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Joint Doctrine for the Canadian Forces:

Vital Concern or Hindrance?

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Joint Doctrine for the Canadian Forces: Vital Concern or Hindrance?

By Colonel Berthier Desjardins

Introduction

There seems to be a general agreement that, from a structural and a doctrinal perspective, military jointness has increased a great deal since the passage of the United States Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986.¹ A large amount of military restructuring has taken place in Canada as well, and joint doctrine publications have been produced and promulgated at an ever-increasing pace. Although this innovative approach at enforcing jointness and the flurry of activities to make it stick appear, on the surface, to be working, it is worthy to assess just how well it really works.

Is joint doctrine understood and being assimilated by the individual military services? How successful is it at ensuring effective orchestration of military actions in major operations? How useful is it for ensuring that service doctrine, ambitions, and prejudice have been subordinated to the task of finding joint solutions?² All these are legitimate questions, especially in a time where significant portions of scarce resources are being dedicated to the edification, promotion and further development of jointness at the military strategic, operational and tactical levels.

History shows that “jointness has tended to flourish more in war than in peace” and that it seems difficult to establish and even harder to maintain.³ The present attempts at developing joint doctrine and mindset within the individual services and establishing

Jointness as an essential principle of successful warfare during peacetime perhaps are going too far. The production of a substantial number of joint publications seems to have buried the fundamental principles and instituted a jointness bureaucracy that provides a sense of direction that may be too complicated or blurry. While jointness is many things to many people, it should escape no one that joint doctrine is turning into a requisite **set of processes** aimed at keeping complicated systems of people and technology running smoothly.

Although early tests in relatively minor conflicts and in military operations other than war indicate that joint doctrine works reasonably well, it is not perfect and there is concern that it may not be sufficient to overcome parochial service attitudes when funding dwindles to increasingly lower levels.

As the 21st century dawns upon us, it is timely to revisit the fundamental reasons for establishing joint doctrine and verify that, from a Canadian viewpoint, current efforts at jointness will meet the needs of the Canadian Forces (CF) well into the next century. This paper will conduct a short historical review of joint operations, describe the current operational context, discuss the different services' views on joint doctrine, revisit some of the principles at the foundation of jointness and, finally, argue that joint doctrine is a vital concern for the CF. Neglecting jointness, even while facing profound budget cuts and manpower reductions, would adversely affect the fighting capability of the CF and reduce even further its ability to conduct missions at the operational level. The paper will also suggest that the Department of National Defence (DND) should increase its attention to the operational level of warfare and that jointness should become an important criterion for force structuring and procurement decisions.

Historical Perspective

Structures and attitudes of jointness faded away quickly...despite many solemn resolutions made in the immediate wake of disasters and victories.⁴

Military history shows that there is a long lineage of joint operations and that jointness and opposition to it have been around for quite a long time.⁵ It also highlights that again and again, the lessons of jointness had to be re-learned in the midst of crisis and disasters. A short historical review of joint operations since World War I underscores the significance of joint doctrine.

The need to blend forces for best effect arose many times during World War I; however, innovations such as amphibious warfare, close air support and special operations were quickly pushed aside as the war ended. Parochial concerns of shrinking armies, navies and air forces once again took over in the competition for scarce resources and public support. In spite of extensive training, thought and development between the world wars, jointness remained a peripheral concern in the shaping of military doctrine. It was also widely believed that joint activities would have little significance in future wars.⁶

As a result, Britain and her allies entered the Second World War ill prepared for joint warfare and paid a very high price for their lack of vision in peacetime. The frustrations of the beginning of the war began a long series of efforts that eventually brought allied operations to the highest scale and quality of joint warfare ever seen.⁷ Time after time, the blending of air support, armor, artillery, and ground forces offset the high quality of German infantry and armor.⁸ The complexity of joint organization grew as the war progressed, and the list of refinements in joint techniques expanded as the pace and scale of joint operations increased.⁹ However, as had been the case after World War I, the “vast apparatus of joint

operations so carefully and painfully crafted during the war crumpled rapidly as nations quickly demobilized".¹⁰

