CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE /COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES COURSE 2

NOVEMBER 1999

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

- THE VANGUARD FOR THE REVOLUTION

By/par Captain(Navy) Kevin D.W. Laing

INFORMATION OPERATIONS
– THE VANGUARD FOR THE REVOLUTION

Modern technology is revolutionizing the manner by which information is acquired, processed, displayed and used. The explosion in the availability of information and information technology is shaping our perceptions and giving us the tools that increase our productivity and efficiency. Like other organizations, advances in military information technology are making militaries more efficient. From the layman's perspective, greater efficiency is demonstrated by the video of a laser-guided bomb precisely hitting its target. From the military perspective, however, the ability to put that weapon in that precise spot is merely the "tip of the iceberg". The significant changes lie beneath the surface – the ability to put that weapon in that precise location at a given time from dispersed forces brought together to do precisely that is part of a much broader perspective touted as the "Revolution in Military Affairs" or RMA.

That advances are being made and efficiencies achieved is beyond question. RMA's goal of achieving greater awareness and clarity on the battlefield is aimed at rolling back the Clauswitzian "fog of war". Uncertainty is being replaced by truth, mass by combat multipliers and attrition by precision strike. Technology is honing the tools of warfighting to make the conduct of warfighting more efficient. But is this a revolution? True, the tools are changing, as are the ways we employ them – but whether you're using an axe, a hand saw or a circular saw you're still just cutting wood. In looking at the literature available, one gets the sense that we've focussed on the development of the tools rather than on what's going on around us. There is a revolution going on,

but it is not a revolution of the tools used for warfighting or indeed those used for transferring information. The revolution is in the focus of *international relations* and stems from the *impact* of the widespread availability and currency of information. Significant change is underway. It commenced more than fifty years ago with the creation of the United Nations. The end of the Cold War was a major turning point, and the events of this last decade, the 1990s, give an inkling of how profound the changes are; how fast they are accelerating; and where we are headed. No, we are not *witnessing* a revolution in military affairs…we are *experiencing* a revolution in human affairs – the RHA.

A speech given by Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan at the opening of the 55th Session of the Commission on Human Rights is a testament to this change of focus:

> We all deeply regret that the international community,… failed to prevent this disaster [Kosovo]. What gives me hope -- and should give every future 'ethnic cleanser' and every state-backed architect of mass murder pause -- is that a universal sense of outrage has been provoked. Emerging slowly, but I believe surely, is an international norm against the violent repression of minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of state sovereignty. It is a principle that protects minorities -- and majorities -- from gross violations. And let me therefore be very clear: even though we are an organization of Member States, **the rights and ideals the United Nations exists to protect are those of peoples. …** No government has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in order to violate the human rights or fundamental freedoms of its peoples. Whether a person belongs to the minority or the majority, that person's human rights and fundamental freedoms are sacred.[1]

This paper shifts the focus of the information revolution from the tools of the RMA on the battlefield, to the broader implications of the RHA. To set the stage for understanding this shift, one must first consider some aspects of the UN Charter and the impact that they had on the dynamics of international confrontation in the late 20th century. Next, the human dimension of war,

particularly the mind, must be evaluated because that is the target of war. Consideration will then be given to the impact that information and information operations have on the minds of the leaders and their populations. Finally, a review of the major conflicts in the 1990s will demonstrate how critical information operations are to creating and sustaining the necessary information environment that enables states to collectively wage war in the Information Age.

Every nation acts in the pursuit of its own sovereign interests. These interests are oriented either for the security, preservation and/or aggrandizement of state, leadership, system of government, population and/or culture. When one nation attempts to expand its influence at the expense – real or perceived – of another, conflicts arise. The severity of these collisions of interest is directly related to the importance of the interest being threatened. Traditionally, the pursuit of expansion has been achieved through conquest, subjugation, and confiscation of a state's resources until such time as the victim is subsumed. Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the retreat of colonialism with the consequential increase in the number of independent states, however, the world has become a somewhat "smaller" place. It is "smaller" because, with the exception of Antarctica, there are no remaining land areas without some generally recognized independent, self-governing national authority. Although border alignment may be a source of irritation, generally speaking the playing field is pretty well cast in stone.

Although creation of the UN and the definition of state boundaries did not prevent all conflicts in the latter half of the 20th century, they certainly aided in identifying the aggressor and victim. In these conflict situations, the ultimate international goal was straightforward, unambiguous and soundly based in international law – expel the aggressor and return the situation to that which existed prior to the conflict. This clarity assisted in the development of collective action to prosecute the offender. When undertaken, collective combat action was largely successful and achieved the intended military aim. Probably the best two examples of this type of collective action are the coalition efforts in Korea and the Persian Gulf. Consequently, given the demonstrated success of recent coalition efforts, it is submitted that leaders of states are now less likely to deliberately pursue such overt means of extending their nations' interests.

In considering this change and the evident impact of the United Nations, it is worthwhile to review some of the keystone messages and articles of the UN Charter.

In the Preamble to the Charter, it states that:

> the peoples of the United Nations reaffirmed their "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small".[2]

Article 1 details the purposes of the United Nations. At paragraph 3 it states:

> 3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;[3]

In pursuit of those principles, Article 2 details seven actions which the organization and its members are to abide by. Paragraph 7 is of most interest.

