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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

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OPERATIONAL-LEVEL LEADERSHIP

LEADERSHIP DURING PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS:

“MISSION POSSIBLE”

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents the argument that the ever-increasing employment of military forces in more complex, multinational coalition peace support operations places unique demands on military commanders that require competence in a wider array of leadership styles than those presently practiced. In presenting this argument, the widely accepted practice of basing argument and conclusion on social/behavioural science and leadership theory and models was adopted. Recent military studies and reference to lessons learned from past operations supplemented this approach. In order to situate the arguments of this essay the relationship between command and leadership as well as that between commander and leader is established. The evolution and importance of effective leadership is explored in all sectors of society with particular emphasis place on the military as a result of the unique authority of commanders to place their subordinates in “harms way”. The Full Range of Leadership Model (Avolio and Bass) is used as the framework to situate leadership approaches. The characteristics, environment and leadership challenges of present peace support operations are then explored in detail. Finally, conclusions are drawn which highlight the need for an expanded leadership paradigm.

Leadership During Peace Support Operations:

“Mission Possible”

“Competent military leaders develop trust, focus effort, clarify objectives, inspire confidence, build teams, set the example, and keep more hope alive and rationalize the sacrifice. However, the method for routinely inculcating, supporting and sustaining the desired leader behaviors has yet to be determined. The link between concept and practice is at the heart of the matter.”¹

- Walter Ulmer

Introduction

The identification of a finite list of principles, characteristics, skill sets or human traits that define the art of leadership and those who practice it, has been the pursuit of academics, business communities, governments and the military for many years. The leadership studies and teachings that have resulted from this pursuit emphasize to varying degrees, the importance of leader-follower relationships and the impact these relationships can have on the success of an organization in various operational environments.

When one considers the varied missions assigned by the government to the Canadian Forces (CF) and the operational environments involved, it is easy to understand why effective leadership at all levels in the military is vitally important. Notwithstanding the requirement at every level, the effectiveness of leadership is particularly evident during the actual conduct of deployed operations. It is “in the field” where designated military commanders are responsible and immediately accountable for decisions that

often involve the direction and control of armed force toward the resolution of international conflicts.

The scope and frequency of international conflicts has changed dramatically since the end of the cold war. At the far end of the present spectrum of conflict is the familiar military role of war fighting, however, much more complex operations other than war (OOTW) now characterizes the initial phases of the conflict spectrum. Although OOTW may not be considered the prime purpose of national militaries, the CF continues to be employed ever more frequently in aid to the civil power, humanitarian assistance, natural disaster relief and most notably, international peace support operations.

The aim of this paper is to argue that the ever increasing employment of military forces in more complex, multinational coalition peace support operations places new and unique demands on the operational commander that require a broader array of leadership competencies than presently practiced. The very familiar transactional-based leadership that pervades all levels in the CF must be expanded to meet the new challenges that result from operational deployments in the new world security environment. To be effective in today's military a commander must be willing to adopt and apply the principles of transformational leadership in addition to the present transactional leadership approach, and be capable of transitioning from one approach to the other. By so doing, the commander and the chain of command will be better equipped to meet the myriad of operational and cultural challenges in the conduct of today's more complex and frequent peace support operations.

To support this argument the terms command and commander, and their relationship with the concepts of leaderships and leader, will be defined. The "Full Range

of Leadership” model (Bass and Aviola),² which encompasses transactional, transformational and laissez- faire leadership, will be briefly described and serve as the framework for particular leadership approaches. The expanded spectrum of peace support operations will be presented and analyzed to identify the specific challenges and the leadership approaches considered appropriate to support mission accomplishment. Leadership lessons learned from previous peace support operations will be injected where possible to support this analysis. Finally, concluding remarks will serve to evaluate the validity of the argument that the military’s present transactional- based leadership paradigm must be enhanced by the practice of transformational leadership in order to meet the challenges presented in the conduct of peace support operations.

Discussion

Command-Commander/ Leadership-Leader - In addition to clarifying often misused or misunderstood terms, the importance of defining the relationship between command and leadership and the types of influence a commander or leader can exercise over subordinates or followers, is particularly germane to situating the leadership arguments of this paper. When used as nouns the terms command and leadership, as well as commander and leader, are often used interchangeably. While these terms may appear synonymous, in a military legal context, there is an important difference which sets the framework for the commander /subordinate, leader/follower influence relationships which exist. Canadian Forces Publication B-GL-300-001/FP-000, *Conduct of Land Operations* defines command as “the authority vested in an individual for the direction,

coordination and control of military forces.”³ Similarly, the Canadian Forces Publication *Leadership Vol 2*, describes command as “the lawful authority which a superior exerts over subordinates in the Services by virtue of his rank and appointment.”⁴ These definitions may vary slightly, one appearing more authority dependant than the other, however both contain the lawful or legal imperative for “command” as established in the National Defence Act (NDA).⁵ Those individuals who have been appointed and are responsible for the exercise of this legal authority are designated as Commanders. As a result of this legal framework in the CF, subordinates are required to carry out the lawful orders of their commanders in accordance with the code of service discipline.

