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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE/COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
Advanced Military Studies Course – AMSC 2/Cours supérieur d'études de guerre – CSEG 2

ARMY LOGISTICS BEYOND REPAIR: CAN CONTRACTING OUT SAVE THE DAY?

By/par

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3 November 1999

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ARMY LOGISTICS BEYOND REPAIR: CAN CONTRACTING OUT SAVE THE DAY?

By Colonel Robert Maynard

The civilian presence in the Gulf Region meant more than moral support and filling in for soldiers. Gulf War veterans say that combat soldiers could owe their lives to the Department of the Army civilians who helped maintain equipment. Their support tells it all; they've been with their military colleagues every step of the way.

General Gordon R. Sullivan¹

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Canadian Forces (CF) have been involved in an increasing number of expeditionary-type UN and NATO peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the Government of Canada has greatly reduced the size of the CF and the resources allocated to Defence. The reality in this decade is that the Regular Force has been reduced by 30% and the budget cut by 23%, while the tempo of operations has remained at a high level that has been termed unsustainable². In an attempt to maximise the number of personnel employed in Army combat arms units, which bear the brunt of the tasking load, it has been necessary for the CF to cut in other areas. We will concentrate here on one specific area, that of strategic and operational level logistics support,³ because unfortunately it appears that the CF's sustainment capability has been reduced to a level that is below the critical mass. This creates a serious impact on support to international operations and as a result, the CF are not providing the necessary support to deployed troops.⁴ As an example of this poor state of affairs, a Joint Staff Strategic Movement Assessment paper evaluating the CF's capability for strategic movement of troops and equipment concluded that the strategic movement resources currently available to the CF were inadequate to meet the requirement.⁵

¹ Larry L. Toler, "Civilians on the Battlefield," *Army Logistician* 26.6 (November-December 1994): 3.

² Brigadier-General J.M. Comtois, "Contractors in Support of Deployed Operations." Presentation, Red Bank, New Jersey, 18 March 1999, 7.

³ From this point on, I will use the term logistic support to indicate strategic and operational level capability. The tactical level first line of logistics support is integral to the Army units which are deployed on operations.

⁴ Comtois 8.

⁵ Major M.K. Overton, *Joint Staff Strategic Movement Assessment* (Ottawa : DND Canada, 31 July 1996) 3.

There is no simple solution to the problem. Of course, the concept of maximising the number of personnel assigned to combat arms units is a false economy if the necessary logistics support is not available. But unfortunately, maintaining logistics support and reducing combat arms units would have been much worse and would have broken the CF's already strained capability to generate capable units. This is a classic Catch-22 situation that is not resolvable within the normal constraints imposed on the CF.

In an academic discussion, it could be suggested that there is an easy solution available: reduce Canada's commitments to UN and NATO peacekeeping operations to a level commensurate with the CF's capabilities. This point of view will not be envisaged here, as it suggests a fundamental in change in governmental policy. This is not a practical consideration, so the current, and possibly increasing, level of commitments will be considered an imposed constraint.⁶

Similarly, it could be argued that the CF should reduce some of its other components, such as ships and aircraft to concentrate its resources on peacekeeping operations. Again, this is not a practical consideration. The 1994 White Paper and subsequent Defence Planning Guidance documents have repeatedly stated that the CF will maintain a multi-purpose capability and will be ready to respond to a wide range of contingencies⁷. So although there may be some slight adjustments, major changes to the resource allocation to cater for a current global situation will not occur. In fact, it should be noted that due to the large number of missions supported by the Land Force Command, its allocation of personnel was not reduced in the latest cutbacks, and was even slightly increased. However, the Land Forces logistics support capability was still reduced, and was not included in the reengineering effort that most other capabilities went through. In addition, the Militia restructure initiative did not specifically allocate a logistics support role to the Militia.⁸ So the current resource allocation within the CF will also be considered an imposed constraint.

⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence Planning Guidance 2000 (Ottawa : DND Canada, 5 August 1999) 2-5.

⁷ Department of National Defence, "Defence Planning" 2-5.

⁸ Major Michel Guilbeault, Le Soutien au Combat d'Op Sabre en 2010 (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 1998) 3.

To find a solution, it will be necessary to look outside of the normal CF box. There are possibly a number of alternatives that can be considered, most of them complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In this essay, we will look at one in particular that has been proposed in some quarters and that is being considered by many of our Allies: the use by the CF of contractors in logistics support roles.

