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Attacking our Cohesion – Who needs Enemies?

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Introduction

Because war and armed conflict are conducted on moral and physical planes, Canada's army comprises both moral and physical components. Moral components are those spiritual, psychological, intellectual and sociological factors which enable soldiers to overcome fear and defeat an enemy in battle or successfully carry out a mission . . . These things contribute most to creating cohesion in units and instilling in soldiers the will to fight on until the battle is won or the mission accomplished [1]

In this century over two million Canadians have fought and one hundred thousand have died. Since the Korean War Canada has participated in every United Nations peacekeeping mission and since 1992 up to a brigade-group, 4,400 troops on 22 UN and NATO missions, has been deployed in sub-unit, battle-group or brigade size packages. The operational tempo and experience of individuals and units in today's Canadian Forces (CF) is at its highest level since Korea and yet the military is at its lowest manning level since World War Two, having met and exceeded the force reduction target of the 1994 Defence White Paper of 60,000 personnel to its present manning level of approximately 57,000. The rising national employment rate results in the military having to compete with industry and commerce for high quality personnel to man the present and future Force. Even if the military can attract sufficient high quality recruits, the much reduced-in-size CF schools and instructor base may preclude sufficient volume throughput to halt the present "downwards spiral" CF strategic manning is facing.[2]

Despite history and the high profile of present day operations, Canadians, including politicians and the media, have little understanding of their military. Despite this high tempo and operational experience, the Canadian military is facing a crisis in the human dimension. Increasingly the dedicated professional soldiers who accept the unlimited liability are becoming marginalized "in the Canadian army by a country, government, and defence structure that no longer values real military virtues . . . They want to lead well, and they want to be well led . . . by those like themselves, who still remember

that armies exist to fight wars, and that they are therefore very different from other types of human organizations."[3] The demise of the human dimension of the CF risks present and future operational effectiveness. In addition, a recent study has confirmed the Auditor-General's findings that the CF, without the infusion of considerable sums of money is incapable of meeting Canada's future defence requirements.[4] The Canadian military senses that it is being devalued by society due to 10 years of decreasing funding causing drastic force reductions and change accompanied by MCCRT. Under MCCRT, headquarters were reduced in size, some as much as fifty percent thus placing increased work-load stress on Staff at all levels. This change, forced by fiscal realities, has caused a shift from emphasis on processes to emphasis on market-place principles and "bottom-line" outputs. At the same time, the nation's demands on the military have increased. As a result of this perception that society is breaking its social contract with its military, the military is undergoing a shift from intrinsic to extrinsic motivators and from group gain to individual advantage.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to highlight the need to reinvigorate the human dimension - the moral component of the CF. This paper contends:

- that the moral component, transcends the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, and although mitigated and ameliorated at each level, many of the causes to the breakdown in the moral component are found at the strategic level;

- that the present Unit Climate Profile, a subjective survey tool administered to the rank and file in the unit, measuring horizontal/vertical cohesion at the tactical level, is worthwhile but needs to be augmented by an objective measurement tool for commanders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels;

- that the CF must improve its moral health by countering the increased fragmentation, polarization, and experience gaps between ranks caused by down-sizing and the lack of recruiting new members;

- in operations, events at the tactical level, such as a MCpl led Coyote patrol in Kosovo, broadcast by CNN can have a strategic impact and thus cause an overlapping, blurring, and compression of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict; and,

- personnel problems inherently lower combat readiness and operational effectiveness.

In pursuit of the aim, the following will be examined: the future military environment; the concepts of fighting power (the ability to fight) and the relationship between its constituent parts, the physical component (the means to fight), the conceptual component (the thought process), and the moral component (the ability to get people to fight); the group dynamics of horizontal and vertical cohesion, and combat motivation; the conceptual models of the relationship of the military in society; assaults from within the institution on the moral component; and, recommend ways to counter attack assaults on the moral component thereby countering the decline in morale and resultant operational effectiveness.

Future Military Environment

The mission of the CF is to protect Canadians and their interests around the world.[5] The fundamental role is to fight and win wars. The military may fulfil this through deterrence which requires the maintenance of forces that are credible and visible in peace and conflict, or through the conduct of operations should deterrence fail.[6] The recently published *Future Security Environment – Report 99-2 Director Land Strategic Concepts* studies the defining features of the future security environment, the force capabilities and characteristics required, and the alternative concepts and technologies essential to realize those capabilities.[7] In assessing the most probable versus highest risk

operation, it states: "the most frequent form of overseas operations will be peace support and humanitarian assistance, which will require a combat capability. However the less frequent more difficult tasks will be high-risk warfighting military roles when our vital interests are in danger. The tension between frequency and importance will not go away and must be carefully managed."[8] Therefore the traditional view of the military's role and that of its members has broadened considerably from:

- Euro-centric to global;

- conventional interstate to include asymmetric intrastate conflict;

- mid to high intensity conflict to include peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace support operations, humanitarian operations, nation building, and disaster relief; and,

- the military ethos to include the mental agility and skill-sets of diplomat, peacemaker, NGO, mediator, negotiator and humanitarian.

