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Command: Positions for Citizen-Soldiers?

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Command: Positions for Citizen-Soldiers?

Abstract

The following paper discusses the human capabilities required to command as identified by Dr Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, in an attempt to provide answers to the questions of what is it that distinguishes commanders from other leaders in society and enables them to command their troops effectively? What are those special capabilities that a commander needs to be successful?; where are they found?; can they be developed through life in general or only through service in the regular component of the armed forces? Using their Competency, Authority and Responsibility (CAR) structure to guide an analysis of the human capabilities as they are perceived in the armed forces, it also looks at the same capabilities, or their equivalents, in the business environment and explain their similarities with those of the armed forces. Through a small number of examples it then explains that the characteristics required in the future are more likely to be developed in the business environment, concluding that the armed forces must find ways to tap in that pool of competent manpower. The ensuing quick look at history highlights the career of successful citizen-soldiers, demonstrating that the source of their success was the merging of their civilian capabilities and their involvement with the Reserve Force. Lastly, bringing all of the above together, this paper demonstrates that the human capabilities required to command exist in the business world and can be brought into the armed forces whenever required, particularly through the use of reservists.

Command: Positions for Citizen-Soldiers?

*“Permanent forces were needed, desperately so,
but so, too, were the one-night-a-week
Militiamen”*

Jack Granatstein

Introduction

For centuries the question of what is required for commanders to succeed has been studied by many. What is it that distinguishes them from other leaders in society and enables them to command their troops effectively? At the same time, year after year members of the NATO Confédération Interalliée des Officiers de Réserve¹ have indicated that their respective Regular or Permanent Force colleagues often assume that the command capabilities of reservists are inferior to their own.² Which raises questions such as what are those special capabilities that a commander needs to be successful; where are they found; can they be developed through life in general or only through service in the regular component of the armed forces?

In an effort to answer the above questions this paper will discuss the human capabilities required to command as identified by Dr Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. It will use the Competency, Authority and Responsibility (CAR) structure³ they developed to guide an analysis of the human capabilities as they are perceived in the armed forces. It will look at the same capabilities, or their equivalents, in the business environment and explain their similarities with those of the armed forces. Through a small number of

examples it will then describe that the characteristics required in the future are more likely to be developed in the business environment.

A quick look at history will also highlight the career of successful citizen-soldiers, demonstrating that the source of their success was the merging of their civilian capabilities and their involvement with the Reserve Force. Lastly, bringing all of the above together, this paper will demonstrate that the human capabilities required to command exist in the business world and can be brought into the armed forces whenever required, particularly through the use of reservists.

The Commander

Before getting into the analysis of the human capabilities required for command, it is essential to start by defining what command is. Again there has been a large number of definitions of command through the years. All types of experts have tried to explain what command is, some with success, others with difficulties. Van Creveld, for one, warns us, somewhat bleakly, that “Command being so intimately bound with numerous other factors that shape the war, the pronouncement of one or more “master principles” that should govern its structure and the way it operates is impossible”.⁴ Slim, on the other hand, describes command as “an intensely personal affair”.⁵ Still many others explain that command works two ways; first as the authority vested in an individual and second as the action of exercising that command.⁶ In order to maintain consistency throughout, this paper will use the term command as the combination of an official position within a

military organization and a person filling that position as described by Pigeau and McCann.⁷

Next, there is a need to define what the function comprises before looking at the human capabilities required to accomplish his or her tasks. What is a commander? While Pigeau and McCann, as indicated above, define a commander “as a position/person combination... with special powers to enforce discipline and put military members in harm’s way”⁸, the Canadian Forces (CF) Force Employment manual provides more details to help complete the definition. It indicates that commanders possess authority and responsibility with regard to their assigned forces; commanders have a responsibility to make decisions, issue orders and monitor the execution of assigned tasks; and ultimately commanders possess the freedom and duty to enforce discipline and impose their will on their subordinates.⁹

The Manager

To many people command is considered to be the military equivalent of what the civilian calls management.¹⁰ Management involves deciding what needs to be done, creating networks and relationships that can accomplish the agenda, and then trying to ensure people actually do the job.¹¹ Companies manage situations by planning, setting a vision and developing strategies for producing the changes required by the vision. They create an organizational structure to support the plan, select qualified individuals, delegate responsibilities. They communicate the plan to those individuals and ensure the

accomplishment of the plan by controlling, solving problems and monitoring the results.¹² It should all sound very familiar to the reader.

