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SEMINAR 3 DISCUSSION PAPER A/AS/JCO/DOC/S-5:

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

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SHIPS ARE NOT JUST JEEPS WITH

FANCY SHOWER FACILITIES:

THE USE OF CANADIAN MARITIME FORCES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION SITUATIONS

Despite my best efforts I could not convince even [Brigadier-] General [Lewis] Mackenzie that the fast patrol boats we were using as part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in El Salvador were not just jeeps with fancy shower facilities.
(Commander B. Ross Struthers, in discussion with the author at the Canadian Forces College, 13 September 1999)

By/par Captain(Navy) Richard R. Town

<u>Abstract</u>

Canadian and allied naval and maritime resources have played significant roles in pursuing a resolution to various conflicts. Yet, despite operations conducted throughout parts of Europe, Asia-Pacific, African and the Caribbean area, the overall impact of that contribution has been largely ignored. Captain Town's paper is devoted to addressing that shortfall and, in so doing, it outlines the character and utility of naval forces and resources during peacekeeping operations and, separately, in conflict resolution activities. It distinguishes maritime peacekeeping employment from pure conflict resolution activities, while recognizing that peacekeeping operations have received the highest profile for naval forces as they have for Canadian Forces deployments generally. The paper further contends that with the anticipated joint nature of future operations, there exists an urgent need for a wider acknowledgement of the value that maritime forces add to peacekeeping support missions and to conflict resolution. Pitched at the operational level, the essay defines a number of terms, followed by a short taxonomy of relevant naval functions. To advance its thesis the paper focuses on selected examples of the Canadian experience and analyzes the results in determining whether or not naval and maritime forces succeeded in furthering a resolution to the conflict in question. Finally, it completes the analysis with coverage of Canadian naval work in "Track Two" arenas and the consequent utility of such efforts.

<u>Introduction</u>

Over the years Canadian and allied naval and maritime resources have played significant roles in pursuing a resolution to various conflicts. Although it is important to distinguish peacekeeping employment from pure conflict resolution activities, it is germane that peacekeeping operations have received the highest profile for naval forces as they have for Canadian Forces deployments generally. Yet, despite operations conducted throughout parts of Europe, Asia-Pacific, African and the Caribbean area, *The Blue Helmets*, a publication dedicated to cataloguing and reviewing United Nations (UN) peacekeeping activities, largely ignored the overall impact of that contribution.[1] Nor is that diminished level of recognition and awareness unique. Few think of maritime forces as a natural component of either the peacekeeping or the conflict resolution process. Nonetheless, as Commander Struthers' frontispiece statement similarly conveys, it is this document's contention that there remains a widespread misunderstanding of the functions that naval resources fulfil when they are deployed into theatre. Moreover, the paper further contends that with the anticipated joint nature of future operations, such as that which has just deployed to East Timor,[2] there exists an urgent need for a wider acknowledgement of the value that maritime forces add to peacekeeping missions and to conflict resolution. Hence, this paper is devoted to addressing that shortfall and, in so doing, it will outline the character and utility of naval forces and resources during

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[1] *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (3rd ed.; New York: United Nations Dept of Public Information, 1996), ignores naval and maritime forces, with one minor exception on page 456 where the maritime effort during the UN El Salvador mission is mentioned in passing reference.
[2] Department of National Defence, "Canada Deploys Forces To East Timor," 17 September 1999, Ottawa: DND News Release-99.087. It indicated that "the Canadian

peacekeeping operations and, separately, in conflict resolution activities. Pitched at the

operational level, the essay will start with a definition of terms, followed by a short

taxonomy of relevant naval functions. Thereafter, the paper will focus on selected

examples of the Canadian experience and analyze their results in determining whether or

not naval and maritime forces succeeded in furthering a resolution to the conflict in

question. Finally, augmenting this analysis will be coverage of Canadian naval work in

"Track Two" arenas[3] and the consequent utility of such efforts. To commence any

scholarly analysis of a topic, such as maritime peacekeeping and conflict resolution,

however, there must be a clear understanding of the terms that will be used. The

following selected concepts will be investigated in some detail and defined: conflict

resolution; the grouping of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and preventative

diplomacy; and Track Two diplomacy.

       Regrettably, the first of the expressions under consideration -- ***conflict resolution***

-- was easily the most difficult to define. Asserting that there was confusion regarding

what it comprises was certainly no understatement. Indeed, innumerable authors have

shared their views on what the term means, but none so poignantly, or bluntly, as

Kenneth. E. Boulding did in 1964. A noted early writer in the first volumes of *The

Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Boulding wrote that embarking on a search for

methodologies to accomplish peace or resolve a conflict without theory was akin to

playing "a game of hide-and-seek in which we do not quite know what it is we are

looking for and in which nobody is able to tell us whether we are getting 'warmer' or

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Joint Task Force Commander will be Captain (Navy) Roger Girouard," as well as a joint
force of navy, army and air force resources.
[3] See text below for a definition of the terminology.