During that same period, the United States military brought the operational art of jointness to an equally high level of practice. The Pacific war, for instance, saw assorted elements of sea, land and air forces constantly being repackaged to satisfy operational plans that hinged on a high level of service cooperation. But here again, the case for jointness was unable to survive calls for retrenchment in the face of successive rounds of budget cuts. Even though both General Eisenhower and President Truman voiced strong arguments for unification of commands, a single chief of defence staff, maximum inter-service assignment of officers and a common procurement system, the positive benefits of jointness faded.¹¹

But after World War II, the armed forces abandoned joint practices and retreated into their separate organizations. Jointness once again became based on inter-service goodwill, a rare commodity at the best of times.¹² Although the merits of jointness were demonstrated on several occasions during the Korean War, most notably with MacArthur's forces landing at Inchon, that war was fought with far less jointness than World War II. Jointness was also notably absent during the Vietnam War.¹³ The practice of muddling through in an ad hoc fashion remained the mainstay of operational doctrine from the 1950s through the 1980s, with a resultant lack of synchronicity and low synergy in major operations. Mounting joint operations was viewed as a complex, chaotic process that was best avoided.¹⁴ Joint operation failures such as Operation Eagle Claw, the April 1980 operation to free American hostages in Teheran, and the Grenada invasion, Operation Urgent Fury, revealed the extent of the inter-services problems.¹⁵

The old familiar problems of meshing separate service doctrine, logistics, and command and control reemerged during the Falklands War and, once again, many lessons had to be relearned, the “hard way”. The British experiences in the South Atlantic created a new sense of the value of jointness and a joint doctrine renaissance in the British forces.¹⁶ Soon after the Falklands War, the Goldwater-Nichols United States Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, together with the Gulf War of 1990-1991, provided further impetus in the drive for jointness.

In both world wars, the Canadian military services fought separately from one another as combined forces with the armies, navies and air forces of Canada’s major allies. Although the services suffered the same frustrating experiences as that of their allies, any joint experience gained from the war had little impact on improving tri-service coordination and CF jointness at the operational level.¹⁷ Services continue to pursue their own individual aims until unification in 1968 created a single Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and brought to an end the three services as separate entities. The unification process, however, did not focus on military operations or war and the need for an effective joint staff system remained unfulfilled. Subsequent attempts at improving the military force structure fell short of the goals and there is a view that the operational effectiveness of the Forces diminished rather than increased.¹⁸ By the time the Gulf War started in 1991, “the CF was clearly unprepared for joint operations as it lacked both a joint doctrine and an adequate command and control infrastructure for major operations”.¹⁹ The retention of a strategic joint staff at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) after the Gulf War and the recent establishment of a permanent Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) at the operational level have redressed the situation to some extent. But many CF Senior Officers believed that a lot more should be

done “if the CF is to maintain its effectiveness in joint operations beyond the end of this century.”²⁰

Although history resolutely points to the imperative of having a sound, well practiced and permanent joint doctrine, the recent rounds of defence cuts, personnel reductions and restructuring are very much reminiscent of earlier post war times that witnessed the fading of jointness. Absence of consensus between ministers, officials and officers about the situation, objectives and the resources needed for Canadian national defence has left the CF highly vulnerable.²¹ The risk is high that jointness again could be among the first casualties of inter-service competition for weapons systems, equipment infrastructure, and a tangible piece of military action.

The Modern Operational Context

It can be argued that the end of the Cold War and the events that immediately followed the fall of the Soviet Empire have created an unstable, stressful military world environment. Inter-state and intra-state conflicts seem more frequent than during the Cold War period, and there seems to be an unending requirement for the United Nations to call on the military for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peacemaking, contingency intervention, and limited international wars in various sectors of the globe. The essence of national security, military strategy and the main rationale for armed forces has changed and reforms to accommodate the new strategic environments have been undertaken by most nations, particularly those in the NATO alliance. The lesser requirement for territorial defence and the increasing need for quick response also have contributed to modifying the

operational environment substantially²² and, one could argue, for displacing the focus of defence planning from the strategic to the operational level.

