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JOINT FIRES: IN SEARCH OF OPTIMIZATION

By

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that United States Joint Publication 3-09, “*Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*”, has failed to appropriately reconcile divergent air force and army views on the management of the deep battle and must provide more precise guidance on the planning and execution of joint operational fires to meet the needs of the Joint Force Commander (JFC). The argument is introduced with an overview of the air force and army opposing views on the conduct of the deep battle. The published doctrine is then evaluated using the principles of war as criteria and the document is found to be deficient in its application of the principle of unity of command in two separate instances. First, the doctrine is vague about the circumstances whereby the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) function may be delegated by the JFC. The paper recommends that the doctrine should indicate that the JTCB function should normally remain at JFC level and be only delegated to a subordinate commander under exceptional circumstances. Second, the doctrine is found to violate the principle of unity of command by establishing two supported commanders (the land commander and the Joint Force Air Component Commander) for the interdiction mission in the deep battle area. The paper recommends that the doctrine should make provisions for the designation of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) as a restrictive boundary, positioned at the range of artillery to demarcate the limit of the land commander’s area of operation, should the needs of the campaign so dictate.

JOINT FIRES: IN SEARCH OF OPTIMIZATION

In any future war operation, Canada will most likely find itself in a coalition or alliance with the United States. For this level of conflict, the United States will invariably field a substantial joint force that has been organised, trained, and equipped according to United States joint doctrine. In fact, most United States joint doctrine publications include a prefatory statement that highlights the fact that, in addition to providing guidance to their own forces, joint doctrine provides “the basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations.”¹ From a purely pragmatic point of view, the doctrine of the dominant partner in any warfare coalition will have a tendency to prevail. Therefore, in any effort led by the United States, other coalition partners will necessarily need to integrate their own forces into the American doctrinal architecture.

Accepting that United States joint doctrine will have a tendency to prevail in coalition warfare involving Canada, it is important that Canadian military officers develop and maintain a certain degree of awareness and understanding of the joint doctrine developed by our American allies. This requirement is no small task. The Goldwater-Nichols *Department of Defense Reorganization Act* of 1986 has effectively directed a higher degree of “jointness” in the American armed forces and prompted a new emphasis on the development of joint doctrine in the United States. Under General Shalikashvili, the rate of production of doctrine publications increased from two per year in 1993, to four per month in 1995.² A quick perusal of the United States “Joint

Electronic Library” web site reveals dozens of published documents covering every aspect of military operations.

The process of writing joint doctrine brings to the forefront divergent points of view as military professionals from all services debate the fundamental concepts of joint operations and search for consensus. The development of Joint Publication (JP) 3-09, “*Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*”, provides a good example. This document was published after nearly ten years of debate on terminology and command and control issues with far reaching impacts on both the air force and the army. In the end, an executive meeting or “Tank session” comprising the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the four Service chiefs had to be called to resolve the stalemate.³ While a significant battle had been fought, the “doctrine war” between the services continued. Key doctrinal differences between the air force and the army had not been resolved and were quickly brought to the forefront once again in subsequent doctrine development efforts.⁴

However, it would appear that differences have by now been set aside. Two key doctrine development initiatives are ongoing: the review of JP 3-0, “*Doctrine for Joint Operations*”, which is scheduled for approval in July 2001, and the writing of the new JP 3-60, “*Doctrine for Joint Targeting*”, which should become official in March 2001.⁵ That co-ordination of both these documents is proceeding on schedule with no substantive issues to be resolved is a testament to the willingness of the services to accept the consensus reached in the development of JP 3-09.⁶ At what price was consensus achieved? Is the emerging body of doctrine on joint operational fires meeting the needs of the Joint Force Commanders (JFC)?

This paper argues that JP 3-09 has failed to appropriately reconcile divergent air force and army views on the management of the deep battle and must provide more precise guidance on the planning and execution of joint operational fires to meet the needs of the JFC. In presenting this argument, the paper begins with a review of the main differences between the army and air force viewpoints on the management and co-ordination of joint fires in the deep battle area. Contending that a return to first principles is warranted to assess the merits of these opposing views, and how they have been reconciled in JP 3-09, the publication is evaluated using the principles of war as criteria. The paper concludes that the doctrine is particularly deficient in its application of the unity of command principle, specifically as it relates to the planning and execution of joint fires in the deep battle area.