'colder'."[4] In that same year, Roger Fisher, another pre-eminent author in the field,

espoused the view that the core elements of the solution lay with behavioural scientists.

However, in a very revealing fashion he lamented, "no one, it may be assumed, is happy

with the present method of coping with international conflict."[5]

Apparently, little clarity has been added to this definitional abyss; the situation

has not improved over the years. In 1970, the renowned game theorist and conflict

resolution analyst, Anatol Rapoport enshrouded the term in people-based concerns and

looked to game theory for the structure to get to the source of the key elements to resolve

conflict in dispute resolution.[6] Inherent in his writings was the belief that negotiations

and interest-based reasons formed the background of dispute and conflict resolution.

Twenty years later, Ronald Fisher described the process as one that depended upon

replacing competitive interactions between states with ones that were co-operative in

nature.[7] John Burton, a widely published author, practitioner and teacher in the field,

observed that those of the "realist" school in political studies ignore the phraseology and

"react to *conflict resolution* as merely another form of idealism."[8] Expanding on his

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[4] Kenneth E. Boulding, "Toward a Theory of Peace," in *International Conflict and Behavioral Science: The Craigville Papers*, ed. by Roger Fisher (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), p. 70. Additionally, Paul Swingle makes extensive use of Boulding's quotation in "Dangerous Games," in *The Structure of Conflict*, ed. by *idem* (New York: Academic Press, 1970), p.235.
[5] Roger Fisher, "Introduction," in *op cit.,* p. 1.
[6] Anatol Rapoport, "Conflict Resolution in the Light of Game Theory and Beyond," in *The Structure of Conflict, op cit.*, pp. 1-43, esp. pp. 1-4.
[7] Ronald J. Fisher, *The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution* (New York: Springer-Verlag New York Inc., 1990), pp. 21-38.
[8] John Burton, "Conflict Provention as a Political System," in *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution In The Post-Cold War Era*, ed. by John A. Vasquez *et al* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 122. Emphasis added. Also, *vide* John W. Burton, "Track Two: An Alternative to Power Politics," in *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*, ed. by John W. McDonald, Jr., and Diane B.

theme of conflict analysis, Burton asserted that "the analytical conflict resolution process introduces another realism: it is essentially a costing process."[9] More recently, David M. Last, writing at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, put the term into the context of inter-group violence, research, experience and "processes for controlling and managing conflict."[10] He adopted a view to conflict resolution as embodying the pursuit of determinant causal factors and interests with a concomitant model for de-escalation.[11] Accordingly, after due consideration of the panoply of other offerings available, this paper used the definition advanced by James A. Schellenberg, a pioneer of the graduate programme in conflict resolution at Indiana State University. He wrote the following definition: "we may conceive of conflict resolution as a marked reduction in social conflict as a result of a conscious settlement of issues in dispute."[12] The reason why his relatively simple definition was chosen above others lay in his conception of the conflict problem as a fundamental social condition. It was an aspect of the natural human condition that Sigmund Freud shared with Albert Einstein during their famous exchange of letters in 1932, immediately prior to Einstein's self-

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Bendahmane (rev ed.; Washington: The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 1995), p. 84. Burton identifies Hans Morgenthau as the main exponent of the realist school, then proceeds to critique the flaws in Morgenthau's 1948 book *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 122. Burton averred that this methodology "enabled the parties to a conflict to perceive more accurately the issues that are usually hidden in a power bargaining situation." The concept is critical to a belief that negotiations can lead to results in conflict resolution.

[10] David Last, *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Clementsport, Nova Scotia: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), pp. 14-38.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 22-24.

[12] James A. Schellenberg, *Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research and Practice* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 9.

imposed exile as Hitler rose to power.[13] Moreover, it resonated with the interest-based

analytic approach favoured by the seminal works of John Von Neumann and Oskar

Morgenstern,[14] and reflected the musings of Hedley Bull in his ground-breaking 1977

work *The Anarchical Society*.[15] Overall, the quintessential interest-based argument

centred on the fact that a failure to address or resolve the underlying interests in a dispute

or conflict impinged on the settlement process and prevented an enduring peace resulting

from an agreement.[16]

Having grappled with one difficult item in the set of terminology, the definitional

elements associated with peacekeeping have been more consistent, but even they have

evolved in recent years. In 1984, The International Peace Academy outlined

peacekeeping merely as a synonym for UN deployed forces. Additionally, their family of

related terminology included:

- *Peacemaking:* An effort to settle a conflict through mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful settlement; and
- *Peacebuilding:* Social change that actively seeks to eliminate the likelihood of direct and/or indirect violence.[17]

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[13] Quoted extensively in James A. Schellenberg, *op cit.,* pp. 39-42. Freud's opening point in a letter to Einstein was that violence had always been the final arbiter for human conflicts. Freud's conclusion was equally pessimistic: "the attempt to replace actual force by the force of ideas seems at present to be doomed to failure."

[14] J. Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour* (2nd ed.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944 & 1947), "Preface to First Edition," dated January 1943, and p. vii.