As can be seen from the above descriptions, there are a lot of similarities between the commander and the manager's responsibilities: authority and responsibilities over the assigned personnel/forces; make decisions/plan; issue orders/communicate the plan; control; and monitor the results. Therefore, it can be maintained that the managers in the civilian sector often have responsibilities similar to the commanders in the military. These tasks and responsibilities will be used in the following discussion to determine the human capabilities required and to demonstrate that most of them are available, or can be developed, in both the military and the business worlds. The fact that there is no equivalent for the commander's role in enforcing discipline, imposing their will on their subordinates and taking them in harm's way will also be addressed.

The Human Capabilities

With a clearer understanding of what a commander or a manager is, it should be easier to proceed with the analysis of the human capabilities required to accomplish the tasks and missions they would be responsible for. The CAR structure of Pigeau and McCann's describing competency, authority and responsibility,¹³ will provide the framework. But it is also essential to understand that leadership is an integral part of both command and management because it will not be explicitly addressed as such in the following descriptions. On the civilian side it is said that "Leadership complements

management; it doesn't replace it."¹⁴ Slim, for his part, holds that "Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision –its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, statistics, methods, timetables and routine – its practice a science."¹⁵ Both the art and the science are required where human resources are involved and it is an unquestionable fact that both the commander and the manager deal with human resources.

The first block of the CAR structure is Competency. Physical, intellectual, emotional and interpersonal competencies are described as the abilities required to accomplish the missions successfully.¹⁶ They include the qualities that Slim refers to as eloquence, will-power, judgement, flexibility of mind, knowledge and integrity,¹⁷ Montgomery as initiative, moral courage, and confidence¹⁸ and the CF manual entitled *Command* as leadership, professional knowledge, vision and intellect, judgement and esprit de corps, resolve and integrity.¹⁹ Most of them are straight-forward and well understood in the armed forces but nonetheless they are crucial for one to command effectively.

In the business world they are referred to as adaptability, flexibility, cross-cultural sensitivity, and interpersonal skills.²⁰ Management and career consultants such as Beverly Geber claim that flexibility, interpersonal skills, adaptability and knowledge of business are key success factors for managers.²¹ A description of the human side of management in the *Harvard Business Review on Leadership* describes management arts as including strategy, persuasion, negotiation, writing, speaking and listening.²²

Managers should demonstrate qualities such as vision, fortitude, passion, sensitivity, commitment, insight, intelligence, ethical standards, charisma, luck, courage and even from time to time humility.²³ In the end there is very little difference with the qualities expected of a military commander.

From the research, though, it is obvious that so far not enough attention has been devoted to some of the specific skills required. To start with, in the works reviewed, there is almost nothing on physical competency as a military attribute required for commanders. That is not surprising because the common assumption is that members of the military are usually physically fit; however, physical competency is more than physical strength because it also involves sophisticated sensory motor skills, good health, agility and endurance.²⁴ Current managers agree that all these qualities are also required in the civilian environment.²⁵

Communication skills are another aspect that requires emphasis. Communication – both in terms of what information is passed on to subordinates and how well it is done – has an enormous impact on the workplace, be it military or civilian. Sharing information is vital.²⁶ When well done, communication will motivate as well as inspire confidence but it is not just a one-way tool. Until recently there was a tendency to listen up and speak down and now more efforts are put into listening down and speaking up. Processing information is a key part of a manager's job. They often spend 40% of their contact time on activities devoted exclusively to the transmission of information.²⁷ In the

armed forces, communication skills have recently been included in the Officer General Specifications at all levels.²⁸

