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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

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Fundamental Concepts: Joint and Combined Campaign Planning

**Legitimacy – A Center of Gravity For
The Information Age**

By /par

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ABSTRACT

Identifying the center of gravity, both that of the enemy and for oneself, is critical to effective campaign plan design. This paper argues that in the particular circumstances of Peace Support Operations (PSO), legitimacy is the center of moral strength, and is thus a center of gravity for both our own forces and those of opposing forces. It further argues that recognizing this fact, and subsequently setting the appropriate conditions in the form of structures, training and operational plans that cater for this notion is essential for mission success in such operations. The essay briefly reviews the historical development of the concept of centers of gravity, examines the nature of conflict most likely for Canadian involvement in the near future, and concludes with some thoughts on the impact of the concept of legitimacy on the commander and operational planner engaged in PSO.

INTRODUCTION

The operational commander should not seek battle so much as a situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this.¹

While nations have always attempted to conduct warfare at the least cost to themselves, the search for a “Silver Bullet”, or the means by which an enemy can be defeated at the minimal cost, continues to take on ever more importance for most westernized, democratic nations. This is due to a combination of the ever increasing worth being placed on human life by such societies, combined with the impact of the information technologies being thrust upon them. In this period of near instant communication, where public perceptions interact with government decisions to a much greater degree than in the past, the military and the political authorities that commit them, strive to find the most economical means to achieve assigned missions. As one of the means of accomplishing this objective, Canadian and allied doctrine, from the tactical level to the strategic, joint and coalition, highlight the importance of determining our own and the enemy centers of gravity, and using these as the basis upon which campaign plans are developed. The rationale for this approach is based on historical development of the concept. It is widely accepted that through proper identification of both friendly and enemy centers of gravity, an effective campaign plan can be developed, incorporating valid decisive points, end states and lines of operation, with the result the enemy being defeated most efficiently. At the same time, protection of our own center of gravity helps ensure that the enemy does not realize this same goal. While it is impossible to argue with this assessment, as is so often the case, the “devil is in the detail”. Planners continue

¹ B.H. Liddell Hart. Strategy, Second Revised Edition, Meridian 1991, p 325.

to experience difficulty, not only agreeing upon how one goes about attacking or protecting the respective centers of gravity, but more fundamentally, how the center of gravity applies to conflict today.

Part of the current problem with identifying and applying the concept of centers of gravity is based upon the confusion that results from the various interpretations of the concept. The result is that there appears to be an associated lack of understanding on the application of this tool by some staff officers. The recent formation of the Joint Operations Group HQ in Kingston, with its theatre activation responsibility, may be instrumental in refining the use of this, and other Canadian operational level planning tools, that to date have largely been paid lip service.² Time will tell, however the fact remains that in Canada, as well as in the United States, staff officers and commanders appear to continue to struggle with this concept.

Uncertainty on this subject has been recognized and continues to be a subject of debate as it applies in a warfighting scenario (the ongoing debates as to the Iraqi strategic and operational center of gravity being one example). However, this debate is even more pronounced in the circumstances found in operations other than war (OOTW), and specifically peace support operations (PSO). While it is accepted that each conflict in which Canada has become involved possesses its own peculiarities, due to the nature of these new forms of conflict, and the circumstances inherent in the age of information, there are also many similarities, in particular as they relate to centers of gravity.

In the past, in operations where armed forces have been deployed in the various forms of a peace support environment, the notion of legitimacy has been viewed as important to the “friendly” forces. More recently, it is becoming apparent that not only is

it important, but fundamental to mission success. Additionally, many of the same arguments can be made to support the selection of legitimacy, albeit defined differently, as an “enemy” center of gravity in PSO.

The notion of legitimacy is the crux of this paper. Based on a brief historical review of the development of this concept, this essay will discuss the relevance of the concept of center of gravity as a planning tool in operations today. It will demonstrate that in the particular circumstances of PSO, viewed as the most likely environment for Canadian Forces participation, the legitimacy should be viewed as both a critical friendly and enemy center of gravity. It will then discuss the implications of selecting this center of gravity at the operational level.

