CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

AMSC 3 / CSEM 3

Coalition Operations

Canadian Force Option Development Process:

"Enabler to Future Military Coalition Operations"

By /par

Capt(N) J.R. MacIsaac

ABSTRACT

This essay assesses the impact the revised Force Development framework will have on the Canadian Forces ability to conduct coalition operations. It briefly describes the principles of effective multinational coalitions and focuses on two considered key to success, flexible response and interoperability among forces. Against this backdrop, the present force development process is presented in response to, among other concerns, budget reductions, the present world security construct and the need for a change to the stagnated military force development approach of previous years. The inherent linkages of force development to force capability requirements, force options, and a capability-based capital equipment procurement process are established. Finally, the impact of decisions and actions being taken as a result of the new force development framework are reviewed in the context of the Canadian Forces' future employment in multinational coalitions.

Canadian Military Force Development and Coalition Operations

Introduction

In present day, the threat of a direct military attack on Canada or the advent of an all out world war similar in scale to those of the past is considered to be somewhat benign. However, the present international scene that has followed the demise of the world bipolar balance of power construct is characterized by a growing number of regional or intra-state conflicts that threaten Canada's strategic objective of promoting world security.

Among other factors, present fiscal realities resulting from successive years of reductions in overall government spending, limit Canada's ability to support a viable response to all, or even a significant number of these conflicts. The response options available to Canada and other nations span the full spectrum of diplomatic measures from economic sanctions, to the more direct action of the use of military force. Where the latter option is deemed necessary, Canadian political authorities must make difficult choices in deciding when, where, and to what degree the Canadian Forces (CF) will be deployed. In support of this decision process, the CF must be able to clearly articulate the capabilities of the various force options available to its government.

As recent experience suggests, where military force is necessary to address world regional conflict, the preferred response option is the combining of forces of traditional allies[1], and those of other nations of common resolve, under the construct of a multinational military coalition. Canada's active role in formal security alliances, (e.g.

NATO, NORAD), will most likely dictate that the CF will continue to be a participant in such coalitions.

In full view of the above, and the inadequacy of the CF's historical force posture, the Department of National Defence is undergoing a military structure review. A focus of this review is a revised military force development process designed to produce force employment options to meet, among other defence and security challenges, the CF's future participation in international coalitions. The aim of this paper is to argue that this revised force option development process will enhance Canada's ability to participate in future multinational coalition operations. To do this, a brief look at the characteristics of multinational military coalitions will be put forward. Principles for its effective employment will be discussed with a focus on two within the purview of the CF considered key, flexible force response and interoperability. A historical review of Canada's defence posture will follow to provide the basis for the requirement for the new force development approach now being undertaken. Finally, the present force development framework and one of the actions it facilitates, procurement of capabilities, will be highlighted by example (Canadian Advanced Logistics and Sealft Capability project (ALSC)) to demonstrate how the CF's ability to effectively participate in future multinational military coalitions will be enhanced.

Multinational Military Coalitions

Unlike formal standing alliances such as NATO, military coalitions are often " ad-hoc in nature"[2] as a result of being hastily thrown together to provide an international

community response where diplomatic efforts to resolve a conflict have failed. Because military coalitions have a political birth and are often subject to ongoing refinements as operations progress, they represent many challenges to participating nations. At the outset, difficulty is often encountered in identifying a mutually agreed purpose and an end-state, the point at which operations cease. The latter often shifts as the nature of the conflict becomes more defined. Moreover, past practice suggests coalitions are typically temporary organizations, often formed for a specific crisis and then dissolved.
Given the varying levels of military capabilities and operating procedures individual military forces bring to the table, cooperation and compromise are essential at all levels in the creation and employment of multinational coalition.

In addition to common purpose and end-state, the more commonly stated principles key to coalition effectiveness span strategic, operational and tactical concerns. A commonly recognized doctrine, a long lead-time for planning, a defined and understandable command and control construct, a measure of interoperability, [3] an inherent sustainment capability, flexible force response options and interoperability all contribute to coalition effectiveness. [4] As experience in the Persian Gulf conflict suggests, not all need be present to ensure success. Sufficient lead-time for planning can compensate, in some instances, for future coalition weaknesses.[5] Notwithstanding its less than all inclusive nature, such a list of elements or principles for success can serve as a valuable checklist for planners during the initial stages of standing up a multinational coalition.

