This is an unending task as new forms and sources of conflict arise.²⁴

Some conflicts cannot be resolved without the help of a third party. This takes place mainly due to the parties' biased and limiting perceptions of issues that prevent them from seeing mutually satisfactory or mutually beneficial options, even when they have the desire to settle their discrepancies. It is in such cases that third parties can be the most helpful. By bringing to the conflict their own knowledge and experience, their own perspective and their own power, they make previously unconsidered options visible and feasible. The question is, what are the characteristics of an effective third party intervening in a conflict?

To answer this question, a conflict escalation / termination model is useful.²⁵ As peace support operations are often considered synonymous with intervention, peace support terminology is used. The "peace" stages are first **peacekeeping**, which entails stopping the fighting and usually involves separation of the parties. Next, is **peacepushing** where the parties are pushed towards settling their dispute non-violently. Trust and confidence are also established during this stage to initiate resolution. The third stage is **peacemaking** when problem solving and reconciliation efforts are undertaken. Lastly, there is **peacebuilding** where the conditions that gave rise to the conflict are altered to prevent reversion to violence.

The first step in conflict management is to achieve a cessation of hostilities. The idea of deploying military forces early to prevent or stop conflict is not a new one and was built into Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. Military action to prevent or stop fighting must happen early and the intervening force must have sufficient strength to

carry out what it is mandated to do.²⁶ The force must be legitimate and have a robust array of capabilities including command and control, information and intelligence gathering and analysis, firepower, protection, manoeuvre, and be sustainable. Military forces contribute to a secure environment, which is also critical to the building of a lasting peace. An effective third party must therefore have a respected and credible force capable of separating the parties and provide a safe and secure environment; it must be able to **peacekeep**.

Conflict management thinking and practice has been shaped by years of study. Early theorists saw the potential of applying approaches that were evolving in industrial relations and community mediation to conflicts in general. These ideas attracted interest and the field began to grow with the creation of scholarly journals and institutions devoted to the study of the field.²⁷ There have been efforts to interest organizations in supporting the development of conflict resolution that would parallel diplomatic activities. John Burton, a noted conflict and resolution scholar, together with the Australian Mission at the UN, organized a “middle power” conference in 1986. They believed that middle powers’ influence, supported by a problem solving approach to conflict resolution, could have a significant and positive effect when intervening in conflict.²⁸ Ronald Fisher completed additional study in 1993 using the Cyprus conflict. Workshops with Greek and Turkish Cypriots led to increased awareness and understanding, and a desire to establish a renewed relationship.²⁹ Critics challenge the transfer of conflict resolution theory to armed conflict because of the requirement for a broader approach and a lack of established rules governing hostile party conduct. Despite the challenge, an effective third party must have the capability to facilitate resolution

discussion; it must be able to **peacepush**. A detailed knowledge of conflict and conflict management theory contributes to understanding and success.

There are also situations when the nature of the conflict demands that the third party use its full range of influence. A third party must know very well what to demand of the parties, and when and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand.³⁰ A successful third party must couple its persuasive and bargaining power to encourage the parties to comply with the demand.³¹ In addition, it must consider that the opponent is not rational; in other words, the third party should not expect that the parties would behave, or react in a certain way, based on its calculations or speculations.³² The third party must be aware that multiple external and internal factors influence the parties' behaviour and their capacity to receive and assess new, changing and challenging information.

In concert with the requirement to use persuasive and bargaining power is the ability to sense what power strategy is the best, complete with access to the full gamut of rewards and punishments. The instruments available to third parties in the control of conflict include political, economic, social and military force. These means are all vital. Access to political and diplomatic influence wielded through national representatives and embassies is critical. There is also the influence attained by regional organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business and academic groups. Economic instruments include all activities and resources aimed at sustaining or improving life, developmental assistance and humanitarian activities, and they become a powerful ally. Social tools are amongst the most powerful, although sometimes difficult to control, and include education, community and region organization, and information management.³³

The use of force with military forces is another necessity and often the last to be employed. An effective third party must understand the influence it has available and have access to the complete array of incentives and punishment; it must be able to **peacemake**.

Successful conflict management has “a preventive effect on future conflicts by eliminating the possible causes of problems.”³⁴ A third party then, is the party that is skilful enough to destroy the roots of conflict and stop the reoccurrence of similar events. Resolving a small issue that depends on an overarching one, without eliminating the causes of that overarching conflict, is not a successful resolution at all. The roots of the dispute must be removed. A third party intervening in a conflict must take seriously the various concerns, prove its ability to transform relationships and reduce the parties’ sense of isolation. The number of agencies involved in peacebuilding is extraordinary. The list includes international and NGOs, national governments and their militaries, corporations, and individuals.³⁵ Success largely relies upon gaining support and cooperation, which implies overall coordination.³⁶ The ability to influence all the parties to conflict, including those agencies who want to help, is key. An effective third party must be capable of eliminating the causes of conflict and coordinating the entire peacebuilding effort; it must be able to **peacebuild**.