CENTER OF GRAVITY DEFINED

The first task, then, in planning for war is to identify the enemy’s centers of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one.³

The concept of a center of gravity being fundamental to the conduct of operations is not new, and can be traced back to Sun Tzu in his book “The Art of War”. Centuries later both Carl Von Clausewitz (in “On War”) and Jomini (also “The Art of War) further developed the concept in their equally familiar writings. The similarities between Jomini and Clausewitz render comparison between these two as unnecessary, at least with respect to centers of gravity. In comparing the writings of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, while the case can be made that the interpretations differ, as pointed out by Michael Handel they share many similarities. Indeed, as he effectively demonstrates, they have

² Meeting LCol Petryk and JOG J7 Coord/COS 1 Oct 2000.

³ Carl von Clausewitz. On War, Howard-Paret paper edition, Princeton University Press, 1976, p 619.

much in common when one is intimately familiar with the writings as opposed to simply having a superficial understanding.⁴ Thus they both recognize the importance of determining and neutralizing the enemy center of gravity.

However, while they share similarities in this area, there are also significant differences. This disparity can be at least partly attributed to the level from which they assess the concept: Sun Tzu primarily from a strategic perspective, and Clausewitz more from an operational one. These different perspectives explain the focus of Sun Tzu more on diplomacy and Clausewitz on destruction of the enemy. This is most evident when one compares the different objectives when prioritized as potential centers of gravity. While Sun Tzu assesses physical destruction (or at least attack upon) the army or key cities as the third and fourth priorities respectively, Clausewitz views physical attack as a first priority.⁵

Both of the interpretations have value in developing a useful definition of a center of gravity, despite the fact that the writings of Sun Tzu were developed during feudal times, and Clausewitz' focus evolved during the rise of the nation state. Both authors experienced an environment characterized by widespread use of military force in all its forms, including violent total or near total war, and the also war of a more limited nature. While numerous other authors have since further developed the concept in more recent times, each introducing a new or revised interpretation, on the whole the result is a recognition of the durability of the concept in modern times.

Accepting that the concept remains valid, it is appropriate to determine an effective definition upon which to base further discussion of the subject. Dr Joe Strange

⁴ Handel, Michael I. Masters of War, Classical Strategic Thought, Second Revised Edition, Frank Cass, London, Portland Or, 1992, p 17 to 19 and 39 to 42.

presents a very convincing case that the Clausewitz model should be used as the basis for any useful definition. This has validity, particularly when discussing the operational level. He effectively develops the argument that according to Clausewitz, a center of gravity is a **source of moral or physical strength, few in number, and found at each level of war.**⁶ What is important to note, is that there is recognition of the possibility of more than one center of gravity, and that they are equally valid for an enemy or for oneself.

While the concept can be accepted as valid today as in previous conflict, the question that remains is what is the nature of a center of gravity? What distinguishes it, and how can it be utilized? To address these questions, one must better understand the nature of conflict today.

PRESENT AND FUTURE CONFLICT

*Like a man who has been shot in the head, but still manages to stagger forward a few paces, conventional war may be at its last gasp.*⁷

Whether one believes we have entered a period of revolutionary or evolutionary change, one must agree that the development of information technology is rapidly changing the nature of the world we live in. These technologies have had far-reaching effects, more than simply making instant communications possible. The ramifications of the rapid development of computer technology, has brought with it both technological and more importantly cultural changes.

⁵ IBID, p 47.

⁶ Strange, Joe. Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, US Marine Corps University, Quantico Va, 1996, p 24.

⁷ Van Creveld, Martin. The Transformation of War, The Free Press, New York, N.Y., 1991, p205

The Tofflers, among other writers, identify some of the ramifications of these changes brought on by the onset of this “information age”⁸. These characteristics include the breakdown of the traditional nation state, possibly into a much larger number of postnational states; the evolution of transnational companies, now acquiring socioeconomic status, and becoming the real decision-making powers of the future; and the growing influence of global religions, such as Islam. Complicating matters, the pace of events, fostered by faster communications and higher expectations for such information, means that events unfold and demand political actions at an accelerated rate.

