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Joint Doctrine and the Canadian Forces: Ready for the Next Decade?

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La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Joint and combined operations have existed for much of military history. The stories of the British capture of Quebec in 1759, the multinational operations at Gallipoli during the World War I and the Inchon landings during the Korean War describe significant amphibious operations.¹ Each stands as testament to the success that is possible when military forces of different services have acted together to accomplish tasks. A striking aspect, however, of the rich history of joint action is that, for the most part, once the demand of specific circumstance passed, most, if not all, of the hard lessons were soon put aside and needed to be relearned when next required.² There seems to have existed in the collective experience of Western militaries, impediments to transforming joint experience into enduring military doctrine.

The Canadian Forces' experience in the Cold War period proved to be no exception, in spite of the fundamental structural changes that took place in 1968 under the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act (C-243), which unified the three services into one force. It has only been most recently, beginning in the late 1980s and continuing into the mid-1990s, that Canadian Forces basic doctrine has begun to reflect synergy in conception and planning beyond simple coordination of service capabilities in operations. The current Chief of Staff J-3 (Joint Operations), Brigadier-General Jurkowski, who has observed this phenomenon since Canadian Forces participation in the Gulf War, believes that a fundamental transformation in the way of thinking about joint operations within the Canadian Forces is underway.³ In contrast, in a paper entitled "Joint or Combined Doctrine: The Right Choice for Canada", Lieutenant-Colonel Boomer has postulated that the paramount requirement for environments of the Canadian Forces (CF) to operate with allies "...demands a combined doctrine.... that the Canadian Forces and its allies use to

collectively guide their action to achieve their objectives." ⁴ Canadian Forces joint doctrine, while important would be relegated to a second order and used to support combined doctrine.

This paper will argue that in the next decades, the development of joint doctrine for the Canadian Forces is the more important activity and that combined doctrine should flow from joint doctrine. To inverse the relationship risks much, most particularly the continued relegation of the CF to a component status with major allies as well as to risk being unable to effectively command joint forces at home or on the international scene to meet national priorities.

A general discussion of doctrine is required in order to provide a framework for more specific analysis and establish a common understanding and definitional base. Within that framework, a number of factors will be identified and used to analyze the development of the climate for joint doctrinal development in the Canadian Forces. The paper will then examine the convergence of strategic, operational, organizational and cultural factors that have produced a climate conducive to the development of joint doctrine for the Canadian Forces in the 1990s. From this base, the paper will then briefly examine some areas for doctrinal development for the Canadian Forces to participate effectively into the next century. This exercise is likely to generate more question than answers but is, in this way, intended to be a minor addition to the understanding of this complex and important issue.

NATURE OF DOCTRINE

The current keystone manual within the CF doctrine publication system, B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Canadian Forces Operations defines doctrine as "fundamental principles

by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives."⁵ This definition is certainly a model of brevity but does not assist in clarifying the process of how, for example, the "fundamental principles" at its core have been formulated. Indeed, the criticism could also be laid that this definition obscures the complexity as well as the multiple facets of doctrine.

Charles Grant has described three components of doctrine.⁶ The first, is an intellectual component, derived from a study of history and experiences, that sets out more general principles, best practices and guidance for military action. This form of doctrine is closest to the definition above. A second component is the set of more dynamic, practical instructions that marries the first more general precepts and constructs with day-to-day circumstances and technology. This form of doctrine is most closely related to tactical level doctrine. Finally, doctrine has a predictive component or form that "...seeks to influence the evolution of the military to ensure it meets future challenges."⁷ This form is closely linked to, but not synonymous with, the first component of doctrine discussed above. In this context, Lieutenant-General John Cushman in his analysis of command and control doctrine in the United States military believes that both deductive as well as inductive processes are involved in the development of doctrine:

"Military doctrine offers itself as the fundamental truths of the military art. ... Doctrine is developed through experience or by theory. The best doctrine (that is the doctrine best suited to govern action in the circumstances) results from intelligent evaluation of the past and the logical and creative application of the past to present and future predicted conditions. It comes from the interaction between, on the one hand, the practical experience gained from battle, exercises, tests and war games, and on the other, the intellectual activity of the military professional at his desk and in the clash of ideas with other professionals."⁸

