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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES
AMSP 10 - PSEM 10

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS IN CANADA

The Relevance and Applicability of Mission Command

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ABSTRACT

One of the key expectations of most nations is the ability for its government to provide a timely and appropriate response to civil emergencies and threats to national security. The Canadian Government's response for recent events has been challenging and difficult to coordinate. Canada's first National Security Policy was published in April 2005 and provided the framework and direction for establishing an integrated security system that would be used for coordinating all applicable government agencies. As part of Canadian Forces transformation, Canada Command was established in 2005 to provide a unified and integrated military chain of command at the national and regional level. The new organization is based on existing Canadian Forces doctrine which uses mission command as its basic command philosophy. The thesis of this paper is that mission command is still relevant and applicable for domestic operations in Canada.

This paper will discuss the evolution of mission command on a historical and doctrinal basis from a number of different perspectives. It will then look at the nature and context of domestic operations in Canada and how Canada Command, as a recent development, has been generated to address some of the perceived issues with command and control. The applicability of the mission command philosophy on Canada Command, and the new transformed CF model, will then be examined for relevance to the various types of domestic operations. This paper will show that the 5 fundamentals of mission command can be found within Canada Command's structure and are relevant to domestic operations in accordance with Canadian doctrine. It will also be noted that the applicability of mission command is fully dependent on the type and nature of the operation being carried out.

"There can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens."

National Security Policy¹

INTRODUCTION

One of the key expectations of most nations is the ability for its government to provide a timely and appropriate response to civil emergencies and threats to national security. Recent natural disasters such as the floods in Manitoba, the fires in British Columbia, the SARS outbreak in Toronto and the effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City, are all examples of the types of incidents which required a national response. The government response for many of these events has been challenging and difficult to coordinate. Although the Canadian Forces (CF) are viewed as a force of last resort, the military response for contingency operations has been dealt with on an ad-hoc basis between force generators and force employers; in most cases there was limited opportunity to conduct detailed joint contingency planning and training. In all cases these domestic operations were still carried out effectively but lacked a coordinated, command centric approach to force employment.² Until its implementation, the lack of a coherent National Security Policy created a source of friction that resulted in delays and inaction among federal, provincial and military authorities.

The International Policy Statement (Defence) released in 2005 reinforced the need for transformation in the CF by stating:

Transformation, however, is not just about technology and equipment modernization. It will require a fundamental change to the culture of our military

¹ Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: PCO Canada, April 2005), vii.

² After Action Reports (AARs) for Op PEREGRINE and Op ASSISTANCE both contained numerous observations as to the ad-hoc nature of the command and control relationships.

*to ensure a fully integrated and unified approach to operations. This will require new command and operational structures, including the creation of a national operational command headquarters (Canada Command), and fresh thinking surrounding concepts and doctrine....*³

The Chief of the Defence Staff's (CDS) vision of a command centric organization utilizing a mission command leadership approach is still the basis for transformation.⁴

The recent standup-up of the various operational commands, including Canada Command (Canada COM), represents an intentional shift to providing operational commanders more decentralized authority with respect to command and control. The CF has also adopted manoeuvre warfare as its doctrinal approach to operations and war fighting with mission command as the command philosophy that decentralizes decisions and fosters initiative.⁵ Mission command has been part of Canadian doctrine since the 1990's and has been adopted by most of the western nations as one of the fundamental tenets of command. The thesis of this paper is that mission command, as a command philosophy and integral part of CF doctrine, is still relevant and applicable for domestic operations in Canada.

This paper will begin these discussions by examining the evolution of mission command on a historical and doctrinal basis from a number of different perspectives. The next step will be to look at the nature and context of domestic operations in Canada and how Canada COM, as a recent development, has been generated to address some of the perceived issues with command and control. The applicability of a mission command philosophy on Canada COM, and the new transformed CF model, will then be examined

³ Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World – Defence* (Ottawa: Communications Group Canada, 2005), 4.

⁴ CDS Sitrep 5, email 5 October 2007. 2.

⁵ Department of National Defense. B-GL-300-003/FP-000, *Command*, (Kingston: Directorate of Army Doctrine, 1996), 3-2.

for relevance to the various types of domestic operations. The paper will conclude with a statement on how mission command is relevant and applicable to domestic operations in Canada.