[15] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1977), esp. his discussion of "the goal of peace" on p. 18.

[16] Louis Kreigsberg, "Applications and Misapplications of Conflict Resolution Ideas to International Conflicts," in Vasquez, *op cit.*, pp. 90-99.

[17] International Peace Academy, *Peacekeepers Handbook* (Toronto: Pergamon Press Canada Ltd., 1984), p. 7. Emphasis is as in the original.

In his 1992 report, "*An Agenda for Peace*," UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali expounded on peacekeeping as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field . . . normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well." He introduced a definition of *preventive diplomacy* as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." He concluded: "peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace."[18] Six years later, Kofi Anan, the current UN Secretary-General, clarified his own views on the concept of "peacemaking." Anan stated that peacemaking excludes the use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities.[19]

Equally important to the burden of this paper, Michael Pugh, Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Plymouth, UK, carefully put distance between peacekeeping concepts and conflict resolution when he stated: "peacekeeping itself is politically and juridically divorced from the rights and wrongs which underlie conflicts."[20] Paul Diehl, from the University of Georgia, had outlined similar thoughts on the matter years earlier, placing considerable scholarly distance between the two ideas:

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[18] Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping," http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html 17 June 1992.

[19] United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), "Preventative Action and Peacemaking," http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm, 1 July 1998. Anan posited, "Member States attach importance to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking as the most cost-effective ways of preventing disputes from arising, stopping existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and controlling and resolving existing conflicts."

[20] Michael Pugh, Jeremy Ginifer and Eric Grove, "Sea Power, Security and Peacekeeping after the Cold War," in *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United*

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> Peacekeeping has many desirable qualities, but it also removes the
> urgency from the situation and thereby contributes to the protraction of
> conflict. Paradoxically, decreasing the level of hostility may make it more
> difficult to arrange a final resolution of the conflict.[21]

Diehl's arguments also resonated with the latest article by Edward Luttwak, a

senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies:

> Wars among lesser powers have rarely been allowed to run their natural
> course. Instead, they have typically been interrupted early on, before they
> could burn themselves out and establish the preconditions for a lasting
> settlement."[22]

That distinction introduces a pivotal environmental element and intellectual separation

that will be developed further later on in this work.

The final term under examination is *Track Two diplomacy*. It too has enjoyed

widespread acceptance in the academic and diplomatic communities ever since John

Montville introduced it in late 1981as an "unofficial, informal and unstructured

process."[23] John W. McDonald, Jr. a career US diplomat, defined the phrase as

"interaction between private citizens or groups of people within a country or from

different countries who are outside the formal government power structure."[24]

Furthermore, McDonald advanced the concept that to progress Track Two activities,

groups or individuals needed to function in parallel with the more formal Track One, or

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Nations Operation, ed. by *idem.* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University
Press, 1995), p. 16.
[21] Paul F. Diehl, "When Peacekeeping Does Not Lead to Peace: Some Notes on Conflict
Resolution," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals,* Vol. 18, No. 1, 1987, p. 51.,;
[22] Edward N. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 78, No. 4 (Jul/Aug
1999), pp. 36-44.
[23] William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville, "Foreign Policy According to Freud"
Foreign Policy, No. 45 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 145-157. Montville was a Foreign Service
officer in the US Department of State.
[24] John W. McDonald, Jr., "Introduction," in *op cit.*, p. 1.

intergovernmental diplomacy and actions that influenced conflict resolution.[25] As will be

illustrated later, this Track Two notion has particular application regarding maritime

resources employment in that area of conflict resolution activity.

Taken at face value, it would seem like an obvious assertion that the characteristic

feature of maritime and naval resources is their employment at sea. Similarly, one must

bear in mind that the world's oceans allow for a relatively unimpeded passage.

International waters offer an operating environment where "lines in the sand" do not exist

as permanent boundary markers.[26] But the downside of this equation is that the remote

character of life beyond the water's edge means that there are few fundamental state

interests that exist exclusively in that domain. In this respect Pugh offered his opinion:

"naval units have not been prominent in traditional peacekeeping roles, primarily because

the origins of internationally significant disputes are predominantly land-based and

because there have been few calls for autonomous maritime operations to secure the

maritime domain."[27] Hence, it is not surprising that various other authors concluded that

peacekeeping was a land-dominated activity.[28] Nevertheless, it is that essential

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[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

[26] Many writers have observed on this reality. R. H. Thomas, "Maritime Strategy and Doctrine - General" http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc/thom02.html covers the main authors, including K. Booth, James Cable, Eric Grove and Geoffrey Till. A selection of others include: Donald Schurman, "The Search for Principles and Naval Strategy," in *Military History and the Military Profession,* David A. Charters, Marc Milner and J. Brent Wilson, eds. (Westport: Praeger Publishing, Inc., 1992), p.174; Brian Tunstall, *The Realities of Naval History* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1936), p. 6; Colin S. Gray, "Seapower and Landpower" in *Seapower and Strategy, idem* and Roger W. Barnett, eds. (London: Tri-Service Press Limited, 1989), p. 9.