Fighting Power

Fighting power is recognised as the ability to fight and it has three components: the conceptual - the thought process; the physical - the means to fight; and the moral - the ability to get people to fight.[9] Success in operations is generally accepted as being a function of strong leadership, robust and realistic training; confidence in weapons, technology and administration, fighting spirit, and chance. Although this last element of chance or randomness is difficult to quantify and control, we can have it play in our favour if we maximise the preceding elements, especially those that deal with the moral dimension - leadership and fighting spirit. The conceptual component, the thought process, incorporates the principles of war, derived through an analysis of the factors that have contributed to past battlefield successes and the intellectual contributions of soldiers such as Clausewitz and Napoleon, both of whom stressed the moral factor. Napoleon stressed the moral component in his maxim that "In war, three

quarters [of what matters] is morale; the relative strengths of troops only matters one-quarter."[10]

Clausewitz's *On War* first published 167 years ago is considered by some to be the definitive work on

war written in the Western World[11] if not the World.[12] His analysis of the theory of war resulted in

his determination that war is a form of social interaction[13] and that war is an art that cannot be

reduced to scientific quantification.[14] As a testimony to his continuing relevance, many of his

concepts are embodied in the keystone doctrinal manuals of armies of many countries.[15] From his

many enduring concepts, the one that remains compelling and relevant to not just the military profession

in late 20th century society but to society as a whole, including government, is that of trinitarian warfare

- the trinity of violence, chance and politics.

> War . . . adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant
> tendencies always make a paradoxical trinity-composed of primordial violence, hatred, and
> enmity . . . ; of the play of chance and probability . . . ; and of its element of subordination as an
> instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects
> mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.
> The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope
> which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends
> on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the
> business of government alone.[16]

The three pillars of the trinity: violence, chance, and politics have been expressed alternatively as: the

people, the commander and his army, and the government; or as the will of the people, supporting a

fully resourced military to achieve the aims and objectives, and end-states determined by the

politicians.[17] It is self-evident today, when no aspect of military operations can be concealed from the

media and therefore the citizenry, that a nation cannot wage war without the popular support of the

people. Clausewitz argued against war as a science and for war as an art. He believed that war is a

clash of wills, "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will"[18] and that "the moral elements are

among the most important in war".[19] Clausewitz addressed this in his dialectical relationship between

moral and physical forces. "One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while

the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely honed blade."[20] The second pillar

of the trinity is that of chance. Chance is also expressed as the means or the courage, talent, and genius

of the commander and the pride, fighting spirit, and ability of his army. Equally applicable to both, and

linking these two pillars, is the interaction of Clausewitz's dialectic of the physical and the moral. As

morale impacts on the nation's will power and determination to conduct war, it also affects the

determination of the commander and the fighting spirit of his troops. Again he wrote of the importance

of the moral element: "Physical casualties are not the only losses incurred by both sides . . . ; their moral

strength is shaken, broken and ruined . . . the loss of morale has proved the major decisive factor."[21]

The third pillar of the trinity is that of politics or the will of the government expressed through clear

aims, objectives and end-states determined by politicians. Of the linkage between the middle pillar, the

means, and this third pillar, Clausewitz wrote: "war is a serious means to a serious end . . . When whole

communities go to war . . . the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always

due to some political object . . . that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a

continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."[22] The commander and his army,

as the means, fights to attain a series of intermediate stages or objectives in order to achieve the goals of

the government.[23] Clausewitz wrote of the close interrelationship between the statesman and the

soldier necessary in the shaping of these objectives in war: "If war is to be fully consonant with political

objectives, and policy suited to the means available for war, then unless the statesman and soldier are

combined in one person, the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of

cabinet, so that the cabinet can share in the major aspects of his activities."[24] Politicians and civil

servants must know their military. They must understand and appreciate: the nature of the military

institution; the unique capabilities, culture, values and ethos; the need for the military to be different[25]

from other government organs, departments and ministries; and, within the context of national security

policy aims, assign roles and allocate resources in order for the military to achieve future operational

success.

The Dynamics of Cohesion and Motivation

> Morale:
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> a confident, resolute, willing, often self-sacrificing and courageous attitude of an individual to the functions or tasks demanded or expected of him by a group of which he is a part that is based upon such factors as pride in the achievements and aims of the group, faith in its leadership and ultimate success, a sense of fruitful participation in its work, and a devotion and loyalty to the other members of the group.[26]

Military morale is generally thought of as a group dynamic - a collective "state of motivation for combat

throughout the group"[27] and the glue that binds the group together is cohesion. Cohesion is unity. It

is a quality that binds together constituent parts thereby providing resilience against dislocation and

disruption. It minimises vulnerability to defeat in detail and the adverse effects of preemption.[28] In

its simplest form, the purpose of tactics is to break the enemy's will to fight by destroying his cohesion

while maintaining your cohesion and fighting spirit. Cohesion exists in both the horizontal plane, within

and between units at the tactical level, and the vertical plane, up and down the chain of command and

between higher, lower units and formations throughout the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

The study of cohesion is worthy of another paper. For further understanding, see Guy Siebold's

excellent study on horizontal, vertical, and organizational cohesion in "The Evolution of the

Measurement of Cohesion".[29]

Tactics is based upon group dynamics and the mutually supporting fires between individual

soldiers or weapon systems such as tanks, between small eight to ten man groups such as sections,

between larger groups such as thirty-man platoons or four-tank troops, between successively larger

groups such as 100-man companies and 1000-man battlegroups all utilizing various forms of fire and

movement. It is because of this purpose, to defeat the enemy by destroying his cohesion through fire

and movement, that military units are designed, structured and equipped as they are during war. It is a truism that militaries should be organised, trained, equipped, administered, and led in peace as they would be in war.