The question then, is what will be the characteristic of conflict as it evolves in this period? How can these characteristics be analyzed to determine the potential centers of gravity (or sources of power) that would facilitate either our own or our opponents operations in this environment as was accomplished in the past. Wars of the early feudal period can be viewed as a contest of muscle power, fought on behalf of rulers. Wars during the rise of the nation state were contests of mass, fought on behalf of the state. During both periods wars were of a limited or total nature. Strategic aims, and by extension the operational plans, reflected the different natures of these natures of conflicts. In the case of total wars, where continued existence of the state was at stake, centers of gravity tended to be physical in nature; the army itself most commonly.⁹ In the case of limited wars, those primarily of the written on by Sun Tzu, centers of gravity were of the moral nature. What then will be the nature of centers of gravity in the conflict of the information age?

⁸ Toffler, Alvin and Heidi. War and Anti War, Little Brown and Co, Canada, 1993, pp241-247.

⁹ Clausewitz, p 485_486.

While the quote following the title to this section may be premature, depending upon how one defines the term “conventional”, it might not be quite as far from accurate as first thought. It is becoming more and more likely that conflict, as previously typified known, is becoming less likely. In the Future Security Environment¹⁰, wars between nation states, organized and equipped in a similar manner, and conducting operations according to their written doctrine and international rules, is not perceived as the most conflict scenario involving Canadian troops. This does not imply that such conflicts are not a possibility, rather that it is logical to assume that operations other than war will continue to command greatest attention and effort. Such a sentiment is reinforced by Wm. J. Olson who predicts that the major source of future security problems will arise as a result of unstable states, particularly due to their difficulties in governability:

*The majority of problems in the future, as in the past, that will levy demands of our attention are likely to occur in various parts of the developing world, in Asia, Latin America, Africa, the Caribbean and now states arising from the ruins of the Soviet empire.*¹¹

In her recent book¹², New and Old Wars, Mary Kalder express a similar sentiment, but relates it to the changes brought about by the technology. She contends that conflict of today, and the near future, must be seen in the context of “globalization”, brought about by the interconnectedness of the world as a whole. She goes on to state that the implications of this globalization will be the rise of “new wars”, as the autonomy of states disintegrates as a result of the technology available. Kalder describes these new

¹⁰ The Future Security Environment. Report No 99-2. Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts. Kingston: August 1999. On this subject this report states “View 2 conflict is asymmetric conflict. This type of conflict envisions the nation state opposed by armed bodies that are not necessarily armed forces, directed by social entities that are not necessarily states. It is the most common types of conflict.... Over 33 such conflicts are going on today.

¹¹ Olson, Wm. J. A New World a New Challenge, “Managing Contemporary Conflict”, Westview Press, Boulder Co, 1996, p 4.

wars as those where there is a blurring of the distinction between war, organized crime and large-scale human rights violations. Old wars were ideological or territorial based. New wars will largely pit those who are part of the global process (cosmopolitan), be they national or transnational, responding to actions initiated by those whose beliefs are grounded in identity politics, or those claiming power based on a particular identity – national, clan, religious or linguistic. The increasing number “hot spots” in Africa in particular, typify this.

These “new wars” (referring not only to those of the future, but also those presently underway) are different from wars of the past. Identity based groups will have members comprising a variety of types, including paramilitary, criminal gangs, police and even regular army units. Their strategies are based on the experience of guerilla warfare and counterinsurgency. They will be armed with an array of light accurate weapons, which are easy to use and incorporate advanced technology. However, they also have differences. While they will look to avoid battle, unlike guerrillas they will seek to control the population by eliminating those not of a shared political identity. This will be achieved through killing and other forms of intimidation, with the resulting large numbers of refugees and displaced persons¹³. Kosovo and Rwanda are two recent and extreme examples of the type of conflicts in which it is probable that Canadian troops will continue to be placed, with the ultimate aim of conflict resolution.

Canadian Forces doctrine recognizes these types of operations under the very broad heading of Peace Support Operations.¹⁴ The term encompasses many facets,

¹² Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 1999, pp 1-10.