[27] Michael Pugh, "Introduction," in *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations Operation*, ed. by *idem.* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 6.

[28] Michael Pugh, "Peacekeeping, Monitoring and Verification," *Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution at Sea in the Post-Cold War Era*, Peter T. Haydon and Ann L.

environmental factor of life on the ocean that highlights the greatest strengths of naval

and maritime forces deployed at sea for peacekeeping purposes. Perversely, it is also

their greatest weakness when considering conflict resolution situations. That

differentiation lies at the heart of this paper's thesis.

Because the sea creates a unique environment it leaves open a wider range of

options for the operational commander. Hence, a naval force can exert an influence that,

by its presence alone, demonstrates resolve to the other participants in the encounter.

Hedley Bull described the result: "by being seen on the high seas or in foreign ports a

navy can convey threats, provide reassurance, or earn prestige in a way that troops or

aircraft in their home base cannot do."[29] As well, during an interview discussing his

latest book an eminent Canadian naval historian, Marc Milner, explained that "a warship

visits a foreign port as a sign of peace and goodwill. It's the most movable piece of our

country. It tells others that we have the capability to reach them." Later, in the interview

he gave a vivid account of the principle of demonstrating resolve. Milner "recalled an

episode relayed to him by a former naval captain whose ship was once instructed to see

what it could do to quell domestic disturbances on a small Caribbean island. [The captain

Griffiths, eds. (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1994),
pp. 207 & 208; Peter Haydon, "Naval Peacekeeping: Multinational Considerations," in
The New Peacekeeping Partnership, ed. by Alex Morrison (Clementsport, Nova Scotia:
The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995), p. 105; Amb. John G.H. Halstead,
"Preventative Diplomacy and Escalation Management," in *Multinational Naval Forces,*
Peter I. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, eds. (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies,
Dalhousie University, 1996), pp. 46-47; Robert H. Thomas, "The History of Maritime
Peacekeeping Operations" a presentation to Course C16 -"As Pass on the Seas" - The
Maritime Dimension of Peacekeeping Operations, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian
Peacekeeping Training Centre, May 1999.
[29] Hedley Bull, "Sea Power and Political Influence," in *Seapower and Influence: Old
Issues and New Challenges*, Johnathan Alford, ed. (Montclair, NJ: Gower Publishing
Company Limited for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), pp. 8-9.

explained] that 'all they did was steam into the harbour and stop. The trouble ended.'"[30]

By way of further example, D. P. O'Connell, a professor of international law, illustrated the effect when he wrote of the 1937 Spanish Civil War confrontation off Bilbao between Her Majesty's Ship *Royal Oak*, a battleship, and a Spanish Nationalist cruiser, *Almirante Cervera*. During the incident the Spaniard attempted to apprehend a merchant vessel with Republican refugees aboard. *Royal Oak* interposed herself between the two and tensions naturally ran high as the following exchange of signals occurred:

- *Almirante Cervera*: I have orders from my government to stop any Spanish ship leaving Bilbao
- *Royal Oak*: I have orders from my government to protect them on the high sea.

No shots were fired; *Royal Oak* prevailed by her presence and her communicated sense of resolve. *Almirante Cervera* withdrew.[31] Although the incident transpired at a tactical level, the concept holds true for a theatre-level demonstration of resolve. One need only imagine the effect of an exercise staged close to shore and featuring multiple aircraft carrier battle groups demonstrating force suitable for an operational level force in theatre. Indeed, on 23 October 1999, a multinational force of some 60,000 executed just such a demonstration in Egyptian waters as part of Exercise Bright Star. Taking full advantage of the opportunity, US Secretary of Defence William Cohen made pointed remarks to the media bringing Saddam Hussein's attention to the display.[32] Hence, implicit in this illustration is the fact that there exists at sea a higher threshold of activities during

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[30] Rob Matthews, "Navy's Importance Underestimated, Argues Author" *The Halifax Herald Limited*, Sunday, 7 November 1999, pp. C8-C9. Matthews discussed Marc Milner, *Canada's Navy: The First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
[31] D.P. O'Connell, *The Influence of Law on Sea Power* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), pp. 58-61.
[32] CNN news broadcast, 23 October 1999.

operations, including peacekeeping, that allow a force commander to pursue a wider

range of options without having to resort to, or consider resorting to, the use of force.

Such an application of demonstrating resolve may be required to maintain control over a

situation involving two belligerents. In this manner, showing an implied capability to use

force may forestall a continuation of violence or prevent a situation from getting out of

hand.