Studies in combat motivation have recognized the importance of the relationship between motivation, cohesion and operational effectiveness/future operational success, and the primary group - that group with which an individual forms the closest bond. Anthony Kellet's study *Combat Motivation* examined group dynamics by the factors of compatibility, turbulence, competition, anxiety and group solidarity, size, and the regimental system. "The group is a fundamental social situation."[30] From a young age, people identify with groups through school, sports, and church. Military induction training is designed to induce group identification.[31] Compatibility within a group fosters cohesion.[32] Personnel turbulence detracts from cohesion. In 210 BC Petronius Arbiter wrote: "We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing: and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization."[33] Group identity can be strengthened through competition between differing groups. Bus and Portnoy found that competition between Australians and Americans in Vietnam added to morale and operational effectiveness.[34] Yet George Clay found that competition within a like-minded group or competition internal to a unit could be a disunifier.[35] The greater the group cohesion, the greater anxiety will be held in check and the greater will be the capacity to endure pain.[36] A well-knit, cohesive group of paratroopers exhibits little anxiety with respect to danger save the individual anxiety of not meeting the expectations of the group.[37] The size of the primary group has been studied. Until the beginning of this century the company was thought to be the primary group in the infantry. During World War Two this infantry primary group shifted down to the section/squad. Frederick Hanson, an American

psychiatrist, noted "that after the squad, the company - not the platoon - was the next major psychological group because of its relative administrative, tactical, and disciplinary self-containment. But in time of combat the soldier's identification with the company became weaker and he was drawn closer to his squad."[38] Shelford Bidwell's study[39] of the British Army had similar findings to that of Hanson. Of the regimental system Kellett writes, "the regimental system has shown itself capable of articulating primary group (squad or section, platoon, and even company) goals with those of military authorities."[40] In sum, a soldier in combat gains mutual support from the primary group - the group with which he forms the closest bond. General Sir Michael Rose speaks of this bond when talking about UN peace support operations. "No matter how just the cause, soldiers do not die for the UN. They die for their comrades - their section, platoon/troop, battalion/regiment, and country - in that order!"[41] S.L.A. Marshall writes in *Men Against Fire,* "I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing that enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed presence of a comrade."[42] The vital process of defeating the enemy by destroying his cohesion, previously stated, extends to the necessary and concurrent process of safeguarding and of reinforcing one's own cohesion. Therefore any changes during peace and war to organisations, training, equipping, administration, and leadership must always consider the impact on the moral component - the morale, cohesion and fighting spirit of the primary group. Any cause that effects cohesion effects combat effectiveness - future operational success. "The military is second only to religion in the extent to which in peace, it must question its tenets and beliefs: in war it is second to none in its need for strong, easily interpreted doctrine."[43] In wartime society understands and accepts the requirement for a military. The longer a society enjoys peace the more difficult it is for the military to articulate to society the need to be preserved as a sub-culture of society. Charles Cotton "believes that an isolated military in a democratic society is impractical as well as undesirable. At the same time, 'economic man,' or a

military based on marketplace principles, can lead to the worst of two worlds: a military isolated from civilian society and a lack of cohesion within the military. The optimum is a military organization that is both internally cohesive and congruent with society."[44]

Conceptual Models of the Relationship of the Military in Society

The "culture of the assembly line is not equivalent to the culture of the firing line . . . we must build a culture of the firing line and make policy with this culture always in mind, working to strengthen the social legitimacy, cohesion, and operational commitment of the military and its membership."[45] Sandy Cotton's prophetic words originally written over seventeen years ago, in the context of post integration of the CF, are appropriate to the present Canadian military circumstance. Cotton's writings contribute to the many studies since World War Two that have advanced concepts and models to further define the unique relationship between the military and society. Max Weber's study defined the military as an ideal-type bureaucratic model. R.H. Turner's 1947 study and A.K. Davies' 1948 study examined naval bureaucracy and J. van Doorn's 1956 study of organisations utilised the military structure as a baseline.[46] Samuel P. Huntington's 1957 study, *The Soldier and the State*,[47] and Morris Janowitz's 1960 study, *The Professional Soldier*,[48] promoted the concepts of military professionalism and highly bureaucratised armed forces.[49] Huntington's thesis is that the "modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man."[50] He further defines the concept of profession by the distinguishing characteristics of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.[51] Furthermore he states that a "strong, integrated, highly professional officer corps . . . would be a steadying balance wheel in the conduct of policy."[52] The more professional the officer corps is, the more influence it will have on government policy. Janowitz uses five basic hypotheses in his analysis of the American military profession since 1910: changing organisational authority; narrowing skill

differential between military and civilian elites; shift in officer recruitment, significance of career patterns; and trends in political indoctrination.[53]