Leadership by definition is less formal or absolute than command and does not include the legal imperative. Moreover, a prescriptive definition of leadership remains somewhat elusive despite the plethora of research conducted on the subject. Rost for example, identified approximately 600 books written from 1900 to 1990 that identified 221 definitions of leadership.⁶ After a comprehensive review of leadership literature, Stogdill concluded that there were as many definitions of leadership as there were persons attempting to define the concept.⁷ In the military context, there remain several slightly different but commonly used definitions for leadership. A common reference, CFP 131(2), (1973) describes leadership as “the art of influencing human behaviour so as to accomplish a mission in the manner desired by the leader.”⁸ In 1974, CFP 131(1) defined leadership as, “ the art of influencing others to do what is required to achieve an aim or goal.”⁹ Finally the most recent doctrinal publication, CFP B-GL-300-003/FP-003 (1996) refers to leadership as, “the art of influencing others to do willingly what is required to achieve an aim or goal.”¹⁰ There are subtle differences in these definitions

but all contain the requirement for a type of leader influence to stimulate or motivate action by others. Simply stated for the purposes of this discussion, leaders are those individuals who influence others toward accomplishment of and an established goal, aim, or mission.

Having established the very visible legal difference, a less evident relationship, which exists among these terms, is also important to establishing clarity. The particularly germane writings of McCann and Pigeau, provide such clarity by describing the three qualities or dimensions of command as competency, authority (legal) and responsibility.¹¹ Competency is then further described as requiring physical, intellectual, and emotional strengths, but most importantly, interpersonal or leadership skills.¹² This analysis is consistent with the interrelationship between command and leadership as detailed in the CF doctrinal publication, *Conduct of Land Operations*, where command is identified as incorporating three vital elements - leadership, decision making and control.¹³ It should be noted that of the three elements of command, doctrinally, leadership is considered the most critical.¹⁴ The consistency in these definitions is that both quite correctly present leadership as an essential element of the concept of command.

In summarizing the definitions and interrelationships in a military context,, “command” has a legal imperative and commanders have the legal authority and responsibility to direct the actions of subordinates who are subject to the code of service discipline. Commanders are “leaders” as a result of their rank and their practice of leadership as an essential element of command. Leadership by definition and practice, however, does not always include a legal foundation and not all leaders are necessarily appointed nor do they have legal authority to direct followers’ actions. These conclusions

are particularly germane to the arguments of this paper as commanders in peace support operations are often required to exercise leadership not only in relation to subordinates as defined above, but frequently must do so when dealing with groups or individuals not in the formal chain of command. This latter challenge is somewhat consistent with the evolution in leadership that has been taking place in other sectors of society. In civilian organizations the predominant leader- follower relationship relies less on subordinate obedience and more on leader influence without the requirement to exercise authority to achieve common purpose. A closer look at the evolution of leadership and a contemporary multidiscipline leadership model, will serve to support the arguments of this paper by describing the wider array of leadership approaches available for use in the military. Transformational leadership will be specifically highlighted.

Evolution in Leadership - Over the past hundred years there has been a significant number of studies that attempted to codify the characteristics of leadership most appropriate to meet the challenges of the times. Rost's study of the evolution leadership since 1900 concludes that the leadership approaches defined differ only from the perspective of the author's particular field of expertise (i.e. behavioural, social psychology and business).¹⁵ His study begins with reference to the great man theory of the early 1900s, followed by the emergence of group theory during the 1930 - 1940s. The trait theory is then highlighted in the late 1940s and 1950s and behavioural theory appears in vogue during the late 50s and most of the 60s. Contingency or situational theory surfaced in the 60s and 70s followed by the excellence theory of the 80s.¹⁶ The 1980s also produced scholarly writings on single discipline leadership that suggested

leadership in a selected profession is different or distinct from that of other professions; the hyphenated leadership styles, e.g. business-leadership, resulted. In the 90s, multidisciplinary leadership models emerged to meet the demand from all sectors of society for a blueprint of leadership principles or traits that characterize effective leaders for less hierarchical organizations. Various leadership models were developed. Most articulate the requirement for expanded leadership competencies rather than the past framework of authority and follower obedience.

Full Range of Leadership Model - A relatively new paradigm of leadership, the main components of which consist of transactional and transformational leadership (Burns 1978; Bass 1991) has gained support in government, private sector and military fora. Building on the work of Burns (transactional leadership, 1978) the Full Range Of Leadership Model by Avolio & Bass¹⁷ identifies the co-existence of three leadership approaches: transformational, transactional and laissez-faire. Individuals are situated on the model based on the relative degree to which they utilize each approach.¹⁸ A brief description of each follows with a more comprehensive review provided at appendix.