More specifically, it can be argued that the Canadian Army will find it necessary to use contractors on the battlefield to supplement its military logistics personnel. In preparation for such an eventuality, this paper proposes that the Canadian Army must institutionalise the use of contractors on the battlefield within its logistics doctrine. This will ensure that the effectiveness of logistics support is maintained and will reduce the risks to a minimum. We will investigate this further, using a construct of “thesis – antithesis – synthesis”.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE USE OF CONTRACTORS

Martin van Creveld notes that documentation on using civilian contractors on the battlefield dates back to at least the 16th century. Commanders furnished their armies through the use of “sutlers,” who were paid to bring supplies to their armies.⁹ Since then, all types of general support have been contracted at one time or another. A few developments have made the issue more complex and controversial today. First and foremost, as systems become more sophisticated, the need for civilian technicians to be closer to the battlefield has never been greater. A second strong reason is that the advent of weapons of increased range and the disappearance of the linear battlefield, has placed civilians on the battlefield more than ever before.¹⁰

Generally speaking, there are several reasons for governments to contract out various services and these can be transposed to a military context. The most obvious reason is to conserve fighting strength. In a period of force reductions, contracting out non-combat functions allows the Army to preserve uniformed personnel for combat functions. A second reason is to

⁹ Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 8.

¹⁰ Major James E. Althouse, “Contractors on the Battlefield: What Doctrine Says and Doesn’t Say,” *Army Logistician* 30.6 (November-December 1998): 14.

save money, when a private firm can perform a service at less cost. Often, the cost of training troops to perform a task exceeds the cost of contracting with someone who performs that task on a routine basis. A third reason for contracting is to obtain one-time help. For instance, when political constraints limit troop numbers, some functions can be performed by contractors, who are not counted against force totals. Finally, in some areas there is a need to contract because technological advances create a growing dependence on sophisticated maintenance support, which is not normally available in a military force.¹¹

All these arguments become increasingly attractive in the current conjuncture of rapid reductions in numbers of uniformed personnel. Use of civilians will be increasingly pronounced as under-funding of the military persists. It is likely that, when faced with the dilemma of trying to maintain a level of force structure that is higher than the level of funding, the military will opt to retain a higher teeth-to-tail ratio. This means that combat units will be retained at the expense of logistics support units. The result will be an increased reliance on civilian contractors to provide this logistics support.¹²

Mr. Thomas Edwards, Deputy to the Commanding General of the Army's Combined Arms Support Command, is very straightforward in his praise of contractors on the battlefield and his comments are worth noting:

Today we continue to use contractors and to expand their roles. We're certain that in the next decade, more contractors are going to be required faster, and faster is the key word. With more and more sophisticated systems deploying with rapid reaction forces around the world, the Army has come to depend on the readiness and expertise of manufacturer personnel to support fielded systems. Contractor support has also been shown to have significant cost savings and reliability benefits to the systems with which they are employed.¹³

Lieutenant-General Paul Kern, the top military deputy to the Army acquisition chief, maintains that weapons systems' reliability has been increased with the help of contractor personnel. As a result, the Rangers and the 82nd Airborne Division will be

¹¹ Althouse 15.

¹² Colonel Patrick J. Dulin, "Logistics Vulnerabilities in the Future," Army Logistician 30.1 (January-February 1998): 22.

¹³ Hunter Keeter, "Army Plans for More Battlefield Contractors," Defense Daily 201.32 (19 February 1999): 1.

supported by contractors, if they go to war.¹⁴ There were 54 contracts and 45 contractor organisations serving in Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and nearly 100 US contractors employing more than 1,000 personnel world-wide.¹⁵

Use Of Contractors In US Army

Current fiscal, political and force structure policies in the US limit the availability of military logistics assets for Joint Task Force Commanders' missions. This shortage can only be overcome by using civilian contractor support and they have become an essential component of the US Army's ability to provide the logistic support and sustainment needed for military operations.¹⁶ Lieutenant-General Kern reinforces the need to understand the impact of using contractors: "While the concept of Contractor Logistics Support is certainly not new to the Army, the notion of contracting directly with an original equipment manufacturer to provide complete wholesale logistics support is revolutionary."¹⁷

The role of contractors has been addressed in the US Army by their Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The aim of this program is to obtain logistics, maintenance and engineering support through contracting. It is managed at the strategic level, but allows commanders at both the operational and tactical levels to call up these services. The use of contractors is considered a measure of last resort, but it is necessary in most Operations Other Than War (OOTW) because of troop ceilings, unavailability of host nation support and the need to keep uniformed personnel available for major conflicts.¹⁸

The basic contract funds a small contractor staff to perform studies and conduct logistics planning and training with commanders' staffs. Mobilisation of the contractor to support an actual operation is described in options to the basic contract. The optional support package described in the contract, for which the contractor must develop a notional plan, calls for

¹⁴ Keeter 2.