It is widely accepted that the most important principle for international coalition effectiveness is a defined and viable command and control structure.[6] Coalitions are often

characterized by one of three basic command and control structures: parallel, lead nation or a combination of the two.[7] Although input from military leaders may be considered, military advice is not the determining factor in deciding the command structure selected. Because of the sovereignty issues involved, the decision taken is more heavily influenced, if not totally determined by political considerations.[8] For this reason, the arguments in this paper will focus on other key coalition principles that are determined more within the military's purview and relate to the specific structure and operational capabilities of the military forces involved. Specifically, this paper will focus on the principles of flexible ***response*** and ***interoperability*** as measures of coalition effectiveness. These principles are considered particularly germane based on their stated importance in the primary source documents, United States Joint Publication 3-16, *Joint Doctrine For Multinational Coalitions* [9], and Canadian Forces, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: Strategy 2020.*[10] Additionally, during interviews with the Director Force Program Planning and Coordination (DFPPC), and Director Maritime Force Employment, (DMFE), both officers confirmed that flexible response options and interoperability are the most fundamental principles which determine the degree to which the CF can effectively participate in multinational coalition operations.[11]

Flexible Response - There are numerous military definitions and perceived characteristics of flexible response. At the strategic level, the Canadian Forces keystone document, *Strategy 2020,* refers to flexible response in the context of force options, combat readiness, deployability or global reach, mobility in theatre and sustainability[12]. Other operational definitions encompass range of available force options and the ability

to employ them at will, exemplified by Robert W. Ricassi 's in his article: *The Principles of Coalition Warfare*:

> "*agility"* which calls for maintaining balance and force in shifting situations while striking in fleeting windows of opportunity, "*initiative"* which means dominating the terms of battle and thus depriving the enemy of that same option, "*depth"* which considers every dimension of war and envelopes the entire spectrum of events across time and space, and "*synchronization"* which applies combat power at the optimum moment and in the right place while controlling a myriad of simultaneous actions.[13]

It is important to note that multinational coalitions vary by circumstance and "every coalition will be different in purpose, character and scope."[14] What then does flexible response mean in a coalition context given the often short lead-time for stand-up and the initial uncertainty of both force requirements and the duration of operations? In comparing the various viewpoints of flexible response against the inherent uncertainty of coalition operations, a less prescriptive definition is necessary. Therefore, flexible response in coalition operations will be defined as the ability to employ a wide range of force capabilities to a theatre of operations and the means to sustain them until an agreed end-state is reached. It follows that, for individual nations to effectively participate in coalition operations their military forces should consist of a variety of force options that are deployable and possess the means for sustainment over a protracted period.

Interoperability – With the increased reliance on computer driven weapon and information systems, interoperability among forces of different nations is often expressed initially in terms of technological similarities; the ability of systems to talk to each other or process the same information. This aspect of interoperability poses a challenge for nations that envisage themselves operating in a United States lead, or heavily influenced,

coalition. [15] The United States' trend setting advances in technology leaves most countries struggling to maintain a viable link to the overall command information picture. Indeed system and equipment interoperability with the US military is a stated goal of the CF, as articulated in the Canadian Forces *Strategic Capability Planning Document:*

"By achieving the goal of interoperability with US forces in particular, who are currently and for the foreseeable future setting the standard for advanced military equipment, we will most certainly be capable of operating with the rest of our major allies, providing significant flexibility in our approach to foreign affairs."[16]

It is important to note that the dimensions of interoperability go far beyond technological concerns and include such issues as language, doctrine, command and control, rules of engagement, standardized operating procedures, training and logistics."[17] Many allies share these additional elements of interoperability as a result of participation in NATO operations or exercises where well established, standarized operating procedures, based on formal standing argreements (STANAGS) were utilized. At present and for the immediate future however, many nations' will not be able to keep pace with United States technological advances and therefore are concentrating on a measure of equipment standardization while striving to enhance the other dimensions of interoperability mentioned above.

From an operational viewpoint, the challenge inherent in the employment of coalition participants is the assignment of tasks commensurate with capabilities while maintaining overall combat effectiveness.[18] It is not likely that those less technologically equipped will be able to participate in an integrated offensive action lead by the United States. However, those military forces may be employed in important, complementary or specialized roles (e.g. mine clearing, refueling support to ships at sea, or the provision of

medical support). This was demonstrated in the Mediterranean and Baltic mine clearing exercise in July 1997 that was highlighted as " Clearing the Way for Coalition Operations".[19] Despite technological shortfalls a measure of interoperability can be maintained and important tasks executed. This is further stressed by US Joint Pub 3-16 which states that ever effort should be taken to increase logistical and procedural interoperability to enhance unity of effort.[20]

In summary, there are many dimensions to interoperability among military forces. It is recognized that regardless of the degree of technological interoperability, because of common operating procedures, or logistics, for example, military coalition partners can be assigned complementary tasks to enhance unity of effort. Therefore, stated in broad but widely accepted terms, interoperability in coalition operations can be defined as the ability of forces of different nations to operate together. From a Canadian perspective, in addition to being able to operate with other coalition partners, interoperability with the US is a specific goal that is linked to the requirement for advanced equipment.