In 1977 Charles C. Moskos, against the backdrop of "a quiet malaise, a sense that the recruits were being bought at the margin of the labour market, that officers were driven by careerism, and that reasons for military service had become obscured,"[54] proposed his Institutional/Occupational or I/O thesis.[55] This thesis utilises several levels of analysis to examine changing individual attitudes and behaviour, the changing social organisation within the military, and the impact of historical and societal influences on the civil-military relationship. The I/O model serves as a caution that the military profession as an institution, refracting societal trends, is moving towards occupationalism, that the institutional integration of military members is being challenged by their increasing identification with civilian occupations, and that a military's shift towards occupationalism affects military effectiveness with respect to mission performance, member motivation, and professional responsibility.[56] "The I/O thesis assumes a continuum ranging from a military organisation highly divergent from civilian society to one highly convergent with civilian structures."[57]

Moskos's study focused on the American military during the difficult years following the withdrawal from Vietnam. Although the model is over twenty years old much of it remains valid for discussion.

The institutional military model is based on altruistic values and norms in order to serve the greater good of society. Members are embued with a higher calling and believe the unique features of self-sacrifice, ultimate liability, mobility, 24/7 work reality, customs, traditions, code of service discipline, reward based on rank, security and benefits whilst serving and deferred to retirement, all serve to set the military apart from society. "To the degree institutional membership is congruent with

notions of self-sacrifice and primary identification with one's institutional role, institution members ordinarily enjoy esteem from the larger society."[58]

The occupational military model is based in the market-place. Pay, supply and demand dynamics of the working conditions, contracts, production output and profit demands prevail. "The occupational model implies the priority of self-interest rather than that of the employing organization."[59]

The I/O thesis pits the value orientation of the military institution against the occupational military's rational calculation of the market-place and compares the two with respect to the following variables: societal regard, role commitments, reference groups, basis and mode of compensation, legal system, residence, sex roles and evaluation of performance.[60]

Underlying the I/O thesis is motivation. "Is motivation rational or subjective, oriented toward moral concerns of altruism, strongly affected, perhaps, by internal emotional concerns, or is it efficient and rational, concerned primarily with objective calculation? The problematics of action are concerned with the relative weight of idealism and materialism. In philosophic terms, it is as old as the struggle between romantics and utilitarians."[61] Whatever sociological model or continuum one derives; warrior versus manager, peacetime leader versus bureaucrat, idealist versus materialist, enlightenment versus engineering, or profession versus job, motivation is the moral determinant on the continuum.

Janowitz presents the social science and policy concepts of the engineering model and the enlightenment model.[62] The former lies in the realm of applied research conducted in order to collect data, test hypothesis, make recommendations and solve specific problems. The I/O thesis falls into the latter category of enlightenment-type of social research. Rather than furnish specific answers to policy makers, it serves to increase their understanding of the military institution as a social organisation and to highlight key issues. "It seeks to increase sensitivity to how broad military organizational changes affect

members attitudes and commitment, which in turn affect organizational effectiveness. The I/O thesis will not give concrete answers, but it will better inform those who must come up with their own answers."[63]

Henning Sorensen has re-examined Huntington's and Janowitz's definition and concept of officers as professionals and Moskos's I/O concept.[64] With respect to trends in the US military, Moskos argues a shift to occupationalism whereas Janowitz argues a shift to civilianization. Moskos believes it effects the whole of the US military while Janowitz believes it has effected change only to a portion of military professionals. Whereas Moskos views with alarm and caution the reversible occupational shift and the negative impact on the effectiveness of the military, Janowitz sees little reason for alarm and only minor and not widely-based discontent with the irreversible shift towards civilianization. Sorensen further examines Segal's model of occupations-professions and organizations-institutions differentiating at the individual level, "jobs from callings (professions) and at the organizational level, institutions from workplaces."[65] Segal states "that the model addresses two levels of analysis: the organizational, comparing the military as an institution with the military as a workplace; and the individual comparing military service as a calling with military service as a job."[66] Of organizations-institutions, organizations "are often divided into two types, technical vs. institutional. The aim of technical organizations is to produce an output, while institutional organizations such as schools, churches, universities, and armed forces are judged more by their processes than by their outcomes."[67] And of occupations-professions, occupations "are characterized by persons who are most often employed in a structure working to produce an outcome. They are seldom experts and they do not feel the responsibility to clients as the professional does . . . Professionals are often given autonomy, while, in contrast, those in occupations are often managerially controlled."[68] On the face of it, processes to measure the output or outcome, such as the operational readiness of the armed forces

as an institutional organization, are problematic. Operational evaluations, inspections, and reporting

mechanisms in peacetime adequately measure the conceptual and physical elements, but less adequately,

if any, the moral element or component of fighting power.