Transactional Leadership - This form of leadership occurs when a leader rewards or disciplines followers or subordinates depending on the adequacy of their performance of mutually agreed or leader assigned tasks. According to Burns, transactional leaders use constructive, positive contingent reward (CR) or corrective, active or passive management-by-exception (MBE-A, MBE-P) approaches to meet organizational goals. Under a CR approach, the promise or actual allocation of rewards based on satisfactory completion of assignments is deemed to motivate individuals to

higher personal development and performance. Under an MBE approach a leader actively or passively monitors deviance from standards in an individual's performance and takes corrective action as necessary. The active approach is often adopted and is effective where safety is of concern. Followers generally expect and react without question to this leadership approach where short-term crisis is evident. Proper direction results in proper situational response. A passive management-by-exception approach tends to be relatively successful in a situation where a leader has a large number of subordinates reporting directly and/or the span of control is overly large.

Transformational Leadership – Bass explains transformational leadership as an expansion of transactional leadership which goes beyond the setting up of exchanges or agreements with a system of rewards and punishments to influence subordinate development or performance. He describes the four components of transformational leadership as charismatic or role model leadership, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration which results in leaders being able to motivate individuals to do more than they originally intended or thought possible. Rost also defines transformational leadership as the influence relationship between leaders and followers who intend real changes that effect their mutual purpose.¹⁹ He further identifies four essential elements to transformational leadership: “multidirectional and non coercive influence; close relationship between leaders and followers; intention of changes; and pursuance of mutual purposes.”²⁰ There is considerable support to Bass's conclusions that, in order for leaders to develop enduring trust, loyalty and commitment from followers, they must be able to employ a more transformational leadership approach, pay

special attention to individual followers needs for achievement and growth, and frequently act as coach or mentor.

Laissez-Faire or Non-Leadership – This is the most inactive leadership style of all and is often referred to as the total absence of leadership. Unlike transactional or transformation type leaders, those who display a laissez-faire approach do not transact with subordinates at all. Consequently, leadership responsibilities are ignored, decisions are not made and action is not taken. Such individuals are sometimes referred to as being retired–on- the- job, or just filling time before the pension gate opens. This leadership style will not be the subject of further detailed discussion but is only presented to describe the ineffective portion of the full range of leadership model.

Canadian Forces Leadership Approach

The CF has always placed significant emphasis on the requirement to develop effective leaders to meet envisaged missions. It should be noted that the CF's best leaders have always been capable of adapting their leadership style to meet a given situation. This adaptability included the practice of what Bass and others now describe as transformational leadership. However, in reviewing the Full Range of Leadership model it is clear that the CF has predominately taught, practiced, and for the most part been successful in applying transactional leadership for at least the past 50 years. Performance evaluations and personal development opportunities have traditionally been based on the performance of mutually agreed or assigned tasks. Active and passive management by exception has appropriately been implemented in the many areas where safety was of

prime concern, the span of control was overly wide, or decision in crisis was necessary. This transactional leadership approach comes as no surprise given the relatively consistent security environment and the familiar missions conducted by the CF over the last half century. The clearly defined military threat and response posture of the cold war era, combined with the rather benign threat environment which characterized classical (Cyprus) cold war peacekeeping, served as the basis for military training and leadership. Training for the conduct of war easily encompassed the skills sets required for conducting the CF's peacekeeping mandate of the time. Arguably one leadership approach more or less fit all. However, the present security environment and the complex peace support operations envisaged for the 21st century dictate the requirement for a change to military training, and an enhancement to the present leadership approach practiced by the CF and its closest allies. In consideration of the factors that underlie an international response to present world inter or intra-state conflicts, US Army Chief of Staff, General E.K. Shinseki, stated in his "Green Book" for the army:

"it is clear that past held verities of individual national purpose, policies, strategies and priorities are being significantly challenged and must be reassessed. Collective security, and the classical and frequently exercised military means to attain it, while still necessary, are no longer considered sufficient in the new world order."²¹

Security and Peace Support Operations

It is generally accepted that the significant events that have played out on the international stage over the past decade or so could not have been predicted and planned for. The fall of the Berlin wall and the break up of the Soviet Union were the most visible indications that the bipolar world security framework that had existed for the past

fifty years would give way to new international relationships. Although there was an international sigh of relief as the arms race and the threat of a nuclear confrontation between superpowers subsided, the predictable Cold War international security posture was replaced by one of pervasive uncertainty and political ambiguity which necessitates new multinational conflict resolution options.