Given the reduction of the Soviet threat, nuclear deterrence and the threat of first use have, for all practical purposes, been subjugated to better conventional defence as a means of countering aggression and ensuring victory. The operational concept of joint Airland battle where new technology and doctrines would blend air and ground operations and combined deep strikes with close battle also has come and gone. Linear forward defence and attrition war has evolved toward non-linear defence and maneuver war.²³ Recently, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 validated the U.S. forces' emphasis on power projection, superior maneuver-and-strike forces, and total battlefield awareness and "underscored the importance of joint operations, even though it revealed stubborn problems in getting ground, air and naval elements to work in harmony."²⁴ The latest military operations in Central Africa, Haiti and the Balkans have highlighted the need for flexibility, imagination and innovative approaches to joint and combined operations. Joint headquarters in Canada, together with others in the U.S. and NATO, are working to draw lessons and use them to clarify the new operational needs from a joint perspective.²⁵

The U.S. Joint Vision 2010, the U.S. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and Canada's Defence Strategy 2020 add to the dilemma and, when combined with recent reductions and cutbacks, present both operational doctrine and force structure developers with serious problems. Militarily, the battlespace will be global and increasingly dependent upon information and networking. Operations will be conducted at an accelerated pace, requiring rapid coordination of objectives and ready, mobile forces capable of responding to a wide range of contingencies. Although, unlike the U.S. and other major powers, Canada

does not face “the chilling prospect of having to operate against rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction,”²⁶ it is still required to contribute a modest but militarily significant joint warfare capability to NORAD and the NATO alliance. Identifying and maintaining requisite capabilities to respond to relatively minor contingencies, peacekeeping, disaster relief, domestic operations, and limited conflict interventions should remain a basic minimum for Canada. Contributions for the handling of more dangerous and demanding contingencies will require more capabilities and, given the decline in defence spending, difficult choices will have to be made regarding technology and organization. Networked forces, integrated sensors, standoff precision-strike systems and improved power projection capability appear to be, at this moment, priority items.²⁷

The task of maintaining a CF joint war fighting capability that correctly addresses the real world requirement will not be easy. However, any assumption that the CF should only provide small elements that will combine with components of other forces should be discounted. The U.S., NATO, British and Australian forces models for enhanced joint operations may offer good ideas on how best to reorient plans, doctrine and capabilities but it is crucial that the CF finds its own path and construct its own doctrine. It will have to define, build and sustain its own joint team within and against a Canadian vision, plausible Canadian missions and realistic Canadian contributions.²⁸

Fundamental Principles and Practical Considerations

Both Clausewitz and Moltke considered study and inquiry to be more reliable guides to success in war than any doctrine based on principles and axioms. However, thinking things through by weighing the pros and cons of situations is more difficult than using rules

and guidance for attaining a model and military officers usually have preferred practical and prescriptive doctrine to abstract and contemplative discourses.²⁹ This also seems to be the case today. Rather than relying on common sense and deep thinking to work out operational warfare issues, forces are developing joint doctrine in a continuous and systematic fashion as experience builds up and lessons learned filter in. Since it is not possible to accommodate every potential military situation, there is a sense that there could be a price to pay for using this ‘prescriptive’ approach, particularly if one aspect of thought is developed to the exclusion of another. For example, favoring high technology to organizational structures or supporting the sharp end to the detriment of a support element could leave the armed forces unbalanced and poorly organized for coordinated and sustainable joint military action.³⁰

Joint doctrine dictates that operational commanders should have the best possible information and analysis tools to reduce uncertainty and risk, and that they should have an optimum mix of military forces. Joint Vision 2010 states that “... forces will have an enhanced ability to produce a range of desired effects by bringing together the correct mix of assets at the place and time most favorable to success.”³¹ Recent events show that this is easier said than done as political imperatives and strategic considerations will more often than not preclude the commander from having what he really requires, let alone what he wants. A good illustration of this, perhaps, is the latest military operation in East Timor, which saw Canada commit ‘troops’ at the political level, and allocate a number of ‘personnel’ and specific types of assets to the task at the strategic level. The thought of contributing a coherent Canadian military component, if present, would appear not to have been followed to a commonsense conclusion from a CF joint perspective.³² Therefore, operational commanders should not expect everything to be necessarily well thought out or

logical, and should always be prepared to adjust operational plans and do the best that they can with the resources at their disposal. It also gives emphasis to the fact that joint doctrine must be flexible and must provide commanders freedom of judgement and room for imagination and initiative. Does the current joint doctrine satisfy these requirements?