These same concepts formed a part of what Eric Grove described as the types of

activities that naval forces could engage in when on peace support operations. His

taxonomy of employment is as follows:

- ‹ *peacekeeping* - 'classical' interposition activities to facilitate and monitor the implementation of cease fires, or more substantial agreements pursuant to Chapter 6 of the Charter with the consent of the belligerents;
- ‹ *peace enforcement* - coercive operations under Chapter 7 to maintain or re-establish the mandated peace;
- ‹ *conflict prevention* - preventative deployments, fact finding missions, and operations to warn, inspect and monitor;
- ‹ *peacemaking* - military support to ongoing diplomatic activities aimed at establishing a cease fire or more permanent peace;
- ‹ *peace building* - actions to support political settlements by improving well being and confidence, and the support of economic and physical reconstruction; and
- ‹ *humanitarian operations* - action to relieve the human cost of conflict, often in support of specialised relief agencies.[33]

Written in the context of UK naval doctrine, Grove's taxonomy mixed the elements of

peacekeeping with conflict resolution. Nonetheless, he was careful to distinguish

between the two in his inferred hierarchy of operations: Later on in his text he made the

distinction clearer still:

Peace support operations are best regarded as operations that utilise the
inherent qualities and attributes of maritime forces…. Even benign

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[33] Eric Grove, "Navies play their part in peace support operations," *Jane's Navy International,* Vol. 104, Issue: 002 (Mar 1, 1999), p.26

operations such as disaster relief use skills that a fully competent navy should possess as a result of its damage control abilities.

If sanctions and/or an arms embargo are part of the peace process, naval forces can monitor a sea area and, under the right mandates, engage in the boarding and diversion of ships carrying contraband. More classical peacekeeping by interposition is more problematic in the maritime context, as the conflicts in which peacekeeping is relevant usually take place in man's preferred habitat -- on land….[34]

His main point focused on the usefulness of navies across a wide range of employment options for an operational commander, but, equally, he recognized that it took work ashore to have a real impact on effecting a resolution to the situation.

Of course, the difficulty inherent in naval and maritime forces operating at sea in their natural environment is that they are not engaged directly in the land-dominated element Grove and others highlighted. That arena is where the majority of parties' interests reside; that arena is where naval and maritime forces need to make an impression to contribute effectively to conflict resolution. Pugh spelled it out quite clearly and forcefully:

Differences at sea do not attract the political symbolism and popular levels of emotion which interfere with peaceful resolution processes. The unavoidable conclusion is that whilst coastal communities may develop proprietary attitudes to ocean areas and governments may seek advantages in claiming sovereignty… over large areas of the ocean, dangerous tensions are less likely to arise in uninhabited environments.[35]

Furthermore, a maritime force separated from land limits the visibility for work done in joint operations in a peacekeeping environment. Therefore, that factor contributes to the incomplete or inaccurate view of what maritime forces are capable of in that context. As

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[35] Michael Pugh, "The Historical Record and the Relevance of Force Thresholds," in *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping, op cit.*, p. 33.

an example, in 1995 David N. Griffiths, a Track Two practitioner and author, took exception to the level of misunderstanding reflected in Major-General Mackenzie's opinion that peacekeeping was the exclusive purview of the Army.[36] Being out of sight complicates the process necessary to build an appreciation among military leaders at the operational level. As well, the distance affects the political and diplomatic leaders involved in the decision-making and approval process for deployment of naval and maritime assets. As R.H. Thomas pointed out most recently in a presentation at Canada's Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, "there has been a declining understanding of the capabilities and limitations of maritime forces by governments and, especially, the United Nations."[37] Moreover, the distance and isolation of ships at sea makes them difficult targets for media to gain easy access and file their stories. This factor further complicates efforts to address that shortfall. The pertinence of Thomas' remark becomes all the more crucial to building upon the understanding when viewed in light of James Cable's historically-based observation: "today's disputes between states are decorated by United Nations resolutions rather than Papal bulls, but they are still decided by coercion, expressed or implied."[38] Similarly, Cable's point is considered most relevant when placed against the underlying definitional element of conflict resolution. As was stated earlier, true conflict resolution requires a long-term satisfaction of the interests of the

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[36] David N. Griffiths, "The Maritime Face of Peacekeeping," in *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, September 1995, p. 12, citing Major-General Lewis Mackenzie, "Peacekeeping's Strategic Imperatives," in *The Changing Face of Peacekeeping*, ed. by Alex Morrison (Toronto: CSIS, 1993).

[37] Robert H. Thomas, "The History of Maritime Peacekeeping Operations," *op cit.*

parties involved. The question remains in what capacity naval and maritime forces can satisfy those conditions.