The 1978-79 Military Ethos Scale study[69] was conducted to measure the institutional and

occupational orientation of 1,636 Canadian soldiers. Respondents were given six questions "three . . .

deal with the scope of military role obligations, and three deal with the primacy of those obligations over

other social roles and interests."[70] Officers and combat arms soldiers were found to be biased more to

the institutional whereas combat service support soldiers leaned more to the occupational. Three role

types emerged: soldiers, ambivalents, and employees with almost 40% in the ambivalent category. This

was similar to the findings of a 1980 US Air Force survey "that an individual's perception of his role

within the military could be both institutional and occupational."[71] Segal refers to this mix of

institutional and occupational views in the US military as pragmatic professionalism.[72] If one

assumes that the findings of the Military Ethos Scale study, the US Air Forces survey, and Segal's

pragmatic professionalism remain extant and that the findings of the latter two can be extrapolated to the

present Canadian military, the majority of members of the CF may be ambivalent/ employee

occupationalists. The lack of a perceived threat to Canada and assumed long lead-time scenario, fuelled

by the need to balance the budget and reduce the national debt, has caused a severe reduction in the

percentage of operational personnel or soldier/institutionalists in the CF merely to a capability

subsistence level.

Due to MCCRT, Area-level headquarters were reduced by fifty percent. As a result many

staffing functions are no longer being performed due to a conscious and deliberate, almost daily, risk-

assessment of placing staff horsepower to those issues of highest priority. An excellent example of this

risk taking is in the changes brought about to the audit process caused by severe reductions of financial

management staff. The very compelling control mechanism of the one hundred percent financial inspection, conducted on a regular basis, has given way to a compliance process whereby periodic and random inspections risk causing opportunities for committing fraud. Without the control mechanism the extent of fraud cannot be determined and the cost to DND may indeed surpass the savings accrued through personnel reductions.

Some capabilities are in danger of being lost such as the ability to fight at the high intensity end of the continuum of conflict. As cuts have been made to operations, corresponding economies have not been made to cut excess uniformed and civilian support personnel and Department of National Defence civil servants. In 1993 Brigadier-General Michel Matte aptly stated that "even if the Defence Department were eventually to eliminate the entire combat function of the military, National Defence Headquarters would continue to operate on its present scale".[73] This statement reflects what Cotton defines as the "beleaguered warrior" syndrome. His interviews with combat arms Army officers revealed their "estrangement from the military bureaucracy which ostensibly exists to support them in field operations."[74] One officer replied, "I feel that most service members have forgotten that our primary role is to prepare for war. I find it increasingly difficult to relate to administrative heavy support personnel in the Canadian Forces. These civil servants in uniform need to get out of their offices, see what we are doing, and support us."[75]

The 1995 Phillips Employee Feedback Survey conducted among 900 Privates to Colonels throughout the Canadian Forces in 1995, revealed that 83 per cent had lost confidence in their senior leaders. Senior officers were viewed as "self-interested careerists and empire-builders"[76] who "couldn't care less about the soldiers . . . lack courage and the willpower to lead effectively . . . mistrust of leaders runs so deep that the Armed Forces is going through what the Americans went through in Vietnam."[77]

Attacks from within the Institution on the Moral Component

Over the past 25 years the iterative evolution of civilianization and bureaucratization, and the intertwining of the military with civilians within NDHQ has diminished the quality of professional military advice given to civil servants and politicians. Civil servants advise on policy and once Cabinet decides, they are obliged to act on these policy decisions. Whereas military leaders have, in addition to their responsibility to Parliament, the paramount responsibility to maintain an operationally ready and fit armed forces, the only segment of society honoured with the unlimited liability. Two additional factors have contributed to the marginalization of military advice in NDHQ. Firstly, due to the careerist progression plan in the civil service, civil servants bounce between departments competing and filling more elevated positions. The result has been that many serving in the Department of National Defence do so for such a short period of time that they do not acquire an appreciation and understanding of the military ethos and why the military needs to be dealt with differently from other federal departments. This short service and lack of knowledge base precludes the development of expert and sophisticated military advice from civil servants in the Department. Secondly, the "beleaguered warrior syndrome" versus "civil servants in uniform", as referred to previously[78], has resulted in a "we" versus "them" dynamic and a break in vertical cohesion. The "we"/ "beleaguered warriors" tensions remain at operational field staff and below with soldiers deploying on operations and avoid serving with "them"/"civil servants in uniform" on the central or capital staff. As "warriors" they view serving in NDHQ as pejorative and careerist. Perception can be reality. There is also the perception that the traditional pyramidal structure of the Canadian Forces, with staff effort focusing from the top - NDHQ down, serving the needs of the "customers" in the subordinate commands, areas, operational formations and units, has changed to an inverted pyramid where increasingly the staff effort of subordinate units,

formations, and of the NDHQ central staff is directed laterally within headquarters and upwards serving other staff officers in the next superior headquarters. Ronald Dowell diagnoses this structural paradigm shift as a sign of a dysfunctional organization.[79]

The evolution of integration and unification, both processes of bureaucratic rationalization, has made bureaucratization systemic to the decision-making process. So ingrained is the process is that many decisions and policies made since integration have had little linkage to future operational effectiveness. This is creating tensions between the military and society and widening the gap between the two especially given the military's ethos of duty to win on the future high intensity battlefield and succeed in all operations of less intensity such as peace support operations.