¹³ Kalder. p 8

¹⁴ B_GG_005_004/AF_000, Canadian Forces Operations, 15 May 1997, p 10_1.

including the concepts of peace making, peace keeping and peace building, to name a few. The tasks performed may well take place during periods that amount to war, but at the same time, there will be the need to carry out tasks that resemble policing. Therefore, those participating must have a range of capabilities and skills akin to those of both policeman and soldier. While this very broad title for the nature of operations being conducted today, and likely to be conducted in the foreseeable future is not indicative of the wide range of activities it comprises, for simplicity the term PSO will be accepted to apply to the used to describe these activities.

Accepting that there are differences in the nature of conflicts that will most likely involve Canadian troops, it must also be accepted that the environment in which this takes place has similarities. Understanding these similarities helps guide the search for centers of gravity. The next step is therefore to determine the source of moral or physical strength of belligerents in such conflicts. Similarly, can we determine what are our own sources of strength are in such circumstances? In a recent monograph, Major L Marich conducted an analysis of three OOTW involving US military forces¹⁵. In addition to validating the concept of centers of gravity as a planning tool in OOTW, based on a study of Lebanon, Dominican Republic and Haiti, he developed a “Generic Centers of Gravity Aide Memoire”. This aide memoire identified the centers of gravity for the various components of national power: diplomatic, economic, military and informational. Interestingly enough, of the eight potential centers of gravity (friendly and enemy for each component of national power), legitimacy was identified in five cases. While this

¹⁵ Marich, Lou L. Centers of Gravity in OOTW: Useful Tool or Black Hole. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1995.

assessment was at the strategic level, it can equally be applied at the operational level as well.

LEGITIMACY DEFINED

Conversely, in limited wars, and operations other than war, might has most often had to be right to be successful, and civilian support has often been the difference between success and failure.¹⁶

So what then is legitimacy? Legitimacy as a notion has numerous connotations. Traditionally, it has been associated with one's own operation, and thus has been variously considered a principle, a fundamental and even a center of gravity in PSO. It is currently viewed as fundamental in current US Joint doctrine, and is considered one of the principles of operations other than war. Joint Publication 3_07, Joint Operations for Military Operations Other Than War makes this clear stating "committed forces must maintain the legitimacy of the operation, and of the host government where applicable."¹⁷

This publication further states that legitimacy is a "condition" which is based on the perception of the rightness of the action, and still later "that it is bestowed by the population".¹⁸

I maintain that legitimacy is not only a principle, but that it is the fundamental source of all strength. Rudolph Barnes reflects this same sentiment to some extent when dealing with the subject of legitimacy in his book Military Legitimacy, Might and Right in the New Millennium. In prioritizing the principles for OOTW and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Barnes lists legitimacy as number one in both instances.¹⁹ Central to

¹⁶ Barnes, Rudolph C. Jr. Military Legitimacy, Might and Right in the New Millennium, Frank Cass, Portland Oregon, 1996, p 231.

¹⁷ Joint Publication 3_07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, The Joint Chiefs of Staff June 1995, p11_5.

¹⁸ Ibid, p 11_5.

¹⁹ Barnes, p 61.

Barnes thesis is that in limited wars in particular, the essence of legitimacy is the principle of rightness being done and seen to be done by the population. He maintains that legitimacy provides the moral authority, and that it is this authority that allows the one the right to act.²⁰ I believe that, without such an underpinning, PSO missions in the future are as likely to fail as to succeed.

In her book, Kalder identifies another aspect of legitimacy (which she views as fundamental) as the key to the control of violence in the new wars of which she wrote. Similar to Barnes, she asserts that “power rests on legitimacy, not violence”²¹, with legitimacy referring to support for political institutions, and such institutions being founded on law. Her contention is that solutions to the many ongoing crises, will, in the end have to come from within the cultures themselves. While she goes on to describe the political and strategic changes that need to be made, it is suggested that the sentiment is equally valid and should be effected at the operational level today.