EVOLUTION OF MISSION COMMAND

The origin of what is now called mission command or *Auftragstaktik* (directive command) can trace its roots back to the defeat of the Prussian armies at Jena and Auerstedt by Napoleon in 1806. This particular battle illustrated a fundamental shift in the way armies were commanded. The Prussian Army, during this period, was a well disciplined force that used a very centralized, process-driven, approach towards command and as a result no action was taken unless there were orders to do so. Napoleon did not have this kind of Army, the French forces were based on conscripts and there was limited time to train them. He focused his efforts on developing an Army that was comprised of a number of Corps commanded by Marshals. They were hand picked leaders that shared a common operating doctrine and most importantly, Napoleon made sure that his intentions were clearly understood by all of them prior to any battle and expected them to use their initiative and act without further orders. This approach allowed the French to defeat the Prussians by reacting quickly and decisively, thereby creating an operational tempo that the rigid Prussian Army was unable to match. In the post-war period the Prussians acknowledged the need for change and began to revise their regulations to include, a degree of initiative, independent of thought and action.⁶

⁶ Maj. Gen. Werner Widder, "Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German Leadership." *Military Review* 82, no. 5 (September/October 2002): 2/7.

It was not until the mid 1800's that intellectual rigor and thought was given to articulating an operational command and control approach. Field Marshall Helmuth Carl Bernard Graf Von Moltke was a practitioner and innovative thinker in the field of strategy. As Chief of the General Staff of the Prussian Army he was instrumental in the development of *Auftragstaktik* and emphasized the need for speed in making and executing decisions in conjunction with the requirement for independent action by local commanders.⁷ Moltke's command during the German wars of unification, in Austria 1866, and France 1870-71 proved his basic theories and he was known to lead his army commanders using directives (*Weisungen*) vice detailed orders. It should be noted that in spite of the success of these battles, the basic tenant of allowing local commanders freedom of action continued to be controversial throughout the late 1800s. His basic concepts and views were taught in the Prussian Army and published in a document called *Instructions for Large Unit Commanders* in 1869 and essentially remained in effect until 1914.

There is some indication that a similar approach of "directive command" was being used during the American Civil War when General Robert E. Lee defeated Major-General Joseph Hooker at Chancellorsville, 1863.⁸ The Union Army of 134, 000 ended up in a defensive battle with 60,000 Confederate troops. Hooker relied on detailed command techniques and withheld his intent from subordinate commanders fearing security leaks. Lee adapted his force throughout the battle by dividing it up and taking advantage of the Union Army's subordinate commander's lack of knowledge of Hooker's

⁷ Moltke, *On the Art of War*, Edited by Daniel Hughes, translated by Daniel Hughes and Harry Bell (Novato: Presidio Press, 1993), 5.

⁸ Headquarters Department of the Army. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington: Department of the Army USA, 2003), 1-21.

overall intent. Lee did not provide specific orders to his subordinate commanders but he made sure they understood his intent. In the end the numerically superior Union Army was defeated because Hooker's plan was too rigid and his subordinates were unable to take the initiative due to a lack of understanding his overall intent.⁹

The German Army was very effective and formidable during World War II as a result of superior tactical and operational doctrine. The defeat of France in 1940 was a battle based on manoeuvre and directive command. The German Army Regulation 300, *Truppenführung* (Unit Command), written in 1933 was the principle document that provided guidelines and tactics for the conduct of operations right up to the end of World War II. Moltke's underlying principles of command were still applicable and reflected in *Truppenführung* where it stated, "the commander must allow his subordinates freedom of action..."¹⁰ The latest German Army Regulation AR 100/100 describes *Auftragstaktik* as:

*...the pre-eminent command and control principle in the Army. It is based on mutual trust and requires each soldier's unwavering commitment to perform his duty...he[the Commander] gives latitude to subordinate leaders in the execution of their mission. Thus Auftragstaktik is more than giving a mission to a subordinate and allowing him to execute it. Rather it is the superior's duty to specify the objective, and the frame work within which the subordinate has to accomplish the mission.*¹¹

In comparison, US Army Doctrine defines mission command as, "the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on orders for effective mission accomplishment". Successful mission command is based on four elements; Commanders

⁹ United States. Headquarters Department of the Army. FM 6-0, Mission Command..., 1-24.