It is clear that past classical uni-dimensional, UN peacekeeping operations which involved the consent of the belligerents involved are not adequate to meet today's conflict resolution requirements. For example, past peacekeeping missions were generally the purview of one discipline, the military, and were conducted under the auspices of the UN Chapter VI regulations which only provided for the use of force in self defence. Additionally, peace support operations from a media perspective were “out of sight, out of mind.”²² This once permissive peacekeeping environment, with its clearly limited but rather well defined mandate, has been replaced by a much more challenging and transparent operational environment where belligerents are much more active.

Previously suppressed state or secular aspirations have now come to the fore as evidenced by increased demands for ethnic, religious, economic and national autonomy. Of even greater concern, past hatreds and conflicts that were previously held in check by the risk of escalation to the super power arena, are now re-emerging in many regions with devastating result. Ethnic cleansing, typified by the killing and dislocation of mass populations, the redefinition of inter and intra-state borders and the emergence of questionable state authority, calls for measured responses from the international community now considered to be under the umbrella of peace support operations. The

previously disparate missions of peacekeeping and war fighting have come together under the requirement to conduct an increased number of United Nations sanctioned missions, peace support operations.”²³ As put forward by General Shinseki,

“our forces must be able to dominate the full spectrum of military operations to make the transition from military operations other than war to warfighting without a loss in momentum. It is about the character and values and professionalism of its soldiers and leaders.”²⁴

Having realized the limitation imposed by traditional peacekeeping, the international community and the UN have accepted the need for Chapter VII peacekeeping missions and more robust rules of engagement.

The Leadership Challenges and the Approach

The complexity of present day, peace support operations has given rise to five categories of operations that have gained general acceptance in the UN and Canada and define those operations to which the CF may be deployed. These categories include: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding.²⁵ The tasks involved in these operations span the spectrum from assistance to diplomatic relations, the containment of hostilities, the use of armed force to restore international peace, to humanitarian assistance and the restoration of infrastructure to strengthen the peace environment. Recent CF deployments to UN missions have been conducted in a considerable threat environment and have been as difficult and complex as any facing the international community. Moreover, a recent NATO threat assessment conducted by the US, UK, Belgium and Canada suggests this considerably unstable operational environment is envisaged to continue.²⁶

The most recent missions in which Canada participated were characterized by increasingly hostile, uncertain and often ambiguous threat environments in unfamiliar regions of the world. These missions did not always have clearly defined mandates, involved a myriad of government and non-governmental agencies, were highly transparent and critically viewed by the international community. More often than not the use of armed force was required and increasingly, military personnel were placed in harm's way.

This environment presents many challenges to effective command and calls for particular strength in the most important element of command, leadership. At this juncture, the present and envisaged peace support operational environment as describe above will be analyzed and an assessment made as to which leadership approach(s) would enhance the probability of mission success. This analysis will focus on two main areas, external leadership of other peace support participants and internal leadership of subordinates Where possible, examples from past operations will be cited to supplement the analysis.

External Leadership - As discussed earlier, from a military perspective, the present international security or peace support operational environment involves working with many non-traditional participants or partners. Given, the transparency of operations resulting from media exposure and the international and inter-organizational framework of UN missions, the “role setters”²⁷ of military leaders no longer include only their superiors and subordinates. It now includes members of other forces, organizations and civilians. From his experience as Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission

for Rwanda, Lt. Gen. Dallaire emphasized that military leaders must be aware that international agencies and non-government agencies (NGOs) will lobby and act independently of the military plan, without consultation, or at best, with only a cursory acknowledgement of military help.²⁸ At the same time these same organizations will often look to the military leader as a role model, a source of direction or advice. It is in this domain that military leaders must quickly assess the personalities and competencies of the individuals involved, determine what their specific interests are, learn how to gain their support, and where formal operating agreements are not in place, influence their actions to gain unity of effort toward overall mission success. Early alienation of any of the myriad of organizations that are present may be inconsequential to short term military specific objectives but may easily jeopardize the overall end-state of the mission. As detailed in US Military doctrine and clearly articulated in various applicable UN resolutions, “Political settlement, not victory on the battlefield, is the ultimate measure of success in peace operations.”²⁹ In order to enhance the probability of success, military leaders must be able to shift from an emphasis on formal agreed procedures to one where liaison, negotiation, cultural awareness, demonstrated understanding and patience elicit support from followers external to the military but involved in the management of conflict..

In summary, in addition to much preferred formal agreements and the requirement to monitor compliance among partners in peace support operations, the military leader must be able to earn external support from varied organizations by applying many of the elements of transformational leadership. It must be stressed that this does not usurp the requirement for the more familiar transactional leadership approach that will be required

to measure and ensure compliance with agreements or orders or extract immediate follower response should hostilities occur. From the Rwandan mission, it became painfully evident to those involved that, in addition to the training and leadership appropriate to classical war fighting, leaders in theatre must possess the capacity to develop and adopt innovative solutions and methods for conflict resolution.³⁰ On any such future operation, the ability to quickly apply varied leadership approaches to deal with varied national aims or individual personalities will be most important to enabling unity of effort toward the objective of long lasting peace.

