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Coalitions and the Peace Support Operations Continuum:
"Reading the Peace-Field" - An Unbalancing Experience.

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EXTRACT

The emerging "New World Order" demands cooperation and burden-sharing among nation states of a magnitude not contemplated before. Coalitions have become the new paradigm, by which the international community can respond to rising concerns for global security. Much has been written about warfighting alliances. The interest is now turning towards coalitions of the willing, engaged on the peace support operations continuum. From the perspectives of leadership and professional skills, it is argued that these coalitions demand as much, if not more, in terms of competence and prowess. The multinational force commander faces unique integration and unity of effort issues. Against a diversity of impediments, political and others, the commander must blend the skills of his component forces so that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. In the end, he must be able to read the "peace-field" effectively, often having to rally around him the various agencies involved in the mission, including those over which he does not really have a command relationship, the NGOs as per example.

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INTRODUCTION

> Now that the cold war has come to an end, we must work to avoid the outbreak or
> resurgence of new conflicts. The explosion of nationalities, which is pushing
> countries with many ethnic groups towards division, is a new challenge to peace and
> security.[1]
>
> **Boutros Boutros-Ghali**
> **Secretary-General**

> Although our Armed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we expect to
> work in concert with allied and coalition forces in nearly all our future operations,
> and increasingly, our procedures, programs and planning must recognize this reality.[2]
>
> **General John M. Shalikashvili - 1996**

During the the late 1980s, the defining character of the global setting and world politics
changed, involving the gradual disappearance of the bipolar regime that prevailed during the Cold
War. Characterized by an increase in transnationalism and regionalism, a "New World Order"
emerged in the early 1990s, forcing a reconsideration of the underlying concepts of national
sovereignty and international security.

It is in this context that the strategic issues, which started surfacing during the Cold War,
pushed to the fore, thereby resulting in the inescapable reality of post Cold War era instability. [3] As
Brian Urquhart points out, given the phenomenon of globalization, few important things happen
which do not in some ways have repercussions for the other parts of the world," or for that matter, on
international organizations. [4] This inter-dependence, suggest Alvin and Heidi Toffler, "doesn't

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[1] Excerpt of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's address at the 31 January 1992 Meeting of the Security
Council at the level of Heads of State and Government (See : United Nations. "Historical Security Council
Session Reaffirms Commitment to Collective Security." *UN Chronicle.* June 1992, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 6)

[2] John M. Shalikashvili. *Joint Vision 2010.* Washington, DC. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996, p. 6.

[3] Among these emerging challenges, we note, the international threat posed by humanitarian issues - those
internal to a state included, the persistence of interstate conflicts, the emergence of nationalist forces threatening
territorial integrity, the multiplication of ethnic conflicts, and the expansion of the menace to cultural security.

[4] Brian Urquhart. "The United Nations System and the Future." *International Affairs.* 1989, p. 227.

necessarily make the world safer. It sometimes does just the opposite, and "[. . .] a small war in a remote place can, through a series of often unpredictable events, snowball into a giant conflagration."[5]

This new international order demands cooperation and a burden-sharing of a magnitude not contemplated before. Whereas prior to Desert Storm, coalitions were primarily viewed as a means to maintain the regional balance of power, they are now regarded as the new "paradigm in responding to world problems." [6] Notwithstanding, it has proven challenging enough to cause the divisive issues associated with multi-national military operations to vanish almost completely. On the whole, this is particularly true of the convoluted questions associated with unity of command and unity of effort, especially within the realm of coalitions engaged on the peace operations continuum. [7] This essay posits that there is as much, if not more, competence and prowess involved in securing integration within a coalition engaged in peace support operations and Operations Other Than War (OOTW) as there is in fighting a war.

To demonstrate this thesis, the paper first review some of the fundamentals of coalition operations, then determines how they apply to multinational forces engaged in peace operations. Within this framework, the paper considers the attitudes and national factors confronting such coalitions and delves into the role of the commander who, it is suggested, has the means by which to curtail some of the exacerbation that may exist within his command - an exacerbation brought about mainly through ignorance. The paper then explores some of the means that might be at the disposal of the Multi-national Force Commander (MNFC) in his effort to secure unity of effort. In so doing,

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[5] Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War - Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century.* New York, Little, Brown and Company, p. 211.

[6] Thomas C. Linn. "The Cutting Edge of Unified Actions." *Joint Force Quarterly Forum*, Winter 1993-94, p. 36.