ORIGINS OF THE DEBATE

At the core of the doctrinal dispute between the air force and the army were disagreements on how best to manage the “deep battle”. Marshal Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevski, a Soviet theorist, originally introduced the concept of deep battle in the 1930’s in response to a need to wage battle against the full depth of the enemy ground forces.⁷ This new perspective was based on Bolshevik experiences during the Russian civil war. During the early 1980’s, NATO planners also saw a need to organize the battlefield into close battle and deep battle areas to address the superiority in numbers of the Warsaw Pact armies.⁸ The demarcation line between the two areas was defined as the Fire Support Co-ordination Line (FSCL), which was positioned in front of the Forward

Line of Troops (FLOT) at the maximum range of field artillery. The army commander was responsible for the close battle area while the air force conducted interdiction operations in the deep area to weaken enemy ground forces before they could be moved forward and engage friendly forces in the close battle area.⁹

This division of labour left the army with some concerns over the ability of airpower to discharge effectively its deep battle responsibilities. First, it was felt that the slow and deliberate air force targeting cycle could not be responsive enough to changing circumstances. Second, as airpower assets had to address other conflicting priorities, it was feared that insufficient firepower would be dedicated to the deep battle in support of a given ground commander's objective. Finally, as the air force was responsible for the selection of deep battle targets, there was concern that the allocation of firepower might not be synchronized with the ground commander's intent. The army's solution to these concerns was to reduce reliance on the air force and initiate procurement of weapon systems, such as the AH-64A Apache and the Advanced Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).¹⁰ With these new systems, the ground commander could extend his reach and independently prosecute targets in the deep battle area.

The acquisition of deep battle weapon systems by the army resulted in an overlapping area of operation with the air force since these systems could reach a portion of the theatre that previously had been the exclusive domain of air power. In parallel, the other services also acquired new weapons systems and developed capabilities that could traverse traditional theatre boundaries. The Marine Corps procured the F/A 18 and AV-8 aircraft. Special operations forces trained direct action and special reconnaissance teams. Both the navy and air force acquired strike aircraft, cruise missiles and unmanned

aerial vehicles with the ability to conduct interdiction missions that affect the deep battle area.¹¹ The challenge for the JFC, as it had been historically, was to ensure the optimal synchronization of these various weapon systems in time and space to maximize the overall effectiveness of the joint force.¹² The challenge for the services was to find agreement on the joint command and control structures, processes, and procedures that would provide this optimization to the JFC. The stage was set, and the services began working on JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*, in October 1988.¹³

The drafting of JP 3-09 immediately brought to the forefront the opposing army and air force views on how best to manage joint fires in the deep battle. General Tilelli, who was then the army Vice Chief of Staff in 1994, summarized the rationale behind the army perspective: “The army position on the issue is that one commander, who’s focussed on the objective in an integrated battlefield must have the ability to orchestrate all elements of combat power to win as decisively as possible with minimum loss to the force.”¹⁴ To implement this doctrinal tenet, the army argued that the land commander must be a “supported commander” within an Area of Operation (AO) that includes both the close and deep battle areas. According to US doctrine, a JFC can establish a support relationship between subordinate commanders when one needs to “aid, protect, complement, or sustain” the other.¹⁵ The land commander, based on mission and force protection requirements, would determine the size and shape of the AO and seek JFC approval for its implementation. Invariably, the army would argue that organic long-range weapons gave the land commander needed influence over the deep battlefield consistent with his mission requirements. It followed that the land commander’s AO needed to extend well beyond the FSCL.¹⁶ As the supported commander, he would be

responsible for the synchronization of fires, maneuver, and interdiction efforts within his AO, and the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) would be a supporting commander.¹⁷

Colonel Jay Vittori (USAF) was assigned to the Air Force Doctrine Centre from 1993 to 1998 and worked alongside the air force doctrine writers who were then engaged in the debate over the content of JP 3-09. He offers that “if one were forced to pinpoint an area at the crux of the dispute, it would be command and control.”¹⁸ The air force believed then, as it does now, that the JFACC should be the controlling authority over all theatre air interdiction efforts. According to the current edition of *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, “joint force interdiction needs the direction of a single commander who can exploit and coordinate all the forces involved, whether air-, space-, surface- or information-based ... the JFACC is the supported commander for air interdiction and uses JFC priorities to plan and execute the theater wide interdiction effort.”¹⁹