As stated, it will be the processes involved in the development of higher level joint doctrine that will be investigated here rather than seeking to determine specific aspects of joint doctrine currently under development at the present time. In this way, the analysis will endeavor to identify the circumstances within which doctrine is created and apply this to current Canadian Forces undertakings in the creation of joint doctrine. This emphasis on formative environment and context is important for, in John Gooch's words,

"The way an army acts in war is determined to a very considerable degree by the way it thinks. A conscious awareness of how that thinking has developed.... is likely the best foundation upon which to create the standard operating procedures for tomorrows wars."⁹

It will be extremely important to understand the process and context within which through which joint doctrine will be developed in the Canadian Forces as it joins other allies in the current headlong rush to create and implement joint doctrine. Difficulties can result from two possible situations. The first may arise in a desire for rapid progress and a focus on readily available measures of success without appropriate context. The United States Armed Services has made remarkable efforts to implement the mandate of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that created a legal requirement for joint operations within the U.S. armed services. However, it has been observed that,

"In the haste to get joint doctrine to the field, the initial publications were little more than re-worked service doctrine between purple cover. They were created out of need, but many were redundant or should have been published as tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)."¹⁰

It will be important to ensure that the measures of success used to judge the development of joint doctrine for the Canadian Forces avoid too great an emphasis on the volume of publications or the rapidity with which single service doctrine is replaced by joint doctrine.

A second area for caution is to ensure that the development of Canadian joint doctrine is grounded in Canadian national requirement and that the linkages that do exist to allies are kept within an appropriate framework. In the past, Canadian military doctrine has normally been shaped by the existing relationship with other powers. In the inter-war period, relations with the British Empire were key, and:

"Left with just one 'raison d'être - to fight alongside the British Army in a major war - the general staff drew the obvious conclusion. Operational planning would be in the hands of the British who would control the Canadian Army once war broke out and British doctrine was accepted as given."¹¹

A transfer of doctrinal example from British to American leadership began with the Ogdensburg Declaration in 1940 that created the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The close military cooperation between Canada and the United States during the war continued in the post-war era and in the subsequent decades the United States has become firmly entrenched as a major doctrinal source for the Canadian military.¹² This relationship will continue and is likely to become even closer as the United States continues in its dominant position in the Pantheon of global military powers. As indicated in the recent policy statement entitled, "Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A strategy for 2020", interoperability with the United States will be an central pillar of Canadian Forces planning and doctrine in the future. The document states:

"Special Relationship with Principal Allies. A vital distinctive competency is the ability to work together with our allies. Our most important ally now and for the future is the United States where our strong relationship has long benefited both countries. We must plan to nurture this relationship by strengthening our inter-operability with the US Armed Forces, training together, sharing the burden for global sensing and telecommunications and pursuing collaborative ways to respond to emerging asymmetric threats to continental security."¹³

However, in the current environment where joint doctrine is the watchword and our allies, including the United States, are moving forward quickly on their own agendas, the Canadian Forces must avoid adoption of joint doctrine that does not meet its needs. The borrowing of joint doctrine from allies is not at its root a bad practice, but it must be subjected to a critical examination to ensure that it truly meets Canadian needs. The United States, the United Kingdom and Australia are now providing sources of joint doctrine which may be "dusted off and Canadianized",¹⁴ but suitable caution must be exercised. Interoperability with allies is not synonymous with identical doctrine; rather it relates more closely to technical compatibility and tactical procedures. Doctrine relates to common understandings that allows effective synchronization of action and forces to achieve unity of effort in the field.