The other aspect of communication skills is the requirement to deal with the media. Tom Goodwin, president of Goodwin & Co., Washington D.C. points out that “today’s (manager) has to be savvy about media- both print and electronic” as one of the competencies he is looking for in a manager.²⁹ The same is applicable in the armed forces. The fact that commanders must be aware of the need to maintain a positive relationship with the media³⁰ is not quite enough. They must be able to deal with all aspects of media relations and, like their civilian counterpart, they must become “savvy” about the media. Although dealing with the media has been part of officers’ courses for a long time, only recently has emphasis been put on ensuring that commanders get more comfortable in front of a camera or a microphone.³¹

The *Harvard Business Review on Leadership* when discussing the human side of management indicates that “great managers are distinguished by something more than insight, integrity, leadership and imagination and that something more (part of it is tenacity; much of the rest is plain courage) bears a close resemblance to heroism.”³² Military commanders have often been admired for their courage and a lot of them, through historical times, have been considered heroes. From the comparisons made above and these last few lines it is reasonable to conclude that the same competencies are required and developed in both in the civilian and military worlds.

In its description of Authority the CAR structure offers two distinct components, personal authority and legal authority. The two together describe the degree in which a commander is empowered to act.³³ While the personal authority is the authority given informally to an individual by peers and subordinates, the legal authority is the power to act as assigned by a formal agency, typically a government.³⁴ Both the commander and the manager are empowered with personal authority which is described as an empowerment coming from the confidence of others as well as being nothing more than the granting of authority equal to the responsibility.³⁵ Managers will add that, on top of being accountable to their superiors, they are also accountable to society legally, ethically, morally and socially.³⁶ Both then are also empowered with legal authorities but those of the commander go well beyond that of any private organization. These powers are the key to distinguishing commander positions from managerial positions.

The armed forces describe these special powers by stating that the commander possesses “authority and responsibility with regards to their assigned forces, and are accountable, while in command, to their superiors and the nation”.³⁷ However, they “ultimately, possess the freedom and duty to enforce discipline and enforce their will on subordinates.”³⁸ As well, because “Militaries have the authority to enforce obedience among their members and, more importantly, (the militaries) can knowingly put their members in harm’s way.”³⁹ Therein lies the main difference between the two positions. There is no equivalent in the business world and neither should there be.

And, finally, Responsibility is the last block of the CAR structure. The extrinsic (external) responsibilities and intrinsic (internal) responsibilities describe the degree to which an individual accepts the liabilities commensurate with his or her position as commander or manager.⁴⁰ In the business environment it is perceived that the manager is ultimately responsible for every decision and action of every member of the company, including those decisions and actions that they are not aware of.⁴¹ Effective managers understand the source of their own power: they use it thoughtfully, judiciously and appropriately to influence other people's actions and to achieve goals.⁴²

Being responsible for the outcome of how well people perform is also a requirement in the armed forces. As explained in the CF Force Employment manual: "Commanders have the responsibility to make decisions, issue orders and monitor the execution of the assigned tasks... Consequently they are responsible for the health, welfare, morale and discipline of personnel, as well as the state of the equipment within their command."⁴³ They are also responsible for the decisions and actions of their subordinates under the National Defence Act⁴⁴ and the Law of Armed Conflicts.⁴⁵ Therefore the commander assumes the responsibility for all that his or her unit does or fails to do.⁴⁶ Once again a close match between the responsibility of the manager and the commander has been established.

This brief review of the commander's and manager's human capabilities has illustrated the fact that most of the capabilities required for an effective commander are the same as the ones required for an effective manager, with only one exception. The

Competencies may vary in the way they are described but by and large they encompass the same basic elements. As well, the same level of Responsibility exists in the two worlds because both are responsible for their subordinates and accountable to their superiors. Therefore the only major difference between a commander and a manager resides in the “special powers” within the legal authority, that a commander has over the discipline and the lives of his or her subordinates. Pigeau and McCann go as far as saying that “without these qualifiers (*special powers*), any executive from any civilian organization could call him or herself a commander.”⁴⁷