¹⁵ Keeter 3.

¹⁶ Major Camille M. Nichols, "The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program," *Military Review* 76.2 (March-April 1996): 65.

¹⁷ Lieutenant-General Paul Kern, "Prime Vendor Support: Wave of the Future," *Army RD&A* 98.1 (January-February 1998): 5.

¹⁸ Guilbeault 6.

construction, facilities management and general logistics support services for a force of 20,000 for up to six days.¹⁹

Both the Logistics Management Institute and the General Auditor's Office (GAO) found LOGCAP to be a cost-effective method of providing logistics support. GAO expressed serious concerns about the Army's ability to control and report costs effectively, but by the end of the first year of LOGCAP in Bosnia, USAREUR had developed the necessary cost-reporting systems to overcome earlier criticisms. The solution is to assemble a professional contract management cadre, including financial experts, to augment the normal staff.²⁰

But what is the bottom line as to commanders' satisfaction with the program? The US Army put in place a merit system based on a list of factors for which commanders would allocate a point score, with a bonus being given to the contractor for a result of 71% or more. LOGCAP obtained an 81% or more rating in each of the 66 evaluations that occurred in 1997.²¹

Use Of Contractors In The British Army

To meet increasing international commitments with an overall smaller force, the British Armyevalunanleveancial

commanders can pick and choose the required augmentation based on the type of mission, along with the specialized skill set required. The program provides a means of maintaining the required military capability at cheaper costs. With the exception of a stipend paid to the contractor for basic military training of his employees, costs are limited to periods of call outs on an as required basis.²³

Experiences In Areas Of Operation

The LOGCAP contract with Brown and Root, the first major contractor for this program, had barely been established when it was decided to deploy the US Marines to Somalia in Operation Restore Hope. Host nation support was essentially non-existent, so logistics support was needed immediately and needed to be complete and reliable. Also, there was a political desire to minimise troop presence. The best option available to support the Marines was civilian contractor support, so the Marines requested mobilisation of the LOGCAP contractor. The contractor's responsiveness was remarkable, given the fact that no prior planning had been done for this area of operations. Contractor personnel were on the ground in Somalia one day after the Marines' landing. The contractor received numerous accolades. Although there were problems, these were with the contract mechanics, and the LOGCAP program was validated in actual operations.²⁴

Major-General M.S. White, who was the Logistics Commander for the UK contingent during the Gulf war, describes the logistics support received from the over 40 individuals working on contract very positively. The contribution of Defence contractors was extremely beneficial to equipment availability, sustainability and performance. Their specialist knowledge and advice enabled crews and technicians to operate and maintain their equipment to a significantly better standard than their previous training would have allowed. This co-operation between contractors and soldiers must be maintained and be capable of development for future such conflicts.²⁵

²³ Lefort 6.

²⁴ Nichols 67-68.

From a US Army perspective, Major-General Williams fully supports this point of view on contracting logistics support: “Indeed, the outstanding support provided by contractors during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm ensure contractors will continue to be an integral part of Army sustainment.”²⁶

Lessons learned from the US Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti show that OOTW require a rapid transition to LOGCAP from the initial military deployment in order to restore logistics capability to contingency forces. Early integration and introduction of LOGCAP into the planning process is the key to future success.²⁷

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE USE OF CONTRACTORS

In any discussion on this subject, the first question that comes is whether or not the contractors will be there when they are needed. Perhaps the most important characteristic of logistics support is that it must be reliable. This requires close co-ordination between military and contractor staff. This has not always been the case: although the US Army’s contractor support in Somalia in 1994 was generally excellent, lack of funds caused problems during the transition to UN, as the contractor started to demobilise too early.²⁸

However, the main issue facing us is not whether large contractors will continue to service the contract, but whether or not they will be able to keep their employees on the battlefield when they are needed.²⁹ The example of the opening of the Sarajevo airport in 1992 by the 1 R22eR Battle Group, where UNHCR employed civilian drivers to deliver humanitarian

²⁵ Major-General M.S. White, *Gulf Logistics: Blackadder's War* (London: Brassey's, 1995) 149.

²⁶ Major-General Norman Williams and Jon Schandelmeier, “Contractors on the Battlefield,” *Army* 49.1 (January 1999): 33.