As defined, flexible response and interoperability remain two key principles for success in coalition operations and are the specific focus of the CF. Historically, Canada's approach to force structure, development, employment, and the resultant equipment procurement process, ensured a measure of interoperability between individual Canadian services and their allied counterparts. However, there were major problems identified that needed to be addressed in order to maintain viable force options to respond to envisaged security and defence challenges.

Canadian Military Structure - Historical Perspective

Participation of nation states in collective defense and military operations has a long history. Canada's contributions since the outbreak of World War I and the years following are well documented. More recently during the post World War II period, Canada has been a full participant in collective security, aligned with like-minded nations. This security posture was adopted in recognition of the fact that Canada could not shoulder the financial burden associated with an individual nation approach to defence.[21] To promote continued post war collective security and stability in Western Europe and North America, Canada joined Western European countries in the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Shortly thereafter, to provide additional security closer to home, Canada entered a bilateral agreement with the United States for the collective air defense of North America (NORAD). These collective security arrangements enjoyed continued political support and served as the foundation for Canadian Forces structure. However, weaknesses in joint force development and employment were evident.

Canada's military force development steered a characteristically steady course. It focussed on the specific roles assigned to Canada as a result of its membership in respective alliances. Consequently, military doctrine, strategy, operational procedures, equipment procurement, personnel strength, training and tactics were predominately focussed on the conduct of operations in the Western European theatre and the defence of

the homeland. Individual services specialized in their ability to conduct the specific tasks assigned. The air force advanced its capability to employ fighter aircraft in the defence of North America and air to air combat over the European battlefield. The navy sought excellence in the conduct of anti-submarine warfare in an effort to protect the vital sea lines of communication to the European continent. Finally, the army specialized in heavy mechanized warfare to contribute to the alliance response to a Warsaw ground attack into Western Europe. The air, land, and naval components of the Canadian Forces became quite capable of operating with their respective NATO partners. [22] However, the lack of any significant Canadian joint operations, fostered single service-oriented force planning. There was little impetus for services to learn about or even appreciate each other's operational capability, much less understand their force or equipment requirements. One result was an institutionalized, disparate equipment procurement process characterized by strong inter-service rivalries. Doug Bland notes:

> "as emergency deployments to Europe in 1951 hardened into long-term commitments, institutional preferences and not flexibility came to rule the capital procurement game" [23]....
> "the service chiefs were content to compete for defence funding as best they could"[24]

Concerned about the single-minded focus of the land, sea and air leadership and the affordability of the Defence Services Program, then Minister of Defence, Paul Hellyer noted:

> ..."many important, and I would say the most important, matters often have not been given the consideration by the chiefs of staff committee that is required in order to contain them in one program. In other words, they have come from each individual element for consideration rather than come forward as a whole package"[25]

Up until the late 80's, the capital acquisition process continued much as described by Hellyer. Single-service force planning remained mired in past threat scenarios that continued to foster excessive, single-service focussed force requirement and capital equipment demands. The additional reductions in Defence spending in the 1990's, the closure of Canadian bases in Europe and the lack of a viable modernization program, significantly reduced the Canadian Forces' ability to provide flexible force options to address international conflicts.

In 1991, additional reductions in the Defence budget and the challenges faced during the deploym

multilateral operations under the auspices of the UN, NATO, or other regional organizations and coalitions of like minded countries.[28]

To address many of the problems inherent in the CF's force posture, and in order to meet the objectives and challenges envisaged, initial force restructuring commenced in 1994 with a more focussed force restructure and development process to follow.