Internal Leadership – Throughout World War II, a soldier’s commitment to the mission was rooted in a deep, all encompassing belief of just cause. Training was specific to the one and only role of the military, warfighting. Overwhelming national support and the belief of service to country further enhanced motivation. Troops were prepared to fight and were generally aware of the environment in which action would take place. In this environment, soldiers rarely questioned the legitimate authority of their commanders or their orders. All were aware of the purpose and end-state to be achieved. This is a classical example of a situation where a strong organizational structure and culture may have served as “substitutes for leadership” in the sense of the reduced requirement to coordinate or guide follower behaviour. (Kerr and Jermier, 1978). These commanders were probably quite successful in exercising active or passive management by exception under a transactional leadership style.

As discussed earlier, present military commanders continue to exercise a legal authority and responsibility for the direction of subordinates. Unlike in a world war

scenario, any number of factors previously described may erode effective command in today's peace support operations. Moreover, subordinates are highly educated, inquisitive and more likely to require a broader understanding of why certain actions are required. More so than in the past, in order to preserve unity of command in a unit, today's commanders today must rely heavily on the most important element of command, leadership. A leadership approach appropriate to today's subordinates' needs is particularly important for long term strength of a military unit, defined not in terms of firepower, but in terms of commitment and loyalty. Regardless of any of the challenges of command in present peace support operations, the requirement to exercise the unique "harm's way" authority at any moment represents a unique challenge to military leaders. Commanders in these circumstances must possess the highest level of professional competency and a leadership approach that engenders the deepest sense of loyalty and trust from subordinates at all times. Clearly the environment of today's ambiguous peace support operations, like those conducted in Somalia, Bosnia, or Croatia, represented a much more complex challenge to leadership than past years' peace keeping operations and arguably, the great wars. Under the ever-changing and stressful conditions of peace support operations, there is no substitute for appropriate leadership. In such an environment, leaders must provide the mental models and frameworks to coordinate the behaviour of organizational members. (Fairhurst and San, 1996). In the military context, this applies to the more fundamental requirement of providing purpose and meaning for a mission in a manner which subordinates understand, most effectively by face to face dialogue.

A painful example of where both transactional and transformational leadership was required was during the Canadian Forces deployment as UN Protection Force in Croatia, Operation Harmony (ROTO Two) from April to October 1993. This was a highly publicized deployment as a result of the subsequent finding that several serving members were implicated in an act of mutiny which consisted of the placing of harmful chemicals in a superior's coffee. The intent of reference to this deployment is not to question the actions of the chain of command that led to this incident or to present this criminal act as an example of what could happen if a leadership approach is inappropriate. Rather, the important point is to highlight the subordinates' disposition during a most stressful operation and the need for the chain of command to transition among leadership approaches.

The information that follows was extracted from the Detailed Report of the Special Review Group Operation Harmony (Rotation Two). In this public domain report the UN peace support mission was described as extremely stressful and life threatening, lacking in clear mandate, and full of human atrocities committed by the belligerents. The findings identified inappropriate leadership and disagreement in the chain of command over what was first priority, the welfare of the individual soldier or the accomplishment of the mission. These disagreements were well known to the soldiers who also stated that they did not understand (or believe in) their mandate which was abruptly changed but not explained. Without explanation of mission nor the belief that concerns were being heard and appreciated, the sense of purpose and commitment on behalf of the troops involved was lost. The perception that inappropriate risks were being taken by leaders that unnecessarily placed lives in harm's way, resulted in a break down in trust and the

unacceptable criminal act of mutiny followed. Clearly, in addition to the need to ensure response to defined tasks, an emphasis on a collective sense of mission and the importance of discussing mutual trust could have mitigated the severe problems that existed. Where rapid decisions are required, clear direction and well-practiced drills in response to defined tasks are extremely important to alleviate the stress of combat conditions in the short term. However, where extended periods of stress or ambiguity persist, the earned trust and confidence of subordinates is fundamental to a leader's ability to ensure unit cohesion and extract a sustained commitment to mission accomplishment.

A more positive example where a successful leadership approach resulted in trust was during the Gulf conflict. General Franks, the US VII Corps commander met with his troops just before committing them to the attack on Iraq forces. He began to explain in some depth how the upcoming manoeuvres were wargamed and how maximum advantage to the Corps would be maintained. In mid-sentence he was interrupted by a young soldier who said, "General, you don't have to talk to us like that. We trust you!"³¹ General Franks was well known for being with the troops whenever possible to explain the mission at hand, to express confidence that goal would be achieved and to foster pride and sense of purpose for any mission. This transformational leadership approach served him and his corps well on the eve of combat.