¹⁰ On the German Art of War, *Truppenführung*, ed. and trans. Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishing Inc. 2001). 23.

¹¹ Widder, Maj. Gen. Werner. "Auftragstaktik...", 3/7.

Intent, Subordinate's Initiative, Mission Orders and Resource Allocation¹². Canadian and English doctrine for mission command is essentially the same. The full Canadian definition of Mission Command is provided here:

...is the army's philosophy of command within the Manoeuvre Warfare approach to fighting, has three enduring tenets: the importance of understanding a superior commander's intent, a clear responsibility to fulfill that intent, and timely decision making. The underlying requirement is the fundamental responsibility to act within a framework of the commanders intentions. Together, this requires a style of command that promotes decentralized decision-making, freedom and speed of action, and initiative....¹³

DOMESTIC OPERATIONS IN CANADA

In order to understand Canada's perspective on national security it is helpful to know how it compares to the rest of the world. Canada is relatively wealthy and is ranked 8th in the world for Gross Domestic Product, with the 12th lowest population density of only 32 million people in a country that is ranked 2nd largest in the world. It is also ranked 5th in the world for quality of life, according to the United Nations Development Program index, and is enjoying a strong economy with direct access to its largest trading partner the United States. Canada is unique in having the largest coastline in the world that straddles a border of 8,890 kilometers with the United States.¹⁴ The country is considered a middle power and has membership to most of the major international organizations including NATO, UN, OAS, G8, and APEC. Canada has a relatively small military of 62.5 thousand regular and 37.3 thousand reserve personnel and is presently engaged in supporting an International Stabilization Assistance Force mission in

¹² Headquarters Department of the Army. FM 6-0, Mission Command... 1-17.

¹³Department of National Defence. B-GL-300-003/FP-000, *Command* (Kingston: Directorate of Army Doctrine Canada, 1996), 3-6.

¹⁴ The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. Fact sheet, *Strategic Profile: Canada (2006/2007)*, ed. W. Don Macnamara and Stephanie Cote (Toronto).

Southern Afghanistan. It should be noted that in some cases reserve units are the only federal government presence in some of the more isolated community's across the country.

In Canada, the civil authorities have the lead in national security issues and CF participation is in a supporting role as restricted by law.¹⁵ From 1966 to 2003 the Solicitor General was the minister responsible for domestic security issues in Canada including the RCMP, CSIS and Corrections Services of Canada. There were certainly other departments and agencies that were integral to national security, such as justice and agriculture, but there was no single ministry or government policy that focused on national security issues. With a country the size of Canada, the provincial agencies play a large role in providing local security, critical infrastructure and consequence management protection. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the lack of a coordinated and centralized federal agency was partially responsible for the position of Solicitor General to be renamed as the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada in 2003. Just recently the department was renamed again as Public Safety Canada (PSC) and the minister's portfolio was expanded to include the Canada Border Services Agency¹⁶

The CDS is charged with the control and administration of the CF and commands all Domestic Operations.¹⁷ Until transformation, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) was the CF Chief Operations Officer and responsible for all CF operations. At the strategic level, the DCDS acted as the focal point for domestic operations and the J3 Continental was responsible for the day-to-day oversight of domestic and continental

¹⁵ The Constitution Act of 1867 (The BNA Act), the Emergency Preparedness Act and the National Defence Act provide jurisdictional guidance.

¹⁶ Public Safety Canada, Website, "About us." <http://www.ps-sp.gc.ca/abt/www/index-eng.as>; Internet; accessed 7 October 07.