Canadian Forces Restructure and Development Process

> "In 1984, we found weaknesses in the Department's process for linking policy to the equipment needed to fulfil the policy. In 1992, we noted that the Department lacked a system for setting priorities in the Defence Services Program. In 1994, we reported that the policy planning and force development process needed improvements to resolve gaps and make plans affordable. The Department did not have conflict scenarios to provide guidance to force development planners.[29] And: [C] capability assessments and decisions on equipment acquisition are currently being undertaken without benefit of fully developed and approved force planning scenarios to determine the needed levels of capability, readiness, sustainability and deployability."[30]

The above noted reports encapsulated the problems identified by political and military leaders and defined the road map for addressing the challenges that lay ahead. In response, an aggressive force restructure has been initiated for the Canadian Forces. Among a myriad of change objectives designed to enhance Canada's military force options is the identified requirement for properly equipped forces, "capable of deployment anywhere in the world and of conducting joint operations with their principal allies."[31]

By way of approach, the Canadian Forces strategic capability planning process has been designed to integrate all other initiatives toward a "capability-based approach to force development."[32] To ensure that identified concerns are incorporated, this planning process encompasses Government direction contained in the *1994 Defence White paper*,

the guidance issued in the Defence capstone document *Strategy 2020*, the annual *Defence Planning Guidance* and assessments found in the *Strategic Overview and Military Assessment 2000*.[33]

The first outcome of this overarching process is the establishment of a notional concept of operations for the Canadian Forces. This concept of operations provides the foundation for force structure and development and supporting capital equipment procurement. The fundamental building block of the force development process is a detailed hierarchical Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL) consisting of eight capability areas, contextually based on eleven force planning scenarios as listed below.

CJTL Capability Areas	Force Planning Scenarios
1.Command	1.Search and rescue in Canada
2.Information and Intelligence	2.Disaster Relief in Canada
3.Conduct Operations	3.International Humanitarian Assistance
4.Mobility	4.Surveillance/ Canadian Territory and Approaches
5.Protect own Forces	5.Evacuation of Canadians Overseas
6.Sustain	6.Peace Support Operations (Chapter 6)
7.Generate Forces	7.Aid to the Civil Power
8.Co-ordinate with Other Government Initiatives[34]	8.National Sovereignty/Interests Enforcement
	9.Peace Support Operations (Chapter VII)
	10.Defence of North America
	11.Collective Defence[35]

Hence, the present force development process is capability based to meet rather than the single threat process of past years. With all forces based in Canada, it is evident the JTL capability areas of, Information and Intelligence, Mobility, Sustainment and Co-ordination, represent a particular focus on the ability to deploy forces to international areas of operations. Similarly, force planning scenarios 3,6,9,10 and 11 are constructed to focus on operations that envisage international coalition efforts.

The development of this Canadian JTL leverages work done by Canada's closest allies. The United States, NATO and the UK all have similar lists that are based on the

desired effect of specific tasks. Combinations of these tasks address the capabilities required and lead to a comprehensive description of the myriad of activities involved in military operations.[36] This common approach to force development facilitates a mutual understanding of how each other's forces are generated. Moreover, it is evident that such a common fundamental building block among nations will provide a foundation for advances in other components of interoperability such as doctrinal approaches and mutual logistic support requirements.

TSSsU. Theproposved byd-states forcenstrm

Having developed an extensive CJTL, based on a concept of operations and the capabilities envisaged for future planning scenarios, force development process underlies force employment at the operational level. Because the Canadian Forces "lacks the capability to achieve operational goals by itself in international situations"[37] deployed forces in these scenarios will be made up of " tactical self-sufficient units or (TSSUs).[38] The inherent force option flexibility is that these units are capable of modular integration to form a larger force unit. For example, a ship by itself is considered a TSSU. Additionally, a force consisting of land, sea and air elements can also be considered a TSSU. The important aspect to note is the CJTL construct idby 5(f)Tj12 0 0 12403019739n155.35968 Tm(li

ctrm lateds oa th Deuf bctlyerem b acteP lantingGuidtacteob

contingent headquarters level with Canada's allies, globally deployable and affordable over time."[39] To equip these forces, linkages to the capability-based, long term capital procurement process and the resultant Long Term Capital Plan (Equipment) have been established.

Earlier discussion pointed to fact that the procurement practice of past years was characterized by single – service rivalry resulting in a lack of coordinated activity in the setting of priorities. However, the present force development process provides an institutionalized, forward looking strategy that brings much needed discipline to the prioritization and transparency of the equipment procurement decision process. The steps in the process which follows are a compilation of those contained in the overarching *Strategic Capability Planning Document* and its associated referenced documents.