External and Internal Leadership - The perceived need to define and apply new, more appropriate, leadership skills for the 21 century is being driven in part by the acceleration of change in technology and the need for more immediate and all

encompassing information. The technological connectivity of the battlefield and its impact on command and control has led to much effort under the rubric of a Revolution in Military Affairs. Rapid changes tend to challenge the fundamental organizational design of the military, characterized by rigid hierarchies, well-defined authority, unity of command and vertical lines of communication. What then is the possible impact of this rate of technological change on the most important element of command?

The ability to isolate and disseminate vast quantities of information will impact many of the environments where world conflict is present. The Military leaders involved in conflict resolution must be aware of such impacts. The synchronization of military fires, the space dimension of war, and the ability to view the complete battlefield will definitely influence the conduct of war and peace support operations. However, what is often lost in RMA discussions, is the fact that the nature of war and regional conflicts remain as described by Tilford, “ a complex interaction of political objectives, human emotions, cultural and ethnic factors, and military skills.”³² Fundamentally, the success of military interventions will continue to rely on “boots on the ground” and the fundamentals of human interaction.

It is argued that technology will impact leadership in military operations as a result of the ability of the media’s ability to cover almost any conflict in detail. The omni- present media gives rise to internal and external factors that influence a commander’s leadership approach. One impact is the time commanders must now engage in public relations, time which some might consider better spent on other operational concerns. A more significant challenge to command is the overlapping of the traditional levels of war/conflict and the defined authorities for decision at each level. The

traditional tactical, operational and strategic levels can merge to a single level as a result of media coverage. The most often-cited example is how the broadcast of actions or decisions of the common foot soldier can for example, change national or international support for a mission or send inappropriate messages to belligerents that could jeopardize the previously established impartiality that is so important in peace support operations. From a commander's perspective, this situation requires subordinates to be aware of much more than the "commander's intent." Individuals throughout the ranks must have a sense of the overall mission, the moral and ethical consequences of decisions and the exact rules of engagement for the application of force. In addition to performing tasks, at any time subordinates could, be subject to a spot interview and have to respond to complex media questions. In such an environment of transparency, the commander must have confidence in his subordinates and be able to provide them with timely information by means other than the use of direct or formal orders. Often face to face discussions are required. These actions required by commanders underlie the fundamental principles of a transformational leadership approach.

Finally, the reality of transparency and the media will not only impact how well the civilian population is influenced by the actions of the soldier, but will also influence how the soldier views his or her leaders when they are placed in the international broadcast spotlight. Subordinates closely observe the performance of their commander's interaction with the media and the general public. The effectiveness of a commander's internal leadership is therefore determined, in part, by how well he or she can gain the respect and influence of wider, external audiences through the display of personal and professional attributes. Commanders must be role models at all times, and act in ways

that build respect in public and internal circles. The leadership approach must be transparent, genuine, and include public expression of important values, beliefs, and confidence in subordinates. Such a transformational leadership approach will serve to enhance a commander's effectiveness. Despite technological advances and the resultant ability to accurately put ordnance on target, war and conflict is a human endeavour that requires human interaction and a variety of leadership skills.

The preceding analysis of peace support operations and the leadership deemed appropriate, confirms the requirement for commanders and the chain of command to avail themselves of a variety of leadership approaches. The many situational and environmental factors, and the variety of personalities and organizations present in the "peacefield", require leaders to be effective in negotiation and persuasion, to display a strong sense of mission and commitment, and to ensure subordinates and followers are motivated to the same goal of long term peace. In addition to the more familiar transactional approach, military commanders in peace support operations must be able to adopt and employ the principles of transformational leadership.

Canadian Forces Leadership Initiative

Prior to providing concluding remarks to the arguments presented in this paper it should be noted that the principles of what Bass codifies as transformational leadership have been practiced by the CF's very best leaders. However such a leadership style is not pervasive in the CF. It is also important to note that much action has been initiated in the past few years in an effort to enhance leadership in the CF. These initiatives are the

direct result of, among other factors, the visible leadership failures that have, for the most part, been presented during recent peace support operations. One can argue that the requirement for enhanced leadership skills is not restricted to the operational level but is required at all levels in the CF to meet present day challenges and the pace of change described in the early part of this paper. Indeed the issue of leadership in the CF is being addressed at the highest levels in the chain of command. Moreover, leadership failures or inadequacies are not restricted to the operational level rather it is at this level that the consequence of failure is most immediate and can result in the loss of lives. A number of studies and programs to effect necessary changes to leadership in the CF have been undertaken. And it appears that the adoption of a more transformational leadership approach may be a part of the solution. As detailed in the keystone document, *Shaping the future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, the vision statement for the CF states in part, “with transformational leadership and coherent management, we will build upon our proud heritage in pursuit of clear strategic objectives.”³³ Such a cultural change will take time, but continual progress must be made.