[7] The current trend of development from what was once known as traditional peacekeeping to "second generation peacekeeping," and its positive impact on the ability of the United Nations to develop into an effective system of collective security invites nations concerned with international peace and security to dispatch even more troops in arms way. In the 1990s, threats to international peace and security have become more diverse, less predictable and definitely more controversial. The international community is now asked to deal with a wide range of new and complex situations that have changed the character of peacekeeping operations. These operations may now include involvement in intra-national conflicts, humanitarian relief operations, cease-fire negotiations, resettlement programmes, disarmament and demobilization, economic reconstruction, reconciliation, human rights and elections. On the more demanding part of the spectrum of peacekeeping activities, peace enforcement operations are arguably not peacekeeping at all, at least in the traditional sense. They entail increased risks of casualties and death. A distinct peace operations continuum has developed. See Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping." *International Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3, 1993, p. 459 and David Last. "A Guide to Peace Support Operations." *Peacekeeping and International Relations.* Vol. 26, No. 3. Ottawa, May/June 1997, p. 17.

the paper establishes that a commander's mandate asks for singular skills and a level of competence that go beyond those required of warfighting coalitions.

I - COALITION OPERATIONS - SOME FUNDAMENTALS

1.   "Coalition" defined

In their preface to *Coalition Warfare - An Uneasy Accord*, Keith Nielson and Roy A. Prete argue:

> [. . .] coalitions are a phenomenon easily observed but awkwardly characterized. While each has similarities, each also has its own particulars rooted in the nature of the power relationship among the allies, the ideological givens of the countries involved, and the beliefs of the individuals who form the coalition and make it function. The tremendous impact which coalitions have made upon world history over the past century means that we ignore them at our peril, however difficult they are to understand. [8]

Coalitions have been and will continue to be based mainly on practical necessity. They engage 'partners' rather than 'Allies', the latter term denoting the existence of some formal agreement between the nations involved, some type of long-standing relationship, a structure of some sort. [9] In coalitions, the partners are nations with whom other nations may have had no formal agreement, but with whose armed forces they are operating for a given operation. As a consequence, the differences among the member countries can be profound. In 1947, General Devers, Commander of the 6th Army Group (US Army), summarized the problems a commander had to confront in a combined theatre of operations as follows:

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[8] Keith Nielson and Roy A. Prete, (eds.) *Coalition Warfare - An Uneasy Accord.* Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Ontario, 1983, p. xii. Canadian Forces (CF) doctrine, as specified in the manual *The Use of Force in CF Operations,* defines a coalition as:"[. . .] a less formal alliance which is normally limited to a specific mission. Coalitions normally lack the formal status of forces agreements and infrastructure architectures that are common to alliances such as NATO. A coalition may operate under the legal umbrella of a UN Security Council resolution, but they are not UN sponsored missions. Once a mission or operation has been completed, the coalition is normally disbanded. The document draws a parallel with alliance operations that are defined as operations conducted under a formal standing alliance such as NATO or Canada-United States (CANUS). In these cases, there are formal policy, command-and-control and force structure instruments impacting the development and application of Rules of Engagement (ROE). (See: Canada. Department of National Defence. *Use of Force in CF Operations*, Vol. 1 (B-GG-005-004/AF005, 1 October 1996, Chapter 4, article 401.)

[9] Joint Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* Joint Pub 3-0, Washington, Joint Staff, 1 February 1995, p. VI-I. Alliances and coalitions are defined as follows: a. *Alliance:* An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad , long-term objectives. b. *Coalition.* A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

[. . .] characteristic lack of clarity and firmness of directives received from the next superior combined headquarters or authority
-the conflicting political, economic, and military problems and objectives of each of the allied powers.
-the logistical capabilities, organization, doctrines, and characteristics, of each of the armed forces under command.
-the armament, training, and tactical doctrines of each of the armed forces under command
-personal intervention and exercise of a direct, personal influence to assure coordination and success in the initial phases of the mission assigned by the next higher combined authority.
Lastly, in the final analysis probably the most important of all: the personalities of the senior commanders of each of the armed services of the allied powers under command, their capabilities, personal and professional habits, and their ambitions.[10]

These problems remain relevant. In modern coalitions, political and military objectives continue to be reached by means of a "consensus among the participating member nations."[11] They involve friction and inefficiency, with the whole, as suggested by Wayne Silkett, "[. . .] amounting to less than the sum of all the parts", and "military logic often [having] little relevance."[12] It is well known that multi-national operations seldom impose burdens of similar magnitude on all partners, a situation that fosters recriminations from some of the partners. The pressure that the Soviets put upon their allies during the Second World War for opening a second front exemplifies the extent of such tensions.

In general, coalitions of the past could be said to have lacked the commonality of trust, purpose, and understanding of one another's weaknesses and strengths that would have made the contributing forces a team with a single purpose. Today, coalitions are formed in an attempt to allow the sharing of the burden among partners, reduce costs, and convey legitimacy. Their bedrock is undoubtedly trust. This trust, suggests Terry J. Pudas, is based on four enduring principles: unity of command - the most fundamental principle of war; unity of purpose - the political adhesive that binds the coalition; unity of effort - necessary to achieve success; interoperability, which demands

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[10] Jacob L. Devers. "Major Problems Confronting a Theatre Commander in Combined Operations." *Military Review.* Vol. 27, October 1947, p. 4.

[11] Linn, p. 37.