²⁷ Brigadier-General John M. McDuffie, “Force XXI Corps Support,” *Army Logistician* 27.4 (July-August 1995): 30.

²⁸ Nichols 68.

²⁹ Eric Orsini and Lieutenant-Colonel Gary Bublitz, “Contractors on the Battlefield: Risks on the Way Ahead?” *Army Logistician* 31.1 (January-February 1999): 131.

aid, is perhaps more worrisome.³⁰ After one day under artillery bombardment, the drivers left and had to be replaced by Canadian soldiers.³¹

Another important characteristic of logistics support is flexibility. It brings the question of what will happen if the mission requirements change suddenly. The contract is a legal document that defines the expectations of both parties. If the contract is not broad enough, it may need to be modified in the face of a changing situation. The only recourses when changes of this type occur are the modification or termination of the contract. This can mean unacceptable delays and additional costs. “Commanders have enough to worry about in fighting a war; they do not need to be concerned about contracting. They need the flexibility to do what is needed, when it is needed and to the degree it is needed. To have any less flexibility increases risk significantly.”³²

While most civilians are non-combatants, their jobs may be seen as involvement in hostilities, which may make them subject to attack. Whether or not they carry self-defence weapons, their mere presence in the vicinity of a weapon system will suffice to make them targets. For this reason, doctrine generally accepts that there are limitations to the use of contractors in a hostile environment. This statement by Lieutenant-General R.B. Johnston, who was Chief of Staff for General Schwarzkopf during the Gulf War describes his position: “the use of LOGCAP should be limited to the seaport and airport point of entries to a theatre of operations.”³³

The trend toward increased civilianisation of logistics also opens new avenues of attack. Civilian organisations, especially if they are hastily hired, do not have the economic incentive to conduct rigid screening of all employees. This could allow a relatively unsophisticated adversary to infiltrate the logistics information systems, for example, and create much damage.

³⁰ Colonel Michel Jones, NATO’s Combined Joint Task Forces and the Canadian Forces Logistics Support at the Operational Level (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 1998) 4.

³¹ This example is provided for the sake of completeness of the existing concerns on the use of contractors. It should be noted that the UNHCR drivers were in fact local employees, who were specific targets of the fighting parties. So they do not represent normal contractor personnel response.

³² Orsini and Bublitz 131.

³³ Althouse 17.

More direct attacks can also be entertained: as civilian organisations tend to rely more on civilian communications, which are very vulnerable to attack.³⁴

Rear area security is a very important responsibility for the operational level commander. The conduct of a campaign includes, within his theatre of operations, a framework of three space and time areas: deep (enemy's rear), close (the front) and friendly rear where normally the operational level logistics apparatus is located. Because administration provides the physical means by which military forces apply combat power, attacks on the support system can often produce the most damage to a military force. It may, in fact, be the centre of gravity of the force.³⁵ The commander will need to allocate forces to protect contractor employees, whereas uniformed logistics support personnel can provide themselves with some level of self-defence. In addition, civilian employees cannot be transformed readily into infantry soldiers, as commanders have done in the past in dire situations. Major Nichols summarises the issue in stating that commanders must evaluate the operation with respect to the risks to civilians and the military operation if they must provide troops to protect the contractor's operation. Commanders must conduct risk analyses before selecting LOGCAP solutions. However, civilian contractors should not be totally discounted when the situation turns sour - Brown and Root proved themselves by performing admirably under fire in Somalia.³⁶

Finally, opponents of the LOGCAP view the program as expensive, although this perception cannot be validated because there is no reliable way to compare the contractor's actual costs with the military costs of performing the same functions.³⁷

THE REALITY - NEED FOR A COMPROMISE

As could be expected, there are numerous and very real risks in using civilian contractors on the battlefield. There is no doubt that from a purely military point of view, military personnel are generally best suited for most functions on a battlefield, and they should be the first choice for logistics support when planning for an operation. However, this idealised view is not

³⁴ Dulin 23.

³⁵ Jones 6.

³⁶ Nichols 69.

³⁷ Nichols 68.

consistent with current political and fiscal realities: military personnel will not be available in the numbers necessary. Attempting to simply “will” them into existence will result in failure.