Conclusion

Little research has been conducted on leadership at the operational level of war, and even less in operational settings. This paper focussed on identifying effective leadership styles during the conduct of peace support operations. The fact that leadership is a human interaction and the most important element of command is fundamental to the conclusions reached. Indeed there are leadership principles which transcend the test of time; they just need to be recognized and employed in proper circumstance.

The rate of change in all sectors of society resulting from the proliferation of technology, globalization, and increased market competition has led to an ambiguous work place. In order to meet the challenge of implementing and managing change a significant emphasis is being place on effective leadership. Multinational corporations seek capable, adaptable leaders to guide a team to long term profitability. More and more, the business environment calls for senior management to lead and motivate the company's employees toward a company vision.

The world security and peace environment has undergone significant change since the end of the cold war. The present pervasive uncertainty and political ambiguity has resulted in frequent regional conflict and crisis that necessitate an international community response. The frequent deployment of the Canadian Forces on extremely complex and ambiguous UN peace support operations will continue. The challenges inherent in these operations far surpass the classical peacekeeping operations of past years. The multi-national, multi-dimensional and multi-threat environment that characterizes these operations, places a premium on effective leadership at all levels in the chain of command. Military leadership is being challenged on new and unfamiliar fronts. The present transactional leadership practiced by the CF, based on competencies required for war fighting and classical peacekeeping, remain extremely important but require significant enhancement during peace support operations. Military commanders must employ a leadership approach in full cognizance of the fact that the overall objective of these operations is lasting peace and security. The military, and more importantly the controlled use of force, is often necessary but is only part of the solution.

The analysis conducted of past and envisaged peace support operations confirms the requirement for commanders to exercise varied leadership approaches and competencies beyond those of past practice. In addition to traditional leadership skill sets, the peace support commander requires cultural sensitivity, negotiation and mediation skills when dealing with civilian agencies and even belligerents. Moreover, given the presence of NGOs and other civilians, the military commander will often be required to exercise leadership, without designated or legal authority, in order to ensure unity of effort. Finally from an external leadership perspective, where formal agreements are not in place, the military commander will have to be patient and adopt innovative solutions that will be acceptable to all parties. A more transformational leadership approach will be necessary.

On internal lines, the commander will lead well-educated and inquisitive subordinates. Under stressful and threatening conditions these well-disciplined troops will prove capable of executing, without question, well-established and practiced drills in response to direct orders. However during the prolonged periods of stress or ambiguous conditions that are often present in peace support operations, subordinates may require a deeper sense of personal purpose and a clearer understanding of why certain tasks are required in order to remain committed to mission accomplishment. The commander will have to exercise a leadership approach that engenders a sense of collective values and a strong sense of personal and group commitment. This will require much more than issuing orders and tasks and monitoring completion. The commander will have to know the individual and collective needs of his troops and demonstrate active concern and clarity to alleviate the fog of peace operations.

Conversely, this fog in peace operations has a “fish bowl” aspect. Given the ever present media, leaders must ensure they and their subordinates are able to effectively engage in public relations. They must become comfortable and effective purveyors of confidence on the public stage. The ever-present media scrutiny requires all ranks to have and display a strong sense of overall mission, an understanding of the moral and ethical consequences of decisions. Where armed action is required, the rank and file must understand the precise rules of engagement that exist. One wrong or misrepresented action at any level in the chain of command, broadcasted in the public or the belligerents’ domain, could jeopardize any trust or cease-fire established, lead to the withdrawal of political support to the mission. Given these verities, the commander must have confidence in his subordinates and provide them with timely information. This means face to face two-way discussions and the sharing of ideas and understanding.

Based on the findings of the analysis conducted of the peace support operations it is concluded that the very familiar transactional based leadership that pervades all levels in the CF remains extremely relevant but must be enhanced to meet the unique challenges of present peace support operations. To be effective in today’s peace support operations a commander, in addition to the transactional approach, must be willing and able to adopt and apply the principles of transformational leadership and be capable of transitioning from one leadership approach to the other. Because of the complexity of present peace support operations, transformational leadership is no longer only desirable it is essential. The wording of the present CF strategic guidance appears to support the requirement for transformational leadership. The task at hand is to turn these words into action, not only during peace support operations, but at all levels in the CF. As stated in

the initial quote to this paper, the link between concept and practice is really at the heart of the matter. People are our most valuable asset, they must be appropriately lead and developed. The most important task of today's leadership is developing the leaders of tomorrow.