The strategic capability planning process measures present capabilities against those resulting from policy direction. Capability gaps are identified based on the CJTL, "which has been accepted as the core task framework for the entire CF,"[40]. Thus, explicit links are made to policy, guidance and capability requirements. To assist in these linkages, a rigorous testing process is applied that involves decision support tools such as, "Fundamental Investigation of Defence Options or FIDO" and the risk or gap analysis model, " Scenario Operational Capability Risk Assessment Model (SOCRAM). "[41]. The resulting force options and capability requirements are used to evaluate the merits of proposed procurement projects. It is clear that any one procurement proposal is now considered in view of all others based on the degree to which it addresses the CJTL capability areas and the planning scenarios, many of which have been devised to suit coalition type operations. The listing of prioritized projects is then drafted into a Long

Term Capability Plan where the constraints of available present and long term budget are considered. The Long Term Capital Plan brings forward for review the Department's equipment acquisition priorities over a fifteen-year period consisting of two planning horizons: present to 2006 and 2007 to 2015.[42] A newly formed Joint Capability Planning Board with membership from all services and departmental groups reviews the LTCP and provides a recommendation based on the strategic and near- term fit to the overall force development plan. The LTCP is then presented to the Defence Management Committee, co-chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister of National Defence. At this forum, relative funding levels for the top-priority capability projects are assigned. Subsequently, the actual process of obtaining formal approval, which depends on the scale of expenditure required, is pursued and an appropriate acquisition procedure is selected.

The above discussion illustrates the significant linkages between the force development process, the capabilities required, and the procurement process and decisions which follow. Increased force employment options result from the TSSU construct that is based on the jointness of land, sea and airforces captured under the Canadian Joint Task List. The procurement process has been revised to move from a single, service-specific focus, to one that is capability- based and linked to required force employment options. This new force development process addresses the concerns of military leadership and the specific findings contained in the Auditor General's reports. But does it lead to action that will provide enhance Canada's with flexible force option

responses options and enhanced interoperability with allies thereby making Canada a more effective partner in the conduct of multinational coalition operations?

To answer the above question, a look at some of the present capability procurement priorities that have resulted from the new development process will serve for assessment purposes.[43]

Capability Based Procurement Priorities and the Advanced Logistic and Sealift Capability (ALSC)

Priorities - Of all the capability gaps identified through the force development process, two of the most significant are, the requirement for increased interoperability and deployability.[44] The analytical assessment of the myriad of procurement proposals compared each procurement proposal against these capability gaps. The following illustrates a prioritized listing of the top capability- based procurement proposals to address interoperability and deployability:

Interoperability

1. Joint Command and Control Information System (JC2IS);
2. Canadian Military Satellite Communication (CANMILSATCOM);
3. Command Area Defence Replacement (CADRE);
4. Advanced Logistics and Sealift Capability (ALSC); and
5. Strategic Airlift Capability.

Deployability

1.ALSC and Strategic Airlift;

2.Strategic Air to Air Refueling;

3. New Tactical Transport (Land Forces) and CANMILSATCOM;

4. Maritime Helicopter (MHP); and

5. Frigate Life Extension (FELIX).[45]

A further assessment of one of the current capabilities in the procurement process will provide additional insight. Due to its impact on the deployability and interoperability capability gap, a closer look at the ALSC project will serve as a prime example of the linkages between the force development process and the capability-based procurement action which results in flexible response options and greater interoperability with allies.

ALSC - The capabilities inherent in the PROTECTEUR class Auxiliary Class Oiler (AOR) are required beyond their expected decommissioning in 2010.[46] Under the old single-service, equipment replacement mindset, the Navy would most likely have sought to replace the AOR with a similar type vessel for support to naval operations. However, when analyzed against the CJTL and planning scenarios under the force development process, the scope, utility and the time-line for the vessels have been dramatically changed. In DPG 2000 the Commander Maritime Command was tasked to co-ordinate with the other services and departmental group principals, a Concept of Employment document (COE) [47] and a Statement of Operational Requirements document (SOR)[48] for the ALSC. At present the ALSC project is programmed in the LTCP and the COE and SOR documents have been prepared.

The SOR is based on the COE and calls for a multi-role fleet of vessels capable of providing support to a deployed naval task group and significant support to a wide spectrum of joint and combined operations.[49] A detailed listing of the requirements and capabilities is contained in the above documents that are now available in the public domain and have been provided to industry. Stated in general, but not all inclusive, terms the ALSC will be purpose built to provide: all the capabilities inherent in the present AOR fleet, complete with NATO and US interoperable resupply equipment; a significant sea lift capacity of 7500 lane meters; support for up to 4 maritime helicopters (MHP); a landing deck and maintenance support for army helicopters; third level medical and dental support; a command and control information system for a Joint Task Force Headquarters with a modern intelligence, information and communications suite, interoperable with allies and modular in construction to facilitate retrofit of emerging upgrades(J2CIS); and, significant refrigerated storage capacity to carry replenishment rations for forces in company, and modest accommodation facilities for incremental personnel. [50] Although not an exhaustive list, it clearly indicates the increased capability these vessels will provide over our present, predominately naval task group focussed AORs. The linkages to other capability procurement priorities are clear. What these enhanced capabilities translate to in terms of future flexible force response options and interoperability with allies during coalition operations is significant.