> 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.[4]

In reviewing these articles, one should note that while the Preamble and the Purposes of the United Nations' Charter are oriented towards the promotion and respect of human rights, the actions which nations are directed to follow are based on the integrity and inviolate nature of the state. This notion of non-interference in domestic affairs of a state had been long practiced by the major powers well before the United Nations. Enshrining it in the Charter, however, gave it the virtual status of an immutable commandment that could be trotted out by both established and newly constructed states to stymie attempts to pursue accomplishment of the Charter's broader ideals and purposes. As a result, the UN was severely limited in its pursuit of these broader ideals during the strategic stalemate that existed in the Cold War. Arguably, its existence in the Charter may have been effective in reducing opportunities for super power entanglement, but, unfortunately, some lessor states took full advantage of it to "put their house in order". Let us now turn our attention to the human dimension of war.

Warfare is a human activity.[5] In the "Information Age" with its reliance upon technology, many people – military practitioners, politicians and the normal citizen – seem to be forgetting that war is a human, not a technical activity.

Certainly, warfare is technical in execution – increasingly so in the current era – but it is a human decision, based on the mind's knowledge and perceptions of the situation, whether to wage war or to pursue peaceful means for achieving objectives. So what is knowledge?

Both knowledge and beliefs can be thought of as systems of organizing information. On the one hand, knowledge is based on a methodology that takes empirical data gained by senses (observation) which, through cognitive processes, assigns some meaning that can be perceived by the human mind. This elevates "observation" from data to information. This information is then organized, subjected to some hypothesis and, when "scientifically" proven to be valid, is accepted as knowledge. On the other hand, beliefs take observations, massage them through non-verifiable perceptions (phobias, the sub-conscious, unconscious)[6] and arrives at an assessment or faith in their validity, rather than relying upon scientific proof. In essence, the difference between knowledge and belief is that the validity of knowledge can be tested in relation to something else, whereas beliefs cannot.[7] Admittedly, both can be tenaciously held as "truths". Although beliefs can shape the interpretation of information, the scientific demonstration of knowledge versus belief usually modifies the belief. What is important for this discussion, is that both knowledge and beliefs – the *epistemology* of an individual – are components of the human mind and form the basis for the determination of human will and decision-making. Why is this important?

According to Col. Szafranski, "Warfare is the set of all lethal and non-lethal activities undertaken to subdue the hostile will of an adversary or enemy"[8]. The objective is to make the other party behave in a manner favourable to the accomplishment of your objectives. The core element or "centre of gravity" is the will of the opponent. From a popular perspective, will is often accepted to be the "collective" will of the population of a state or group. In reality, however, although the population may exert influence, it is the leader who makes the "decision to engage in warfare, including the decision to terminate warfare"[9]. It must be remembered that today, "the head of state [has] virtual presence in the theatre of war".[10] Consequently, it is the "hostile will of the enemy leaders that must be subdued to be successful in warfare."[11] Will is based on knowledge derived from information and shaped by the cognitive framework of culture.

With this understanding that will is the target of warfare, let us turn to one of the weapons that is aimed directly at it in the information age. Before doing so, however, it is important to properly set the framework. It is submitted that much of contemporary military writing considers IW primarily in offensive terms. Indeed, because we (predominantly western countries) consider ourselves to have the modern technological tools, the tendency is to think of how we can affect the opponent – blind them, target their communication nodes, affect their population and leaders. To appreciate the challenges that lie ahead, however, we must picture ourselves as the intended victim. Why? Because, in all probability we will conduct military operations in coalition environments and contemporary coalitions are inherently "politically fragile".[12] Coalitions are not monolithic; they are

comprised of individual states, each of which has a leader who has his or her

own individual *epistemology* that is subject to manipulation through information

warfare. Indeed, the United States has already been victimized at least twice –

once in Vietnam and more recently in Somalia. In this instance, a Somali clan

leader, Mohammed Aideed, who reportedly had fifteen times the number of

casualties as US forces, cleverly used television images of a dead American

soldier being dragged through the streets to achieve his objective – the departure

of the US.[13] Let us now turn to the use of information as a tool of warfare.

The U.S. DOD defines *Information Operations* as "actions taken to affect

adversary information and information systems, while defending one's own

information and information systems."[14] Martin Libicki distinguishes between

seven forms of information warfare: (I) Command and Control, (ii) Intelligence

based, (iii) Electronic, (iv) Psychological, (v) "Hacker", (vi) Economic, and (vii)

Cyberwarfare.[15] Of these, only command and control (C^2) and psychological

warfare are primarily aimed at the leader. The two forms, however, have different

approaches. C^2W, often termed the "head and neck" approach, focuses on

separating or isolating the leader from his forces through primarily physical

attacks on command, control and communications facilities. Therefore, of the

two, we are most interested in psychological warfare as its target is the mind.

Psychological operations or PSYOP is defined as "operations planned to

convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their

emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign

governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."[16] The purpose is to induce

or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior to make it favorable to the originator's objectives.[17]

According to Libicki, PSYOP can be conducted against national will, commanders, troops and culture.[18] As "counter-troops" has primarily a battlefield or tactical focus, it is not applicable to this higher level discussion. PSYOP is not new and has been long practiced in warfare. Historically, well-documented examples of successful acts of deception, disorientation and confusion have been demonstrated from the Trojan Horse to Desert Storm. In today's complex information environment, however, it is a more challenging task to execute successful deception in the presence of total battlespace awareness. Prior to combat, the goal of "counter-commander" is to confuse and disorient by manipulating what he observes. After the commencement of combat operations, you dictate how he observes. Once control of how he receives information is seized, you can fully manipulate what he receives and shape the perception of it to suit your requirements. This will affect the decisions that are subsequently made and the course of the battle.