The argumentation cannot be resolved by a standard comparison of advantages and disadvantages. It must rather take for granted that contractors will be present on the battlefield and from there, we must make best use of the advantages that they bring while minimising the risks that are incurred. We are thus left with an alternative course of action: the achievement of a critical mass of uniformed personnel employed in logistics support, complemented by the necessary civilian contractors. But what ratio of military to civilian is acceptable? What roles do we assign to the civilians? What are the conditions of their employment? What level of preparation do they receive? If we are not able to answer these questions correctly, the operation will also result in failure.³⁸

Using contractors to provide logistics support services to military operations is not without risk or cost. Accordingly, their use must be institutionalised in military doctrine. The following basic principles can be summarised from the “for” and “against” arguments presented above and they provide a framework for developing the doctrine of using contractors on the battlefield:

- Contractors do not replace force structure. They augment Army capabilities and provide additional options for meeting support requirements.
- Contractors may, subject to operations considerations, deploy throughout the area of operations (AO) and in virtually all conditions. In violent conditions in an echeloned theatre, they generally will be assigned duties at echelons above division. In less violent circumstances, they may be employed throughout the theatre depending upon the operational and tactical situation.
- Commanders are legally responsible for protecting contractors in their AO’s.
- Contractors must have a sufficient number of employees available who have appropriate skills to meet potential sustained requirements.
- Contracted support must be integrated into the overall support plan.

³⁸ Joe Fortner and Ron Jaeckle, “Institutionalizing Contractors on the Battlefield,” Army Logistician 30.6 (November-December 1998): 11.

- Contingency plans must accommodate service continuation if a contractor fails to perform.
- The user community should be unaware that a specific service was provided by a contractor. Links between Army and contractor automated systems must not place any additional burdens on soldiers.
- The Army must remain capable of performing required battlefield functions to provide critical support before contractors arrive in the theatre or in the event contractors do not deploy or cannot continue to provide contracted services.
- Although contractors can provide flexibility at the macro level, commanders must remain aware that, within a given operation, contractor use may decrease flexibility. Changing contractor functional activities to meet shifting operational requirements may require contract modifications, and some battlefield tasks cannot be assigned to contractors.³⁹

When civilian contractors are uprooted from their usual place of business and sent overseas to face adverse conditions, they must know what to expect and they deserve to know they will be taken care of by the military forces. Many problems occurred in the past because the contractors were assigned duties out of their line of work, and under conditions that were unexpected. Civilians need to know what to expect from soldiers, and vice versa. Time must be taken to teach both groups what to expect.⁴⁰

Uniformed troops will be responsible to provide the necessary protection of civilian employees, even though this will create an additional burden. Note also that the Geneva Convention protects civilians in time of war and distinguishes between foreign nationals and the local population. It declares that both combatants and certain other persons are entitled to Prisoner of War status if they carry a Geneva Convention identification card for persons who accompany the Armed Forces.

³⁹ Fortner and Jaeckle 11.

⁴⁰ Althouse 15-16.

With more civilian support personnel on the battlefield, the Army needs to clarify contractors' roles to the field commanders. Among the issues confronting the latter are support for the contractors and under what conditions civilian personnel should be permitted in forward operating areas. In defining these conditions, Mr. Thomas Edwards states that it is necessary to clarify where, in the spectrum of conflict, contractors are needed. It is also necessary to clearly define what the core capabilities are that will never be contracted out. Although it would be preferable for contractor personnel to remain in the rear, it must be accepted that the weapon systems contractors in particular are going to move around the battle space. Establishing the ground rules for employing that support force has been a source of confusion for field commanders in the past and this must change.⁴¹

Lieutenant-General William Pagonis, US Central Command's senior operational logistician summed it up very well by commenting: "It has been and will continue to be necessary to rely upon the private sector for support that we should have in-house."⁴² Ideally, the preferred source of logistics support would be uniformed personnel. The reality, however, is that they are not available and will not be in the current foreseeable future. So there is no alternative. Contractor support must be made to work. Fortunately, past experience has shown that it can be made to work, if we are ready and we fully understand the issues.

THE CANADIAN ARMY PERSPECTIVE

Notwithstanding the existing plentiful and positive documentation, the CF have been reluctant to contemplate the pre-planned use of contractors on the battlefield. Of course, use of civilians in theatres of operations is not new to the Canadian Army: there are currently over 275 locally engaged civilians in Bosnia working with a National Support element of 250 logistics support troops. But the employment of these contractors is done on an ad hoc basis, employing low-skilled labourers available in the local region. There has been no attempt at looking for contractor support in areas that demand more skills.⁴³

⁴¹ Keeter 1.

⁴² Nichols 66.

⁴³ Lefort 7-8.

