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CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE:

2020 VISION

By/par

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ABSTRACT

Canadian Forces (CF) operational level doctrine is undergoing a significant evolution of change to meet the realities of current and forecasted operations, and to accurately reflect extant government defence policy and emerging military strategic guidance. This doctrinal renaissance has only recently gained momentum as a result of a continuous series of challenging domestic and international operations over the past decade, a recognized need and focused effort on joint operations and doctrine, and a rejuvenated interest in the art of operational planning.

This paper analyzes the current state of CF doctrine at the level of conflict at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives, and argues that, despite recent progress, the understanding and use of this level of CF doctrine is incomplete and incoherent. In the context of four guiding precepts that are considered essential to the provision of coherent doctrine, recommendations are made to accelerate the process of *doctrinal convergence*, thereby reducing the gap between operational concept, in both substance and design, and actual practice or usage.

CF OPERATIONAL LEVEL DOCTRINE: 2020 VISION

“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common purpose, common language and a unity of effort.”¹

Introduction

Canadian Forces (CF) doctrine is undergoing a doctrinal renaissance to meet the realities of current and forecasted operations, to remain compatible with governmental defence policy and departmental strategic guidance, and to respond to the recommendations of the *Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change*² as they relate to CF operations. Revised umbrella capstone, keystone and amplifying publications at the level of conflict at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives are now available in various forms that encapsulate the Canadian ‘meshing’ of joint and combined doctrine. However, this paper contends that the understanding and use of this current CF operational level doctrine, is incomplete and incoherent. The unification and integration of the CF over a quarter of a century ago and the growing complexities of international peace support missions created a doctrinal gap between operational concept and practice. Encumbered by inertial tendencies, this gap has been closing at a pedestrian pace. To accelerate this ongoing process of *doctrinal convergence*, much work remains in developing a comprehensive library of cogent and relevant doctrinal publications that is widely used and understood.

The state of CF doctrinal development will be evaluated with recommendations for improvement provided, where appropriate, in the context of four guiding precepts or *pillars* considered essential to the provision of coherent doctrine. These pillars link doctrine to operations and are as applicable to doctrinal content and substance as they are to the blueprint

from which doctrine is conceived, reviewed, promulgated and revised. First and foremost, there must be a common philosophy applied to the structure, missions, objectives and way ahead for CF operations and its supporting doctrine. Second, the doctrine must assimilate the individual services into a cohesive and effective force to enhance the probability of mission success. This common purpose precept is equally applicable to the understanding of why doctrine exists and why it matters. Third, CF operational concepts and terminology must be communicated in a succinct, unequivocal lexicon, or common language, and in user friendly formats. Finally, operational level doctrine is no longer the sole domain of the ‘operators’. It must reflect the entire matrix of CF enabling capabilities to undertake any national or international mission. This unity of effort must also be the mantra of those in a position to influence the quality of our doctrine at all levels of command.




Figure 1: The Four Pillars linking doctrine to CF operations

*“The ends we seek are implicit in the means we use.”*³

Common Philosophy

Philosophy is described in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as the search for wisdom or knowledge, or a set of principles for the conduct of life. By extension to the military context, it is purported that a common philosophy is represented by the collective understanding of the CF structure, missions, objectives, and vision. Arguably, philosophy and doctrine are analogous. The word doctrine itself is a derivative of the Latin *doctrina*, meaning teaching⁴, and interpreted in the Canadian military to mean “the fundamental tenets for the employment of military forces to translate the CF mission and strategic objectives into action”⁵. The air force definition more elaborately explains that “military doctrine is comprised of principles, theories and policies, accepted as valid and reliable, which offer military forces good chances for success when applied in periods of tension, crisis or war.”⁶ The United Kingdom (UK) adopts the NATO definition that describes doctrine as “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application.”⁷