"Counter-culture" and "counter-will" are closely related as culture shapes the interpretation and perceptions of beliefs and knowledge, which, as we have seen, are fundamental elements of will. Of interest to our discussion, however, is to note that democracies, by their nature are rarely homogeneous societies. Consequently, several cultures may exist within and be shared between states. Therefore, the epistemology of democracies is not necessarily universal. As a result, developing an IW plan may be a highly complex and challenging

undertaking. Similarly, defending against an IW attack is also a daunting task. As is true for many endeavours, however, the best defense is a strong offense. This is particularly true in the Information Age as democratic states must shape their own internal information environments to generate and maintain support for the government's actions. Failure to do this can alienate a segment of the population thus hindering the successful achievement of stated objectives. As well, it is important to remember that the message that may be produced to support national objectives is also being heard elsewhere – in the capitals of both friend and foe.

Information technology has greatly increased the sphere of the battlefield and the effects that it has on the participants, leaders and citizens of the affected nations. The military no longer has a monopoly on the management and the presentation of battlefield information. Journalists have the means to "ensure that events anywhere on the planet, whether authentic or arranged for show, can be delivered to audiences in many countries"[19]. And today, by virtue of the immediacy of direct-link satellite technology, the time between the occurrence of an event and the widespread knowledge of that event both at home and in the adversary's capital is substantially reduced. Indeed, the technological means to provide information by one nation's leader to another nation's citizens, with or without their leader's permission, is eroding one of the aspects of national sovereignty.[20] So what is the relevance of this increased visibility? It shapes the perceptions of the supporters of waging war – the populations and leaders of the states participating in the collective effort.

Coalition warfare is not a new phenomenon of the 20th century. The reality of human history is that relations between states have been conducted in a continuum of shifting coalitions and alliances. For example, during the Napoleonic wars, seven coalitions were formed against France at one time or another, with several of the states changing sides during the period.[21]

While alliances and coalitions share many attributes, they are different. Alliances tend to be formalized affairs designed for the achievement of broad, long-term objectives, whereas coalitions are "formed almost exclusively for wartime purposes"[22]. The creation of fixed military alliances in peacetime is a relatively recent occurrence begun by Bismark in 1879 with the creation of the Austro-German alliance.[23] Over the course of the 20th century, however, alliances have received mixed reviews. From a positive perspective, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can only be considered a success in that it achieved its members' stated objective of "maintaining peace and defending their freedom".[24] The longevity of this alliance, its level of integration and the consultative, diplomatic mechanisms that are in place, make this a remarkably resilient international organization. On the other hand, the system of alliances and treaties that existed in Europe prior to WWI is thought to be one of the major contributing factors to the start of the war. This, plus the development of the League of Nations (which was seen to replace the requirement for alliances), resulted in the avoidance of formal alliances in the inter-war years[25]. Conversely, coalitions, the predominant form of cooperative effort throughout history, tend to

be short-term, informal agreements developed with a common, immediate goal in mind.

The impetus for the formation of a coalition is practical necessity, while the glue for its maintenance is self-interest. Nations join "to overcome a common threat or situation that an individual nation could not face alone."[26] Weak states align themselves with stronger ones for protection against more powerful adversaries, while strong ones may be pursuing a strategy of justification, for "few factors contribute to public legitimacy like a coalition effort."[27] Coalitions provide dual security – aid from partners in times of hostility, and assistance to those whose defeat would be disastrous to self-interests.[28] There are, however, costs for joining coalitions; the principal one is the requirement to surrender a portion of sovereignty. The amount of sovereignty which nations are willing to cede to the coalition depends upon the perceived importance of the interest being threatened and the level of the assessed threat. This, in turn, influences decisions regarding contribution of resources – be they money, manpower, materiel or simply moral support – and the amount of control over these resources which they wish to retain or give to the coalition. Coalition participation is, however, a dynamic undertaking, for nations continuously evaluate whether the costs of their participation are being validated by the benefits being derived. It is this ongoing evaluation that makes coalition participation politically "fragile" and, militarily a challenge, as coalition politics often override military logic.[29] As Paul Kennedy notes, "Coalitions were usually not the same midway through the war as they had been prior to the conflict; and they were rarely, if ever, the same

by the end of it."[30] It is the dynamic and fragile nature of coalitions that is particularly relevant to contemporary operations. Let us now consider some of the vulnerabilities that are extant in contemporary coalition operations.

At a conference hosted by the US Army Europe in 1996, Thomas Marshall noted that, "Differences in languages, terminology, military doctrine, equipment, capabilities, and command organization may all have been present in previous operations, but may be exacerbated by the level of interaction among units and limited preparation time available to most coalitions."[31] Similarly, Wayne Silkett notes that "a coalition leader must contend with…often huge differences in operational-level realities such as goals, training, capabilities, equipment, logistics, culture, doctrine, intelligence, and language."[32] Finally, Steve Bowman develops a list similar to Silkett's, except that he has broken the list into two parts – those that he considers to be historical points of friction and those that are culturally based.[33] Although coalition leaders must be cognizant that each point is a potential source of coalition vulnerability, by and large, these are lower level concerns that affect the mechanics of integration of forces in the Coalition implementation phase. Of particular concern to this discussion are the potential IW targets that affect the ability to generate a coalition.