The principles laid down in Article 33 of the UN Charter as well as in subsequent declarations might be viewed as idealistic: “States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.”³⁷ Third party intervention is often the most realistic and appropriate response.

BOSNIA AND NATO'S ROLE

As in all conflicts involving ethnicity, religion, national aspirations and economics there is no single cause of the Bosnian conflict.³⁸ Yugoslavia was created after World War I. It was divided into six republics, including Bosnia, and two provinces with a collective, Federal Assembly. Strains within Yugoslavia's federal system emerged after Josip Tito's death in 1980 and a power vacuum developed in which separatist tensions quickly mounted.³⁹

In 1990, Bosnia had approximately four million inhabitants. Of these, three ethnic groups dominated: Slavic Muslims (44%), Serbs (31%) and Croats (17%).⁴⁰ The 1990 elections resulted in a governing coalition corresponding to the three major ethnic groups. Muslims and Croats favoured independence for Bosnia, which the Bosnian Serbs rejected.

In 1992, Yugoslavia broke up and wars began in the republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. In a 1992 referendum, over 63% of Bosnians chose independence; however, the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote.⁴¹ The Bosnian Serbs, backed by the Serbian controlled Yugoslav army, began forcible resistance to Bosnia's independence. By spring 1992, the Serbs, who had significant military superiority, achieved control over more than 60% of Bosnia's territory.⁴² The international commu1Tf4 12 89.99997 184164ona

During the summer of 1992, as the human rights and humanitarian crisis intensified, the Security Council voted to send UN peacekeepers to Bosnia to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid. This mandate was later extended to the protection of a number of UN declared 'safe areas.' To help assure the safety of humanitarian operations, the UN imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia in October, which NATO began to monitor. NATO had also announced its readiness to support peacekeeping activities with Operation Sharp Guard, a maritime enforcement operation of economic sanctions.⁴³

In April 1993, NATO began to enforce the no-fly zone with Operation Deny Flight. By early 1994, the UN efforts were bogged down and NATO threatened air power. Bombs were dropped for the first time in the history of the Alliance in March to protect safe areas and UN peacekeepers.⁴⁴

NATO initiated aggressive efforts to bring the war to an end in the summer of 1995 following a rocket attack that killed many civilians in a Sarajevo market. On 30 August 1995, NATO forces launched air strikes on Serb targets, thus commencing Operation Deliberate Force, the largest NATO military action until that time.⁴⁵ NATO's aim was primarily to ease the siege of Sarajevo, induce the Bosnian Serbs to agree to negotiate, and permit complete freedom of movement for UN forces. NATO had also initiated contingency planning for the withdrawal of UN forces.

The Parties to the conflict were brought to the negotiating table in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995. The presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia gathered with representatives from the Contact Group (U.S., France, Britain, Germany and Russia) to initiate a peace agreement ending the war in Bosnia. The road to the Dayton Accord was a long and difficult one. It was paved by NATO bombardment and years of

negotiations.⁴⁶ The Dayton agreement effected a compromise between two contending visions of Bosnia: the first, a single state with room and rights for a mix of nationalities; the second, an effective division into three nationally homogeneous mini-states.

Dayton's mediators ensured that the first vision triumphed over the second.⁴⁷ The basic principles for the final settlement included the preservation of Bosnia as a single state, an equitable division of territory between the Muslim/Croat Federation and a Bosnian Serb entity based on the Contact Group's 51/49 % formula, constitutional structures, free and fair elections, and respect for human rights.⁴⁸

The peace agreement was formalized in Paris on 14 December. A study of the arrangements are beyond the scope of this paper; suffice it to say that the Dayton Accords consisted of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 12 Annexes. The annexes set forth obligations of the parties and the international community to implement the Accords and were in the form of agreements between the government of Bosnia and the two Entities that constituted the state: the Republika Srpska and the Bosnian Federation.⁴⁹ Four annexes set out transitional arrangements by Bosnia and its two Entities, largely giving formal approval to NATO and other authorities to carry out security functions in the country. The other eight annexes were basically constitutional, including the Bosnian Constitution, the scheme for elections, the human rights guidelines and the regime for the return of refugees. The military portions of the agreement primarily revolved around securing the cease-fire line, and providing for regional stability and confidence building measures. The provisions further laid out a detailed calendar of obligations governing the parties' military. To enforce the

agreement, NATO launched Operation Joint Endeavour with an international military force of 60,000 called the Implementation Force (IFOR) on 20 December 1995.⁵⁰