MULTIFACTOR LEADERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE

Bernard M. Bass and Bruce J. Avolio prepared the following table. It provides further factors to explain the leadership styles from the Full Range of Leadership model (1991).³⁴

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Idealized Attributes

- Instil pride in others for being associated with them
- Go beyond self-interest for the good of the group
- Act in ways that build others' respect
- Display a sense of power and confidence
- Make personnel sacrifices for others' benefit
- Reassure others that obstacles will be overcome

Idealized Behaviors

- Talk about their most important values and beliefs
- Specify the importance of having a strong sense of purpose
- Consider the moral and ethical consequences of decisions
- Emphasize the importance of having a collective sense of mission
- Champion exciting new possibilities
- Talk about the importance of trusting each other

Inspirational Motivation

- Talk optimistically about the future
- Talk enthusiastically about what needs to be accomplished
- Articulate a compelling vision of the future
- Express confidence that goals will be achieved
- Provide an exciting image of what is essential to consider
- Take a stand on controversial issues

Intellectual Stimulation

- Re-examine critical assumptions to question whether they are appropriate
- Seek differing perspectives when solving problems
- Get others to look at problems from many different angles
- Suggest new ways of looking at how to complete assignments
- Encourage non-traditional thinking to deal with traditional problems
- Encourage rethinking those ideas which have never been questioned before

Individualized Consideration

- Spend time teaching and coaching
- Treat others as individuals rather than just as a member of the group
- Consider an individual as having different needs, abilities and aspirations from others
- Help others to develop their strength
- Listen attentively to others' concerns
- Promote self-development

Transactional Leadership

Contingent Reward

- Provide others with assistance in exchange for their efforts
- Discuss in specific terms who is responsible for achieving performance targets
- Make clear what one can expect to receive when performance goals are achieved
- Express satisfaction when others meet expectations
- Clarify what outcomes are expected
- Deliver what is promised in exchange for support

Management-by-exception (active)

- Focus attention on irregularities, mistakes, exceptions and deviations from standards
- Concentrate their full attention on dealing with mistakes, complaints and failures
- Keep track of all mistakes
- Direct their attention toward failures to meet standards
- Arrange to know if and when things go wrong
- Watch for any infractions of rules and regulations

Management-by-exception (passive)

- Fail to interfere until problems become serious
- Wait for things to go wrong before taking action
- Show a firm belief in “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”
- Demonstrate that problems must become chronic before taking action
- Take no action until complaints are received
- Have to be told what went wrong before taking any action

Non-transactional Leadership (Laissez-faire)

- Avoid getting involved when important issues arise
- Absent when needed
- Avoid making decisions
- Delay responding to urgent questions
- Avoid dealing with chronic problems
- Fall to follow-up requests for assistance

Endnotes

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- ² Bass, Transformational Leadership: Industry Military and Educational Impact. p.3-8.
- ³ Canada, Canadian Forces Publication B-GL-300-001/FP-000, Conduct of Land Operations, p.3-2.
- ⁴ Canadian Forces Publication: A-131-002/PT-001 art. 202, 1,2-1. *Leadership, Volume 2: The Professional Officer*, 31 July 1973.
- ⁵ Canada, National Defence Act, Chapter N-5, part 1, para 19.
- ⁶ Rost, Leadership For The 21st Century, p.1-5.
- ⁷ Bass, p.11.
- ⁸ Canada, Canadian Forces Publication, 131-2. 1973, art. 2-1.
- ⁹ Canada, Canadian Forces Publication, 131(1) art, 2-1.
- ¹⁰ Canada, Canadian Forces Publication, B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command.* , 21 Jul 1996, p. 1-6.
- ¹¹ Mc Cann and Pigeau, Clarifying The Concepts of Control and Command, pp.7-9
- ¹² Ibid, p.7.
- ¹³ Conduct of Land Operations, p.3-3.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Rost, Leadership For The Twenty–First Century, p.1-5.
- ¹⁶ Rost, Leadership For The Twenty–First Century, p.1
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- ¹⁸ Bass, Transformational Leadership: Industry Military and Educational Impact. p.3-8.
- ¹⁹ Rost , p.30.
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- ²¹ General E.K Shinseki, US Army Chief of Staff, *Green Book* . 1999. p 7.
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- ²⁸ Dallaire, (LtGen Ret'D) *The Theatre Commander in Conflict Resolution*, Chapter 14 p.201 based on Command Experiences in Rawanda published in Mc Cann, Carol and Pigeau, R., eds., *The Human in Command Exploring the Modern Military Experience* (New York: Kluwer Academic, Pleum Publishing 2000)
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- ³⁰ Dallaire, p. 48
- ³¹ Cherrie, S. (Bgen Ret'd). *The Human in Command* , Chap. 3, p.22.
- ³² Tilford. Earl H. *The revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions*. US Strategic Studies Institute., 23 July 1995.
- ³³ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Shaping the future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020*, p 7..
- ³⁴ Champagne . A.J. LCol AMSC 3 (unpublished) appendix.

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