The air force was willing to concede that the land commander should have the responsibility for integrating the interdiction effort within his AO for all fires inside the FSCL. This arrangement was in keeping with the doctrine for the traditional Close Air Support (CAS) mission of the air force. However, beyond the FSCL, the air force maintained that the synchronization responsibility should be vested in the commander (normally the JFACC) who has the preponderance of assets and the C3I capability to discharge this function. The air force drew a parallel in the assignment of these responsibilities to the JFACC, with the uncontested authority granted to the land commander inside the FSCL. The air force believed that synchronization of all attacks

was as critical to the JFACC beyond the FSCL as it was for the land component commander inside the FSCL.²⁰

Effectively, the air force argued that the land commander's AO should consist of rear and lateral boundaries, and that the forward boundary of the AO should continue to be the FSCL as it had been before the arrival of army deep strike weaponry. The air force contention was that the FSCL should be placed "at the range where artillery and missiles stop being the greatest threat to the enemy and air attack becomes the greatest threat."²¹ The air force perspective was that the JFC, having designated the JFACC as the theatre-wide authority for the interdiction mission, should place army air units (with the possible exception of ATACM) and other joint air interdiction assets under JFACC control to carry out his mission.²² Placing all interdiction-capable forces under one commander would serve to facilitate the synchronization function.

The air force was particularly concerned with the possibility of surface-to-air and fighter-to-helicopter fratricide should land commanders be able to employ long range weapons in the deep battle area, while airmen were engaged in the interdiction mission in the same location. Army doctrine writers accepted that the risk of fratricide needed to be mitigated but effectively argued that mission imperatives might require commanders to accept this risk in certain circumstances. Army doctrine maintained that the attack of targets beyond the FSCL by army assets should be coordinated with supporting tactical air; however, the inability to effect this co-ordination did not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL.²³ Effectively, the army adopted a risk management philosophy, arguing that the imperatives of some scenarios might require the employment of uncoordinated fires in spite of the risk to aircrew.

Notwithstanding, consensus on joint fire support doctrine was difficult to achieve due to a core disagreement between the air force and the army on the role and authority of the JFACC in the prosecution of the deep battle. The air force maintained that one commander could best control all fires in the deep battle, and that the deep battle area should commence at the FSCL. This point of view was in direct conflict with army doctrine that saw the deep battle as an extension of the land battle and the land commander, therefore, as the synchronization authority for all firepower, including airpower, in an AO that extended into the deep battle area.

Given that these conflicting views were so deeply rooted in individual service doctrine, the gulf would prove very difficult to bridge. Doctrine that established rules on the creation and location of the FSCL, and whether the FSCL should serve as a boundary between the land commander and the JFACC, would effectively have to choose between these opposing views. The ruling would force one of the individual service doctrines to be realigned with joint doctrine.

The outcome of nearly ten years of deliberations on joint fire support doctrine was finally captured in the current version of JP 3-09 that was published on 12 May 1998. The army point of view prevailed and the land commander was deemed a supported commander within his AO, and the FSCL defined, not as a boundary, but rather as a permissive fire control co-ordination measure to be invoked at the discretion of the land commander.²⁴ Were these the correct choices? Has JP 3-09 correctly established the division of authority and responsibility between the land commanders and the JFACC with respect to the prosecution of the deep battle area? Has the doctrine created

structures and processes that will optimise the employment of joint fires and meet the needs of the JFC?

METHODOLOGY

These questions are best answered by evaluating JP 3-09 against the principles of war. It is universally accepted that these principles “guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”²⁵ The JFC must apply these principles to be effective as a commander, and the doctrine chosen must optimise and facilitate the application of these principles. Furthermore, a return to first principles may be the only way to evaluate the divergent army and air force viewpoints that are so deeply rooted in fundamental service doctrine and culture.

Other related joint doctrine manuals, such as JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, and JP 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*, currently include definitions of terms and concepts that are not consistent with JP 3-09. The fact that joint publications are written by a lead service might be the source of this lack of doctrine integration.²⁶ However, all publications undergo a rigorous co-ordination process.²⁷ The JCS Joint Vision and Doctrine Division oversees the effort, and each service is provided the opportunity to comment. Critical issues that cannot be resolved by consensus are forwarded to the CJCS for ruling, as was the case for the issue of Areas of Operation for JP 3-09. A published document, therefore, reflects the best available consensus and, in the case of irreconcilable differences, the CJCS direction on joint doctrinal concepts as of the date of publication. JP 3-09 is the most recent document on issues affecting the roles

and responsibilities of the JFC and his subordinate commanders with respect to the planning and execution of operational fires. It is, therefore, reasonable to overlook the lack of doctrinal integration in related documents and to base an analysis of joint fires doctrine solely on this publication. Since this paper evaluates United States doctrine, the principles of war as defined in American doctrine will be used.²⁸

ANALYSIS

OBJECTIVE: “The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective ... The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and will to fight.”