Awareness of how these “fundamental principles” have been formulated and influence doctrine is equally germane to understanding the composition of doctrine. UK sources explain that doctrine is founded in history, that it derives its authority from the distillation of much hard won experience, that it evolves in response to changes in the political and strategic background or as a result of technology, and finally, that it influences the way in which policy and plans are developed, forces are organized and trained, and equipment procured.⁸ In

essence, doctrine comprises intellectual, interactive and predictive components⁹, not all of which are fully developed in the context of Canadian doctrine. To understand the components of doctrine is to also recognize that current CF doctrine at the operational level is more about creating a framework within which to prepare, plan and conduct operations - yard markers on the national and international 'fields of conflict' - rather than procedures on 'how to fight'. The premise is to establish a common framework for interoperability and allow the commander to concentrate on coping with the dynamics of the operation. "Doctrine provides the guidance during that critical period between stimulus and response to incidents."¹⁰ The understanding of the development and composition of doctrine is a professional imperative. By virtue of training and appointment, junior officers will gravitate to tactical doctrine, mid-grade officers the operational level and senior officers to strategic levels. For the doctrinal framework to be most effective, an understanding of doctrine starts at the junior officer tactical level, and is then cultivated at the mid- to senior-grade officer operational level where the benefit of field and technical experience combines with a knowledge of traditions and political objectives. To reap benefits from this intellectual investment represents a significant educational challenge at all levels of military instruction. As this education will draw from only a limited bank of Canadian operational level experience, serious study of the historical experiences will be necessary. "Commanders without actual experience can participate vicariously in military operations only through historical study".¹¹

A common philosophy also extends to the sharing of a joint vision and knowledge of how the Canadian Forces conducts its operational business. To assess the degree of commonality of philosophy in current CF doctrine requires a brief review of the key

institutional changes of past few decades. The winds of organizational change forcibly struck the proudly independent services of the Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force in the 1960s with the passing of two legislative acts that served to integrate, then unify the three services. The National Defence Act states that “*The Canadian Forces are the armed forces of Her Majesty raised by Canada and consist of one service called the Canadian Armed Forces*”.¹² After unification, an evolving process of reorganization continued, culminating in the *1994 Defence White Paper* that endures as the current Government’s direction on Defence. A management command and control reengineering team (MCCRT) was then established to develop a new command and control structure, and a new resource management process for the Department of National Defence. This team affirmed that the CF would remain unified, NDHQ integrated, operational HQs reduced in numbers and size, and Command HQs closed with Environmental Chiefs of Staff subordinated to the Chief of the Defence Staff.¹³ Theoretically, this structure is the necessary foundation for delivering operationally effective sea, land and air forces capable of operating in a national (joint) or multinational (alliance or coalition) context. Although this fundamental change occurred thirty-two years ago, it is only since the late 1980s to early 1990s that Canadian doctrinal development has gained momentum. Prior to this period, the intellectual, interactive and predictive component factors of doctrine did not alter sufficiently to drive doctrinal change, nor apparently did the institutional shake-up in the 1960s. Inextricably linked to extant NATO and North American Defence plans in the Cold War context, there was no driving impulsion for change for at least twenty years. The necessary impetus to adapt the fundamental principles of employment of the Canadian military was provided, in due course, by the emergence of U.S. military interest in joint doctrine reflected

in the landmark Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986, the end of the Cold War, British incorporation of the operational level of war into doctrine in 1989¹⁴, and a series of significant Canadian fiscal, organizational and operational changes¹⁵. Most significant in the past decade was the post-Somalia need to reform the Canadian military in the areas of openness and disclosure, accountability, human resources management, leadership, military justice, operations and reserves and cadets.¹⁶ Thus, the evolving global strategic climate combined with the growing accumulation of operational experiences in a variety of challenging domestic and international operations over the past decade, has resulted in increased effort to the articulation of joint force structures, operational concepts, guiding principles and training.

This transformation to a common understanding of the philosophical nature of our operations and doctrine, present and future that has been underway for the past decade or so, must emanate from the highest levels of Canada's political and military leadership and disseminate to the widest audience possible. To gauge how effectively the CF is achieving the aim of a common operational philosophy, both present and into the future (2020), the consistency of guidance between the *1994 Defence White Paper*, and the strategic capstone and operational keystone publications must be reviewed.

The *1994 Defence White Paper* provides the government's broad direction for the CF. It espouses the maintenance of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces in the national interest and reaffirms Canada's traditional goals of deterrence and reversal of aggression, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the relief of civilian populations. It states that Collective Defence remains fundamental to our security. It directs that Canada need not cover the entire military

spectrum of capability and, confidently boasts that the CF should be able to fight ‘alongside the best, against the best’.