Another factor that is relevant to the discussion of joint doctrine is the significant difference in sensitivity to change over time of the various components of doctrine. The intellectual and predictive components that shape "... the intangible set of shared beliefs, which condition the way in which the organization and its members think and respond to event.",¹⁵ are normally stable over time. Some operational level and most tactical doctrine, which are more closely linked to technology and organizational forms, can be altered quickly without fundamental changes to overarching operational doctrinal ideas. In assessing this phenomenon, Steven Biddle, for example, has proposed that even the apparently radical doctrinal constructs as 'blitzkrieg' - with its amalgamation of technology with new organizations and tactical methods - existed in an operational framework that had changed little between 1870 and the 1940s. The central operation doctrinal concept:

"The battle of annihilation, obtained by encircling enemy forces in the field and designed to afford rapid decisive offensive victory was the basis of German strategy and operations from Moltke the elder, through Schlieffen, Moltke the younger, Guderian, Rommel and Manstein."¹⁶

The point to be taken is that the current emphasis on joint doctrine may not be a radical departure from the past but rather may simply be, " ... a continuation of a century-long increase in the importance of skill in managing complexity..."¹⁷

Three significant issues flow from points made above and are relevant to the discussion of joint doctrinal development in current circumstances. The first is that relatively long periods will normally be required to institutionalize significant doctrinal changes. Second, the national context within which joint doctrinal development will take place is influenced by a number of relatively stable factors beyond the direct control of the Canadian Forces. Finally, a combination of both practical experience and a theoretical framework are normally required to give shape to new doctrinal concepts.

John Gooch has noted that it often requires decades to change the relative weights of factors influencing doctrine¹⁸ and to translate this into practical doctrinal change. As well, in her examination of coalition doctrine, Martha Maurer explicitly comments on this issue stating,

"The lessons of history do not bode well for the time needed to develop coalition doctrine. It took 25 years to bring the air force and army closer doctrinally and to be more cooperative."¹⁹

Why should this be so? Military forces, as well as the doctrine that is integrally related to them and which conditions their way of thinking and acting, do not exist in a vacuum.

Context is provided by many factors, only some of which are directly within the

influence of the military. John Gooch has proposed a set of factors that shape the environment within which doctrinal development must occur. As he notes:

"...doctrine is a product of a complex process in which many different influences combine to produce a *standard operating procedure*. (Italics in original) The ingredients of doctrine, which combine together differently in each and every case include: the nature of weapons technology, the influence of formative experiences, organizational and institutional interests, ideology, national culture and the political and strategic situation."²⁰

Thus, as stated, issues that are not entirely within its control will condition the environment within which joint doctrine for the Canadian Forces is developed. As the nature of the elements which influence doctrine are normally relatively stable over time, the rapidity with which the modes of thinking at the roots of doctrine are alterable within a short time is an valid question. It will be fruitful to examine the recent past to come to better understanding of the influence of such factors likelihood of success in implementing joint doctrine. Has the environment in which Canadian doctrine been altered significantly in the last decades and is so, will joint operations and doctrine benefit from such changes?

Finally, doctrinal development is influence by both practice and theory at the same time, in varying combination depending upon the specific circumstances at the time. For example, the impact of the Naval War College in the development of U.S. Naval doctrine is illustrative. In the 1920s and 1930s, the doctrinal concepts developed at the War College were pushed outward to the fleet for examination in trials, war games and operations. During World War II, with major fleet action taking place in distant theatres, a shift in role occurred as these operations pushed problems as well as practical solutions back to the College for examination. In the post-War environment, with fleets

forward deployed and engaged day-to-day in trials, exercises and operations, the role of the College in innovation was reduced.²¹ As the Canadian Forces moves forward with joint doctrinal development, appropriate mechanisms for ensuring an effective and balanced combination of theory and practice, will be needed.

The remainder of the paper will focus on an examination of the recent past in light of the factors influencing doctrinal development. In this way, it is hoped that a better understanding of the significant progress that has been made to date toward establishing the required conditions for the meaningful development and implementation of Canadian Forces joint doctrine.