This opinion evokes an interesting concept. I would argue that it is the lack of legitimacy of governments in many of the current and future trouble spots, that provides the various hostile factions their “power” to operate in the manner in which they do. In such cases it is **lack of legitimacy** on the part of authority that must be seen as one of the enemies major centers of gravity in future operations. Defeating the enemy will depend to a great extent of eliminating this lack of legitimacy. It must be made clear that this legitimacy must be seen in the context of conflicts resulting from the increasing reliance placed on violence by a minority attempting to impose their will on the majority. This is where efforts must be focused to bolster the legitimacy of legal authority.

²⁰ Ibid, p 53.

²¹ Kalder, p 114.

The difference between this understanding of legitimacy and that previously discussed, is that in this latter case it is not our own legitimacy that is in question. Rather it is the efforts needed to recognize and legitimize lawful authority of the state itself. While some of the aspects of this notion will be further developed, at this point, it is sufficient to note that at the operational level, efforts to attack the enemy center of gravity must be aimed at recognizing, developing, and supporting legitimate authority. As attributed to Hannah Arendt:

No government exclusively based on the means of violence has ever existed ... Single men without others to support them never have enough power to use violence successfully. Hence, in domestic affairs, violence functions as the last resort of power against criminals or rebels – which is against single individuals, who as it were, refuse to be overpowered by the consensus of the majority. And, as for actual warfare, ... an enormous superiority in the means of violence can become helpless if confronted with an ill-equipped but well organized opponent who is much more powerful.²²

APPLICATION OF CENTERS OF GRAVITY AT THE CANADIAN OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The identification of the enemy's center of gravity, and the single-minded focus on the sequence of actions needed to expose and neutralize it, are the essence of the operational art²³

Current Canadian, and most allied doctrine, highlight the importance of centers of gravity, and as indicated by the quote above, the concept is intended to play a prominent role in the planning processes at the operational level. Despite this apparent importance, however, there is little evidence that it has been effectively utilized in the planning for recent Canadian operations. This may have as much to do with the fact that despite rejuvenation (or the initiation) of the operational level, Canadian operations are primarily

²² Kalder, pp 114

in coalition settings. As a result, Canadian concerns have been limited to either the strategic or tactical levels. At the strategic level, where national political direction is converted to military strategic aims, the focus is primarily on setting the conditions that facilitate the tactical level realizing the operational tasks that are assigned by a non Canadian superior HQ. As a result, planning staffs have focused on issues such as command and control, force structure, Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO & E), training, deployment, rules of engagement, and the plethora of administrative and logistic matters, rather than the development of campaign plans. Canadian tactical contingents have routinely been placed under the operational control of coalition HQs, where the questions as to how, when and where to engage decisively the enemy, the concerns of the operational level campaign planner, have been determined. Thus the question as to whether or not the Canadian Forces as an entity will ever be in the position of developing operational level plans is a valid one. There are, however, valid grounds to develop this ability in Canadian officers. As evidenced by recent examples in Rwanda and Bosnia, Canadian commanders and staffs have been, and can expect to continue to be, intimately involved in the planning and conduct of such missions. The potential exists for Canada to assume lead nation status in similar such activities in the future. It is therefore prudent to assume that a capability to understand and apply such concepts at the operational level is necessary. With this in mind, what are the implications on the strategic and operational level planners of the identification of the notion of legitimacy as a potential center of gravity?

²³ B-GG-005-004/AF-000, Canadian Forces Operations. Issued on the Authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff. May 1997.

The development of both natures of legitimacy requires a concerted effort of all components of national and international power, and it is recognized that the military is not and should not be the major player in many of these activities. I see three major areas that have impact on the strategic and more importantly the operational level commanders and planners that evolve from identification of legitimacy as centers of gravity. These are the mental approach of commanders, staffs and soldiers; the organizational capabilities that it demands and the training implied by both of the above.

Elemental to the proposal of selecting and applying the concept legitimacy as a center of gravity is the mental approach that must be adopted. Commanders, staffs and those executing plans must first recognize that legitimacy has relevance as a center of gravity. This is a function of leadership that must be properly articulated to all members of the mission. Without the acceptance of this fact, the lack of unity of effort towards attacking and more importantly protecting legitimacy will not be achieved.