The *Defence Strategy (DS) 2020* builds on the strategic assessment embodied in the *White Paper* to provide the strategic framework for defence planning and decision making well into the next century. It identifies seven strategic defence missions, strategic imperatives, and describes a strategy and vision for 2020:

The Defence Team will generate, employ and sustain high quality, combat-capable, interoperable and rapidly deployable task-tailored forces. We will exploit leading edge doctrine and technologies to accomplish our domestic and international roles in the battlespace of the 21st century and be recognized, both at home and abroad, as an innovative, relevant knowledge based institution. With transformational leadership and coherent management, we will build upon our proud heritage in pursuit of clear strategic objectives.¹⁷

The *Strategic Capability Planning (SCP)* document for the CF draws on the *White Paper*, *DS 2020* and the *Strategic Overview* to set out a new, capability-based (as opposed to threat-based) approach to force development. In consonance with the *White Paper*, it acknowledges that only selective capabilities at the operational level are required - except for limited domestic situations - as the CF will normally participate in international operations as a contributing part of a coalition. This document further sets out a notional concept of operations based upon task-tailorable tactical units. The fundamental asset the CF requires for international operations, and also a key contributor to domestic responsibilities, is the Tactically Self-Sufficient Unit (TSSU). The new Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL) establishes a framework for describing and relating the myriad of capabilities that may be required by the CF and is accepted as the core task framework for the entire CF.¹⁸

The next strategic document of interest is the annual *Defence Planning Guide (DPG)*. *DPG* is the primary means of providing CF and Departmental leadership guidance on assigned resource levels, anticipated tasks and planning priorities. *DPG 2001* lists defence and change objectives that match, amplify and assign responsibility for current and future strategic objectives of *DS 2020*.

To use a naval analogy, the *1994 White Paper* provides the Captain's orders, *DS 2020* charts a safe course, the *SCP* identifies the lead marks, and the *DPG* gives the helm orders. Are the Captain's, that is the Government's orders, being followed? A complete review of the existing library of operational level doctrine is beyond the scope of this paper; however, the numerous capstone and keystone documents appear to accurately depict Canadian military philosophy emanating from the *1994 Defence White Paper*. This consistency is attributable to the nature of the *White Paper* that reoriented the CF into the post Cold War security environment and, in so doing, allowed sufficient latitude to maintain a wide capability of high quality, rapidly-deployable combat-capable land, air and sea forces.

To provide a more direct linkage between policy and operational planning and to ensure a common joint vision and knowledge of how the CF intends to execute its defence mission today and in the future, the strategic guidance should be consolidated into one overarching publication. This effort appears to be well underway with the development of the fledgling *Strategic Framework for the CF* publication, though it is uncertain whether this publication will adequately augment or replace existing strategic guidance.¹⁹ The UK version, *British Defence Doctrine*, is a sound model though it falls short of the type of

strategic visioning and planning guidance contained collectively in the *DS 2020*, *SCP* and *DPG*. The title of this new strategic level publication is equally important to its contents. The title *Canadian Defence Doctrine* would provide more emphasis on the doctrinal aspects of such strategic guidance and its importance to CF operations.

The *CF Operations Manual* follows in the hierarchy of publications as the keystone CF doctrinal publication and is best described as a blend or ‘meshing’ of doctrinal concepts and guidance that encompasses the full range of ‘joint and combined’ operations. The composite nature of this document thereby reflects a unified force and the need to cater to both domestic and international operations, without generating confusion within a Canadian force or amongst our allies; hence, where appropriate, joint terminology is used. Divided into four parts and approximately thirty-four chapters, this manual provides overall doctrinal concepts and guidance in international, domestic and enabling operations. To conduct more detailed planning however, one must refer to a series of amplifying publications of which only approximately 25% are published.²⁰ In sum, although there is evidence of a common philosophy of the knowledge and linkage of CF structure, missions, objectives and vision, the overall library of strategy guidance and operational doctrine remains somewhat cumbersome and incomplete.