It is submitted that there are seven fundamental areas against which a nation will evaluate its potential participation in a coalition. They are: Nature of the Transgression, Goals of the Coalition, Legality, Regional Acceptance, Burden Sharing, Culture, and Probability of Success. Arguably, Coalition Goals and Legality are the cornerstones, but fractures in the others will increase lower level

friction and seriously prejudice each nation's continuing cycle of participation evaluation. Let us briefly review each:

    a. *Nature of Transgression*. – The more overt and unambiguous the transgression, the easier it will be to develop a broadly supported coalition.

    b. *Coalition Goals*. – The glue of a coalition. They identify the overall objective and provide the rationale for the expenditure of effort and the sustainment of loss. The more important the goal, the greater tolerance there is for compromise and sacrifice. While there may be a common goal, it must be acknowledged that the successful conclusion of the operation will mean different things to each participant. Therefore, the aims of each participant may not be identical.[34]

    c. *Legality*. – The cornerstone of relations between states. It is maintained by conforming to the generally accepted practice of states and through adherence to the various laws, treaties, conventions and Charters in existence. In modern practice, resolutions passed by the UN are seen to provide the legal basis for collective action. Nations who do not agree to the legality of the proposed operation, are unlikely to be willing and reliable participants.

    d. *Regional Acceptance*. – The state or region receiving the international support must be supportive of the effort and willing to assist. This can be demonstrated through the provision of basing and over-flight rights,

infrastructure, economic assistance or simply the positive preparation of the local population to receive the intended support. Failure to do so will cause coalition nations to question the validity of their participation.

e. _Burden Sharing_. – deployment and sustainment of forces is expensive. Depending on the distance and the forces contributed, not all nations will have equal costs. As well, rich nations will be expected to support poorer ones either economically or through the provision of services and/or materiel. But burden sharing is not solely restricted to economics and may include concerns of influence, risk and responsibility. Early resolution of burden sharing will ease the enlistment of participating nations.

f. _Culture_. – A critical factor in coalition development and sustainability. The key to success in this area is not to avoid it, but to address the sensitivities in such a fashion that makes cultural differences a "non-event".

g. _Probability of Success_. – Nothing contributes more to team spirit than the certainty of victory. This clearly is dependent on the assessment of forces, the goals of the coalition, the "justness" of the cause and the commitment to ultimate victory by each of the participants.

The development of the Coalition and the erection of its "Pillars of Solidarity" take place in a dynamic information environment. This information environment can be considered as the atmosphere created through the reports

made by the major media sources available to the populations of the participating states. It is, however, a very subjective topic and accurate assessment of whether the atmosphere appears to be positive, negative or essentially neutral can only be arrived at through polling of the audience. Although the information environment is continuous throughout, there are two distinct phases – pre-combat and during combat. In the pre-combat phase, clearly, the inter-relationship of the first three sets the initial tone. There is a direct relationship between each of these "Pillars" – the more pronounced the Nature of the Transgression, the stronger the Goals and the Legal basis for action. Similarly, the stronger the case, the more likely a positive information environment will be created. This obviously affects the achievement of the remaining "Pillars". Although a coordinated information plan is required for each coalition, the management effort required is inversely proportional to the strength and the justness of the cause. Irrespectively, it is necessary to be proactive in order to seize and maintain the information initiative. In the combat phase it is likely that the emphasis will shift to reactive management of the adversary's IW efforts in response to coalition combat actions.

With this understanding of human will as the target for information operations, and an appreciation of the vulnerability of the threads which bind coalitions, let us now consider what has transpired over the last decade.

It is submitted that there are three major factors that have significantly influenced the conduct of international relations in the latter half of the 20th century. These factors are the increasingly integrated global economy; the

explosion of information exchange facilitated by communications technology; and the immediacy of the delivery capabilities of the world media. The net impact of these factors is that nations are ceding much of the control that they have traditionally had in managing their economies and shaping the perception of their populations. Through this erosion of national sovereignty, countries have less control over currencies and their valuations, businesses and their regulation, and markets and commodity prices. From the information perspective, borders are more porous, there is a freer movement of ideas and, of particular concern to totalitarian regimes, an increase in the access and sources of information available to their publics.[35]

It is submitted that the integration of the world economy, spurred by the increasing availability of information, was largely responsible for Gorbachev's promotion of his twin policies of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) for reforming the Soviet Union. This significant change of Soviet policy opened the proverbial "Pandora's Box" and laid the foundation for the rapid rise in the passion for freedom and democracy in the peoples of the former Soviet Union and their satellite countries in the Warsaw Pact. As a result, these decrepit and ideologically and economically bankrupt regimes collapsed.

The end of the Cold War, in large part, removed many of the obstacles that had hindered the ability of the UN to respond to international crisis over the previous four decades. Following that heady November of 1989, when the walls of European communism literally and figuratively crumbled, the international community was faced with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Although a US- vice a UN-

led collective effort, it was the first test of the post-Cold War era and, from an information environment perspective, it could not have been better conceived. Let us consider this situation by referring to the "Pillars of Solidarity".

    a. *Nature of Transgression*. This was an obvious case of naked and unprovoked aggression against a sovereign member of the United Nations.

    b. *Strategic Goals*. The threat posed by Iraq to the world's oil supplies was clearly against the vital strategic interests of the United States and most of the major industrialized powers of the western world. This provided the necessary impetus for these countries to provide military forces in response to the threat.

    c. *Legal Basis*. This unambiguous and unprovoked attack was clearly a violation of the UN Charter and international law. This enabled the UN to pass the appropriate resolutions that provided the legal basis for military action. This legal basis facilitated the presentation of this action as a "just cause" and permitted the development and sustainment of broad popular public support for the preparations for military action.