The importance of the actions of individual soldiers in such an environment must be well understood. All must be aware that actions at the lowest level can have implications on legitimacy, out of proportion to the act itself. Central to this factor is training, and this will be covered in more detail in a following section.

Fundamental to the mental approach is the acceptance that the nature of such operations is not a short-term endeavor. As pointed out by Lieutenant General Dallaire, it must be with the understanding that success will likely only be measured in the longer term.²⁴ The impact of this reality is significant. Milestones need to be placed in perspective; it is not reasonable to expect changes in one tour, or for that matter even two

or more. Commanders, planners and operators must accept they will probably not see the fruits of their labours. Commanders cannot allow this fact to influence the selection and prosecution of plans (lines of operations) concerning this center of gravity. In the past, the six-month tour syndrome has too frequently resulted in fixation on the short term, at the expense of longer-term initiatives. Commanders must not only guard against this, but also actively promote plans that are longer term in nature.

The mental approach also implies a different style of leadership. Barnes refers to this as the “Diplomatic Warrior”.²⁵ He sees a style of leadership more dependent upon knowledge and the power of persuasion, with leaders able to motivate others, both military and civilian without raising hostility.

This is particularly pertinent for Canada. Most international operations that the Canadian Forces will participate in will be of a coalition nature²⁶; coalition in the case of PSO refers to both the groupings of both other nations’ militaries, as well as international, governmental, non-governmental and private organizations. In such instances, the aims and missions can often be at odds with one another. The ability to garner cooperation in such an environment is critical.

The goal in these cases must be an “integrated campaign plan”, one that achieves the maximum degree of coordination from the outset. This goal is applicable at every level, indeed articulation of such plans must be seen as essential to the operational and even tactical commanders from the outset.

²⁴ Dallaire, Romeo, LGen. “Command Experience In Rwanda”, *The Human in Command*, ed Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau, Kluwer Academic, Plenum Publishers, New York, New York, 2000, p41.

²⁵ Barnes, p 107.

²⁶ CF Operations, pp1-8.

Developing such plans will not be an easy task. Commanders must not only focus on attacking the enemy center of gravity through creating the necessary actions that legitimize the authority of legal government. At the same time, plans must be designed that allow for the fact that there may not be complete unity of purpose between the various participants. Therefore in some instances, it must be accepted that the best that can be achieved will be non-interference with the ultimate aim of attacking the lack of legitimacy. Such efforts require a concerted effort of all components of national and international power, and it is recognized that the military is not, and cannot be the major player on many of the activities. However, the nature of military involvement in such operations, characterized early establishment in the theatre, available communications and infrastructure, and not insignificantly the capability for organization and coordination, make the military the appropriate element to undertake this activity, at least in the early stages. This is particularly the case at the tactical levels, even down to the lowest such levels. It should not be considered unrealistic to expect unit and possible even sub unit commanders developing integrated “campaign” plans that incorporate all the elements of power in their own area of operations. The challenge will be developing such plans that are all in accordance with the theatre (operational JTFC) intent. Training is therefore fundamental.

Planners must understand how to define and then focus on activities that support legitimacy, both our own, and that of the appropriate authority. The lines of operation that support (or rather attack) the enemy center of gravity are focused on Information Operations, in particular CIMIC, Legal, and PSYOPS. The lines of operations that

impact on our own center of gravity are related to situational awareness, Public Affairs, training and sustainability. HUMINT is fundamental to both.

Several capabilities have been mentioned as key to the notion of legitimacy as a center of gravity, and planners need to re visit how contingents are organized, manned and equipped. Some of these capabilities are ones where Canada has traditionally been weak; others are in areas where we have demonstrated a strong, although limited in relative scope, competence.