Common Purpose

In consonance with a common philosophy, operational level doctrine must reflect a standard operating methodology while maintaining essential linkages to defence policy. The

army, navy and air force must understand the roles and purposes of their individual capabilities in the greater context of CF 'joint and combined' doctrine. "While CF and Environmental specific doctrine are separate bodies of doctrine, they must be compatible."²¹ This precept is why doctrine matters most at the operational level, as it is the focal point of multi-service doctrine. Since unification, there have been noteworthy achievements in inter service logistics support, communications and interoperability, and in the development of mutual understanding and tolerance;²² in particular, the past decade has proffered a wealth of lessons learned in domestic and international operations. From the Gulf War to the Kosovo Crisis, from Oka to Y2K contingency planning (Op ABACUS), the lessons of command and control, logistics and operational level planning have served to improve service harmony in joint operations. No better recent example than the intensive and thorough planning associated with Op ABACUS in which 2,500 CF personnel were employed during the operation with an additional 14,000 Regular Force and 11,000 Reserve Force personnel readied for deployment should the need have arisen.²³

The ongoing pursuit of convergence between operational concept and design with operational practice and use of doctrine will require further development of the subjective Capability Goals of the CF set forth in the *SCP* document and as shown in Table 1. For example, the *SCP* proposes a high (H) level of command capability at the strategic level of war because it is at this level of conflict that the CF must advise national and multinational commanders regarding Canadian military options. At the operational level however, a medium (M) capability is acceptable because the CF will conduct operational level military efforts as part of a coalition or alliance, unless it is involved in a domestic operation. These

capability goals, it is purported, should form the foundation of doctrinal development and ensure that the environmental services are striving for a common purpose. They do not necessarily reflect the realities of today; however, they represent a useful point of departure for assessments of force structure options and resultant doctrinal development.²⁴ Indicative of the need to be focused on a common purpose and tri-service cohesion, the *SCP* notes that the Land Forces of the CF are developing five operational functions to describe their future doctrinal view of operations and that coordination and aggregation will be required.

Level	Command	Info & Intel	OPERATIONS					OGD Coord
			Conduct	Mobility	Protect	Sustain	Generate	
Military Strategic	H	H	L	H	L	L	M	H
Operational	M	M	L	L	L	M	L	M
Tactical	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	H

Table 1: “Capability Goals of the CF”

H = CF needs a High degree of capability

M = Medium or moderate level of capability is acceptable

L = CF seeks only a low degree of capability

OGD = Other Government Department

Common purpose must also extend to the emerging concept of employing the TSSU. Recognizing that the CF lacks the capability to achieve operational goals by itself in international situations, the fundamental asset the CF requires for international operations (also a key contributor to domestic operations) is the TSSU that can be integrated into a Combined Force package as a ‘task-tailored’ component. The contribution of eighteen CF 18s in the Kosovo Crisis, the integration of a Canadian Patrol Frigate into a USN Battle

Group enforcing UN sanctions in the Arabian Gulf, and the joint air, land and sea components to the International Force in East Timor²⁵ are recent examples of CF ‘task-tailored’ contributions to multinational operations. Arguably, this is attaching nomenclature to what has been routine practice; however, CF operational level doctrine should adopt and rationalize this terminology and these concepts.

Common Language

The CJTL, broadly based on the UK Joint Essential Task List (UK JETL) and the U.S. Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL),²⁶ is a positive step towards common lexicon or “language” as it applies to force and associated doctrinal development. The CJTL has eight major capability areas that correlate with the capability goals shown in Table 1 above and which are divided into three levels of joint tasks, namely: strategic, operational and tactical. The joint tasks establish a framework for describing, and relating, the myriad types of capabilities that may be required by the CF. This three-tier blueprint and associated sublevels captures the complex, multidimensional and multilevel nature of military activity. The CJTL is both a product and a process²⁷ and is, therefore, the essential “language” in CF doctrinal development.

Despite the composite nature of the evolving ‘allied synchronous’ Canadian doctrine that attempts, for the most part, to synthesize NATO and U.S. doctrine for the purposes of efficiencies and compatibility, disconnects of terminology exist within the Canadian system. Herein lies the challenge of the Canadian operational planner. To seek guidance on the CF operational planning process, it is necessary to consult two official publications, namely, the

CF Operations Manual and the *CF Force Employment Manual*. In comparison, there are differences between the ‘planning sequence’ of the keystone manual (task initiation, staff orientation, force option development, commitment of forces, detailed planning, implementation) and the ‘planning process’ of the amplifying doctrine (initiation, orientation, courses of action development, decision, plan development and plan review). However, the most detailed information on the subject of operational planning, is found in the *CF Operations Planning Process Guide*, produced at the Canadian Forces College, and intentionally restricted to in-house training use only. Attempting to find the right balance of keystone versus detailed doctrinal information in the *CF Operations Manual* is an ongoing challenge. Furthermore, the draft *Strategic Framework for the CF* refers to ‘Levels of War’, whereas the *CF Operations Manual* refers to ‘Levels of Conflict’. The air force keystone manual, *Out of the Sun*, unlike the publication to which it is intended to be fully compatible, the *CF Operations Manual*, also refers to ‘Levels of War’. These nuances of differences must be resolved, in due course, to ensure common terminology.