The greatest enhancement of capabilities the ALSC will provide in the conduct of international coalition operations is deployability and mobility. Given the limited airlift Canada possesses (which is being addressed as highlighted by the Strategic Airlift capability procurement project) and the possible non-availability of airfields in theatre,

transport by sea may be the only option available for initial deployment of forces and equipment to theatre. The ability to embark and transport the Army's equipment and a core of army personnel under the protection of a Naval Task Group, most likely in consort with allies, provides Canada with significantly enhanced force options for employment in coalition operations. Moreover, the ALSC, provides the ability to sustain the force while in theatre and evacuate or re-deploy it by sea intra or inter theatre. This will add to the ability to conduct protracted operations in a wider area of operations. Where land resupply routes are unavailable the ALSC can provide a valuable link in the sustainment supply chain by access to ports in theatre. Additionally, embarked MHP can transfer supplies from sea or from land if required. Where theatre infrastructure is not available the ALSC can serve as a headquarters with valuable communication links (JC2IS capability) to both national and coalition headquarters. Should the threat posture permit, the ALSC can carry the core of a national support element capable of setting up a land based support element prior to the arrival of the ground forces.

In summary, given the above and other inherent capabilities listed in the ALSC SOR, Canada will possess an enhanced capability to deploy a wider range of force options and a more flexible means of sustainment over a protracted period.

With respect to interoperability, the ALSC will provide the valuable support the AOR now provides naval allies. In particular, this applies to refueling and logistic support that is conducted under standardized NATO procedures. Additionally, with a more compatible communications fit, interoperability among services and with allies will be enhanced during operations at sea, while at anchor or alongside in port. With the ALSC fitted communication equipment, the ability to link information and coordinate

actions will produce much improved capabilities and efficiencies in the coordination of information and its transfer to ships in company or ground troops that may not have compatible land links established. Where orders groups are required among coalition commanders, the ALSC helicopters can be utilized to transport naval and land personnel intra-theatre. Given the inherent increased air and sealift of the ALSC, transport and resupply of Canadian forces, as well as allies in theatre, will be enhanced. Finally, with third level medical and dental facilities the ALSC can provide a modest casualty evacuation and treatment facility. In summary, the ALSC will enhance many dimensions of interoperability discussed earlier, and therefore, the ability of Canada's forces to work with allies during protracted coalition operations.

In summary, the new force development process described, links capability-based procurement to an expanded number of force options that have been developed through the creation of an extensive list of effects required of individual tasks captured in the CJTL. The CJTL provides the building blocks for employing modular, tactical self-sufficient units, (TSSUs) to meet envisaged operational scenarios. The ALSC is a prime example of how the resultant prioritized, capability-based procurement process will serve to equip Canada's military forces in the near and long term. The ALSC is but one scheduled priority procurement project that will enhance Canada's ability to operate within a military coalition. Identified gaps in requisite capabilities will be reduced thereby providing Canada with enhanced flexible force response options and an increased measure of interoperability among its own forces and those of its closest allies.

Conclusions

The present, post cold war, international security environment, combined with Canada's military alliance posture will most likely result in the Canadian Forces being employed in the resolution of future regional or intra-state conflicts. Where such a military response is required, Canada will deploy its forces as a member of an international coalition. Unlike formal standing alliances, military coalitions are often ad-hoc arrangements theatre characterized by numerous elements or principles required for effectiveness. Among these principles, flexible response; the ability to deploy a variety of sustainable forces for a protracted period, and interoperability; the ability of forces to operate together, are considered key.

Due to years of fiscal restraint and the stagnant force posture since the cold war's end, Canada's new force development process has been initiated to meet the present challenges and envisaged threats to international security. The strength of this new force development process is that it is capability-based. It follows from the effects required of defined joint tasks (CJTL) that are linked to the employment of modular, self- sufficient tactical units (TSSUs) which are assessed against probable force planning scenarios. The capabilities required for the conduct of coalition operations are highlighted throughout these force planning scenarios.