The length constraint of this paper permits little further elaboration, however the following are but a few examples of bureaucratic rationalization and assaults on the military institutional model imposed from within and outside the military that, to varying degrees, have a deleterious effect on operational effectiveness, that undermine, rather than sustain and foster cohesion, the moral component, and that have created the impression of a Centre out of touch with the rest of the institution.

Operational tempo is the rate of military activities, missions, and/or tasks and applies to individuals and collectively to units and formations. At the operational level, it is generally an aggregate of the tactical level. The present state of operational tempo has resulted in one-third of the Army deployed on operations for the past six years and, more recently, since deployment to Kosovo, this has increased to more than one-third. Having stated previously that the CF is at its highest operational tempo since the Korean War yet at its lowest manning since World War Two, at time of writing, the strength of the Army is approximately 20,000 plus 18,000 reservists at financially constrained levels of training and readiness. Because the bulk of the 4000 plus soldiers committed to operations is sourced from the Army, the average soldier is either training (three months) for, is deployed (12 months) on, or

recovering (three months) from a tour with only 12-16 months before preparing for another tour. It has been determined that stress is cumulative for each deployment. Therefore soldiers that have had three tours in five years have the potential of suffering 18 months of accumulated post-traumatic stress disorder. [80] Add to this the stress of units having to maintain their primary combat proficiencies between operational tours through individual and collective training on field training usually resulting in more family separation. This training in combination with garrison duties can be equally as stressful as operational deployment. This is exacerbated with smaller units or in smaller trades such as the 600 series MOS, the so-called "endangered species list", who deploy with greater frequency. Operational tempo risks burnout, attacks motivation, and creates cynicism. Other stress inducing factors are internal and external unit turbulence, lack of mission specific training, lack of pre-deployment mental and cultural conditioning, unit undermanning, tour length, the location, type of operation/ROEs, and the perceived relevance of the operation by those deployed. "All are likely to have an effect on such military outcomes as morale, unit cohesion, family adaptation, career intentions, and health because they affect the soldiers' and units' quality of life during deployment." [81]

The five-year freeze on pay and benefits 1992-1997 as part of the federal government's overall commitment to fiscal restraint deeply impacted on morale and quality of life. Monthly rent charges for married quarters increased annually during this period commensurate with cost of living increases while services decreased with the creation of the Housing Agency. This freeze was lifted in May 1997 however married quarter charges (determined by Treasury Board) for the non-commissioned members have negated much of this pay raise. It has been stated previously that members of the military are motivated intrinsically by internal personal values towards the institution or extrinsically by external motivators such as pay. It can be deduced that one does not miss something until it has been denied one. Those members intrinsically motivated and not focused on pay may now be focussed on pay and may

have shifted more to extrinsic motivation as a result of this five year pay freeze and associated financial

hardship and sense that society has broken its contract with its military.

> The interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards can be quite complex; not only may these
> rewards be non-additive, but also inducing members to perform tasks with strong extrinsic
> rewards may create behaviour that will not be performed in the future except for even greater
> extrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards, moreover, can weaken intrinsic motivation . . . we might
> expect that increasing the extrinsic reward will increase the effort expended; However, the
> military person's motivation may possibly decrease sharply if the extrinsic reward is no longer
> forthcoming, and the member's interest in performing military activities outside the specified
> task *without extra pay* may be reduced correspondingly.[82]

The 5 March 1995 disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment resulting from the "Somalia

Affair" when a small group of soldiers killed a Somali in custody during the US lead UN Somalia

humanitarian mission in the spring of 1993. The Prime Minister, despite the advice of the Chief of the

Defence Staff and virtually all in or related to the Canadian defence community, sent a strong message

of vertical cohesion to the CF. Rather than punish these small few, a regiment was punished and in so

doing displayed to many in the CF a breaking of faith and loyalty downwards.

In sum, this bureaucratization has negatively affected the Canadian military profession and has

lowered morale. The military is subject to the same utilitarian spending constraints as other departments

and increasingly organizational, materiel, and personnel decisions are being made by those out of

uniform and by bureaucratic rather than operationally focused officers. The perception has been created

amongst military members that the government, and therefore society, devalues them, the military

family, and the military institution. The degree to which the military acquiesces or is forced to lead or

comply with politically expedient programs of social change and thereby becoming just like another

government department, is a serious matter of consideration for all who pride themselves as being

military leaders entrusted with nurturing and maintaining operational effectiveness.