    d. *Regional Acceptance for Intervention*. The threat to the stability of the Gulf region was of direct interest to the nations in that area. Despite pre-existing ideological differences, the situation was of such concern that the majority of nations tolerated, if not welcomed, foreign intervention.

e. *Burden sharing*. Given the importance of this situation to the nations, both those of the coalition and those of the region, there was great motivation to share the economic costs required to sustain the effort.

f. *Culture*. The potentially thorny issue of a cultural, ethnic or religious based war was significantly eased by the fact that it was an Arab country that had attacked another Arab country. This greatly mitigated the opportunity for a potentially divisive belief-based information warfare campaign. Although Iraq tried to change the conflict into an Arab-Israeli one through Sculan n7Ted attacns, thea

cnclus

demonstrated that he had no idea of how to use the information environment. As a result, the international media was pre-disposed to support the Coalition's efforts. In the combat phase, the "halo effect" of the previous phase carried over and was sufficient to withstand the occasional instance of unintentional damage. Additionally, the new technologies provided startling visual proof of western weapon technological superiority and effectiveness. All of these facets were used to significant advantage by the Coalition. In American Gallup polls, conducted on 16 January and 24 February 1991, approval ratings for US involvement stood at 79% at the commencement of the Air War and 84% at the start of the ground campaign[36]. The result was a complete military victory in all environments – at sea, in the air, on the ground and in the media.

Let us now consider the war that was conducted at the end of the decade. This was an entirely different situation. What motivated NATO, a consistently professed defensive alliance, to take offensive action against Serbia – a sovereign country? Such action would have been inconceivable ten years before. What had changed? The difference lies in what had transpired in the years following the successful collective effort in the Gulf War.

Why was quick and decisive action taken in Kosovo but not in Bosnia or Rwanda? It is submitted that this action was undertaken because, by 1998, leading powers and the UN knew, from a moral perspective, that they ***should have*** intervened in these other areas but failed to. This failure cost the lives of roughly a million human beings. There was the realization (by both NATO and

the UN) that **somebody** had to take action to avoid a repetition of these human tragedies. The major impediment, of course, was paragraph 7 of Article 2. Under international law, intervention in a state's domestic affairs is illegal. Without a legal basis there was little hope that a coalition could be formed. Clearly, action had to be taken if the purpose of the UN was to be achieved. Therefore, if it *couldn't* be a coalition, it *had* to be an alliance that took action. Indeed, once the records are unsealed in the future, it would not be surprising to learn that senior UN officials quietly asked, perhaps even implored, NATO to act.

Although it was an Alliance that took action vice a coalition, let us consider the same "Pillars of Solidarity".

a. *Nature of Transgression*. This was a conflict initiated by a state against a people within its borders. It was a humanitarian tragedy that affronted morality (of the western world, at least) but, as it did not cross an internationally recognized border, it was not an obvious breach of international law as currently described in the UN Charter.

b. *Strategic Goals*. Kosovo was not a vital strategic interest. The principal interest stemmed from historical remembrances of the implications of regional instability. There was no concrete geographic or economic based interest at stake – rather it was the notion, concept or belief of humanitarian rights. Beliefs and concepts, however, mean different things to different people.

c. _Legal Basis_. As reflected in Article 2 of the Charter, from a narrow legal perspective the sanctity of domestic affairs precluded the UN from supporting NATO's intervention in Kosovo. Perhaps, in the fullness of time an agreed upon approach could have been developed, but by then it would have been too late. It was obvious that there would be no resolutions forthcoming that could provide the traditional legal basis. A most vivid demonstration of the effect was the inability to establish a Maritime Visit and Search regime in the Adriatic. At the Washington Summit, NATO Ministers agreed to institute such a measure in an attempt to stop the flow of oil to Serbia. In practical application, however, the absence of a legal basis meant that NATO maritime forces had no authority to compel compliance. This inability to enforce compliance precluded the establishment of any effective regime. Had enforcement been attempted, it is likely that there would have been an escalation with nations not currently part of the dispute. This absence of a legal basis was the key vulnerability to – and severely tested the cohesion of – NATO. There was no way an ad hoc coalition could have survived.

d. _Regional Acceptance for Intervention_. Acceptance of deploying forces was not universal. Even NATO nations in theatre who supported the Alliance's efforts had to tread lightly when dealing with their publics. Greece was forced to suspend arrival of deploying NATO forces during elections due to concerns of an insufficient number of security forces to

manage both situations. In consideration of local sensitivities, once NATO forces did arrive, they generally remained in port complexes until dark before moving on to staging areas in Macedonia. Additionally, the stability of the front line states was threatened by the huge influx of Kosovar refugees. The result was severe strain on their relations with western countries and the requirement for continuous and careful diplomacy.

e. *Burden sharing*. As this was an Alliance effort, costs were borne by the alliance members and burden sharing was not an Alliance IW target. Having said this, however, within the nations themselves the incremental costs to conduct the operations were subjected to debate and were IW targets.

f. *Culture*. Although the conflict was culturally motivated, it was not cultural differences between the participants of the Alliance that was at issue. Consequently, although not a factor to the Alliance, NATO took great pains to demonstrate that their target was the actions of the government of Serbia – not the Serbian people or culture.

g. *Probability of Success*. NATO leaders were sure of victory in the early part of the air campaign. As the campaign dragged into its third month, however, the increasing talk of introducing ground troops and a re-invigorated courtship of Russia to assist in bringing Milosevic to the table are likely indicators that things were not going as they had

intended at the outset. Fortunately, whatever fractures that did exist in the Alliance remained hidden.