[12] Wayne A. Silkett. "Alliance and Coalition Warfare." *Parameters.* Vol. 22, No. 1, Summer 1993, p. 83.

appropriate force assignments, including responsibility for national logistics; and the fact that the political benefits derived from these operations varies across the spectrum of conflict. [13]

Three of these enduring principles - unity of command, unity of purpose, and unity of effort - are now addressed in more detail. This analysis attempts meant to establish the foundations upon which the paper explores the workings of multinational coalitions engaged on the peace operations continuum later on.

2. *Unity of command*

In general terms, command ensures the delivery of combat power at the time and place of the commander's choosing. The principle of unity of command, which is essential to the delivery of this power, remains the most contentious issue to be resolved within the framework of combined operations. [14] The sensitivity is associated to the authority actually mandated a commander to command national forces other than his own and the level of authority and autonomy of this commander over these troops. As evoked by Robert W. Riscassi, the relinquishment of national command and control of forces constitutes "an act of trust and confidence that is unequalled in relations between nations. It is a passing of human and material resources to another nation's citizens." [15.] The purpose of unity of command, as stipulated in U.S. Department of Defence Joint Pub 3.0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations,* is "to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose." [16] In essence, one person in command demands unswerving obedience from the partners of the coalition, but within the constraints established for the purpose of their employment.

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[13] Terry J. Pudas, "Coalition Warfare: Preparing the US Commander for the Future." *Essays on Strategy XI.* John N. Petrie (ed.), Washington, National Defence University Press, 1994, pp. 130-131.

[14] Joint Publication -JP-01 *Allied Joint Doctrine* establishes that unity of command is achieved by vesting the authority to direct and co-ordinate the action of all forces and military assets in a single commander. The command relations by which this authority is achieved will be determined mainly by the composition of an Allied Joint Force (AJF). However, constraints may be placed on the use of national force components and supporting national assets and also by the extent of military activities of other authorities in the commander's area of responsibility. See Joint Staff. U.S. Department of Defence. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. JP-1, Washington, DC. 10 January 1995.

[15] Robert W. Riscassi. "Principles of Coalition Warfare." *Joint Force Quarterly.* No. 1, Summer 1993, p. 67.

[16] Joint Staff. U.S. Department of Defence. *Doctrine for Joint Operations.* Joint Publication 3-0, Washington, 1 February 1995, p. VI-1.

Unity of command is essential to the success of the coalition's military mission. Notwithstanding, as observed by Wayne A. Silkett "it has usually not meant, full compelling authority over allied commanders and formations. Authority, therefore, tends to be collegial, and a successful coalition leader will be persuasive rather than coercive." [17] When unity of command is not achievable, then unity of purpose, and unity of effort in particular, are left to the co-operative efforts of the commanders of the coalition.

3.   *Unity of purpose and unity of effort*

Unity of purpose is the political glue that binds the coalition together. To attain it effectively, commanders must understand the ultimate political objectives and create the military conditions that will lead to the achievement of the strategic goals. The need for clarity of purpose and political oversight is essential to the development of a unified operational concept of operations. The lack of it clearly undermines the legitimacy of the intervention. Unity of purpose, then, ought to permeate through the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations, leading to the intervening powers understanding the situation to which they are faced. This end can be accomplished by means of a set of goals meant to unite the parties; without it, the integrity of the force on the ground is lost. As MGen MacInnis, a former Commander of the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) explains: "In order to operate effectively, commanders at all levels must understand both the intentions of their superiors and what role they themselves are to play in the achievement of the desired end-state." [18] But sometimes, as was the case for UNPROFOR, the end-state remains undefined. Politico-strategic guidance and the provision of political constancy on the part of contributing nations need be provided if unity of effort is to be achieved.

At the operational level, unity of effort is secured by the alignment of the various missions allocated the contingents, based not only on how they are equipped but also on how talented they are known to be on the battlefield. [19] Thomas K. Adams, when assessing the situation in Haïti, proposed that the concept of unity of effort was made of two components: "One is the common understanding of the desired end state among the participants in a mission. The other is the effective coordination of

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[17] Silkett, p. 78.

[18] John A. MacInnis. "Piecemeal Peacekeeping - The United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia." In John T. Fishel (Ed.) *The Savage Wars of Peace - Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations*. Westview Press, 1998, p. 122.

[19] Riscassi, p. 67.

available means to achieve this end state." [20] Co-operation and coordination are deemed to be the keys to unity of effort.