Gaps in the capabilities that are required for the CF to meet its objectives have been identified by way of the overall force development process. Moreover, based on these gaps, capital equipment procurement activity is prioritized. One representative procurement priority, the Advanced Logistics and Sealift Capability will, among other capabilities, provide enhanced deployability and sustainment of land, naval and assigned

air assets for protracted operations. The inherent information, intelligence and communications suite will be compatible and interoperable among the CF's single service elements and the forces of Canada's closest allies. Consequently, the ALSC will enhance, Canada's ability to "deploy a wider range of force capabilities and the means to sustain them while improving the CF's "ability to operate with its allies."

From the analysis conducted in this paper, it is concluded that the present force development framework of the Canadian forces will serve to enhance Canada's ability to contribute to multinational coalition operations by enhancing two key principles, flexible response and interoperability.

Notes

[1] United Stares Joint Publications 5-0 (Doctrine For Planning Joint Operations).
[2] Michael Smith, *Doctrine and Training: The Foundation of Effective Coalition Operations*, presented to 1996 USAREUR Workshop: Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations, Chapter 4 p. 1
[3] Riscassi, p. 60
[4] US Joint Pub 3-16., Joint Doctrine For Multinational Operations. p. 50.
[5] Michael Smith, p.10.
[6] US Joint Pub , 3-16, p.I-10 and Canada : Strategy 2020 p.7.
[7] US Joint Pub, 3-16 p. I-10.
[8] Ibid. p 12.
[9] US Joint Pub, 3- 16 p.50,
[10] Canada : Strategy 2020. p.7.
[11] Interviews with Cmdre MacNeil and Capt(N) Laing , 3 Oct. 2000.
[12] Canada: Strategy 2020 p. 7.
[13] Ricassi , p.58.
[14] Ibid., p.59.
[15] US Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Intelligence Planning.
[16] Canada.VCDS , Part II -Strategic Capability Planning Document, p.3
[17] Riscassi, pp. 59¬70.
[18] Terry J. Pudas. Preparing Future Coalition Commanders, Joint Force Quarterly, winter 1993-94 p.43.
[19] Keller, Stephen H. Clearing the Way for Coalition Warfare: *Sea Power* December 1997 p. 50.
[20] US Joint Pub. 3-16, p.. I-12.
[21] Kevin Laing., At the Rubicon: Coherent Canadian Force Planning in an Incoherent Post Cold War World. Essay prepared for NSSC 2 p. 3.
[22] A.J. Goode, For Example, See NATO.,Proceedings, March 1995 p. 57.
[23] Douglas Bland.,. *Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces.* (The Canadian Institue of Strategic Studies, Toronto:Brown Book Company,Ltd.1995) p. 270
[24]. Ibid.p. 224.
[25] Canada. Special Committee on Defence: Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. 19 May-9 Jun, 1964. (Ottawa: Queens Printer.1964).p.42.
[26] Wayne A. Silkett., Alliance and Coalition Warfare, Parameters, Summer 1993, p.7.
[27] Canada, 1994 Defence White Paper p.2
[28] Ibid. pp.38-39.
[29] Canada. Report of the Auditor General of Canada. April 1999 Chapter3.p.3.www.oag-bvg.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/980ce.html
[30] Ibid.p.11.
[31] Canada. DPG 2001.
[32] Canada. VCDS -Strategic Capability Planning Document, p.1.
[33] Ibid. chapter1, p.1.
[34] Canada. CJTL Capability Area. As at Hwww.vcds.dnd.ca/DGSP/dda/strat/chap 5_e.asp
[35] Canada. Force Planning Scenarios. As at www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgsp/dda/scen/intro_e.asp
[36] Ibid.
[37] Stategic Capability Planning Document.,chap. 4, p. 1.
[38] Ibid
[39] Canada. Defence Planning Guidance 2001. Forward.
[40] Ibid p.2.
[41] Strategic Capability Planning Document., chap. 5 , p.2.
[42] Canada. Brief to CDS: Long Term Capital Plan (Equipmnet), LTCP(E) 2000 p.6
[43] Interview CMDRE D. McNeil, Director Force Planning and Program Coordination, 3 Oct. 2000
[44]Ibid.
[45] Ibid., and Interview with Cdr. Doug Hales, Staff Officer Directorate Force Program and Planning

Coordination (DFPPC), 3 Oct, 2000. And VCDS Capability Integrsted Database @ vcds.dnd.ca.
[46] Canadian Afloat Logistic and Sealift Capability (ALSC): Draft Statement of Operational Requirements, 17 Jul., p.2.
[47] DPG 2000 and Canadian Afloat Logistic and Seailft Capability Ships(ALSC) Concept of Employment Guidance 2000.
[48] Canadian Afloat Logistic and Sealift Capability Draft SOR 15 Jul 2000.
[49] Ibid.
[50] DND. ALSC (COE) and (SOR). Compiled from information contained in both documents

Bibliography

Bland, Douglas. *Chiefs of Defence: Government and The Unified Command of The Canadian Armed Forces.* The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Toronto: Brown Book Company, Ltd.1995.