Like the Gulf War, the information environment was the first critical battleground. In Kosovo, however, it was a real contest and both the Alliance and Milosevic knew this. When the conflict began, Milosevic stated "I am ready to walk on corpses and the west is not – that is why I shall win".[37] He knew that he could not win a military victory over NATO, but he was sure that he could break the cohesion of the Alliance and win the war through the information environment. In the preparation phase, the Alliance's tasks were to transform the "value" of humanitarian intervention into a strategic "interest", and then fill the legal void with a "higher" moral obligation to act for the common good. This was the "just cause" which could then be sold to theirs' and the world's publics. This required development of a detailed information plan coordinated between the various diplomatic and military offices of both the organization and the individual member states. The Alliance then had to seize the initiative and proactively build their case ensuring that the messages put out by all entities were consistent and directly relevant to the "just cause". During the conflict, however, the advantage shifted to Serbia. With its centrally controlled media and the tight restrictions it placed on western journalists, it was able to direct the course of events. It could produce more vivid, emotionally charged images of "non-military" targets ostensibly destroyed by NATO warplanes faster than NATO could investigate and refute alleged errors and "atrocities". As well, without journalists in Kosovo,

NATO was unable to provide visual images of ethnic cleansing to substantiate the validity of their intervention action. The exodus of refugees and the tales of horror they told were believable, but lacked the impact that otherwise might have been achieved. An editorial in the New York Times pointed out three unwritten rules for the Serbian War: 1. No casualties on our side; 2. No casualties on their side; and, 3. Do it fast, before public support collapses at home.[38] American Gallup poll results verify the validity of this short statement. A few days before the commencement of operations only 46% of Americans polled supported military intervention versus 43% opposed. Within three weeks this had changed to 61% for versus 35% against. By the latter part of May, however, support was dwindling to a virtual tie with only 49% for versus 47% against.[39] Nonetheless, the proactive and coordinated media campaign conducted by NATO, plus the credibility that it garnered and maintained throughout the campaign, created an information environment which sustained Alliance operations.

Perhaps it is too soon to make a full account of the results, but the immediate objectives of the international community were served – ethnic cleansing in Kosovo stopped, Milosevic's forces left the province and stability returned to the neighbouring countries. The results turned out the way they did because NATO succeeded in the information environment and remained united and committed to the cause. That was the real defeat of Milosevic.

It is unlikely, however, that any coalition could have achieved the results that NATO did. A review of the "Solidarity Pillars" shows that at virtually every

point of potential divisiveness, the situation was such that a coalition would have fractured.

What does this portend for coalitions, alliances and the information environment? One must accept that we are in a period of transition. NATO's action in Kosovo established the precedence for humanitarian intervention. This, plus the UN's move to legitimize such intervention and the International Court of Justice's demonstrated increased willingness to prosecute crimes against humanity, should, in the words of Kofi Annan, "give every future 'ethnic cleanser' and every state-backed architect of mass murder pause". The international media will also pause to consider and digest what has happened. They will likely be the ones to first recognize and appreciate the validity and the probity of this change and accelerate its support and adoption by the international community. No doubt, there will be leaders and states who may wish to challenge the international community's commitment to this change. This new environment, however, will support and sustain coalitions formed to deal with the crisis, because the value of humanity will be a strategic interest and the law will provide the legal basis for the intervention.

The continued growth of information technology is inevitable. It will continue to shrink the world in which we live. Not only will states be brought closer together, but so will people. With the reasonable expectation that Kofi Annan and the UN are successful, one can project that in the next decade or so, the mechanisms and the bounds for acting in support of similar interventions, if required, will be developed. Over the longer term – twenty-five, fifty, a hundred

years – the consideration of human rights as a belief based "value" will change to become a known and commonly understood human "interest". This, therefore, is the essence of the Revolution in Human Affairs – individual and collective action based on the "interests" of humanity vice sovereignty.

In conclusion, we are experiencing not a Revolution in Military Affairs, but a Revolution in Human Affairs. Information technology and its use to support various information operations are having an impact far beyond the narrow viewpoint of the warrior. Not only is it affecting the conduct of warfare, more importantly, it is affecting the ability of nations to engage in and sustain warfare. Given that threats to international security will continue to be responded to by coalitions comprised of like-minded but independent states, before the first shot is fired in pursuit of the "just cause", they must first win the battle in the information environment. Why? – Because warfare, like diplomacy, is an activity of the human mind. The epistemologies of those who direct the states' operations are vulnerable to the power and persuasiveness of information. As increased availability of information transitions the world to democratic institutions, the support that populations are willing to give to the adventures of state will be dependent on the perceptions formed in the information environment. A coalition's failure in the information environment will preclude its ability to field forces for battle.

The events of the 1990s portend the future impact of information operations on both collective action and on the shifting focus of international relations. As we entered the 1990s, the international community faced an

unambiguous, cross-border invasion of one state by another. This enabled it to band together and fight the first war under the "New World Order". The effort was founded on law and, in the traditional sense, was interest-based. This justified the cause and any potential sacrifices. The information environment was ideal for the establishment and sustainment of a coalition. Over the next several years, the world witnessed the growing and ugly spectre of genocide. The flagrant violations of human rights, the preservation of which is so fundamental to the UN Charter, were loudly and vigourously debated in the UN – now freed and unfettered by the stifling effects of the Cold War. But the law concerning the inviolate nature of a state's internal affairs prevented the UN from intervening and taking action to preserve human life. The cost in human terms, the mockery that this made of the ideals of the UN and the fallacy of Article 2 was vividly and horribly demonstrated. When the threat to humanity arose in Kosovo, it was recognized that law or no law, intervention was justified for the value and sanctity of human life. Appreciating, that the information tools available to the adversary and that the environment would not support a 1990-type coalition, the NATO alliance, either on its own or quietly urged by the UN, acted and prevailed.