The Future

While researching the above capabilities it became obvious that things are changing. The so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) is already affecting commanders at all levels and will continue to do so for many years to come. Although the way wars will be fought in the future will be different because of these changes, it is expected that the described basic competencies will always remain necessary for an effective commander to accomplish his or her mission.⁴⁸ It is also certain that with the different types of missions, more constabulary oriented, and the new technology under development, more skills and capabilities will be required. In that respect, General Roméo Dallaire reminds us that “The skills required for peace support operations demand a much broader range and depth of knowledge and a much richer set of experiences”. He goes on to say that: “Militaries must ensure that their personnel also develop linguistic, cultural and analytic skills that are unique to peace support operations-

skills that are not currently taught in military education and training program.”⁴⁹ This is but one example of the new way of doing business in the armed forces.

If effective management is achieved in part through the adaptation of new techniques⁵⁰ and if commanding is indeed just another version of managing (less the commander’s special powers), it is then essential to devote more efforts towards the enhancement of these new techniques. For example, the communication and Information Technology (IT) advancements are already at the forefront of the business world but not quite so much in the armed forces. The way General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), handled things in Kosovo seemed revolutionary to some. They were astonished with the fact that: “It was a virtual war, fought in video-conference rooms, using target folders flashed on screens, and all that Clark saw of the rush of battle was the gun-camera footage sent every night on secure Internet systems to his Headquarters in Belgium.”⁵¹ Video-conferencing, tele-team, Internet imagery and distance management is already an integral part of the way business is done in a lot of civilian companies.

It is said that the Kosovo Conflict was won by technicians and a “virtuoso display of technical improvisation.”⁵² Because of this, and other RMA implications, the armed forces are now starting to realize that this is the way of the future. Very soon improvisation will not be enough. Only the employment of commanders with a sound knowledge of IT and telecommunication will ensure that future battles are won. Because they are regularly exposed to these new methods through their civilian employment a

large number of these specialists are already available outside the armed forces. The American forces have realized that in the future many military technologists will have to be drawn from civilian universities⁵³ but the armed forces can hardly compete with the salaries offered in industry.

Another example of future requirements, is communication with the media. More and more it is alleged that the future commanders should regard the media as an asset, not as an impediment, to the mission. They should consider the media a tool to be used with caution and respect. Commanders must become comfortable with having cameras and microphones thrust in their faces.⁵⁴ The business world has been aware of the need to maintain good relationships with the media for a long time and have always insisted that their managers be good communicators, quick on their feet and not scared of a camera or a microphone. On the other hand the military is just now starting to train its commanders to react to this type of scrutiny. Again media savvy managers are already available in the civilian world.

It is also said that “the speed and tempo of future battles will require flattened organizations with fewer echelons in the chains of command.”⁵⁵ Technology will also play a hand in this foreseen dramatic change because with faster information technology faster decisions will be possible.⁵⁶ “This trend will drive hierarchical organizations in becoming more networked and centralized; control yielding to decentralized control”.⁵⁷ In this regard the military falls short with its old fashion hierarchy at a time when major changes flattening the organizations are already happening in the business world.⁵⁸ Very

much like the current manager the future commander may see himself or herself as controlling only in the sense of directing a cooperative problem-solving effort.⁵⁹

The above represent only a few examples of the future requirements. There are obviously more aspects to consider. With the need to avoid casualties at all cost and the fact that it is now impossible to look at a military victory as a “violent, overwhelming force, swiftly applied,”⁶⁰ different ways of doing business are required. The mo

For example, General Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain of the US Civil War was an entrepreneur, a teacher, a College President and a Governor in Maine in times of peace but when the need arose he was also a military man.⁶² He was considered an extraordinary man and one of the finest leaders in military history because of his relationship with his men, his dedication to a cause he believed in, and his continual self improvement.⁶³