There is general agreement that one of the primary attributes of military doctrine is that it consists of fundamental principles.³³ The US Army “Field Manual 100-5 Operations” defines doctrine as the “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgement in application.”³⁴ It is useful to review the principles behind the current joint doctrine and reflect on the soundness and practicability of it all.

Joint doctrine is defined as the “fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective.”³⁵ Usually vast differences exist in the organizations, capabilities and cultures of military services. But there are also commonalities from which the all-important trust and confidence can be built. Personalities and leadership can greatly influence the running of operations and that differing views can cause friction between services. As one could expect, the effects of these are normally amplified in multinational environments where differences between military elements and cultures tend to be more pronounced. Ideally, forces that fight together should train and exercise to common standards, employ interchangeable equipment and organizations, follow universally recognized procedures, and adhere to unified doctrine.³⁶ In practice, however, implementing these is hardly straightforward. Excessive focus on interoperability and standardization can also detract commanders from addressing more pressing operational problems and from concentrating on the operational objectives.³⁷

Another important, but often overlooked underlying principle of doctrine is that it should be simple and easily understood by all. There is a general belief amongst joint staff that, at operational level, jointness should be implicit, without having joint doctrine for every bit and parcel. Unfortunately, there is also a sense that current joint doctrine is too abstract, too hard to digest and that there is too much of it. The large number of joint publications would tend to support this view, especially considering that many of these documents are services' publications rearranged using the word 'joint' throughout the text to make them 'joint' doctrine publications.³⁸ Joint doctrine should be mainly for the combatant commanders and should provide a simple, consistent set of rules to facilitate teamwork and cooperation among the services. But strategic military planners, in addition to viewing joint doctrine as a tool for improving operational effectiveness and enhancing cooperation, also see jointness as an institutionalized means of integrating new concepts for service wide applications.³⁹ Therefore, joint doctrine becomes both policy for force structuring and procurement, and guidance for the operational commanders. As a direct consequence understanding and simp

curated

Joint Doctrine - The Services' Perspective

Jointness is not a new concept. Neither is the opposition to it that arises during peacetime, especially when public support for defence spending dwindle^s.⁴¹ However, the fervor with which jointness is pursued and the military forces' attitude towards it are new. Long-term planning documents profess that "joint doctrine will remain the foundation that fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for joint military operations".⁴² Although there is general agreement that "jointness is absolutely essential for military success",⁴³ the collective military view, however, is not unanimous regarding the exact nature of jointness and just how far it should go into blending service elements.

The services traditionally have not shared similar views on what doctrine means or what purpose it should serve.⁴⁴ Since there are very few studies from which an accurate assessment of the Canadian services perspective on joint doctrine could be derived, this paper will assume that the CF and the U.S. services' views converge and that, after taking differences in scale and major dissimilarities into account, an extrapolation is acceptable for the purpose at hand.

The army is the most closely integrated of the services and sees doctrine as being essential. It uses it as the basis for organization and change.⁴⁵ The operational army works as an inter-dependent, combined arms team, with each specialty closely interacting with and depending on the others for support.⁴⁶ Operational deployments and combat interdependence further molds the army into a cohesive entity. The army is the environment that feels most at ease with doctrine. It also tends to exert within the joint doctrine process a larger influence than the other environments and is often seen by the other services as excessively biased

toward land warfare.⁴⁷ The on-going debate as to whether conflicts will invariably require ground force action to expedite a decision⁴⁸ is but one indication that, paradoxically, joint doctrine can be a source of friction between the services.