CLIMATE FOR JOINT DOCTRINE BEFORE THE 1990s

On 1 February 1968, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force were abolished and a single service, the Canadian Forces, came into being. With minor modifications to the organization and structure in 1972, the Canadian Forces,

"...operated for the next two decades, with a unified single national headquarters organized on functional lines with some subordinate functional organizations, three major environmental commands and an array of bases."²²

It would have seemed that from an organizationally perspective, the stage was set for the Canadian Forces to begin to operate in the joint mode and that an accompanying growth of joint doctrine would follow. Indeed, from a definitional perspective the issue of 'joint operations or doctrine' as it might apply to the Canadian Forces is somewhat moot, for there were no longer separate services to consider, however for clarity the adjective is still a part of Canadian Forces usage.²³

But what was the reality within the newly constituted Canadian Forces that might have given hope that joint operations and doctrine would ensue? On closer examination, the reality was that none of the component factors identified by Gooch as influencing doctrinal development had been altering in any significant way.

At a higher level, the Alliance commitments of the Cold War constrained any novel employment of the Canadian Forces in joint operations, which then might have generated thinking regarding a joint doctrinal base for such action. In the collective defence scenario of NATO, Canada forces were committed to pre-agreed plans within the NATO Area of Responsibility and, support for these forces would be provided existing plans and agreements. In essence, the entire capacity of the Canadian Forces was committed to extant NATO or North American Defence plans. Even peacekeeping operations, which may have served to draw the Canadian Forces outside the limits of the General War in Europe scenario, were largely restrained by the bi-polar superpower rivalry and undertaken with residual capacity that remained on call to the Cold War scenario in Europe. Indeed, peacekeeping operations during these years, aside from short-term forays, consisted principally of rotations of army units through Cyprus and this scenario demanded no new cooperative mode of thinking within the Canadian Forces.

The Cold War focus on Europe as the potential arena for superpower confrontation continued to require major commitments for support to the Alliance from continental North America, and this contributed to the Canadian Forces of the period remaining largely a static organization. Canadian bases in Canada as well as support postures were optimized to generate forces in support of NATO and NORAD commitments. Forces stationed in Europe, were based and supported by full Canadian

infrastructure at CFBs Lahr and Baden-Sollingen. Even the Canadian Air Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, brought into being in response to the acceptance of a mission to reinforce NATO's Northern Flank, reflected the highly planned static operational and support models common to NATO. This mission had been accepted in 1967, but the first time the entire brigade deployed on exercise was during Exercise BRAVE LION in 1980. The air and sealift involved constituted "...Canada's most ambitious.... exercise of the decade."²⁴ It remains an open question whether the CAST commitment could have been mounted and sustained in the face of other NATO commitments.

Indeed, the organizational changes of 1968 and further minor adjustments in 1972 were relatively benign in their impact on operational elements of the new Canadian Forces. Even with the outward trapping such as common uniforms and ranks between 1968 and 1987, the environments (former services) of the Canadian Forces, continued to be occupied operationally with activities and duties that drew them into closer links with similar services of other nations rather than toward each other. Without an imperative to change operational focus, the observation that, " The cultural signature of land, naval and air units are so marked that it is easier to cross national lines within the same type of unit than to cross service lines within the same nation.",²⁵ held true.

This was the case for all of the new environmental commands of the newly constituted Canadian Forces. The NORAD Agreement and Canadian Forces Europe (CFE) commitments linked air force operations and doctrine to that of the air forces of the United States and other NATO nations. The NATO General Defence Plan and reinforcement commitments to Europe tied army doctrine to that of Alliance partners.

Similarly, the East and West coast fleets were linked to the major player in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the United States Navy. In the absence of any significant operational requirement to operate together and the natural affinity of similar services, the practical joint experience that would have formed one pillar for the development of joint doctrine was absent.