Closer to home Lieutenant-General Howard Graham also had a great career that took him all the way to Chief of the General Staff. As described by Colonel George E. Renison in the epilogue of his book *Citizen and Soldier*: “Howard Graham was a man of humble origins who became one of Canada’s most distinguished soldiers, a man who was equally at home in the field with his troops, in the law court of Ontario, in boardrooms of business...”⁶⁴ During the First World War (WW I) he served as a private and between the two wars he became a lawyer, a politician and a Militia Officer. He attended the Reserve Force Advanced Staff Course before being called out for the Second World War (WW II). At the end of the war he decided to stay in the Army because he was convinced that he would be, “successful because of (my) wide range of experience in the Militia, in command and staff appointment during the war and, of some importance, (my) civilian background.”⁶⁵

Another great Canadian General was Sir Arthur Currie who commanded the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France during WW I from June 1917 until the end of

the war. Why was Currie such a great commander? Part of the answer lies in the fact that his business experience was in a relatively small, free-wheeling personal operations with little or no assistance from others.⁶⁶ Furthermore he had been a reservist and had attended the Militia Staff Course. He also had experience with the 5th Regiment of Artillery, a Militia unit, as well as with command of a Militia infantry battalion.⁶⁷ Because of all that he was known to have a flair for recognizing talent in others; a flair for efficient organization; and perhaps most important of all, a really sound knowledge of the mechanisms of war.⁶⁸

And what to say of General Bruce Matthews and General Bert Hoffmeister, whom the historian Jack Granatstein refers to as Militia Successes?⁶⁹ Bruce Matthews while working for his father's firm joined the Militia in 1928. He completed the Militia Staff Course and was a Major when he was sent overseas for WW II, where he went through a number of Artillery appointments before commanding the Royal Artillery, 1st Canadian Division as a Brigadier. After Italy, Normandy and the Scheldt Estuary he was promoted to the rank of Major-General and took command of the 2nd Infantry Division.⁷⁰ Bert Hoffmeister was also a Major in the Militia when he went overseas with the Seaforths as part of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and ended up commanding the 5th Canadian Armour Division. After commanding the division-strong Canadian Army Pacific during the last days of the war, he went back to civilian life to become the Chairman of McMillan and Bloedel.⁷¹

Merging Civilian and Military Capabilities

The previous represents just a few examples of what can be achieved when merging civilian capabilities with military exposure. Four out of the five mentioned had obtained their previous military exposure through the Militia. They were not the only ones merging civilian and military capabilities to great effect. Many more citizen-soldiers became commanders during WW II. That fact was brought out to light for the first time in 1945, when Charles Foulkes, talking about the “Contribution of Canada’s Citizen Army,” offered a few statistics supporting his statement that “the non-permanent active militia had produced the vast majority of Canada’s wartime commanders.” Surprisingly for some, and not quite so for others, 60% of the Division Commanders, 75% of Brigade Commanders and 90% of the Commanding officers came from what he then referred to as the Citizen Force.⁷²

Men in the first half of the twentieth century enjoyed considerable experience of war at different levels. Unfortunately that reservoir no longer exists⁷³ and with the number of regular or permanent members of today’s armed forces unlikely to grow anytime soon, different sources of personnel must be considered to meet the future command requirements of the armed forces. Through the examples of the commanders mentioned above and the eloquence of Foulkes’ statistics it has been clearly established that the use of reservists worked very well in the past. It should work even better now since today’s reservists often spend days and years in positions of responsibility where the new, or extra, manager/commander’s capabilities exist already or are being

developed. They are part of that competent pool of personnel that, as established earlier, the military must tap in.

Through their civilian employment reservists are regularly exposed to the new technology and new ways of doing business that will become essential in the military of the future. At the same time through their part-time military service they acquire a degree of military expertise that will ensure they are prepared for times of conflict when they will take on the special powers or authority that are unique to a commander. With a foot in both worlds, reservists seem to be one of the most cost-effective sources of personnel available to meet the military challenges of tomorrow. They offer a good alternative to sending Regular Force members on a “tour of duty” in the civilian industry.