¹⁷ Pursuant to Section 18 of the National Defence Act (NDA).

contingency operations. DCDS was a National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) staff centric organization that was not necessarily in tune with the operational commanders and force generators; however, the last version of the DCDS Direction for domestic operations did indicate that change was being instituted with the stand up of the CF Joint Operations Group (JOG) for expeditionary operations and the CF Information Operations Group (IOG).¹⁸ Although the operational commanders were generally tasked through the DCDS to act as Task Force Commanders when required for domestic operations, or delegated for contingency operations, the Environment Chiefs of Staffs (ECS) still reviewed and prioritized the level of support which could be provided to an operational-level commander. It should be noted that there were ECS representatives as integral members of the DCDS Joint Staff. The DCDS would also be responsible for recommending to the CDS when to deploy the Joint Nuclear Chemical Biological Defence (NBCD) Company, the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), and the Joint Headquarters (JHQ).¹⁹

Canada's first National Security Policy was published in April 2005 and provided the framework and direction for establishing an integrated security system that would be the basis for coordinating all applicable government agencies. The Government Operations Centre (GOC) is Canada's strategic-level operations centre and is the hub for a network of operations centre's run by a variety of federal departments and agencies including the RCMP, Health Canada, Foreign Affairs, CSIS and National Defence. The

¹⁸ Department of National Defence. DCDS Directive on Domestic Operations (Ottawa: DND Canada Version 7, 7 February 2005), 1-2/8

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2-1/8.

GOC is a 24/7 organization that maintains contact with the provinces and territories as well as international partners such as the United States and NATO.²⁰

CANADA COMMAND

As part of CF transformation, under the auspices of the 2005 National Security Policy and the 2005 International Policy Statement (Defence), Canada COM stood up on February 2006 and assumed responsibility for the conduct of all domestic operations. It is the national operational authority for the defence of Canada and North America. Canada COM is also the primary operational military link with USNORTHCOM and NORAD.²¹ The Canada COM Concept of Operations contains some definitions of operations that would be beneficial to review prior to discussing command and control relationships. Routine operations are predictable, normally recurring in nature, and can be deliberately planned for activities such as fishery patrols. Contingency operations deal with unique events that, while considered possible or even likely to occur, the exact timing of the event may remain unknown like an earthquake in British Columbia. Operations can be either Domestic or Continental. Domestic operations (within Canada and its approaches) are by definition Routine or Contingency in nature and may include:

- Provision of Services: humanitarian assistance, military liaison and community support;
- Surveillance and Sovereignty Demonstrations: surveillance, situational awareness and routine ISR and patrol operations;
- Sovereignty Enforcement: fishery and environmental monitoring patrols, Arctic sovereignty patrols, etc, (frequently conducted as support to Other Government Departments);
- Preparation for Contingencies: force protection, defence planning including response to asymmetric threats, exercises, and operations;

²⁰ Public Safety Canada, <http://www.ps-sp.gc.ca/prg/em/goc/index-eng.aspx>; Internet; accessed 7 October 07.

²¹Department of National Defence. *Canada Command – Concept of Operations*, Draft Version 3 (Ottawa: DND Canada, 3 April 2006), 1-1/5.

- Emergency Management (full spectrum); and
- Search and Rescue.²²

Continental operations include any military operation conducted outside of Canada but within the Canada Command AOR, namely within the contiguous 48 states, Alaska and Mexico and the approaches to these same landmasses. They are also by definition Routine or Contingency in nature, examples of continental operations include:

- Provision of Services: humanitarian assistance, military liaison and community support;
- Surveillance: surveillance and situational awareness;
- Preparation for Contingencies: defence planning, exercises, and operations;
- Emergency management (full spectrum); and
- Search and Rescue.²³

There are six subordinate commands that respond to Canada COM, they are asymmetric in nature, and reflect the regional nature of their area of operations. The Commander 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) is also the CF Air Component Commander and acts as Commander Canada COM's advisor in regards to air asset generation. The regional Joint Task Forces (JTF) are based on the operational command headquarters of the force generators, Land Forces Areas (LFA) and Maritime Commands in the Atlantic and Pacific (MARLANT and MARPAC respectively). Most of these Headquarters are double-hatted and have expanded HQ's that include both operational command functions except for Land Force Atlantic which is collocated with MARLANT. There are some notable variations in the structure where JTF Pacific (JTFP) does not have any integral Land Force Units within its AOR and must rely on Land Force Western Area (LFWA) to force generate resources from 39 Canadian Brigade Group (CBG) located in British Columbia or from other LFWA assets. JTF Western Area (JTFW) operates within the Provincial boundaries of the 3 prairie provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba and can utilize all LFWA resources less

²² *Ibid.*, 1-3/5.