In the case of the Gulf War, unity of effort was emphasized to compensate for a recognized weakness in the principle of unity of command. Practical, political and sovereignty issues prevented the subordination of forces from Saudi Arabia's and Allied Arab countries' to the coalition. A new cell, the coalition coordination, communications, and integration centre (C3IC), was formed as a consequence; it complemented the personal rapport and good relationship that existed between General Schwarzkopf and Lieutenant-General Khalid Bin Sultan, the commander of the joint forces of the Islamic states. The C3IC command office, as it was known, was particularly efficient at integrating the efforts of the two major partners of the coalition. But it must be emphasized that, despite its acronym, the 'cell' did not have command authority or a direct role in the campaign planning process. Instead, the new 'cell' integrated and moulded the effort of the two lead nations "into a unity of effort, not a unity of command," [21] thereby contributing, as notes Terry J. Pudas, to the assignment of missions that were "consistent with political restrictions, military requirements and force capabilities." [22]

4.   *Broad impediments to unity of effort within a coalition*

Realistically, nations will be more concerned by their ability to retain control over their national forces than for the overall coalition effort. Nation-states are expected to place their national interests at the heart of a coalition, each coming to the table with its own agenda. As a result, even within warfighting coalitions, unity of command and unity of effort will be difficult to achieve. Essentially, there will remain inherent differences among partners. Societal values such as religion, work ethic, standards of living, national tradition, discipline and cultural tolerance, gender distinctions, to name a few, present the potential to develop into real points of friction.

In the context of unity of purpose, the commander and his staff need to anticipate and plan for national vetoes, especially in the case of plans or operational concepts that raise culturally divergent views. As goals will change over time, care has to be taken to ensure that smaller coalition members are not pushed around by larger powers. Similarly, the latter should feel that the weight and risks of the operation are shared equitably. In a general sense, assignment of missions, while bound by the

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20 Thomas K. Adams. "The US and the UN in Haïti: The Limits of Intervention." Fishel, p. 179.

21 Rice, p. 162.

22 Pudas, p. 44.

operational imperative of efficiency and practicality, need be done with diplomacy and tact, with each partner seen to contribute meaningfully and successfully to the overall effort.

Finally, whether mononational or multinational, fundamental asymmetries in national sustainment capabilities can feed damaging competition among partners and shake the coalition's resolve. Similarly, an area as benign as language can be tantamount to a formidable barrier. As will be discussed later, it behoves the commander to circumvent the disruptive impact of the numerous impediments to the coalition's unity of effort. [23]

II   COALITIONS ENGAGED ON THE PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS CONTINUUM

1.   Coalitions of the willing in the context of peace support operations

In peace support operations, there are no enemies. No evil force faces the coalition. The conflict itself is the enemy. As David A. Charters notes, "the final decisions regarding peace and war rest, not with the peacekeepers but with the disputants. The peacekeepers are not in command of the situation but remain subordinate players." [24] This situation, it is advanced, is true of all operations across the peace support operations continuum. As suggested by Major-General J. A. MacInnis, in the context of these operations, "there is no victory to be won by armed force, the only victory is the securing of a lasting peace." [25]

Second generation peacekeeping introduced in the first section has created a continuum of peace operations which itself embraces the notion of a coalition spectrum. While not described in the literature, this concept recognizes a relatively broad typology of coalitions. Among these, we note coalitions of the willing and able (principally in the context of an alliance) and those made of willing nations (for which unity of purpose and effort would not be a concern) constitute practical examples of this concept. Recognizing that each type of coalition would be approached in a different way, our intervention is limited to a third kind of coalition: the UN coalitions in which all nations are usually welcome to partake.

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[23] Impediments to the unity of effort of a multinational coalition will be discussed further in the next section on peace support operations.

[24] David A. Charters (ed.). *Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution*, Proceedings of the Sixth annual Conflict Studies Conference. University of New Brunswick, September 1992, p. 5.

[25] John A. MacInnis. "Lessons from UNPROFOR: Peacekeeping from a Force Commander's Perspective." In *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*. Alex Morrison (ed.), James Kiras and Stephanie A. Blair (assistant eds.) Halifax, The Printer. 1995. p. 180.

Until the mid-1980s, multinational forces that formed coalitions engaged in peace operations were subjected to a rather predictable and well-established framework with clear structures and lines of authority. Contingents took their orders from the Secretary-General, and interference by one's home capital was not tolerated. [26] But a political hurricane was approaching.

A host of partisan non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with mandates and agendas complementary to those of the multinational military force have become interested. This new presence has moulded the framework of the operational environment to an extent not anticipated. Nowadays, when a multinational force is gathered, it not longer goes into "the field" alone. The new "players" in the area of operations have created a new environment referred to as "wider peacekeeping by the British, as "second generation peacekeeping" by the UN and "new peacekeeping partnership by the Canadians. [27]

Typical Groupings - Mission Elements

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
[26] Cedric Thornberry. "Facilitation Cooperation in Multinational Operations." *RUSI Journal*, London, December 1997, p. 2.

[27] Andrew Bair. "The Changing Nature of Civil-Military Operations in Peacekeeping." In *The New Peacekeeping Partnership.* Alex Morrison (ed.), James Kiras and Stephanie A. Blair (assistant eds.), Halifax, The Printer, 1995, p. 68.