The establishment of clear and attainable objectives is a primary responsibility for commanders at every level. Objectives must be formulated judiciously and communicated effectively. Subordinate objectives must support superior objectives throughout the chain of command, and individual commanders conducting operations must “avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective.”²⁹

To ensure that joint fires are integrated and focussed on the objective, the JFC must ensure an effective targeting process is installed. As outlined in JP 3-09, targeting is a cyclical process which includes the formulation of the JFC objectives and guidance, the nomination and prioritisation of targets in support of these objectives, the determination of the best means of attack, and finally the attack itself followed by the bomb damage assessment.³⁰ Based on the results, new objectives are formulated and the cycle begins anew.

JP 3-09 suggests that either a Joint Targeting Co-ordination Board (JTCCB), reporting directly to the JFC, can provide oversight of the targeting process on behalf of the JFC or the task can be delegated to a subordinate commander. However typically, it is assigned to a JTCCB.³¹ The conditions under which a delegation can occur are not specified in the publication. Presumably, the JFC's decision will be based on the distribution of available weapon systems. When joint fire support resources include weaponry from more than one component, the integration of fires should be done at the JFC level. In the opinion of the author, only when all joint fire support resources are held by one of the component commanders should the function be delegated. However, as discussed later, any delegation of the JTCCB function may negatively impact on the principle of unity of command.

The doctrine also makes provisions for several command and control cells to advise commanders on joint fire support issues and to facilitate co-ordination between the components and the JFC staffs.³² In particular, a Battlefield Co-ordination Detachment (BCD) is co-located with the Joint Air Operations Centre (JAOC) to serve as the interface between army and air forces.³³ These co-ordination cells should promote effective communication between the parties and facilitate the integration of the air and land efforts, at least in the planning phase. Therefore, since JP 3-09 includes sound mechanisms for the formulation and communication of joint fire support objectives, the publication meets the "objective" criteria.

MANEUVER: "The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force."

The principle of maneuver is a quintessential element of army doctrine. Maneuver figures prominently in both offensive and defensive action within the army's FM 100-5, *Operations*.³⁴ In air doctrine, maneuver is an advantage inherent to the air medium that provides the "ability to engage the enemy at any place in minimum time".³⁵ In both air and land operations, topography, weather, and other factors hinder the ability to maneuver. Consequently, both air and land commanders must continuously factor freedom of movement into their plans and tactics.

In army doctrine, an AO is designed to provide land commanders with control over sufficient geography to accomplish their mission.³⁶ Deep, close, and rear operations occur within the AO, and land commanders strive to conduct all three simultaneously.³⁷ "While firepower plays an essential role in the conduct of deep operations, the integrated application of firepower and maneuver makes the army's deep attack capability effective."³⁸

JP 3-09 makes provisions for the creation of an AO on the authority of the JFC.³⁹ The land and naval commanders are given the authority to synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction, and are supported by other commanders, such as the JFACC, in the accomplishment of their mission objectives. Within the AO, an FSCL can be established to facilitate the attack of targets of opportunity beyond this co-ordination line. However, the FSCL does not divide the AO.

Thus, the air force view that the FSCL should represent the outer boundary of the AO, and that the air commander, not the land commander, should synchronize attacks

beyond the FSCL does not prevail in JP 3-09. Has the flexibility and maneuverability of airpower been unduly restrained?

Each campaign will bring a different set of operational variables that will need to be assessed by the JFC. The doctrine must provide him with the freedom to choose the model that best meets the situation. With respect to the creation of an AO, JP 3-09 does provide this flexibility and will allow the JFC to designate battlefield boundaries that meet the needs of the operation. There will be several factors to consider in setting the boundaries and placing the FSCL, including political restrictions, fear of collateral damage, weather, and terrain, to name a few.⁴⁰ For example, if the JFC does not want to constrain airpower operations beyond the FSCL, he can direct that the outer boundary of the AO be set at the range of artillery, thereby creating the situation favoured by the air force. Land commanders may find this smaller AO places constraints on their ability to fight the deep battle, but this may be an acceptable compromise in some situations. Therefore, JP 3-09 provides the JFC with the flexibility to apply the principle of maneuver adequately.

OFFENSIVE: “The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.”

SURPRISE: “The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared.”