For instance a small number of reservists are already in positions of command in the Area and Brigade Headquarters of the Land Force and on board the Kingston Class vessels of the Maritime Force. But more of these Citizen-Soldiers should be allowed the opportunity to get through the ranks and enhance their military exposure. Nevertheless it should be mentioned that some projects are underway at the national headquarters to facilitate the transportability of qualifications between the Regular and the Reserve Forces. Although it is already a step in the right direction, a lot more needs to be done. For example, the recognition of the reservists’ civilian capabilities and the provision of better military training and education should be established. Unfortunately the merit of such recommendations will have to be discussed in another paper.

Conclusion

In the end, it is evident that the human capabilities required to be an effective commander are the same as the ones required to be an effective manager; the one exception being the special powers or legal authority that a commander has over his or her personnel. The need for these capabilities is not expected to diminish in the future. But with the new technology and the anticipated new ways of doing business the armed forces will have to consider calling upon different resources to provide the extra capabilities that a commander will require. These new capabilities are already available or being developed in the world of business and not, at least not to the same extent, in the military world. History has shown that the use of civilians worked well in the past, but mainly because most of the successful commanders had previously been exposed to military matters through their service in the Militia.

Therefore, knowing that the commander's capabilities can be developed through civilian life and that civilians with part-time military exposure can be successful in the military environment, it can be safely concluded that one does not have to be a member of the Regular or Permanent Force to become an effective commander. Reservists, on the other hand, embody the capabilities, military and the extra ones currently only available through civilian industry, that will become essential in the armed forces of the future. Because they have a foot in each world they are already better equipped to accept the special challenges and empowerment associated with leading troops in time of peace or hostilities.

Furthermore, reservists have been, until now, a somewhat underestimated pool of manpower. Although we now see a few reservists in positions of command, it is still felt that more efforts should be dedicated to provide a larger number of them with better training and education as well as to facilitate their transferability between the military and the civilian worlds. As in the past, the Citizen-Soldiers have what it takes to assume positions of command and play a significant role within the Total Force of the future.

¹ The Confédération Interalliée des Officiers de Réserve is a NATO Reserve Officers organization that meets twice a year to discuss military matters and how they affect the Reserve Forces.

² Young Reserve Officer Workshop (YROW) Report, *How can Reserves Contribute in a Post-Conscription Democratic Environment*, (Athens 1999) 7. Up to 60 reservists meet once a year as part of this workshop. They represent one of many components of the Confédération Interalliée des Officiers de Réserve mentioned previously.

³ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. “*What is a commander*,” (Paper presented to the Human in command Workshop & Symposium 5-8 June, 2000, Breda, The Netherlands.) 4.

⁴ Martin van Creveld. *Conclusion: Reflections on Command*, (Extract from *Command in war*, 1985 Chap. 8) 1.

⁵ Field Marshal Sir William Slim. “Higher Commander in War” in *Military Review*, (Vol 70, No 5, May 1990) 1.

⁶ *CF Force Employment Manual*, (Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-004, 1998-06-06) 1-2.

⁷ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. “*What is a commander*” (Paper presented to the Human in command Workshop & Symposium 5-8 June, 2000, Breda, The Netherlands.) 3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁹ *CF Force Employment Manual*, (Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-004, 1998-06-06) 1-2.

¹⁰ Colonel Samuel H. Hays and Lieutenant-Colonel William N. Thomas. “*Taking Command; The Art and Science of Military Leadership*,” (Harrisburg Pa. USA: Stackpole Company, 1967) 16.

¹¹ *Harvard Business Review on Leadership*, (Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998) 41.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. “*What is a commander,*” (Paper presented to the Human in command Workshop & Symposium 5-8 June, 2000, Breda, The Netherlands.) 4.

¹⁴ *Harvard Business Review on Leadership*, (Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998) 38.

¹⁵ Patrick L. Townsend and Joan E. Gebhart. *Five-Star Leadership; The Art and Strategy of Creating Leaders at Every Levels*, (Toronto ON: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1997) 8.

¹⁶ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. “*What is a commander,*” (Paper presented to the Human in command Workshop & Symposium 5-8 June, 2000, Breda, The Netherlands.) 5.