Donna Winslow writes in her study, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-Cultural Inquiry,* that she found the Canadian military subculture to be "out of sync with the larger society it was created to serve, one that thinks its values and needs are under attack from a nation that doesn't care about them and, as many believe, would be only too happy to see them disappear"[83]. She points out "the imposition of 'a collegial bureaucratic responsibility culture,' has created ethical problems for an institution which had traditionally been based on personal loyalty and individual responsibility."[84] It has been said by many military observers that this dichotomy is the fundamental source for the demise of ethos in Canada's military. "The failure by successive governments to heal this mental breach by attempting to arrive at some public consensus about what we expect our military to be in the 1990s and beyond guarantees the current problems will continue."[85]   In the absence of any perceived threat to the security of Canada, especially in the void of no over-arching national security policy, this situation will not be resolved.

Counter-attacking assaults on the Moral Component

The health of the moral component remains a challenge for the CF. The CF must in peacetime articulate its continuing existence to a Canadian society that is questioning the continuing need to maintain a military. The conduct of writing this paper has determined the following recommendations for rejuvenating and halting the demise of the moral component of the Canadian military.

a.   In the absence of a national security policy, of which defence policy is but a part (the others include immigration and demography, trade, finance, crime, communications, environment, etc.), conduct a defence review to determine what Canada desires of its military in terms of roles and missions in order that the present capability gap is resolved.

b.   Promote and safeguard the moral component of fighting power, that ability to get people to fight, and the military's institutional ethos "where the shaping of values and perceptions takes precedence over the development of policies and programs."[86] Leaders at all levels must live this ethos that puts the priority on readiness, and stresses "the nation over the military organization, mission over career, the unit over the individual, and the service ethic over the job ethic."[87] The importance of the moral component must be appreciated and supported by all. It must be taught, developed, internalized, and nurtured in all military training.

c.   Primacy must always be given to operational effectiveness over bureaucratization. Operational effectiveness must be the focus of manning, equipping, personnel support, training and conditions of service. The military is morally justified in articulating its need to be different from society in those few areas that impact on operational effectiveness.

d.   Potential leader selection, career development and advancement should place operational ability, honesty, integrity and the will to succeed in operations over the administrative acumen of the bureaucrat. The CF Personnel Appraisal System Performance Evaluation Reports should be amended to rate suitability for operations by answering Yes or No to the questions "I would go into battle with this soldier" or "I would trust him or her with my life".

e.   Conduct a DND-wide review of policies since unification and integration to confirm primacy of operational effectiveness and where not initiate corrective change.

f.   Develop a command-driven mechanism for commanders to measure the moral component of fighting power.

g.   Increase the military awareness of MPs and civil servants by initiating a program for attaching parliamentarians and civil servants to military units.

h.   Civil servants to serve longer stints in DND.

i.   Reduce operational tempo or increase the size of the CF.

Conclusion

One hundred and sixty-seven years ago the following words of von Clausewitz were published, words that remain as relevant to Canada's present and future military as they have in the past. In writing of the military virtues of the Army, he stresses the moral element.

> An army that maintains it cohesion under the most murderous fire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary fears and resists well-founded ones with all its might; that proud of its victories, will not lose the strength to obey orders and its respect and trust for its officers even in defeat; whose physical power, like the muscles of an athlete, has been steeled by training in privation and effort; a force that regards such efforts as a means to victory rather than a curse on its cause; that is mindful of all these duties and qualities by virtue of the single powerful idea of the honour of its arms--such an armuch an army 12 17ell its armu   c

[8] *Ibid,* p. viii

[9] *Conduct of Land Operations,* pp 1-4, 1-5

[10] Napoleon, 'Maxims', *War,* Lawrence Freedman ed, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994) p 215

[11] Michael Howard, *Clausewitz,* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988) p 1. The author cites Bernard Brodie who believes Clausewitz's *On War* is the only great book on war.

[12] Martin Van Creveld, *On Future War*, (London. Brassey's, 1991) p 126. He considers Sun Tzu the greatest writer on military affairs.

[13] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* (M. Howard and P. Paret, eds., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984) p 149

[14] *Ibid.*, p 148

[15] *Conduct of Land Operations* and *US Army FM 100-5*

[16] Clausewitz, p 89

[17] Colin Powell, *A Soldier's Way,* pp 207-208. Powell interprets the trinity as three rules that must be satisfied before the US goes to war: rule number one - determine what is to be achieved and how to achieve it; rule number two - politicians set the war's objectives, while armies achieve them; and rule number three - the people must support the war. As none of these 'Clausewitzian rules' were adhered to for the Vietnam War, he was determined that they would be met prior to any future conflict involving the US.

[18] Clausewitz, p 75

[19] *Ibid.*, p 184

[20] *Ibid.*,p 185

[21] *Ibid.*, p 231

[22] *Ibid.*, pp 86-87

[23] *Ibid.*, pp 142-143

[24] *Ibid.*, p 608

[25] The British Army in an effort to articulate this concept commissioned Patrick Mileham to write *The extent to which the Army has a right to different,* prepared for the Executive Committee of the Army Board, Ministry of Defence, April 1996. The 'need' to be different may be argued more successfully than the 'right' to be different. No similar study of the CF could be determined by the author.