In this context, the picture that emerges in the initial post-integration years within the framework of operational commitments for the Canadian Forces is environmental commands continuing much as before, despite official unification. As well the singular focus remained NATO and NORAD commitments. The approved, static plans for both operations and support generated centrifugal effects that drew the environments commands to cooperation with similar services of allied nations rather than together. This situation was, in turn, reinforced by the natural propensity of,

"...officers who grew up alongside one another in one shared culture..."
from not actively seeking changes to the status quo in the face of,
"...unfamiliar cultures, the ways, the language and the shared know-how
which are different, and the insides of which are hard to penetrate."²⁶

DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1990s

In the 1990s a confluence of events and factors began moving the Canadian Forces forward toward more effective joint operations and efforts to develop doctrine to support these operations. What occurred in the intervening years that helped created an environment in which joint operations are the preferred mode of operation and the creation of joint doctrine for the Canadian Forces is fostered?

The Australian Defence Force is held as a model for a military force that has begun the journey toward joint thinking and planning from which relevant joint doctrine flows. The event that presaged this set of circumstances took place in a review of the

assumptions within which the force would operate in 1976. It became clear that the previously held reliance on allied military assistance in the event of a direct threat to Australia was no longer viable. This generated a decade-long process of changing the way the nation and its military conceive of operating in the world.²⁷ In Defence of Australia (1987) the elements of a balanced; more self-sufficient force operating in a joint mode was elaborated. Thus, for the Australian Defence Force, it was the removal of the central tenant from the way of thinking about its traditional military activities that began a process for the move to joint operations and the resulting development of joint doctrine to support them.

For the Canadian Forces, a change to the central tenant - direct linkage to a potential war in Europe - generated a paradigm shift that was solidified with the decision to cease basing Canadian Forces personnel in Europe in support of this country's NATO commitments. In the course of several short years the strategic concepts that had framed military thinking for decades in Canada were altered. While Canada remained an active member of the alliance in the political realm, at the operational level, the central structural that had tied the Canadian Forces in so many ways to a major land-war scenario on the central front in Europe disappeared. In North America, likewise, the mission of NORAD to provide the security for two legs of the Alliance's trump card, the American nuclear Deterrent, became less urgent, as the true state of Russian military power became evident. For naval forces, operational thinking began to search for new models as the tight focus on anti-submarine operations in support of European re-supply diminished.

In the late 1980's, as well, an intellectual impetus for thinking differently about operations had been jolted into being in the United States as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This congressional legislation, in response to identified failing during operations, such as the invasion of Granada, made changes to command and control arrangements, and instituted mandatory "jointness" between the services. The environmental staffs in Canada closely linked to the services there and aware of the evolution of U.S. service doctrine its various forms were required to assess the likely impacts upon themselves.

It is certain that reduction in focus toward Europe combined with events occurring within the U.S. military following the Goldwater-Nichols legislation would have, over time, generated fundamental changes in CF operations. However, another set of issues internal to Canada came into play at the same time that acted to generate new thinking about how the Canadian Forces was to employed. These would generate both practical experiences and an intellectual ferment that could provided the foundation for joint doctrinal development. These changes occurred in three areas: fiscal, operational and organizational.

Beginning in 1989 a series of budgets removed completely any illusions that the Defence Services Programs of the day were affordable. The results were a series of personnel reduction, infrastructure adjustments and re-organizations that have acted to further strengthen the centralized control of resources at the national headquarters level. It has been noted that, "Component commanders have one great advantage over multi-service commanders... They control service resources in personnel and money."²⁸ Such a potential rivalry does not exist within the Canadian Forces. Reductions in overall

personnel strength in personnel has made it impossible for any component of the Canadian Forces to be sustainable in operations without reliance on scarce support personnel resources from across the Canadian Forces. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff, at the center of a unified departmental headquarters exercises effective control of departmental resources planning and allocations via a centrally controlled Defence Planning Guidance and business planning cycle.²⁹ Recurring detailed scrutiny of operational and support acquisitions have ensured that common systems will be acquired. The results of these processes has been that the 'tail' in the 'tooth to tail relationship' of operations to support has been driven together. Operational commanders must now look for ways to sustain and support operations in concert with a common or 'joint' national staff and in many instances required resources that are held at the national level.