The navy is the second most cohesive of the three services⁴⁹ and sees doctrine as being conceptual or a collective way of thinking that is not directive⁵⁰. The navy normally deploys as a naval task force, which operates as an interdependent operational organization. This interdependence provides a binding force across weapons systems and units.⁵¹ The navy feels that joint doctrine is the art of the commander and exists to support combat actions and decisions of the commander, his staff and the commanding officers.⁵² It also sees the level of standardization on doctrinal issues being dependent upon the required degree of integration of the fighting forces as needed. The navy is prepared to cooperate with and support both the army and the air force. However, it does not believe that ‘joined to fight together’ necessarily means having to do so as an integrated whole.⁵³

The air force is the least interconnected of the services⁵⁴ and tends to treat doctrine informally. It loosely defines aerospace doctrine as what airmen hold true about aerospace power and the best way to do the job in the air force. It sees doctrine as a guide for the exercise of professional judgement rather than a set of rules.⁵⁵ Technology is the organizational essence of the air force and airmen identify with the weapons systems that they operate, more than with doctrine. The air force’s effectiveness and efficiency come from organizing around weapons systems. It has to master several types of operational warfare, including support to surface and sub-surface maritime warfare, strategic and tactical air support operations, airlift and space support. The air force combines resources for operations, but “units live apart and do not work together until they join up en route to the

operational theater".⁵⁶ There is less physical contact and closeness than one finds in the other services. The air force sees the current joint doctrine as being land-centric⁵⁷ and feels that there is a danger that joint doctrine may relegate airpower to a supporting role.⁵⁸

The above serves to illustrate that when it comes to jointness, the services are not as unified as we may be tempted to believe. How joint doctrine should be used and to what degree it should dictate military planning and actions varies appreciably from one service to the other. Which doctrine should dominate operations when two or three services join together and support one another? Given that joint doctrine is authoritative but not directive, who then should be accountable and for what? What are the exceptions and how far can commanders deviate from the rules? These legitimate doctrinal concerns not only could result in conflict and tensions across the services but they could potentially lead to less than optimal campaign planning and dysfunctional results on the battlefields.⁵⁹

Although the Canadian military has been ‘unified’ for more than 30 years, the CF still shares to a certain degree the rigid and parochial organizations of the U.S. forces and NATO. Self-interest should be strong at unit level, where it is necessary to bond fighting elements under a tactical purpose. However, it should disappear at the operational level. The CF must ensure that the operational level Headquarters adopt a firm joint team perspective and sublimate services’ self-interest to the common good of a joint CF team. The three Environmental Chiefs, having been collocated with the Chief of Defence Staff, are in an ideal position to work closely with the joint staffs and develop joint solutions for the CF as a whole. How services will react to proposals for joint reforms that affect individual services to varying degree is hard to assess. However, it is reasonable to envisage that opposition may be raised against any plans that would favor one service to the detriment of another.

Progress towards implementing a joint vision will require close collaboration between the three services and decisions even if the absence of unanimity.⁶⁰

Joint Doctrine for the CF – A Vital Concern

... the services began to pull together for victory, [having] failed to do so when disaster could be avoided...⁶¹

The Defence mission is to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security.⁶²

The historical review showed that coalition warfare has usually been very effective and powerful, but that joint practices tend to disappear quickly after wars and to be absent during peacetime. It also suggested that military operations should almost always be ‘joint’. Modern joint doctrine has been evolving steadily since the late 1980s. However, there is still confusion regarding the exact nature of joint doctrine and no complete acceptance of it yet by all services. Lack of a clear and steady vision of a Canadian military role in the present post cold war era, expectations of a ‘peace dividend’, and the poor comprehension that the Canadian public has of the utility of standing military forces have left DND in a precarious position, with a reduced size and a wide-ranging mission set.⁶³ Recent initiatives such as the Revolution in Military Affairs and Joint Vision 2010 have muddied the water some more by questioning the traditional military practice and principles and by proclaiming that new technology and jointness are key to a successful military.⁶⁴ The fundamental tenets of joint doctrine are stable and basically add up to unity of command, teamwork, common understanding, and mutual interest. However, achieving these is anything but easy and

requires substantial investments in personnel, equipment, command and control infrastructure, research and development and education and training.