²³ *Ibid.*, 1-4/5.

the North Western Ontario Units of 38 CBG which are aligned along the Ontario/Manitoba provincial boundaries with Land Force Central Area (LFCA).²⁴

Canada COM is now the national military authority responsible for the conduct of all domestic operations and is subsequently the central point of contact with federal and provincial authorities. Regional JTFs have been delegated authority to conduct contingency planning and coordination with local and provincial first responders, emergency planning organizations, corrections facilities, etc. Aid of the Civil Power is one area where Canada COM will be the lead agency vice the civil authorities once the request for assistance has been made. This type of request is infrequent with Oka and the FLQ crisis as two examples. The new command has been received with guarded optimism from some agencies such as Public Safety Canada. A memorandum by the Director General Emergency Management and National Security Policy just before the standup of Canada COM raised the following observations:

*For the first time, Canada will have a unified and integrated chain of command at the national and regional levels that has immediate authority to deploy maritime, land and air assets in support of domestic operations. The creation of Canada Command does not represent a shift in CF policy vis-à-vis domestic operations which are strictly prescribed by law, DND policy, MND direction, and/or memoranda of understanding. It should not be seen as impinging on the PSEPC mandate. Instead, it makes the CF more responsive by allowing them to quickly mobilize and deploy personnel to deal with a crisis anywhere in Canada.*²⁵

The knowledge that the CF was publicly pursuing the startup of Canada COM in an aggressive manner raised some concern that there would be confusion within the civilian community regarding PSEPC's role and that of Canada COM. There was also potential for

²⁴ Power point briefing package, J3 Plans Canada COM, 26 Feb 07.

²⁵ Kimber Johnston, *Canadian Forces Restructuring: Canada Command*. Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada: file No./TD No. 328959, 29 June 2005.

differences of opinion with respect to responsibilities between Canada COM and the PSEPC portfolio leading up to the 2010 Olympic Games.²⁶

Canada COM recently completed its first rapid response contingency operation plan (COP) in anticipation of potential flooding in British Columbia. The planning activity was called COP Pontoon and occurred during the period of 22 March to 15 June 2007. Although the plan was not executed, it did demonstrate some of the potential friction points when mounting this type of operation using the new command and control organizations. Canada COM, CONOSCOM, CLS, JTFP and LFWA were all involved in the planning process. Although the Canada COM After Action Review (AAR) for COP Pontoon has yet to be released, conversations with J3 Canada COM and COS JTFW indicate that there is a perceived difference in the way the Operational Planning Process is being implemented in each organization. This may be due to the unfamiliarity in working together in a truly joint and integrated manner. It was also observed by Public Safety Canada that there was some further friction with provincial EMO and the RCMP as a result of the “leaning forward in the saddle” approach taken by Canada COM in setting up the advance DND team in the Fraser Valley.²⁷

A report commissioned by the CDS, was recently released on the transformed CF Command Structure and it indicated that the CDS’ vision of a single operational commander responsible for all domestic and continental operations had been achieved.²⁸ The report also indicated that the Canada COM chain of command is separated from the force generators and

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Cameron Buchanan, Acting Regional Director Public Safety Canada, email, 19 October 2007.

²⁸ RR. Crabbe, L.G Mason and F.R Sutherland, *A Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure*, Report Prepared for the Chief of Defence Staff (Ottawa: 31 January 2007), 15

this has put these chains of command in competition with each other.²⁹ Subsequently the primacy of operations in Afghanistan is resulting in Canada COM not getting the attention and priority that might otherwise be the case.