By 19 January 1996 (D+30), the Parties had withdrawn their forces from the zone of separation on either side of the agreed cease-fire line. As of 3 February (D+45), all forces had been withdrawn from the areas to be transferred. The transfer of territory between Bosnian entities was completed by 19 March (D+90), and a new zone of separation was established along the inter-entity boundary line. Under the terms of the Peace Agreement, all heavy weapons and forces were to be in cantonments or to be demobilized by 18 April (D+120). This last milestone in the military annex to the Peace Agreement was achieved 27 June 1996.⁵¹

By implementing the military aspects of the Agreement, IFOR contributed to the creation of a secure environment conducive to civil and political reconstruction. It also provided substantial support for civilian tasks within the limits of its mandate and available resources. IFOR worked closely with the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and many others, including more than 400 NGOs active in the area. It offered a range of support facilities to these organizations, such as emergency accommodation, medical treatment and evacuation, vehicle repair and recovery, as well as transport assistance, security information and advice, and other logistical support. IFOR was also involved with the task of preparing, supervising and monitoring the elections that took place on 14 September 1996. IFOR provided support

to the Office of the High Representative in assisting the Parties in building new common institutions. IFOR military engineers were able to repair and open more than 50% of the roads in Bosnia, and rebuild or repair over 60 bridges. They were also involved in the repair of railroads, the opening of airports and in restoring gas, water and electricity supplies.⁵²

NATO's intervention in Bosnia was designed to end a war, guarantee a lasting peace and lay the foundations for a reintegration of the divided ethnic communities. The Dayton Accords had provisions that gradually increased the authority of the central institutions including the police, justice, health, and education systems, as well as the functions of the commissions on human rights, and displaced persons and refugees. The Bosnian central government would then have substantial authority over their future and their peace.

WAS NATO AN EFFECTIVE THIRD PARTY?

The assessment of whether NATO was an effective third party intervening in the Bosnian conflict must be measured against the four criteria established earlier: deploy a respected and credible force; facilitate resolution discussions; use third party influence; and coordinate peacebuilding efforts.

The risks of failure are increased, the more half hearted the intervention. As Lawrence Freedman, a professor of war studies said, “[i]t is as difficult to have a marginal intervention, as it is to have a marginal pregnancy.”⁵³ NATO focused much of its energy on the Balkans during the 1990s. Throughout the Bosnian war, the Alliance

monitored and enforced UN sanctions in the Adriatic and the UN no-fly zone. NATO also provided close air support to the UN Protection Force. NATO forces had respected command and control, information and intelligence, firepower, protection, manoeuvre and sustainment capabilities. The threats as well as the use of force were credible and instrumental in achieving the international community's aims in the Bosnian conflict. The sustained NATO bombing campaign fundamentally transformed the strategic landscape in Bosnia.⁵⁴ Further, Milosevic, who would not negotiate at the beginning of the conflict, became eager as NATO force was introduced. IFOR was seen as a potent force and accomplishment of the military aspects of the Dayton Accords indicates success. The secure environment that NATO was able to establish permitted furtherance of the important civil aspects of the Accords. NATO was clearly a respected and credible intervention force.

A successful third party can prevent misinterpretation of opposing parties' intentions, and reduce tension and hostility. They too, preserve stability and enhance confidence. H.C. Kelman studied the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for over 25 years and found that third party facilitation contributed to a changing and more constructive political dialogue, the humanization of the enemy, and a hope that the conflict is resolvable.⁵⁵ Throughout the Bosnian dispute, when contact between the parties was impossible, NATO served as a communicator, transmitting facts, options and suggesting solutions. NATO's main activity was diplomacy, negotiation and conciliation.⁵⁶ NATO was successful in facilitating resolution discussions.