Pugh has stated that "naval forces can undertake multinational roles in support of peace and security for which there are no land-based equivalents."[39] However, as noted above, traditional peacekeeping means that although maritime force deployment provide impartiality, their sepa

service of peace."[41] Building on an inter-war historical perspective, Thomas made his

case by citing the use of French and British ships offshore to "supervise the voting"

during the 1920 plebiscite on the division of Schleswig-Holstein. He expanded his

argument further, referring to the despatch of a Royal Naval fleet to maintain order in the

Dardanelles in 1922, and the 1936 international naval reaction to evacuate nationals

during the Spanish Civil War. His post Second World War examples included the

following:

- ‹ the joint Netherlands and Pakistani monitoring of the 1962-3 transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia,
- ‹ the multinational force and observers aboard Italian minesweepers in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba and
- ‹ the British, French and Soviet vessels cooperating in the evacuation of civilians during the 1986 Yemeni civil war.[42]

Thomas made a powerfully persuasive argument to buttress his case, illustrating the

unique ability that a warship can provide -- a mobile, neutral platform for peacekeeping

negotiations. He provided several post war examples and concluded with three from the

1990s as follows:

- ‹ "The Avenger Accord in 1992 at Dubrovnik, Croatia
- ‹ Peace talks on board SAS OUTENIQUA in May 1997 [and]
- ‹ In 1998 HMN25 Endeavour was . . . the site for peace talks between Papua New Guinea and Bougainville."[43]

From a Canadian context, it would appear from a review of the literature outlining

Canada's involvement in peacekeeping that few missions satisfied the stringent

requirements imposed by the conflict resolution definitions outlined earlier. Although

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[40] Peter I. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, eds., *Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution at Sea in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1994), pp. 213-224.
[41] Robert H. Thomas, "History of Maritime Peacekeeping Operations," *op cit.*, p. 4.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-10 and 18-19.

sanctions and embargoes featured in the writings, the authors acknowledged the

remoteness that such employment imposed on the ships and aircraft as either an implicit

or expressed part of their description of events.[44] Certainly, in the 1990s alone Canada

participated in a wide variety of maritime peacekeeping endeavours including the

following:

- ‹˙ (1990) in Central America provided observers with Argentine Navy patrols in the Gulf of Fonseca, monitoring the demobilization process in Nicaragua and patrolling for cross-border incursions in El Salvador
- ‹˙ (1990) in the Arabian Gulf, following the Gulf War, in the multinational interdiction force enforcing the UN sanctions against Iraq
- ‹˙ (1992) in Somalia acting as the joint force headquarters afloat, affording humanitarian relief, and providing logistics support to Canadians and multinational forces
- ‹˙ (1992) in Cambodia conducting riverine and coastal patrols, supervising the cease-fire and monitoring the cantonment and demobilization of naval forces
- ‹˙ (1993) in Haiti enforcing sanctions and assisting in reconstruction
- ‹˙ (1993) in the Adriatic enforcing economic sanctions and an arms embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)
- ‹˙ (1999) in East Timor assisting in the multinational logistics effort and supporting the Canadian contingent[45]

It forms an impressive list, yet does not cover anything approaching the entire spectrum

of deployments or contingency operations that Canadian naval forces have undertaken

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[43] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[44] Captain(N) Robert H. Thomas, "The Use of Naval Forces in Imposing and Enforcing Sanctions, Embargoes and Blockades" *Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution at Sea in the Post-Cold War Era*, Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, eds. (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1994) pp. 183-188; Robert H. Thomas, "History of Maritime Peacekeeping Operations," *op cit.*, p. 29; Peter T. Haydon, "Introduction" in *Multinational Naval Forces, idem* and Ann L. Griffiths, eds. (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1996) pp. 14-16 & 20-24.

[45] Robert H. Thomas, "History of Maritime Peacekeeping Operations," *op cit.*, pp. 17-18, 21-23, and 25-29; Michael Pugh, "The Historical Record and the Relevance of Force Thresholds," in *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping, op cit.*, pp. 36-42; Eric Grove, "Navies play their part in peace support operations," *op cit.*, p.26; David N. Griffiths, "The Maritime Face of Peacekeeping," *op cit.*, pp. 12-16; and *HMCS PROTECTEUR*, "Operation TOUCAN Diary", *HMCS PROTECTEUR* Web-site Home Page, http://www.hmcsprotecteur.com/operatio.htm, 24 October 1999.

outside of the aegis of the UN. However, when measured against the definition, few

qualify as conflict resolution activities. Those operations that fit could perhaps be

generalized as ones in which the forces were employed closer to shore, in "brown water"

areas, where assisting with refugees and evacuees, support to plebiscites and monitoring

illegal actions took place. In most other instances, maritime forces acted in a

peacekeeping role and, when successful in that capacity, they isolated the situation. But,

the principle remains as Thomas phrased it: "except in the rarest cases, naval forces

cannot by themselves resolve crises."[46] Certainly, though, there were cases in which

ships contributed to conflict resolution. *HMCS PRESERVER*'s deployment to Africa in

the early 1990s served as a notable deviation from the normal naval operational tour. It is

one worth exploring in some detail.