There have been some recent attempts to spell out a need to abandon traditional views and to consider contractor assistance. In attempting to describe the future, senior planners for the Canadian Army state that traditional methods of administering the Army, both in garrison and on operations, will undergo dramatic change. Support functions that have traditionally been carried out by armed forces themselves, will increasingly be performed by, or integrated with, civilian organisations and agencies. In effect, civilian agencies will perform those support activities that they can perform better or in a more economical way. This approach may see private service providers working directly in an area of operation to deliver support.⁴⁴

The most recent discussion of the use of contractors is found in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Concept Paper developed by the DND RMA Working Group (WG). The WG states that the integration of the Canadian Defence Industrial Base into the Defence Team can be approached in a number of ways, including contractor support on the battlefield, contractor backfill behind deployed CF personnel and global contractor support networks. Such use of the Industrial Base could act as a force multiplier, freeing up scarce resources and broadening access to specialized skill sets. The WG also lists associated issues such as: guaranteeing that the contractor will still show up when the shooting starts; liability insurance for contractor personnel working in war zones; and application of the Geneva Convention to contractors. The WG also introduces non-battlefield related issues such as: the vulnerability of the CF if organic logistics capability is eliminated from its structure; and the transition between two support systems when CF capability is backfilled by industry after deployment.⁴⁵

In recommending that the logistics support community must aim to minimise the size of the support tail/footprint throughout the supply chain, including in-theatre, the DND RMA WG proposes that: “Steps must be taken to increase confidence and safeguards in contracting with industry, particularly with respect to its ability to deliver to in-theatre locations, and its ability to

⁴⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada’s Army, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1998) 119.

⁴⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence Beyond 2010 – The Way Ahead, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 31 May 1999) 25.

overcome “home nation” priority. Future support concepts need to be developed which are closely integrated with, and based on, sound operational concepts.”⁴⁶

Notwithstanding the above recommendations, Canadian doctrine pretty much ignores the concept of using contractors on the battlefield. At the strategic level, it is normally well recognised that all national resources can be used in support of our objectives and, although quite terse in its statement, logistics doctrine states that: “Strategic level logistics is the support provided by the national military and civilian infrastructure. Strategic level logistics is the responsibility of the CDS.”⁴⁷ At the operational level, however, doctrine barely recognises that there is a need to augment forces in campaigns and major operations, and its single sentence comment provides no insight in how this can be achieved: “Operational level logistics is a military effort, but may include augmentation with civilian resources.”⁴⁸

As a result of its doctrine ignoring the possible use of contractors to supplement its organic logistics support capability, the Canadian Army places itself in an extremely vulnerable position and may have to deal with a problem that is beyond its comprehension and ability to control. In fact, is it already too late? Colonel Gord Grant, a logistics specialist in NDHQ, has been tasked by DND to develop a plan for the use of contractors to provide complete logistics support in the Bosnia theatre of operations within the next few years.⁴⁹

CONCLUSION

The use of civilian contractors must not be rejected as it will enhance operational capabilities and effectiveness in the face of continued reductions in numbers of uniformed personnel. For example, the use of specialised technical civilian services and complementing military logisticians at the seaport and airport point of entries of a theatre of operations will allow efficient uses of contractors.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Department of National Defence, “Beyond 2010” A-2.

⁴⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence. B-GG-005-004/AF-013 Logistic Support to Canadian Forces Operations. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 8 January 1998) 1-2.

⁴⁸ Department of National Defence, “B-GG-005-004/AF-013” 1-2.

⁴⁹ Colonel Gord Grant, “Use of Contractors in Bosnia,” Interview at Canadian Forces Staff College (29 October 1999).

⁵⁰ Jones 11.

In the US Army, the use of contractors on the battlefield is now considered a “fait accompli”, and they are taking the necessary measures to ensure that the problems are mitigated. Lieutenant-General John G. Coburn describes a future where the force structure will increasingly consist of a mix of soldiers and contractors. No longer will it seem unusual to see contractors on the battlefield. The US Army will partner with industry through research, production, facility use and “partners on the battlefield.”⁵¹

While contracting is not new, the idea of incorporating the concept of contracting into doctrine is not well understood in the CF. But it is a vital step towards the proper use of this resource. To a certain extent, we are talking about a revolution in logistics, which will require reconstituting the full structure of logistics support.⁵² This will not occur without a deep understanding of the implications on the CF.