The method of expression of doctrine is as important as the words themselves. Canadian military officers routinely lament the voluminous, notoriously verbose and pedantic style of our publications. Generalizations and pages of abstractions and lists in small font are the norm. If readership is to be increased and the communication and retention of ideas the aim, a complete redesign is in order, starting with the *CF Operations Manual* which carries valuable keystone information but is mired in lists and formality. Major-General I.B. Holley, Jr. proposes a model format in which each doctrinal statement is supported by historical illustration and a footnote to sources.²⁹ Trends are evident in this direction: to wit, the draft

Strategic Framework for the CF, and the *electronic Information Operations* manual are closer to the mark with inclusive pictures, diagrams and historical context quotes that facilitate retention and interest. To enhance portability, the publications should be designed along the lines of the Environmental keystone publications, for example, Canada's Army or the U.S. Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-3. Finally, must the readership be enslaved by an unintelligible alphanumeric identification system? *B-GG-005-004/AF 000* (CF Operations Manual) might be better identified as CFDP (CF Doctrine Publication) 01. A fully functional CF doctrine web site along the lines of the impressive US Joint Doctrine web site³⁰ would assist in improving accessibility, understanding and use of CF doctrine.

Unity of Effort

Unity of effort in both design and practice of doctrine is essential. "Based on unity of effort, jointness seeks to focus all of the energy of the Armed Forces across the full range of military operations, throughout all the levels of war, in every environment (peace, crisis and war), toward enhancing the effectiveness of military operations."³¹ More succinctly, as Sun Tzu postulated, "he will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks".³²

Joint teamwork does not just happen. It is about Canadian forces working in unison with allies in bilateral and multinational operations. In the past year, the CF was involved in 7 domestic operations (mission areas: sovereignty, counter drug and migrant smuggling, search and rescue, national interests and humanitarian) and 24 international operations (primary

mission areas: peace support and humanitarian assistance).³³ Teamwork also requires a ‘ground-up’ shared understanding of the roles each participant is required to play and needs mutual confidence fostered by extensive practical experience of operating together. Such unity is manifested by the men and women of the CF working together to achieve objectives, as part of the National Joint Training Plan, or as part of an operational mission.

Regardless of the Force which creates a joint working environment, joint expertise and efficiencies evolve from soldiers, sailors and aviators training and working together to improve skills, defining essential requirements, developing force models, coordinating, planning and problem solving in their day to day environments.³⁴

Unity of effort in design and development will require immediate attention to the creation of an understandable hierarchical framework of operational level doctrine publications that flow from the keystone manual and are in recognizable groupings by both function and title. Domestic and international operational doctrine should be grouped by mission area, such as Peace Support Operations or Aid to the Civil Power, while the enabling doctrine is grouped by functional area, such as Use of Force and Information Operations. The enabling doctrine is currently the most underdeveloped area of operational level doctrine though significant progress has been made to produce quality documents such as *Information Operations* and *Use of Force Manual*. This amplifying doctrine represents the essential functions that focus and integrate forces in the conduct of operations.³⁵ This new doctrine must also integrate the concepts of TSSUs, CJTL and Capability Goals. A representational and non all inclusive CF Hierarchical Doctrine List for the year 2020 is therefore envisioned as shown in Table 2.




Table 2: Proposed 'representational' CF Hierarchy of Doctrine

The process of change to Canadian doctrine is an important as change itself. As MGen I.B. Holley Jr (ret'd) highlights in his article "*Fifty Questions for Doctrine Writers*", promulgating doctrine involves far more than publishing a manual. He offers, in part, that:

- There must an institution or mechanism to identify the need for change;
- The educational background of the principal staff and command personalities responsible for change must be sufficiently rigorous;
- There must be a spokesman for change;
- Spokesman must elicit wide support for the change;
- Senior officers must be involved; and
- Change must be subjected to trials.