¹⁷ Field Marshal Sir William Slim. “Higher Commander in War” in *Military Review*, (Vol 70, No 5 May 1990) 1 – 7.

¹⁸ Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein. *Higher Command in War*, (Germany: Printing and Stationery services, 21 Army Group, June 1945) 11 & 12.

¹⁹ *Le Commandemen*, (Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-003/FP-001, 1997) 12.

²⁰ Robert Barner. *Executive Resource Management*, (Palo Alto, California: Davies-Black Publishing, 2000) 99.

²¹ Ibid., 98.

²² *Harvard Business Review on Leadership*, (Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998) 149 –150.

²³ Ibid., 150.

²⁴ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. “*What is a commander,*” (Paper presented to the Human in command Workshop & Symposium 5-8 June, 2000, Breda, The Netherlands.) 5.

²⁵ Francis Bleeker. Manager, Service Delivery, Investment Analytical Services, Royal Trust, personal interview, 5 Oct 2000.

²⁶ Patrick L. Townsend and Joan E. Gebhart. *Five-Star Leadership; The Art and Strategy of Creating Leaders at Every Levels*, (Toronto ON: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1997) 130.

²⁷ *Harvard Business Review on Leadership*, (Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998) 17.

²⁸ *Canadian Forces Officer General Specifications*, (Canada, Department of National Defence, A-PD-0055-002/PP-001, 24 August 199) 2-3-3 & 2-4-3 & 2-5-3.

²⁹ Anonymous. “CEO Selection: Crucial qualities and Competencies” in *Association Management*, (Aug 1996) 2.

³⁰ *Canadian Forces Force Employment Manual*, (Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-004, 1998-06-06) 29-1.

³¹ *Canadian Forces Officer General Specifications*, (Canada, Department of National Defence, A-PD-0055-002/PP-001, 24 August 199) 2-3-3 & 2-4-3 & 2-5-3.

³² *Harvard Business Review on Leadership*, (Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998) 165.

³³ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. “*What is a commander,*” (Paper presented to the Human in command Workshop & Symposium 5-8 June, 2000, Breda, The Netherlands.) 6.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Patrick L. Townsend and Joan E. Gebhart. *Five-Star Leadership; The Art and Strategy of Creating Leaders at Every Levels*, (Toronto ON: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1997) 9.

³⁶ Francis Bleeker. Manager, Service Delivery, Investment Analytical Services, Royal Trust, personal interview, 5 Oct 2000.

³⁷ *Canadian Forces Force Employment Manual*, (Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-004, 1998-06-06) 1-2.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. “*What is a commander,*” (Paper presented to the Human in command Workshop & Symposium 5-8 June, 2000, Breda, The Netherlands.) 6.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ *Harvard Business Review on Leadership*, (Boston MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998) 117.

⁴² Jeff Russell and Linda Russell. “Are you CEO Material?” in *Credit Union Executive Journal*, (Madison, Jul/Aug 2000) 4.

⁴³ *Canadian Forces Force Employment Manual*, (Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-004/AF-004, 1998-06-06) 1-2

⁴⁴ *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational Level and Tactical Level*, (Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GG-005-027/AF-020, September 23, 1999) 16-4.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 16-7.

⁴⁶ Colonel Samuel H. Hays and Lieutenant-Colonel William N. Thomas. “*Taking Command; The Art and Science of Military Leadership*,” (Harrisburg Pa. USA: Stackpole Company, 1967) 49.

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- ⁶⁴ George E. Renison. *Citizen and Soldier, the memoirs of Lieutenant-General Howard Graham*, (Toronto ON: McClelland and Stewart, 1987) 289-290.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 205.
- ⁶⁶ Albert Mark John Hyatt. *The Military Career of Sir Arthur Currie*, (University Microfilms, Inc., Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1965) 15.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 19-29.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 267.
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- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 180-188.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 188-202.
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- ⁷³ UK Army Doctrine Publication "The Role of the Commander," (Volume 2, HQDT/18/34/51 dated 1995 Army Code No 71564) 2-A-13.

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