In the realm of operations, the activities of the Canadian Forces did not simply defocus from its familiar transatlantic view. Participation in the Gulf War propelled the Canadian Forces into a distinctly expeditionary mode of operations that has accelerated up to the present. Operations have been mounted in the former Yugoslavia, Latin and Central America as well as in South-west and South-east Asia. A comparison of the nature and scope of UN operations in the 1990s and British military activities in the late-Victorian era might raise the question whether current UN sponsored military activities reflect a return to an older model rather than a discovery of new joint operational truths.³⁰

Nonetheless, increased Canadian government support for the United Nations coupled with a more assertive United Nations have lead to a marked increase in Canadian Forces participation in UN mandated missions. Canada continues to provide contingents, and from time to time, commanders of multinational and multi-service contingents. These

missions have provided a wealth of exposure to real-world joint operations. Currently, there are 23 active operations around the world. Significant in both diversity and the number of Canadian Forces personnel involved, these operations provide experiences for a growing database which is now being analyzed to provide the essential practical lessons learned for inputs into doctrinal development. For example, each of the 23 current mission theatres has undergone a different activation process. These experiences will be invaluable in determining appropriate joint doctrine for the future.³¹ To address this need, in 1996 a doctrine and lessons learned cell was created in the J-3 Operations under the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff to begin the task of developing joint doctrine.³²

Following direction in the 1994 Defence policy White Paper and the recommendations of the Management Command and Control Re-engineering Team (MCCRT), command and control changes were put in place that subordinated more fully the environmental heads under the Chief of the Defence Staff. This change combined with reductions and restructuring of operational-level headquarters firmly established the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff at the center of operations in the Canadian Forces.³³ As a result the role of environmental commanders in the conduct of operations has diminished and their function as force generators has become paramount.

In his study of the recent history of the office of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Douglas Bland notes the slow pace at which post-integration CDSs had assumed centralized control of the Canadian Forces. His study ends prior to 1990s, however, many of the issues that he notes as hindering progress have been addressed by changes brought about by centralization of control of operations and resources within the national headquarters.³⁴

Before concluding that these changes have firmly and irrevocably set the Canadian Forces on the path of joint operation and the ensuing codification of practices into joint doctrine, a brief discussion of the intellectual climate which currently exist is warranted. In The Foundations of the Science of War, Major-General J.F.C Fuller states:

"The central idea of an army is known as its doctrine...In its ultimate relationship to the human understanding this central idea or doctrine is nothing else that common sense - that is, action adopted to circumstances."³⁵

Thus there is an intimate interactive relationship between practical action and the mindset of individuals in military organizations as it relates to doctrine. New experience will cause questioning of pre-conceptions, this questioning will generate new concepts and modes of thinking that will be incorporated into exercise or operations.

Since the mid-1980s a series of accelerating changes have occurred in strategic circumstances, organization, and operations that have effected every aspect of the Canadian Forces. The way of thinking of individuals within the Canadian Forces contains at least half of the answer to whether this will take hold and generate new doctrine. As well, Changes in attitudes and interpretation of events relate to experiences, both collective and individual, the frame of reference that has been created since unification has shaped a generation of Canadian Forces officers.

Although, through most of the period in question, service linkages and doctrine served to reinforce each other, unification did create common institutions. The Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, for example, has been a common professional development experience for most senior Canadian Forces officers.³⁶ Through the 1980s, as resource management became more centralized within the integrated national headquarters, service on a 'purple' staffs or with the representative environmental staffs in

Ottawa was an arena in which common understandings were forged between officers of differing services. A similar situation began to occur in the 1990s in the operational realm. As the national level joint staff has assumed the central role for Canadian Forces operations, comm

elements to undertake joint operations as a lead nation and major contributor to such a United Nations mission?