The CF mandated champion of change is the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff who is responsible for overseeing joint capabilities development, joint programs and common doctrine.³⁶ His vehicle for doctrinal development is the CF Doctrine Board fuelled by the intellectual horsepower of a broad representation of joint and Environmental staff officers. These architects of change must champion the cause of two significant DCDS change goals by July of 2002. First, as directed in *DPG 2001*, the DCDS must coordinate joint doctrine and joint requirements into joint experimentation to maximize the effectiveness of new doctrines and systems. Second, he is required to develop a comprehensive program to adopt new doctrine compatible with our principal allies. The first goal reflects current operational realities. According to *DS 2020*, "...to incorporate modern equipment and new concepts into operations, we must expand our understanding of process through experimentation. This will require integration of new operational concepts and simulation into our training, exploitation of new technologies and skill development for joint and combined operations." Dr. Scott Roberston of the Directorate of Strategic Analysis at National Defence Headquarters

amplifies that “absent the opportunity to hone skills and judgement on the battlefield, armed forces need to look to their equivalent of the laboratory to undertake a comprehensive programme of experimentation and innovation.”³⁷ Thus, in the context of CF doctrinal change, the mechanism is available, the spokesperson identified, a joint facilitating Board established and the need for joint experimentation directed. What remains unclear is the extent to which senior officers are applying their collective efforts to this important process. It is contended that the Chief of Defence must lead the commitment to change by proclaiming his personal attention to this process and by assigning additional manpower to the task at hand, particularly at the DCDS Group level. Furthermore, through professional education, joint and environmental field and staff experience, and through heightened awareness of what doctrine is and why it matters, CF senior officers would be more influential in the *doctrinal convergence* process.

Conclusion

The dependence on unwritten customary doctrine reflected as commander’s intent, as well as in the cumulative experience of admirals and generals is a waning form of operational art. Today’s complex military operations and evolving policy guidelines leave no room for misinterpretation of commander’s intent and hence, require cogent, authoritative and relevant written doctrine. Canadian doctrine at the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to obtain strategic objectives, has been slow to respond to the unified and integrated structural changes of the CF legislated over twenty-five years ago. Recent signs of progress are promising, although there remains today a plethora of publications and documents providing strategic guidance and an incomplete library of hybrid,

non standard format, unwieldy, operational level publications that are insufficiently used or understood by CF personnel. To remedy this deficiency is to accelerate the process of *doctrinal convergence* thereby reducing the gap between written guidance and the reality of operations and force structure. While an endstate of total convergence of practice and design is likely unachievable in today's fast pace world of constant change and innovation, the gap can be minimized by solidifying the four *pillars* that link doctrine to CF operations. While current CF doctrine appears to reflect the necessary intellectual orientation of Canadian national interests, the strategic level guidance must be streamlined to maintain the necessary clarity of direction and common understanding of the roles, missions, objectives and vision of the CF. Tri-service cohesion is founded in the ethos of joint operations that, by extension, fosters effective participation in multinational or combined operations, and which must, therefore, remain the common purpose of the CF. The operational doctrine will need to embrace the emerging concepts of joint task lists and tactically self-sufficient units. It will need to modernize its style and accessibility to attract readership and retention of information. It will need to be organized in an understandable hierarchical manner that reflects the uniqueness of CF 'joint and combined' doctrine. In the pursuit of Canadian doctrinal coherence, remaining 'allied synchronous' in substance is also a critical lifeline to the successful execution of future multinational CF missions. Finally, the personal commitment of time and resources by senior leadership towards this challenge is essential.

The benefits of this process will be threefold. First, it will provide a common philosophy about how the CF, as an institution, thinks about and conducts its business and how it portrays its image to both external and internal audiences. Secondly, it will standardize

the methodology for conducting CF operations and provide a unity of effort and purpose by directly linking, horizontally and vertically, strategic guidance to practical, day-to-day operations. Finally, a rejuvenated operational level CF doctrinal system will provide the intellectual conduit to attainment of the 2020 vision.

Endnotes

¹ General George H. Decker, USA in an address to the Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 December 1960, quoted in Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, (United States Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1966)

² The *Committee's* mandate extends over some 339 decisions by the Minister to implement change in the CF and DND as a result of recommendations in six Reports: Report to the Prime Minister on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces (MND Report); Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and the Military Police Investigation Services (Dickson I Report); Report on Quasi-Judicial Role of the Minister of National Defence (Dickson 2 Report); Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Somalia Report); Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR Report); and the Report of the Military Police Services Review Group (Belizile Report). Status of reports are submitted under eight thematic groupings: Openness and Disclosure; Accountability; Human Resources Management; Leadership; Military Justice; Operations; Reserves and Cadets; and Other Issues. Further information on the status of implementation of recommendations made by the *Committee* can be found in the Minister's Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Final Report - 1999. A detailed description of departmental activity related to all ministerial decisions can be found on the D-Net, the Department's Internet site at www.dnd.ca.