[26] *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (London, G. Bell & Sons, LTD., 1961) p 1468

[27] R. Grinker & J. Spiegal, *Men Under Stress,* (Philadelphia, Blakiston, 1945), p 37, cited in Anthony Kellett, *Combat Motivation-ORAE Report No. R77,* (Ottawa, Department of National Defence, November 1977) p 14

[28] *Canada's Army,* pp 101-102

[29] Guy Siebold, "The Evolution of the Measurement of Cohesion", *Military Psychology, 11*(1), pp 5-26

[30] Anthony Kellett, *ibid.,* p 42

[31] F.R. Hanson, *Psychological Factors of Adaptation in Combat,* (Washington, Dept of Defense Research and Development Board, June 1951), p 9, cited in Kellett, *ibid*

[32] Sir John Moore, 'Regulations for the Rifle Corps' in 1800 directed Company Commanders to form the 'buddy system' between Cpls and Ptes and that they were to be kept together as much as possible. Cited in Kellett, *ibid.,* pp 43-44

[33] Kellett, *ibid.,* p 44

[34] A. Bus and N. Portnoy, 'Pain Tolerance and Group Identification', in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* vol 6, no 1, 1967, cited in Kellett, *ibid*

[35] G. Clay, 'Training for Co-ordination within Rifle Squads', Paper presented to 12th US Army Human Factors Research and Development Conference, October 1966, cited in Kellett, *ibid.,* p 45. This is supported by the author's own experience. With respect to sports and military skills competitions, the author's experience as a Commanding Officer of a tank regiment caused him to carefully consider the balance between strengthening as much as possible the identity of individual tank squadrons while maintaining as much as possible cohesion within the Regiment.

[36] Kellett, *ibid.,* p 47

[37] H. Basowitz, *Anxiety and Stress*, (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1955). Cited in Kellett, *ibid.,* p 46

[38] Hanson, pp 12-13, cited in Kellett, *ibid.,* p 45

[39] S. Bidwell, *Modern Warfare: A Study of Man, Weapons and Theories,* (London, Allen Lane, 1973), p 99, cited by Kellett, *ibid.,* p 46

[40] *Ibid.,* p 309

[41] General Sir Michael Rose, AG, *Presentation to British Army Command and Staff Course 30, 9 December 1996*

[42] S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire,* (New York, William Morrow, 1947), p 42

[43] J.C.T. Downey, *Management in the Armed Forces: An Anatomy of the Military Profession,* (London, McGraw Hill, 1977), p 134

[44] C. Moskos & F.R. Wood, *The Military: More than just a job?,* (London, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), p 7

[45] C.A. Cotton, 'The Institutional Organization Model and the Military'. Cited by C. Moskos & F.R.. Wood, *ibid.,* p 44

[46] G. Harries-Jenkins, 'The Concept of Military Professionalism', *Defence Analysis,* Summer 1990, p 123

[47] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957)

[48] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* (Glencoe Ill., The Free Press, 1960)

[49] Harries-Jenkins, *ibid.*

[50] Huntington, *ibid.,* p 7

[51] *Ibid.,* p 8

[52] *Ibid.,* p 464

[53] Janowitz, *ibid.,* pp 8-17

[54] C. Moskos & F.R. Wood, *ibid.*, p 3

[55] C. Moskos, 'From institution to occupation; trends in military organization', *Armed Forces & Society,* Fall 1977, pp 41-50

[56] C. Moskos & F.R. Wood, *ibid.,* pp 4-5

[57] C. Moskos, 'Institution and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces', *ibid.,* p 15

[58] *Ibid.,* p 16

[59] *Ibid.,* p 17

[60] C. Moskos & F.R. Wood, *ibid.,* p 6

[61] *Ibid.,* p 25

[62] Janowitz, 'Sociological Models and Social Policy', *Political Conflict* (Chicago, Quadrangle, 1970), pp 243-259. Cited by C. Moskos & F.R. Wood, in 'Institutional Building in an Occupational World', *ibid.,* p. 279. Moskos cites Janowitz, 'Sociological Models and Social Policy', *Political Conflict* (Chicago, Quadrangle, 1970), pp 243-259

[63] *Ibid.*

[64] H. Sorensen, 'New Perspectives on the Military Profession: The I/O Model and Esprit de Corps Reevaluated', *Armed Forces & Society,* Summer 1994, pp 599-617

[65] D. Segal, 'Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis', *Armed Forces & Society,* Spring 1986, p 352, cited by Sorensen, *ibid.,* p 601

[66] Segal, *ibid*

[67] Sorensen, *ibid.,*

[81] C.A. Castro and A.B Adler, "OPTEMPO: Effects on Soldier and Unit Readiness", *Parameters,* Autumn 1999, p 4

[82] Moskos, C., & Wood, F.R., *ibid.,* p 5

[83] Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia-A Socio-cultural Inquiry* (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 1997), cited by D. Grant, 'Military and society at arms over force's role', *The Toronto Star,* 1 September 1997, p A13

[84] *Ibid*

[85] *Ibid*

[86] C.A. Cotton, 'The Institutional Organization Model and the Military', cited by C. Moskos & F.R.. Wood, *ibid.*, p 53

[87] *Ibid.,* p 7

[88] Clausewitz, *ibid.,* pp 187-188

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