A serious study of the US Army experience with LOGCAP must be undertaken. It could be modified for Canadian use, with specific UN mission clauses added. Although not a panacea, it could relieve the strain on our current logistics support structure. It is only with a thorough logistics estimate for a particular operation that we should determine what, where, when and how civilian contractors should be used. The CF must examine the lessons learned by our Allies and then develop the required doctrine, as none currently exists.

⁵¹ Lieutenant-General John G. Coburn, “Linking Today’s Logistics with the 21st Century Force,” *Army* 48.10 (October 1998): 130.

⁵² Lieutenant-Colonel Gregory P. Guillie, “A Logistics Corps and a Logistics Structure,” *Army Logistician* 29.4 (July-August 1997): 40.

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Maj Althouse is working on an M.B.A. degree with a concentration in logistics. He argues that contractors, in one form or another, have been used on the battlefield for centuries, but the changes in modern warfare have not been accounted for with an updated doctrine concerning their presence on the battlefield today.

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This document provides Government of Canada direction to the Department of National Defence.

Coburn, Lieutenant-General John G. “Linking Today’s Logistics with the 21st Century Force.” Army 48.10 (October 1998), 127-132.

LGen Coburn is the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. He discusses the challenge of supporting Army XXI. He then describes the programs and initiative that will get the Army from here to there.

Comtois, Brigadier-General J.M. Contractors in Support of Deployed Operations. Presentation at the U.S. Army Materiel Command LOGCAP World-Wide Requirements Conference, Red Bank, New Jersey, 18 March 1999.

BGen Comtois is Director General Management Renewal Services in NDHQ. He presents a Canadian point of view with respect to contracting logistics services.

Dulin, Colonel Patrick J. “Logistics Vulnerabilities in the Future.” Army Logistician 30.1 (January-February 1998), 20-23.

Col Dulin is CO of the Headquarters and Support Battalion for Camp Pendleton. He examines current trends in logistics that could introduce vulnerabilities for the logistics system. He then introduces some possible remedies.

Fortner, Joe and Jaeckle, Ron. “Institutionalizing Contractors on the Battlefield”. Army Logistician 30.6 (November-December 1998), 11-13.

Ron Jaeckle is chief of the Capstone Doctrine Branch, Directorate of Combat Developments for Combat Service Support, Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia. Joe Fortner is a logistics management specialist in the same organisation. They formulate the principles that apply to the use of contractors on the battlefield. Then they describe the types of contractors that can be used and the roles they can play, as well as some related issues.

Foster, Susan C. “Contractors on the Battlefield: Force Multipliers or Detractors?” Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1998.

Ms Foster is a student at the US Army War College. She acknowledges that contractors have been used in a rear area support role, but are now proposed for forward area roles. She proposes that we proceed carefully, as there are real risks.

Grant, Colonel Gord. “Use of Contractors in Bosnia.” Interview at Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 29 October 1999.

Colonel Grant is a logistics specialist at the National Defence Headquarters. He explains his current assignment of designing contractor support for deployed Canadian Forces in Bosnia.

Guillie, Lieutenant-Colonel Gregory P. “A Logistics Corps and a Logistics Structure.” Army Logistician 29.4 (July-August 1997), 40.

LCol Guillie is a special assistant to the Commanding General Staff Group, Army Materiel Command. He provides a short commentary that argues the need for a new logistics structure, in addition to a logistics corps, to achieve logistics success.

Guilbeault, Major Michel. “Le Soutien au Combat d’OP SABRE en 2010.” Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 1998.

Maj Guilbeault is a student on the CFCSC. He argues that the CF changed the logistics support structure and reduced the assigned resources, but there was no attempt to improve the effectiveness of logistics support. He recommends some changes to the CF logistics doctrine, organisation, training and equipment in the context of supporting our Op SABRE commitments.

Jones, Colonel Michel. "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces and the Canadian Forces Logistics Support at the Operational Level." Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 1998.

Col Jones is a student on the AMSC. He attempts to show that the alternate service delivery initiatives within DND will further impair the Canadian Forces operational logistic support capabilities.

Keeter, Hunter. "Army Plans for More Battlefield Contractors." Defense Daily 201.32 (19 February 1999), 1-3.

Mr. Keeter states that the Army will need a greater quantity of rapid-deployable contractor support personnel on future battlefields, officials said here Tuesday. Then he argues that the Army must clarify the role of contractors if they are to provide effective support of the uniformed commanders.

Kern, Lieutenant-General Paul. "Prime Vendor Support: Wave of the Future." Army RD&A 98.1 (January-February 1998), 5-6.