     PRESERVER sailed to Somalia in support of the Canadian joint force commander

and some 1300 Canadian Forces personnel. Almost immediately after *PRESERVER*

anchored in the waters off Mogadishu in December 1992 she functioned as a joint

command and control platform to assist army, navy and air forces while the joint forces

were getting established ashore and setting up operations. As well, she performing duties

as a floating logistics, medical and support base, an operating base for helicopters and a

floating centre for technical repair and support. In fact, her multi-faceted role and

flexibility in theatre prompted Haydon to describe the experience as "a superb object

lesson in mounting a small-scale joint operation."[47]

     Beyond her joint headquarters role *PRESERVER* executed humanitarian

assistance to those ashore, providing medical and dental care, equipment repair and

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[46] Robert H. Thomas, "History of Maritime Peacekeeping Operations," *op cit.*, p. 29

building an orphanage.[48] Such activities certainly qualified as efforts to resolve conflict

and engaged the ship in an attempt to work at the root causes. Even so, as noted

previously, that close interaction with shore-side events was not representative of the

majority of deployments. Perhaps *PROTECTEUR*'s deployment to East Timor,

announced in September 1999, may recreate some of the conditions for work in conflict

resolution. So far, though, accounts to date indicate that the focus of that ship's activity

revolves around her logistical support capability rather than any direct integration with

the Canadian joint force commander as his supporting platform. According to the ship's

web site, as of the time of writing she is conducting a turnover for logistics operations as

a replacement on-station for the Australian replenishment ship *HMAS SUCCESS*.[49] Time

will tell, but up to now, insufficient information is available to provide an assessment of

the relevance of *PROTECTEUR*'s deployment to conflict resolution considerations.

Nonetheless, there is other maritime activity occurring in a Track Two field that may

serve as a promising area to consider for its application to the task of conflict resolution.

      Recalling that Track Two deeds reflect a parallel, unstructured and informal

approach to pursuing conflict resolution, Canadian involvement in such initiatives has

usually remained very low key. A Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

(DFAIT) web-site contains one of the few references to any maritime Track Two

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[47] Peter T. Haydon, "Introduction," in *Multinational Naval Forces, op cit.*, pp. 20-21.
[48] Captain(N) R.W. Allen, "Combined and Joint Operations in Somalia" in *Multinational Naval Forces, op cit.*, pp. 203-230; and Robert H. Thomas, "History of Maritime Peacekeeping Operations," *op cit.*, p. 29
[49] Dennis Passa, The Canadian Press, "No Rest for Ocean-Weary Crew - Protecteur Back in Harbour After Just Two Days Ashore in Australia" *The Halifax Chronicle-Herald*, 22 October 1999, p. A1, and *HMCS PROTECTEUR*, "Operation TOUCAN Diary", *op cit.*, http://www.hmcsprotecteur.com/operatio.htm, 24 October 1999.

activities.[50] Discussions with one of the participating facilitators, David Griffiths,

provided additional amplifying information.[51] Both sources indicate that Canada's

activities in the Middle East serve as a good example of how successful Track Two

actions can be in furthering conflict resolution goals when working in conjunction with

Track One activity. Hence, despite its inconspicuous profile, the ACRS programme

justifiably retains a place as one of the most rewarding areas for a Canadian maritime

contribution to resolving disputes. Drawn from the interview and the DFAIT web-site,

the ensuing paragraphs outline some of the events that warrant that strong assessment.

Although details are sparse, the overall Canadian maritime approach stems, at

least in part, from Canada's involvement in the Track One activity of the Middle East

Peace Process (hereinafter referred to as The Peace Process). The Peace Process was an

initiative of the US and Russia, who acted as co-sponsors when it was launched in 1991.

It focused on "resolving the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict."[52] As part of the

organization within that scheme, Canada chaired discussions on Maritime Confidence-

Building Measures (CBMs) in the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group

(ACRS). ACRS was one of the five working groups that make up the multilateral track

of the Peace Process, with negotiations between Israel and its neighbours representing the

bilateral track.

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[50] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Canada's Contribution to
Arms Control, Regional Stability and Confidence Building in the Middle East --
Multilateral Activities," http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peaceprocess/acrs-e.asp, 1998. To
avoid any risk of misinterpretation this section will assiduously follow the sequence and
logic of the material contained in the web-site augmented by the author's interview with
one of the participating facilitators, David N. Griffiths. All direct quotations, including
short phrases or unique CBM terminology, will show appropriate attributions.
[51] David N. Griffiths interview and email exchange with the author, 27-28 October 1999.
[52] DFAIT, "Canada's Contribution," *op cit.*, p. 1.

In 1992, Canada accepted a request from the ACRS Working Group to serve as "mentor" for maritime CBMs and to prepare "proposals for a series of regional activities to bring regional navies and personnel together."[53] The intent was to work on two vital issues: negotiation toward a regional agreement for the prevention of incidents at sea and safety at sea, particularly in cooperative Search and Rescue (SAR) and Vessel Traffic Services (VTS). The Canadian Navy took the lead in the former and the Canadian Coast Guard in the latter.[54] Between 1993 and 1996, Canada hosted four maritime CBM events "at which high-ranking naval officers from Israel and several Arab countries as well as representatives of the Palestinian Coastal Police attended."[55] One of the most noteworthy successes accomplished during one of the events took place aboard *HMCS HALIFAX* in the waters of the northern Adriatic. Canadians lead a "demonstration of practical [maritime] CBMs" with the representatives observing the evolution. That occasion was a major accomplishment as it was "the first time naval officers from Israel and Arab countries had ever put to sea together."[56]