Canada, Afloat Logistics And Sealift Concept of Employment, Ottawa. Undated.

Canada, Afloat Logistics And Sea Lift Capability, Statement of Operational Requirement (Draft), Ottawa,17 July 2000

Canada, Brief to CDS(Draft) Long Term Capital Plan (Equipment) July, 2000

Canada, Canadian Joint Task List as at, www.vcds.dnd.ca/DGSP/dda/strat/chap 5_e.asp

Canada, " CDS: Presentation to the Symposium on *"Creating the Canadian Forces of 2020"* Ottawa- April 26, 2000, p.2 ., http//www.vcds.dnd.ca/cds/speeches/cf2020_e.asp

Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence Planning Guidance 2001.* Ottawa . April 2000.

Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 White Paper on Defence.* Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1994.

Canada, Department of National Defence, *Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy For 2020.* Ottawa. June 1999.

Canada, Department of National Defence. VCDS Force Planning Scenarios. www.vcds.dnd.ca/dgps/dda/scen/into_e.asp.

Canada, Report of The Auditor General of Canada. April1998. Chapter 3 as at www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9803ce.html and Chapter 4 as at

www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9803ce.html

Canada, Special Committee On Defence Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. 19 May- 9Jun, 1964. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. 1964.

Durell. Young, Thomas *"Command in Coalition Operations." In Problems And Solutions in Coalition Operations*. ed. Stategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1997. (355.005 S882 97-28 / IRC-CIS)

Goode, A.J. "*For Example , See NATO",* . Proceedings, Summer 1993 pp 55-58

Hales, D Commander. Director Defence Analysis, Special Projects, personal interview, 3 Oct. 2000.

Hobson, Sharon. "*Price of Working Together"*, Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 April 1995, p.29.

Keller, Stephen H. "Clearing the Way for Coalition Warfare": *Sea Power,* December 1997.

Leyton - Brown David and Dewitt, David B, *Canada's International Security Policy* , (York University Prentice Hall Canada Inc .Scarborough) 1995.

Laing, Kevin. *"At the Rubicon: Coherent Canadian Forces Planning in an Incoherent Post Cold War World.* CFC , NSSC 2, 2000.

McNeil, Dan. Commodore, Director Force Force Planning, Program Coordination, personal interview, 3 Oct. 2000.

Michaelis, Marc. Lt Col. " Importance Of Communicating in Coalition Warfare". *Military Review*. Vol 72 no. 11 (Nov 19992): pp 40-50.

Mundy, Carl E Jr. " Complementary Capabilities from the Sea". *Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1993*, p.19

Neves, Juan Carlo. Cdr. " Interoperability in Multinational Coalitions: Lessons from the Persian Gulf*." Naval War College Review.* Vol no. 1 (Winter 1995) : pp 50-62.

Pudas, Terry J. "Preparing Future Coalition Commanders." *Joint Force Quarterly, Winter, 1993 p.43*

Riscassi, Robert. "*Principles of Coalition Warfare*." Joint Forces Quarterly.no.1 (Summer 1993):
(Periodical–Periodique/IRC-CIS)

Silkett, Wayne. *"Alliance and Coalition Warfare*", Parameters, Summer 1993. Pp74-85.

Smith, Michael. " *Doctrine and Training : The Foundation of Effective Coalition Operations."* In Problems In Future Coalition Operations. ed.. Stategic Studies Institute, 1997. (355.005 S882 97-28 / IRC-CIS)

Till, Geoffrey. "Maritime Strategy and the Twenty – First Century." *The Journal of Strategic Studies.* Volume 17 no. 1., March, 1994, pp. 176-199

United States, Joint Forces Publication 2-01, Joint Intelligence Planning, 20 November 1996.

United States, Joint Forces Publication 3-16 , Joint Planning for Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000.

United States, Joint Forces Publication. 5-0. Doctrine For Planning Joint Operations. 13 April 1995.

Vottori, Jay M.: *Making The Case for Multinational Military Doctrine*. Joint Defence Quarterly, Spring. 1998. pp. 109- 115.