RELEVANCE OF MISSION COMMAND IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

Almost all of the recent CF transformation policies and statements released by the government and military leaders have referred to a command centric, mission command style of leadership. The latest CDS Sitrep reinforces this approach:

*The CF will continue to develop and exemplify mission command leadership – the leadership philosophy of the CF. In essence, mission command articulates the dynamic and decentralized execution of operations guided throughout by a clear articulation and understanding of the overriding commander’s intent. This leadership concept demands the aggressive use of initiative at every level, a high degree of comfort in ambiguity and a tolerance for honest failure.*³⁰

This now begs the question as to whether the complexities and relatively risk-averse nature of domestic operations can fully employ a mission command philosophy. For the purpose of determining relevance, the 5 fundamentals of mission command (as defined by existing CF doctrine) will be compared to the directives and concept of operations used by Canada COM.³¹

Unity of effort is central to mission command. An understanding of the commander’s intent is required both from subordinates as well as those two levels up. Knowledge of the higher commander’s intent during both routine and contingency operations allows subordinate commanders to effectively carry out their missions,

²⁹ LGen A.B. Leslie, *CLS Comments on Draft Canada COM Command and Control Authority* (NDHQ Ottawa: file 3350-1(G33 Dom Ops), 7 June 2007).

³⁰ CDS Sitrep 5, email 5 October 2007, 2.

³¹ Department of National Defense. B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command* (Kingston: Directorate of Army Doctrine Canada, 1996), 3-6.

especially when an operation becomes unpredictable and a standard procedure is no longer applicable. Well trained and knowledgeable leaders will be empowered to react appropriately. Rules of Engagement (ROE) and effective situational awareness are some mechanisms that can mitigate concerns regarding a decentralized mission command approach.

Decentralized Authority ensures that timely and effective military response can be provided. Command authorities have been assigned that allow RJTF commanders the flexibility to conduct domestic operations in response to specific requests. It is desirable to set decision thresholds as low as possible, allowing for swift and timely decisions. This encourages the use of abbreviated orders and directions. Subordinate commanders are expected to use their initiative and to seize opportunities when they appear; this is most applicable at the RJTF and tactical unit command levels. An example of the need to continually review the command authorities of subordinate commanders is illustrated by Commander JTFW comments on the CANFORGEN for the Revised Command and Control Authority:

Changes to command and control authorities to keep pace with the continuing transformation of the CF and Domestic Operations is not only an obvious challenge but of critical importance to all commanders in our current and future operations. Any improvement to understanding authority of Air, Naval and Other Forces personnel and assets available in support of JTFW operations and events is an important step.³²

There are certain types of domestic operations; however, that will still require detailed orders and limited delegation of command authority such as Aid of the Civil Power. Another complicating factor is the blame culture of the media and perceived need for government to control politically sensitive operations.

³² BGen Mark Skidmore, *JTFW Comments- Revised Command and Control Authority*. (JTFW Edmonton: file 3350-1 (J3 Ops), Oct 2007).

Trust is paramount for mission command to succeed and will be a challenge in an environment that is traditionally risk-averse. There must be two-way trust between force employers and force generators. Tactical level commanders need to have the ability to act in accordance with the higher commander's intent without fear of retribution if they carry out the mission in good faith.³³ This can only be achieved when the superior trusts the subordinate to carry out the task in accordance with his intent and the subordinate commander believes he has been given the resources and direction appropriate to carry out the task. The subordinate must also feel that he will be supported by his superior if he exercises his initiative. As mentioned before, there is a potential for friction and distrust among PSC and various civil authorities if Canada COM is too aggressive. If Canada COM is seen as leaning forward and taking the initiative on domestic operations using a mission command approach, it may be perceived as intruding on PSC and other agencies portfolios and responsibilities. A more responsive and robust CF presents a potential threat to interagency cooperation and this need to be considered as part of the battle procedure prior to any contingency planning operation.