LGen Kern is Director of the Army Acquisition Corps. He outlines the advantages and risks of contractor support for high technology equipment, in this case the Apache helicopter. He concludes that the benefits outweigh the risks.

Kitchens, John A. Captain, USAF, Economic Analysis for an F-22 Organic vs Contractor Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Ownership Decision, Air Force Inst. Of Tech, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, School of Logistics and Acquisition Management, Sep 97

Capt Kitchens presents an analysis of the cost of contractor maintenance. He also introduces a good summary of the results of an effectiveness study of the LOGCAP programme.

Lefort, Major D.E. "Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield." Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 1998.

Maj Lefort is a student on the CFCSC. He examines issues ranging from the need for doctrinal change to the management of risk in the context of using contractors on the battlefield. He then proposes alternatives for further study.

Lemieux, Major S. "Les Civils sur le Champ de Bataille : le Soutien Logistique de Troisième Ligne de OP SABRE." Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 1998.

Maj Lemieux is a student on the CFCSC. He states that the CF cannot fulfil its commitment to Op SABRE, as the logistics structure has been reduced to a level where third line support will be impossible to provide. He argues that we will need to augment the regular force with reserves and contractors.

McDuffie, Brigadier-General John M. "Force XXI Corps Support." Army Logistician 27.4 (July-August 1995), 26-31.

BGen McDuffie is the Commanding General of the 1st Corps Support Command. He describes the lessons learned from the recent UN operation in Haiti in the context of logistics support for operations other than war.

Nichols, Major Camille M. "The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program." Military Review 76.2 (March-April 1996), 65-72.

Maj Nichols is a congressional legislative liaison officer with the Office of the Secretary of the Army. She provides a full description of the Army LOGCAP program, with some specific examples of its utilisation. She then discusses advantages and problems related to the use of contractors in areas of operation, concluding that there is great potential for this program.

Orsini, Eric and Bublitz, Lieutenant-Colonel Gary. "Contractors on the Battlefield: Risks on the Way Ahead?" Army Logistician 31.1 (January-February 1999), 130-132.

Eric A. Orsini is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment). LCol Gary T. Bublitz is a U.S. Army Reserve Active Guard/Reserve officer in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics). Accepting that the Army is moving toward increased reliance on contractors for battlefield support, they suggest some issues that need to be examined as this initiative progresses. They then call for more discussion of these issues before they become actual problems.

Overton, Major M.K. Joint Staff Strategic Movement Assessment. Ottawa: NDHQ Report, 31 July 1996.

This study investigated the Canadian Forces involvement in recent operations with respect to strategic movement in support of those operations. The study concludes that current capability is inadequate.

Pagonis, Lieutenant-General William G. and Cruikshank, Jeffrey L. Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.

LGen Pagonis provides an anecdotal account of his military career with an emphasis on Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Desert Farewell. Written in a very readable style, the book provides an insight into the tremendous size and complexity of the logistic effort during the Gulf War.

Toler, Larry L. "Civilians on the Battlefield." Army Logistician 26.6 (November-December 1994), 2-6.

Mr Toler is a logistics management specialist at the Army Combined Arms Support Command. He describes the findings of an interdisciplinary team that was chartered to review all issues affecting the deployment of civilians to support military operations.

Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Mr van Creveld examines the impact of logistics on most important modern campaigns of Europe. From that point of view, he offers some new interpretations of some aspects of those campaigns.

White, Major-General M.S. Gulf Logistics: Blackadder's War. London: Brassey's, 1995.

MGen White was the Logistics Commander for the UK contingent during the Gulf war. He describes all aspects of logistics support to the campaign from beginning to end from his own point of view. The book is useful for students of the operational art, as he adds many interesting view points on operational planning for a large campaign such as this one.

Williams, Major-General Norman and Schandelmeier, Jon. "Contractors on the Battlefield." Army 49.1 (January 1999), 33-35.

MGen Williams is the Chief of Staff of the US Army Materiel Command and Mr Schandelmeier is a logistics management specialist at AMC. They examine the trend toward using more contractors for sustainment of operations. They conclude that opportunities for use of contractors will increase in the future, as the Army better defines their roles and status.

Young, David. "Planning: The Key to Contractors on the Battlefield." Army Logistician 31.3 (May-June 1999), 10-13.

David L. Young is the Contingency Contracting Administration Program Manager at the Defence Logistics Agency. He examines various challenges for military planners in preparing for contractors on the battlefield. He then argues that, with proper planning, the growing presence of contractors on the battlefield can be an asset to the US armed forces.