Bosnia played a critical function in the process of NATO's role re-definition in the post-Cold War era. NATO became drawn into the conflict as the international

community, and Europe in particular, was unable to bring an end to the fighting. NATO's role of crisis management, peace support operations and support to collective security did not evolve smoothly. The Alliance had little knowledge of third party intervention and conflict management theory. NATO leadership however, appreciated the respect afforded NATO and the influence inherent in its position. NATO's coercive "try and see" stance used in February 1993 was quite effective.⁵⁷ However, the lack of unity among allies plagued policymaking and the determination of common strategy.⁵⁸ Conflict management efforts were chronically reactive and differing views of the threat to national interests plagued access to "carrots and sticks." The Dayton Accords represented a largely imposed solution to the conflict.⁵⁹ NATO played a significant role and used persuasive and bargaining power to some success. Threat power though, was used with less effect. The Alliance was tremendously effective with the fear and use of force, however their lack of access to economic and social means stifled their full potential. NATO did not succeed in effectively using third party influence.

The Dayton Accords stopped the fighting, but they did not include a framework for ethnic reconciliation or multiethnic societies. "It is not enough to just terminate a conflict – attention is always needed for what is to follow."⁶⁰ Peacebuilding deals with the deep-rooted sources of conflict and implies that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile and the conflict structure has been positively changed.⁶¹ Education and social incentives to adjust attitudes and beliefs must be incorporated into the plan. Peacebuilding efforts included a multitude of other organizations and although NATO worked closely with them all, they had neither authority, nor control over their actions. Civil-military interaction was wanting, perhaps based on a lack of understanding

or a lack of trust, however the resultant absence in plan harmonization, and government and community empowerment had a negative affect on progress. The Dayton Accord pledged Bosnia's warring parties, their most influential neighbours, as well as the international community to an unprecedented level of involvement in helping those parties implement its military and civilian provisions. This commitment represented a powerful inducement to the Parties. The expectations have regrettably not been realized and support in many areas has been poor.⁶² The Alliance cannot promote synchronization alone. It is assessed that NATO was unable to eliminate the causes of conflict and coordinate the entire peacebuilding effort.

CONCLUSION

Successful third party intervention grants openings for communication between disputing parties and brings positive changes in their relationship. Effective conflict settlement diminishes a sense of isolation and a fear of abandonment, and generates a belief in others. Disagreements and arguments are successfully managed if extreme polarization, physical violence and rancour are avoided. Efforts to build trust move a protracted, destructive struggle between adversaries towards constructive accommodation. Thus, conflict transformation and strengthened relationships are outcomes of successful conflict management and third party intervention.

NATO's involvement in Bosnia highlights the expanded role of the Alliance in European and world affairs. Although it is difficult to imagine how the parties themselves could ever have stopped the fighting let alone reached agreement, this does

not indicate NATO's ability to manage and resolve conflict. NATO was not an effective third party for conflict intervention in Bosnia. It possessed a respected and credible force that successfully separated the parties and provided a secure environment, and it facilitated resolution discussions; however, it did not effectively use third party influence nor did it eliminate the causes of conflict by coordinating the entire peacebuilding effort.

The Bosnian challenges remain daunting. Despite the successful deployment of NATO's forces in the region and the arrest of ethnic cleansing, stability and security in the Former Yugoslavia remains perilous while menaced by ethnic hatred, criminals and political uncertainty. Today, amid renewed debate over the purpose of third party intervention in Bosnia, the challenge is not just to maintain the current level of involvement, but also to demand much greater commitment as well as greater harmonization efforts on the part of the international community, including NATO.

NATO can only be as strong as the collective will and objectives of member states. Bosnia was an important test and NATO's performance, which was initially indecisive, improved during the years of conflict management. The positive adjustments along the way to NATO's involvement and IFOR's formation and presence in Bosnia were considerable. Other refinements in NATO's policy and role for the post-Cold War security environment are inevitable. NATO has been able to shed its Cold War identity for a more diversified post-Cold War mantle. The Balkan testing ground will be seen by future analysts to have played a major role in this process.

The CJTF Commander completes his address ...

“Of course we are only part of the solution. Our campaign plan is consistent in every way, and supports the other members of the international community. NATO will separate the belligerents and provide a secure environment. The influence that we bring to the table

will be exploited to its full potential. The peacebuilding efforts will be well coordinated to ensure harmony and promise long term peace for this troubled land.”

Endnotes

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¹⁴ F. Cristiana Matei, NATO and Conflict Resolution (Monterey: Naval Post Graduate School, March 2001), 8.

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¹⁶ United Nations, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (New York: United Nations, 1992), 9-97.

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- 24 Hugh Maill et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 22.
- 25 There are several conflict escalation / termination models. Glasl (1982) developed a nine-stage escalation model, Fisher and Keashly (1990) have a four-stage model, and Mitchell (1993) presents a cyclical process of 11 stages. There are certain similarities as are pointed out by David M. Last in his study entitled, Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations (Cornwallis Park: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997). I have chosen to use a four-stage model with peace support terminology.
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