SECURITY: “The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage ... results from measures taken by commanders to protect their forces.”

In any debate on how to prosecute the deep battle, the principles of offensive and surprise are closely linked and, to some extent, compete with the principle of security. By establishing AOs for land commanders that, at least potentially, go beyond the range of artillery, and defining the FSCL as a permissive control measure, it can be argued that

the principles of offensive and surprise have been optimized at the expense of the principle of security. Allowing the land commander freedom to maneuver in the deep battlefield will clearly permit him to seize and exploit the initiative and strike at the enemy where and when it is least expected.

The air force has expressed no objections to JP 3-09 based on the principles of offensive and surprise. However, the permissive nature of the FSCL will place aircrew at an increased risk while they engage targets in the deep battlespace simultaneously with the land forces. In the view of airmen, this risk is unacceptable.⁴¹ To optimize the principle of security, as it relates to the protection of aircrew, the FSCL should be a restrictive measure.

JP 3-09 seems to have adopted a compromise solution by setting safeguards to mitigate the risk to aircrew. The publication states that, due to the risk of fratricide, uncoordinated attacks beyond the FSCL are only to occur in exceptional circumstances.⁴² Therefore, when such co-ordination is not possible, the decision facing the commander is one of risk management. He must decide if the risk taken is justified by the gains afforded by an uncoordinated attack. Furthermore, JP 3-09 makes provisions for the creation of an Airspace Co-ordination Area (ACA) to ensure aircrew are protected from friendly surface fires.⁴³ The ACA is a restrictive co-ordination measure which can be pre-planned, or created quickly in response to a given situation.

The above measures, coupled with effective joint co-ordination through a robust C3I architecture and the use of liaison cells in operations centers, should sufficiently mitigate the risk to aircrew. Therefore, JP 3-09 addresses the principles of offensive, surprise, and security adequately.

UNITY OF COMMAND: “The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective ... Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective ... ”

SIMPLICITY: “The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.”

MASS: “The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have decisive effect.”

ECONOMY OF FORCE: “The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces.”

As discussed previously, JP 3-09 creates supported commanders that are responsible for the synchronisation of maneuver, fires, and interdiction within their AO.⁴⁴ The doctrine also allows commanders with theatre-wide functions to execute their mission within supported commander AOs. One such function is assigned in JP 3-03, where the JFACC is designated as the supported commander for theatre-wide air interdiction.⁴⁵ Consequently, two separate commanders conducting interdiction operations in the deep battle area can lead to a potential problem of unity of effort.⁴⁶

The doctrine acknowledges the need for unity of effort and calls for prior co-ordination of attacks by the land commander in the deep battle area with any affected commanders and specifies several co-ordination mechanisms and requirements between the land commanders and the JFACC to synchronise interdiction and maneuver operations.⁴⁷ However, the resulting increased level of co-ordination that is required, at times made difficult by the “fog of war”, may be violating the principle of simplicity. The principles of economy of force and of mass are also at risk when the synchronisation of attack is made difficult or impossible by the same increased need for joint co-ordination. Therefore, to optimise the principles of unity of command, economy of

effort, and of mass, it could be argued that all weapon systems able to reach the deep battle area, including army aviation and ATACMs should be commanded and tasked by one commander.

The air force perspective on the management of the deep battle offers one solution to this potential unity of command deficiency, and the cascading effect on the principles of simplicity, economy of force, and of mass. As discussed previously, the air force argues that the command of the deep battle should rest with the JFACC. This view is based on the fact that the employment of fires in the deep battle area is primarily an air force domain in terms of C3I capability and weaponry.⁴⁸ The dilemma, however, is that solving the unity of command problem in this way would have a direct negative impact on the principle of maneuver, and create a new problem in meeting the principle of unity of command for land operations. The army doctrine that the deep battle area is an integral part of the land commander's operation drives the need for an AO that includes the deep battle area. It would seem that JP 3-09 has chosen to provide for unity of command for the land commander at the expense of the JFACC.

DOES JP 3-09 MEET THE NEEDS OF THE JFC?

Close study of JP 3-09 leads one to the conclusion that air force and army doctrine writers have not been able to detach themselves from individual service paradigms and a true joint doctrine on fire support has not yet surfaced. The final product is a compromise solution that attempts to preserve simultaneously the pre-eminence of the JFACC in the interdiction mission while complying with the army doctrine of warfare

in depth. The result is a doctrine that does not fully support the application of the principles of war and therefore, in its current form, one that fails to meet the needs of the JFC.