Mutual Understanding is an ongoing process and key to establishing long term effectiveness. A professional knowledge base of shared/joint doctrine, drills and procedures among force generators and force employers is **not** fully implemented in the CF at the present time. Under the previous DCDS system, the ECSs and other force generators provided forces that essentially worked within their respective organizations. The need for a "joint" headquarters was identified in the After Action Report (AAR) for the 1997 Flood in Manitoba where the Joint Task Force Commander did not have an

³³ Stephen Bungay, "The Road to Mission Command: The Genesis of a Command Philosophy." British Army Review no. 137 (Summer 2005): 7/8.

integrated and experienced joint headquarters.³⁴ This caused some initial delay in the employment, coordination and use of Naval and Air assets; therefore, it is essential that Canada COM and the RJTFs be fully integrated and operate as true ‘joint organizations’ in order for all three environments to be able to function effectively in a domestic operation. Mutual understanding takes time to establish and cultivate, and cannot be done without common doctrine and training. This is not just a Canada COM issue since the civil authorities are the lead agencies and need to be engaged during all phases of a domestic operation. It is therefore imperative that the CF and civil authorities are familiar with each other and have an established working relationship through personal contact and combined training events.

Timely and Effective Decision-Making allows subordinate commanders to recognize favorable circumstances and make sound and timely decisions in order to take advantage of the situation. Wherever possible, routine decisions should be delegated to the lowest possible level. The revolution in military affairs has greatly increased the need and desire for situational awareness and connectivity. The intelligence cycle which consists of Direction, Collection, and Dissemination is a process that will demand high levels of information and the ability to exchange information. The ability to exchange information between the RJTFs and Canada COM has not yet reached the point whereby the advantages of speed and information management of network enabled operations are being achieved.³⁵

³⁴ MGen N.B. Jeffries, *Operation (Op) ASSISTANCE Post Operation Report* (LFWA Edmonton: file 3350-105-26(Op ASSISTANCE), 16 July 1997).

³⁵ R.R. Crabbe, L.G Mason and F.R Sutherland, *A Report on the Validation of the Transformed Canadian Forces Command Structure*, Report Prepared for the Chief of Defence Staff (Ottawa: 31 January 2007), 14.

What if mission command is not applicable? Major-General Daniel Gosselin's paper on the loss of mission command for expeditionary operations provides another perspective.³⁶ He argues that modern conflict results in a centralized-decision making process. General Wesley Clark, NATO Commander and Supreme Allied Commander Europe during the 1999 Kosovo War said that senior commanders like himself need to "have a strong grasp of detail" to be able to work the every day decisions that he or she must now assume. This meant that Clark utilized a centralist approach and was constantly seeking information from lower level operational and tactical level commanders.³⁷ Gosselin indicates that information networks are the main cause of this trend because it allows theatre commanders to make decisions that would normally be made by subordinate tactical commanders.³⁸ He concluded that adopting Moltke's mission command philosophy is too simplistic a solution in light of the political, media and risk-averse nature of modern warfare.³⁹

It has been noted that Canada COM exercises tight control over the RJTFs and that there is very limited delegated control for the conduct of domestic operations below the threshold of Rapid Response Contingency Operations.⁴⁰ Using Gosselin's analogy, it could be argued that Canada COM presently has a centralist command structure. As Canada COM continues to evolve and become more fully integrated the basic organizational structure does not prevent a mission command philosophy from being

³⁶ MGen D.P. Gosselin, "The Loss of Mission Command for Canadian Expeditionary Operations: A Casualty of Modern Conflict." *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: Leadership and Command* ed. by Allan English (Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 193.

³⁷ Wesley Clark, *Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Conflicts*, 2nd ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 86

³⁸ Gosselin, *Loss of Mission Command*.... 206.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 222.

⁴⁰ RR. Crabbe, L.G Mason and F.R Sutherland, *A Report on the Validation of...* 53. Report can not explain why such tight controls are in place but it does suggest that the concept of operations have not been fully promulgated throughout Canada COM.

used on a prescriptive or selective manner. The real challenge lies with a culture resident in the various federal and provincial agencies where the interdepartmental rivalries and constant need for public credibility dictate that many of these agencies feel threatened if they are not seen as having the lead. Any perception that the CF is conducting detailed planning or pre-positioning of personnel or resources has been construed in the past as undermining the role and responsibilities of these agencies. The civil authorities have been reticent in asking for help because of funding issues, political sensitivities and the desire to explore all other opportunities before requesting military assistance.