The efficacy of the military force at the operational level is being tested, with the success of the mission lying, as Cedric Thonberry contends, "in the extent to which cooperation and coordination can be achieved with bodies over which the mission leader does not have a command relationship." [28]

The diagram on the previous page shows some of the various players that might be found in a particular theatre or operations. [29] Each is expected to do its own thing, go its own way with some creating parallel chains of command structures and reporting results in a pipeline manner to their distant superiors. [30] Not atypical, such a situation makes unity of effort a difficult objective to attain with lateral planning and coordination left to the military commander, more or less by default. This is not an easy task. The multiplicity of reporting channels prevents the production of a comprehensive campaign plan by the commander and his staff. NGOs may not contribute to the overall security effort, but they will definitely call for a substantial amount of military resources and impact the tasks to be performed by the troops. Some sort of division of labour within the area of responsibility has to be established early on as part of the planning process, keeping in mind the need to face changes in the mandate. These might be brought about, in part, by the use parallel command structures, outside interventions, and the lack of understanding of the tasks performed by military personnel. In this context, mission creep becomes a serious concern. [31] Planning and coordination must be systematic

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[28] Ibid.

[29] The diagram is meant to be representative rather than prescriptive.

[30] The diagram is an adaptation of a model presented by MGen MacInnis in a presentation entitled *21st Century Peacekeeping and the United Nations*. It is not meant to be prescriptive and only lists some of the organizations that could contribute to the overall effort. For the purpose of clarification, the major acronyms are explained here: UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), UNDP (United Nations Development Program), UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), UNCIVPOL (United Nations Civilian Police), UNEP (United Nations Environment Program), UNTAG (United Nations Transition Assistance Group), UNVP (United Nations Volunteer Program), NGOs (Non-governmental organizations), GOs (Governmental organizations), IGOs (Interdepartmental Government organizations), OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), OAS (Organization of American States), OAU (Organization of African Unity), OECD (Organization Economic Cooperation and Development), MNCs (Multinational Corporations). A Leroy Bennet expands on the role, structure and functions of each of these organizations in detail; see A. Leroy Bennet, *International Organizations - Principles and Issues*. 6th Edition. Prentice Hall. 1995.

[31] The term refers to the insidious expansion of the mission of an intervening force beyond its original stated mandate. As per example, it could involve the enlargement of a mission from one of providing security forces for humanitarian relief to one of 'nation building'. Some mission creep is directed, some is self-inhibited, but many analysts see it as inevitable. As per example, as the operation develops, the UN agencies, including military troops, might be involved in rebuilding and repairing schools, orphanages and roads, conducting disarmament operations, and assisting local populations in a variety of other ways. Mission creep involves a gradual change in the situation or in the type or scope of tasks assigned a commander without the simultaneous

and rigorous to pull together the effort of all the agencies involved in what was once the exclusive domain of military forces. In this context, the idea of an equivalent to the C3IC that was so effective during the Gulf War might constitute a way of solving a rather complex matter in the field of command and control.

2.   *Attitudes and national considerations*

> Every nationality has its own characteristics. It is a century since Britishers were ranged alongside foreigners in war, and many of our officers had forgotten that to get the best results [. . .] it is necessary to study their characteristics. There were many cases in the late war where incompatibility of temperament failed to get good results, and happily many brilliant examples of sympathy and understanding. It behoves our Officers to combat the national feeling of insularity, and to study the characteristics and points of view of our continental neighbours, so that we may be able to give a good account of ourselves when called upon to act either with or against them in any future struggle. Failure to achieve results through personal prejudice is inexcusable.[32]

Field Marshall Ironside - 1928

In the 1990s, nations have broken with traditional peacekeeping, with the result that coalitions of powers are engaged in a wide range of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). [33] These coalitions, suggests Lieutenant-General R. Dallaire, may even include what he refers to as "pseudo-coalitions of one power 'with hangers' to be the crisis managers responding to conflicts or humanitarian catastrophes." [34]   Many of the coalitions merged for the purpose of peace support operations are by nature politically fragile. First, because the nations involved might not have vital

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adjustment of his mission, thereby making his assigned mission invalid. See Arnold S.L. "Somalia: An Operation Other Than War." *Military Review*. December 1993, p. 31.

[32] Field Marshal Edmund Ironside's comments in 1928 concerning the battle of Tannenberg in 1914. Cited in John Hixson and Benjamin Franklin Cooling. *Combined Operations in Peace and War*. U.S. Army Military History Institute Publication, Carlisle, PA. Revised Edition, 1982, p. 52.

[33] In a lead article, Colonel Richard Taylor, director Department of Joint and Combined Operations, defines Operations Other Than War as " [. . .] interdepartmental, political, economic and informational [operations] undertaken to carry out strategic or tactical tasks to attain political purposes and to frustrate those of an adversary in an environment of routine, peaceful competition or LIC [low intensity conflict]." See: Richard Taylor. "What Are These Things Called 'Operations Short of War ?'" *Military Review*. January 1988, pp. 5-6.