Based on the emphasis that needs to be placed on influencing opinion in the attempt to provide legitimacy to lawful authorities, additional emphasis on the ability to conduct CIMIC, particularly with regards to coordinating the activities of the various participants is required. In the past this has largely been an “ad hoc” manned function. The importance of this activity justifies specific recruitment, training and possibly consideration of even a specific career field. The nature of this task suggests CIMIC personnel not follow the same posting restrictions as other mission members. Continuity, in the form of knowledge of other government departments, non governmental organizations and private volunteer organizations, the importance of well developed personal contacts, and the long term nature of projects themselves, suggests longer tour lengths, and repeated such employment in this field.

While PSYOPS has not been a well-utilized capability by Canadian units in the past, this capability must be revitalized if it is to be used to effectively attack the legitimacy center of gravity. This needs to be integrated with Public Affairs. For all three of these activities, a detailed review of the doctrine, manning, training and equipment to support operations is necessary.

Legal officers can have a greater impact on PSO than has been the case. As a Reserve lawyer, Barnes deals with this subject at length.²⁷ From a Canadian perspective, the major point that has application, is the use of legal officers not only as advisors to national contingents on rules of law, but also the untapped possibility of using legal officers to advise civilian authorities in emerging democracies on human rights, democracy etc. This has vast potential, but also invites significant debate. It is an area that would justify more detailed review.

The last aspect is that of training. This would wrongly be considered a strategic initiative, as it has application at all levels. There are significant training concerns at the strategic level that need to be addressed to support the capabilities outlined above, and this will not be further developed. There are however, two other primary natures of training that are critical at the operational: leadership training and individual soldier training to prepare for such operations.

The individual soldier must understand the reason for their particular tasks, and more importantly acknowledge the potential consequences of behavior, particularly in this time of the media microscope. Detailed and ongoing training in cultural awareness, application of ROE, language, and others have proven to be effective in Bosnia, but have also proven to be insufficient particularly when initiating new missions. A more effective means of determining the training requirement for new missions must be developed. As attributed to Gen Dallaire²⁸, this type of activity is more difficult than warfighting, and we must train our soldiers and leaders to be able to operate in such an environment.

²⁷ Barnes, p 174_176.

²⁸ Dallaire, p 31.

While warfighting skills are important, they need to be supplemented by more effective training in the areas of cultural awareness, collecting HUMINT and other related skills.

Lastly, training of leaders. The training of leaders on legitimacy cannot wait until the months preceding a deployment. Training in the code of conduct, application of ROE, CIMIC, negotiating, human rights among others needs to be incorporated into the training of officers from commissioning and onwards. As a result of recent operations, the Army is making positive steps in many of these areas, in particular in training in the laws of armed conflict. Many of the other areas have become mission dependant, with the resulting steep learning curve, and limitations on knowledge. It remains to be seen in the future how this, as well as the approach of the Air Force and Navy, has on the effectiveness of our leaders, not only at the operational level, but the tactical as well.

CONCLUSION

Thus, one able to gain victory by modifying his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation, may be said to be divine.²⁹

Maintaining legitimacy, conceded to us not only by the adversary, but also the population, allies and the home front, provides our forces the necessary freedom of action to complete assigned missions. It therefore must be recognized as a friendly center of gravity and protected as such. At the same time, it is offered that legitimacy is equally an enemy center of gravity, albeit of a different nature. In this case it is the lack of legitimacy that is the source of strength of the opposing forces, primarily in the context of PSO.

There are numerous implications on the operational and strategic level planners of acknowledging these centers of gravity. Developing and sustaining legitimacy will take a

²⁹ Sun Tzu, p101

concerted effort, not only by the military component but all participants in international missions. However, the military plays a major role through the application of CIMIC, PSYOPS and aggressive public affairs campaign. Appropriate plans, with valid decisive points, and that are coordinated with the other coalition partners is critical. At the same time protection of the friendly center of gravity is also critical and is achieved through proper training resulting in a better informed focus on the part of soldiers. Additionally, a level of situational awareness, beyond that previously able to be developed, must also be developed. This will depend upon new procedures, equipments and equally importantly, training in many new skills.

Incorporating the concept of legitimacy, both as a friendly and enemy center of gravity, at the operational, strategic or even both levels should be considered in all PSO. It is suggested and contributes to the development of more effective and valid campaign plans.

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