It is generally believed that future conflict interventions and wars will be conducted and fought as multinational joint and combined efforts.⁶⁵ ⁶⁶ Therefore, it is credible that the CF should not have to contemplate the whole range of potential military conflicts, from global war and power projection to contingency interventions and humanitarian relief operations. However, as a member of major military alliances, a G8 country and a partner in peace, Canada has the responsibility to play a significant global role, commensurate with its international political and military stature. Furthermore, provided that it retains sufficient capability to carry out the joint teamwork needed in operations, the CF should qualify for meaningful positions in joint and combined force deployment and force employment campaign plans. Consequently, DND must establish, equip, train and sustain modern military elements that will be able to integrate with other operational units and fight in joint and combined environments. How exactly DND should do so is at the heart of this discussion.

The CF is increasingly being asked to do much more with a lot less. As a result, it can be argued that senior leaders in DND could soon be forced to choose between a new vision and the safeguarding of present-day force structures and fighting capabilities. Should the CF services move swiftly down the path of jointness, and function as a single closely integrated and unified entity? Or should the services continue to operate under the current regime, as independent and widely dispersed components that assemble, train and fight jointly if and when required? In fact, is joint doctrine a key to survival and success of the CF or is it a hindrance to the retention and development of the more traditional sea, land and air components?

DND presently has nearly the same interests and commitments as it had ten years ago. The size of its Regular Forces, however, has decreased by 31 percent over the past decade, from 88,800 personnel in 1989 to 60,000 in 1999.⁶⁷ Contrary to natural logic, the department has not proportionally reduced its mission set to balance the equation. Thus far the CF has given an acceptable performance in the majority of tasks and operational missions assigned to it by the political and strategic levels. However, the guarantee that it will continue to be able to do so in the future is conjectural. It is widely believed that the overall capability of the CF has sunk to a dangerously low level and that the ‘can do’ attitude of its members is showing signs of strain. Moreover, successive participation in peacekeeping missions does little to enhance the CF *operational* capability and *combat* readiness. The probability of being able to bring contingency situations to successful conclusion in congruence with the political and strategic objectives of the nation could become more speculative in the future.⁶⁸

Since it is unlikely that the current trend for retrenchment of military forces will reverse itself in a near future, and considering the likelihood that Canada will be asked to contribute more, not less to the protection of common international interests, DND must ensure that it can meet the demand. Clearly, the CF does not have the requisite capability to carry out every type of future operations, from nuclear deterrence and global war to low intensity conflict and military operations other than war. Also, the CF, by itself, cannot conduct joint operations at the operational level of war.⁶⁹ It must, therefore, assess the capability requirement against the tasks that it could be called to execute in a multinational and joint context, or at least against the types of conflict that Canada would like to fight. It should accept at the outset that simultaneous focus on different types of threat will be

counter-productive and may no longer be feasible. In short, the type of forces to be maintained needs to be decided.

As discussed in previous sections, the modern operational context will require joint application of military forces to resolve conflicts quickly⁷⁰ and wars will be more restrictive, with campaign end states and targeting criteria that call for minimum collateral damage and minimum casualties. The trend for smaller but frequently employed armed forces will continue with more emphasis on joint operations and inter-operability.⁷¹ Joint Vision 2010 indicates that military organizations will have to become more responsive to contingencies, “with less ‘start up’ times between deployment and employment”.⁷² The combination of fast moving operations and continuing improvements in command and control technology will require “joint and combined forces that can operate seamlessly on the battlefields”.⁷³

The joint doctrine of the CF is based largely on that of the U.S. and NATO but it is unlikely that the CF could by itself bring unity of tactics, operations and strategy to the battlefield. Historically, Canada has always fought alongside forces of other nations and it is likely that it will continue to operate in that fashion for the foreseeable future. There is a sentiment that the CF should be structured and trained with a view to conducting combined operations more than joint operations⁷⁴. However, the body of information provided above suggests that not being proficient at joint operations could very well consign the CF to minor roles, as small single-element components in coalitions led by other nations, or to operations at the low-end of the conflict spectrum. Driving towards more jointness would appear to be a vital concern if the CF is to retain a substantial measure of autonomy and remain a worthy partner on the international military scene.