Battles and warfare will continue to exist in the future, but the reasons that they will be fought will go beyond the current concept of state interests. The 1990s have demonstrated that we are in the transition period of the Revolution of Human Affairs where the "value" of humanity is changing to an "interest". Unthinkable at the start of the decade, the belief in the inviolate nature of sovereignty for the purpose of destroying humanity was proven to be wrong at

the end. This proof gives us the knowledge necessary to accept the "value" of

humanity as the "interest" of humanity. Once adopted, this "interest" will become

another of the interests of states. With that will come the legal basis and

mechanisms necessary to finally achieve the UN's purpose –

> To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

NOTES

[1] Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, speech to *Opening of the 55th Session of the Commission on Human Rights,*" 7 April 1999,
[Hhttp://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/6eb37a89cad0ae7d8025660f005cee27/a6466321c23e10068025662e00569454?OpenDocumentH]

[2] "The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations", [www.un.org/Overview/Charter/preamble]

[3] "Article 1," *Charter of the United Nations* [http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter1.html]

[4] "Article 2," Ibid.

[5] Richard Szafranski, "Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill," in *Athena's Camp – Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, ed by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, Ca., RAND, 1997) p 396.

[6] Richard Szafranski, "A Theory of Information Warfare – Preparing for 2020," *Airpower Journal*, (Spring 1995), p 59.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Ibid,* p 57.

[9] *Ibid,* p 58.

[10] Robert R. Leonhard, *The Principles of War for the Information Age* (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1998), p 156.

[11] Joseph A. Englebrecht, "War Termination: Why Does a State Decide to Stop Fighting"(Phd diss for Columbia University), as cited by Szafranski in *A Theory…*, p 58.

[12] Steven Metz, "The Effect of Technological Asymmetry on Coalition Operations," in *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations*, ed by Thomas J. Marshall, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army War College, December 1997) p 56.

[13] Martin C. Libicki, *What is Information Warfare?* (Washington, D.C., National Defense University, August 1995), p 36.

[14] US Department of Defense. Joint Pub 3-13 *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, (Washington., D.C., US DOD, October 9, 1998) p I-9.

[15] Libicki, p x.

[16] US Department of Defense. Joint Pub 3-53 *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, (Washington., D.C., US DOD, July 10, 1996) p I-1.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] Libicki, p 35.

[19] Ibid, p 36.

[20] *Ibid*, p 37.

[21] Wayne A. Silkett, "Alliance and Coalition Warfare", *Parameters* (Summer 1993), p 74.

[22] Paul Kennedy, "Introduction" to *Coalition Warfare – An Uneasy Accord*, ed by Keith Neilson and Roy A. Prete, (Waterloo, Ont., Can., Wilfred Laurier Universiy Press, 1983) p 4.

[23] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, (New York, NY, Random House, 1987) p 249.

[24] "What is NATO", [www.saclantc.nato.int/nato/handbook]

[25] Kennedy, "Coalition Warfare…" p 4.

[26] Steve Bowman, "Historical and Cultural Influences on Coalition Operations," in *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations*, ed by Thomas J. Marshall, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army War College, December 1997) p 1.

[27] Silkett, p 75.

[28] Kennedy, *Coalition Warfare*, p 6.

[29] Bowman, p 8.

[30] Kennedy, *Coalition Warfare*, p 3.

[31] Thomas J. Marshall, "Foreword" to *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations* ed., by T.J. Marshall (Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army War College, December 1997) p viii.

[32] Silkett, p 79.

[33] Bowman, p 2 to 12.

[34] Silkett, p 79.

[35] Brian Nichiporuk and Carl Builder, "Societal Implications," in *Athena's Camp – Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, ed by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, Ca., RAND, 1997) p 304.

[36] Frank Newport, "Public Support for U.S. Involvement in Yugoslavia Lower Than for Gulf War, Other Foreign Engagements" *Gallup News Service*, Poll Releases, March 30, 1999, found at Hhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990330.aspH

[37] Samuel R. Berger, Ass't to the President for National Security Affairs, in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. July 26, 1999.

[38] Josef Joffe, "Three Unwritten Rules of the Serbian War", *New York Times*, Late Edition (East Coast), 25 July 1999, pg. 15.

[39] Frank Newport, "Support for U.S. Kosovo Involvement Drops" *Gallup News Service*, Poll Releases, May 26, 1999, found at Hhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990526.aspH

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Bin Alberto, Hill Richard, Jones Archer. *DESERT STORM – A Forgotten War.* Westport, Connecticut, Preager, 1998.

Campen, Alan, D., Dearth, Douglas, and Goodden, R Thomas. *Cyberware, Security, Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age*. Fairfax Virginia, AFCEA Int'l Ppress, May 1996.

Campen, Alan, D. *The First Information War.* Fairfax, Virginia, AFCEA Int'l Press, October 1992.

Chaudhry, Moshud, H. *Coalition Warfare, Can the Gulf War – 91 Be the model for the future.?* Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army War College, 21 February 1992.

Kennedy, Paul. "Introduction," *Coalition Warfare – An Uneasy Accord*. ed by Keith Neilson and Roy A. Prete, Waterloo, Ont., Can., Wilfred Laurier Universiy Press, 1983.

Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, New York, NY, Random House, 1987.

Kuehl, Daniel, T. *Strategic Information Warfare: A Concept.* SDSC Working Paper. Canberra Australia, Australian National Defense University, February, 1999.

Leonhard, Robert R. *The Principles of War for the Information Age.* Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1998.

Libicki, Martin C. *What is Information Warfare?* Washington, D.C., National Defense University, August 1995.

Marshall, Thomas J., Kaiser, Phillip, and Kessemeire, editors. *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations*. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army War College, December 1997.

Metz, Steven. "The Effect of Technological Asymmetry on Coalition Operations," *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations*. ed by Thomas J. Marshall. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., US Army War College, December 1997.

Pfaltzgraf, Robert L. and Shulz, Richard R, editors. *War in the Information Age – New Challenges for U.S. Security Policy.* Washington, D.C. USA, Brasseys. 1997.

Schwarzkopf, Norman H. with Peter Petre. *It doesn't Take a Hero.* New York, NY. Bantam Books, 1992.

Siegal, Pascale Cambelles. *Target Bosnia- Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operrations*. Washington, D.C. National Defense University, 1998.

Szafranski, Richard. "Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill," *Athena's Camp – Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*. ed by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. Santa Monica, Ca., RAND, 1997.

US Department of Defense. Joint Pub 3-13 *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, Washington., D.C., US DOD, October 9, 1998.

US Department of Defense. Joint Pub 3-53 *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, Washington., D.C., US DOD, July 10, 1996.

US Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff Pamphlet, *Information Warfare – A Strategy for Peace…The Decisive Edge in War.* Washington., D.C., US DOD 1996.

Waltz, Edward. *Information Warfare – Principles and Operatiions.* Norwood, Ma. Artech House, Inc, 1998.

Periodicals

Anonymous, "The Tortoise and the Hare." *The Economist.* (Aug 7, 1999).

Barnes, Frederick. "Washington Looks at Kosovo's Lessons." *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy.* (Jul 1999).

Campbell, Alastarir. "Communications lessons for NATO, the Military and Media." *RUSI Journal.* (Aug 1999).

Codner, Micheal. "Bringing an end to an old-fashioned war? *RUSI Journal*. (June 1999).

Elliot, Micheal. "The Lessons of a 'War of Values'". *"Newsweek*, New York. (Jun 28, 1999).

FitzSimonds, James R. "The Cultural Challenge of Information Technology." *Naval War College Review.* (Summer 1998).

Friedman, Norman. "Did Kosovo teach us Anything?" *United States Naval Institute*. *Proceedings.* Annapolis, (Aug 1999).

Levien, Frederic, H. "Kosovo: An IW report card." *Journal of Electronic Defense.* (Aug, 1999).

Lind, Micheal. "Civil War by Other Means." *Foreign Affairs*. (Sep/Oct 1999).

Mandelbaum, Micheal. "A perfect failure." *Foreign Affairs"*. (Sep/Oct 1999).

McCausland, Jeffrey D. "Governments, societies, and armed forces: What the gulf War portends." *Parameters.* (Summer 1999).

Muirhead, Oona. "My Job: At the sharp end of the media operation." *RUSI Journal.* (Aug 1999).

Munro, Neil. "AK-47s, lies and videotape." *Asociation for Computing Machinery. Communications of the ACM.* New York, NY. (Jul 99).

Muradian, Vago. "Kosovo Will be to Post-2000 Defense as Gulf War was to 1990s." *Defense Daily.* (Apr. 27, 1999).

Nye, Joseph S. and Owens, William A. "American's Information Edge." *Foreign Affairs.* (March/April 1996), pp 20-36.

Silkett, Wayne A. "Alliance and Coalition Warfare." *Parameters* (Summer 1993), pp 74-85.

Stein, George J. "Information Warfare." *Airpower Journal.* (Spring 1995). Pp 30-39.

Szafranski, Richard. "A Theory of Information Warfare – Preparing for 2020." *Airpower Journal*, (Spring 1995), pp 56-65.

Electronic Sources

"Article 1," *Charter of the United Nations* [http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter1.html]

Annan, Kofi. UN Secretary General, speech to *Opening of the 55th Session of the Commission on Human Rights,"* 7 April 1999.
[Hhttp://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/6eb37a89cad0ae7d8025660f005cee27/a6466321c23e10068025662e00569454?OpenDocumentH]

Canada, Department of National Defence.
[http://bbs.cfc.dnd.ca/Admin/jointdocs/cdnpubs/af_032_info_ops/chap1int.html]

Newport, Frank. "Public Support for U.S. Involvement in Yugoslavia Lower Than for Gulf War, Other Foreign Engagements" *Gallup News Service*, Poll Releases, March 30, 1999.
[Hhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990330.aspH]

Newport, Frank. "Support for U.S. Kosovo Involvement Drops" *Gallup News Service*, Poll Releases, May 26, 1999. [Hhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990526.aspH]

Other Sources

Berger, Samuel R. Ass't to the President for National Security Affairs, in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. July 26, 1999.

Fysh,, John, T. *Limitations of Information Warfare in the Gulf War*. CFC Toronto, Exercise New Horizons, 2 May 1997.

Joffe, Josef. "Three Unwritten Rules of the Serbian War", *New York Times*, Late Edition (East Coast), 25 July 1999, pg. 15.

Whitney, Craig R. "When is War Worth It?" *New York Times Upfront. New York Times (Sep 6, 1999)*