The 1994 Defence White Paper declares that "Multilateral security is not merely a Canadian tradition; it is the expression of Canadian Values in the international sphere."³⁸ The most recent strategic statement, Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020, released in June 1999, acknowledges global deployability and interoperability with allies as objectives to support this theme.³⁹ However, the strategy paper also explicitly links Defence Department objectives to interoperability with United States. There is no argument with the notion that the "United States will in all likelihood remain the dominant global power"⁴⁰ or that "Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations."⁴¹ However, these statements must be assessed in the context of the real world to ensure they are not utilized to defend and rationalize existing structures, equipment or modes of thinking at the expense of developing doctrine to ensure the Canadian Forces could meet the missions it may be task to perform.

Canadian Forces doctrinal development tied too rigorously to Allies, regardless of their preponderance in world affairs, risks making that doctrine less relevant to the needs of the Canadian forces as it prepares to support Government policy. Dr. Allen Sens of the University of British Columbia, notes that Canadian involvement in peacekeeping "...has been one of the expressions of our foreign policy independence from the United States."⁴² Carl Builder, questions whether the United States is erring in its apparent search for peer competition to fight a big war on an old model,

"Like the drunk searching for his keys under the lamppost, we seem to be looking for RMAs in the kind of wars we prepare ourselves for (or the

wars that size our forces) rather than in the conflicts we would most like to forget."⁴³

As well, such a course would risk perpetuating incorrect assumptions regarding how and for what ends individual governments will use military forces. It is not certain that the United States will be involved in all missions that might be tasked to the Canadian Forces. As Joel Sokolsky states:

"We complain that if it wasn't for US domestic politics, the USA would be able to support peacekeeping. But we have the opposite problem. If it wasn't for Canadian domestic politics, we might be more modest in our peacekeeping contributions."⁴⁴

The Canadian Forces may be required to respond to demands in the next decades for missions that might range from the stillborn Zaire operation, the current mission in East Timor or, potentially, to others that might be undertaken without traditional allies.

In this context, getting Canadian Forces joint doctrine right in the next years is crucial. As discussed earlier, lessons learned are being gathered and analyzed. Similarly, an intellectual discussion must occur to ensure that the efforts in the next years are directed to appropriate objectives. What might the priorities be?

Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief Pacific has identified priorities for joint doctrinal development needed to generate joint force capability for response to contingencies. These involve: crisis action planning; gathering and managing information; practice in joint staff operations; forming and deploying joint task forces and headquarters; and developing the capability to flow joint forces to distance operating areas.⁴⁵ These areas are all consistent with a concept that would see a joint force, centered on a task-organized structure, including Canadian air, naval and land forces, with the joint headquarters provided by Canada as lead nation. Over time, the

work that is necessary to move these issues forward would likely also require other structural issues to be examined.⁴⁶ What might the appropriate relative weight of 'support' to 'combat' capability be within the Canadian forces? What force structure is called up by Operations Other Than War where the Canadian Forces might be required to operate in a mode other than "along side the best, against the best?"⁴⁷ And perhaps finally, what are the implications for size and diversity required within the Canadian Forces that joint doctrine and the capability to operate in a joint fashion might engender?

CONCLUSION

This paper has postulated that in the hierarchy of doctrine, the requirement for flexibility in the face of unknown challenges in the next decades will require that the Canadian Forces possess relevant joint doctrine. This must be a first order priority. Doctrine was examined to assess how the significant changes that have taken place in strategic context, operational activity and Canadian Forces organization might impact the ability of the Canadian Forces to undertake this effort. There appears to be opportunities for rapid evolution in this sphere if appropriate attention is paid to the need. It will however, be necessary to keep the following observation foremost in mind during these efforts.

"Armies like nations have cultures that profoundly influence their behavior. To change the way armies fight, one must not begin with field manuals, but with the way an army thinks about itself."⁴⁸

The Canadian Forces must examine itself closely in order to ensure that its operational concepts, organization and equipment will be relevant in the emerging strategic nexus of the next century. Would perspectives change if it was assessed "...that

the Cold War was the aberration, not the norm." Finally, an examination of joint operational requirements, recent experiences and a long look back to military actions outside the Cold War framework could greatly assist in the development of relevant joint doctrine - action adopted to circumstances - to better serve the needs of the Canadian Forces and Canada in the future.

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