However, when the Peace Process later encountered severe political difficulties, ACRS work effectively ceased. Fortunately, by the time of the last maritime activity, participants in the maritime CBM process had achieved considerable success in moving toward cooperation in SAR matters. They had produced an incident at sea agreement acceptable to the navies involved. But, the fact remained that the hiatus in ACRS precluded political approval. Griffiths assessed that "the work was not wasted as a great deal of mutual trust and understanding had been achieved and the Canadian facilitators

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[53] *Ibid.*, p. 1 and Griffiths interview.
[54] Griffiths interview.
[55] DFAIT, "Canada's Contribution," *op cit.*, p. 1.

were lead to understand that at least some of the navies were carrying the draft INCSEA in their ships. Moreover, they were prepared to use it if necessary as a gesture of good faith."[57]

At this stage in proceedings, Griffiths indicated that, "having undertaken to facilitate maritime confidence building in the region, Canada was loath to abrogate that undertaking at the very time when it was most important."[58] Through its coast guard, Canada had ongoing connections in the region. It had trained the initial cadre of the newly formed Palestinian Coastal Police and provided boats and communications equipment for its use in Gaza.[59] The Canadian Coast Guard was also cooperating with several Middle East and North African nations in various initiatives involving maritime infrastructure, safety and training. Therefore, the Canadian Coast Guard instituted a series of "Maritime Safety Colloquia," with support from the Canadian government, the United States Coast Guard and Canadian naval officer participation. This forum enabled regional maritime dialogue to continue in a "purely apolitical and technical context."[60] The first two events were held at the Canadian Coast Guard College in Sydney in 1997 and 1998. The third such event is scheduled for mid-November 1999 in Aqaba, Jordan.[61]

Quite accurately, Griffiths has assessed that the Colloquia "have effectively served as a Track Two process that continued the practice of confidence building and

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[56] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[57] Griffiths interview.
[58] *Ibid*.
[59] *Ibid*.
[60] *Ibid*.
[61] DFAIT, "Canada's Contribution," *op cit.*, p. 1-2 and Griffiths interview. Interestingly, the author was an invited participant to present lessons learned on search and rescue and work with other governmental agencies based on his experience in the Swiss Air disaster effort off Nova Scotia, September 1998.

mutual cooperation despite the political impasse."[62] Although each element of progress represented seemingly small steps, David Griffiths' comments on the ACRS Track One activities are equally true for the Track Two initiatives: "Perhaps most important, this [incidents at sea] forum is bringing Middle East naval officers and maritime authorities into regular, personal contact . . . ."[63] If the theory holds true, perhaps the habit of dealing with their counterpart will, in David Last's words, "[rebuild] the trust and mutual confidence of erstwhile enemies, [thus] undermining the causes of conflict and ending mutual hate and fear . . . ."[64] Although no one expects that an enduring peace agreement will result directly from the Canadian efforts, it can be said that the meetings yielded incremental results that at least assembled the parties collectively. Taken together, perhaps such developments may positively influence prospects for a resolution in the longer term.

Accordingly, it is this paper's assertion that Canadian work in the ACRS sub-group met the criterion outlined within the context of the conflict resolution definition. Still, it represented but one part of Canada's maritime effort, and begged the obvious question of what were the implications and lessons learned for a broader maritime contribution to conflict resolution. The common key elements in the observed successes outlined in the text so far were the presence of maritime or naval individuals in company with the parties to the conflict. Put another way, the Track Two contributors were in the same environment where the interests of the parties resided.

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[62] Griffiths interview.

[63] David N. Griffiths, "The Maritime Face of Peacekeeping," *op cit.*, p. 16.

[64] David Last, "Winning the Peace," *Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-escalation in Peacekeeping Operations* (Cornwallis Park: Canadian Peacekeepers Press, 1997), Chap. 6.

In summary, although it would be premature to generalize much based on the limited results reported herein, the inescapable conclusion drawn from the successful maritime conflict resolution experience is that the critical factor is the congruence of the interests, the parties involved in the dispute and the facilitators. For naval and maritime forces at sea that fact alone presents a powerful argument for contact with the disputants. Of import, that observation does not imply that all geographical elements have to correspond before any maritime formation or resource can contribute. It infers, however, that a certain parallel does fit, and presents a strong argument for undertaking face-to-face encounters, at least in Track Two contexts. Equally, even when employed in a classic maritime peacekeeping situation interposed between conflicting parties, it places an increased value on encounters with those at odds with each other. One could surmise that it might be difficult to expect enduring conflict resolution results otherwise.

Finally, one of the overtly stated goals of this paper was, at the operational level, to raise awareness of the application of maritime and naval forces to peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Within the constraints imposed by the operating environment it is evident that, at least where nautical or naval interests are involved, maritime forces have vested interests and key skill sets to apply to the circumstances. The compelling arguments and examples put forward by Thomas, Pugh, Grove, Griffiths and Haydon attest to that reality.

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