³ MGen I.B. Holley, USAFR (ret'd), "Fifty Questions for Doctrine Writers", Airpower Journal Vol XI 3 (1997): 22-31.

⁴ J.B. Sykes, ed., Concise Oxford Dictionary. Also see Paul Johnston, (Capt., CF) "Doctrine is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of Armies," Parameters, Autumn (2000) 30.

⁵ Canadian Forces Operations, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, 20001002, GL-E-5.

⁶ Out of the Sun - Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces. Craig Kelman & Associates, Winnipeg, 1.

⁷ British Defence Doctrine, JWP 0-01, p. 1-1, and AAP-6: NATO Glossary.

⁸ *Ibid*, 1-1.

⁹ Charles Grant, "The Uses of History in the Development of Contemporary Doctrine", in The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine, No. 30 Sept (1997) 8-9.

¹⁰ John Clay, (Capt., USCG) "The Fifth Service Looks at Doctrine", Joint Force Quarterly, Winter (1996-97) 64.

¹¹ William McAndrew, "Operational Art and the Canadian Army's Way of War", in The Operational Art, Developments in the Theories of War, ed. By B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, 98.

¹² Canadian Forces Operations, i.

¹³ *Ibid*, ii.

¹⁴ John English, "The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War", in The Operational Art, Developments in the Theories of War, edited by B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, 17.

¹⁵ J.D.A. Hincke, (Col., CF) "Joint Doctrine and the Canadian Forces: Ready for the Next Decade?", Canadian Forces College, AMSC 2, Nov., 1992, 10-13.

¹⁶ For more details, see Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the CF, Final Report - 1999.

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- ¹⁷ Defence Strategy 2020, www.vcds.dnd.ca/cds/strategy2k/s2k07_e.asp
- ¹⁸ 5180-2 (J3 DLLS 2-2) 14 Apr 2000, Record of Decision of the 22nd Meeting of the Canadian Forces Doctrine Board, p. 9.
- ¹⁹ Publication remains development as of 24 Oct 00.
- ²⁰ CF Doctrine - Master Publications Listing dated 28 March 2000-10-08.
- ²¹ Canadian Forces Operations, 1-2.
- ²² Nason, K.A.(Commodore, CF) “Joint Operations in the Canadian Forces: A Meaningful and Timely Start”, Canadian Defence Quarterly, December, (1994) 6.
- ²³ Building on a Stronger Foundation: Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 1999 - 2000, A1.
- ²⁴ VCDS Strategic Capability Planning, www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/dda/strat/intro_e.asp
- ²⁵ The air component comprised two Hercules transport aircraft with 105 personnel in Darwin, Australia; the sea component was the HMCS PROTECTEUR with 277 personnel onboard; and the land component comprised a reinforced company of 272 personnel. Source: 1999 - 2000 Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff.
- ²⁶ VCDS Strategic Capability Planning, Chapter 5.
- ²⁷ Ibid, para 5.5.
- ²⁹ I.B. Holley Jr.,(MGen, USAFR), “A Modest Proposal, Making Doctrine More Memorable”, Airpower Journal Winter (1995).
- ³⁰ www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/c_pubs.htm
- ³¹ M.C. Vitale, “Jointness by Design, Not by Accident”, Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn (1995).
- ³² S.B. Griffith, ed., Sun Tzu, The Art of War
- ³³ Building on a Stronger Foundation: Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 1999 - 2000 A1-A6.
- ³⁴ Nason, 8.
- ³⁵ Vitale. See discussion on ‘joint integrators’ p. 27. Vitale describes ‘joint integrators’ as those common joint functions that focus and integrate the efforts of the Armed Forces in preparing for and conducting operations.
- ³⁶ Defence Planning Guide 2001, 3-14.
- ³⁷ Scott Robertson, Dr., “Experimentation and Innovation in the Canadian Forces”, Canadian Military Journal Summer (2000) 66.

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