Jointness is being rediscovered and it is fashionable to think of everything military as joint. This is not sensible. Jointness exists at the operational level, where joint command and control is needed to synchronize the effort of an optimum mix of military components to achieve the best possible synergy. The small size of the CF, the geographical scattering of its infrastructure and its limited resources in terms of personnel, equipment and weapons systems make it difficult to organize and combine components such that they can train and operate ‘jointly’ on a regular basis. But teamwork is still possible and could be sufficient if practiced regularly by joint personnel at the right level, and if it is accompanied by sound complementary capabilities. The retention of a joint staff at NDHQ and the formation of a JTFHQ at division level should go a long way in ensuring that the CF acquires and retains the knowledge and skills required for effective joint operations from crisis interventions to low intensity wars. However, it will not be sufficient unless combined and joint become the preferred way of doing business for all CF operations.

Although politically attractive, penny packaging the forces so that Canada can be seen to partake in a multitude of operations is not efficient. Furthermore, it reduces the CF’s ability to develop the stalwart fighting capabilities that the new operational context calls for. Cutting down the number of missions and eliminating support to operations that do not provide much payback in term of joint and combined experience for the CF should be seriously considered by DND. This would also ensure that Canada’s efforts remain substantial enough to be recognized as significant contributions towards the achievement of international security objectives.

The last major hurdle for the CF becoming truly capable of combined and joint operations is that of aligning its military capabilities with the modern operational context.

As discussed in previous sections, specialization exists and must continue within each of the three services if units are to develop the war fighting capabilities that are needed for joint operations. The correct mix of personnel, weapons systems, equipment and training must be achieved within each of the three environmental elements for the CF to be capable of meeting all of its roles. However, the need for the CF to be able to work as a ‘joint’ team must now be given added weight when planning force structure and deciding what it takes to achieve success at the least cost. This would suggest that both individual services and joint staffs’ inputs are critical for force structure and procurement decisions. The Environmental Chiefs and their staffs should coordinate the force development effort with an increased focus on the operational level of warfare. They should also ensure that parochial views and services’ self-interests are sublimated to the higher sense of purpose of the joint CF team.

In sum, what is required is a *Canadian* joint doctrine that will:

- a. equip and train the army, navy and air force to be capable of conducting operations alongside its allies at the operational level of warfare;
- b. align structures, capabilities and resources to meet common Canadian objectives; and
- c. provide a sense of a ‘joint’ mission to the whole DND organization.

The tasks of defining the common objectives and determining the exact composition of the CF ‘joint’ team necessary to meet the defence needs of Canada within the challenging operational context of the 21st century battlefields should be at the top of DND’s list of priorities.

Conclusion

The crusade to establish jointness as the ‘way business is done around here’ has progressed immensely and there is every reason to believe that it will remain an essential element of modern warfare. Although the CF has developed and promulgated doctrine manuals, it has yet to develop a truly Canadian joint doctrine that will serve to orient Canada’s military force towards an increased focus on operations and war fighting capability.

A brief review of the history of joint operations showed that jointness has been difficult to achieve in the past and almost impossible to maintain during peacetime. The need to rebuild jointness in the midst of crisis and disasters has been the norm rather than the exception and budget cuts and military containment have normally compelled services to disregard jointness in favor of self-preservation. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, however, jointness has received increased attention and forces around the world have embraced the concept. The CF has followed suit but it is unclear whether it will be able to establish and retain jointness as a key element for progress, if military cutbacks and personnel reductions continue.

The principles upon which joint doctrine is founded appear to be sound and to provide essential guidance to commanders at the operational level as intended. However, joint doctrine is also slowly becoming a form of policy upon which force structures and procurement decisions could be made. The need to balance the requirements of the fighting elements with those of the joint organizations should not be underestimated.