[34] R. Dallaire. "The Rwandan Experience." In *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*. Alex Morrison (ed.), James Kiras and Stephanie A. Blair (assistant eds.) Halifax, The Printer, 1995, p. 18.

interests in the conflict they are attempting to resolve. [35] Second, because these coalitions tend to suffer from tensions usually caused by the continuous evaluation of one's own self interest. Third, and to be sure, politically, no country showing interest is too small to be ignored; and each brings its impediments, as well as its singularities. Lastly, nations are not likely to be willing to bear the full costs of the operation and for that matter, the risks involved. Under these circumstances, the coalition commander may have to accept greater operational and tactical risks in an attempt to preserve the unity of his command and sustain the political support of the nations involved. [36] As Terry J. Pudas observes, "understanding the complexities of coalitions and successfully executing coalition warfare requires a unique combination of political and military prowess," a particularly exacting accomplishment, it is emphasized, in the case of a coalition involved in peace support operations. [37]

In general, coalitions include contingents with a variety of languages, religions, ethnicities, cultures, and different levels of training and operational experience. The profile of coalitions gathered for the purpose of peace operations and/or OOTW is bound to be especially complex, given the relatively smaller size of national representation and the number of contingents that may be called together. Given these factors, marginalization and/or ostracization of specific national groups may happen along racial, cultural, or religious lines; but it can also be based on expected skills, values, or behaviour; with a significant amount of ignorance may be implied." [38] The allocation of operational tasks must indeed take into consideration the operational capabilities of the various partners, the status of their training and their equipment. Potential issues of friction among coalition partners abound. As Clausewitz wrote:

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[35] Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. Washington, DC, GAAPO, 16 June 1995, III - 12-13) defines peace operations as military operations supporting political settlement through diplomatic effort. The range of involvement presents a wide spectrum of different efforts ranging from peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian operations. Within the norms imposed by the Cold-War geopolitical structure, there was to be no intervention without consent. But UN practices have changed since 1989, with domestic conflicts being portrayed as potential threats to international peace and security, making intervention by the international community necessary. In this context, our governments are operating in a new paradigm, one in which religious and ethnic conflicts, among others, enlist the worst passions among the nations involved.

[36] Steven Metz, "the Effect of Technological Asymmetry on Coalition Operations." *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations.* Thomas J. Marshall, Philip Kaiser, Jon Kessmeire (eds.) Carlisle, USAWC Strategic Studies Institute, 1997, p. 56.

[37] Pudas, p. 43.

[38] E.D.J. Plante. *Leading a Multinational Force Without Leaving Anyone Behind: The Human Dimensions of Marginalisation.* Advanced Military Studies Course, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, (Unpublished Paper), 1998.

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. [. . .] countless minor incidents - the kind you can never really foresee - combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the intended goal. [. . .] Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. The military machine - the army and everything else related to it - is basically very simple and therefore seems easy to manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is of one piece: each pat is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential of friction. [39]

This potential for friction finds some of its roots in the military culture and ethos characterizing each contingent. These elements alone have the potential to break open inter-group dynamics. In his effort to form an effective and integrated team, the commander may be limited by the national characteristics of each contingent. In this context, the concerns of the commander are at times directly proportional to the difficulties experienced by the weakest partners. Difficulties that are often revealed through degradation in terms of conduct and performance, but that might not always be noticeable to the 'untrained eye.

Significant deviations in performance, values and moral standards are to be expected. How, then, can a multinational force commander cast a sense of purpose across the national contingents and build the force into a highly effective team? There is no single answer to this question, which probably represents the biggest challenge facing anyone selected for the job. It might be, as suggested by MGen Clive Milner, that the commander has to pursue unity of effort by demanding that contingents set aside their national differences as well as some of their national pride, even, as they don the blue beret. [40] Without a doubt, he/she has to enforce respect for the rule of law within his/her force. This essential principle can only be ignored at the risk of compromising the mission and himself/herself, since "nothing breaks down the credibility of a force faster than illegal or inappropriate activity on the part of its members. In this respect, the perception of wrongdoing can be as damaging as the proof of it. [41]

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39 Clausewitz. *On War*, p. 119. Cited in Gregory Witol. "International Relations in a Digital World." In Alan D. Campen and Douglas H. Dearth (Eds.) *CyberWar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality.* AFECA International Press, Fairfax, VA. June 1998, p. 73.

[40] Clive Milner. "Command and Control of International Forces." In *The New Peacekeeping Partnership*. Alex Morrison (ed.), James Kiras and Stephanie A. Blair (assistant eds.), Halifax, The Printer, 1995, p. 173.

[41] MacInnis, p. 183.

Even if indirectly, a less capable partner will affect the integrity of the whole effort and may even attempt to impart limitations on others. Such a situation could develop, for example, if debilitating technological asymmetries were forced upon the coalition for reasons beyond its control (political ones, as per example). These asymmetries may hinder effective interoperability and even force the commander to limit the scope of his concept of operations. As Steven Metz suggests, "technological asymmetry [. . .] is the key variable" to unity of effort. [42] . It is expected that the fast-paced technological advancements being associated to a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), will exacerbate the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots.' Possibly to the point where some nations may not be able to operate effectively, even within the realm of a coalition engaged in peace operations. [43] Extensive training, restraints at the collective and individual levels, as well as unequivocal rules of engagement will assist in securing the success of these operations.