Domestic operations vary significantly and do not all require the same level of command flexibility; however, the floods of 1997 in Winnipeg is a prime example of where the requirement for CF assistance was not certain, even though significant flooding was expected in Manitoba. There must be a balance between prudent preparations that permit a useful heightening of readiness and the production of detailed plans.⁴¹ There was significant concern by local authorities that the CF was intruding in their area of responsibility when Commander 1 CMBG pre-positioned personnel and material to CFB Shilo as part of a training exercise. This could be considered a classic case of mission command where a subordinate commander fully understood the Area Commanders intent and took preliminary steps that allowed him to be in a position to assist in a timely manner if required. In this particular case, the request for assistance came a few days later and the pre-positioned force was able to arrive on site and become engaged in a very short period of time, despite the province's delay in making the decision. The one underlying advantage of the military is the ability to anticipate future

⁴¹This is a common theme that is mentioned in the AARs for OP ASSISTANCE and OP PONTOON.

tasks and have the inherent flexibility to react to changing situations. As a force of last resort, neither the CF nor the Canadian Government can fail when it comes to domestic operations.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the relevance of mission command, as a command philosophy, and its applicability for domestic operations in Canada. The concept of operations and doctrine presently used by Canada COM does not prevent a mission command approach from being used, but there are definitely areas that would need to be addressed before this could be fully realized. This needs to begin with Canada COM developing a joint culture. This can be accomplished by conducting training, revising doctrine and developing employment practices that will encourage trust and mutual understanding among force employers and force generators. Trust and cooperation with Public Safety Canada and provincial authorities needs to be Canada COM's vital ground so that it can support these agencies with the ultimate goal of providing the necessary protection and safety of Canadian citizens.

The revolution in military affairs, net centric environments and media, has caused some experts to say that a centralist command approach is prevalent within the modern military operations. Even Moltke recognized what the impact of a telegraph could have on the independence of subordinate commanders.⁴² The main attractiveness of mission command is its ability to generate results that have historically triumphed over threats that would have otherwise prevailed. It has been shown that strong innovative leaders who have been entrusted to carry out their commander's intent have exploited

⁴² Moltke, *On the Art of War*....5.

opportunities to overcome adversity and situations that may have normally been untenable. Canada has been recognized as having a strong and well-educated officer and NCO cadre and this should be leveraged and taken advantage of when applying a mission command philosophy. It should not be blindly assumed that mission command can be used holistically for domestic operations without a common joint doctrine for all three environments.

The ad-hoc nature of recent domestic and national security responses has been mitigated at the Strategic Level with the development of a National Security Policy and allocation of dedicated resources and funding. At the operational level, the stand up of Canada COM, the reorganization of Public Safety Canada, and the establishment of a Government of Canada Command Centre has set the stage for allowing tactical level units to train and operate within doctrine, as it pertains to domestic operations. There have also been some encouraging developments between the CF, Federal and Civil agencies in generating a Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) that provides the basis for coordination and allocation of tasks.⁴³ More importantly, is the recognized need by all parties to improve communication and awareness on developing a “whole of government” approach to common policies and doctrine in order to build trust and establish unity of effort.

After almost 2 years it can now be said that Canada COM has met the CDS’ vision of a single operational commander responsible for all domestic and continental operations. This organization now provides the basis for a unified and integrated chain of command at the national and regional levels. It now has immediate authority to deploy

⁴³ Public Safety Canada, Emergency Management and National Security Branch Operations Directorate: *Federal Emergency Response Plan*, Master Draft, 23 May 2007.

maritime, land and air assets in support of domestic operations. The 5 fundamentals of mission command can be found within Canada COM's structure and are relevant to domestic operations in general. It is worthy to note that the applicability of the fundamentals is dependent on the type and nature of the operation being carried out. Terrorist attacks and natural disasters are operations that require quick and immediate responses and are examples of Clausewitz's "fog of war" where chaos demands a command philosophy that allows inherent flexibility and initiative.⁴⁴ A strong foundation of well trained leaders and common doctrine that are able to employ mission command philosophy can provide this flexibility when required. Since there does not appear to be a universal application of mission command for all domestic operations, it is recommended that further study be done using the Pigeau and McCann model based on the 3 factors of Competency, Authority and Responsibility (CAR).⁴⁵ This is another command and control05 /Pns thatcouldy beuased to fur

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