The modern operational context will require joint forces that are equipped and trained for joint operations. Joint Vision 2010, the Revolution in Military Affairs and Canada’s

Defence Strategy 2020 provide a good evaluation of the future requirements. It is anticipated that operations will be conducted at a fast pace, requiring mobile forces ready to respond to a wide range of military contingencies. It is, therefore, imperative that the CF develops its own joint team within and against a Canadian vision to face the upcoming challenges. Difficult choices will have to be made regarding technology and organization of a joint CF team.

Despite the appearance of unity at the strategic level, it is important to recognize that the CF is not immune to the potential effects of services' parochialism. The services have different cultures, which must be taken into account when articulating and promulgating joint doctrine. DND is well positioned to develop joint solutions for the common good of the CF and should take full advantage of the collocation of the Environmental Chiefs, the Chief of Defence Staff and his joint staff.

The CF should work out and implement a strategy that will develop a combat capable force that fits the new operational context. It should also develop a customized *Canadian* joint doctrine that will reflect and accommodate the reality of a small size military organization, facing a wide ranging mission set. More emphasis should be placed on the operational level of war and on the need to organize the army, navy and air force to meet common Canadian objectives and realistic international commitments. The tasks of setting the objectives and defining the exact composition of a CF 'joint' team should be given a high priority.

Jointness is very much an attitude. A joint doctrine that promotes the best interest of the CF and clearly articulates the essential requirements for continued success is becoming both vital and urgent.

ENDNOTES

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³ Ibid, p 187.

⁴ Ibid, p 155.

⁵ Ibid, p xiv.

⁶ Ibid, p 61.

⁷ Ibid, p 85.

⁸ Ibid, p 113.

⁹ Ibid, p 104.

¹⁰ Ibid, p 119.

¹¹ Ibid, pp 100-129.

¹² Ibid, pp 130-136.

¹³ Major Paul F. Wynnyk, "Jointness: The Need for the Canadian Forces to Go Farther" (unpublished paper, Royal Military College, Kingston, 24 January 1997), [<http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc/wynnyk2.html>], p 1.

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¹⁵ LCol F.M. Boomer, CF, "Joint or Combined Doctrine?: The Right Choice for Canada" (unpublished paper, Advanced Military Studies Course – AMSC 1, CFC, Toronto, Ont), [<http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc/amsc1/index.html>], p 3.

¹⁶ Beaumont, *Joint Military Operations*..., pp 163-166.

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¹⁹ Ibid, p 4.

²⁰ Commodore K.A. Nason, "Joint Operations in the Canadian Forces: A Meaningful and Timely Start," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (December 1994), p 7.

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²² David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs* (Washington: National Defense University press, 1999) pp 18-19.

²³ Ibid, pp 30-31.

²⁴ Ibid, p 32.

²⁵ Ibid, p 82.

²⁶ Ibid, p 11.

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²⁹ John A. English, *Marching Through Chaos: The Decent Of Armies in Theory and Practice* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), p 39.

³⁰ Advanced Military Studies Course 2, Syndicate A Classroom discussions, September 1999.

³¹ United States, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), p 18.

³² Canada’s Online News Source, WebPosted Mon Sep 20 07:07:31 1999 [<http://www.cbcnews.cbc.ca/cgi-bin/templates/view.cgi?/news/1999/09/18/cantimor990918>].

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³⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM [Field Manual] 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993) p 3.

³⁵ United States, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994).

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³⁷ Ibid, p 161.

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⁴³ Col Mackubin T. Owen, USMC(Ret), “Organizing for Failure: The Rush Toward ‘Jointness’ Going Off Track,” *Armed Forces Journal*, Vol. 81, (June, 1998), p 12.

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⁴⁸ English, *Marching Through Chaos...*, p 193.

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⁵¹ Smith, *Air Force Culture and Cohesion...*, p 51.

⁵² Tritten, *Naval perspective for Military Doctrine Development*, p 16.

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⁵⁶ Smith, *Air Force Culture and Cohesion...*, p 51.

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⁷⁰ Malik, ed, *The Future Battlefield*, p 129.

⁷¹ Ibid, p 186.

⁷² Joint Vision 2010, p 21.

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