3.   *The multinational force commander (MNFC) in peace operations*

In the past, commanders were required to read the battlefield. Nowadays, they are expected to learn to read the "peace-field", an experience that often proves unbalancing. [44]

Being responsible to establish and maintain trust among all coalition partners, the commander's mandate demands patience and respect. These are not easy tasks. He/she is responsible to make a functional force from all interests represented. Integrating all elements into an effective entity, regardless of need, size, special competence and impediments demands that a MNFC consider his contingents very closely, identify their strengths and weaknesses, and develop an effective training programme to cater to the operational shortfalls identified. The commander will also have to deal with those partners interested only in safe missions. "Coalition building is not always fast and

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[42] Metz, p. 51.

[43] It is beyond the scope of this paper to debate whether we are about to enter an RMA or not. Suffice to note here that rapid advancements in technology are likely to affect the face of the batttlefield. As a question of interest, the staff at National Defence Headquarters define Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations. According to this definition, an RMA, they establish, addresses three elements: technological change, doctrinal innovation, and organizational adaptation. They also suggest that the rapid advancement of information technology and information systems hold forth the prospect of dramatically altering command and control of armed forces among other possibilities. (See Canada. Department of Defence. *Canadian Defence Beyond 2010 - The Way Ahead*. RMA Operational Working Group. National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario, 31 May 1999, p. VI.)

[44] Rick Atkinson. "Warriors Without A War, US Peacekeepers in Bosnia Adjusting to New Tasks: Arbitration, Bluff, Restraint", The Washington Post, 14 April 1996, A-1.

coming" [45] says LGen Johnston of the United States Marine Corps. As MGen MacInnis explains, "[. . .] frequent rotations, lack of experience with peacekeeping, and diverging concepts of operational capability [mean] that common standards and practices [are] almost impossible to achieve." [46]

Reading the "peace-field" may include, as we have discussed, some meanderings into the international and national political arenas, what many refer to as the "no-man's land" of professional soldiers. But not knowing the real objectives of nations or what their allegiance may be constitutes a conundrum of the first order for the commander. Some nation-states place their national interests at the heart of a coalition, some not. Regardless, the commander has to assume that each is possibly coming to the table with its own agenda, with the unfortunate results that politicians and national pride often get in the way of good judgement. There must be agreement on the overarching strategy. As Robert W. Riscassi suggests, this agreement ought to be "[. . .] sharp enough to shape the direction of an implementation campaign, yet broad enough to capture the efforts of the various national forces." [47] It then behoves the appointed commander to make the best of the circumstances and resources made available to him. Early on, he/she must make his/her assessment and conclusions/proposals widely known. Gaining consensus among coalition partners at this early stage is essential. But he/she has to make do with disparate views. Despite what may be seen as settled political consensus, there might be differences among military professionals as to whether the force is or not rationalized in terms of operational capabilities. When addressing these disparities the commander will need to be tactful and persuasive rather than coercive.   In the end, within the limits imposed by the necessity of the operations undertaken and the agreed strategy, national forces must receive equitable treatment and be considered fairly in terms of combat exposure.

At the operational level, there also exists a growing need for the commander to deal with the mediation and supervision of diverse situations, such as the " [. . .]cross-border flow of refugees, the threat of conflict spreading across borders, damage to the global environment, or the abuse of basic human rights. Peacekeepers are increasingly likely called upon to restore government services as well as law and order, to replace police and other services, and even to form transitional governments [. . .]

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45 Johnston., LGen, USMC (Ret'd). In a presentation to the Advanced Military Studies Course - 2 (AMSC 2), 2 Nov 1999.

[46] John A. MacInnis. "Piecemeal Peacekeeping - The United Nations Protection Force in the Former Yugoslavia." In John T. Fishel (Ed.) *The Savage Wars of Peace - Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations.* Westview Press, 1998, p. 118.

[47] Riscassi, p 63.

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harmoniously with allies must be identified early on and ruthlessly moved out.[50] As to a commander's military qualities and virtues, the shopping list is rather extensive. All nations have a list of qualities that they like to see: "[. . .] courage, decisiveness, dependability, endurance, initiative, integrity, judgement, sense of justice, loyalty, robustness, knowledge, experience, confidence, charisma. And, yes, it helps to have a little bit of an ego too." [51]

It must be pointed out that the problems associated with the building of a coalition are not the sole purview of the operational commander. They also affect political leaders who must have the courage to refuse potential partners when the disadvantages of their contribution outweigh even the political gains. Politicians also have to be prepared to revise the terms of the mandate and withdraw the force when it is faced with a substantial shift in mission and no longer possesses the required operational capabilities.

Reading the "peace-field," as it turns out, can be an unbalancing experience.