The following two recommendations are offered as improvements to the current doctrine. First, the conditions under which the targeting oversight functions of the JTCB can be delegated to a subordinate commander need to be clarified. While some have argued that JTCB functions should always be delegated to the JFACC, many argue strongly against the idea.⁴⁹ The JTCB processes and output must be seen as a command function rather than simply a target selection exercise. Through a JTCB nested at the Joint Force Headquarter level, the JFC can exercise one of his primary responsibilities as a commander. It can be argued that “delegating the targeting process to a subordinate commander abrogates the responsibility of the JFC, and violates the principle of unity of command.”⁵⁰ Furthermore, as operations in the Gulf War and Bosnia-Herzegovina have shown, delegation of the JTCB function to a subordinate commander like the JFACC may lead to a perception that attack resources are not being allocated properly.⁵¹ Should there be conditions where the JFC can delegate this command responsibility to a subordinate commander, then these criteria should be clearly specified in the doctrine. Mechanisms to ensure effective communication between component commanders in the absence of a JTCB should be fully described.

Secondly, and most importantly, the outstanding unity of command issue must be resolved. The air force argument that the JFACC should be the synchronization authority for operational fires in the deep battle recurs frequently in the literature and merits consideration. In general terms, several proponents of this view call for modifications to

the doctrine that would restrict the size of the land commander AO to what is strictly necessary for maneuver warfare⁵². Further, several authors have argued for the use of the FSCL as a restrictive boundary positioned at the range of artillery to demarcate the close and deep battle areas.⁵³ While such proposals can only be implemented at the expense of the land maneuver doctrine, the gains in unity of command and simplicity through a reduction in the need for joint co-ordination in the deep battle area may be justified in some scenarios. The doctrine should make provisions for the likelihood that the JFC may want the FSCL to act as a boundary and as a restrictive fire support co-ordination measure.

The foregoing specific deficiencies identified in JP 3-09 may point to a general philosophy that should be adopted by the writers of joint doctrine. To meet the needs of the JFC, doctrine must provide guidance that allows a commander to choose from a range of options to successfully plan and execute the campaign. When individual service doctrines cannot be reconciled due to a clash of ideologies, the joint doctrine must not be necessarily prescriptive, but rather should provide a clear assessment of the conditions that favor one view over another. As advanced by Rear Admiral Winnefeld, USN (ret.), “the real decisions are not necessarily based on published doctrine but lie with the CINC and his joint force commanders.”⁵⁴

CONCLUSION

In spite of the noted deficiencies in JP 3-09, the document represented an important milestone in the development of joint doctrine when it was published after ten years of deliberations that sought to reconcile divergent air force and army views on how

best to manage the deep battle area. The air force had argued that the JFACC should be the supported commander for air interdiction in the deep battle area while army doctrine had espoused the need to give the land commander synchronization authority in an AO that included both the close and deep battle areas. The publication of JP 3-09 aligned joint fires doctrine with army doctrine and, in the current edition, allows land commanders to create an AO that includes the deep battle area. Within the AO, the land commander is designated as supported commander and the synchronization authority for all fires; however, the joint fires doctrine designates the JFACC as supported commander for theatre-wide air interdiction. Consequently, in the deep battle area, there are effectively two supported commanders for the interdiction mission. This creates a unity of command problem that is aggravated by the fact that the FSCL is defined as a permissive fire control measure and not as a boundary. This deficiency could be resolved by allowing the JFC to designate the FSCL as a restrictive boundary of the AO if warranted. Another potential unity of command problem arises due to the lack of precise guidance on the role of the JTCB and the circumstances under which this vital function would be delegated to a subordinate commander. The doctrine, therefore, needs to amplify its guidance on the JTCB and amend the definition of the FSCL to meet the needs of the JFC and allow for the best optimization of the principles of war within the constraints imposed by a given campaign.

Notes

- ¹ United States, Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 February 1995) i.
- ² Roman, Peter J. and David W. Tarr, "The Joint Chiefs Of Staff: From Service Parochialism To Jointness," *Political Science Quarterly*; New York; Spring 1998: 1.
- ³ Vittori, Jay M., "Fighting Fires with Fire: An Airman's Perspective On The Development Of Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine For Joint Fire Support," paper, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, April 1999, 23.
- ⁴ Vittori, 35.
- ⁵ United States Joint Doctrine Web Site, *Quarterly Joint Publication Status Report*, 31 August 2000. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.html>.
- ⁶ *Quarterly Joint Publication Status Report*.
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