4.   *Promoting integration and unity of effort*

As discussed, a necessary condition for achieving unity of effort is an agreement on the objective of the operation among the parties to it. But there is little the operational level commander can do to influence the politico-strategic arena and the political constancy among contributing nations. Notwithstanding, there are means available to him in his effort to integrate the various components into an effective force; these instruments should assist him in promote unity of effort within the coalition.

Firstly, the building of trust among partners will enhance unity of effort within the coalition. To this end, a common doctrine constitutes the technical language within which the commander may communicate his intent, mission, and establish relationships, joint procedures and command relationships; [52] it should play a substantial role in reducing differences among coalition partners. Complemented by common Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), a shared doctrine would go a long way towards unifying approaches to a wider scope of events, thereby minimizing friction. However, Professor Holley argues that joint doctrine is mainly in the mind. While it is "[. . .] an essential tool

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[50] Hixon, p. 352.

[51] Milner, p. 170.

[52] Michael Smith. "Doctrine and Training: The Foundations of Effective Coalition Operations." *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations.* Thomas J. Marshall, Philip Kaiser, Jon Kesssmeire, eds. Carlisle, USAWC Strategic Studies Institute, 1997, p. 60.

to joint and combined operations, [one must recognize that] the key to success remains the basic attitude of people involved." [53] and practice.

Secondly, education and training can also contribute to unity of effort within the coalition. Both offer practical means by which to compensate for widely divergent standards, customs and degrees of familiarity with international law and customs of war among the powers represented within the coalition. Training for coalition operations should not concentrate only on headquarters elements via the use of extensive command post exercises but recognize that field training offers the advantage of decreasing cultural and historical differences between nations as well.

Thirdly, only a truly integrated staff can pursue unity of effort effectively. Therefore, a proper balance has to be reached between efficiency and the need to have meaningful representation by contributing nations. In the case of crisis operations laced with uncertainty, LGen Johnston suggests that the commander not hesitate to commit with a large staff, possibly even national. He can always reshape his headquarters as the mission changes. [54]

Fourthly, logistics impacts on unity of effort. The lack of a single supply system constitutes a source of dissension among coalition forces, especially when contingents come from Third World countries. A single supply line into which common items could be integrated would seem eminently desirable. A designated nation could operate such a system, augmented by personnel from each nation represented. Close control could be exercised over critical items of equipment, thereby ensuring fair distribution and effective utilization. Integrating the elements of a coalition of the willing engaged in peace operations demands that the commander be innovative when looking after the well-being of "his troops."

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, peace is not breaking all over. Numerous phenomena promote instability around the world, including "rising nationalism, burgeoning international arms bazaars, increasing ethnic tensions, religious fundamentalism, environmental degradation and disease, economic

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[53] Professor I. Holley, in a presentation to Canadian Forces Advanced Military Studies Course 2. As part of the panel discussion on joint and combined doctrine, Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 20 September 1999.

[54] Johnston, LGen, United States Marine Corps (Ret'd). In a presentation to the Advanced Military Studies Course - 2 (AMSC 2). 2 Nov 1999.

stagnation coupled with rising expectations, and overpopulation and urbanization [. . .] " In the context of the New World Order, planners and warriors alike face an unprecedented level of complexity and uncertainty.

Coalitions are the norm for military intervention in the foreseeable future. They offer the means by which to reduce costs, convey legitimacy, and allow the sharing of the burden among nations. In short, they constitute a viable framework around which the international community and its various agents can realize their desire to intervene. There is not choice but to make coalitions and interoperability work. These are not questions of philosophy but "realit[ies] with which everybody must cope." [55] As political reality and national constraints continue to plague coalitions of the willing engaged on the peace operations continuum, operational commanders face the unenviable and usually unbalancing task of having to read the "peace-field." Of the intangibles of coalitions' command and control matters, mutual trust between partners is perhaps the most important. Being able to trust is essential to unity of effort, much more so in the case of non-conventional operations where the commander is mandated to blend the skills of national contingents so that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The Tofflers advocate: "if war was ever too important to be left to the generals, it is now too important to be left to the ignorant, whether they wear uniform or not." [56] This statement applies particularly in the case of coalition operations in peace time. There is much prowess and competence involved in standing up a coalition for the purpose of peace operations; as much, it is suggested, as is the case for warfighting ones. The "peace-field" is marred with conundrums and it requires creative leaders with well-honed skills of persuasion to secure success.

> You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war . . . The ability to get to the verge without getting into the war is the necessary art. If you cannot master it, you inevitably get into war. If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to go to the brink you are lost. [57]

> John Foster Dulles - Jurist

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[55] George Blanchard. "One Voice in Europe, Making Interoperability Work." *Army*, Vol. 29, January 1979, p. 23.

[56] Toffler, p. 12.

[57] John Foster Dulles. Cited in Tyrrell, Patrick. "Cyberwar: the Role of Allies and Coalition Partners." In Alan D. Campen and Douglas H. Dearth (Eds.) *Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality.*Fairfax, VA. AFCEA International Press. June 1998, p. 380.

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